Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Education and politics enjoy a symbiotic relationship, that is, education affects politics and vice versa.
Education, or lack thereof, influences the collective intellect, goals, and values of the body politic. The way
in which a society is educated will thus determine who is able to hold office; how those in office are
elected (or chosen); how much power and control those in office will have at their disposal; what laws are
considered reasonable and unreasonable; and how those representing the state will choose to regulate,
promote, and establish educational institutions.
The last point is critical as it shows how the cycle comes full circle. Just as much as educational institutions
have a role in creating, maintaining, and limiting the state, the political has immense power over the
educational. Look at how the modern state has control over how much schools are funded and what they
can and can’t teach (evolution, sexual education, the way in which history is framed, among many other
examples). Indeed, there are many states that strictly prohibit secular education, as it is in their interest to
keep their populations misinformed. Why? Precisely because the more informed (educated) their
population, the more likely it is that their stranglehold on power will be overthrown.
Over the last 30 or so years, different political ideologies have given rise to different notions of how the state should
promote social justice through education. The policies that schools experience today, such as the National
Curriculum, school choice, high-stakes testing and school accountability through league tables, have been the result
of different political views on how best to achieve a world-class education system. The role that education can play in
promoting social justice has been particularly prominent, with parties on both the political Left and Right seeing
education as key to reducing social inequality:
Without good education there can be no social justice. (Cameron 2007: 84)
It is education which provides the rungs on the ladder of social mobility. (Brown 2010)
As the above quotations illustrate, the role of education in reducing inequality and promoting social mobility is a
favourite topic among politicians seeking to share their vision for a fair and just society. However, while politicians
from various parties may agree that education has a key role in promoting social justice, they differ in their views on
the best way to achieve it.
As an academic discipline the study of politics in education has two main roots: The first root is based on
theories from political science while the second root is footed in organizational theory.[1] Political science
attempts to explain how societies and social organizations use power to establish regulations and allocate
resources. Organizational theory uses scientific theories of management to develop deeper understandings
regarding the function of organizations.
Researchers have drawn a distinction between two types of politics in schools. The term micro-politics refers to
the use of formal and informal power by individuals and groups to achieve their goals in organizations.
Cooperative and conflictive processes are integral components of micro-politics. Macro-politics refers to how
power is used and decision making is conducted at district, state, and federal levels. Macro-politics is generally
considered to exist outside the school, but researchers have noted that micro- and macro-politics may exist at
any level of school systems depending on circumstance.[2]
There exist significant difference between "Politics of Education" and "Politics in Education". More debates on
the prevailing differences are solicited from academia of the world to define politics educationally.
The Philippines is a republic with a presidential form of government wherein power is equally
divided among its three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. The government seeks to
act in the best interests of its citizens through this system of check and balance.
Within weeks of his inauguration as president of the Philippines in June 2016, Rodrigo R.
Duterte became the most internationally known Filipino leader since Ferdinand Marcos, the
country’s infamous dictator, and Corazon Aquino, the iconic housewife-turned-president who
championed the restoration of democracy in 1986. A great deal of media attention has been paid
to Duterte’s murderous war on drugs as well as to his often crass and controversial statements.
His embrace of China and his visceral disdain for the United States has garnered additional
attention in foreign policy circles, and he frequently is included in media reports and scholarly
articles on the rise of populism globally.
Although the attention to Duterte and his brutal drug war is warranted, much less attention has
been paid to his administration’s broader policy agenda, its approach to politics and governance,
and its broader impact on democratic institutions and norms. As a candidate, Duterte promised
that he would produce real and rapid improvements in the lives of Filipinos, particularly by
aggressively addressing crime and corruption. Two and a half years into his presidency, it is both
warranted and possible to assess what has and has not changed under Duterte. The picture is a
mixed one, with elements of change, continuity, and regression.
The Duterte government’s track record regarding human rights and democracy is undoubtedly
disturbing. It has run roughshod over human rights, its political opponents, and the country’s
democratic institutions. The combination of the Philippines’ powerful presidency and the
malleability of most of its political institutions is resulting in significant democratic backsliding.
But to focus only on Duterte fails to appreciate two other important elements: the extent to
which this degradation has happened through nominally legal means, and the limited pushback
to date by groups and institutions opposed to strongman rule. This working paper takes an in-
depth look at the complex dynamics contributing to democratic backsliding in the Philippines.
The Duterte administration’s assault on human rights and democracy also raises the question of
what the U.S. government and America’s nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can and
should do to defend democracy in America’s former colony. The analysis concludes with a
discussion of America’s extremely limited support for human rights and democracy in the
Philippines since Duterte became president and offers suggestions for a more robust response.
ANTECEDENTS
To begin to make sense of Duterte and his approach to politics and governing, it is necessary to
understand three aspects of contemporary Philippine politics: the mixed record of elite
democracy since 1986; the successes and shortcomings of the Benigno Aquino III
administration (2010–2016); and the particularities of the 2016 presidential election.
Liberal democracy, a legacy of America’s colonization of the Philippines (which lasted from 1898
to 1946), has always struggled to become deeply rooted in the country. The reasons given for this
include cultural factors (the power of familial and clientelistic ties); religious beliefs (Catholic
fatalism); colonial legacies (America’s empowerment of a land-owning elite); socioeconomic
conditions (persistent poverty and inequality); and institutional factors (a presidential system
with winner-take-all elections). Between 1946 and 1972, democracy struggled under the weight
of elite competition and avarice, flawed economic policymaking, poor governance, and armed
insurgency. In 1972, then president Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law, and until 1986
democracy was dispensed with in favor of a dictatorship. For nearly fifteen years, the Philippines
experienced unprecedented repression and corruption.
The return to democracy following the People Power Revolution in February 1986 restored
many of the pre-martial-law era institutional features and political elites. Although it is
generally accurate to view 1986 as a return to elite democracy, Philippine society, the state, and
modes of political competition have changed since 1972. Still, even the most positive views of
democracy in the Philippines since 1986 see it as a flawed work in progress; harsher critics see it
as a sham and a failure. Commonly cited flaws include elections tainted by violence and vote
buying, widespread rent-seeking and corruption, policies that have benefited elites and special
interests at the expense of the poor majority, and a dysfunctional justice system.
However, since 1986 democracy has been institutionalized in many ways, and at times has
worked fairly well. Liberal values were central to the nonviolent People Power Revolution and
informed the drafting of the 1987 constitution. This resulted in constitutional guarantees of
human rights; regular, competitive elections for local and national offices; a system of checks
and balances; and a free (if flawed) media and robust civil society. The Philippine military
remains somewhat politicized, but since 1992 it has been reluctant to directly intervene in
politics. Beginning in 1986, substantial deregulation and privatization, as well as economic
integration, set the stage for strong growth in the Philippines’ gross domestic product (GDP)
over most of the past decade. But even observers who applaud the post-1986 reforms have
questioned if they have been broad and deep enough to produce fundamental improvements in
politics, governance, and the economy.
From 1935, when the Philippines became a semiautonomous commonwealth, the behavior of
presidents and other powerful political and economic elites has heavily influenced the quality of
the country’s democratic politics and governance. 1 The Philippines is a unitary state with a
winner-take-all electoral system, a presidency that exercises huge power over budgets and
appointments, and congenitally weak political parties. As a result, the president plays a central
role in determining policy outcomes, as well as the norms and behavior that shape politics and
governance.
The second important influence on democracy in the Philippines is the country’s remarkably
resilient political and economic elite. The president is limited to a single six-year term, so the
power and influence of individual presidents is transitory. By contrast, political and business
families such as the Marcoses, Cojuangcos, Aquinos, and Ayalas—to name just a few—have had
noteworthy longevity and adaptability.2 They exert a powerful influence over elections,
legislation, policymaking, regulatory bodies, jurisprudence, and the distribution of government
resources.
For decades, this elite has thwarted the development of a strong state by limiting the
government’s fiscal base and co-opting, corrupting, or intimidating the bureaucracy. It has
stunted and distorted the Philippine economy, preferring collusion and protection over
economic competition, and has been slow and selective in opening the economy to foreign
competition. Because elites dominate legislative and policymaking processes, successive
governments have failed to adopt and implement socioeconomic policies that address the needs
of the poor and middle class. With a Gini coefficient of 0.43, the Philippines has long been one
of the most unequal societies in Asia, with one of the highest levels of poverty incidence among
Asia’s developing economies. Even after more than a decade of relatively strong macroeconomic
growth, the incidence of poverty decreased only a little, to 21.6 percent in 2015.3
Today, by the World Bank’s metrics the Philippines is a lower-middle-income country with a per
capita income of $3,600 and a consumption-driven economy that has been growing at about
6.5 percent per year for most of the past decade, fueled by remittances and a growing business
process outsourcing sector.4 As a result, the country’s sizable, predominantly urban, middle
class now comprises 15 to 20 percent of the population.5 In sum, over the past quarter century,
the rich have become richer, the middle class has grown but remains insecure, and about one-
quarter of the population remains poor.
THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT AND LIMITS OF REFORMISM
The “real change” promised by Rodrigo Duterte has obscured how much positive change
occurred under the administration of Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016). 6 Aquino’s promise to
follow the “straight path” was an effort to both appropriate his mother’s (Corazon Aquino)
perceived integrity and draw a sharp contrast with the pervasive corruption associated with the
administration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001–2010).7 Notable successes of the Aquino
government included passing reproductive health and “sin tax” reform laws, implementing
twelve years of basic education, extending public finance reform, expanding fiscal space and
social spending, and making an effort to provide greater autonomy to Muslims in Mindanao.
GDP growth reached 6.5 percent, and by virtually every measure the country’s international
standing improved significantly. As a result, Aquino remained popular throughout most of his
term.
To be sure, there also were significant shortcomings and mistakes. Macroeconomic growth was
slow to reduce poverty, and the government was unable to rapidly improve infrastructure,
especially in traffic-clogged Metro Manila. It did little to reform dysfunctional food and
agriculture policies, and could have done more to strengthen anticorruption institutions and to
pass a freedom of information law. In terms of governance, Aquino was widely seen as honest,
but he sometimes valued loyalty over competence and occasionally seemed to lack the empathy
that Filipinos expect from their political leaders. His administration also suffered from
complacency (due to the president’s personal popularity), problems communicating its
accomplishments, and its failure to make the Liberal Party a more coherent and durable political
party. And when it came time to choose a successor, Aquino remained committed to supporting
Manuel “Mar” Roxas, his secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG)—even though opinion polls consistently indicated that Roxas would not win. 8
DUTERTE AND THE PROMISE OF REAL CHANGE
On May 10, 2016, Rodrigo Duterte, then seventy-one years old, was elected president, winning
39 percent of the vote in a five-way race. Charismatic, blunt, and frequently profane, Duterte
combined a Dirty Harry persona with a track record as a successful mayor of Davao City,
Mindanao’s largest city. Although Duterte might appear to be unsophisticated and crude, he is
politically savvy and attuned to the attitudes and concerns of average Filipinos. He ran on his
reputation as an effective, no-nonsense mayor of Davao who prioritized law and order over legal
protections for alleged criminals. The overarching theme of Duterte’s campaign was that his
strong leadership would produce rapid change. During his campaign, he heaped criticism on the
Manila-based elite, vowed to undertake a nationwide assault on illegal drugs and criminality,
and promised to change the government to a federal system. His victory over Mar Roxas, who
placed a distant second, signaled that the promise of change was more compelling than
continuity. Even though Duterte had been popular in Mindanao before he ran for president, his
victory showed that his appeal spanned regions and socioeconomic classes. The 16.6 million
Filipinos who voted for him appeared to believe that he could deliver real change.
Duterte’s victory surprised many and shocked some. In the wake of his election, political
analysts have grappled with what it says about contemporary Philippine politics. The reasons
why he won are complex, suggesting that cautious and nuanced conclusions are warranted.
First, the incumbent, Benigno Aquino—the embodiment of reformist elite democracy—could not
run for a second term. If he had been able to run, it might have been a very different
outcome.9 Second, the Philippine election law has no provision for run-offs, so there is no
incentive to form coalition tickets. Had Mar Roxas and Senator Grace Poe, the two most like-
minded candidates, joined forces, they might have been able to defeat Duterte. Third, Duterte
ran a savvy and effective campaign. He announced his candidacy late, so the media had little
time to scrutinize his record as mayor and his rivals had much less chance to attack him. His
campaign mobilized large numbers of volunteers and used social media well. Fourth, all four of
Duterte’s opponents had significant negatives. In contrast, Duterte, because of his personality
and message, was an attention-grabbing and compelling candidate, who was able to tap into
(and to some extent manipulate) middle class frustrations and “latent anxiety,” particularly
about drugs and crime.10 Although the assertions of middle-class frustration seem valid for
anyone who has lived in Metro Manila, Cebu, or the handful of other cities that are home to
most of the Philippine middle class, the extent to which this sense of frustration and anxiety was
national in scope is relatively less clear.
Upon assuming office on June 30, 2016, Duterte assembled an eclectic cabinet that included law
school classmates, long-time associates from Davao, ex-military officers, business leaders, and
representatives of the communist left. His diverse coalition came together through personal
loyalty, regional affinity, and political opportunism. It included many political figures who had
been sidelined during the Aquino administration, most notably former president Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo and members of the Marcos, Estrada, and Villar families.
Now seventy-three years old, Duterte’s world view is heavily influenced by nationalist and leftist
thought dating from the 1960s and 1970s, as well as by his twenty-two years of experience as
mayor of Davao City. In Davao, he combined a hardline approach to law and order with socially
progressive and pro-business policies. As mayor he was both a paternalistic patron and a
fearsome boss whose orders had to be followed. As a result, he has little tolerance for scrutiny or
challenges to this authority. He sees the country as beset by existential threats of drugs, crime,
and corruption. As befits Philippine culture, his approach is highly personalistic: he presents
himself as the only leader strong and decisive enough to save the nation. As for his frequently
crude and threatening rhetoric, anthropologist Nicole Curato has called his approach “crass
politics” that, though objectionable to many, communicates multiple messages:
Duterte may be offending the norms of respectful communication when he prefaces his
remarks with “mother fucker,” but he brings to the surface the collective frustration many
feel. He may not offer the clearest policy, but he puts forward the sincerest discourse of
sympathy. . . . Duterte’s gutter language establishes the urgency of saving the republic.
Including “kill” and “death” is essential to the president’s vocabulary for the country is at
war, and his politics of “I will” demands quick, albeit painful, solutions. 11
KEY CONCERNS AND PRIORITIES
The Duterte government’s top priorities include combating illegal drugs and crime, promoting
rapid infrastructure development, sustaining economic growth and making it more inclusive,
enhancing peace and development in Mindanao, and reorienting the Philippines’ foreign
relations. To support these goals, the government has significantly increased spending on
infrastructure, raised the salaries of government employees, expanded existing social
development programs, revived the stalled peace process with the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), entered into negotiations with
the communist insurgents, and established a closer relationship with China.
Space constraints do not permit a full discussion of the government’s domestic and foreign
policies. Instead, the following sections discuss three policy areas that offer insights into the
Duterte administration—economic policymaking, peace and development in Mindanao, and
constitutional change—and discuss in greater detail the ongoing war on drugs.
The most significant accomplishment pertaining to Mindanao was the passage of the
Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) in July 2018. The BOL translates into law many of the
provisions included in the 2014 peace agreement between the Aquino government and the
MILF. Under the BOL, a new political entity, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, would replace the current Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The BOL is an
important step forward, but multiple challenges remain, including possible objections to its
constitutionality, a forthcoming plebiscite scheduled for late January and early February 2019,
and the actual establishment of the new autonomous entity.
The fading prospects for constitutional change. As a candidate, Duterte ran against
the widely perceived political and economic dominance of “imperial Manila” and promised to
change the Philippines into a federal state. This platform was not unprecedented: since 1992,
there have been recurring initiatives for charter change (or “Cha-Cha,” in the colloquial
expression), and all of them have failed. Duterte’s popularity and political dominance seemed to
enhance the prospects for success this time. But during most of his first two years in office, he
showed limited interest in this complex and contentious issue of federalism. He appointed a
twenty-two-member Constitutional Commission, and received its proposed draft constitution in
early July 2018. The commission suggested eighteen federated regions and kept the directly
elected presidency. Cha-Cha is now in the hands of the Congress. If both houses agree to change
the constitution, the revised charter will be subject to a national plebiscite.
Over the past year, opposition to both the substance and process of Cha-Cha has grown.
Senators are elected in a nationwide constituency, so many of them see federalism as a threat to
their political influence and ambitions. Others criticize the process for being tightly controlled
and nonparticipatory. Several of Duterte’s own economic managers have raised concerns about
the economic costs and uncertainties that would accompany such a fundamental change. A
recent Pulse Asia survey indicated that most Filipinos have little knowledge of the 1987
constitution and 66 percent are against changing it. The same survey also found that 69 percent
have little or no knowledge of federalism and only 28 percent favored changing to a federal
system.14
As of December 2018 it appears unlikely that Cha-Cha will happen before the May 2019
midterm elections. The outcome of these elections—and particularly, the future composition of
the Senate—may determine whether Cha-Cha will be revived in the next legislative term.
Duterte’s principal priority has been a highly punitive approach to illegal drug use, which he
sees as an existential threat to the country’s social fabric. His nationwide war on drugs has
applied the approach that he used in Davao City, giving the police free rein to deal with
suspected drug users and pushers with little concern for legal niceties. It also has involved a
lesser-noticed campaign against government officials allegedly complicit in the drug trade. This
approach has resulted in the deaths of thousands of suspected drug users and pushers—mostly
young males living in poor urban neighborhoods—at the hands of the police or unidentified
assailants. The police claim that many of these deaths were the result of the suspects resisting
arrest, but evidence from journalists and human rights groups shows that many were
premeditated extra-judicial killings (EJKs).15 The number of EJKs is difficult to determine and
disputed—in part because the government and Philippine National Police (PNP) intentionally
obfuscate the data—but estimates range from 6,000 to 12,000 deaths. 16
This loss of life is the most horrific and immediate consequence of the drug war. But the drug
war itself is a sign that the Philippine government has abdicated its responsibility to protect
human rights and respect the rule of law. EJKs violate both the Philippine Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (to which the Philippines is a signatory),
particularly the provisions concerning the presumption of innocence and adherence to due
process. Given the attention that human rights organizations and the media have paid to the
drug war, it is worth looking more closely at the reasons for it and some of its broader
consequences.17
Why is Duterte singularly focused on drugs and crime? It is not surprising that
crime is a major problem in the Philippines, given its high level of poverty, underresourced and
corruption-prone law enforcement agencies, and glacially slow judiciary. Criminal activities, in
the form of smuggling, illegal gambling, drugs, trafficking in persons, and money laundering,
are significant features of the Philippine political economy.18 Studies by International Alert
suggest that the illicit economy in Mindanao plays an important role in sustaining the multiple
conflicts across the island.19
Crime has been a political issue intermittently since the 1960s. Marcos pointed to criminality
and lawlessness as a justification for martial law in 1972, and Joseph Estrada’s image as a crime
fighter was an important aspect of his political appeal in the late 1990s. 20 Crime also corrupts
politics and undermines institutions. Politicians and the police have long participated in,
protected, or otherwise benefited from criminal activity. The proceeds from these illegal
activities have been an important source of financing for some politicians as well as for terrorist
groups. At the community level, drug use and drug-related crimes have long been recognized as
serious social problems. By the late 1990s, the importation (primarily from China), local
production, and use of methamphetamine hydrochloride (known as shabu in the Philippines)
was a major issue for law enforcement and the courts.21 In public opinion surveys prior to 2016,
crime usually came just behind unemployment and food prices in the list of people’s main
concerns. Survey data also showed a complex trend during the Aquino administration: fewer
people were victims of crime, but more were worried about encountering drug addicts. Under
Duterte, the official estimates of drug use have increased significantly—suggesting that they
were either understated before or are being overstated now.22
Since the early 2000s, there has been a growing awareness of the problem of narco-politics,
mostly involving mayors and other local officials thought to be complicit in the drug
trade.23 However, it would be an exaggeration to assert that the Philippines is becoming a narco-
state, where state institutions have been penetrated by the power and wealth of drug lords and
the economy depends heavily on the production or distribution of illegal drugs. Nevertheless,
Duterte sees it differently. Although he was not the first presidential candidate to run against
drugs and crime, he was the first to frame drugs as an existential threat and to be explicit about
the brutal approach he would use to solve the problem.
Why has Duterte made illegal drugs his signature issue? In addition to viewing drugs as a cancer
on society, there is an ugly political logic. Combating drugs and crime was central to his
reputation as an effective mayor of Davao City. Moreover, public acceptance of the Davao Death
Squad, a shadowy group that specifically targeted suspected drug dealers, petty criminals, and
homeless youth, showed the low cost and high returns of mounting an extra-legal war on drugs
and crime.24 As president, Duterte’s nationwide war on drugs continues to play well across most
socioeconomic segments of society, particularly as long as the principal victims are the urban
poor.
The drug war also offers a potent and useful political narrative in which Duterte alone possesses
the moral authority to rescue the country from the dangers posed by drug pushers and other
criminals. As Peter Kreuzer, a German researcher, has observed:
Duterte not only successfully established crime as the most pressing problem, but also
made the unconditional fight against this threat into a hallmark of a comprehensive “we”
group. Given the assumed absoluteness of the evil to be combated, any criticism of the
president has been silenced. Detractors are suspected of being supporters of the criminal
threat to society, and any reference to due process can be ignored. 25
This narrative of drugs as an existential threat has been used to justify imprisoning opposition
Senator Leila de Lima (a prominent critic of Duterte’s drug war), to exercise control over local
officials, and to frame the motivation of the Islamic extremists who took over Marawi City 26
Public attitudes about the war on drugs. Most Filipinos believe that Duterte’s war on
alleged drug users and pushers is a draconian but necessary response to a serious social
problem. Survey data have shown strong but softening support for it: in December 2016,
85 percent of those surveyed voiced satisfaction, though by June 2018, only 78 percent were
satisfied.27 At the same time, almost three out of four Filipinos (73 percent) believe that EJKs
happen, almost as many are concerned that they might be a victim of an EJK, and a large
majority think that it is important for the police to capture suspects alive. 28
Why is there such strong public support for the drug war? One explanation offered is that it
reflects widespread disillusionment with the Philippine justice system. Certainly, rich and
powerful Filipinos enjoy near-total impunity while many poor and middle-class Filipinos see the
system’s high costs, delays, partiality, and corruption. However, the degree of alienation should
not be overstated: few Filipinos ever go to court, and surveys indicate that the judiciary and the
police both enjoy moderately high approval ratings.
A second explanation is that Duterte has successfully dehumanized suspected drug pushers and
users and turned them into a threatening “other” to be eradicated by any means available. As
such, they do not deserve legal protections, rehabilitation, or empathy. This view might erode if
the war on drugs expanded to target alleged drug users in the middle and upper classes.
A third explanation is that the drug war, despite its excesses, is seen as a welcome example of
government responsiveness. It is rare for multiple government authorities—including the PNP,
national government agencies, and local government officials—to work together to address
pressing social issues. This whole-of-government approach appears to have produced results.
According to the PNP, the national crime rate (excluding murders) has declined more than
20 percent over the past two years, and surveys suggest that Filipinos feel more secure. In a
June 2018 Pulse Asia survey, 69 percent said that the Duterte administration’s efforts to
eradicate the drugs is his most important accomplishment, with the fight against criminality
ranking second.29
The drug war’s impact on the Philippine National Police. The PNP is the
government institution most deeply involved in implementing the drug war—known locally as
Oplan Double Barrel or Oplan Tokhang—and therefore most directly affected by it. 30 The
involvement of PNP elements in EJKs is well documented and beyond dispute. 31 Some broader
consequences of the PNP’s involvement are worth examining in greater detail.
Although largely overlooked by most analyses, the PNP, and its predecessor the Philippine
Constabulary, have long been at the nexus of politics, crime, and the rule of law. As historian
Alfred McCoy has shown, Philippine presidents and local officials have used the police as an
essential tool to assert their authority, bolster their legitimacy, selectively fight crime, and
control dissent.32 As the principal law enforcement agency, the PNP has a long history of being
vulnerable to corruption, particularly in the highly lucrative areas of illegal gambling, drugs, and
smuggling. Some of this corruption stems from individual greed, but it also is the product of low
salaries, the complicity of politicians, and the multifaceted shortcomings of the justice system.
As mayor of a city that at times was wracked by political and criminal violence, Duterte
considered the police to be a central pillar of his government. He established close relationships
with many in the police and gained an intimate understanding of how the police operate. Thus,
it is not surprising that Duterte and the PNP have a symbiotic relationship.
In the context of Duterte’s drug war, individual police officers face difficult choices. Journalist
Sheila Coronel describes the complex considerations that influence police behavior today:
Policemen weigh the continually shifting balance of incentives and risks as they seek to
deter crime, advance their careers, please their political patrons, and make money, while
also evading exposure and prosecution. Yet in the end, these policemen often also believe
they are upholding order and helping keep the peace. They are specialists in violence—
practitioners in the skills of lethal force—who improvise often morally and legally
questionable workarounds to the constraints of a broken justice system. 33
The longer-term consequences for law enforcement from the war on drugs may be highly
damaging. The Brookings Institution’s Vanda Felbab-Brown has warned about its potentially
corrupting influence:
Other collateral damage. Duterte’s war on drugs has had less dramatic but significant
consequences for other aspects of governance in the Philippines, including the justice system,
public health, and local governance.
Impact on the justice system. The war on drugs has further stressed the Philippines’
overburdened justice system. The volume of cases to be investigated, prosecuted, and tried, as
well as the number of alleged offenders awaiting trial in detention facilities, has increased
dramatically. A comprehensive picture of the impact on the justice system is beyond the scope of
this working paper, but some of the available data point to these burdens. In 2016, there were
28,000 drug arrests—a 44 percent increase over 2015—and more than 47,300 drug-related
cases were filed.35 During the first 10 months of 2017, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
conducted 34,744 drug enforcement operations, with 66,672 arrests.36 In 2017, about 70,700
drug-related cases were filed in court, and about 21,400 were reviewed.37 According to the
Supreme Court, as of 2017 more than 289,000 drug cases had been filed in the country’s lower
courts.38
As a result, drug suspects and convicts are crammed into the Philippines’ already packed jails
and prisons. According to the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Corrections, in 2017 the
national prison system held 41,500 inmates, more than double its capacity. Data from the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, which oversees provincial and municipal jails, show
an even more disturbing situation. As of May 2018, there were over 141,000 detainees—of which
about 70 percent were drug-related cases—held in jails that were 582 percent overcapacity.39
Ultimately, the legal dimensions of the war on drugs will test not only the capacity of the justice
system, but also the jurisprudence, values, and autonomy of the Philippine judiciary. In
November 2018, a Regional Trial Court issued the first legal judgment against the PNP, finding
three policemen guilty of murdering Kian Delos Santos, a seventeen-year-old the policemen
claimed was a drug runner who resisted arrest. Currently, there is one case before the Supreme
Court challenging the constitutionality of the PNP’s official plan for eradicating illegal drugs.
Impact on public health. The government’s punitive approach to reducing drug use also has
important consequences for public health. It has overwhelmed the country’s paltry
rehabilitation capacity and is having a negative effect on drug-linked diseases. As of mid-2017,
the Philippines had only forty-eight drug rehabilitation facilities and only about fifty medical
personnel trained in addiction medicine.40 According to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency, close to 990,000 “drug personalities” voluntarily surrendered in 2016, and by May 2017
that number had grown to 1.2 million people.
The war on drugs has had predictable negative effects on drug-related public health problems.
According to Vanda Felbab-Brown:
[A] crucial goal of drug policy should be to enhance public health and limit the spread of
diseases linked to drug use. The worst possible policy is to push addicts into the shadows,
ostracize them, and increase the chance of overdoses as well as a rapid spread of
HIV/AIDS, drug-resistant tuberculosis, and hepatitis. In prisons, users will not get
adequate treatment for either their addiction or their communicable disease. . . . Even prior
to the [sic] Duterte’s brutal war on drugs, the rate of HIV infections in the Philippines has
been soaring due to inadequate awareness and failure to support safe sex practices. . . .
Duterte’s war on drugs will only intensify these worrisome trends among drug users. 41
Impact on local politics and government. Duterte’s almost singular focus on the drug war has
far-reaching consequences for the country’s local politics and governance. In many respects,
subnational government in the Philippines is highly decentralized, but most local government
units (LGUs) are dependent upon central government funding and grapple with the challenge of
unfunded mandates. LGUs are key actors in the drug war, and local officials need to juggle
multiple and sometimes conflicting priorities, including protecting their citizens, cooperating
with local law enforcement, and demonstrating results to central authorities. And as reported by
Rappler, a respected Philippine news website, the drug war has caused a major shift in LGU
priorities:
At the local level, the drug war has changed the way barangays [the smallest LGUs] spend
their funds. . . . Traditional social services such as medical clinics or feeding programs for
malnourished children are no longer budget priorities. Through a number of policy
incentives as well as strict supervision by the DILG, the priority at the barangay level has
now become the monitoring and surveillance of drug suspects and the rehabilitation of
drug users who have surrendered.42
There also is a darker dimension to the drug war at the local level. Peter Kreuzer notes the
pressure and intimidation experienced by local officials:
It has become highly problematic for local political elites to evade the president’s injunction
to participate in the anti-crime killing spree that is engulfing the Philippines. . . . The
various reshuffles are placing more hard-line police officers in command positions.
Furthermore, these officers are well aware that results measured in dead bodies are
expected of them. In addition, police officers and politicians alike have been publicly
denounced as supporting and profiting from drug crimes and thus threatened not only with
being indicted, but also with becoming victims of extrajudicial executions themselves. Most
officials then choose to fall in line with the president.43
The Duterte government’s approach to eradicating illegal drugs, besides being inhumane and
misguided, has negative consequences for the rule of law, governance, and politics. But that is
not the full extent of the damage being done to the Philippine polity. This section provides an
assessment of the Duterte government’s impact on democratic institutions and norms.
Some observers of Philippine politics might argue that Duterte is only the most recent example
of presidents who exercise fully the levers of executive power to advance their political and
policy agendas. In this light, he is perpetuating and perhaps perfecting the hardball politics that
every president has practiced since 1986. To be sure, Duterte’s predecessors all used a mix of
persuasion and inducements to advance their agenda, and no president has been above using
intimidation and subterfuge to get their way at times. Therefore, the “politics as usual” view has
some superficial validity. But a deeper assessment shows that the Duterte presidency is
qualitatively different from its post-Marcos predecessors because of its willingness to intimidate
the opposition, weaken institutional checks, and discard democratic norms.
The Duterte presidency is fundamentally different from post-1986 administrations in its
unrelenting use of intimidation to weaken any challenges to its authority. Duterte’s brutal drug
war sends a powerful message regarding his willingness to use extra-legal means, including
EJKs, to achieve his goals. Unlike previous administrations, Duterte and his supporters
routinely use lawsuits, incarceration, and social media trolling to intimidate opponents and
critics. As sociologist Randy David has observed:
Compared to Ferdinand Marcos, Mr. Duterte has performed the art of intimidation with
consummate skill. Without warning, he calls out the name of his prey, denouncing him or
her in the strongest possible terms, and publicly announces that he or she, or they, are in
his line of fire. . . . The public has learned to take these instances of public vilification of
targeted figures as part of the Duterte style of rule. People know these are not empty
threats. Indeed, the public takes them as synonymous with the President’s exercise of
political will.44
In some cases, Duterte’s threats may simply reflect his impetuous personality and desire to
dominate media coverage. However, his statements and actions also send the message that no
one is safe from his attacks and that opposing him is a high-risk venture.
As a former mayor, Duterte is used to governing by decree and by dint of his personality,
popularity, and unrivaled authority. In Davao City, he had no strong political opposition,
significant institutional checks, or close media scrutiny. Peter Kreuzer, writing in 2009 (when
Duterte was mayor), presciently observed:
Duterte makes abundantly clear that there can be security, but only he himself can provide
it. Security is provided according to his personal ideas of justice and adequateness. In his
political symbolism, Duterte clearly is above the law. It is him, who indicts, passes
judgment and orders the executioners to do their job. It is a personalized fight between
those who do not follow the rules and the rightful vigilante whose rules reign supreme. 45
As president, Duterte has repeatedly expressed his disdain for those who oppose his policies,
and has taken numerous steps to silence his critics and weaken institutional checks:
Led by Solicitor General Jose Calida, the government has weaponized the
legal system to attack political opponents. This began in early 2017 when
opposition Senator Leila de Lima was imprisoned on nonbailable drug-related
charges.46 Groups allied with Duterte, as well as some leftist organizations, have
filed multiple lawsuits against former president Aquino and former budget
secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad, a longtime leader of the Liberal Party. Most
recently, in September 2018 the government arrested Senator Antonio Trillanes
IV, a vocal critic of Duterte. The government claimed that a presidential pardon
granted to Trillanes by Benigno Aquino in 2011 was invalid, therefore making
Trillanes ineligible to serve as senator.47
Duterte has repeatedly disparaged or threatened the leaders of key
accountability institutions like the chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, and the chairwoman of the Office
of the Ombudsman. Followers of Duterte threatened to seek the impeachment of
Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales, but her term ended in July 2018. Most
disturbingly, in March 2018 Solicitor General Calida filed a quo warranto petition
against then chief justice Maria Lourdes Sereno, and in May 2018, the Supreme
Court—which currently is dominated by Macapagal Arroyo appointees and in
time will be dominated by Duterte appointees—took the unprecedented and
arguably unconstitutional step of removing its own chief justice. 48
The government has threatened the mainstream media with lawsuits and
nonrenewal of franchises.49 These threats have been directed at media owners
like the Rufino-Prieto family, which owns the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and the
Lopez family, which owns ABS-CBN, the country’s largest TV network. In January
2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission revoked the operating license of
the highly respected news website Rappler, alleging that it has foreign owners and
therefore is in violation of the constitution. In November, the Department of
Justice said that it had grounds to indict both Rappler and its founder Maria
Ressa for tax evasion and failure to file tax returns. 50 Meanwhile, on social media,
critics of the government are routinely harassed and threatened.
Finally, Duterte has periodically raised the specter of declaring martial law
nationwide or forming a revolutionary government that would no longer be
bound by the constitution. Declaring martial law would be constitutional, at least
initially, but would be extremely polarizing politically. However, declaring a
revolutionary government would be an extra-constitutional act. It seems likely
that these statements are intended as trial balloons to gauge public and elite
reactions.
President Duterte’s continued popularity is not surprising. His base of support is rooted in his
persona, his tough approach to fighting drugs and crime, his proto-populist policies, and the
Philippines’ continuing economic growth. Moreover, Duterte and his supporters have
demonstrated an impressive ability to put their opponents on the defensive. They portray
individuals and groups associated with the Aquino administration as incompetent or corrupt
elitists. They accuse defenders of human rights of protecting drug peddlers and criminals. They
charge the mainstream media with being partisan and disseminating “fake news.” What then,
are the existing and potential checks on Duterte?
A brief scan of the political landscape suggests that most institutions and actors that can serve as
checks on Duterte are weak, divided, or under attack.
In recent years, the AFP appears to have become more professional and less political, but all
presidents still cultivate the support of the AFP leadership. Duterte has appointed numerous
former officers to senior civilian positions in his government. He knows a number of them from
when he was mayor, and he appears to believe that military officers will be more effective
administrators and less prone to corruption than civilians. He also wants to bolster support
within the military for his national security policies, including negotiating with the communists
and embracing China. He has courted rank-and-file soldiers and police, visiting many military
bases and raising salaries.
To date, Secretary of Defense Delfin Lorenzana and the AFP leadership have shown they
understand the constitutionally mandated role of the military and are committed to military
professionalism. The AFP has avoided being drawn into the antidrug campaign, and to date the
army appears to have administered martial law in Mindanao with competence and restraint.
However, given mandatory retirement ages, the senior leadership of the AFP changes fairly
rapidly. Therefore, routine leadership changes could bring to the fore senior officers who are
more political.
A final potentially important issue is the uncertain extent to which members of the AFP agree
with the Duterte administration’s approach to addressing the country’s national security
challenges. Some members of the military may likely object to his pivot to China, his willingness
to negotiate with communist insurgents, and his fixation on the drug war. Other military
officials may also feel that the AFP’s domestic role has become unacceptably overextended by
the Marawi crisis in 2017, the administration of martial law across Mindanao, and the
continuing threat of Islamist extremism.
Public opinion in the Philippines is frequently measured by credible survey firms and closely
monitored by all politicians. As a result, public support for the president is an important factor
in perceptions of presidential power. Duterte has remained popular because he entered office
with an energized base of support and because elements of his persona and policies appeal
across socioeconomic classes. What might cause public support for Duterte to soften?
In recent years, “populist” has become a convenient adjective to describe a growing number of
political leaders, including Duterte. But as a term intended to categorize a particular approach to
politics and governing, populism is frustratingly expansive. Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira
Kaltwasser describe populism as a “thin-centered ideology that considers society to be
ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonist camps, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the
corrupt elite.’”57 To this can be added Jan-Werner Muller’s observation that, “In addition to
being anti-elitist, populists are always anti-pluralist. . . . When running for office, populists
portray their political competitors as part of the immoral, corrupt elite; when ruling, they refuse
to recognize any opposition as legitimate.” Muller also notes that populists in power tend to
frame their rule as a response to a crisis or an existential threat. 58 Finally, Steven Levitsky and
James Loxton point to two additional traits of populist leaders: they claim to be political
outsiders and they establish a personalistic linkage to voters. 59
Using these criteria, Duterte certainly has some populist traits. His Mindanaowan roots, crass
language, and brusque behavior set him apart from most of the national political elite. In his
campaign, he ran as a Manila outsider, and portrayed the members of the elite associated with
the Aquino government as incompetent and corrupt. As president, he has framed the problems
of drugs and crime as an existential national crisis and portrayed drug users as a dehumanized
“other.” His efforts to intimidate political opponents and critics clearly are anti-pluralist.
However, other aspects of Duterte’s politics do not comport with populism. Although he
portrays himself as a political outsider, he is from a prominent political family and served as
mayor of a major city for twenty-two years. Even as he criticizes some members of the political
and business elite, in practice he has allied himself with powerful members of the political
establishment—most notably Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and the Marcos, Estrada, and Villar
families. And while Duterte is more antagonistic toward powerful taipans and conglomerates
than Benigno Aquino was, he appears more interested in ensuring that they support him than in
reducing the concentration of economic power.
Duterte has increased spending for social programs and some of the government’s policies, such
as higher salaries for government employees, free irrigation, and tertiary public education, can
be viewed as populist. But to date his core fiscal and macroeconomic policies are more
neoliberal than populist. However, if Duterte’s popularity declines, there is a risk that his
government will adopt economic policies that are more statist and populist.
Finally, to date Duterte has not created a mass movement or highly personalistic political party
typically associated with populist leaders. According to Joel Rocamora, “Digong [Duterte] may
bring the popular medjo bastos (rudeness) into political discourse, but he does not bring citizens
into formal processes of political participation. In contrast to populists who mobilize people,
Digong like Estrada is a demobilising populist.”60 Reflecting this perspective, as well as the more
general challenge of building political organizations in the Philippines, efforts to create a pro-
Duterte grassroots movement, Kilusang Pagbabago (Movement for Change), appear to have
faltered. In its stead, Duterte’s daughter, Sara Duterte-Carpio, has established Hugpong ng
Pagbabago (Faction for Change), a Mindanao-based political party widely viewed as her vehicle
for entering national politics. The putative failure of the former and the creation of the latter
demonstrate the continued dominance of traditional dynastic politics.
In sum, describing Duterte as a populist provides a convenient but not entirely accurate label to
characterize a complex, somewhat contradictory politician with a disparate policy agenda. Still,
the growing literature on populist leaders generally depicts them as being toxic to liberal
democracy, so the Duterte-as-populist narrative provides a valid but limited frame for viewing
his impact on democracy.
With the challenges currently facing liberal democracy in the United States and elsewhere, the
concept of democratic backsliding has taken on new saliency. According to Nancy Bermeo,
backsliding, in its broadest sense, is “state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political
institutions that sustain existing democracy” (emphasis added). 61 A 2015 study on democratic
backsliding, written by Ellen Lust and David Waldner for the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), suggests that backsliding is best conceived as
a change in a combination of competitive electoral procedures, civil and political liberties,
and accountability, and that backsliding occurs through a series of discrete changes in the
rules and informal procedures that shape those elections, rights and accountability. These
discrete changes take place over time, separated by months or even years, and the end
result is not predetermined: backsliding may result in democratic breakdown, or it may
not, and can occur within both democratic and authoritarian regimes. 62
The term “backsliding” is particularly appropriate for low-quality democracies like the
Philippines, where concerted and sustained efforts are required to improve the quality of
democracy. Absent that, backsliding is inevitable. How serious is the problem of democratic
backsliding in the Philippines, and is the country on the way to democratic breakdown? In
answering these questions, it is important to start by recognizing the sources of democratic
resiliency in the Philippines.
Democratic resiliencies. Elite democracy was practiced before martial law was declared in
1972 and after the restoration of democracy in 1986. It often was not pretty, and it failed in a
number of important ways. But many Filipinos take pride in people power, and norms of
constitutionalism, political competition, free speech and media, and autonomous civil society
have fairly deep roots. A variety of influential institutions, including the Catholic Church, many
schools and universities, and most of the media, embrace and promote democratic norms.
Moreover, the alternative to democracy—authoritarianism—is not an abstraction, at least to
older Filipinos who experienced the Marcos dictatorship.
Broad support for democracy among Filipinos has been consistently borne out in surveys. A
2018 Social Weather Stations (SWS) survey showed that 78 percent were satisfied with how
democracy works and 60 percent always preferred democracy.63 Surveys also consistently show
a high degree of satisfaction with the country’s democratic institutions, including the Senate,
House of Representatives, and Supreme Court. So while Filipinos tend to be fairly cynical about
the motivations and integrity of politicians and government officials, they are used to enjoying
political freedoms, lively political debates, and competitive elections.
Vulnerabilities. At the same time, multiple conditions in the Philippines make it vulnerable
to democratic backsliding.
Socioeconomic conditions. Inequality, the uneven distribution of benefits
from economic growth, and an apparent sense of middle-class insecurity and
vulnerability may make the poor and middle class receptive to promises of
simplistic quick fixes.
Presidentialism and weak institutions. The combination of a powerful
presidency and generally weak and malleable political institutions gives the
president wide latitude. If a president does not respect democratic institutions
and norms, many other political actors will follow suit.
The weakness of collective action. This applies particularly to political
parties and civil society organizations. In How Democracies Die, Steven Levitsky
and Daniel Ziblatt underscore the important role that political parties historically
have played in containing extremist demagogues. But in the Philippines, parties
are abysmally weak, and to date have been unable to provide compelling
alternative leaders or narratives. Although the Philippines boasts a robust civil
society, as of yet it has not been an effective counterforce to Duterte.
Generational change. Most Filipinos under the age of forty-five did not
directly experience either the abuses of the Marcos era or the nonviolent People
Power Revolution that forced him from office in 1986. Moreover, because school
curricula have glossed over the period and the younger members of the Marcos
family (particularly his children) have been able to revamp his image, public
understanding of the severe damage done by the Marcos dictatorship has been
diminished.64 As a result, younger Filipinos know only the freedoms and
disappointments of thirty years of elite democracy. This may make them less
protective of the democratic freedoms that were lost during the Marcos era.
Death by a thousand cuts? In How Democracies Die, Levitsky and Ziblatt describe the
incremental demise of democracy:
Many government efforts to subvert democracy are “legal,” in the sense that they are
approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. . . . Because there is no single
moment—no coup, declaration of martial law, or suspension of the constitution—in which
the regime obviously “crosses the line” into dictatorship, nothing may set off society’s alarm
bells. Those who denounce government abuse may be dismissed as exaggerating or crying
wolf. Democracy’s erosion is, for many, almost imperceptible. 65
This observation is highly relevant for the Philippines under Duterte. Two and a half years into
his presidency—with the very important exception of EJKs—his government still operates
largely within the bounds of the constitution. He has not muzzled the media, outlawed the
political opposition, or canceled elections. Despite his threats, he has not declared nationwide
martial law or created a revolutionary government. Nevertheless, the extent to which he has
used the powers of the presidency to run roughshod over human rights and weaken democratic
checks and balances is unprecedented.
Levitsky and Ziblatt also observe that “without robust norms, constitutional checks and balances
do not serve as the bulwarks of democracy we imagine them to be.” In particular, they point to
the importance of two norms: (1) mutual toleration, the understanding that competing parties
accept one another as legitimate rivals, and (2) forbearance, the idea that politicians should
exercise restraint in deploying their institutional prerogatives. 66 Duterte’s actions clearly violate
both of these norms. To be sure, they have been frequently disregarded in the past, but under
Duterte any pretense of honoring them has disappeared. As Lisandro Claudio and Patricio
Abinales have noted, “Duterte is the first Philippine president to not render even the minimum
obeisance to liberal democratic politics.”67
Bermeo points to the challenge of responding to gradual or incremental backsliding: “Slow
slides toward authoritarianism often lack both the bright spark that ignites an effective call to
action and the opposition and movement leaders who can voice that clarion.” To date, Duterte
hasn’t triggered “the bright spark,” and the opposition to him has yet to generate compelling
new leaders or political movements.
But even where there is backsliding, there may be grounds for optimism that it can be reversed.
As Bermeo notes:
Incremental and ambiguous change preserves mixed landscapes wherein one set of
institutions or ideas can correct others. As long as some electoral competition takes place,
power can be clawed back. When civil society is allowed some space, countermobilization
can occur. Because backsliding reflects incentive structures, changed incentives can reverse
negative trends.68
The election-driven overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, as well as the electoral defeats of
then president Mahinda Rajapaksa in Sri Lanka in January 2015 and then prime minister Najib
Razak in Malaysia in June 2018, give at least some credence to Bormeo’s cautious hopefulness.
SUMMING UP: A MIXED RECORD DELIVERING CHANGE AND AN UNCERTAIN
FUTURE
Thus far, how much real change has Duterte’s presidency produced? And what does this suggest
for the future? To date, there has been real change in several areas. The first is the drug war and
the damage it has inflicted on the rule of law, the professionalism of the PNP, and other aspects
of governance. Second is the weakening of democratic institutions and norms. Third is a portion
of the government’s economic policies, particularly the increase in spending on infrastructure
and a few populist social programs. Fourth is the reorientation of the Philippines’ foreign
relations to move closer to China and pullback from the United States, the United Nations, and
the liberal norms espoused by the international community. Finally, the possibility of
constitutional changes, up to and including federalism, would be highly significant for the
Philippines.
Alongside these changes, there are important elements of continuity. So far, there is
considerable continuity in most macroeconomic policies and public financial management. The
government also has continued to expand (with some tweaks or rebranding) most preexisting
social development programs. Finally, the passage of the Bangsamoro Organic Law was the
culmination of a decades-long process.
Under Duterte, there also are worrying signs of regression back to some of the worst aspects of
traditional Philippine politics. First is the emphasis on highly personalistic leadership: Duterte’s
presidency is all about him and not about institutions. Second, little effort has been made to
reduce the entrenched power of political dynasties and oligarchs—except those that might
challenge Duterte. Instead, Duterte has been willing to ally with traditional political leaders who
have shown little interest in reforming politics and governance. Third, his administration has
adopted a somewhat more statist approach to economic development. Finally, Duterte’s
selective pandering to 1960s-style anti-U.S. nationalism, which exaggerates the influence of the
United States and sometimes is used to deflect public attention away from the shortcomings of
far more important domestic actors, is an unwelcome development.
Looking ahead, it seems likely that there will be a continuing struggle between elites and other
groups who desire a strongman and those who believe in the desirability of democracy, even the
flawed version that has been practiced in the Philippines. The best-case scenario is a gradual
reassertion of checks and balances brought about by a softening of public support for Duterte, a
growing recognition of the damage being done to Philippine democracy, and more unified and
effective pushback against his antidemocratic actions. But it is also possible that the country’s
contentious politics could move in dangerous directions. This might be the case if Duterte
declares nationwide martial law or manages to ram through major changes to the 1987
constitution. Alternatively, if Duterte, who is in poor health, were to resign or be incapacitated
before the end of his term, members of his coalition might try to block Vice President Robredo
from succeeding him. Under any of these scenarios, there is a risk of mass mobilization (both for
and against Duterte) that could lead to extraconstitutional and potentially violent forms of
people power. This popular uprising, in turn, could tempt or compel the PNP and AFP to take
sides. The Philippines would then be in perilous, uncharted territory.
American diplomats often boast of the strong people-to-people connections that exist between
the United States and the Philippines, principally because of the large Filipino-American
community in the United States. But America’s institutional engagement with the Philippines is
surprisingly thin, even though the country is a former colony, a major treaty ally, and a fellow
democracy. There are two reasons for this state of affairs. First, historically the bilateral
relationship has been dominated by military/security ties, key elements of which include the
1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the presence of two massive U.S. military bases in the Philippines
until the early 1990s, the post-9/11 Global War on Terror, and most recently the U.S. response to
China’s assertion of sovereignty in the South China Sea. Second, the Philippines’ moderately
sized economy has been less open to foreign investment and less export-oriented than many
other East Asian economies. As a result, though U.S.-Philippines economic ties are not
insignificant, they are small compared to the United States’ relations with larger and more open
economies in the region.
During the Obama and Aquino presidencies, the bilateral relationship was the most cordial it
had been since the Fidel Ramos administration (1992–1998). During the six-month period
following the election of Duterte and before the election of Donald Trump, the bilateral
relationship went into a downward spiral. The nadir came in early September 2016, prior to the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Laos, when it was reported that
President Obama would raise human rights issues in his one-on-one meeting with Duterte. In a
news conference before the summit, Duterte angrily rejected being lectured by Obama and
famously said, “Son of a whore, I will curse you in that forum.” 69 In response, Obama canceled
the meeting with Duterte. In September 2016, $4.5 million in U.S. State Department funding
intended to assist Philippine law enforcement was shifted to maritime security. In November of
the same year, the State Department suspended the sale of 26,000 military assault rifles to the
PNP. The arrival of a new U.S. ambassador, Sung Kim, in early December, a month after
Trump’s election, provided an opportunity to reset the bilateral relationship.
Today, U.S. foreign policy is shaped by a president who expresses admiration for authoritarian
rulers and has shown little interest in defending human rights and democracy. The Duterte
administration is pro-China, much more transactional in its relationship with the United States,
and intolerant of any foreign criticism of human rights abuses associated with his drug war.
Washington now finds itself with limited influence with regard to the Duterte government.
Unlike China and Japan, the U.S. government cannot compel American corporations to fund
large infrastructure investments.70 Moreover, the Philippines is not dependent on foreign aid, so
it can take or leave US development assistance. This is exactly what it did in December 2017,
when Manila withdrew from being considered for a second Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC) compact worth over $400 million. The Philippines no longer met the MCC’s minimum
requirements in the areas of rule of law and controlling corruption, so it withdrew in order to
avoid the embarrassment of being turned down by the MCC Board of Directors.
The nongovernmental foundations of U.S.-Philippine relations are also surprisingly weak.
University-to-university ties are limited, and only a few American universities offer Philippine
studies. The involvement of American foundations—even those that traditionally have had an
interest in Southeast Asia such as the Ford, Henry Luce, and Open Society Foundations—is
minimal. And in the realm of public diplomacy, the passage of time has diminished the ranks
and influence of champions of close U.S.-Philippines relations such as former senators John
McCain and Richard Lugar, former representative Stephen Solarz, former secretary of state
George Shultz, and former ambassadors Stephen Bosworth and Nicholas Platt, all of whom have
died or retired.
Since Donald Trump became president, the U.S. government has avoided saying or doing
anything that might alienate Duterte. During the first half of 2017, the scale and brutality of
Duterte’s drug war became irrefutably clear in major reports by Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International, as well as by powerful photojournalism by the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
Reuters, and the New York Times. Despite this, in late April 2017, in a phone conversation with
Duterte, Trump told him: “I just wanted to congratulate you because I am hearing of the
unbelievable job on the drug problem. . . . Many countries have the problem, we have a problem,
but what a great job you are doing and I just wanted to call and tell you that.” 71 He also invited
Duterte to the White House—an invitation Duterte later declined.
When the State Department was headed by Rex Tillerson and was itself in turmoil, the U.S.
government was largely silent regarding the drug war and human rights abuses. In August 2017,
when Tillerson met with Duterte at the ASEAN summit in Manila, their discussion focused on
the Marawi crisis and terrorism and did not include the human rights violations associated with
the drug war. The State Department’s 2017 human rights report on the Philippines
acknowledged that “extrajudicial killings have been the chief human rights concern in the
country for many years and, after a sharp rise with the onset of the antidrug campaign in 2016,
they continued in 2017. . . . Concerns about police impunity increased significantly following the
sharp increase in police killings.” However, it seemed to suggest that the drug-related EJKs were
not all that different from other human rights abuses in the Philippines. 72
In June 2018, the United States joined thirty-seven other members (out of forty-seven total) of
the United Nations Human Rights Council to sign a statement on human rights in the
Philippines issued by the government of Iceland:
We urge the government of the Philippines to take all necessary measures to bring killings
associated with the campaign against illegal drugs to an end and cooperate with the
international community to investigate all related deaths and hold perpetrators
accountable. . . . While acknowledging that drug use in the Philippines is a serious problem,
actions to tackle drug abuse must be carried out in full respect of the rule of law and
compliance with international human rights obligations. 73
This statement appears to be the strongest public statement with which the U.S. government has
been associated, but it received little attention in the media. On the same day this statement was
issued, the United States pulled out of the Human Rights Council.
The U.S. Congress expressed some initial concern over the situation in the Philippines, but has
not taken any meaningful action. In May 2017, senators Ben Cardin and Marco Rubio
introduced a bill, the Philippines Human Rights Accountability and Counter Narcotics Act of
2017 (S 1055), which would restrict arms sales to the PNP and provide up to $25 million in fiscal
years 2017 and 2018 to support human rights groups and assist the Philippines in dealing with
its drug problem. The bill was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee and has languished
there since. In the House of Representatives, in July 2017 the Tom Lantos Human Rights
Commission held a hearing on “The Human Rights Consequences of the War on Drugs in the
Philippines” that was highly critical of Duterte’s war on drugs. But there has been no subsequent
action.
Although the U.S. embassy in Manila might be engaged in quiet diplomacy regarding human
rights, conversations with Filipino human rights leaders suggest that little has taken place.
USAID’s Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) portfolio in the Philippines funds
conventional rule-of-law, civil society, and local governance programs, but stays well clear of
anything that addresses democratic backsliding. Because of their dependency on USAID and
State Department funding, democracy promotion organizations like Freedom House, the
National Democratic Institute, and the International Republican Institute have not responded in
a major way. The Asia Foundation in the Philippines, which relies more on Australian than U.S.
funding, does some work on the rule of law, but also shies away from anything that might
antagonize the Duterte government. Only the National Endowment for Democracy has
significantly increased its funding in support of democracy in the Philippines, from under
$500,000 in 2015 to over $1 million in 2017.
Moreover, the Philippines is not China, Vietnam, or Cambodia, where the prospects for
democracy are negligible in the short to medium term. The situation in the Philippines is
dynamic, and investments in human rights and democracy have the potential to make a
difference. Despite Duterte’s efforts to weaken checks on his power, there are civil society,
media, religious, and educational organizations—and even some members of the business elite—
that are committed to defending democracy. Like Trump in the United States, Duterte has
become a catalyst for a struggle between vastly different visions of what kind of country the
Philippines can and should be. This is a contest Filipino democrats need to win; but in doing so,
they will need to offer something better than just a return to the pre-Duterte status quo.
Naturally, there are no quick or easy fixes. The goal of more robust American support for
democracy in the Philippines should be twofold: first and most immediately, to promote greater
solidarity among “small-d” democrats in the Philippines, the United States, and around the
world, and second, to improve and expand the sharing of ideas and strategies for how to defend
and strengthen democratic institutions and norms. Illustratively, in the near term, the United
States could support Filipino efforts on the following fronts:
promote solidarity and sharing lessons for defending human rights and
democracy by supporting visits to the Philippines of human rights advocates,
democratic political leaders, and scholars on democracy.
Longer term, Americans and Filipinos should work together to address common challenges to
preserving and improving democracy. This could include joint efforts to:
Finally, a U.S. House of Representatives controlled by the Democrats holds out the possibility of
greater congressional attention to the situation in the Philippines. Members of Congress should
consider pushing the Trump administration to apply Magnitsky Global Act sanctions to current
and former PNP leaders responsible for EJKs.
A more robust American response will prompt some Filipinos to accuse the United States of
meddling in the Philippines’ domestic affairs. Duterte’s supporters will almost certainly portray
it as effort to destabilize his government. Therefore, support must be transparent and
nonpartisan, and those providing it will need to be prepared to take some heat. Ideally, this
should not be a solely American project—it should involve democratic groups elsewhere,
including in Australia, Canada, Europe, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
As long as strategic and security interests dominate U.S. policy toward the Philippines, and with
the U.S. Congress largely consumed with domestic politics, it is unlikely that the U.S.
government will take meaningful steps to support human rights and democracy in the
Philippines. Therefore, American NGOs, foundations, and universities will need to step up and
take the lead. But ultimately, it will be the actions of Filipino democrats that matter most.
What is the difference between formal non formal and informal education?
The distinction made is largely administrative. Formal education is linked with schools and
training institutions; non-formal with community groups and other organizations;
and informal covers what is left, e.g. interactions with friends, family and work colleagues.
The most common way of contrasting informal and formal education derives from an
administrative or institutional concern and includes a middle form – non-formal education.
Back in the late 1960s there was an emerging analysis of what was seen as a ‘world educational
crisis’ (Coombs 1968). There was concern about unsuitable curricula; a realization that
educational growth and economic growth were not necessarily in step, and that jobs did not
emerge directly as a result of educational inputs. Many countries were finding it difficult
(politically or economically) to pay for the expansion of formal education.
The conclusion was that formal educational systems had adapted too slowly to the socio-
economic changes around them and that they were held back not only by their own
conservatism, but also by the inertia of societies themselves… It was from this point of departure
that planners and economists in the World Bank began to make a distinction between informal,
non-formal and formal education. (Fordham 1993: 2)
At around the same time there were moves in UNESCO toward lifelong education and notions of
‘the learning society’ which culminated in Learning to Be (‘The Faure Report’, UNESCO 1972).
Lifelong learning was to be the ‘master concept’ that should shape educational systems
(UNESCO 1972:182). What emerged was the influential tripartite categorization of learning
systems. It’s best known statement comes from the work of Coombs with Prosser and Ahmed
(1973):
Informal education: the truly lifelong process whereby every individual acquires attitudes,
values, skills and knowledge from daily experience and the educative influences and resources in
his or her environment – from family and neighbours, from work and play, from the market
place, the library and the mass media.
Non-formal education: any organised educational activity outside the established formal system
– whether operating separately or as an important feature of some broader activity – that is
intended to serve identifiable learning clienteles and learning objectives.
The distinction made is largely administrative. Formal education is linked with schools and
training institutions; non-formal with community groups and other organizations; and informal
covers what is left, e.g. interactions with friends, family and work colleagues. (See, for example,
Coombs and Ahmed 1974).
These definitions do not imply hard and fast categories – as Fordham (1993) comments. When
we look more closely at the division there can be considerable overlap. For example, there can be
significant problems around the categorizing the education activity linked to involvement in
groups and associations (la vie associative) sometimes it might be informal, at other times non-
formal, and where the group is part of a school – formal. We can see similar issues in some of
the discussions of informal science education in the USA.
[I]nformal education consists of learning activities that are voluntary and self-directed, life-long,
and motivated mainly by intrinsic interests, curiosity, exploration, manipulation, fantasy, task
completion, and social interaction. Informal learning occurs in an out-of-school setting and can
be linear or non-linear and often is self-paced and visual- or object-oriented. It provides an
experiential base and motivation for further activity and learning. The outcomes of informal
learning experiences in science, mathematics, and technology include a sense of fun and wonder
in addition to a better understanding of concepts, topics, processes of thinking in scientific and
technical disciplines, and an increased knowledge about career opportunities in these fields.
(National Science Foundation 1997)
The NSF definition falls in line with what Coombs describes as informal education – but many
museums and science centers also describe their activities as informal science education (and
would presumably come fall under the category of non-formal education). Similarly, some
schools running science clubs etc. describe that activity as informal science education (and may
well fulfill the first requirements of the NSF definition).
Recognizing elements of these problems, some agencies have looked for alternative definitions.
One possibility here has been the extent to which the outcomes of the educational activity are
institutionally accredited. Such activity involved enrollment or registration – and this can also
be used as a way of defining formal education. Non-formal education is, thus, ‘education for
which none of the learners is enrolled or registered’ (OECD 1977: 11, quoted by Tight 1996: 69).
Using non-accreditation as a basis for defining an area of education has a strong theoretical
pedigree. Eduard Lindeman famously declared that:
Tony Jeffs and I have been critical of administrative approaches to defining informal (and
formal) education. Instead we have looked to process as a significant way into setting the
boundaries of informal education. Viewed in this way, formal education can be seen as
essentially curricula-driven. In other words, it entails a plan of action and defined content. It
also involves creating a particular social and physical setting – the most familiar example being
the classroom.
In contrast, informal education can be viewed as being driven by conversation and, hence,
unpredictable. Informal educators do not know where conversation might lead. They have to
catch the moment, to try to say or do something to deepen people’s thinking or to put others in
touch with their feelings. Such ‘going with the flow’ opens up all sorts of possibilities.
On one hand educators may not be prepared for what comes, on the other they can get into
rewarding areas. There is the chance, for example, to connect with the questions, issues and
feelings that are important to people, rather than what they think might be significant. This is
also likely to take educators into the world of people’s feelings, experiences and relationships.
While all educators should attend to experience and encourage people to reflect, informal
educators are thrown into this. (Jeffs and Smith 1999a: 210)
For the most part, they do not have lesson plans to follow; they respond to situations, to
experiences. There is not a prescribed learning framework, nor are there organized learning
events or packages. Outcomes are not specified externally (Eraut 2000: 12) or accredited. What
is more, those working in informal education, for the most part, have far less control over the
environment in which they are operating: ‘Informal educators cannot design environments, nor
direct proceedings in quite the same way as formal educators’ (Jeffs and Smith 1999).
First, a focus on conversation is central to building communities. The sorts of values and
behaviours needed for conversation to take place are exactly what are required if
neighbourliness and democracy are to flourish. What is more, the sorts of groups informal
educators (such as youth and social action workers) work with – voluntary, community-based,
and often concerned with mutual aid – are the bedrock of democratic societies (Jeffs and Smith
1999: 34-46).
Whether we are identified as a formal or informal educator we will use a mix of the formal and
informal. What sets the two apart is the relative emphasis placed on curricula and conversation,
and the range of settings in which they may work.
Within the primary education field the notion of informal education has been used to describe
the more fluid, ‘open’ and apparently progressive forms of schooling that developed in the 1960s
(e.g. McKenzie and Kernig 1975). As Blyth (1988: 11) has commented, informal pedagogy has
‘figured spasmodically in English education from quite early in the industrial age and even
before. Robert Owen and, later, Samuel Widlerspin are examples here. However, there was a
particular moment when ‘informal education’ came to the fore:
Certain words have acquired a peculiar potency in primary education, and few more so than
‘informal’. Never properly defined, yet ever suggestive of ideas and practices which were
indisputably right, ‘informal’ was the flagship of the semantic armada of 1960s Primaryspeak . . .
spontaneity, flexibility, naturalness, growth, needs, interests, freedom . . . self—expression,
discovery and many more. (Alexander 1988: 148)
Many of the thinkers (e.g. Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel, Dewey and Bruner) that we would see
as informing the development of informal education as a conversational form are also important
influences in this movement (see Blyth 1988: 7-24). However, since the 1960s the terms of
educational debate have shifted dramatically. By the mid 1990s, the British government
‘espoused the simple nostrum that the key to enhanced standards and economic
competitiveness was an unrelenting concentration on basic skills in literacy and numeracy, to be
addressed mainly through “interactive whole-class teaching”‘ (Alexander 2000: 2). It is now far
less common to hear informal approaches to primary education being advanced as a blanket
alternative to formal ones.
When we look at usage within discussions of primary schooling, the most consistent form by the
late 1980s was the noun informality’, rather than the adjective ‘informal’ (see Jeffs and Smith
1990: 5-6). Thus, instead of informal education, we it was possible to examine informality in
pedagogy, in curriculum, in organization, in evaluation and in personal style (Blyth 1988). What
was being examined here was a tendency. To talk of informality in education was to indicate
significant elements of flexibility and openness.
Bentley, T. (1998) Learning beyond the Classroom: Education for a changing world, London:
Routledge. 208 pages. Argues the case for a focus on learning beyond the formal sector and the
need to connect what happens in schools to wider opportunities for learning. The book is rather
light on theorization, coming, as it does, from a policy perspective (Demos).
Blyth, A. (ed.) (1988) Informal Primary Education Today, Lewes: Falmer Press. 219 + viii
pages. Very useful review of informality in primary education from the Plowden Report to the
situation in the late 1980s. The contributors are a bit of a ‘Who’s Who’ in the area: Gammage on
primary school practice; Blenkin on education and development; Galton on the nature of
learning; King on informality and ideology; Kelly on middle years schooling; Nias on teachers’
accounts; and Alexander on teacher development.
Educational systems exist to promote formal learning, which follows a syllabus and is intentional in the
sense that learning is the goal of all the activities learners engage in. Learning outcomes are measured
by tests and other forms of assessment. Adult migrants engage in formal learning when they take a
course in the language of their host community. If the course is based on an analysis of their needs, it will
follow a syllabus that specifies the communicative repertoire to be achieved by successful learners. The
nature and scope of that repertoire should be reflected in whatever forms of assessment accompany the
course.
Non-formal learning takes place outside formal learning environments but within some kind of
organisational framework. It arises from the learner’s conscious decision to master a particular activity,
skill or area of knowledge and is thus the result of intentional effort. But it need not follow a formal
syllabus or be governed by external accreditation and assessment. Non-formal learning typically takes
place in community settings: swimming classes for small children, sports clubs of various kinds for all
ages, reading groups, debating societies, amateur choirs and orchestras, and so on. Some non-formal
learning arrangements become increasingly formal as learners become more proficient; one thinks, for
example, of graded exams in music and other performing arts. Adult migrants engage in non-formal
language learning when they participate in organised activities that combine the learning and use of their
target language with the acquisition of a particular skill or complex of knowledge.
Informal learning takes place outside schools and colleges and arises from the learner’s involvement in
activities that are not undertaken with a learning purpose in mind. Informal learning is involuntary and an
inescapable part of daily life; for that reason, it is sometimes called experiential learning. Learning that is
formal or non-formal is partly intentional and partly incidental: when we consciously pursue any learning
target we cannot help learning things that are not part of that target. Informal learning, however, is
exclusively incidental.
These definitions and distinctions help us to understand the complexity of successful language learning.
When children acquire their first language they do so not because they are taught. Their learning is an
incidental result of their participation in family life, and the linguistic skills they develop and the concepts
they master reflect the social practices of their immediate environment. Similarly, adults are said to learn
a second or subsequent language “naturalistically” when they do so by living among speakers of the
language and interacting with them on a daily basis. Their emerging communicative repertoire is shaped
not by a conscious learning agenda but by their attempts to satisfy their social and material needs. These
are both examples of informal learning. In either case informal learning may be supported by non-formal
learning: intentional learning that is prompted, for example, by the explanations parents give to their
children and adult learners receive from those with whom they interact.
When children learn to read and write in their first language, they generally do so as part of their formal
education and as a result of conscious effort; and when adult migrants attend a course in the language of
their host community, they are aiming to achieve a prescribed level of proficiency. In both cases,
however, intentional learning is usually accompanied by incidental learning; and the effects of incidental
learning in formal educational contexts are reinforced by informal and non-formal learning in the world
outside. The literacy of young children benefits from their out-of-school engagement in the reading they
undertake for pleasure or in pursuit of a special interest, and the proficiency of adult migrants in the
language of the host community is likely to be enhanced when they have opportunities to interact
informally with other speakers of the language.
These considerations prompt two questions. First, how can those responsible for organising language
courses for adult migrants ensure that their learners have opportunities to use the language outside the
classroom and thus benefit from informal/non-formal learning? One obvious answer is to arrange cultural
visits and social activities that bring the learners into informal contact with members of the host
community. Another is to encourage learners to participate in social activities, or to arrange such activities
specifically for their benefit. Secondly, if adult migrants who have learnt the language of their host
community “naturalistically” are required to demonstrate proficiency in that language in order to secure a
residence permit or citizenship, can their informal/non-formal learning be recognised without requiring
them to take a test? Any attempt to answer this question must consider alternative forms of assessment
(the OECD has explored the recognition of non-formal and informal learning by adults in a three-year
project).
At a time when many Council of Europe member states are receiving large numbers of adult refugees, the
distinctions between formal, non-formal and informal learning help us to formulate radical and cost-
effective responses to questions that have previously been answered in traditional ways. Instead of
organising formal language courses, for example, in the short term it makes much better sense, and is
certainly more affordable, to involve volunteers in the organisation of social activities that promote non-
formal and informal language learning. If appropriately designed and efficiently implemented, such
activities can provide migrant learners with a sound basis for participating in formal language courses at a
later stage if that is judged to be desirable or necessary.
SINGAPORE - As students of all levels returned to school this past week, it was announced that
home-based learning (HBL) is here to stay.
Education Minister Ong Ye Kung said recently that online learning is set to become routine,
suggesting that HBL could be held once a fortnight, for starters.
Amid the coronavirus pandemic, HBL was rolled out nationwide after schools shut in April.
SINGAPORE - As students of all levels returned to school this past week, it was announced that
home-based learning (HBL) is here to stay.
Education Minister Ong Ye Kung said recently that online learning is set to become routine,
suggesting that HBL could be held once a fortnight, for starters.
Amid the coronavirus pandemic, HBL was rolled out nationwide after schools shut in April.
1. CROSSOVER LESSONS
Many of the innovative approaches teachers employed during HBL last month can already be
translated into a classroom, says Dr Teo Chew Lee from the Office of Education Research at
National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University Singapore.
She recounts a physics experiment where the teacher asked Secondary 1 students to build a
catapult using ice-cream sticks, bottle caps and rubber bands at home. Photos and videos were
taken and uploaded.
This led to wide-ranging discussions on energy conversion, renewable energy and real-world
problems like power shortages faced by some African schools.
Dr Teo says the same lesson can be replicated in the classroom, but perhaps
made more open-ended and more seamless, by incorporating messaging
features similar to group WhatsApp chats, which can include discussions
before or after the lesson. This is so that even after the lesson ends, the
learning continues.
He says: "I believe one of the weaknesses of traditional classroom learning is that students are
all by themselves once they get home. They have no one to assist them in their learning, so they
turn to tutors.
"The key idea here is to provide students with instant access to the learning materials and
guidance in the form of pre-recorded lessons."
So if a student wants to learn about statistics, for example, he can access the relevant tutorial
online and take as long as he needs to ingest it.
3. HOMEWORK BY VIDEO
The uploading of video and audio recordings, which were commonly used during HBL, could be
a different way of submitting homework, says Dr Nicholas Duggan, principal of Invictus Family,
the virtual extension of Invictus International School.
Inspired by the lockdown worldwide, the virtual campus, which will be launched next month,
will offer full-time home-based learning.
Dr Duggan says: "Not every child can communicate his or her work well or speak well, such as
some students with dyslexia."
Using videos or audio footage to talk about their work may help some children become more
confident speakers, he says.
During the circuit breaker, parents monitored their children doing HBL.
Such close observation meant that "parents were forced to look at how their kids learn and they
can better communicate that to their children's teachers", says Mrs Pamela Lim, founder of All
Gifted High School, a private school.
For example, parents may have noticed that their child is a kinaesthetic learner, who learns
more quickly with hands-on experiments and manipulatives, compared with others who prefer
the more auditory form of learning that dominates in classroom settings, she says.
Teachers are generally keen to work closely with parents and such feedback can help the teacher
offer the child more targeted assistance.
5. GAMIFICATION WORKS
Video-conferencing tools, commonly used during the stay-in period because of Covid-19, can be
a boon for shy kids.
Mrs JoBeth Williams, head of English at Cherrr, an online learning platform that offers live-
streamed tuition lessons, says: "With HBL, I get kids who are more excited to raise their hands.
They want to speak and like to see their faces blown up onscreen.
"It's a lot more freeing for them as it doesn't feel like 40 other people are watching them."
The former teacher says her mini quizzes online, where she gives out "virtual trophies", are a hit.
A similar interactive points reward system can be used in primary-school classrooms, she
suggests.
Mr David Squires, who teaches English at British Council Singapore, has found that
gamification - which has elements of game-playing, like scoring points and competing with
others - is very motivating for his students.
Quiz-based game platforms like Kahoot! also have the benefit of giving him "instant feedback"
on which questions his students found particularly difficult.
Such games can be played on interactive whiteboards, which he uses in his classroom.
Looking back on the HBL experiment, he found it rewarding how quickly many teachers and
students mastered the technology required for virtual lessons.
Another thing that struck him was "how much the connection between the teacher and students
means".
"I always looked forward to seeing my own students online and my daughters, who are in
Primary 4 and 6, had teachers who made a video for the children."
"The compassion and empathy is the same, whether it is online or face to face."
This guide has been created for parents of school-aged children looking for strategies, ideas,
and resources to support and promote effective home-based learning. It is structured around
six main principles.
As a parent, you can support your child’s learning in many different ways.
ensure that they clearly understand the task they have been given: ask if they
understand what they are expected to do and why?
ensure that they have the tools and resources required to complete it
check if they have any questions about the learning
check with the teacher to see that the work has been completed and shared through the
appropriate channel (emailed to their teacher, uploaded or posted on a shared forum)
familiarise yourself with the digital programme that your child’s teacher is using (such as
Google Classroom, Zoom, Skype, Moodle or Blogger)
ask questions about the work to show interest and gauge their understanding of the activity
they have completed. This offers children a chance to be the ‘expert’ and has a positive effect
on their learning, motivation, confidence and sense of self. You might ask what they enjoyed
most about the task, what challenges they faced, and something new that they learned
check that they know what to do next
Children might also feel that they have lost a sense of control over their lives during the
transition to home learning, which may be confusing and disempowering. It will really help if
parents regularly ‘check in’ with their children, listen to their concerns and adjust home learning
routines and expectations accordingly. Both parents and children will need to be patient as the
new systems, routines and practices are introduced and embedded. Striking a suitable balance
between consistency and flexibility is key.
If you are trying to balance your own work requirements with supporting your children’s learning,
consider setting up some routines such as regular check-in times during the day, or
interspersing learning tasks that require more help and support from you with activities that you
child can do relatively independently such as an online maths game or an art activity.
There are plenty of digital tools that children can use to connect with others and share their
learning. They may choose to share it:
Irrespective of the method, it is important that, at times, children have the chance to interact or
engage with others in ‘real time’ (perhaps using Whatsapp, Skype or Facetime), as this
facilitates deeper social connection. You may also wish to post comments on your child’s blog
or posted videos, and encourage family members and friends to do the same. As a final note,
we would caution against the use of social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram
and Snapchat for promoting social connection during periods of home learning. In addition to
having an age limit of 13, these sites are difficult to monitor and much of the content may not
be appropriate for children.
Where possible, schedule time each day for outdoor play and exploration. Ideally, this will be in
support of a task set by your child’s teacher but, if not, you can always go outside and simply
encourage your children to be explorers and keen observers. What do they see? What have they
found? There are lots of suggestions for outdoor learning activities on the Department of
Conservation website, or you might check out Forest and Bird’s Kiwi Conservation Club for
children. You might also like to take a look at The Education Hub’s outdoor learning activities.
Feedback can be given at any stage in the learning process and will serve a number of different
functions, although it should be positive and focused on improvement. You can give
The web is full of resources to support all of us in understanding the theory and practice of
giving feedback to children. One of most effective methods is called the ‘Sandwich Technique’,
which involves giving specific praise, followed by some constructive criticism (feedback to
improve), and then another round of specific praise. You can also find useful videos on
the Education Hub website.
Home-Based Learning
The term “homeschooling” suggests a school-at-home approach in which parents or tutors
replicate the instructional process of schools, including a set curriculum, traditional instruction,
assignments, and so on. Many families start out this way, but a good number of them soon find
that this approach is no more satisfactory than regular school—or worse.
But home-based learning doesn’t need to be like school; instead, it can be a continuation of how
your family lived before your children became “school age.” This section shows you how and
why home-based, self-directed learning can help you and your children. Under the legal
umbrella of homeschooling, there is the option of following a more youth-directed approach,
ranging from a young person
Although the majority of homeschooling is still the school-at-home type, the self-directed
segment is also growing strongly. Connecting with other families that practice home-based, self-
directed learning is very useful for determining if this can work for your family. Conferences also
provide social confirmation, as well as peer groups and diversity for parents and children. If you
don’t “click” with folks at one conference or group, move on to the next one, or start your own!
The Internet is another good source of support. Most states have several homeschooling support
groups and online message boards. To connect with them, do an online search for: “[your city or
state] homeschool support groups.” Home-based, self-directed learning is easy to initiate,
because your primary mission is to create a happy home base from which your children can
explore and learn about their family, community and world. You don’t need to be a master
teacher in all your children’s subjects, nor some sort of “super parent.”
Your role is to be “the guide on the side, not the sage on the stage.” Use the time with your child
to work out family dynamics and relationships, and each child’s goals and dreams. Every family
will arrive at different formulations for how they live and learn together over time. Moreover,
embracing home-based learning doesn’t mean never being able to step foot in a class or other
group learning setting. Some choose to take à-la-carte classes as they go along. And those that
enroll in a full-time school after a period of home-based learning typically do well at their grade
level (or above) after a brief adjustment period. Many go on to thrive in college. Home is merely
the base; the community and the world are where much of the learning occurs.
It isn’t enough to just take children out of school and leave them alone with some books and a
computer; parents need to consistently support their children’s explorations and growth.
Parents who use home-based, self-directed learning for their children are not the sole
instructors or only adults their children need, so a big part of their role is to provide their
children with access to opportunities and people in their communities. Fortunately, as detailed
in this and the Community Resources sections, there are many powerful opportunities and
places for children to learn, including a growing number of local resource centers specifically
catering to this group, where children can go and spend one or more days each week. This
section also includes academic research, media reports, and other resources about home-based
self-directed learning, to help visitors see the possibilities that exist for learning without school
(click on the links that most interest you in the menu on the left).
“What is most important and valuable about the home as a base for children’s
growth into the world is not that it is a better school than the schools, but that it
isn’t a school at all.” John Holt
Benefits of Homeschooling
The many benefits of homeschooling mean more kids and teens than ever are learning at
home. Families want the advantages of homeschooling, with the flexibility, academic benefits,
efficiency, and opportunities homeschooling can offer. They seek an education and even a
lifestyle that’s not based on minimum standards and a one-size-fits-all approach.
We’ll take a look at the academic benefits of homeschooling plus each of these additional
benefits in more detail below.
Continuing education. You can continue learning alongside your child. Learn a foreign language,
brush up on algebra, rediscover maps of the world, learn to code, visit museums, and enjoy field
trips.
Sharing your hobbies and interests. You can share your own passions with your kids more than
if they were attending school full-time. Hike the Appalachian Trail, study the constellations,
share your knowledge of home construction or investing, play music together, work together on
political or social causes.
Saving money. Some aspects of homeschooling can be less expensive than school: fewer
expensive school clothes, off-season vacation and travel rates, no public school fees or private
school tuition. Some parents spend a lot of money on homeschooling; others homeschool on a
budget.
Freedom from a school schedule. Homeschooling means you’re not tied to the timing of the
school bus or school schedule. Plan your homeschooling schedule so it works for your family.
You can homeschool at night, on any kind of weekly schedule, or any kind of yearly schedule.
Personal growth. Because it’s an immersive experience with your children and it’s taking total
responsibility for their education, homeschooling can change you. Parents can grow in
philosophical, spiritual, or social-emotional ways. Some people find homeschooling can be a
source of personal empowerment, a shared journey where you and others recognize the value,
labor, and challenge of nurturing children and helping them learn.
Of course, despite all the benefits of homeschooling, there is no homeschool guarantee. Kids
are kids, and some kids who go to school have challenges, just as some kids who homeschool
have challenges. There are thousands upon thousands of homeschoolers around the world, and
their homeschooling experiences and outcomes vary, just as happens with children who are
enrolled in schools.
It’s also possible to homeschool poorly, though perceptions of what good homeschooling looks
like may be uninformed or inaccurate. One of the advantages of homeschooling that people
forget about is that you can quit homeschooling if it doesn’t work for your family.
While homeschooling is not for every family, people from all walks of life in many different
circumstances have found ways to incorporate the benefits of homeschooling into their lives.
Academic advantages
Better teaching materials. Homeschoolers have access to the best teaching materials
available. And, teaching materials can be selected based on a child's individual needs
and capabilities.
Over the past three weeks, I have been observing how six of my children have been handling their remote
learning. Three of the younger ones are doing Home-Based Learning (HBL), while the older ones are on
full online learning in Polytechnic and University.
With so many children, one of my top priorities has always been to make them independent from a young
age. From the time they entered Primary 1, they were fully in charge of their homework, spelling and
tingxie revision, and tests.
HBL would be the litmus test as I do believe that remote learning comes easier for those who are
organised and independent.
Otherwise, parents have to step in a lot to handhold them, remind them or nag at them.
HBL works well for a child like my seven-year-old daughter, #6. It took me two weeks to teach her how to
log in, where to check for her assignments, how to take photos of her offline work and air drop it to the
computer and upload it into SLS.
Thereafter, she was on auto-pilot. Organised, self-motivated, disciplined, eager to learn… I don’t have to
bother about her at all. She wakes up, has her breakfast and goes into SLS to check her homework for
the day. She gets everything done, and is punctual and waiting for her daily 12pm lesson to commence. It
is totally hands-off for me. The only problem she faces is with Chinese, as she sometimes can’t read the
instructions and we have to help her with that.
As for #5, my son who is in Secondary 2, HBL has been a nightmare. He is an experiential learner, and
doing worksheets has always been a struggle for him. His favourite subjects in school are Design and
Technology and Science.
Even when he was in school before HBL started, he got by with a lot of scolding, punishment and staying
back during recess to get his work up to scratch.
With HBL, all these issues are compounded. It is hard for his teachers to reach out to him to provide help
when he refuses to go online 1-1 with them. They have no choice but to text me daily to get him to
complete his work. When I asked him why, he stared at me incredulously, saying, “Why would I want to
face-time my teacher? That is just too awkward.” He gives his teachers a huge headache with his backlog
of uncompleted work and it is hard for me to help him as I am busy with my own work and running the
household.
My experience over this period makes me think that HBL doesn’t get a child to be independent quickly. A
child who is already independent and self-motivated adjusts easily to HBL. But for the kids who are not,
HBL is hardly an adequate replacement for school.
#4 is in Secondary 4 and will be having her O-Levels this year. Her class has live lessons every hour for
the different subjects. Being able to peer over her shoulder, I admire the teachers’ patience! It seems like
the teaching is probably the easiest part of the job and they are so passionate about it. The hardest part is
to get the kids to be motivated enough to pay attention fully, do their revision or complete their homework
to a good standard. It takes two hands to clap.
I have seen teachers very quick to provide additional help and guidance to students. For example, #6
missed out on a few chapters of her listening comprehension while she was on LOA just before the official
start of HBL. I didn’t expect her teacher to offer to get online immediately and conduct the lesson with her
1-1. #6 was so happy to see her teacher on screen, and to have her full attention.
I have also sensed some teachers’ frustration at students’ apathy in the face of upcoming O-Level exams.
One teacher has been expressing this in my daughter’s class WhatsApp chat group. I can totally imagine
his frustration at his students, but they are also going through a lot.
I remember one of my older girls was faring really badly for Chemistry during the mid-year exams. But for
the O-Levels she did really well. She said that she would never forget how her Chemistry teacher never
gave up on her even though she felt like giving up on herself. The O-Levels is a tough year, and the
students do need their teachers to journey with them through to the end. I guess it is so much harder to
do it remotely. Stay strong, teachers!
A special bond
HBL has brought the classroom into our homes. We get to listen to the teachers talk to their students, we
get to see the relationship they have fostered with our children. It is heartening to see the care and
concern from their teachers. And this episode has brought out a special bond between parents and
teachers, as we are helping and encouraging one another as we overcome all our technical challenges
together!
We were all forced to embrace remote learning, but this has opened up many new options and platforms,
and there are many benefits that we can continue to utilise for learning in the long term.
Education has always been a partnership between the school and the home and HBL has really brought
that home to us.
Take the rough with the smooth
#4 loves HBL! No more walking home from school in the hot sun. No time wasted on transport.
She wakes up at 8am instead of 6.30am and is all done by 3pm. She is still full of energy, so she can
spend a good few hours on her hobbies, too. She enjoys crafts like knitting and weaving, and is creating
her own line of jewellery. She has even sold some of her products online! She is not academically inclined
and studying for hours is stressful for her. This is a great way to destress and relax as the pressure of the
O-Levels is mounting and her teachers are rallying them to revise harder.
On the downside, she was initially disappointed that the volleyball competition season was cancelled.
This is her last year in school and she was really looking forward to it. Not only was the competition itself
exciting, but the whole experience of taking the bus to the different venues was a fun bonding time for the
students as she had made many good friends across the different classes and streams.
But she got over it quickly, knowing that well, that’s just how life is. My kids have gone though many ups
and downs in life and they are resilient and understand that life is unpredictable and it helps if we try to
stay positive, focus on the silver lining instead of what we have lost or is not within our control.
We have movie nights, dance nights, board game nights to break the monotony of being cooped up at
home. They do miss going out and miss their friends, and have been keeping connected with the various
online platforms. I have also relaxed my screen-time limits to buy myself time to work in peace and they
have been playing online games with their cousins and friends.
#6 has also been writing snail mail to her classmates, and they are surprising one another with little
trinkets and craft. Opening the mailbox has become a fun past time!
So, what have we learnt as a family? Discipline, responsibility, self-motivation, good time management,
self-control, pride in handing in a good piece of work versus rushing through it just to get it submitted…
These are much needed traits to nurture. Not only for our children, but us adults, too. These will stand us
in good stead in the years to come.
And there are many little lessons along the way that we may have not noticed before. For instance, #2,
now in her first year of law school, had to complete her exams from home. The younger ones in the family
have learnt to be understanding and considerate, by staying absolutely silent during exam hours so their
older sister can focus.
Now that’s a lesson worth learning that will last long beyond the end of the circuit breaker.
6. We are affected by this COVID-19. How quality of education is acquired? Yes or No. Defend your
answer
• Technology has stepped into the breach, and will continue to play a key role in educating
future generations.
• In a world where knowledge is a mouse-click away, the role of the educator must change too.
Not since World War II have so many countries around the world seen schools and educational
institutions go into lockdown at around the same time and for the same reason. While we know
that the impact of this virus will be far-reaching, what might it mean in the longer term for
education?
For a while now, educators around the world have been talking about the need to rethink how
we educate future generations. This might just be the disruption that the sector needed to get us
all to rethink how we educate, and question what we need to teach and what we are preparing
our students for. So, as we educators grapple with the new ways of communicating with our
students away from our classrooms and lecture theatres, it is a good time to reflect on how this
disruptive crisis can help us define what learning should look like for Generations Z, Alpha and
beyond.
The majority of students in our educational institutions today are from Generation Z, a
generation that has grown up in a truly globalized world. This generation, the oldest of whom
are now 25 years old, is likely to be reflecting on their education as a result of a truly global
pandemic, with many facing cancelled exams, sporting events and even graduation. This
generation is defined by technology, where the terms FOBA (Fear of Being Alone) and FOMO
(Fear of Missing Out) express their expectation of instant communication and feedback –
effected through apps like Instant Messenger, Snapchat and WhatsApp. That includes from
parents and educators, something being amplified with the current remote learning.
This is also a generation that sees the power of working collaboratively to solve the world’s
biggest challenges – climate change and mental health being top on their agenda, and at
present their collective responsibility to self-isolate to protect older members of the community.
Generation Alpha, the children of millennials, are the most racially diverse
generation across the world, and one in which technology is simply an
extension of their own consciousness and identity, with social media being a
way of life. These young pre-schoolers are also the generation with the most
non-traditional family structures, often with “bulldozer parents” who move
obstacles out of the way to create a clear path for their kids. While Generation
Alpha is at this point possibly oblivious to the impact of the global pandemic
on their education, the impact will surely be felt even for our youngest learners
for years to come.
In the midst of this COVID-19 crisis, we are sure that fellow educators, like us,
are wondering what we need to be preparing our students for in the future.
According to a Dell Technologies report, 85% of the jobs in 2030 that
Generation Z and Alpha will enter into have not been invented yet. According
to this World Economic Forum report, 65% of primary-school children today
will be working in job types that do not exist yet.
The COVID-19 crisis may well change our world and our global outlook; it may
also teach us about how education needs to change to be able to better
prepare our young learners for what the future might hold. These lessons
include:
covid19
BSfS
ProfessionalDevlopment
by Marshall Cavendish Education | Jul 06, 2020
The current COVID-19 pandemic has provided a set of circumstances globally that
have not existed in living memory, if ever. The impact of the virus is all-pervasive
and in many places, catastrophic.
It is too soon to be definitive about its impact but we can make a number of important
observations. On balance, the pandemic has challenged and strained education more than it
has benefited it. The responses from education systems and authorities has been typically
rapid, but hurried, hopeful but uncertain. Many students have been placed at great risk, and
teachers have approached their new responsibilities with varying levels of expertise and
confidence. Overall, however, some positives have emerged.
The most obvious implications of the pandemic include the need to: close schools, or at least
invoke social distancing, rapidly ramp up online teaching and learning, keep children safe,
inform and support parents to become partners in their children’s education, and to determine
how quality in education can be sustained.
Teachers have been forced to rethink how they teach when they engage students virtually. The
vital ingredient of interaction has been jeopardised. Teachers have lost the opportunity to ask
students questions dynamically. Lost the ability to confidently gauge student levels of
engagement and motivation, both key to learning. Online learning has excited some students,
but bored others. Hopefully, teachers have been compelled to reflect on the absolute
fundamentals of teaching. Careful and skilful planning of lessons is key. Wise choices must be
made about what students bring to the lesson. What prior knowledge do they have on which to
build new knowledge? Are teachers using familiar examples to illustrate to students the points
they want to make? Are questions being framed so as to maximise learning? Are ‘rehearsal’
techniques being used to consolidate new learning? Where video technology such as ZOOM is
available, are teachers ensuring their presentations are dynamic, and that they are expertly
seeking feedback from students to gauge the effectiveness of learning? In some worst case
scenarios, teachers have been simply issuing worksheets for students - requiring them to
‘research’ new content. Experts like E. D. Hirsch jnr. explain to us how less-capable students
are likely to struggle, if not sink, when left alone to learn.
So, what have been new opportunities? Probably the most obvious is the ubiquitous application
of technology. National Centre for Education and the Economy (NCEE) research shows nearly
80% of educators globally used ‘technology and other innovative solutions’. Over 70% of those
surveyed counted as a positive the opportunity for ‘students to manage their own learning’. The
same survey showed that 65% of respondents considered the new arrangements strengthened
‘involvement and co-operation of parents’. Results are likely to be mixed for students with
special education needs because on one hand there is a depreciation in the quality of personal,
real support, but on the other hand, some students felt more at ease with working from home
and avoiding the at times overwhelming presence of lots of other students.
On balance, however, the likely and concerning impact will be the widening of the social divide
in education as students experienced significant ‘losses in learning’. A Victorian-based Grattan
Institute survey recorded that only 35% of 5,000 teachers in NSW considered students to be
‘learning well in remote learning’. In disadvantaged schools, this dropped to 15% who felt
students were ‘making progress’. Some rural areas in Australia, for example, had 30% of
students without internet access at home. Even where connectivity exits, remote learning calls
on a new range of student skills, skills not yet developed in many students. Add to this,
parental support varies enormously by circumstance and tends to correlate closely with levels of
economic advantage and disadvantage.
In summary, the pandemic caught us all unaware, and we now must work hard to better
understand all the implications of such tumultuous disruptions to schooling and (i) quickly
enhance the quality and accessibility of remote education, and (ii) get kids back to school as
soon as we can!
This article is written by Peter Adams, Global Director of The Balanced Scorecard for Schools.
Quality Education
for All during
COVID-19 Crisis
Quality Education for All during COVID-19 Crisis
Abstract
The aims of this study to suggest effective solutions that help parents, teachers and children
navigate through challenges facing education during the pandemic. This truly is a global crisis,
which is preventing children and adolescents in every country, including those affected by
conflict and displacement, from fulfilling their right to quality, safe and inclusive education.
With Sustainable Development Goal 4 (SDG4), the global community committed to realizing
the right to quality education for all children and adolescents by 2030. The COVID-19 crisis
puts this promise into risk more than ever before. It has abundant insights and high- quality
resources from the opportunity for teacher to form much stronger relations with parents, students
to challenges of untrained teacher and lack of access to digital learning resources. We encouraged
our community to share homeschooling & online learning resources that support student learning
and wellbeing. Students, their parents, and educators around the world are feeling the surprising
current result of the novel coronavirus as schools are shutting down and quarantine methods are
being ordered to cope with the global pandemic. While governments and health officials are doing
their best slowing down the outbreak, global education systems are collaborating to collectively
respond and provide quality education for all during these difficult times. Our aim is to help
everyone in providing quality education for all even in these exceptional times. Quality Education
for all during Covid-19, in partnership with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), expanding on the opportunities and challenges for education during this
unprecedented time. A record number of 1.54 billion children and youth have been impacted by
the pandemic. In short span many organizations documented, packaged and released a collection
of 30 simple, yet effective solutions that help parents, teachers and children navigate through the
excess of challenges facing education during the pandemic. From the opportunity for teachers to
form much stronger connections with parents, students (especially for students with disabilities)
to challenges of untrained teachers and lack of access to digital learning resources, the report has
plentiful insights and resources. As of early April, most countries have introduced nation-wide
early childhood care, school and university closures affecting nearly 91% of the world’s student
population – more than 1.5 billion learners. Governments and donors, in collaboration with
national and international partners must urgently ensure safe, inclusive access to emergency
distance learning, with psychosocial support and social emotional learning components during
and after the COVID-19 crisis. This can be done by supporting governments to plan and develop
flexible national education systems, to give teachers and caregivers the right support to deliver
distance learning and by maintaining and increasing international funding to countries most in
need. Quality education can provide a sense of predictability and routine for children, and can
help to provide a safe, protective and nurturing environment for them to learn and develop. In
emergencies, education can be lifesaving and life sustaining. During the COVID-19 response,
it can play a critical role in protecting public health, keeping children safe, ensuring continuity
of learning and promoting mental health and psychosocial wellbeing. It provides
recommendations for governments and donors, together with partners, to ensure that safe,
quality and inclusive learning reaches all children and that education systems are strengthened
ready for the return to school
HundrED has released a website and a summary report, Quality Education For All During
Covid-19, in partnership with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), expanding on the opportunities and challenges for education during this
unprecedented time. A record number of 1.54 billion children and youth have been impacted
by the pandemic, and as of 31st March, 185 countries in Asia, Europe, the Middle East,
North America and South America have announced or implemented school and university
closures. In the span of ten days, HundrED has documented, packaged and released a
collection of 30 simple, yet effective solutions that help parents, teachers and children
navigate through the plethora of challenges facing education during the pandemic. From the
opportunity for teachers to form much stronger connections with parents, students (especially
for students with disabilities) to challenges of untrained teachers and lack of access to digital
learning resources, the report has plentiful insights and resources.