82840

INTRODUCTION TO

Y
PHILOSOPH

Classicaland ContemporaryReadings
EIGHTH EDITION

editedby

JOHNPERRY MICHAELBRATMAN
University of California, Riverside Stanford University
Stanford University

JOHNMARTINFISCHER
University ofCalifornia, Riverside

New York Oxford

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
 KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY

KEY TERMS What does Hume When he says that

pcrccptions arc the samc in the of their
Metaphysics existence'?What'shisargument this claim?
S 11bstance W Bat importance does placeon thc notions
of coherenceand constancy?How do they fit into
his argument?
Hume points out that "anothcr advantage of this
STUDY QUESTIONS
philmsophical systemis its similarity to the vulgar
one," What he mean by this, Why does
I. According to Hume, what is thc difference be
it an advantage?Do you think it really is
existence and distinct existence?
an advantage?
2. Why do you think Hume saysthat "'tis absurd,
therefore, to imagine thc sensescan e
guish betwixt and external

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

DAVID HUME

In David famously introduces

cal Hurries about induction and thc idea that thc future Will
Linguishesbetween two objects of human «ason. On thc one hand, we rcas(m about the
Ofideas."This is the provinceOfdeductive reasoning,For instance,wc can
that three times five is equal to thc half of thirty. On the other hand, we
"matters of fact." This is the province, e.g.,of scicncc,and is founded, Hurac argues,on our
expectaticmthat the Future will resembleåhepast.Why, though, arc wc instificd in expect-
ing this? Hume argues that wc aren't. Relatedly,Hume also raisesskeptical worries
the notion of cause and effect.

Section II afterwards recalls to his memory this scnsation, or

Of the Origin of Ideas anticipates it by his imagination. These faculties
may mimic or copy the perceptionsof thc scnscs;but
Ew•ry one will readily allow, that there is a considet% they never can entirely reach the force and
abledifference betweenthc pcrccptions of thc mind, of the original sentiment. Thc utmost wc say of
when a man feels the pain of excessiveheat, or thc them, evenwhen they operate with greatestvigour,
pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he is, that they represent their object in so lively a
that- almost say wc feel or sec It:
But, except the mind be disordered by discascor
madness,they never arrive at such a pitch of vi-
Frcm and render perceptionsaltogcthcr
the princip/« hy L _A, Selby-Biggc, distinguishable. All the colours of poetry, however
by P. H _ Nidditch. Copyright 0 1975 by splendid, Cannever paint natural Objectsin a
Uni'Cßity Pros. Repr.nted by Of publisher. manner xs to make the description be taken Fora
 HUME: AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING
reallandscape,The mostlively thought is still infe-
to the dull sensation.
We mayobservea likc distinction to run through
all rhe Otherperceptionsof thc mind. A man in a fit
of anger,is actuatedin a very different manner from
one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me,
that anypersonis in love,I easilyunderstandyour
meaning, and form a just conception of It'S situation;
but ntwer can mistake that conception the real
disorders and agitations of thc passion.When we
reflect on our past sentiments and affections, our
thought is a faithful mirror, and copresits Obieets
truly; but thc colours which it employsare faint and
dull, in comparison of those in which our original
perceptionswere clothed.It requiresno nicediscern-
mcnt or metaphysical bead to mark the distinction
bctwccn them.
Hcrc thcrcforc wc may divide all the pcTcæptions
of thc mind into two classesor species,which aredis-
tinguished by their degreesOf Forceand
vivacity.Thc lcssforcibleand lively arecommonly de
Iwminatcd Thoup51sor Ideas.The Otherspecieswant
a name in our language,and in most Others; Sup-
pose,bccauscit was not requisite for any,but philo-
sophicalpurposes,to rank them under ageneralterm
or appellation. Tat us, therefore, use a little freedom,
and call them employing that word in a
scnsesomewhatdifferent from thc usual. By thc term
impression,then, I mean all our morc lively pcrccp-
tlons, when we hear, or see,or feel, or love, or hate, or
desire, or will- And impressionsare distinguishcd
from ideas,which are the lesslively perceptions,of
which we are conscious,when we on any of
those sensations Or movements above mentioned.
Nothing, arfirst view,may scemmorc unbounded
than the thought of man, which not only cscapcsall
human power and authority, but IS not cvcn
strained within thc limits of nature and reality. To
Formmonsters,andjoin incongruousshapesandap-
pearances, costs thc imagination no more trouble
than ro conceive thc most natural and familiar ob-
jects. And while the body is confined to onc planet,
along which it crccps with pain and difficulty; the
thought can in an instant transport us into the most
distant regions of the universe; or even bcyoru] the
universe, into thc unboundcd chaos, where nature is
supposed to lie total confusion. What never was
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
seen, or heard of, may yer be conceived; nor any
thing beyondthe power of thought, exceptwhat im-
pliesan absolute"jntracliction.
But though our thought sccms to possessthis un-
bou d I liberty, we shall find, upon a nearerexami-
nation, that it is really within very narrow
limits, and that all this creativc power of the mind
anumnts to no more tlran the faculty of compound-
ing, transposing,augmenting,or diminishing the ma-
terials afforded us by thc sensesand experience
When wc think ofa golden mountain, wc only join
two consistent ideas,gold, and mountain, with which
we were formerly acquainted. A virtuous horse we
can bccause,from our own feeling, we can
conceivevirtuc; and this wc may unite 10thc figure
and shapeof a horse, which is an animal familiar to
us. In short, all the materialsof thinking arc derived
cither from our outuard or inward sentiment: the
mixture and compositionof Chese belongsaloneto the
mind and will. Or, to expressmyself in philosophical
languagc,all our ideasor feebleperceptionsare
copicsof our impressionsor more lively ones.
To provethis, thc two Followingargumentswill, I
hope, bc sufficient. First, when Wc analyzc our
houghtsor ideas,howevercompoundedor sublimc,
we alwaysfind that they reM'Ivethemselvesinto such
stmplc idcasaswere copiedfrom a prcccdcntfeeling
or sentiment. Even thosc ideas, which, at hrst view,
seemthe most wide of this origin, arc found, upon a
ncarcr scrutiny, to be derived from it. Thc idea of
God, as meaning an infinitely intelligcnt, wise, and
good Being, from reflecting on thc operations
of our mind, and augmenting, without limit,
thosequalities of goodnessand wisdom. Wc may
prosecute this enquiry to what length we please;
where shall alwaysfind, that cvcry idca which wc
examine is copied from a similar impression.Those
who would assertthat thispositionisnot universally
true nor without exception, have only onc, and that
an easymethod of refuting it; by producing that idea,
which, in their opinion, is not derived from this
It Will then bc incumbcnt on us, it we would
maintain our doctrinc, to producethe impression,Or
lively perception,which correspondsto it.
Secundly.If it happen,from a clefextof the organ,
that a man is not susceptibleof'any speciesof sensa-
rion, wc alwaysfind that he ISasIltrle susceptibleof
 KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY
the correspondent ideas. A blind man can form no
notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds. Restore
either of them that senscin which he is deficient; by
opening this new inlet for his sensations,you also
open an inlet for the ideas;and hc finds no difficulty
in conceiving these obiccts. Thc case is thc same, if
the object, proper for exciting any sensation, Ins
never bccn applied to thc organ. A Laplander or
Negro has no notion of thc rclish of wine. And
though there area fenvor no instancesof a likc dcfi-
Cieneyin thc mind, whcrc a pcrsonhasneverfelt or is
wholly incapableof a sentiment or passionthat be-
longsto his species;yetwe find the sameobservation
to take placein alcssdcgrcc. A man of mild manners
can form no idea of inveterate revengeor cruclty; nor
selfish heart easily conceive the heights of
friendship and generosity.It is readily allowed, that
other beings may pcyssessmany sensesof which wc
can have no conception; becausethe ideasof them
haveneverbeenintroduced to us in thc only manner
by which an ideacan haveaccessto the mind, to wit,
by the actual and
There is, Contradictory phenotnc-
non, which may provethat it is nor absolutelyimpos-
for to arise, Of their
correspondentimpregsions_I I'ælieveit will readily be
allowed, that the several distinct ideas of colour,
Which enter by eye,or Of are
conveyedby the ear, are really different from
other; though, at the sametime, resembling,Now if
this bc true of differenr colours, it must be no
of thc different shades of the same colour; and each
shadc produces a distinct iclt%l,independent Of the
rest. For if this Should he denied, by
continual gradation of shades,to run a colour insen-
sibly into what is most remotefrom it; and if you Will
not allow any of the means to be different, you
cannot, without absurdity, deny the extremes to be
thc same. Suppose, therefore, a person to have
enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become
pcrfcctly acquainted with colours of all kinds except
one particular shadc of bluc, for instance,which it
never has becn his fortune to meet with. Let all dif-
Ferentshadesof that colour, except that single one, bc
placed IRforc him, desccnding gradually from the
deepestto the lightest;it is plain that hc will pcrccive
a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will bc
sensiblethat there is greater distanccin that place
between the contiguous colours than in any othcr.
Now I ask, whether it be possiblcfor him, from his
own imagination, to supply this deficiency,amdraise
up to himself' the of that particular shade,
though it had never been conveyedto him by his
believe there arc but Will be Of opinion
that he can: and this Servcas a prcN3fthat the
simpleideasarenot always,in everyinstance,derived
from the impressions;though this in-
stanceis Sosingular, that it is scarcelyworth our ob-
serving,and docsnot merit that for it aloneweshould
alter our general maxim.
Here, therefore,is a proposition, which not only
sccms,in itself, simple and intelligible; but, if a proper
use made of it, might render every dispute
equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon, which
has so long taken possessionof metaphysical reason-
ings, and drawn disgrace upon them. All ideas,
cially abstract ones, arc naturally faint and obscure;
thc mind has but a slender hold of them; they are apt
to be confounded with other resembling ideas; and
when we have often employed any term, though
without a distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine it
Iras a determinate idea annexed to it. On the con-
trary, all impressions,that is, all sensations,cither
outward or inward, arc strong and vivid: thc limits
between them are more exactly determined: nor it
easyto fall into any error or mistake with regard
them. W ben we entertain, thcrcforc, any suspicion
so that a philosophical term is employed without any
meaning or idea(asis but too frequent),we needbut
enquire,fom impressionis thatsupposedideode•
rived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will
serveto confirm our suspicion.By bringing ideasinto
soclear a light we may reasonablyhope to rcmovc all
dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature
and
Section 111
Of the Association of Ideas
It is evident that there is a principle be-
tween the different thoughts or ideas Of the mind,
and that, in their appearance to the memory Or im-
agination, they introduce each other with a certain
 HUME: AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING
e
degreof methodandregularity.
In our morescri-
ousthinking or discoursethis is so observablethat
anyparticularthought,whichbreaksin uponthc
r
regula rractor chainof'ideas,is immediately
re-
marked and rcicctecl.And even in wildest aml
most wandering reveries,nay in our very drcams,
we shall find, if wc reRect, thar the imagination ran
notaltogetherat adventures,but that thwrcwasstill
a connexion upheld among the different ideas,
which succeeded cach other. Were the loosest and
freest conversation to be transcribed, therc would
immediately bc observed something which con-
nected it in all its transitions. Or where this is want-
ink, the personwho brokethc threadof cliw•ourse utally bedivided into
might still inform you,that therehadsecretly Ideas, and Matters of Fact.
volved in his mind a succcssionof thought, which
had gradually lcd him from the subjectof cnnversa-
tion. Among different languages, cvcn where we
cannot suspectthe least connexion or communica-
rion, it is found, that the words, exprcssivc of ideas,
thc most compounded, do yct nearly correspond to
each other; a certain proof that thc simple ideas,
comprehendedin eomlu-.undones,were [u)und
togcthcrby Someuniversalprinciplc,which had an
equal influence on all mankind.
Though it be too obvious to escapeobservation,
that diffcrent ideasare connectedtogether; I do not
find that any philosopher hasattempted to cnumcr-
ateor classall thc principle_sof association;a subicct,
howcvcr,that seemsworthy Ofcuricßity.To me,there
appearto bc only three principles of connexion
among ideas, namely, Resemblance,Contiguity in
timc or placc,and Couseor
That thcscprinciplesserveto connectideaswill
not, I believe,be much doubted. A picture naturally
leadsour thoughtsto thc original;2the mentionof
oneapartmentin a building naturally introducesan
enquiryor discourse
concerningrheothers:}andif
we think of a wound, wc can scarcelyforbear rcflcct-
ing on thepainwhichfollowsit.*But thatIbisenu-
merarion is complete, and thar there are no other
principlesof associationexceptthese,may
to prove to the vattsfactionof the reader,or evento a
man's satisfaction. All wc Can do, in Such Cases,
is to instances,and examine carefully
thc principle which binds the different thoughts to
eachother, stopping till we renderthe principle
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
asgeneralaspossible.'Thc morcinstancesweexam-
ine, and thc more care we employ, thc more
ancc shall we acalLjire,that the enumeration, which
we form from the whole, is complctcand entire.
Section IV
Sceptical Doubts Concerning
the Operationsof the Understanding
All thc objects of human reason or enquiry may nat-
kinds, to wit, Relations of
Grst kind arc the
sciencesof Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and
in short, everyaffirmation which is either intuitively
or dcmonstratively certain. Thar thc sqcure ofthe hy-
pothenuseis equal to the squareof the two sides, a
propositionwhich cxprcsscs
a relationbetweenthese
figures. Thu' three timesfive is equal the half of
thirty, expressesa rclation hctwccn thesenumbers.
Propositionsof this kind arcdiscoverable
hy themere
operation ot thought, without dependenceon what is
anywhere existent in thc universe. Though there
never were a circle or trianglc in nature, rhc truths
demonstratedby Euclid would for twer retain their
certainty and evidence.
Matters of fact, which are thc secondobjects of
human arc not ascertained in the same
manner; nor is our evidencc of their truth, however
great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The con-
trary of everymatter of fact is still possible;becauseit
can ncwerimply a contradiction, at-Ki conceivedby
thc mind with rhe same facility and distinctncss, as if
ever so conformable to reality. Tho: the sun will not
riseto-monuW is nolessintelligible a proposition,and
implics no more conrradiction than the affirmation,
that it will vise.Wc should in vain, thcrcfore, attempt
to clcmonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively
false,it would imply acontradiction, and could ncvcr
be distinctly conceived by the mind.
It may,thcrcforc,bc a subjectworthy of curiosity,to
enquire what is thc nature of that evidencr which as-
surcsusof anyrealexistenceandmarrerof fact,bcyor«i
thepresenttcstimonyof our senses,
Orthe recordsof
our memory.This partof philosophy,it isobservable,
 KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY
hasbeenlittle cultivated, eithcr by the ancientsor mod-
erns; and therefore our doubts and errors, in the pros-
ccution of so important an enquiry, may bc thc more
excusable; whilc wr march through such difficult
paths without any guiclc or direction. They may even
proveuseful,by exciting curiosity,ancldestroyingthat
implicit fairh and security, which ISthc bane of all rea-
soning and frcc enquiry. The discovery of defects in
the common philosophy, if any such thcrc bc, will not,
I presume, bc a discouragcmcnt, but rather an incite-
ment, as is usual, to attempt something more full and
satisfactorythan hasyct bccn proposedto the public.
All rcasoningsconcerning matter of fact seemto
be founded on the relation of Causeand Effect. By
meansof that rclatlon alonc we go beyond the
cvidcncc of our memory and senses.If you were to
ask a man, why he believesany matter of Fact,which
IS absent; for instance, that his friend is in the coun-
try, or in France;hewould giveyou a reason;and this
reason would be some Other as a letter received
from or thc knowledgeOf former resolutions
and promises.A man finding a watch or any other
machine in a island, conclude that there
had oncebccn men in that island. All our reasonings
concerningfact areof the samenature. And hereit is
constantly supposedthat there is a connexion bc-
tween thc present fact and that which is inferred
from it. Were there nothing to bind them together,
the inferencewould be entirely precMions.The hear-
ing of an articulate voice and rational discoursein
the dark assuresus Of the presenceof someperson:
Why? becausetheseare the effects of the human
make fabric, and connected With it. If we
anatomize all the other reasonings of this naturc, wc
shall find that they are founded on thc relation of
and effect, and that this relation is cither near
or remote, direct or collateral. Heat and light arc col-
lareral effectsof fire, and thc onecffcct may iustly be
inferred from the other.
If we would satisfy ourselves, thcrcforc, conccrn-
ing the nature of that evidence, which assuresus of
matters of fact, must enquire how we arrive at the
knowledge OfCauseand effect.
I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition,
which admits of no exception,that the knowlcdgc of
this relation is not, in any instance,attained by rea-
soningsa priori; but arisesentirely from experience,
when we find thar any particular objects are con-
stantly conioincul with eachother. Let an object be
presentedto a man of ever soStrong reason
and abilities; if that object heentirely new to him, he
will not bc able, by the most accurateexamination
of its sensiblequalities, to discoverany or its causes
or effects. Adam, though his rational faculties he
suppcnscd,at the very first, entirely perfect, could not
Lave inferred from the Buidity and transparencyof
water that it would suffocarc him, or from the light
and warmth of fire that it would consume him. No
object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear
to the senses,either the causeswhich produce it, or
the effects which will arise from it; nor can our
reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any in-
ferenceconcerning realcxistenccand matter of fact.
This proposition, causesand effectsme discover-
able, nor by musonbur by experience,will readily bc acL
mitted with regard to such obiccts, as wc rcmemlkr
to haveonce bccn altogether unknown to us; sincewe
must bc consciousof thc uttcr inability, which wc thcti
lay under, of foretelling what uould arisc from them.
Presenttwo smooth piecesof marble to a man who has
no tincture of natural philosophy;hc will never dis-
coverthat they will adhcrctogetherin sucha manner
as to rcqutrc great force to separate them in a direct
line, while they makc so small a rcsistancæto a lateral
pressure.Such cvcnts, as bear little analogy to the
commoncourseof nature,arealsoreadilyconfessedto
bc known only by experience;nor does any man
imagine that the cxplcysionof gunpowder,or the at-
traction ofa loadstone,could everbe discrwercxlby ar-
gumcnts a priori. [n like manner, when an effect is
supposedto depend upon an intricate machinery Or
SecretStructureOf parts, We in at-
tributing all our or it to experience.Who
will asscrtthat he can give the ultimate reason,why
milk or breadis propernourishmentfor a man,not for
a lion or a tiger?
But the sametruth may not appear,at first sight,
to have the same evidence with regard to events,
which havc familiar to us from our first ap-
pearancein the world, which beara closcanalogy to
the whole courseof nature, and which arc supposed
to dependon the simple qualities of objects,witlu-nmt
any secretstructure of parts. Wc arc apt to imaginc
that we could discover thcse effects by the mere
 HUME: AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
operationof our reason,without experience.Wc
fancy,that were wc broughton a suddeninto this
world, we could at first have inferred that
one Billiard-ball would communicate morion to an-
other upon Impulse; and that we nccded not to have
waited for thc event,in order to pronouncewith
certainty concerning it. Such is the influence of
custom,thar,whereit isstrongest,it not only
our natural ignorance, but evenconcealsitself, and
seemsnot to takc place,merely bccauseit is found
in thc highest degree.
BLitto convince usthat all thc lawsof nature, and
all theOperations
of bodieswithout exception,are
knownonlybyexperience, thefollowingreflections
may,perhaps,suffice.Wereanyoblectprescntcdto
us,and were we requiredto pronounceconcerning
thc effect,which will result from It, without con-
sulting past observation; after what manner, I bc-
seechyou,mustthemind proceedin this operation?
It must invent or imagine somc which it
ascribesto thc objectasits cffcct;and it isplain that
this invcntionmusthecntircly arbitrary. Thc mind
can never possibly find the effect in thc supposed
,
Causeby thc mostaccuratescrutiny and examina-
tion. For the effect is totally different from the
cause,and consequentlycan never be discoveredin
it. Motion in the secondBilliard-ball is a quitc dis-
tinct cvcnt from motion in the first; nor is there
thing in the one to suggest smallest hint of the
other.A stoneor pieccof metal raisedinto the air,
and left without anysupport,immediatelyfalls:but
to considerthematterapriori, isthereanythingwe
discoverin this situationwhich canbcgcttheideaOf
a downward,rathcrthanan upward,or anyOther
motion, in the stone or metal?
Andasthcfirstimaginationorinvcntionofa par-
ticular effect,in all naturaloperations,
is arbitrary,
wherewe consultnot experience;so must we also
estccm the supposed tie or conncxion between thc
causeand effcct, which binds them together,and
rendersit impossiblethat any other cfFecrcould
resultfrom thc operationof that causc.When I scc,
for instancc,aBilliard-ballmovingin astraightline
towards another; evensupposcmotion in the sc&-ond
ball shouldby accidentbe suggcstcdto me, as thc
resultof their contactOrimpulse;may I nor conceive,
that a hundreddifferenteventsmight aswell follow
from that cause?May not Iw,th theseballs remain at
absolute rest? May not the first ball return in a
straightline,or leapoff from rhc secondin anyline
or All these suppositionsare consistent
andconceivable.
Why thenshouldwegivethc prcf-
creme to one, which is no morc consistent or con-
ceivablethan the rest?All our reasonings
a priori
will neverbe ableto showus any foundationfor
this preference.
In a word, then, effect is a distinct event
from its cause.It could not, thcrcfore,bc discovered
in the causc,and thc first inventionor conception
of it, a priori, mustbeentirelyarbitrary.And cycli
after it is suggested,thc conjunction Of it with the
causemust appear equally arbitrary; since there are
always many other effects, which, to reason,must
Seemfully as consistentanclnatural. In vain, tßere-
fore, shouldwe pretcndto determincany Single
event,or infer any causeof effect, without thc assis-
tanceof observationandexperience,
Hencewe maydiscoverthe reasonwhy nophi-
losopher,who is rational and modest,has ever
tendedto a"ign theultimatecauseof anynatural
operation, or to show distinctly the action Of that
p:nver,which producesanysingleeffectin the uni-
•,erse. [t is confessed, that the utmost cffortofhuman
reasonis to reducethc principles,productiveOfnatu-
ral phenomena,to agreatersimplicity,and to resolve
themanyparticularcffcetsintoafewgeneralCauses,
by of reasonings from analogy,experience,
andobsen•ation.
Butasto rhecauses of thesegeneral
causes,
weshouldin vainattemptthcir discovery;nor
shallweeverbcableto satisfyourselves,
byanypar-
ticularexplicationof them.Theseultimatesprings
anclprinciplesarctotallyshutup from humancurios-
ity andenquiry.Elasticity,gravity,cohesionof parts,
communicationof motionbyimpulse;thesearcprob-
ablytheultimatccauses
andprincipleswhichweshall
everdiscoverin nature;and wc mayesteemourselves
sunicientlyhappy,if, hyaccurate
enquiryandreason-
ing,wc cantraccup theparticularphenomenato,or
near to, thcscgeneralprinciples.The most perfect
philosophy
ofthenaruralkindonlystaves
offourig-
norancca little longer;asperhapsthc mostperfect
philosophyof themoralor metaphysicalkind serves
only to discoverlarger portions ofit. Thus the obser-
vation of human blindness atv] weakness is the result
 KNOWLEDCE AND REALITY
of all philosophy, and mccts us at every turn, in spite
of our endeavours to elude or avoid it.
Nor is geometry, when taken into the assistance
of natural philosophy, cvcr able to remedy this
defect, or lead us into the knowledge of ultimate
causes, by all that accuracy of reasoning for which it
is so justly celebrated. Every part of mixed mathe-
matics proceeds thc supposition that certain
laws arc established by naturc in her operations; and
abstract reasonings are employed, cither to assistex-
periencc in the discovery of these laws, or to deter-
minc their influence in particular instanccs, whcre
it depends upon any prccisc degrcc of distancc and
quantity. Thus, it is a law of motion, discoveredby
cxpcricncc, that thc moment or forcc of any body in
motion ISin thc compound vatio or proportion of its
solid contents and its velocity; and consequently,
that a small force may rcmovc thc grcatcst obstacle
or raise the greatest weight, if, by any contrivance or
machinery, we can increase the velocity of that
force, su as to make it an overmatch for its antago-
nist. Geometry assistsus in the application of' this
law, by giving us thc lust dimensions of all thc parts
and figures Whichcan enter into any species ma-
chine; but still the discovery of the law itself is
Owing to all thc abstractrca-
the world us Step
towards the knowledge Of it. When we reason a
priori, consider any ObjectOr as it
appears to the independent or all Observation,
it never could suggestto us the notion Of any dis-
tinct ASits effect; much us the
inseparable and inviolable connexion between
them, A man must be very sagacious who could dis-
by that crystal is the effect of heat,
and ice of cold, without being previously acquainted
with thc operation Ofthesequalities.
Part II
But we have not yet attained any tolerable satisfaction
with regard to the question hrst proposed. Each solu-
tion still gives rise to a new question asdifficult asthc
foregoing, and leads us on to farther enquiries. When
it is asked, What is the nature of all ouv reasoningscon-
caning matter offact? thc proper answer sccms to be,
that they arc foundcd on thc relation of cause and
When again is asked,What is
of our that •
lation? it mayberepliedin oneword, Experience.But
if westill carryonour sifting humour,andask,1,149M
is experience
?this
impliesa newquestion,which maybc of morediffl-
cult and explication. philosophers, give
themsel•.e airs of superior wisdom and sufficiency,
havea hard task when they encounterpersons in-
quisirive dispexsitions,who push them from every
corner to which they retreat,and who arc sureat last
to bring them to Somedangerousdilcmma. The best
cxpcdicnt to preventthis confusion,is to bc nu»desrin
our pretensions;and even to discover the difficulty
ourselvesbeforeit isobjectedto us.By this means,we
may makc a kind of merir of our very ignorance.
I shall contentmyself,in this section,with an easy
task, and shall pretend only to give a negativc answer
to thc question herc proposed.I saythen, that, even
after we have experienceof the operationsof causc
and cffcct, our conclusions from that expcricncc are
no! founded on reasoning,or any processof thc un-
derstanding.This answerwc must endeavourboth to
explain and to dcfcncl.
It must certainly bc allowed, that nature haskept
usat a greatdistancefrom all her secrets,andhasaf-
forded us only thc knowledge Of a few superficial
qualitiesof objects;whilc sheconcealsfrom us those
powers and principles on which the influenceof
thoseobjectsentirclydcpcnds.Our senses incormus
Of the colour,weight,and consistence Of bread;but
neither sense nor reason can eu•r Inform us of those
qualities which fit it for thc nourishment and support
Ofa humanbody.Sightor fcclingconveysan ideaof
the motion of bodies; but as to that wonderful
forceOrpower,which wouldcarryon a movingbody
for everin a continuedchangeof place,and which
bodiesnever by communicatingit to Others;
Of this we cannot the most distant conception.
But notwithstanding this ignorance of natural
powere and principles, we alwayspresumc,when we
Scelike sensiblequalities, that thcy have like secret
powers, and expect effects, similar to those
which we haveexperienced,Will follow from them.
If a body of a like colour and with that
bread, which we have formerly eat, be prcscntedto
us,we make no scruple of repeating the experiment,
 HUME AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDINC

and foresee, with certainty, like nourishment and any connecring propensitionor intermediate step,
support.Now this isaprocessof the mind or thought, which sumu.rtsthe understandingin this conclusion.
of which I would willingly know the foundation. It is But as the question is yet new, everyrcadcr may not
allowed on all hands that there is no known connex- trust so far to his penetration,asto
ion between thc sensible qualities and the secret causcati argument esGIpeshis enquiry, that therefore
powers;and conscqucntly,tlr•t the mind is not lcd to it doesnor reallyexist.For this reasonit maybereq-
form suchaconclusionconcerningtheir constantand uisite to venture upon a marc difficult task; and enn-
regular conjunction, by anything which it knows of mcrating all the branchesof human knowledge,
their nature. As to past Experiewe, it Can be allowed endeavour to show that nonc of them can afford such
to givc directand eevgoininformation of thoseprccisc an argument.
objectsonly, and that precise of time, which All may bc divided into two kinds,
fell undcr its cognizance: but Why this cxpcricncc namely,demonstrativereasoning,or that concerning
should bc extended to filture rimes, and to other relationsOfideas,and moral reasoning,or that con-
objects,which for aught we know, may bc only in ccrning matter of fact and cxistcncc. That there are
appcaranccsimilar; this is the main qucstion on no demonstrative argumcnts in the case seems evi-
which I would insist, The bread, which I formerly dent; sinceir implies no contradiction thar rhe course
eat, nourished me; that is, a body of such sensible of naturemaychange,andthat anobject,seemingly
qualities was,at that time, endued with such secret like thosewhich wc haveexperienced,may be at-
powers:but doesit follow, that othcr breadmust also tended with different or contrary effects. May I not
rw-»urishme at uuwther time, and that like sensiblc clearly and distinctly conceive that a body, falling
qualities always be attcndcd with like secret from the clouds,and which, in all Otherrespects,rc-
powers?The consequence sccmsnowisenecessary, semhlcssnow,has yet the rasteof salt or fccling of
At least,it must be acknowledgedthat there ISherea fire? Is there any morc intelligible provuysttionthan to
drawn by thc mind; that there is a cer- affrm, that all thc trees will flourish in Dcccmber
rain step taken; a processof thought, and an infer- and January, and decay in May and June? Now
enec, which wants to be explained. These two whatever is intelligible, and can bc distinctly con-
propositions are far from bctng the same, huvc ccived, implies no contradiction, and can never be
found that suchan ob}ecthas beenattended with provcd false by any demonstrativcargument or ab-
suchan effect, foresee,that other objects,which stract reasoning a prm
If wc be,therefore,engagedby argumentsto put
effects.I shall allow, if you please,that the onepropo- trust in pastexperience,and make it the standard of
sition may justly be inferred from the other; I know, our future judgment,theseargumentsmustbeprob-
in fact,that it is inferred. But if you insist that ablc only, or such as regard mattcr of fact and real
the infcrcncc ismade by achain of reasoning,I desirc cxistence, according to the division abovementioned.
you to produce that reasoning.The connexion bc- But that there is no argument of this kind, must
tween thcsc propositionsis not intuitive. There is re- appear,if our explieationof that speciesof'reasoning
quired a mcdium, which may enable the mind to be admitted as solid and satisfactory.We have said
draw suchan inference,if indeed it bedrawn by rea- that all arguments concerningexistenceaæ founded
soning and argument. What that medium is, I must on the relation Of cause and cffcct; that our knowl-
confess,passesmy comprehension;and it is incum- edgeOfthat relationis derivedentirelyfrom experi-
benton thoseto produceit, who asscrtthat it really cnee; and that all our experimental conclusions
exists, and ISthe origin Of all our conclusionscon- proceedupon the suppositionthat the future will bc
cerning matter of fact. conformablc to the past.To endeavour,therefore,thc
This negativea must certainly, in process proof of this last suppositionby probablearguments,
of time, altogetherconvincing,if manypen- Orarguments regarding existence,must bc evidently
etrating and able philosophers shall turn their en- going in a circlc, and taking thar for grantcd, which
quiries this way and no one bc ever able to discover is thc very point in questilm.
 KNOWLEDCE AND REALITY
In reality, all arguments from experience are
founded on the similarity which wc discovcramong
natural obiccts, and by which wc arc induced to
expect effects similar to those which we have found
to follm,vfrom such objects.And though nonc but a
fool or madman will cvcr pretend to dispute the au-
thority of experience, or to reject that great guide of
human life, it maysurelybe allowed aphilosopher to
have so much curiosity at as to examine the
principle of human nature, which gives this mighty
authority to and us advan-
that Similarity which nature placed
among different Causes appear
wc expect effexts_This is the sum of
all our experimental conclusions. NOW it seems evi-
dent if this Were by reason,
asperfectat first, and upon oneinstance,as
after everso long a courseof experience.But the case
is far otherwise, Nothing SOlike as eggs; yet nn one,
on account of this 'imilarity, expects the
same taste and relish in all Of them, It is only after a
long course of uniform experiments in any kind, that
we attain a firm reliance and security with regard to
a particular event, NOW where is that processof rea-
soning which, from one instance, draws a conclusion,
so different from that which it infers from a hundred
instances that are nowise different from that single
one? This question I propose as much for the sakc of
information, as with an intention of raising difficul•
ties. I cannot find, I cannot imaginc any such rcason•
ing. But I keep my mind still open to instruction, if
any one will vouchsafe to bestow it on me.
Should it bc said that, from a number of uniform
cxperimcnts, wc infer a connexion betwccn thc sen-
siblc qualities and thc secret powers; this, I must
confess, seems thc same difficulty, couchcd in dif-
fcrcnt terms. Thc question still recurs, on what pro-
cessof argument this bifeytnce is founded? W here is
the medium, the interposing ideas, which join
propositions so vcry Widc of each other? It is con-
fessed that thc colour, consistence, and other sensi-
blc qualitics of bread appcar not, of thcmsclvcs, to
havc any connexion with thc secretpowersof nour-
ishment and support. For otherwise we could infer
thcsc sccrct powers from thc first appearance of-
these sensiblequalities, without the aid of experi-
ence;contrary to the sentiment of all philosophers,
and contrary to plain matter of fact. Here, then, is
our natural state of ignorance with regard to thc
powers and influence or all obiccts. How is this
remedied by experience?It only showsus a number
of uniform effex•ts,resulting from certain objects,
and teachesus that thoseparticular objects, at that
particular With such powers
When new Obiect, With simi-
sensiblequalities, is produced, We Similar
powersand forces,and 100kfor a a
and c o s stenee w We
expect like nourishment and support. But this
surely is a stepor progressOfthc which wants
to be explained. When a man says, havefound, in
sensible
with such And when he says,Similar
sensiblequalities will always beconjoined with similar
scerctpowcrs, he is not guilty of a tautology, nor arc
these propositions in any respect the same. You say
that thc one proposition is an inference from thc
other. But you must confess that the inference is not
intuitive; neither is it dcmonstrativc: Of what naturc
is it, then? To say it is experimental, is begging the
question. For all inferences from cxpcriencc sup-
pose, as their foundation, that thc futurc will rc-
scmblc thc past, and that similar powers will be
conjoined with similar scnsiblc qualitics. If thcrc bc
any suspicion that thc course of nature may change,
and that the past may be no rule for the future, all
cxpcricncc becomesusclcss,and can give risc to no
infcrcncc or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore,
that any arguments from experience can prove this
rcscmblanccof thc pastto thc future; sinecall these
arguments are founded on the supposition of that
resemblance.Let the course of things be allowed
hitherto cvcr so regular; that alone, without some
ncw argument or inference, provesnot that, far the
future, it will continue so.[n vain KIOyou pretend to
havc Icarncd thc nature ot bodies your past
experience.T Be secretnature, and consequentlyall
their effects and Change, without
any changc in their sensiblequalities. This happens
sometimes,and with regard to someobjects; Why
may it not happen always, and with regard to all
objects?W Ilal logic, What processOf argument sc-
cures you against this supposition? My practice, you
say,refutes my doubts. But you mistake the purport
 HUME: AN ENQUIRY
of my As an agent, I am quite satisfied in
this point; but as a philosopher, who has some share
of curiosity, I will not sayscepticism. I want to learn
thc foundation of this inference. No reading, no en-
quiry has yet bccn ablc to rcmove my difficulty, Or
give me satisfactionin a matter of such importance.
Can I do bcttcr than propose thc difficulty to the
public, though, perhaps,I small hopesof
obtaining a solution? We shall at least, by this
means, be sensibleof our ignorance, if we do not
augment our knowlcdgc.
I must confessthat a man is guilty Of unpardon-
ablcarrwance who concludes,becausean argumcnt
has escapedhis own investigation, that therefore it
docsnot really exist I must alsoconfessthat, though
all the learned, for several ages, should havc
cmploycd in fruitless search upon any
subject, it may still, perhaps, bc rash to concludc
positively that the subject must, therefore, passall
human Even though wc examine
all the sourcesofour knowledge, and concludethem
unfir for sucha subject,there maystill remain a sus-
pieion, that the enumeration is not completc, or thc
examination not accurate. But with rcgard to the
present subject, there are some considerations which
to remove all this accusationof arrogance or
suspicion Of mistake.
It is certain that thc most ignorant and stupid
pnsants—nay infants, nay even brutc
improveby experiencc,and Icarn the qualities of nat-
ural ohiccrs, by obscrving the effects which result
from them. When a child has felt thc sensation
from touching thc Hank ofa candle, he will becareful
nor to put his hand nearany candle;but will expecta
similar effect from a cause which is similar in
Siblequalitiesand appearance. youassert,therefore,
that thc understanding of the child is led into this
clusionby any prcxessof argument r ratiocination, I
may justly require you to producethat argument; nor
haveyouany pretenceto refusesoequirableademand.
You cannot say that the argutiwnt is abstruse,and
may possiblyescapeyour enquiry; sinceyou confess
that it is obviousto the capacityOf a mere infant. If
you hesitate, thcreföre, a or if, after
tion, youproduceanyintricate or profound argument,
you, in a manner, give up the question, and confess
that it ISnot reasoningwhich engagesus to suppose
CONCERNINC HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
the pastresemblingthefuture, and to expectsimilar
effectsfrom causeswhich arc,to appearance,similar.
This is thc propJsition which I intended to in
the presentsection.If I be right, I pretend ro have
madeany mighty discovery.And if I Ije wrong, I must
acknowledgemyself to be indeed a very backward
scholar; since I cannot now clisccwcran argument
which, it seems, perfectly familiar to mc long
beforcI wasout of my cradle.
Section V
Sceptical Solution of These Doubts
Part /
The passion for philosophy, like that for religion,
sccms liable to this inconvenience,that, though it
aims at the correction of our manners, and cxtirpa-
tian of our vices, it may only serve,by imprudent
management, to foster a predominant inclination,
and push the mind, with more dctcrmincd resolu-
tion, towards that Sidc which already too
much, by the bias and propensity of thc natural
temper,It iscertain that, whilc aspireto the mag-
firmness Of thc philosophic Sage,and en-
to confine our pleasurcsaltogether within
our own minds, we may, at last, render our philoso-
phy like that of Epictetus, and other Stoics,only a
beasts— more refined system of sclhshncss, and our-
selvesout of all virtuc as well as social enjoyment.
While wc study with attention vanity of human
of life, and turn all our thoughts towards the empty
and transitory naturc of riches atul honours, wc arc,
perhaps, all the while flattering our natural incl'&
sen- lencc, which, hating thc bustle of the World, and
drudgery of business,seeksa pretenceof reasonto
give itsclfa full and uncontrolled indulgcncc.There
is, howe,er, onc speciesof philosophy which sccms
little liablc to this inconvenience, and that becauseit
strikes in with no disorderly passionof thc human
mind, nor canmingle itself with anynatural affection
or propensity;and that is thc Academic or Sceptical
philosophy.The academicsalwaystalk of doubt and
suspenseof of danger in hasty dctcrmina-
tions,of confiningtoverynarrowboundsthccnquiries
of the understanding,and of renouncing all specula-
tions which lie not within the limits of common life
 KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY
and practice. Nothing, therefore, can be more con-
trary than sucha philosophy to lhe supine indolcncc
Ofthe mind, its rasharrogance,its lofty pretensions,
and its superstitiouscredulity. Every passionis mor-
lilied by it, excepttheloveof truth; and that passion
neveris, nor can be, carried to too high a clcgrcc.It is
surprising, therefore,that this philosophy, which, in
almost every instance, must be harmless and inno-
cent, should be the sublect of so much groundless
reproach and obloquy. But, perhaps, the very cir-
cumstancc which renders it so innocent is what
chiefly exposesit to the public hatred and resent-
ment. By Battering no irregular passion,it gainsfew
partizans: By opposing so many vices and follies, it
raisesto itself abundanceOFenemies;who stigmatize
it aslibertine, profane,and irreligious.
Nor nccd wc fcar thar this philosophy,while it en-
dcavours to limit our enquiries to common life,
should cvcr unclcrtnine the reasoningsof common
lifc, andcarryitsdoubtsSOfarasto destroyall action,
as well as speculation.Nature will always maintain
her rights,and prevailin the end overany abstract
reasoning whatsoever.Though should conclude,
for instance, as in the forgoing section, that, in all
reasoningsfrom experience,thcrc isa steptakenby
thcmind whichis notsupportcdbyanyargumentOr
processof theunderstanding;thereis noclangerrhac
thesereasonings,on whichalmostall knowledge
pends,will everbeaffectedbysucha discover-y.If the
mind benotengagedby argumentto makethis step,
It mustbc inducedby sorncotherprincipleof equal
weightandauthority;andthat principlewill preservc
its influence as long as human nature remains thc
same.What that principle is may well be worth thc
painsof enquiry.
Suppose a person, though endowed with thc
strongest faculties of reason and reflection, to be
brought on a sudden into this world; would,
indeed, immediately observea continual succession
of and one eventfollowing another;but hc
would not be able to discoveranything farther. Hc
would not, at first, by anyreasoning,beableto reach
the idea of causeand effect; since thc particular
powers,by which all natural operationsarc pet•
tbrme.rl,neverappearto the senses;nor is it reasona-
ble to conclude, merely onc event, in one
instance, precedcs another, that thereforc thc one is
thc cause,the other thc cffcct. Their conjunction
may bearbitrary and casual.There may bc no ft2ason
to infer thc existenccof one from thc appearanccof
thc other. And in a word, such a pcrson, without
more experience, could never employ his contecture
or reasoning concerning any matter of fact, or be
surcdof anythingbeyondwhat wasimmediatelypre-
sentto his memory and scnscs.
SLjPlujse,again, that he hasacquiredmore experi-
ence, and has lived so long in thc world as to have
observedfamiliar objectsor to be constanrly
conjoine«ltogether; what is thc consequenceof this
experience? Hc immcdiatcly infers the existence Of
one object from thc appearance of the other. Yet hc
hasnot, by all his experience, any ideaor
knowledge of thc sccrct power by which the onc
Objectproducesthc other; nor is it, by any processof
reasoning,hc is engagedto draw this inference.But
still he finds himself determined to draw it: And
though he should be convinced thar rhis understand-
ing hasno part in the operation, he would ncwcrthe•
lesscontinuc In thc samecourseor thinking. Thcrc is
some other principle which derermincs him to form
such a conclusion.
This principle is Custom or Habit. For whcrcvcr
thc rcpctition of any particular act or operation pro-
ducesa propensity to renew the sameact or opera-
tion, without being impelled by any reasoningor
processof the understanding,we alwayssay,that this
propensity is the effectof By employing that
word, wc pretend not to have given thc ultimate
reasonof sucha propensity.Wc onlypointout a prtn-
cipleof humannature,which isuniversallyacknowl-
edged, and which is well known by its effects.
Perhapswecanpushour enquiriesnofarther,or pre-
tend to give the causeofthis cause;but must restcon-
tcntcclwith it asthc ultimatc principle,whichwecan
assign,Ofall Our conclusionsfrom experience,It is
sufficientsarisfaction,that we cango so Far,without
rcpining at thc narrowness of our faculties because
they will carry us no farther. And it is certain we
hereadvancea veryintelligiblepropositionat least,if
not a true one, when wc assert that, after the constant
conjunction of two objects—heat and flame, for in-
stance,weight and solidity—Aveare determined by
custom aloneto cxpcct the one from thc appearancc
ofthe Other.This hypothesisseemseventhc onlyone
 HUME: AN ENQUIRY
which explains thc difficulty, why we draw, from a
thousand instances, an inference which wc arc not
ableto draw from onc instance,that is, in no respect
different from them. Reasonis incapableof any such
variation. The conclusions which it draws
considering onc circle are the same which it would
form upon surveyingall the circles in thc univcrsc.
But no man, having Seenonly Onebody after
being impcllcd by another, could infer that every
body will move after a like impulse. All infcrcnccs
from experience,therefore,areeffectsof custom,not
Custom,then,is the great guideof human life. It is
that principle alone which renders our experielue
useful to us, and makes us expect,for thc futurc, a s'm-
ilar train of eventswith thosewhichhaveappcarcdin
the Without the influencc of custom, we should
beentirely ignorant of cwcrymatter of fact beyond what
is immediately present to the mcmory am:] senses.We
should never know hcr,vto adiust means to etuis, or to
employ our natural powers in thc production of any
effect. There would bc an end at once of all action, as
well asof the chief part of speculation.
But herc it may beproper to remark, that though
our conclusionsfrom cxpcriencecarry us beyondour
memory and senses,and assureus of matters of fact
which happened in the most distant and most
remoteagcs,yet somcfact must alwaysbe presentto
thc scnscsor memory,from which we may firsr prr»
cccd in drawing thcsc cot'w•lusions.A man, who
shouldfind in adesertcountry the remainsOfpomp-
ous buildings, would concludethat rhe country had,
in ancienttimes, beencultivated by civilized inhabit-
ants;but did nothing of this nature occur to him, hc
could never form such an inference. Wc learn
eventsof former ages history; but then wc must
perusethe volumesin which this instruction is cone
tained, and [hencecarry up inferencesfrom one
testimony to another, till we arrive at thc eyewit-
nessesand spectatorsof thesc distant cvcnts. In a
word, if we proceednot upon somefact, presentto
the memory or senses,our reasonings would 1K:
merely hypothetical; and however the particular
links might be connectedwith eachother, the whole
chain of inferenccswould havenothing to support it,
nor could we cvcr, by its means, arrivc at the knowl-
edgeof any rcal existence.If I ask why you believe
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
any particular matter of fact, which you rclatc, you
must tell me some reason; and this reason will bc
somcother fact,connectedwith it. But asyou cannot
procced after this manner, must at
from last terminate in someFact,which is presentto your
mcmory or sensæs;or must allow that your bclicf is
cntircly without foundation.
What, then, is the conclusion of thc whole
matter? A simple one; though, it must bc confcsscd,
prctty remote from the common theoriesof philoso-
ph". All belief of marter of fact or real existence is
dcrived merely from some object, prescnt to the
memory or senses,and a customary conjunction be-
tween that and some other object. Or in other
words;having round, in many instances,that any
kinds Of objects—Hamc and heat, snow and
cold—havealwaysbecnconioined together; if flame
or be presented ancw to thc scnses, the mind
is carried by custom to cxpect heat or cold, and to
believe that such a quality does exist, and will dis-
cover itself upon a ncarcr approach.This belief is
the necessaryresult of placing the mind in such cir-
cumstanccs. It is an operation of thc soul, when wc
are so situated, asunavoidableas to feel the passion
Of love, when wc receive benefits; or hatred, when
we meet with injuries. All thesc Olwrations are a
speciesof natural instincts, which no reasoning or
processof thc thought and understanding is able
either to produce or to prevent.
At this point, it would be very allowable for us to
stopour philosophical researches,In most questions
wc can never make a single stepfarther; and in all
questions wc must terminate here at last, aftcr our
most and curious enquiries. But still our cu-
thc rioslty will be pardonable,perhapscommendable,if
it carry us on to still farther researches,and make us
cxamine more accurately the naturc of this belief,
and of the custrmary conjunction, whence it is cle-
rived.By this meanswe may mcctwith someexpli-
cations and analogiesthat will givc satisfaction; at
least to such as love thc abstract sciences,and can be
entertained with speculations, which, however accu-
rate, may still retain a dcgrec of doubt and uncer-
taint". As to readers of a different taste; thc
remaining part of this section is not calculated for
them, and the following enquiries may well bc un-
derstood, though it be neglected.
 KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY
Part II
Nothing morcfrecthanthcimaginationof man;and
thoughit cannotexcccdthatoriginalstockof Ideasfur-
nished by thc internal and external senses,it hasunlim-
itcd INWerof mixing, comptmnding,separating,
and
dividing these ideas,in all the varieties of fiction and
vision,Itcan feignatrainof events,with all theappear-
ancr of reality, ascribeto a Birticular time
place,conceivethcm asexistent,and paint them to
itselfwith everycircumstance, that belongsto anyhis-
toricalfact,whichit believes
with thcgreatestcertainty.
Wherein, thcrcforc, consists the diffcrcnce between
suchafictionandbelief?It liesnotmerelyin anypecu-
liar idea,which isanncxcdrosuchaconceptionxscom-
mandsour assent,and which is wanting to every
knownfiction.Forasthemind hasauthorityoverall its
idcas,it could voluntarily annexthis particular ideato
any hctton,and aornsequently bc ablc to I*lieve what-
cirr it pleases;
contrarytowhatWcfind bydailyexperi-
cncc. We can,in our omreptlon, join thc ofa man
to thebodyofa horse;butit isnotin our powerto bc-
licvc that suchan animal hascvcr reallyexisted,
It follous, therefi.re, that the difference bctwecn
fiction andbeliefliesin scuncscntimcntor feeling,which
is anncxcdto the latter, not to the former, anil which
clcgxnclsnot on will, nor can cwm-,manclcdat
pleasure.It must excitedby nature,like all other scn-
timcnts;and mustarisefrom theparticularsituation,
in whichthemind isplacedatanyparticularjuncture.
Wheneveranyobjectis prescntcdto the memoryor
scnsc,It immediately, by the forceof custom, carriesthc
imaginationto conccivcthat object,which is usually
conjomcclto it; andthis conceptionisattendedwith a
fccling or sentiment,diffcrcnt from the loosercvcricsof
the fancy, In this consiststhe whole nature ofbclief. For
asthercis matterof factwhich"'e believe
sofirmly
that we cannotconccivcthc contrav,',therewould be
no difference thc conceptionassented to and
that whic:llis rejected,were it for somesentiment
which distinguishesthc one from the othcr. If I seea
billiard-ball moving towards another, on a smooth
table,I caneasilyconceive
it u' stopuponcontact.This
conception implies no contradiction; but still it feels
verydifferentlyfromthatconception
bywhichI repre
sent myself thc impulse and the communication of
motion from onc ball to another.
Wcrc we to attempt a definition of this sentiment,
we should perhaps,find it a very difficult, if not an
impossiblc task; in thc same manner as il- we should
endeavourto definethc feelingof coldor passionof
anger,to a creaturewho newerhad any of
thcscsentiments.BelicfISthc truc and propername
of this feeling;and no oneis e,'erat a lossto know the
meaningOf'that term;because
cvcrymanis every
moment consciousof thc sentimentrepresentedby it.
It maynor,however, bcimpropertoattempta description
of this sentiment;in hopeswc may,by that means,
arrixe someanaloglcs, which may afford a more
perfectexplication of it. I say,(hen,thar belicfis noth-
ing but a morcvivid,lively,Ihrcihle,firm, steadycon-
ceptionOfan object,than what the imagination alone
is ever able to attain. This variety of terms, which
mayseemsounphilosophical, is intended only to ex-
prervsthat act of thc mind, which renders realities,or
what is taken for such,more presentto us than fic-
lions,causes
themto weighmorein thethought,and
gives them a superior influence on thc passionsand
imagination.Providedwe agreeaboutthething, ir is
needlesstodisputeabourrheterms.The imaginarion
hasthc commarKl all its ideas,and canjoin and
mix and vary them,in all the wayspossible.It may
conceivefictitious objectswith all the circumstances
of place and time. It may set thcm, in manner,
bcforc our eyes,in their truc colours,inst as they
might haveexisted. Bur as it is impossible rhar this
faculty of imagination can ever,of itself, reachbelief,
it is evidentthat belief consistsnot in the peculiar
nature or order of ideas, but in the mannc' of their
conception, and in their feeling to thc mind, I confess,
that it isimpiLssible
perfectlyto explainthisfeelingor
manner of conceprion,Wc may make use of words
which expresssomething near it. But its truc and
proper name,as we obscrvcd before,is belief; which
is a term that cweryonc sufficientlyunderstandsin
commonlife. And in philosophy, cango no far-
thcr than assert,that beliefis somethingfelt by the
mind, which distinguishesthe ideasof thc judge-
mentfrom thefictionsof the imagination.It gives
themmoreweightandinfluence;makesthemappear
of greaterimportance;enforcesthem in the mind;
and rendersthem thc governingprinciplcof our ac-
tions.I hearat present,for instance,a person'svoice,
with whom I am acquainted;and thc sound comesas
 HUME: AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING
from thc next room. This impressionof my senws
immediately
conveys
mythoughtsto thc person,
getherwith all Chesurroundingobjects.I paint them
out to myself as existing at with the same
qualitiesand relations,of whichI formerlyknew
them possessed
. These"deas fasterhold of my
mind than ideasof an enchanted castle.They are
vcrydillerenttothefeeling,andhaveamuchgreater
influenceof everykind, either to give pleasureor
pawl, Sorrow.
Let us, then, takc in the whole compassOf this
doctrine, and allow, that the sentiment of belief is
nothingbur a atnceptiot-'moreintenseand steady
than what attendsthc merefictionsof thc imagina-
tion, and that this mownerof conceptionarisesfrom a
customaryconjunctionof theobjectwith something
presentto the mcmory or senses:I bclicvcthat it Will
not bedifficult, uponthesesuppositions,
to find op-
of themind analogousto it, and to traceup
thesephenomenato principlesstill morcgeneral,
We have already observed that nature has estab-
lished connexions among Ideas,and that
no soonerone idca occursto our thoughtsthan it
introduces its correlative, and carries our attention
towards it, by a gentle and insensible movement.
These principlcs of connexion or association wc have
reducedto three, namely,Reseml/once,
Contiguity
and Causation;which are thc only bonds that unite
our thoughtstogether,and bcgctthat regular train
Ofreflectionor discourse,which, in a greateror levs
degree,takesplaceamongall mankind. Now here
arisesa qucstlon,on which tlr solutionOfthc prt>
sentdifficulty will depend.Does it happen,in all
theserelations,that, whcn oneof rheobjectsis pre-
d
sente tothcsenses
or memory,themindisnotonly
carried the conception of the correlative, but
s
reache a steadierandstrongerconceptionof it than
what otherwise it v,'ould have been able to attain?
This sccms to be the case with that belicf which
ariscs from the relation of cause and effect. A nd if
thccasebcthesamewiththcotherrelationsor prin-
ciplcsof associations,
this may be establishedas a
generallaw, which takesplacein all the operations
of thc mind.
We may, therefore,observe,as thc first experi-
ment to our presentpurpose,that, upon the apptüt--
ance of the picture of an absentfriend, our idea of
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
him is evidentlyenlivenedby the resemblance,
and
thatcvcry passion,which that ideaoccasions,whether
of or sorrmv,acquiresnewlörce and Vigour.In
producing this effect, thcrc concur both a relation
and a presentimpression.Where rhc picture bears
him no resemblance, at least was not intended f'"
him, it nc».'er
somuchasconveysour thoughtto him;
And whereit is absentaswellasrhcperson,though
thc mind may passfrom the thoughtof thc to
that of the other, it fecls its idea to be rather weak-
eneclthan enlivened by that transition. We take a
pleasurein viewing the picture of a friend, it is
setbcforeus;but whcn it is removed,rather chooseto
considerhimdirectlythanby in animage,
which is equally distant and obscure.
The ceremonies
of the RomanCatholicreligion
may be considcrcd as instances of the same naturc.
The dc%urecs of that superstitionusuallypleadin
excusefor themummeries,with whichtheyareup-
braided,that they feelrhegoodcffcct of thosecxtcr-
nalmotions,andpostures,
andactions,in enlivening
their dootion and quickeningthcir fervour,which
otherwisewoulddecay,if dircctcdentirelytodistant
andimmaterialoblecrs,
Weshadowouttheobic&-t.s of
our faith, saythey,in sensiblctypcsand imagcs,and
renderthcm more presentto us by thc immediate
presenccof thesetypes,than it is possiblefor us to do
merelyby an intellectualvicw atul contemplation.
Sensibleobjectshavealwaysa greaterinRucnceon
the fancythan any other;and chisinflucncethey
readilyconveyto thoseideasto which they arc
lated,and which they resemble.I shall only infer
from thesepractices,and this reasoning,that the
effectof resemblance
in enliveningthc ideasISvery
common; and as in evcry case a resemblance and a
presentimpre+ion must concur,wc arc abundantly
suppliedwith experiments
toprovethc realityof the
foregoing principle.
Wemayaddforcetotheseexperimentsbyothcxsof
adifferentkind,in considcring
theeffects
ofcontiguity
as wcll as of resemblance.It is certain that distance di-
minishesthe forceof ewer"idea,and that, our
approachto any object;though it docsnot discover
itselfto our senses;
it operatesuponthc mind Withan
influence,whichimitatesan immediateimpression.
The thinking on anyobjectreadilytranv)rts thc
nundto Whatis contiguous;but it is only thcactual
 KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY
presence
of anobject,thattransportsit with asuperior
vivacity. When I am a few miles from home, whatever
relatesto it touchesme more nearly than when I am
two hundred leaguesdistant; though evenat that dis-
LanceLhereflectingon any thing in thc ncigbbour-
hood of my friends or family naturally producesan
ideaof them. Hut asin this latter case,both thc objects
of themind areideas;notwithstandingthereisaneasy
transition between them; that transition alone is nor
ableto gi\e supffior vivacity to any of thc ideas,for
want or some immediate imprcssion.
NO one can but causation has the Same in Ru-
as the other two rclatlons Of and
contiguity. Superstitious pcoplc are fond of the rel-
of-saintsand holy men, for the same reason,that
they seek after types or images,in order to enliven
their devotion, and give thcm a more intimate and
strongconceptionof thoseexemplarylives,which they
desireto Imitate. Now it is cviclcnt, that one of thc best
reliques,which aclcu•tcccould procure,would bethe
handywork of a saint; and if his clothes and furniture
areeverto bc consideredin this light, it is becausethey
were once at his disposal,and were moved and af-
fectcd by him; in which respectthey are ro bc o•nsid•
ercd as imperfect effects, and as with him
by a shortcr chain of consequences than any of thosc,
by which we learn the reality of his existence.
Suppose, that the son of a friend, who had bccn
long dead or absent,were presentedto us; it is Cvi-
dcnt, that this oblect would instantly rcvivc its cor-
relative idea, and recall to our thoughts all past
intimacics and familiarities, in more lively colours
than thcy would otherwise haveappearcdto us.This
is another phenomenon,which seemsto prove thc
principlc abovementioned.
Wc may observe,that, in these phenomena,the stantly excited thc idea of those objects,commonly
beliefof the correlativeobjectisalwayspresupposed; conjoined with it, all our krmvlcdgw'
without which the relation could have no cffcct. The
influence of the picture supposes,that wc believeour
friend to haveonce Contiguity to can
ncvcr excite our idea or home, unless wc believe that it
really exists. Now I assert,that this belief, where it
reachesbeyond the or sense,is Of a Similar
nature, and arisesfrom similar causcs,With the transi-
tion of' thought and vivacity of conceptionhere ex-
plained.When I throw a pieceof dry wcn-.clinto Gre,
my mind is immediately carried to conceive, that it
augments,not extinguishesthc Ramc.This transition
Of thought from thc causeto thc effect proceedsnot
from æason.It derivesits origin altogetherFrom
customand expericncc.And asit first beginsfrom an
Object,present to the senses,it renders cheidea or con-
ceptionof flamemore strongand lively than anyloose,
Ilcnting reverieof thc imagination. T hal idea arises
immediately.Thc thought movesinstantly rowardsit,
and conveysto it all that forceof conception,which is
derived from thc Impression preAe•ruto the senses.
When a sword is levelledat my breast,doesnot the
ideaof wound and pain strike mc morestrongly,than
when a glassof wmc is prsented to me, eventhough
by accidentthis ideashouldoccurafter thc appearance
of the latter object? But what is there in this whole
matter to causcsuchastrongconception,exceptonly a
presentobicct and a customarytransition to thc idea
of another oblect, which we have bccn accustomedto
conjoinwith the This is thc wholeoperation
of thcmind, in all our conclusions concerningmatter
of fact and existence; and it is a satisfaction to find
someanalogies,by which it may be cxplamcd. The
transitionfrom a presentobicctdocsin all casesgive
strength and solidity ro the rclatcdidea.
Herc, then, is a kind of prc-cstablishcdharmony
between [he course of nature and the succession of
our ideas;and though the powersand forces,hy
which theformerisgoverned,bewholly unknownto
us; yet our thoughts and conccptions have still, we
find, goneon in thc sametrain with the other works
of nature.Custom is that principlc, by which this cor-
respondencehas bccn cffcctcd; so necessaryto thc
subsistence
of our spccics,and the regulationof our
conduct, in every circumstam•c and occurrence Of
humanlife, Had not thc presenceof an object,in-
havebeen
limited to thc narrow sphereof our memoryand
senses;and we should neverhavebeenableto adjust
meansto ends,or employ our natural either
to the producing of good, or avoiding Of evil. Those,
who delight in the discoveryand contemplation of
final causes,havehereample subjectto employ their
wonder and admiration.
I shalladd,for a further confirmation ofthc forego-
ing theory,that,asthis of the mind, by which
we infer like cffeetsfrom like Causes,and Viceversa,is
 HUME: AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING
soessentialto the subsistenceof all human creatures,it
not rn-wbable,
thar it could trusted to the fallacious
deductionsof our reason,which is slowin its opera-
tions;appearsnot, in anydegree,during the first years
of infancy, and at bestis, in everyageand period of
human life, extremelyliable to error and mistake.It is
moreconformablerothe Ordinarywisdom of natureto
secureso necessaryan act of the mind, by some instinct
or mechanicalLemlency,
which maybc infallible in its
,
operations
maydiscoveritselfatthcfirstappearance
of
lifc and thought, and may bc independentof all the
labouæd of thc understanding.As nature
hastaught us the useof our limbs, without giving us
thc knowledge of rhc muscles and trrves,
they are actuated;so has shc implanted in us an in-
stinct, which carriesforward the thought in a corrt>
spondent course to that which she has established
among external objects;though we are igmorant of
thosepowersand forccs,on which this regular coursc
andsuccession
of objectstotally depends.
Section VI
Of Probability'
Though thcrc be no such thing as Chancein the
world; our ignorancc of the real causeof any event
has the samc influence on the understanding, and
begctsa like speciesof belief or opinion.
There iscertainly a probability, which arisesfrom
a superiorityof chancesonanyside;andau-ot-dingas
this superiority encrease_g,
and surpassesthc opposite
chances,the probability receivesa proportionablecn-
crcasc,and begetsstill a higher dcgrcc of belief or
assentto that side,in which wc discoverthe superior-
ity. Ifa dyc were marked with onehgurc or number
of spotson four sides,and with anotherfigure or
number of spotson rhetwn•remaining Sides,it would
be morc proEx.bIe,that thc former would turn
than the latter; though, if it had a thousand sides
marked in the manner, and only one side dif-
ferent,the probability would be much higher,and
our beliefOrexpectationof the cvcnt more steadyand
secure.This processofthc thought or reasoningmay
seem trivial and obvious; but to those who consider it
more narrowly, it may,perhaps,afford matter for cu-
rious speculation.
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
Jt seems cvidcnt, that, when the mind looks for-
ward rodiscoverthe event,which may resultfrom thc
throw of sucha dyc,it considersrhe turning up of
eachparticular Sidcasalike probable;and this is the
very nature of chance,to render all the particular
events,comprehcndcdin it, entirely equal, But hnd-
ing a greater number of sidesconcur in the one event
rhan in the other,the mind is G«rierl morc frequently
to that event, am-Imeets it oftener, in revolving thc
various possibilities or chances,on which thc ultimate
result depends. This concurrence of several Views in
one particular cvcnt begetsimmediately, by an mex-
plicablc contrivance of nature, thc scntimcnt of belief,
andgivesthat eventtheadvantage
overits antagonist,
which issupportedby asmaller number of views,and
recurslessfrequently to the mind. If we allow, that
beliefisnothingbut afirmer andstrongerconception
of an obicct than what attends the merc fictions of the
imagination, this operation may, perhaps,in some
measure, bc accounted for. The concurrence of these
scvcral views or glimpses imprints the idea morc
stronglyon the imagination;givesit superiorforce
and rendersits inRucnceon thepassionsand
affectionsmoresensible;and in a word, begetsthat
reliance or security,which constitutesthe narurc of
opinion.
Thecaseisthcsamewith thcprobabilityof causes,
as with that of chance There are some causes,which
areentirely uniform and constantin Imnlucing a par,
ticular effect;and no instancchase\er yetbeenfound
of anyfailureor irrcgularity in their Operation.Firc
hasalwaysburned,andwater everyhuman
cresature;The production of motion by impulsc and
gravity is an univcrsal law, which has hitherto admit-
ted of no exccption. But thcrc are other causes,which
havebeen found morc irregular and uncertain; nor
hasrhubarbalwaysproveda purge,or opiuma sopo-
rific to every one, who has taken thesemedicines. Itis
true, whenanycauscfails of producingits usualcffect,
philosophcrs ascribe not this to any irrcgularity in
nature; but suppose, that some secret causes,in thc
particularstructureof parts,havepreventedthcoper-
ation. Our reasonings,hcnvcver,and conclusionscon-
cerningtheeventarethesameasif this principlehad
no placc.Being determinedby customto transfer the
pastto thcfuture,in all our inferences;
wherethepast
hasbeenentirelyregularand uniform,we expectthe
 KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY
event with the greatest assurance,and leave no room
for any contrary supposition. But where clifTertnt ef-
fects have been found to follow causes,wliieh are
to appeanmccexactly similar, all these various
must occurto thc mind in transferring the vx•stto the
future, and enter into our consideration, when
tern-vinethe probability of the event.Though we give
thc prcferencc to that which has bCen found most
usual, and belicvc that this clYcct will exist, we must
nor overlookthe other cffccts,but must assignto each
ofthcm a particular weight and authority, in propor-
tion aswe havefound it to bemore or lessfrequent.It
is morc probable,in almost everycountry of Europe,
that therc will befrcxstsometimein January,than that
thc weatherwill continucopenthroughout that whole
month; though this probability variesaccordingto the
different climates,and approachesto a certainty in thc
morc northcrn kingdoms. Here then it seemsevident,
that, when wc transfer the pastto the future, in ordcr
to determine the effect, which "will result from any
cause,wc transfer all the different events,in thc same
proportion asthey haveappearedin the past,and con-
ceiveone to have a hundred rimes, for instance,
another tcn times, ancl another once. As a grcat
number of viewsdo hereconcurin oneevent,theyfor-
tify and confirm it to the imagination, begetthat sen-
timcnt which wc call belief, and give its object thc
preference
abovethecontraryevent,which isnotsup-
ported byan equalnumberof experiments,and recurs
not so frcqucntly to thought in transferring thc
pastto the future. Let any Onetry to accountfor this
operation of the mind upon any of thc rc&-eivedsys-
tcms of philosophy,and he will bc sensibleof thc dif-
ficulty_ For my part, I shall think it sufficient, if thc
presenthints excitethe curiosity of philosophers,and
make them wnsible how defective all common thco-
ties are in treating Of such curious and such sublime
subjects.
Section VII
Of the Idea of Necessary
Connexion
part I
The great advantage of thc mathematical sciences
above rhe moral consists in this, that the ideas of
thc former,being sensible,arc alwaysclear and deter-
minare, rhe smallest distinction bctwccn them is im-
mediately pcrccptiblc, and the samc tcrms are
still expressiveof the sameideas,without ambiguity
or variation. An oval is never mistaken for a circle,
nor an hyperbola for an ellipsis. Thc isoscelesand
scalenum are distinguished by boundaries more
exact than vice and virtue, right and wrong. any
term be dehncd in gcomctry, thc mind readily, of
itself, substitutes, on all occasions, the definition for
the term defined: Or ewen when no definition is
ployed, thc obicct itself may be presented 10 the
senses,and by that meansbesteadily and clearly ap-
prehended. But the finer sentiments of the mind, the
operationsof thc understanding, the various agita-
tions of thc passions,though really in themselvesdis-
tinct, easily escapeus, when surveyedby reflection;
nor it in our power to recall the original Object,as
often aswc haveoccasionrocontemplateit, Ambigu-
icy, by this means,is gradually' introduced into our
reasonings:Similar objects are readily taken to bc the
same:A rul the conclusionbecomesat last very wide
of the premises.
Onc may safely,however,affirm, that, if we con-
sider thesesciencesin a proper light, their advan-
tages and disadvantaswsnnrly compensate cach
othcr, and reducæboth of them to a stateof equality.
Ifthe mind, with greaterfacility, retainsthe ideasof
geometry clear and determinate, it must carry on a
muchlongerand moreintricate chainof reasoning,
and compare ideas much wider of cach othcr, in
order to reach the abstruscr truths of that science.
And if ideasare apt, without extremc carc, to
fall into obscurity and confusion, the infcrcncesare
always much shorter in thcsc disquisitions, and the
intermediate steps, which lead to thc conclusion,
much fewer than in the sciences which treat of
quantity and number. In reality, there is scarcely a
proposition in Euclid so simple, as not to consist of
more parts, than arc to be found in any moral rea-
soning which runs not into chimera and conceir_
Where we trace thc principles of thc human mind
through a few steps,wc may bc very well satisfied
with our progress; considering how soon nature
throws a bar to all our inquiries concerning causes,
and reduces us to an acknowledgment Of Our
ignorance. Thc chief obstacle, therefore, to our
 HUME: AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

improvementin thc moral or metaphysicalsciences
is the obscurity of thc ideas,and ambiguity of thc
terms.Thc principle difficulty in thc mathematicsis
thc length of infcrcnccs and compassof thought,
requisiteto thc forming ofany conclusion.And, per-
ly,u", our progress in natural philosophy is chiefly
retardccl by thc want of proper experiments and
phenomena,which are often discoveredby chance,
and cannot always found, when requisite evenby
the most diligcnt and prudent enquiry. As moral
philosophy seemshitherto to have rcccivcd lessim-
pr(wement than either geometry or physics,we may
concludc,that, if there be any difference in thisgreatercertainty, let us scarehf6r it in all the sources,
spect among thesesciences,the difficulties, whichfrom which it may possiblybe
obstruct the progrc" of thc former, require superiorWhen wc look about us Lc».vanls
careand capacity10be surmounted. and consider thc operation of causes,we arc never
There are no ideas,which occurin metaphysics, able, in a singlc instance,to discoverany power or
more obscure and uncertain, than those of
force, energy or ncccsqny connexwn, of which it is
every moment necessaryfor us to treat in all our dis-
quisicions. Wc shall, therefore, endeawur, in this sec-
Lion,to fix, if possible,thc prcciscmeaningof these
terms, and thereby removesomcpart of that obscu-
rity, whichissomuchcomplainedof in thisspecies
of
It seems a proposition, which will not admit Of
much that all our ideasare nothing but
copies of our impressions, or, in other words, that it
is impossiblefor us to think of any thing, which wc
havenor antecedentlyfelt, either by our external or
internalsenses.
I havecnclcavoured10
to explainand
provethis proposition,and haveexpressedmy hopes,
that, hy a proper application of it, men may reach a
greater clearness and precision in philosophical
reasonings,than what they havehitherto been able
to attain. Complex ideas may, perhaps,
known by definition, which is rw)thing but an enu-
meration of tl-w•scparts or simple ideas, that com-
posethem. But when we havepushedup definitions
to thc most Simplcideas, find still someambigu-
ity and obscurity;what resourceare wc then pos-
sesscdof? By what invention can we throw light
upon theseideas,and render them altogetherprccisc
and dctcrminate to our intellectual Produce
thc impressionsor Original senriments,from which
theideasarc Theseimpressionsareall strong
andsensible.They admitnot ofambiguity.They are
not only placed in a full light themselves,but may
throw lighr on their correspondentideas,which lie
in obscurity.And by this means,wc may,perhaps,
attain a new microscopc or spccics of optics, by
which, in the moral sciences,the moscminute, and
most simple ideasmay bc socnlargcd as to fall read-
ily under our apprehension,
and equallyknown
with the grossestand mostsensibleideas,rhaccan be:
the object Ofour enquiry.
To be fully acquainted, thereföre, with the idea Of
power Or necessaryavnnexion, let us examine its im-
and in order to find the impressionwith
externalobjects,
necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the
effect to thc causc, and renders the onc an infallible
consequcnccof the other. We only End, that the one
docsactually,in fact, folkm the other.The impulse
Of One billiard-ball is attended with motion in the
second.This the whole that appearsto the outward
senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward im-
pression from this successionof objects: Conse-
qucntly, there is not, in any singlc,particular instance
of causeandeffcet,anything which cansuggestthe
ideaof poweror necessaryconnexion.
From the first appe%'rance
of an object, we never
can conjecture whar effect will result from it. Hut
wcrc thc power or energy of any causediscoverable
by the mind, we could forcscc thc effect, even with-
out expericnee; and might, at first, with
certainty concerning it, by mcrc dint of' thought and
reasontng.
In reality, there is no part of matter, that does
cvcr,by its sensiblequantitics,discoveranypoweror
energy, or give us ground to imagine, that it could
produceany thing, or be followed by any other
object, which could denominate its effect. Solid-
ity, extension, motion; thesequalities are all com-
in themselves,and never point any other
which may result from them, The Scenesof thc
universeare continually shifting, and one ohicct fol-
another In an uninterrupted succession;but the
power of force, which actuates the wholc machine, is
entirely conccalcd from us, and never discovers itself
 KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY
in any of the sensiblequalities of body. We know,
that, in Fact, heat is a constant attendant Of flame;
but What is the connexion between them, we have no
room so much as to conECture or imagine. It is
impoßible, therefore, chat the idea of power can
be derived from the contemplation of bodies, in
single of their operation;becauseno bodics
ever discover any pcp.ver,which can bc the original
Of this
Since, therefore, external objects as they appear to
the senses,give us no idea of power or necessarycon-
nexion, by their operation in particular instances, let
us see, whether this idea bc dcrivcd from reflection
Onthe operationsof our own minds, and bc copied
from any internal impression. It may be said, that we
are every moment consciousof internal power; while
we feel, that, by thc simple command of our will, we
can move thc organs of our body, or direct the facul-
tics of our mind. An act of volition produces motions
in our limbs, or raiscsa ncw idca in our imagination.
This influence of thc will we know by consciousness.
Hence wc acquire the idea of power or cocrgy; and
arc certain, that wc ourselvesand all other intelligent
beings are posscsscdof power. This idea, then, is an
ideaof reflection,sinceit arisesFromreflecting the
operations of our own mind, and on the command
which is cxcrciscdby will, both over the organsof the
body and faculties of the soul.
Wc shall procccd to examine this pretension;and
first with regard to the influence of volition over the
organs of the body.This influence, we may observe,
is a fact, which, likc all other Itatural events, can be
known only by experience, and can never be fore
seen from any apparent energy or power in the
cause, which connects it with effect, and renders
the one an infallible consequenceOf rhe other. The
motion of our I-n-)dyfollows upon the command of
our will. Of this we are every moment conscious.
But the means,by which this is effected;the energy,
by which the will perForms extraordinary an op-
eration; of this weare so far from being immediately
conscious,that it must for ever escapeour most dili-
For fir"; is there any principle in all nature morc
mysteriousthan rhe union Ofthe soul with thc body;
by which supposed Spiritual substanceacquires
such an influence over a material one, that thc most
refined thought is able to actuate thc grossestmatter?
Wcrc empowered, by a sccrct wish, to remove
mountains, or control the planets in their orbit; this
extensiveauthority would not bc morc extraordinary,
nor morc beyondour comprehension.But if by con-
sciousnesswe perceivedany power or energy in the
will, we must know this powcr; wc must know its
conncxion witb the effect; we must know the secret
union of soul and body,anclthe nature of both these
substances;by Whichthe one is ableto operate,in SO
many instances,upon the other.
We are ableto moveall OrgansOf
thc with a like authority; though cannot
assign any reason besidesexperience, for SOremark-
a differencebetweenoneand the other,Why has
thc will an influence over the tongue and fingers,not
over the heart or liver? This question would never
embarrassus, were we consciousnf a power in thc
former Gese, in the latter, We should then pcr•
ceive, independent Of experience, why the authority
of will over the organsof the body is circumscribed
within sw-hparticular limits. Being in that cascfully
acquainted With the power or force, by which it opcr-
ates, we should also know, why its influcncc reaches
precisely to such boundaric•s,and no farther.
A man, suddenly struck with palsy in thc leg or
arm, or who had newly lost members, frequently
endeavours,at first to move them, and employ thcm in
their usual offccs. Here hc is as much conscious of
power to command such limbs, as a man in perfect
health is consciousof power to actuate any mcmbcr
which remains in its natural statc and condition. But
cons-cu•usness
ncvcr dcccives.Consequently, neltber in
the onc casc nor in the other, are wc ever conscious of
any power. Wc Icarn thc influencc of our will from ex-
pcr•encc alone. And cxperience only teachesus, how
onc event constantly follows another; instruct-
ing us in thc sccrct connexion, which binds them to-
gether, and rcndcrs them inseparable.
Thildly, We learnfrom anatomy,that the immedi-
ate of powcr in voluntary motion, is not the
rncmbcr itself which is moved, but certain muscles,
and nerves,and animal spirits, perhaps,some-
thing still more minute and more unknown, through
which thc motion is successivelypropagated,ere it
reach the member itself whose motion is rhe imme-
diatc obicct of volition. Can there be a more certain
 HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING
proof,that thc power,by which this wholeoperation
performed, so far being directly and fully
k by an inward sentiment or consciousness,IS,
to the lastdegreemysteriousand unintelligible? Herc
the mind wills a certain event:Immediately another
event, tmknown to and totally different
from the one intended, is produced; This event pro-
ducesanother,equally unknown: Till at last,through
long succession, desired event is produced. But
if the original power were felt, it must be known:
Were it known, its effect also must be knmvn; since
all pmver is relative to its effect. And vice versa, if the
effect be not known, the power cannot bc known nor
felt. How indeed can we bc conscious of a power to
move our limbs, when we have no such power; but
only that to move certain animal spirits, which,
though they produce at last motion of our limbs,
yet operate in such a manner as is wholly beyond our
comprehension
We may, thcrcforc, conclude from the whole, I
hope, without any temerity, though with assurance,
that our idea of power is not copied from any senti-
ment or consciousnessof power within ourselves,
when wc give rise to animal motion, or apply our
limbs to their proper useand onice. That this motion
follows the command of the will is a macrer of common
expericnce,like other tutural events:But the Inn-veror
cncrgy by which this is effected, like that other nat-
ural cvcnts, is unknown and inconceivable-12
Shall then assert, that we are conscious Of a
power or cncrgy in our own mirids, when, by an act
or command of our will, we raiseup a new idea,fix
the mind to the contemplation of it, turn it on all
sidcs,and at last dismiss it for some Other idea, when
we think that we havesurveyedir with sufficient ac-
curacy?I believethe sameargumentswill prcwc,that
cvcnthis command Ofthe Will givesusno real ideaof
forceor energy.
First, It must be allowed, that, when wc know a
power, we know that very circumstance in thc
cause,by which it is enabledto produce the effect:
For theseare supposedto bc synonymous.We must,
therefore, know thc cause and effect, and thc
rlation between them. But do we pretend to bc
quainted with the naturc of thc human soul and the
nature of an idea, or thc aptitude of the onc to pro-
duce the other? This is a real creation; a production
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
Of something out of nothing: Which implies a
power so great, that it may seem, at first sight,
beyond thc reachof any being, lessthan Infinite. At
least it must be owned, that sucha power is not felt,
nor known, nor evenconceivableby the mind, We
only feel thc event, tramcly,the existenceof an idea,
consequcnt to a command of the will: But the
manner, in Which this operation is performed, the
power by which it is produced, is entirely beyond
our comprehension.
Secondly,The command of the mind ovcr itself is
limited, as well as its over thc body; and
these limits are not known by reason, or any ac-
quaintance with the nature of causeand effect, but
only by and observation,as in all other
natural eventsand in the operation of cxtcrnal ob-
jects. Our authority over our sentiments and passions
is much weaker than that over our ideas; and even
the latter authority is circumscribed within very
narrow boundaries. Will any onc pretend to as_sign
thwultimate reasonof theseboundaries,or show why
the power is deficient in onc case,not in another.
Thirdly, This self-command IS very different at
different times. A man in health possessesmore of it
than one languishing with sickness. We are more
master of our thoughts in the morning than in the
evening: Fasting, than after a full meal. Can
any reason for thcsc variations, except experience?
Where thcn is thc power,of which we pretend to be
conscious?Is there not here, either in spiritual or
material substance, or both, some secret mechanism
or structure of parts, upon which the effectdepends,
and which, being entirely to us, renders
the powcr or cncrgy of the will equally unknown
and incomprehensible?
Volition is surely an act of' rhe mind, with which
wc arc sufficiently acquainted. Reflect upon it.
Consider it on all sides.Do you find anything in it
like this creativepower,by which it raisesfrom noth-
ing a new idea, and With a kind of Fiat, imitates thc
omnipotenceof its Maker, if I may hc allowed so to
speak, who called G"th into existence all the various
scenesof nature? SOfar from being consciousof this
energyin the will, it requiresascertam cxpcrienceas
that of which we are possessed,to convince us that
such extraordinary effects do cvcr rcsult from a
Simpleact of volition.
 KNOWLEDCE AND REALITY
The gcncrality of mankind neverfind anydiffi-
culty in accountingfor the more commonand fa-
miliar operationsof nature—suchasthedescentof
heavy bodies, the growth of plants, the generation
of animals, or thc nourishment of bodies by food:
supposethat, in all thcsc Cases,they perceive,
the very forcc or energy of thc cause,by which it is
connected with its effect, and is for ever infallible in
its operation. They acquire, by long habit, such a
turn Ofmind, that upon thc appearanceof the cause,
they immediately expectwith assuranceits usual
attendant, and hardly conceive it possible that any
other event could result from it. It is only on the
discovery of extraordinary phenomena, such as
earthquakes,pestilence,and prodigics of any kind,
that they find themselvesat a lossto assigna proper
cause,and to explain the manner in which the effect
is produced hy it. It is usual for men, in such diffi-
culties, to have recoursc to some invisible intelligent
principlel/ as the immediate•causeof that event
which surprises them, and which, they think,
cannot be accounted for from thc common powers
of nature. But philosophers, who carry thcir scru-
uny a little farther, immediately perceivethat, even
in the most familiar events, energy of the cause
is asunintelligible as in rhe most unusual, that
we only learn by experience the frequent Conjunc-
lion of objects, without being ever able to compre-
hend anything like Connexionbetween them. Hcrc,
then, many philosophers think themselvesobligcd
by reasonto have all occasions,to the
same principle, which the vulgar never appcal to
but in casesthat appear miraculous and supernatu-
ral. They acknowledge mind intelligence to be,
not only thc ultimate and original of all
things, but thc immediate and sole causeof every
event which appears In nature. They pretend that
those obiccts which are commonly denominated
causes,arc in reality nothing but occasions;and that
true and direct principle of every effect is not
any power or forcc in nature,but a volition of thc
SupremeBeing,who wills that suchparticular Olv
jectsshouldfor ever bc conjoinedwith other.
Instead of saying that one billiard-ball moves an-
other by force which it hasderived from the author
of nature, it is the Deity himself, they say,who, by a
particular volition, moves thc ball, being
determinedro this operationby thc impulseof' the
first ball, in consequenceof those general laws
which he has laid down to himsclf in rhe govern-
mcnt of the universe. But philosophers advancing
still in their inquiries, diseovcr that, as wc are to-
tally ignorant of the I-yr.veron which depends thc
mutual operation of Ivydie_s, we are no lessignorant
of that power on which depends thc operation of
mind on body,or of body on mind; nor arc we able,
cither from our sensesor consciousness, to assign
thc ultimate principle in one cascmorc than in thc
other. Thc sameignorance,therefore, reducesthem
to the samecom-lusion.They assertthat the Deity is
the immcdiatc cause of the union bctwccn soul and
body; and that thcy are not the organs of scnsc,
which, being agitated by external objects, produce
sensationsin the mind; but that it is a particular vo-
linon of our omnipotent Maker, which excitessuch
sensation,in consequenceof such a motion in the
Organ.In likc manner,it is not arty energyin thc
will that produceslocal motion in our members: It
is God himself, who is pleasedto our will, in
itselfimpotent,andto commandthat motion which
we erroneouslyattribute to our own power and ef-
ficacy. Nor clo philosophers stop at this conclusion.
They sometimescxtcnd thc sameinferenceto the
mind itself, in its internal operations. Our mental
vision or concw•ptionof ideasis nothing but a
tion made to us by our Maker. When we voluntarily
turn our thoughts to any object, and raise up its
image in the fancy, it is not thc will which creates
that idea; It is the universal Creator, who discovers
it to the mind, and renders it prescnt to us.
Thus, accordingto thesephilosophers,everything
is full of God. Not cujntcnt with thc principle, that
nothing existsbut by Iniswill, that nothing possesses
any power but by his concession:They rob nature,
and all createdbeings, of cvcry power, in order to
rcndcr their dependence the Deity still more sen-
Sibleand immediate, They considernot that, by this
theory, they diminish, instead of magnifying, the
grandeur of those attributes, which they affect so
much to celebrate,Ir arguessurely more power in the
Deity to delegateacertain degreeof powerto inferior
creaturesthan to produceeverything by his own im-
mcdiatc volition. It argues more Wisdom to contrive
at hrst thc fabric of the world with such perfect
 HUME: AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING
foresightthat, of itself',and by its proper operation,it
mayserveall the purposesof providencc,than if thc
greatCreatorwereobligedeverymomentto adjust
its parts,and animate by his breath all thc wheelsof
that stupendous machine.
But havea philosophical confu-
tation of this theory, perhaps the two following re-
Hectionsmay suffice.
Ph-sr,ir seemsto me that this thcory of the univer-
sal energy and operation of the Supremc Being is too
bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man, sum-
ciently apprized of the weakncss of human reason,
and thc narrc»v limits to which it is confined in all its
operations.Though thc chain of argumcnts which
conduct to it werc evcr so logical, there must arise a
strong suspicion, if not an absolute assurance,that it
hascarried us quite beyond thc reach of our faculties,
when it leads to conclusions so extraordinary, and so
remotefrom common lifc andcxpcrtcnce.Wearegot
into fairy land, longcrc we havereachedthe laststeps
of our theory; and there we have no reason to trust
our common methodsof argument, or to think thar
our usual analogiesand probabilities have any au-
Our is too fathom such immense
abysses.And We that
wearc guided, in everystepwhich we take,by a kind
Of and experience,we may be
that this has no authority
wethus apply to it subjectsthat lie entirely Outof thc
sphereOfexperience, on this we shall haveocca-
to a herw•ards,
Secxmdly,I cannot peru•ive any force in thc argu-
mentson which this theory is founded, We are igno-
rant, i t i St rue, of the manner in which bodies operate
each other; Their force or energy is entirely incom•
prehensible: But are we not equally ignorant of thc
or force by which a mind, even the supreme
mind, operateseither on itself or on body? Whcncc, I
beseechyou,do we acquireanyideaof it? Wc haveno
or consciousnessof this power in ourselves.
We have no idea of thc Suprcmc Being but what we
learn from reflection on our own facultics. Were our
Ignorance,thercforc, a good reasonfor reiecting any
thing, we shouldbc led into that principlc of denying
all energy in thc Suprcmc Being as much as in the
grossest matter. We surely comprehend as little the
Operationsof onc asof thc other. Is it morc difficult to
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
conceivcthat motion may arise from impulse than
that it may arise from volition:' All we know is our
profound ignorance in ly-sthcases.
But to hastento a conclusionof this argument, which
is already drawn out to too great a length; We have
soughtin vain for an ideaof"power or necessarycon-
ncxton in all the Mjureesfrom which wc could sup•
poseit to bederived.It appearsthat, in singlcinstances
of the operation of bodies, we never can, by our
utmc»stscrutiny, discover any thing but one cvcnt fol-
lowing another,without being ableto comprehend
anyforceor bywhichthccauscoperates,or any
connexion between it and its supposcd effect. The
samedifficulty Occursin contemplatingthe opera-
of mind on body—whcrc wc obscv,ethe motion
of the latter to follow upon thc volition of thc former,
but are not able to observe or conccivc the tie which
binds togetherthe motion and volition, or the energy
by which the mind producesthis cffcct.Thc authority
Of the will over its own faculties and ideas is not a whir
more comprchcnsiblc: So that, upon the whole, there
appearsnot, throughout all nature, any one instance
of connexion which is conceivableby LIS.All events
seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows
another; but we ncvcr can obscrw any tie between
them. They sccm conjoined,but never tunnected. And
aswe can haveno ideaof any thing which neverap-
pearcd to our outward scnscor inward sentiment, the
ncccssaryconclusion seems be (hat we have no idea
ofconnexion or power at all, and that these words arc
absolutely witlv.ut any meaning, when employed
cither in philosophicalreasoningsor common life.
But there remainsonemethodnf avoidingthis
conclusion,and onesourcewhich we havenot yetex-
amined. When any natural Objector event is prc-
sented, it impossible for us, by any sagacity or
penetration, to or even con'ecture, without
experience, what event will result from it, or to carry
our forestghtbeyondthat objectwhich is immediately
present to the memory and senses.Even after one in-
stanceor experiment where wc havc observeda par-
ricular event ro follow upon another, we are not
entitled to form a general rule, or foretell what will
happen in like cases; it being justly esteemed an
 KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY
unpardonabletemerity to judgeof the wholecourseof
nature from onesinglccxpcriment, howeveraccurate
or certain. But whcn one particular speciesof event
has always,in all instances,beenconjoined with an-
other, we make no longer any scruple or foretelling
onc upon thc appcaranceof the other,and of employ-
ing that reasoning,which can aloneassureus of any
matter offact or cxistcncc.Wethen call theoneobject,
Cause;the other,Effect. We supposethat chereis some
connexionbetweenthem; sonæ in the one, by
which it infallibly producesthe Other,and operates
with thc greatestcertainty and Strongestnecessity.
It appears,then, that this idea of a necessary
connexion among eventsarisesfrom a number of simi-
lar instanceswhich occur of the constanto•niuncuon
of theseevents;nor can that ideaeverbc suggestedby
any one of theseinstances,surveyedin all possible
lights and positions.But there is nothing in a number
of instances,different from every single instance,
which is supposedto be exactlysimilar;exceptonly,
that after a repetitionOfsimilar instances,thc mind is
carried by habit, upon the appearanceof one to
expectits usual attendant,and to belicvc that it will
exist.This connexion,therefore,which wcfeel in the
mind, this customary transition of the imagination
from oneobject to its usualattendant,is thc scntiment
or impressionfrom which we form the ideaof v-yjwer
or necessaryconnexion. Nothing farther is in the case.
Contemplatethe subjecton all sidcs;you will never
find any Otherorigin Of that idea.This ISthe soledif-
ference between onc instance, from which we can
never recei•.e the idea Of connexion, and a number or
similar instances,by which it is suggested.The first
time a man sawthe communicationof motion by im-
pulse, asby the shock of two billiard-balls, he could not
pronouncethat the one wasconnected:but only
that it was with the other. After he has ob-
servedseveralinstancesof this nature, he then pro-
nounces them to be connected. What alteration has
happenedto give rise to new idea of connexion?
Nothing but that hc now feels these events to be
nettedin his imagination, and can readily foretell the
existenceof one from the appearanceof the other.
When we say,thercforc,that one object is connected
With another,we mcanonly that theyhaveacquireda
connexionin our thought, and give rise to this infefr
encc, by which they becomeproofs Of each other's
existence: A conclusion which is somewhat extraordi-
nary, but which seemsrounded on sufficient evidence.
Nor will its ewidencebe weakenedby any generaldif-
fidence of thc ur scepticalsuspicion
concerning cvcry conclusionwhich is new and extraor-
dinary. No conclusionscan bemore agrenblr to scep-
ticism than such as make concerning thc
weakncss and narrow limits of human reason and
capacity.
A nd what strongerinstancrcanbeproducedof the
surprising ignorance and weaknessOfthe understand-
ing than the present?For surely,if thcrc bc any rela-
tion among objectswhich it imports to us to know
pcrfcctly, it is that Of causeand effect. On this are
founded all our reasoningsconcerningmatter of fact
or existence.By means of it alone attain any assur-
ance concerning which arc rcrmvcd from the
presenttestimonyofnur memoryandsenses.
The only
immediateutility of all sciences,is to teachus,how to
control and regulate future cvcnts by thcir causes.Our
thoughtsand enquiriesare, thcrcforc,everymoment,
employedaboutthisrelation:Yetsoimperfectarethe
ideaswhich weform concerningit, that It isimpossible
to give any just definition of cause,except what is
drawn from M)mcthingextraneousand foreignto it.
Similar Objectsare always con101ncdwith similar, Of
this we havecxpcricncc.Suitablyto this experience,
therefore, may define a causeto be un object,
lowedby another,andwhereull theobjectssimilarto thc
fist arcfollowed by objectsjøni/ow golhe Or in
other words where, if thefist object had been,
secondneverhad existed.The appe•ranceof a cause
alwaysconveysthc mind, by a customarytransition,to
the ideaof thc effect.Of this alsowe haveexperience.
We may, thcrcforc, suitably to this experience,form
another definition of cause,and call it, objectfol-
lowedby unothe;ond whose alwaysconveys
rhcMoughtto other.Hut though both thesedefini-
tions bc drawn from circumstancesforeign to the
cause, cannot remedythis incmrvemencc,or attain
anymorc perfectdefinition, which maypoint out that
circumstance the cause,which givesit a conncxior'
with its effect. We lv.weno idea of this connexion, nor
evenany distinct notion Whatit is we dcsircto know,
when we at a conceptionof it. We say,for
instance,that the vibration of this string is the causeof
this particularsound.But what do wc meanby that
 HUME: AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

affirmation? Wc cithcr mean Ihat this vibeutionisfol- NOTES

lowedby thisjcntnd,and similar vibations have
by Or, vibration is It is probablethat no more was Incant by who
followedbyrhi;sound,
andthatupontheappeamnce
of denied ideas,than that all ideasWerecopies
one Senses, of our impressions; it must bc confessed,
ore- an ideaof rheother.We mayconsiderthc relation
ly that rhe terms, which they employed, were not
of causeanclcffcct in either of thesetwo lights; but Chosenwith such caution, nor soexactly as
to prevcnt all mistalæs their dcKtrinc. For
beyondthese,wehaveno ideaOfir.lf
what is meantby innate?If innatebc equivalentto
To recapitulate, the reasoningsof this
natural, then all thc perceptions and ideas of the
section:Evcry idea is cuopiedfrom some prcccding be allowed to innate or in
impression or sentiment; and where wc cannot find whatever sensewe take the word, whether in
any impression, we may be certain that there is no ro what is uncommon, artificial, or mi-
idca.In all singleinstancesof the operationof bodies raculous. If by innate be meant, contempc".try ro
or minds, there is nothing that producesany impres- our birth, the dispute seemsro bc frivolous; nor is it
sion, nor consequently can suggestany idea of power "Orth while to enquire at what rhinking
or necessaryconnexion. But when many uniform in- before,at,or afterout'birth. Agai
stancesappear, and the same objcct is al'.vaysfol- thc word idea, seemsto bc commonly takcn a
lowed by the event; then begin to entertain veryloosesense,by Locke and others;asstanding
the notion of Causeand connexion. Wc thenfee/ a
for anyof perceptions,
our sensations pas-
sions, as well as th*ts. Now in this sense, I
new sentiment or •mprcsqon, to Wit, a customary
shoulddcsircto know,whatcanhemeantby asscrV
connexion in thc thought or imagination between
ing, that sclf-lovc, or resentmentof injuries, or the
one object and its usual attendant; and this sentiment passion between thc sexesis nnt innate!
is the original of that idea which we seek for. For as But admitting terms, and ideas,
this idea arisesfrom a number of similar instances, in the senseal»veexplained,arid by
and not from any single instancc, it must arise from innate,what is ("iginal or copied from no precedent
that circumstance, in which the number of instances perception, then may we assertthat all our impres-
differ from every individual instance. But this cus- stons are innate, and our ideas not innate,
tomary connexionor transition of the imagination is To ingenuous, must it to my opin
the only circumstanccIn which they differ. In every ion, that was into this qucstioti by
other particular they are alike. The first instance thc schoolmen,who, making use of undehncd
terms,draw out their disputesto a tediouslength,
which we sawof motion cornmL]nicatedby the shock
without couching thc [u•int in question. A like
Of two billiard-balls (to return to this obvious illustra-
ambiguityand rorun through
tion) is cxactly similar to any instancethat may, at that philosopher's reasonings on this as well as
present, occur to us; except only, that Wco_ouldnot, at most other subjects.
first, infer onc event from the other; which wc arc Rcscmblance.
enablcdto do at present,after solong acourseof uni- _ Contiguity.
form experience. I know not whether thc reader will . Cause and effect.

readily apprehendthis reasoning,I am afraid that, . For instancæ,Contrast OrContrancty is also a con-
I multiply words about it, or throw it into a ncxlon among Ideas: but it may, perhagys,hc con-
Side-red as a mixture Of and
greater variety of lights, it would only becomemorc
obscurcand intricate, In all abstractreasoningsthere Where two objectsare contrary,the one clcstmp
thc other; that is, the af its annihilation, and
is one point of view which, if we can happily hit, we
theideaof thc annihilation of anobject,impliesthc
shall go farther towards illustrating the subjectthan idea of its former cwstcncc.
by all the eloquenceand copious expressionin the Thr v,ord,Power,is here in alcu»se
andpopu-
world. This point of view we to lar sense.Thc more accurateexplication of it would
reach,and thc flmversof rhetoricfor subjects give additional cvidcncc to this argument. See
which aremore adaptedto them. Section VII.
 KNOWLEDCE AND REALITY

7. Nothing is more useful than for writers, [Nen,on is, that thc former bc established without
or subjects,to distinguish some processof thought, and some reflection un
betwccn 'cason and experienc-e,and to suppose, what wc haveobserved,
in ordcrto distinguishits
that thcscspeciesof argumentationare entirely circumstances,
andtraceits consequences:
Whereas
different from cach other. The humer are [aken in thelatter,thc experienced
eventis exactlyand
for the result Of our faculties, familiar to which we asthe result Of
which, by consider-n g a priori the nature Of any fMrricularsituation.The historyofa TIBERIUS
things, and cxamining rhc effccts, that or a NEROmakes dreada like tyranny,Wereour
follow from their operation, establishparticular monarchs freed from the restraints of laws and
principles of and philosophy. latter Scnares:
Butthe Observationof anyfraud or c
aresupposedto bederivedentirely from sens in private life is sufficient, with the aid of a little
learn what has actually thought, to usthe samcapprehension;while it
resultedfrom the operation of particular objects, servesas an instanceOfthe generalcorruprion of
and arc thence able to infer, what will, for the human nature,and showsLISrhedangerwhich we
resulr from them. Thus, for instance, the must by an i re in
limitat i and resrraints of civil and mankind. In both cases,it is cxpcricneewhich is
a legal constituti•o , may bc dcfcnded, either from ultimately thc foundation of our inference and
reason,which reflectingon thc greatfrailty and
corruption of human nature, teaches,that no man is no man young and
cansafelybetrustedwith unlimitedauthority;or as not to have formed, obscrvalitm,
from experienceand history, which inf r of general and just maxims human af-
the enormousabuses,that ambition, in cvcry age fairs and the conduct of life; but i' be con-
and country,hasbeenfound to makeof soimpru- fessed,that, when a man comesto put thesein
dent a confidence.
he will be extremely liable to error, till
The distinction between reason and time and farther experienccboth enlarge these
perlencc 's mainrained in all deliberations maxims,and teachhim their proper useand ap-
concerningthe conductof while the experi- plication, In cvcry situation or incident, there are
eneedStatesman,general,physician,or merchant many particular and seemingly minute circum-
IS trusted and followed; and the unpractised stances, which the man of greatest tal ent at
novice, With Whare ver natural talents endowed, first, apt to overlook, on them the justness
and clcspised.Though it be allowed, of his conclusions,andconsequentlythc prudence
that reasonmay form very plausibleconjectures of his conduct, entirely clcpcnd.Not to mention,
with regardto theconsequences
of sucha particu- that, to a young beginner, rhc obsxrva-
lar conduct in such particular circumstancxs; it is tions and maxims occurnot alwayson thc proper
still impcrfect, without rhc assistanceof occasions,nor can bc immediately applied with
expcricncc,which is alone able LOgive stability due calmnessand distinction. The truth is, an un-
certainty to the maxims,derived from study experienced reasonercould be nn reasonerat all,
and reflection,
Were unexperienced; and when wc
But notwithstanding that this distinction be assignthat characterto anyone,wemeanit only
universally received, [mythin the active and in a comparativesense,and supposehim pos-
speculative
sccncsof life, I shallnotscrupleto pro- sessedof experience, in a smaller and more im-
nounce, that ir is, at bottom, erroneous, at least, perfect degree.
superficial. "Whether it is a natural instance or a mere
f weexaminethoscarguments,which,in any sion, I can't say; but one's emotions arc more
of thcsciences
abovemcntioned,arcsupposccl to be stronglyarousedby seeingthe placesthat tradition
thc mcrcclfcccsof reasoningand reflection,they records to have been the favorite resort Of men of
Will found to terminate,at last,in somegeneral note in days, than by about their
principleor for which Wecanassignno deedsor Ruling their writings.My ownfcclings
reasonbut obsenationand experience.
Thc only at the prcscntmomentarc a cascin point. I am
differencebctwcctithemandthoscImxilns, which OfPlato, first philosopher,sowe are
arevulgarlyestccmcdthe resultof pureexperience, told,thatmadea practiceof holdingdiscussions
in
 HUME: AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

this place;and indeed,the gardencloseat hand, wc krw_rwby experience;but could not know it a
yonder,noronly his memorybut seemsto iMi_ It that thc
bring my eyes. w animal which wc experience,
haunt of Speusippus,nf Xcnocratcs, and of Xeno- afford no accuratcprectscideaof power, entersvery
crates'pupil polemo, who used to sit on the very much into chat vulgar, inaccurate idea, which is
scat Wesee there. For Iny part,
sight of our senat&houseat (I Encanthe 13, Oeös ciTTö lln Latin, "Deus er machina?'
Curia Hostilia, not thc prcscnt ncw building, Literally, from a machine, A thing or person
which to smaller since enlarge that appearssuddenly in a play
ment) usedto call up to me thoughts of Scipio, to provide a contrived solution to a difficulr
Cato, and chief of all, my grandfather; situation]
such Of suggestion do places possess.NO 14. not examine length thevis Which
thc or the memory is so much talked of in the new philosophy,
basedupon locality." Cicero, De Finibuy, Book V, and which is ascribed to matter. We find by
trans, H Rackham (Cambridge: I-larvard Univcr- experience, that body at rest or in motion contin-
sity Press, pp. 291—92. uesfor ever in its presentstare,till from ir by
Mr. Locke divides all argumcnts into demonstrative some new cause;and thata bc«ly impelled takes
and probable.In this view, must say,that it isonly much motion from thc impelling body as it ac-
probableall men die, or that rhe sun will rise quires itself. These are facts. When we call this a
to-morrow. But to conform our language ro vis ineytiue,we only mark these facts
we ought to divide arguments into any idea of thc Inert powcr; in thc
and By proofs samc manner as, when we ralk of gravity, wc
meaning such experienceas Icavc meanccrtain effects,without comprehendingthat
no room for doubt or opposition. active power, Was never thc meaning Of Sir
10_ Section ISAAC NEWTON roh second causes of all force or
Locke, his Chapter saysthat, cnergy; though some of 11Bf o II owers have
ing from cxpcricncc, that there are several new ourcd to establishthat theory upon his authority.
produerions in nature, and concluding that there On the conrrary, that great philosopher had re-
must somewhere a power capableof producing course to an etherial his uni-
them, we arrive at last by [his reasoning idea versal attraction; though he was so
But no reasoning can cvcr give us a ncw, as to allow, that it was a merc hypothesis,
original, simple idea, as this philosopher himsclf not to be insisted on, without morc expcriments. I
confcsscs.This, therefore,can nexerbe the origin must confess,that there is something in the fate of
opinions a little extraordinary. DESCARTESinsin-
12. It may that the resistance which we uatcd doctrine of' rhe universal and solc
mcct With in l»dies, frequently to Curt efficacy of thc Deity, without insisting on it,
our force,and call up all our power,this givesus Lhe MALEBRANCHE ancl other CARTESIANS made it
and It is this or Strongen- the foundation of all their philosophy. It had,
deavour,or which are is thc origi- however,no authority in CIARKE.
nal impression from which this idea is copied. But, and CUDWORTH. ncvcr so much astake notice of it,
first, we attribute powersto a vastnumbcr of objects, but suppose all along, that matter has a real,
wherewe never supposethis resistancenr excr- though subordinate and derived power, By what
tian of forceto take place;to the Being, means has it becomeso prevalcnr among our
who meetswith any resistance;to the mind in modern metaphysicians?
its over its ideas and limbs, in common 15. According to theseexplicationsand dcfinitions, thc
thinking and motion, where the effect follows im- Of is relative as as thar of
mediately the will, witl-øjut any exertion or and both have a reference to an eff&t, or some
of force; to inanimate matter, which Other n c conjoined with the former.
is not capable of this Secondly,This scnti Whcn wc consider the circumstancc of
ment of an cndcavour to overcome resistance has no an obicct, by which the degreeor quanliry of its
known connexion With any event: What follows it, effect is fixed and dctcrmincd, we call that its
 KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY

power: And accordingly,it allowed by all phi- between the ideas,we transfer that feeling to rhe
Insophers, that thc effect is the measure Of the obiecrs;as nothing is more usual than to apply to
But if they had any idea of power,as it is it' external cvcry internal sensation, which
itself, Why could Measure it in itself? The they occasion.
dispute whether thc ibrce ofa body in motion beas
its velociry,or rhesquarr ofits velcnity; this dispute,
Say,need not by its KEY TERMS
in cqual or uncqual times; but by a direct mensura-
and comparison. Metaphysical A prior i
As to the frequencyof of thc words, Force, Relations of ideas Customary conjunction
Power, Energy, etc., Which every where occur in Matters uf fact causes
conversation, as well as in philosophy; Causc and cffcct
that is no Lhar we arc acquainted, in any
instance,with the connectingprinciple between
causeand effect, or can account ultimately Forthe
prcniuction of one rhing to another. These words, STUDY QUESTIONS
as commonly used, have meanings an-
nexcd to them; and thcir ideasare very uncertain Do you agrcc with Hume that "the most lively
and confused. No animal can put external bodies thought is still inferior ro thc dullest sensation"?
in motion Without thc sentiment nf a or HOW does argue rhat our
endeavour; and every animal has a s copiesof our impressions"?
feeling from the stroke or blow of an external Why does Hume think that "custom . is the
object, that is in motion, These sensations, which great guide of human life'? Specifically, how
arc animal, and from Which we can a does Hume employ the notion Of custom when
priori draw no inference, are apt to transfer discussing why we expect the future to restunble
to inanimate objects, and ro suppose, that they
havesomcsuch feelings,wheneverthey transfer Do you agreewith Hume when hesaysthat we arc
or receive motion. With regard to energies, ncvcr able to observe the connection that ties cause
which are exerred, without our anncxing to them with effect? Why or why not?
any idea of communicated otion, we consider What is n c tl •on two c vents

only the constant expcricnccd coniun c'Hon of the beingconjoinedand two eventsbeing
events; and as we fecl a customary connexion What work is this distinction meant to do?

The Problem of Induction

W. C. SALMON

WesleyC. Salmon(1925—2001) wasa leading of scicnccand a metaphysician.

He wasa professorof philosophyat LheUniversity of Pittsburgh,wherehc worked on the
problems of causation and scientific explanation. His best-known are
Explanationand the CausalSoucm-eof the World (1984)and Four Decodesof Scientifje
Explanation(1990).In this selectionSalmon laysour a problem from Hume: To acquire
knowledgeof the unobserved,to employindLKtion,weneedto relyon the sc»calledprinciple
of thc uniformity of nature, the idea that fut ure will rcscmblc the past. The problem,
though,isthat theredoesn'tseemrobeanyrationaljustificationfor thisprinciple.Salmon
considersSIXpossiblejustifications, and he finds them all wanting; they are all either