WORKBOOK 5

Statutory Interpretation
Learning Outcomes
By the end of this part of the course you should be able to:

 Define and apply the literal, golden and mischief rules (and their limitations)
 Define and apply purposive interpretation (and their limitations)
 Explain the rules of language used in SI
 Explain the presumptions used in SI
 Critically analyze the evolution of the approaches to Statutory Interpretation with use of decided
cases.

In using this workbook, please follow the tasks:

Task 1: Before you attend the lecture: Read the following

Background reading (This provides general reading that gives context, major ideas and themes,
vocabulary of the subject matter and credible information that can help you to understand the
essential reading)

Rose-Marie Belle Antoine. Commonwealth Caribbean Law and Legal Systems (2nd edn, Routledge 2008)
Ch 13 and 14

Essential reading (This provides reading that gives specific examples, problem solving solutions, and
detailed analysis that provides tools for critical analysis)

CCJ case of Selby: https://ccj.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Selby-v-Smith-Judgment-Attorneys-at-

Law.pdf

Cross, Statutory Interpretation, 3rd ed. Chps. 1-3, Ch. 4 pp 69-92.

Crabbe, Understanding Statutes pp. 81-97

Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 3rd ed Part XIX, pp. 665-670;

Additional Reading (The name is on the tin! This provides you with additional sources of information
that goes beyond the background and essential reading)

Walker and Walker, English Legal System, Oxford University Press, 9th ed., pgs. 45-76

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M. Zander, The Law-Making Process, 6th. ed., Cambridge University Press, pp. 127-214.

Task 2: Before you attend the lecture: Make notes of the readings
Before any lecture you need to do the assigned readings, at least to some extent. Your professors often
tell students that this is an essential component of learning the course material (or having success in
lectures). And yet, few students actually heed this advice.

So, do the reading. And whilst you’re at it, take notes. The benefits here are three-fold (at least). First,
familiarising yourself with the lecture material in advance will mean you’re clued up on what will be
discussed, and you can spend more time in the lecture focusing on the important bits. Second, going
over the material at least twice will help you commit it to your long-term memory (great for exams). And
third, you can jot down any questions you might have and ask them during, or after, the lecture.

Reference: https://www.oxbridgeessays.com/blog/master-lecture-notes-tips-really-work/

Note-Taking is an important Skill. We recommend you consider the methods suggested at the above
link. To get you started, we recommend you use the Cornell Method. If it does not work for you,
experiment with other styles that fit your needs. For the Cornell Method, Follow this link:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1X5vuSm8piiUwnsoYlyTt28inijWNTBvj7-jGWTUSmSQ/edit?
hl=en_US make a copy of this template if you are working on your computer, or replicate in your
notebooks.

For more information: https://www.timeatlas.com/cornell-note-template/

Task 3: Attend the lecture

The purpose of a lecture is not to give you all the information you need to pass your module. Lectures
are starting points for your own reading unless you want low marks. Lectures are used for a variety of
reasons:

● To give an overview of a subject, in which case you will need to use your reading to fill in the
detail.

● To cover an important detail, in which case you will need to use your reading to put it into
context and get the bigger picture.

● To cover a conceptual idea and give one or two examples of it in practice - you will need to use
your reading to find more examples to ensure you have grasped the concept fully.

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Whatever the purpose, you will need to be able to make effective notes.

Reference: https://canvas.hull.ac.uk/courses/30746/pages/introduction?module_item_id=71654

Task 4: During the lecture

It is important that you focus during lectures, having prepared for classes, with a view to having some of
your own questions, areas of confusion clarified. The point is not to write the lecture word for word.

“Essentially, you only want to write down the main important points. You do this by becoming a really
good listener. The trick to taking good lecture notes is to avoid the tangents and try to pinpoint the stuff
that is important - which may be examined, though not exclusively. Pay attention to signposts: These
might include:

● “You need to know X”

● Anything the professor says more loudly or with more emphasis
● Anytime there is a relationship (e.g. first…second…finally)
● Anytime there are significant signposts (e.g. especially, most significant, consequently, etc.)

At the end of the lecture, we may give a summary, conclusion, or review of the material. These are the
main takeaway points and are likely to be important. Don’t pack up your bags early. Wait until the
professor is done talking – in these last few minutes the professor may be telling you what s/he wants
you to know come essay or exam day.

As a side note, remember that what you do and do not take away from the lecture are equally
important. Did you have unanswered questions, or did your mind wander and miss a point? If the answer
is yes, it is important to get these addressed earlier rather than later to make sure that you have a
complete set of notes.

Reference: https://www.oxbridgeessays.com/blog/master-lecture-notes-tips-really-work/

For additional templates of the Cornell Method and further explanation, see
https://templatelab.com/cornell-notes/ . If you come across similar or better resources, feel free to
share them with us.

Asking questions

At the end of most lectures (and often during) the lecturer will ask if anyone has a question or if further
clarification is needed.

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Please do not hesitate to use this opportunity to ask a question about anything you did not understand -
however dumb you feel. It is a cliché, but true, that the only dumb questions are the ones you didn't ask.
You will be amazed how often there is a collective sigh of relief when someone asks the question that
everyone was too afraid to ask!

Your lecturers are not scary and they are not judgemental, they are (usually) nice, friendly people! It is
important that you develop a good relationship with them. Asking questions is a way to show you are
genuinely interested in their subject and they will be happy to answer them.

Reference: https://canvas.hull.ac.uk/courses/30746/pages/introduction?module_item_id=71654

Alternatively, if you have questions and want to submit them, send an email to the Course Director or
your Tutor at least 24 hours before class.

Task 5: Attend the tutorial

● See tutorial questions in this workbook.
● Before tutorials - Consider the Feynman Method to ensure you understand what you are
engaging with.

STEP 1

Write the name of a concept at the top of whatever place you are planning to record your notes. While
purists will push for a physical pen and paper, this isn’t necessarily prescriptive - for example a
whiteboard or digital note taking app may be used, as long as you maintain focus and attention.

STEP 2

Begin to write out an explanation of the concept on your recording area. The important thing here is to
write it as if you were explaining it to a layman who has no knowledge of the concept. This will begin to
highlight what you understand, but more importantly where you have gaps in your knowledge.

STEP 3

Pinpoint these exact gaps, essentially the areas where explanation is a struggle. Go back to your source
material, and reread and relearn these parts. Repeat Step 2 as a feedback loop as many times as you
require.

STEP 4

Once you have properly explained the concept, put on your editor's hat. If you are using overly wordy or
confusing language (or simply paraphrasing the source material) keep filtering your content. Humans are

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really good at adding complexity - it takes a lot more cognitive effort to remove it. Simplify your
language, and, where possible, use simple analogy.

Reference: https://strategyumwelt.com/frameworks/feynman-technique

Task 6: After the lecture and tutorial

● Consolidate and review your notes.
● If you need further assistance, discuss the material with your tutor and/or attend office hours.
● Attempt past paper questions.

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1
Introduction

While the legislative function of enacting statute is reposed in Parliament, the task of
interpreting it is left to the courts. It is often said that when the Courts are interpreting statute
they are giving effect to the intention of Parliament. Interpretation to give effect to the
intention of Parliament is an objective as opposed to a subjective exercise. Therefore, the
intention of Parliament is sought through an interpretation of the words it used rather than a
review/consideration of what it meant.

Various tools are relied on by the Courts to carry out this task. These tools are contained in rules
of interpretation, presumptions, internal and external aids to interpretation and rules of
language. The Courts in the Commonwealth Caribbean generally follow the same rules, tools
and presumptions of interpretation used in the UK. The major exception relates to the
interpretation of the Constitution, which is generally interpreted purposively. The difference in
approach being primarily occasioned by the Court’s recognition that our written Constitutions
are unique pieces of legislation which are supreme.

Major approaches

The major rules or approaches to statutory interpretation are as follows

 The literal rule

 The golden rule
 The mischief rule
 The purposive approach
 The unified contextual approach.

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2
Literal Rule

This rule is also known as the “plain meaning rule”. As the characterization suggests,
interpretation under this approach is confined to a natural and ordinary construction of the
words contained therein. Therefore, there is no reference to other materials such as policy
objectives, Hansard or, law commission reports

The classic formulation of the literal rule is found in the Sussex Peerage Case (1844) 11 Ch & Fin
85, 143; 8 ER 1034. In that case it was observed that, a natural and ordinary construction of the
words in the statute was mandated where the words of the statute were clear and
unambiguous. In such circumstances, the literal rule requires a construction which gives clear
effect to the words used, regardless of the consequences

Tindal CJ stated as follows:

“The only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed
according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the
statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than
to expound those words in that natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone
do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver…”

The words must however be construed in the context of the statute.

In Pinner v. Everett [1969] 3 All E.R. 257 at 258, Lord Reid stated this principle in the following
terms

"In determining the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute the first question is what
is the natural or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute. It is
only when the meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to
have been the intention of the legislature that it is proper to look for some other
permissible meaning of the word or phrase."

However it must be emphasized that construing words in the context of the statue does not
mean that the limitations should unnecessarily be placed on the words used where the statute
does not require the same:

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Hope v Smith (1963) 6 WIR 464-Consider the statements of Wooding CJ when the Court was
construing the following provision section 104 of the Summary Courts Act, Chap. 4:20 (Trinidad
and Tobago) which provides as follows:

“Any person who is found committing any summary offence may be taken into custody,
without warrant, by any constable, or may be apprehended by the owner of the property
on or with respect to which any such offence is committed, ...and shall in the latter case
be delivered as soon as possible into the custody of any constable to be dealt with
according to law.”

At 467 B-D Wooding CJ stated as follows when construing the words “any summary offence”

“This brings us, then, to the final submission that some limitation must be put upon the
extremely wide power conferred by s. 104. It would be intolerable, it is said, if, say, a
constable who finds a (end of page 17) motorist parking his car on the wrong side of the
road could, without more, take him into custody and march him off to a police station for
his case to be inquired into by a gazetted or subordinate police officer. But where the
language of an enactment is clear and unambiguous, it is not the function of the Courts
to relieve against any harshness which it may or may not be thought to occasion. That is
a matter for Parliament to consider. And if Parliament thinks that any hardship which any
legislation may cause can be avoided by the judicious exercise of discretion by those to
whom is committed the duty and ministering it, the Courts must decline to assume a
corrective power which they do not at all possess.”

As the observations of Wooding CJ reveal one of the weaknesses of the literal interpretation is
that it may lead to harsh results. This is upon a review of the following cases:

Baptiste v Alleyne (1970) 16 WIR 437- the conviction of an accused who choked an individual by
placing his hand through a window while standing outside was overturned on appeal. The Court
of Appeal held that he was not “found in the building” was required by a literal interpretation of
s 29 (d) of the Larceny Ordinance.

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Evon Smith v R [2005] UKPC 43 - consider the distinction between capital murder and murder
made by the Privy Council upon an interpretation of s 2 of the Offences Against the Person
(Amendment) Act 1992. See also the dissenting judgment of Lord Hoffman and Lord Hutton.

Regional restatement of rule

One of the most widely cited regional restatements of the literal rule is found in the dicta of
Savarin v. John Williams (1995) 51 W.I.R. 75 at 78-79 Sir Vincent Floissac, C.J. expressed the
principles thus:

"I start with the basic principle that the interpretation of every word or phrase of a statutory
provision is derived from the legislative intention in regard to the meaning which that word or
phrase should bear. That legislative intention is an inference drawn from the primary meaning of
the word or phrase with such modifications to that meaning as may be necessary to make it
concordant with the statutory context. In this regard, the statutory context comprises every
other word or phrase used in the statute, all implications therefrom and all relevant surrounding
circumstances which may properly be regarded as indications of the legislative intention."

Defects of the Literal Rule

The literal rule however has been criticized as flawed for several reasons. However one of the
main reasons relates to the fact that words have different meanings and as such judges may
differ as to which meaning to ascribe to the word. The issue of alternate meanings becomes
more acute when the word(s) in issue is general: See the case of Betts and Others v COP BS 1991
SC 36 (Carilaw) (here the Court had to construe the word “found”)

Early Approaches

It is only where the words of the Statute are not clear and ambiguous that it is necessary to
enlist aids for interpretation (Per Byron, C.J. in Universal Caribbean Establishment v. James
Harrison). The importance of context was emphasized by Lord Upjohn in the case of DPP v
Schildkamp who noted “words which if plainly and literally interpreted have a wide meaning
have been held to be restricted by their context to a narrower meaning.”

This approach was applied in the case of R v Ramsonahai and Duke 3 WIR 535 where it was said
penal statutes must be strictly construed.

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The two appellants were charged with conspiracy “to prosecute” someone.

GOMES CJ held

“No doubt all penal statutes are to be construed strictly, that is to say, the court must
see that the thing charged as an offence is within the plain meaning of the words used,
and must not strain the words on any notion that there has been a slip, that there has
been a casus omissus, that the thing is so clearly within the mischief that it must have
been intended to be included, and would have been included if thought of”

…the words “to prosecute” in s 330 are to be construed in their strict sense and are not to be
extended to include a conspiracy between two or more persons to cause another person to be
prosecuted.

The Judgment in Nabie v Mayers v Law Association of Trinidad and Tobago and Attorney
General TT 2012 CA 8

http://webopac.ttlawcourts.org/LibraryJud/Judgments/coa/2012/narine/
CvA_12_00892DD08jun2012.pdf

THE PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY regarded as the pre-eminent indication of the

INTERPRETATION legislator’s intention.”

[8] The presumption in favour of a literal SECTION 285

interpretation of the words of a statute are set
PRESUMPTION THAT LITERAL MEANING TO BE
out in Bennion on Statutory Interpretation
FOLLOWED.
(5th ed) at page 864:
“Prima facie, the meaning of an enactment
SECTION 284
which was intended by the legislator (in other
PRESUMPTION THAT TEXT IS THE PRIMARY words its legal meaning) is taken to be that
INDICATION OF LEGAL MEANING. which corresponds to the literal meaning.”

“In construing an enactment, the text of the 9. In seeking to ascertain the intention of
enactment, in its setting within the Act or Parliament as expressed in the language it
other instrument containing it, is to be employed, it must be borne in mind that the

10
intention of Parliament is an objective intended”, they are saying only that the words
concept. The task of the Court in finding the under consideration cannot reasonably be
intention of Parliament from the language of taken as used by Parliament with that
an enactment was articulated by Lord Nicholls meaning. As Lord Reid said in Black-Clawson
of Birkenhead in the House of Lords decision inInternational Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-
R. v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Aschaffenburg AG [1975] AC 591,613: “We
Transport and the Regions, Ex-parte Spath often say that we are looking for the intention
Holme Ltd. (2001) 2 AC 349 at 396 F – 397-B. of Parliament, but that is not quite accurate.
WE ARE SEEKING THE MEANING OF THE
“Statutory interpretation is an exercise which
WORDS WHICH PARLIAMENT USED.”
requires the Court to identify the meaning
borne by the words in question in the
particular context. The task of the Court is
In identifying the meaning of the words used,
often said to be to ascertain the intention of
the courts employ accepted principles of
Parliament expressed in the language under
interpretation as useful guides. For instance,
consideration. This is correct and may be
AN APPROPRIATE STARTING POINT IS THAT
helpful, so long as it is remembered that THE
LANGUAGE IS TO BE TAKEN TO BEAR ITS
“INTENTION OF PARLIAMENT” IS AN
ORDINARY MEANING IN THE GENERAL
OBJECTIVE CONCEPT, NOT SUBJECTIVE. THE
CONTEXT OF THE STATUTE.
PHRASE IS A SHORTHAND REFERENCE TO THE
INTENTION WHICH THE COURT REASONABLY Justification for the Literal Rule
IMPUTES TO PARLIAMENT IN RESPECT OF THE
LANGUAGE USED. It is not the subjective 10. It is desirable that parliament should
intention of the minister or other persons who express its intention in clear and unambiguous
promoted the legislation. Nor is it the language so that ordinary citizens and their
subjective intention of the draftsman, or of advisors are able to understand their meaning.
individual members or even of a majority of This aspect of the rule of law, and the need for
individual members of either House. These legal certainty was expressed by Lord Diplock
individuals will often have widely varying in Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd. (1981) AC
intentions. Their understanding of the 251 at 279-280, and cited by Lord Nicholls in R.
legislation and the words used may be v. Secretary of State for the Environment,
impressively complete or woefully inadequate. Transport and the Regions, Ex-parte Spath
Thus, when courts say that such-and –such a Holme Ltd. (supra.) at 397 H to 398 B:
meaning “cannot be what Parliament

11
“The source to which Parliament must have
intended the citizen to refer is the language of
the Act itself. These are the words which
Parliament has itself approved as accurately
expressing its intentions. If the meaning of
those words is clear and unambiguous and
does not lead to a result that is manifestly
absurd or unreasonable, it would be a
confidence trick by Parliament and destructive
of all legal certainty if the private citizen could
not rely upon that meaning but was required
to search through all that had happened
before and in the course of the legislative
process in order to see whether there was
anything to be found from which it could be
inferred that Parliament’s real intention had
not been accurately expressed by the actual
words that Parliament had adopted to
communicate it to those affected by the
legislation.”
11. The “objective” meaning of an instrument
is the meaning which the instrument would
convey to a reasonable person having all the
background knowledge which would
reasonably be available to the audience to
whom the instrument is addressed. This view
was expressed by Lord Hoffman in the Privy
Council decision in A.G. of Belize and Ors. v. particular provisions within the context of the
Belize Telecom Ltd. and Anor. (2009) All E.R.
1127 at 1132 F-H.
“The Court has no power to improve upon the
instrument which it is called upon to construe,
whether it be a contract, a statute or articles
of association. It cannot introduce terms to
make it fairer or more reasonable. It is
concerned only to discover what the
instrument means. However, that meaning is
not necessarily or always what the authors or
parties to the document would have intended.
It is the meaning which the instrument would
convey to a reasonable person having all the
background knowledge which would
reasonably be available to the audience to
whom the instrument is addressed: see
Investors’ Compensation Scheme Ltd. v. West
Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 All ER 98
at 114-115, [1998] WLR 869 at 912-913. It is
this objective meaning which is conventionally
called the intention of the parties or the
intention of whatever person or body was or is
deemed to have been the author of the
instrument.”
12. Where a literal interpretation of the
enactment produces a result which does not
accord with the purpose that Parliament
intended to achieve, the Court may adopt a
purposive approach which seeks to identify
and give effect to the purpose of the
legislation. In doing so the Court considers the
statute as a whole, and construes the statute
in the historical context in which it was
enacted. This approach was articulated by Lord
Bingham in the case R. (Quintavalle) v.
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Secretary of State for Health (2003) 2 WLR 692 effect to Parliament’s purpose. SO THE
at 697 D-G: CONTROVERSIAL PROVISIONS WOULD BE
READ IN THE CONTEXT OF THE STATUTE AS A
“The basic task of the Court is to ascertain and
WHOLE, AND THE STATUTE AS A WHOLE
give effect to the true meaning of what
SHOULD BE READ IN THE HISTORICAL
Parliament has said in the enactment to be
CONTEXT OF THE SITUATION WHICH LED TO
construed. But that is not to say that attention
ITS ENACTMENT.” (emphasis mine)
should be confined and a literal interpretation
given to the particular provisions which give
rise to difficulty. Such an approach not only
13. In construing particular provisions of a
encourages immense prolixity in drafting, since
statute, the Court may employ internal aids,
the draftsman will feel obliged to provide
such as other provisions in the same statute.
expressly for every contingency which may
The Court may also employ external aids, such
possibly arise. It may also (under the banner of
as the historical background, reports of
loyalty to the will of Parliament) lead to the
advisory committees, or records of
frustration of that will, because undue
parliamentary debates.
concentration on the minutiae of the
enactment may lead the Court to neglect the 14. In Pepper v. Hart (1993) AC 593, it was
purpose which Parliament intended to achieve held by the House of Lords that where
when it enacted the statute. Every statute legislation was ambiguous or obscure or led to
other than a pure consolidating statute is, absurdity, Parliamentary material consisting of
after all, enacted to make some change, or one or more statements of a Minister or other
address some problem, or remove some promoter of a Bill, could be used as an aid in
blemish, or effect some improvement in the construction, provided that the statements
national life. The Court’s task, within the relied upon are clear.
permissible bounds of interpretation, is to give

Similarly-

13
 construction of the Statute on a perception
of its wisdom or propriety or a view of what
Parliament ought to have done.”

THE DOMINANT PURPOSE IN CONSTRUING A

STATUTE IS TO ASCERTAIN THE INTENTION
OF THE LEGISLATURE AS EXPRESSED IN THE
STATUTE, CONSIDERING IT AS A WHOLE AND
IN ITS CONTEXT. IT IS ONLY WHERE THE
WORDS OF THE STATUTE ARE NOT CLEAR
AND UNAMBIGUOUS [sic] THAT IT IS
NECESSARY TO ENLIST AIDS FOR
INTERPRETATION...." (emphasis mine)

[25] Sir Vincent Floissac C.J in Charles Savarin

v. John Williams (1995) 51 W.I.R. 75 at 78-79.
C.J. stated:

“In order to resolve the fundamental issue of

this appeal, I start with the basic principle
that the interpretation of every word or
phrase of a statutory provision is derived
from the legislative intention in regard to the
meaning which that word or phrase should
bear. That legislative intention is an inference
drawn from the primary meaning of the word
Byron CJ in Universal Caribbean
or phrase with such modifications to that
Establishment v. James Harrison
meaning as may be necessary to make it
ANUHCVAP1993/0021 with regard to
concordant with the statutory context. In this
construing statutes:
regard, the statutory context comprises every
“The first principle to affirm is to recognise other word or phrase used in the statute, all
the separation of power between the implications therefrom and all relevant
Legislature and the Judiciary. It is the surrounding circumstances which may
province of Parliament to make the law and properly be regarded as indications of the
for the Court to interpret, without basing its legislative intention. “

14
[26] In Abel v. Lee Willes J stated: repugnancy, or injustice…. But I utterly
repudiate the notion that it is competent to a
“No doubt the general rule is that the
judge to modify the language of an Act of
language of an Act is to be read according to
Parliament in order to bring it in accordance
its ordinary grammatical construction unless
with his views as to what is right or
so reading it would entail some absurdity,
reasonable.”

What are the advantages and disadvantages of the literal rule?

15
3

16
Golden Rule (aka “common sense rule”)

In the Sussex Peerage Case the Court recognized that the application of the literal rule could
lead to absurdity. As such under this rule the Court will permit such modification as is necessary
to avoid absurdity or inconsistency. This may be done by way of implying words in the statute
where “absolutely necessary”.

In Grey v Pearson (1857) 6 HL Cas 61, 106; 10 ER 1216, the rule was restated by Parke B (who
later became Lord Wensleydale ) He stated as follows:

“In construing wills and indeed statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and
ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or
some repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid that absurdity and
inconsistency, but no further.”

Lowther v Bentinck (1874) LR 19 Eq 166 at 169, Jessel MR in turn observed that: “Now in
construing instruments, I have always followed the rule laid down by the House of Lords in Grey
v Pearson which is to construe the instrument according to the literal import, unless there is
something in the subject or context which shows that that cannot be the meaning of the
words”. That rule allowed a Court to depart from the ordinary grammatical sense of the words
of a statute where it produced absurdity or inconsistency: The River Wear Commissioners v
Adamson (1877) 2 App Cas 743 at 764 per Lord Blackburn. In Eastman Photographic Material Co
Ltd v Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks [1898] AC 571 at 575, Lord
Halsbury LC observed that: “We have therefore to consider not merely the words of this Act of
Parliament, but the intent of the Legislature, to be collected from the cause and necessity of the
Act being made, from a comparison of its several parts, and from foreign (meaning extraneous)
circumstances so far as they can justly be considered to throw light upon the subject.”

A well-known regional example of the application of the Golden Rule in order to avoid absurdity
is found in Davis v R (1962) 4 WIR 375. That case dealt with interpretation of parking regulation
which prohibited “parking a vehicle elsewhere than in a place provided for that purpose and in
the manner required by an authorised officer.”

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MacGregor CJ considered the issue as whether the “ court permitted, under the circumstances,
to place a meaning upon the regulation which would not give rise to an absurd interpretation,
but would interpret it in such a way as to carry out the apparent intention of the legislature?

Prior to finding that in order to give effect to the intention of Parliament the words “otherwise
than” rather than the words “elsewhere than” should be used to qualify the words “in the
manner required”. The Court held that the regulation as it stood was obscure and as the
interpretation which it was sought to place upon it would lead to an absurdity, in order to avoid
this and to make the regulation read intelligibly and carry out the apparent intention of the
legislature it was necessary to insert the words “otherwise than” between the words “and” and
“in the manner”. The appellant was charged with a breach of the first portion of the regulation
—”parking elsewhere than in a place provided”—and was clearly proved to have committed
that offence.

Macgregor CJ quoted Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn, at pp 221, 228 and
243, respectively:

'Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads
to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some
inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may
be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the
sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual
meaning to particular words, by altering their collocation, or by rejecting them altogether,
under the influence, no doubt, of an irresistible conviction that the legislature could not possibly
have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications thus made are mere
corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. Where the main object and
intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's
unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability
of the language used. Nevertheless, the courts are very reluctant to substitute words in a
statute, or to add words to it, and it has been said that they will only do so where there is a
repugnancy to good sense.'

18
'Notwithstanding the general rule that full effect must be given to every word, yet if no sensible
meaning can be given to a word or phrase, or if it would defeat the real object of the
enactment, it may, or rather it should, be eliminated. The words of a statute must be construed
so as to give a sensible meaning to them if possible. They ought to be construed ut res magis
valeat quam pereat.'

'They [the authorities] would seem rather to establish that the judicial interpreter may deal with
careless and inaccurate words and phrases in the same spirit as a critic deals with an obscure or
corrupt text, when satisfied, on solid grounds, from the context or history of the enactment, or
from the injustice, inconvenience, or absurdity of the consequences to which it would lead, that
the language thus treated does not really express the intention and that this amendment
probably does.’

In addition to implying words into the provisions of the section in issue , the application of the
Golden Rule may be determinative when deciding which interpretation to adopt. See generally
R v City of London Ct Judge(1892) 1 QB 273 at 290 Esher MR where stated:

“Once the words are clear follow them…but if unclear choose the more reasonable of two
interpretations. Additionally, this rule can be relied on by the Court to ignore grammatical errors
in a statute

See generally:

Enmore Estates Ltd v Darsan (1970) 15 WIR 192

Lewis v St. Hilaire et al (1996) 1 Carib LB 119 ,PC

What are the advantages and disadvantages of the golden rule?

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4
Mischief Rule

This is one of the oldest rules of interpretation. The classic statement of this rule is found in
Heydon’s Case (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a; 76 ER 637 where it is stated that for the sure and true
interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of
the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered:

1. What was the common law before the making of the Act?
2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?
3. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
[Commonwealth]? and
4. The true reason of the remedy.

Unlike the Literal and Golden Rules, when relying on the mischief rule the Court looks outside
the Act during the interpretative process, as such other materials including reports are
considered as well as the purpose of the Act.

An example of the use of the mischief rule is found in the case of Corkery v Carpenter (1951).

20
What are the advantages and disadvantages of the mischief rule?

5
Contextual/Purposive Approach

Pepper v. Hart [1993] 1 All E.R. 42; [1993] A.C. 593; [1992] 3 W.L.R. 1032.

Read the CCJ case of Selby: https://ccj.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Selby-v-Smith-

Judgment-Attorneys-at-Law.pdf

The purposive approach is a modern approach. Court looks not only to determine if there was a
gap was in the law, but decides as to what the court thinks Parliament was trying to achieve.

Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal in Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v Newport
Corporation (1950) stated “we sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and of ministers
and carry it out, and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the enactment
by opening it up to destructive analysis.”

This attitude was criticised on appeal by the House of Lords. Lord Simmons criticized the
approach on appeal in the House of Lords stating that called the approach was “a naked

21
usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation.” Lord Simmons
also stated that say that “if a gap is disclosed, the remedy lies in an amending Act.”

What are the advantages and disadvantages of the purposive approach?

Meadows, BLAINE AND ROSSEAU v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, JAMAICA PUBLIC SERVUCE COMPANY
LIMITED AND OFFICE OF UTILITIES REGULATION JM 2012 SC 63 - Sykes J [There was an appeal
against this case but there was no difficulty in accepting the propositions of law contained
herein]

PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION rule. These rules would be accompanied by

their Latin-speaking cousins with names such
[19] The principles of statutory interpretation
as ejusdem generis, expressio unius est
that are relevant will now be stated. In times
exclusio alterius and generalia specialibus non
past, judges spoke of the various ‘rules or
derogant. All these rules and sub-rules were
cannons of statutory construction.’ In plain
designed; it was said, to arrive at the clear and
English this simply means the principles of
unambiguous meaning of the words of the
statutory interpretation. Until recently, every
statute.
generation of law students would learn of the
golden rule, the literal rule and the mischief

22
[20] The clear and unambiguous meaning of
these words was said to express the intention
[22] It used to be the case that before the
of Parliament. However, as time has gone on it
court could look at the context to interpret a
has come to be recognised that the process of
statute, there had to be some ambiguity. This
interpretation of statutes is more nuanced
has now gone by the way. In R (on the
than previously acknowledged. Language we
application of West Minster City Council) v.
now know only becomes better understood if
National Asylum Support Service [2002] 1 WLR
the context if known.
2956, Lord Steyn said at page 2958:

[21] The expression ‘clear and unambiguous

The starting point is that language in all legal
meaning’ assumed that the words could have
texts conveys meaning according to the
only one meaning. It is now better appreciated
circumstances in which it was used. It follows
that the meaning of a statute is not necessarily
that the context must always be identified and
the meaning of the words used in the statute.
considered before the process of construction
The meaning of words, borrowing Lord
or during it. IT IS THEREFORE WRONG TO SAY
Hoffman’s phraseology, is the business of
THAT THE COURT MAY ONLY RESORT TO
dictionaries but the meaning of a provision is
EVIDENCE OF THE CONTEXTUAL SCENE WHEN
determined by examining the words
AN AMBIGUITY HAS ARISEN....in Investors
themselves in the immediate context; then in
Compensation Scheme Ltd v. West Bromwich
the context of the whole statute; then the
Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 , 912-913
statute in the particular social and economic
LORD HOFFMANN MADE IT CRYSTAL CLEAR
circumstance in which it was passed, and
THAT AN AMBIGUITY NEED NOT BE
perhaps more important, the context in which
ESTABLISHED BEFORE THE SURROUNDING
it is now to be applied (Investor Compensation
CIRCUMSTANCES MAY BE TAKEN INTO
Scheme v. West Bromwich Building Society
ACCOUNT. THE SAME APPLIES TO STATUTORY
[1998] 1 All ER 98, 115). As Lord Nicholls
CONSTRUCTION. (emphasis added)
humourously noted, the meaning of the
expression ‘eats shoots and leaves’ depends
on whether one is speaking about a panda or a
Wild West outlaw (Donald Nicholls, My [23] Implicit in this passage is the idea that an
Kingdom For A Horse: The Meaning of Words, interpretation need not result in a manifest
LQR, (2005), 121 (Oct), 577 – 591, 579). absurdity before it is rejected. Indeed, in this
court’s experience, there are not many

23
interpretations of statutes advanced by
counsel that have been absurd to say nothing
of manifestly absurd. The current case is an
example of that. Many times the different
interpretations are prima facie reasonable and
the court has to look carefully at what has
been advanced and using the various
principles developed over time settle on the
most reasonable interpretation.
[24] This position is not new as Lord Blackburn
made the same point over one hundred years
ago. What is new is that it is now fully
embraced (River Wear Commissioners v.
Adamson (1877) 2 App Cas 743). The
‘rediscovery’ of Lord Blackburn’s thinking
sparked a renaissance in the interpretation of
documents including statutes. Lord Blackburn
explained the position as follows at page 763:
I shall ... state, as precisely as I can, what I of the statute (the four-corners doctrine).
understand from the decided cases to be the
principles on which the courts of law act in
construing instruments in writing; and a
statute is an instrument in writing. In all cases
the object is to see what is the intention
expressed by the words used. But, from the [26] These three cases capture the basic
imperfection of language, it is impossible to position of modern statutory interpretation.
know what that intention is without inquiring
further, and seeing what the circumstances
were with reference to which the words were
used, and what was the object, appearing
from those circumstances, which the person
using them had in view; for the meaning of
words varies according to the circumstances
with respect to which they were used.
[25] In between those two cases was Lord
Reid’s advice in Black-Clawson International
Ltd v. Papierwerk Waldhorf [1975] AC 591, 613
– 615. His Lordship indicated that it is not
accurate to say that we are seeking the
intention of Parliament. What is being sought
is the meaning of the words Parliament used.
His Lordship advocated that one begins with
the words of the statute read as a whole. That
is, putting the section in question in the
context of the whole statute. For Lord Reid,
context was not restricted to the four corners
Context went beyond the words of the text
and included matters that would be known to
the legislators.
24
6
The always speaking rule

25
Fitzpartick v Sterling Housing Associates [1999] 4 All E.R. 701; [2001] 1 A.C. 27; [1999] 3 W.L.R.
1113.

R(Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2002] 2 AC 687, 697-698; [2003] 2 A.C. 687;
[2004] 1 W.L.R. 441.

Re Attorney General’s reference (No. 5 of 1980) [1980] 3 All E.R. 816; [1981] 1 W.L.R. 88.

B.B Inc V Hamilton GD 2015 HC 18 - whether digital signatures are capable of satisfying the
Statute of Fraud

[46] The legislature, by section 4 of the Act, has set out specific requirements for bringing claims
upon contracts for sale of lands or any interest therein. The agreement or a memorandum or
note thereof must be in writing and “signed” by the party to be charged. As found earlier, the
ordinary and natural meaning of “signed” does not include electronic signatures. I am not of the
view that Golden Ocean assists the claimant’s case and, more significantly, that any findings in
that case would cause the word “signed” as used in section 4 of the Act to be given a meaning
other than its ordinary and natural meaning.

[60] Therefore, in addition to my finding that electronic signatures do not fall within the natural
and ordinary meaning of “signed” as used in the Act I am also bound by the decision in Nelson
Lewis which did not treat the word “signed” as used in the Act as including electronic
signatures.

Provided for Statutorily in some Jurisdictions:

RETURNING OFFICERS ET AL v. MUNRO ET AL; CUFFIE ET AL v. MAHABIR ET AL TT 2016 CA 35

The imperative of Section 10 (1) of the Interpretation Act, which provides as follows:

"Every written law shall be construed as always speaking and if anything is expressed in the
present tense it shall be applied to the circumstances as they occur so that effect may be given
to each written law according to its true spirit, intent and meaning."

The application of the principle of law 'as always speaking', goes to mandating interpretation to
achieve ongoing relevance to changing circumstances, including constitutional imperatives.

26
TOMLINSON v. TELEVISION JAMAICA LTD., CVM TELEVISION LTD, PUBLIC BROADCASTING
CORPORATION OF JAMAICA JM 2014 SC 28

Perhaps the framers of the Charter of Rights did not have horizontal application in mind.
However, that does not necessarily mean that the present state of the Charter of Rights cannot
apply to the new position whereby one private citizen can enforce the bill of rights against
another private citizen. The reason for this position is the principle called the always-speaking
principle. What this means is that statute or rules when promulgated are always speaking once
they have not been repealed and it is a matter of interpretation whether the words used apply
to the new situation. For example, in R. v Ireland [1998] AC 147, the issue was whether a
particular psychiatric illness fell within the definition of 'bodily harm' in the 1861 Offences
Against the Person Act. The House of Lords held that it did, despite the fact that the illness in
view was not known in 1861. Similarly in Regina v. Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 A.C.
687 the question was whether a 1990 statute could be extended to protect embryos developed
by a method which did not exist at the time the statute was passed. The House of Lords held
that it did. The point then is that the claimant's submissions have the support, in principle, of
high authority and ought not to be dismissed out of hand.

27
7
Internal and External Aids to Interpretation

Internal Aids

Long Title

R v Galvin [1987] 2 All ER 851; [1987] Q.B. 862; [1987] 3 W.L.R. 93.

Fisher v Raven (1963) 2 All E.R. 389, 394 H to 395 B; [1963] 2 W.L.R. 1137; [1964] A.C. 210.

Fielding v Morley Corporation [1899] 1 Ch. 1, at p.3.

Ealing London Borough Council v Race Relations Board [1972] 1 All E.R. 105, 111g - 112g, 115,
119f; [1972] A.C. 342; [1972] 2 W.L.R. 71.

Preamble

Powell v Kempton Park Race Course Co. [1899] A.C. 143, at p. 157.

Attorney General v Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] A.C. 436; [1957] 2 W.L.R. 1.

Short Title

Vacher & Sons Ltd. v London Society of Compositors [1913] A.C. 107, at p. 128-129.

Headings

Director of Public Prosecutions v Schildkamp [1969] 3 All E.R. 1640, 1641, 1643, 1650, 1655G –
1656; [1971] AC 1, [1970] 2 WLR 279.

Side Notes

28
Director of Public Prosecutions v Schildkamp, supra.

Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] A.C. 763 at p. 789; [1962] 3 W.L.R. 694.

Stephens v Cuckfield [1960] 2 QB 373; [1960] 3 W.L.R. 248.

External Aids

Dictionaries

Customs and Excise Commissioners v Top Ten Promotions Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1163.

R. v Peters [1886] 16 Q.B.D. 636, 641.

Re Rippon (Highfield) Housing Corporation Order [1939] 3 All E.R. 548, 553g-554e, 557c-g.

Manickchand v E. Ramjit (1969) 15 W.1.R. 30, at p. 34D.

Parliamentary Debates

Davis v Johnson [1978] 1 A.E.R. 1132, 1140h - 1141g, 1147 b-f, 1157f – 1158; [1978] 2 W.L.R.
553; [1978] A.C. 264.

Hadmor Productions v Hamilton [1982] 1 All E.R.1042, 1055g - 1056c; [1983] 1 A.C. 191; [1982] 2
W.L.R. 322.

Pickstone v Freemans plc [1988] 2 All E.R. 803, 807 b-d, 814e, 817e; [1989] A.C. 66; [1988] 3
W.L.R. 265.

Pepper v Hart supra

Influence of International Conventions

A. G. of Canada v. A. G. of Ontario [1937] A.C. 326, 347-348.

29
Salomon v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1966] 3 All E.R. 871, 875-876; [1967] 2 Q.B.
116; [1966] 3 W.L.R. 1223.

Brind v. Secretary of State for Home Department [1990] 1 All E.R. 469; [1991] 1 A.C. 696; [1991]
2 W.L.R. 588.

Boyce v The Queen [2004] 3 W.L.R. 786; [2005] 1 A.C. 400.

Where a statute has been passed to give effect to an international convention, this can be
referred to in order to interpret it (e.g. Salomon v Commissioners of Customs and Excise (1966).

In Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd (1980), it was held that even preparatory material and
explanatory notes relating to the convention could be consulted.

STATUTORY

Influence of Constitutions

Worme v Commissioner of Police of Grenada [2004] 2 A.C. 430; [2004] 2 W.L.R. 430.

Human Rights Provisions

Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] A.C. 319; [1979] 2 W.L.R. 889.

30
8
Tutorial Questions

(a)Explain the rules of Statutory Interpretation with reference to decided cases.

(b) Critically examine with reference to decided cases the evolution from the literal to purposive
approach and the limits to both approaches.

31