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Contents
(Top)
Background

Structure

Peacetime organisation
Wartime organisation

Planned deployment

Operations

Mobilisation
6 April
7 April
8 April
9 April
Fate

Notes

Footnotes

References

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27th Infantry Division Savska

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
27th Infantry Division Savska
Country Yugoslavia
Branch Royal Yugoslav Army
Type Infantry
Size Division (26,000–27,000 officers and men)
Part of 4th Army
Engagements Invasion of Yugoslavia (1941)
Commanders
Notable
commanders August Marić

The 27th Infantry Division Savska was an infantry formation of the Royal Yugoslav
Army that formed part of the 4th Army during the German-led invasion of Yugoslavia
by the Axis powers in April 1941. It was raised from the Savska divisional
district, and like all Yugoslav infantry divisions of the time, was a very large
and unwieldy formation almost entirely reliant on animal transport for mobility.
Commanded by Divizijski đeneral August Marić, the division was largely made up of
ethnic Croat troops, many of whom saw the Germans as potential liberators from
Serbian oppression during the interwar period. It also lacked modern arms and
sufficient ammunition.

Along with the rest of the Yugoslav Army, the 27th Infantry Division Savska began
mobilising on 3 April 1941, and was still engaged in that process three days later
when the Germans began an air campaign and a series of preliminary operations along
the Yugoslav frontiers. These attacks ignited rebellion within the Croat troops of
the division. The chief of staff of the division became involved, countermanding
orders for the sabotage of a key bridge over the Drava river at Zákány. The
division briefly established a defensive line on the Yugoslav side of the river,
but German troops began crossing on 7 April, forcing the division to begin
withdrawing. A counterattack delayed the German advance during the night of 8/9
April, but the division began to disintegrate due to fifth column actions,
rebellion and desertion. When the German 14th Panzer Division broke out of the
bridgehead at Zákány on 10 April, the 27th Infantry Division Savska numbered only
2,000 men, mostly Serbs. In a single day, the German panzers, with overwhelming air
support, brushed aside the remnants of the division and captured Zagreb, covering
nearly 160 kilometres (100 mi) and meeting little resistance. On that day the
divisional headquarters was captured, and the division effectively ceased to exist.
Background
Map highlighting the location of Yugoslavia
A map showing the location of Yugoslavia in 1930s Europe

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, was created with the merger of Serbia,
Montenegro and the South Slav-inhabited areas of Austria-Hungary on 1 December
1918, in the immediate aftermath of World War I. The Army of the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes was established to defend the new state. It was formed around
the nucleus of the victorious Royal Serbian Army, as well as armed formations
raised in regions formerly controlled by Austria-Hungary. Many former Austro-
Hungarian officers and soldiers became members of the new army.[1] From the
beginning, much like other aspects of public life in the new kingdom, the army was
dominated by ethnic Serbs, who saw it as a means by which to secure Serb political
hegemony.[2]

The army's development was hampered by the kingdom's poor economy, and this
continued during the 1920s. In 1929, King Alexander changed the name of the country
to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, at which time the army was renamed the Royal Yugoslav
Army (Serbo-Croatian Latin: Vojska Kraljevine Jugoslavije, VKJ). The army budget
remained tight, and as tensions rose across Europe during the 1930s, it became
difficult to secure weapons and munitions from other countries.[3] Consequently, at
the time World War II broke out in September 1939, the VKJ had several serious
weaknesses, which included reliance on draught animals for transport, and the large
size of its formations. Infantry divisions had a wartime strength of 26,000–27,000
men,[4] as compared to contemporary British infantry divisions of half that
strength.[5] These characteristics resulted in slow, unwieldy formations, and the
inadequate supply of arms and munitions meant that even the very large Yugoslav
formations had low firepower.[6] Generals better suited to the trench warfare of
World War I were combined with an army that was neither equipped nor trained to
resist the fast-moving combined arms approach used by the Germans in their
invasions of Poland and France.[7][8]

The weaknesses of the VKJ in strategy, structure, equipment, mobility and supply
were exacerbated by serious ethnic disunity within Yugoslavia, resulting from two
decades of Serb hegemony and the attendant lack of political legitimacy achieved by
the central government.[9][10] Attempts to address the disunity came too late to
ensure that the VKJ was a cohesive force. Fifth column activity was also a serious
concern, not only from the Croatian nationalist Ustaše but also from the country's
Slovene and ethnic German minorities.[9]
Structure
Peacetime organisation

According to regulations issued by the VKJ in 1935,[11] the 27th Infantry Division
Savska was to be raised from the Savska divisional district, which was
headquartered in Zagreb. The Savska divisional district was under the control of
the 4th Army district, also headquartered in Zagreb. The division was named for the
Sava river, a tributary of the Danube that flows along the northern border of
modern-day Bosnia and Herzegovina. In peacetime, the Savska divisional district
included:[12]

35th Infantry Regiment, based in Zagreb

36th Infantry Regiment, based in Varaždin
53rd Infantry Regiment, based in Karlovac
14th Artillery Regiment, based in Varaždin
30th Artillery Regiment, based in Zagreb

Wartime organisation
See also: Yugoslav order of battle prior to the invasion of Yugoslavia

The wartime organisation of the VKJ was laid down by regulations issued in 1936–
1937,[13] which set the strength of an infantry division at 26,000–27,000 men.[4] A
total of 11,200 horses and other pack and draught animals were required to provide
mobility for each infantry division. The theoretical wartime organisation of a
fully mobilised Yugoslav infantry division was:[14][15]

headquarters
divisional infantry headquarters, with three or four infantry regiments
divisional artillery headquarters, with one or two artillery regiments
a cavalry battalion with two horsed cavalry squadrons, a bicycle squadron and a
machine gun platoon
a pioneer battalion of three companies
an anti-tank company, equipped with twelve 37 mm (1.5 in) or 47 mm (1.9 in)
anti-tank guns
a machine gun company
an anti-aircraft machine gun company
a signals company
logistics units

Each infantry regiment was to consist of three or four infantry battalions and a
machine gun company.[16] The divisional artillery regiments were animal-drawn and
largely equipped with World War I vintage pieces.[17] An artillery regiment
consisted of four battalions, one of 100 mm (3.9 in) light howitzers, one of 65 mm
(2.6 in) or 75 mm (3 in) mountain guns, and two of 75 mm or 80 mm (3.1 in) field
guns.[18] The 36th Infantry Regiment and the 14th and 30th Artillery Regiments,
which were administered by the Savska divisional district in peacetime, were
earmarked to join other formations when they were mobilised, and the division was
to be brought up to its wartime strength by the 104th Infantry Regiment and the
27th Artillery Regiment from the VKJ reserve.[14]
Planned deployment
a map showing the locations of the 27th Infantry Division Savska and flanking
formations along the northern border of Yugoslavia
42nd ID
42nd ID
27th ID
27th ID
40th ID
40th ID
Planned deployment locations for 27th ID and flanking formations

The 27th Infantry Division Savska (27th ID) was a component of the 4th Army as part
of the 1st Army Group, which was responsible for the defence of north and
northwestern Yugoslavia.[19] In the event of mobilisation, the 4th Army was to
deploy in a cordon along the western sector of the Hungarian border, with the 27th
ID positioned opposite the Hungarian village of Gyékényes, between the confluence
of the Mura at Legrad and Kloštar Podravski. In this disposition, the divisional
headquarters was planned to be located at Kapela, north of Bjelovar.[20] On the
left flank of the division it was planned that the 42nd Infantry Division Murska
(42nd ID) would be positioned opposite the Hungarian city of Nagykanizsa,[21] and
on the right flank the 40th Infantry Division Slavonska (40th ID) was to establish
itself opposite the Hungarian town of Barcs.[22] Border guard units in the
division's area of responsibility would consist of the 3rd Battalion of the 393rd
Reserve Regiment and the 576th Independent Battalion.[23]
Operations
Mobilisation

After unrelenting pressure from Adolf Hitler, Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite Pact
on 25 March 1941. On 27 March, a military coup d'état overthrew the government that
had signed the pact, and a new government was formed under the Royal Yugoslav Army
Air Force commander, Armijski đeneral[a] Dušan Simović.[25] A general mobilisation
was not called by the new government until 3 April 1941, out of fear of offending
Hitler and thus precipitating war.[26] The day of the coup, Hitler issued Führer
Directive 25, which called for Yugoslavia to be treated as a hostile state; on 3
April, Führer Directive 26 was issued, detailing the plan of attack and command
structure for the invasion, which was to commence on 6 April.[27]

As the Axis invasion began, the 27th ID had only commenced mobilisation,[28] and
was largely in its mobilisation centres or moving to its concentration areas.[20]
On 4 April, the commander of the 4th Army, Armijski đeneral Petar Nedeljković, had
reported that the division could not move for another 24 hours due to lack of
vehicles.[29] Only a small proportion of the division was in its planned positions
on 6 April:[20]

the divisional commander Divizijski đeneral[b] August Marić and his

headquarters staff were mobilising in Zagreb
the 35th Infantry Regiment (less its 3rd Battalion) was marching from Zagreb to
Križevci, with its 3rd Battalion still in Zagreb
the 53rd Infantry Regiment, with about 50 percent of its troops and 15 percent
of its animals, was moving by rail from its mobilisation centre in Karlovac via
Križevci to Koprivnica, with its 1st Battalion detraining in Koprivnica
the 104th Infantry Regiment was marching from its mobilisation centre in
Sesvete via Dugo Selo to Bjelovar
Two battalions of the 27th Artillery Regiment were in position in Novigrad
Podravski near Koprivnica, with the rest of the 27th Artillery Regiment still
mobilising in Zagreb and Varaždin
the divisional cavalry battalion was mobilising in Čakovec but had no horses,
and the divisional machine gun battalion was mobilising in Zagreb but also had no
animal transport
the remainder of the divisional units were at their mobilisation centres in and
around Zagreb

6 April

Early on 6 April 1941, the German XXXXVI Motorised Corps of General der
Panzertruppe Heinrich von Vietinghoff launched preliminary attacks along the Drava
between Ždala and Gotalovo in the 27th ID sector with the intention of securing
crossings over the river, but they were unsuccessful.[30] By the evening, German
successes elsewhere along the Hungarian border made it clear to the Germans that
the Yugoslavs would not be resisting stubbornly at the frontier. The XXXXVI
Motorised Corps was then ordered to begin seizing bridges over the Drava along the
length of the 4th Army front, including at Zákány near Gyékényes. These local
attacks were sufficient to inflame dissent within the largely Croat 4th Army, who
refused to resist the Germans who they considered their liberators from Serbian
oppression during the interwar period.[31]

The continuing mobilisation and concentration of the division and of the whole of
the 4th Army was hampered by escalating fifth column activities and propaganda
fomented by the Croatian nationalist Ustaše. Some units stopped mobilising, or
began returning to their mobilisation centres from their concentration areas.
During the day, Yugoslav sabotage units attempted to destroy the bridge over the
Drava at Zákány. This attempt was only partially successful, due to the influence
of Ustaše propaganda and the countermanding of the demolition orders by the chief
of staff of the 27th ID, Major Anton Marković.[30] The Yugoslav radio network
linking the division with the 4th Army and flanking divisions was sabotaged by the
Ustaše on 6 April, and radio communications within the 4th Army remained poor
throughout the fighting.[32]
7 April

About 05:00 on 7 April, two to three battalions of the XXXXVI Motorised Corps
commenced crossing the Drava at Zákány,[33] and attacked towards Koprivnica.[34] In
response to the German crossing, the 53rd Infantry Regiment withdrew towards
Koprivnica and took up defensive positions in a series of villages including
Torčec. To stop this German penetration and gain more time for the concentration of
the division, elements of the 27th Artillery Regiment were sent to support the
defensive line near Torčec, which was placed under the command of the division's
commanding officer for infantry.[33] About 07:30, the commander of the Yugoslav 1st
Army Group, Armijski đeneral Milorad Petrović, met with Nedeljković at Zagreb and
ordered him to go to Koprivnica and prepare a counterattack against the bridgehead,
to commence at 15:00. The counterattack plan was unable to be carried out, as the
necessary units could not reach their positions.[33]

About 10:30, the Germans reached the defensive line near Torčec, and fighting
began.[33] A few Breguet 19s of the 4th Air Reconnaissance Group, attached to the
1st Army Group, which had survived an early morning raid on their airfield the
previous day, mounted attacks on the bridge over the Drava at Zákány.[35] After the
Germans reinforced their bridgehead with two more battalions, they overcame the
Yugoslav defenders, who had suffered significant losses and were running low on
artillery ammunition. About 18:00, the 53rd Infantry Regiment withdrew to
Koprivnica along with its artillery support, and remained in the town during the
night.[36] The bridge at Zákány was destroyed later that day by sabotage units.[33]
At 23:00, following orders from Petrović that he was to attack on 8 April at all
costs, Nedeljković issued orders for a counterattack to be carried out early on 8
April.[37]
8 April
On 8 April, the German XXXXVI Motorised Corps continued with its limited objective
attacks to expand their bridgeheads on the 4th Army front, including at Zákány. The
resistance offered by both flanking divisions was very limited. The 36th Infantry
Regiment of the 42nd ID, which had been concentrating in the Ludbreg district
northwest of Koprivnica, was transferred to the 27th ID, in an attempt to bolster
the left flank of the divisional sector.[38]
a colour photograph of an artillery piece in a museum building
Two batteries of Skoda 75 mm Model 1928 mountain guns were deployed in support of
the counterattack by 27th ID on the Zákány bridgehead.

In the morning of 8 April, the 27th ID was deployed around Koprivnica. The 104th
Infantry Regiment supported by elements of the 27th Artillery Regiment was deployed
northeast of the town behind the Drava between Molve and Hlebine. The 2nd Cavalry
Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division, which had been riding from its mobilisation
centre in Virovitica to Zagreb, was allocated to the 27th ID to assist with
establishing its forward defences, and was deployed with two artillery batteries
between the outskirts of Koprivnica and Bregi. The 53rd Infantry Regiment, and the
remnants of the 2nd Battalion of the 36th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Battalion
of the 35th Infantry Regiment (totalling around 500 men), and the 1st Battery of
the 27th Artillery Regiment were located in the town itself. The 2nd Battalion of
the 36th Infantry Regiment had not yet arrived in Koprivnica, and the divisional
cavalry battalion had reached as far as Ivanec. The majority of the 81st Cavalry
Regiment, detached from the 4th Army, was on the road from Zagreb to Koprivnica,
although its 1st Squadron, which had been transported to Koprivnica in cars on 7
April, was deployed as part of an outpost line forward of Koprivnica supporting the
1st Battalion of the 53rd Infantry Regiment. The divisional headquarters was
located 5 kilometres (3 mi) southwest of Koprivnica at Reka.[39]

In accordance with Nedeljković's orders, Marić's 27th ID was to undertake a

counterattack against the Zákány bridgehead on 8 April. Supported by two batteries
of Skoda 75 mm Model 1928 mountain guns of the 27th Artillery Regiment, the attack
consisted of three columns converging on the bridgehead. The right column,
attacking from the area of Bregi, was to consist of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment
supported by the divisional machine gun company. The centre column, consisting of
the 53rd Infantry Regiment and the remnants of the 2nd Battalion of the 36th
Infantry Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 35th Infantry Regiment, directly
supported by the 1st Battery of the 27th Artillery Regiment, would attack from
Koprivnica. The left column, attacking from the vicinity of Herešin, was to consist
of the dismounted 81st Cavalry Regiment.[39] As promised support from the 36th
Infantry Regiment, 81st Cavalry Regiment and army-level artillery had not
materialised, Marić postponed the counterattack to 16:00.[40] By noon, a full-scale
revolt had broken out within the flanking 40th ID, resulting in the capture of the
town of Bjelovar and a large portion of the 4th Army headquarters by the rebels
that afternoon.[38] The attack on the bridgehead at Zákány was eventually launched,
but by the time the attack petered out only the 2nd Cavalry Regiment and the 1st
Squadron of the 81st Cavalry Regiment remained in contact with the Germans south of
Peteranec. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment held that area throughout the night of 8/9
April, despite heavy German artillery fire. Of the other units involved in the
counterattack, most were only at 25 percent of their full strength due to Ustaše-
influenced desertions sparked by the rebellion within the 40th ID. Two battalions
of the 36th Infantry Regiment deserted during the day.[40]
9 April
male in German uniform with peaked cap and toothbrush moustache
General der Panzertruppe Heinrich von Vietinghoff commanded the XXXXVI Motorised
Corps.

On 9 April, the left flanking 42nd ID withdrew from the Drava to conform with the
line being held by forward elements of the 27th ID,[41] while the German XXXXVI
Motorised Corps completed its preparations for full-scale offensive action by
expanding its bridgehead at Zákány.[42] The cavalry units continued to fight the
Germans around Peteranec, but the left sector of the divisional front line began to
disintegrate. The commander of the right sector, Pukovnik[c] Mihailo Georgijević
ordered his troops to hold their positions and went to divisional headquarters to
ask approval to discharge the Croats in his units. Marić would not inform 4th Army
headquarters of this idea, so Georgijević went to Zagreb to speak to Petrović, and
to further urge him to withdraw all troops that still wanted to fight to a line
south of the Sava. According to Georgijević, Petrović ordered him to tell Marić to
consider disarming his Croat troops, and to continue to hold positions on the line
of the Bilogora hills, but to conduct a fighting withdrawal towards Zagreb and
Sisak if the German pressure was too great. The intent of these orders was not
implemented, as fifth column elements changed the wording so that orders were
issued to discharge Croat troops and to retreat towards Zagreb without fighting.
[43]

About 09:00, Marić and Marković went to Zagreb to see Petrović, who ordered them to
immediately return to their division and continue to resist the Germans. On the
return journey, they encountered most of their division withdrawing towards
Križevci, with the exception of the cavalry units still fighting north of
Koprivnica. Marić halted the retreat, and established positions around Mali
Grabičani, making his headquarters at Križevci.[43] Georgijević dismissed his Croat
troops and retreated with the rest of his force towards Zagreb, and the commander
of the 104th Infantry Regiment discharged all his troops. In the afternoon, the
hard-pressed cavalry units began to withdraw. About 14:00, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment
withdrew to Novigrad Podravski via Bregi, but receiving a hostile reception from
the Croat population, continued towards Bjelovar. About 18:00, the 1st Squadron of
the 81st Cavalry Regiment withdrew via Koprivnica, reaching the rest of the
division about 23:00. About 19:00, the Germans occupied Koprivnica without
resistance. By evening, Marić's division numbered about 2,000 troops, the 36th
Infantry Regiment and 81st Cavalry Regiment were widely dispersed, the 53rd
Infantry Regiment had effectively ceased to exist, and his artillery regiment had
only two horses to pull guns.[41]

Before the disbandment of the 104th Infantry Regiment, the rebels in Bjelovar had
used the telegraph station and telephone exchange in the town to issue false orders
to parts of it directing them to withdraw from their positions. The rebels also
contacted the Germans by telephone and sent representatives to meet the Germans at
the Drava bridgeheads, to advise them that the roads had been cleared of obstacles,
and the rebels invited them to enter Bjelovar. Rebels and deserters began to
converge on Bjelovar, bringing with them many Serb officers and soldiers who soon
filled the town's jails.[42]

Elements of the 4th Army began to withdraw southwards on 9 April.[44] On the

evening of 9 April, Generaloberst[d] Maximilian von Weichs, commander of the German
2nd Army, was ready to launch major offensive operations from the bridgeheads on
the following day.[46] His plan involved two main thrusts. The first would be
spearheaded by the 14th Panzer Division of Generalmajor[e] Friedrich Kühn, breaking
out of the Zákány bridgehead and drive towards Zagreb.[47] The second would see
Generalmajor Walter Neumann-Silkow's 8th Panzer Division break out of the
bridgehead in the sector of the 40th ID and turn east between the Drava and Sava to
attack towards Belgrade.[48] On the night of 9/10 April, those Croats that had
remained with their units also began to desert or turn on their commanders,[49] and
in the 40th ID on the right flank of the 27th ID, almost all the remaining troops
were Serbs.[50] Due to the increasing momentum of the revolt, Petrović concluded
that the 4th Army was no longer an effective formation and could not resist the
Germans.[42]
Fate

Early on 10 April, Pukovnik Franjo Nikolić, the head of the operations staff with
the headquarters of the 1st Army Group,[51] left his post and visited the senior
Ustaše leader Slavko Kvaternik in Zagreb. He then returned to headquarters and
redirected 4th Army units around Zagreb to either cease operations or to deploy to
innocuous positions. These actions reduced or eliminated armed resistance to the
German advance.[52] On the same day, the 14th Panzer Division, supported by dive
bombers, crossed the Drava and drove southwest towards Zagreb on snow-covered roads
in extremely cold conditions. Initial air reconnaissance indicated large
concentrations of Yugoslav troops on the divisional axis of advance, but these
troops proved to be withdrawing towards Zagreb.[47]
a black and white photograph of a moving tank
German tanks brushed aside Yugoslav resistance.

Degraded by revolt and fifth-column activity, the 27th ID numbered about 2,000
effectives when the German attack began. The 14th Panzer Division vanguard reached
their positions in the Bilogora range around 08:00, and the remnants of the
division began withdrawing towards Križevci under heavy air attack. When they
reached the town around 14:00, they were quickly encircled by German motorised
troops that had outflanked them. The divisional headquarters staff escaped, but
were captured a little further down the road at Bojnikovec. The remnants of the 2nd
Cavalry Regiment had to fight its way towards Bjelovar, but was attacked and
captured by German tanks on the outskirts.[53] The 14th Panzer Division continued
its almost completely unopposed drive on Zagreb using two routes, Križevci – Dugo
Selo – Zagreb and Bjelovar – Čazma – Ivanić-Grad – Zagreb.[54]

About 17:45 on 10 April, Kvaternik and SS-Standartenführer[f] Edmund Veesenmayer

went to the radio station in Zagreb and Kvaternik proclaimed the creation of the
Independent State of Croatia (Croatian: Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH).[56] The
35th Infantry Regiment of the 27th ID was disbanded by its commander when he heard
news of the proclamation.[20] By 19:30 on 10 April, lead elements of the 14th
Panzer Division had reached the outskirts of Zagreb, having covered nearly 160
kilometres (100 miles) in a single day.[47] By the time it entered Zagreb, the 14th
Panzer Division was met by cheering crowds, and had captured 15,000 Yugoslav
troops, including 22 generals.[57]
a black and white photograph of four older males in military uniform wearing
peakless caps
A group of captured Yugoslav generals in Zagreb

About 19:45, the 1st Army Group held a conference in Zagreb, just as German tanks
were entering the city. Nedeljković told Petrović that he could no longer hold his
positions, but despite this, Petrović ordered him to hold for at least two to three
days to enable the withdrawal of the 7th Army to the Kupa river. Nedeljković
replied that he no longer had an army, and suggested that all Serb officers and men
be ordered back to form a defensive line along the Sava and Una rivers. Petrović
refused to consider this, but ordered the 1st Cavalry Division to form a defensive
line along the Sava between Jasenovac and Zagreb.[58] The XXXXVI Motorised Corps
encountered little resistance from the 4th Army, particularly from the 27th ID and
40th Infantry Division Slavonska on its right, and by the evening of 10 April the
whole 4th Army was disintegrating. Petrović wanted to dismiss Marić as commander of
the 27th ID due to suspicions that he was an Ustaše sympathiser, but could not
identify a suitable replacement.[59]

On 11 April, Petrović and the staff of 1st Army Group headquarters were captured by
Ustaše at Petrinja, and the rear area staff of 4th Army headquarters were captured
by Ustaše at Topusko. The personnel of both headquarters were soon handed over to
the Germans by their captors. Nedeljković and his operations staff escaped to fight
on for a few days, but the 27th ID had ceased to exist.[60] On 15 April,
Nedeljković received orders that a ceasefire had been agreed, and that all 4th Army
troops were to remain in place and not fire on German personnel.[61] After a delay
in locating appropriate signatories for the surrender document, the Yugoslav
Supreme Command unconditionally surrendered in Belgrade effective at 12:00 on 18
April.[62] Yugoslavia was then occupied and dismembered by the Axis powers;
Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania all annexed parts of its territory.
[63] Almost all of the Croat members of the division taken as prisoners of war were
soon released by the Germans, as 90 percent of those held for the duration of the
war were Serbs.[64] Marić became the first chief-of-staff of the Croatian Home
Guard when it was created in May 1941, but was removed from his post and retired
that September, probably because the Ustaše leadership did not trust him.[65]
Notes

Equivalent to a U.S. Army lieutenant general.[24]

Equivalent to a U.S. Army major general.[24]
Equivalent to a U.S. Army colonel.[24]
Equivalent to a U.S. Army general.[45]
Equivalent to a U.S. Army brigadier general.[45]

Equivalent to a U.S. Army colonel.[55]

Footnotes

Figa 2004, p. 235.

Hoptner 1963, pp. 160–161.
Tomasevich 1975, p. 60.
Tomasevich 1975, p. 58.
Brayley & Chappell 2001, p. 17.
Tomasevich 1975, pp. 58–59.
Hoptner 1963, p. 161.
Tomasevich 1975, p. 57.
Tomasevich 1975, p. 63.
Ramet 2006, p. 111.
Terzić 1982, p. 99.
Terzić 1982, p. 101.
Terzić 1982, p. 104.
Niehorster 2015b.
Terzić 1982, pp. 104, 106–107.
Terzić 1982, pp. 104–106.
Terzić 1982, pp. 107, 119.
Terzić 1982, pp. 106–107.
Geografski institut JNA 1952.
Terzić 1982, p. 257.
Terzić 1982, p. 258.
Terzić 1982, p. 256.
Terzić 1982, pp. 256–258.
Niehorster 2015a.
Tomasevich 1975, pp. 34–43.
Tomasevich 1975, p. 64.
Trevor-Roper 1964, pp. 108–109.
Barefield 1993, pp. 52–53.
Terzić 1982, p. 269.
Terzić 1982, p. 293.
U.S. Army 1986, pp. 52–53.
Terzić 1982, p. 265.
Terzić 1982, p. 308.
Krzak 2006, p. 583.
Shores, Cull & Malizia 1987, p. 213.
Terzić 1982, pp. 308–310.
Terzić 1982, p. 312.
Terzić 1982, pp. 329–331.
Terzić 1982, p. 331.
Terzić 1982, p. 332.
Terzić 1982, p. 348.
Terzić 1982, p. 345.
Terzić 1982, p. 347.
Tomasevich 1975, p. 68.
Niehorster 2018c.
Terzić 1982, p. 361.
U.S. Army 1986, p. 58.
U.S. Army 1986, p. 53.
Krzak 2006, pp. 583–584.
Terzić 1982, p. 346.
Krzak 2006, p. 585.
Tomasevich 2001, p. 55.
Terzić 1982, p. 367.
Terzić 1982, pp. 367–368.
Niehorster 2018c, p. 295.
Tomasevich 2001, pp. 52–53.
U.S. Army 1986, p. 60.
Terzić 1982, pp. 364–366.
Terzić 1982, p. 364.
Terzić 1982, pp. 386–388.
Terzić 1982, pp. 444–445.
U.S. Army 1986, pp. 63–64.
Tomasevich 1975, pp. 89–95.
Tomasevich 1975, pp. 73–74.

Tomasevich 2001, p. 425.

References
Books

Brayley, Martin; Chappell, Mike (2001). British Army 1939–45 (1): North-West
Europe. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84176-052-0.
Figa, Jozef (2004). "Framing the Conflict: Slovenia in Search of Her Army".
Civil-Military Relations, Nation Building, and National Identity: Comparative
Perspectives. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. ISBN 978-0-313-04645-2.
Geografski institut JNA (1952). "Napad na Jugoslaviju 6 Aprila 1941 godine"
[The Attack on Yugoslavia of 6 April 1941]. Istorijski atlas oslobodilačkog rata
naroda Jugoslavije [Historical Atlas of the Yugoslav Peoples Liberation War] (in
Serbo-Croatian). Belgrade: Vojnoistorijskog instituta JNA [Military History
Institute of the JNA]. OCLC 504206827. Archived from the original on 1 May 2013.
Hoptner, J.B. (1963). Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934–1941. New York: Columbia
University Press. OCLC 404664.
Ramet, Sabrina P. (2006). The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and
Legitimation, 1918–2005. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ISBN 978-0-253-
34656-8.
Shores, Christopher F.; Cull, Brian; Malizia, Nicola (1987). Air War for
Yugoslavia, Greece, and Crete, 1940–41. London: Grub Street. ISBN 978-0-948817-07-
6.
Terzić, Velimir (1982). Slom Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941 : uzroci i posledice
poraza [The Collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941: Causes and Consequences
of Defeat] (in Serbo-Croatian). Vol. 2. Belgrade: Narodna knjiga. OCLC 10276738.
Tomasevich, Jozo (1975). War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: The
Chetniks. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-0857-9.
Tomasevich, Jozo (2001). War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945:
Occupation and Collaboration. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. ISBN
978-0-8047-3615-2.
Trevor-Roper, Hugh (1964). Hitler's War Directives: 1939–1945. London: Sidgwick
and Jackson. OCLC 852024357.
 U.S. Army (1986) [1953]. The German Campaigns in the Balkans (Spring 1941).
Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. OCLC 16940402. CMH
Pub 104-4. Archived from the original on 19 June 2009. Retrieved 7 December 2015.

Journals and papers

Barefield, Michael R. (May 1993). Overwhelming Force, Indecisive Victory: The

German Invasion of Yugoslavia, 1941 (PDF) (Report). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:
School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff
College. OCLC 32251055. Archived (PDF) from the original on 29 April 2017.
Retrieved 17 July 2018.
Krzak, Andrzej (2006). "Operation "Marita": The Attack Against Yugoslavia in
1941". The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. 19 (3): 543–600.
doi:10.1080/13518040600868123. ISSN 1351-8046. S2CID 219625930.

Websites

Niehorster, Leo (2015a). "Royal Yugoslav Armed Forces Ranks". Leo Niehorster.
Retrieved 7 December 2015.
Niehorster, Leo (2015b). "Royal Yugoslavian Army Infantry Division 6th April
1941". Leo Niehorster. Retrieved 7 December 2015.
Niehorster, Leo (2018c). "German Army and Waffen-SS Ranks". Leo Niehorster.
Retrieved 20 July 2018.

vte

1st Army Group

4th Army

27th Infantry Division Savska 40th Infantry Division Slavonska 42nd Infantry
Division Murska

7th Army

32nd Infantry Division Triglavski 38th Infantry Division Dravska

Army Group Reserve

1st Cavalry Division

Categories:

Military units and formations of Yugoslavia in World War IIMilitary units and
formations disestablished in 1941

This page was last edited on 11 April 2023, at 09:10 (UTC).

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