Women's Studies International Forum 76 (2019) 102253

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Women's Studies International Forum

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/wsif

Economic reforms and women's empowerment in Saudi Arabia T

Aylin Topal
Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Middle East Technical University. Üniversiteler Mah. Dumlupınar Blv. No:1, 06800 Çankaya, Ankara, Turkey

A B S T R A C T

Saudi Arabia has made headlines with its drive to “modernize the economy” and implement the structural reforms needed to realize the country's “Vision 2030”. At
the same time, recent “pro-women reforms” have been praised in the international media. This study problematizes these parallel processes, in order to trace the
implications of Vision 2030 for “women's empowerment” in Saudi Arabia. Examining this process is particularly important in Saudi Arabia where gender regime has
long been based on male supremacy and state-sanctioned discrimination depriving women of their basic human rights. The study suggests that women's empow-
erment has been used as a code word to increase the competitiveness of the Saudi economy with a view to increase foreign economic integration. In this sense, Saudi
Arabia is a test case for questioning the extent to which business-friendly “women's empowerment” can actually contribute to the emancipation of women.

Introduction
Toward the end of 2017, the Saudi Kingdom announced that a
process of reformation in its Islamic practices would be undertaken.
These reforms are said to transform the “ultra-conservative Islam” to-
ward a “moderate Islam.” It was also claimed that this version of Islam
would unleash a transformation in women's position in the country. In
September 2017, the Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman ordered
reforms allowing women to enter cinemas and sports stadiums and to
drive with a license without a male guardian present in the car (“Saudi
Arabia to allow”, 2017). In November 2017, several Saudi experts met in
Riyadh for an event entitled “Empowering women is empowerment
society” to discuss the forthcoming reforms (“National experts meet”,
2017). The western media along with the international institutions
unsurprisingly praised these efforts congratulating the Kingdom for
their moves toward women's empowerment.
This study aims to contextualize the Saudi “pro-women reforms”
within the prevailing gender regime in Saudi Arabia and explain why
the recent reforms with a narrow scope were considered as “women's
empowerment”. It argues that these reforms are not standalone Islamic
changes at all. The Saudi reforms are indeed part of a larger socio-
economic transformation with political and cultural implications. In
particular, these reforms targeted to increase the competitiveness of the
Saudi economy with a view to increasing foreign economic integration.
As women's empowerment was not the real purpose of these reforms,
the state-sanctioned gender regime in Saudi Arabia based on male su-
premacy and discrimination depriving women of their basic human
rights is still intact. To come to terms with the recent puzzling em-
ployment of the concept of women's empowerment in the Saudi con-
text, the study also problematizes the current content of the concept. It
compares the original feminist stems that gave insights to the United
Nations' documents in the early 1990s with the World Bank's cooptation
and adaptation of it to market economy from the late 1990s onwards.
Based on this examination, this study argues that the concept of wo-
men's empowerment has diverged significantly from its earlier right-
based focus adopting a more market-based development oriented in-
sight. Hence, it was due to this business-friendly turn of the concept, the
Saudi reforms were successfully packaged as women's empowerment.
The research for this study is based on both a review of the relevant
secondary literature as well as a survey of primary documents and data
concerning the recent economic changes and reforms affecting women
in Saudi Arabia. It should be noted that the empirical information and
primary data emanating from the public agencies are sparse. This
limitation is partly overcome by reviewing the international civil so-
ciety agencies' information sites. For this purpose, Human Rights
Watch, Women's Human Rights Initiatives, UN sources, and in-
dependent news networks are reviewed to be able to examine the extent
of changes that Saudi women have been experiencing. Given the limited
nature of the available data, the research offers an interrogative in-
ference that is consistent with the clues and available information
concerning the subject matter (cf. Eco & Sebeok, 1983). The episte-
mological basis of the explanation is process tracing. Process tracing
tries to uncover the causal mechanisms and structures that produce the
phenomenon in question. Such a research requires converting a purely
historical account into an analytical explanation couched in theoretical
variables (Bennett & George, 2004). Drawing on this basis, the article
traces the process of pro-women reforms to uncover its causal relations
with the project and process of economic transformation. The ex-
planation is also couched with reference to multiple structures of pa-
triarchy and current usages of “women's empowerment”.
The argument will be developed in four sections. The first section
provides an historical analysis of the gender regime in Saudi Arabia.

E-mail address: Taylin@metu.edu.tr.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2019.102253
Received 29 September 2018; Received in revised form 17 July 2019; Accepted 20 July 2019
0277-5395/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
A. Topal Women's Studies International Forum 76 (2019) 102253

The second outlines the recent Saudi reforms with regards to the wo- potential rivals of him (Al-Rasheed, 2010: 80). The most patriarchal
men's position in the society to be able to depict the extend of the form of marriage has been reproduced to create bondages and inter-
transformation. The third section aims to put the Saudi reforms con- dependency in society. These social practices have shaped the culture in
cerning women into its wider economic and political context. The final which men are entrusted with safeguarding female members of the
section examines the change of the meaning of the “women's empow- family, linking their honor with women's virtue (Littrell & Bertsch,
erment” from its earlier mentions to the latest ones in international 2013). Therefore, the most oppressive gender regime has been hard
organizations as well as in the related literature. wired in Saudi Arabia's governmental and social structure.
The gender regime has been reproduced by a state-supported in-
terpretation of Islam. The country has long been based on religious-
Formation of the gender regime in Saudi Arabia
based male supremacy and state-sanctioned discrimination depriving
women of their basic human rights. Wahabism reinforced local customs
Patriarchy refers to unequal gender relations established in relation
and norms of familial structure that oppress women dictating their es-
to social environment encompassing different political and economic
sentialist roles as mothers and wives. The male dominance was natural
systems. Patriarchal domination – i.e. construction of sex boundaries
with reference to religious terms (Ahmed, 1992)2 which brought about
naturalizing gendered inequalities – would take place in multiple
“a deep-rooted exclusion of women and their subordination at the legal,
structures, from market to religion, from language to family (Walby,
social, political and economic levels remain perhaps unmatched in the
1990). As material condensation of all these domains, the state's in-
Muslim world” (Al-Rasheed, 2013: 1). Wahabism also provided the
stitutional operation necessarily involves articulation of different
impetus for political centralism setting the Islamic law (Sharia) as the
practices of patriarchy. Hence, a specific state's gender regime could be
basic law of governance in Saudi Arabia. Quran and its interpretation
understood by revealing the balance of gendered power relations in
by Prophet Muhammad (Sunna) are accepted as the un-codified con-
multiple fields behind the institutional organization. Changing social
stitution of the country. Judges and lawyers of the court system con-
relations would necessarily produce forms of gender regimes along the
stitute part of the religious scholars (ulama). The judges, appointed and
spatio-temporal axis. An historical analysis of gender relations could
relieved by the King, have the total authority to exercise their legal
reveal the transformations of state's gender biases and selectivities
reasoning based on personal Islamic interpretation in each case. The
(Jessop, 2004). Such an analysis would focus on reorganization of the
King has the political power to pass the royal decrees as regulations that
state with its institutional articulation, mode of political legitimacy
are subordinate to Quran and Sunna. King's decrees are only advisory in
(representation and social base), and economic project. Therefore, the
the Sharia courts. The highest legal scholar (mufti) and council of ulama
recent reforms should be evaluated taking into account the extent of
issue their religious edicts (fatwa) that have more determining role in
transformations of social relations behind the state.
courts' legal reasoning.
Historically, the Saudi state has depended on kin and tribal solida-
The image of Saudi women as bearers of society has been strictly
rities for its institutional consolidation that brought about a religious
controlled by the ulama. When the formal education system was laid
nationalism (Al-Rasheed, 2013). The territory of today's Kingdom of
down in the 1940s, a fatwa forbade girls' education. Likewise, legal
Saudi Arabia was under the suzerain of the Ottoman Empire since the
restrictions on women's economic participation were due to several
early 16th century. Since the interior of Arabia was not economically
fatwa on the negative effect of women's work outside their home. Inside
important, the Ottoman control remained rather weak in the region.
the home, however, they were encouraged to undertake many eco-
The local amirs ruled different settlement of region. Through the 18th
nomic activities like weaved wool, taking care of farms and animals.
century, while these amirs were trying to expand their rule, a Saudi
Religious police forces (mutawa) were part of the official religious bu-
amir (Muhammad al-Saud) of a small settlement, Diriyyah, conquered
reaucracy responsible for patrolling the streets to enforce the religious
the territory by allying with a religious scholar (Muhammad ibn Abd al-
norms and conduct, until a law in April 2016 curbing their powers (“A
Wahab). While the rigid interpretation of Islam was not welcome by the
year after”, 2017, also see endnote 3).
rival amirs, Muhammad al-Saud adopted the Wahabi call (dawa) to
In 1953, the year the founding father Abd Al-Aziz died, the Kingdom
purify Islam for its political and economic benefits. With a pact in 1744,
was lacking any social and economic infrastructure. Oil resources dis-
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahab promised Muhammad al-Saud a source
covered in the 1930s started to have socio-economic impact from the
of legitimacy in form of acknowledged leader of Muslim community
1950s. Saud bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, who became the King following his
and wealth in the form of redemption payment (zakat).1 Wahabism
father, had to face with major economic and political transformations.
enabled the consolidation of diverse tribes and vast territories under the
The increasing tensions over Suez Canal and the Soviet Union severed
centralized Saudi rule. Neither the Ottoman Empire nor later Britain
diplomatic relations within the region as well as with the West (Nehme,
was able to establish a direct control, consequently leading to the
1994b: 931–933). Internal affairs were equally challenging: in 1953,
foundation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-
migrant workers in the oil production went on a strike -a completely
Rahman Al Saud (Ibn Saud) in 1932.
foreign practice- demanding better working conditions. Forbidding the
The state building of the Kingdom was based on polygamy. During
strikes “as un-islamic” did not prevent the burst of a financial crisis
the expansion of Arabia in the early 20th century, there have been
caused by the reduced oil production. Saud's brother Crown Prince
continues rival claims to the throne within the Saud family.
Faisal took over the power, as prime minister, taking ulama on his side.
Antagonisms between rivals would be resolved with assassinations or
Yet, he had to show himself as a supporter of democratic reforms to ally
agreements with marriages. The marriages were also mechanisms of
with the modernizers (Nehme, 1994a: 632, 1994b: 934). It was in this
cementing alliances with various sections of population such as well-
context Prince Faisal's wife Queen Iffat opened the first school for 33
known tribal groups, the religious elite and the nobility. Ibn Saud, the
girls in 1955.
founder of the Kingdom, consolidated his power through an active
Through the 1960s, a gradual accumulation of wealth in few mer-
strategy of polygamy and concubinage. By 1953, Ibn Saud had 43 sons,
chant families in developing urban areas increased the pressure for
over 50 daughters from marriages and concubinages “with no fewer
girls' and women's right to participation in social life. Wahabi religious
than 135 virgins and about a hundred other women” (Al-Rasheed,
2010: 75)! Many of his wives were ex-wives or daughters of his ex-rivals
and enemies. Collaterally, several daughters of Ibn Saud married the
2
“Man are protectors and maintainers of women, because God has given the
one more [strengths] than the other, and because they support them from their
1
For detailed analysis of the origin of the agreement between al-Wahab and means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient and guard in [the
Al-Saud in 1744 see Al-Rasheed (2010: 16–26). husband's] absence what God would have them guard” (Qur'an 4:34).

2
A. Topal
teachings had to reconcile with the oil-generated wealth by keeping the
position of women strictly regulated and restricted. Hence, ulama
agreed upon the education of women as long as they remain in control.
While the Ministry of Education was regulating the education policies,
the Department of Religious Guidance controlled women's access to
education until 2002.3 The General Presidency of Girl's Education
under the Department of Religious Guidance made sure that girls'
education would be compatible with their religious roles, preparing
them to be better wives and mothers. As Queen Iffat often noted
“educate yourself. Be good mothers. Bring up perfect Saudis. Build your
country.” Similarly, women's access to labour market has also been
mediated through their traditional roles. Their male guardians allowed
them only for jobs (like teachers or nurses) that would “suit their cre-
ated nature.”
This weak and partial wave of liberalization in the 1960s and 1970s
vanished after the Iranian Revolution in January 1979 and Grand
Mosque's siege in December 1979 strengthening the Saudi Arabian re-
ligious leadership (Hamdan, 2005: 43). The Saudi family became con-
cerned about their legitimacy that they might have given too much
concession to the modernizers. Reforms for women's partial liberal-
ization were seen as symbols of Western penetration and subjugation
(Al-Rasheed, 2013: 4). As a backlash to the episode of liberalization, the
alliance with the Wahabi clerics was enhanced for political stability
while keeping women under the strict authority of male relatives. It
seems that historically structured coherence between Wahabi clerics
and the Saud family would be redefined once again in the recent reform
process.
The limits of recent pro-women reforms
The Reign of King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud was marked by
the tensions between conservatives and liberal reformers. As soon as he
assumed the power in 2005, he introduced partial municipal elections
for the first time in the country's history. In those years, women were
challenging the society with daring voices, critical texts and real mo-
bilization that made both state and society recognize the “woman
question” (Al-Rasheed, 2013: 27). Yet, the reforms concerning women's
political status have been put forward only in the early 2010s, arguably
following the Arab Spring against authoritarianisms in the Middle
East.4 With a decree in September 2011, women were granted the right
to vote for the elections in 2015 (MacFarquhar, 2011). This decree
would also grant women personal identification cards for the first time.
Noting that “we refuse to marginalize women's role in Saudi society”,
King's decree also allowed women to run as candidates for those seats
(MacFarquhar, 2011). King Abdullah promoted these reforms dis-
missing the objections of senior religious scholars. Despite significant
obstacles at every stage, 130,000 Saudi women casted their votes for
the first time and became candidates, 21 of whom eventually won the
municipal council seats in December 2015 elections.5 In January 2013,
the King also issued a decree allowing women to be members of the
Shura Council, a consultative council that is in charge of proposing
3
In March 2002, 15 girls died in an elementary school fire. It was discussed
that the death toll was high because religious police discouraged firemen en-
tering the building. When the Saudi and international press covered the in-
cident, the public outcry forced the regime to bring the matters concerning girl's
education under the Ministry of Education (Hamdan, 2005: 44). This incident
also caused an outrage against the religious police leading to a relative release
of their pressure (BBC, 2002).
4
As one Saudi female blogger, nickname Saudi woman, provides “[to un-
derstand their] victory to cast ballots in municipal elections and run for office,
we must also acknowledge the Arab Spring and the spilled blood of our Middle
East neighbors. Without them, we might still be begging for our rights.”
5
The municipal council elections were held to determine half of the seats
(285) while the other half would be single-handedly nominated and appointed
by the King.
3
Women's Studies International Forum 76 (2019) 102253
draft laws for the King. Soon after, 30 women – out of 150 members –
were appointed by the King to join the Shura Council (Middle East
Policy Council, n.d.). After the death of the King in 2015, there has not
been a significant political reform. As of February 2018, the highest
political position held by a woman was the Vice Ministry of Labour and
Social Affairs.6
The Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman continued with the re-
forms increasing the public visibility of women. The Crown Prince is-
sued a decree in September 2017 repealing the ban on female drivers
effective in June 2018, reopening public movie theaters for women and
men, allowing mixed-sex concert and sports events. Women were al-
lowed to enter King Fahd International Stadium for the first time to
watch the National Day celebrations in September 2017. The Kingdom
publicized these reforms as “women's empowerment” organizing an
event in November 2017 entitled “Empowering women is empower-
ment society.” This event was also to celebrate the forthcoming reforms
(“National experts meet”, 2017). Internationally, the Crown Prince has
collected credits for his so-called “process of reformation in ultra-con-
servative Islamic practices” that would pave the way for a transfor-
mation in women's position in the country. Admittedly, these reforms,
objected by the clerics, would remove some of the barriers for women
to partake in public life. However, the much hailed Saudi liberalization
process still needs to be examined with regards to its impact on wo-
men's daily experiences to be reconciled with the concept of “women's
empowerment”.
Despite the reforms, a comprehensive legal framework to achieve
gender equality is still lacking. Enforcing the legal framework is parti-
cularly important as customary and traditional norms that are not in
line with the international norms and basic human rights have over-
ruling supremacy.7 In particular, the Sharia law still constitutes the
solid legal obstacle for gender equality.8 More concretely, these “timid”
reforms would only bring superficial changes as the kingdom refuses to
abolish the male guardianship system (Acar, 2018). Due to this fun-
damental source of gender inequality, Saudi women still face major
barriers against their empowerment in daily experiences. The guar-
dianship system (the mahram system) requires women to receive the
permission of their guardian/custodian (Walī) - father, brother, hus-
band, or even son - for a number of critical decisions. To illustrate,
women need the approval of their legal male guardian for driving,
travelling internationally,9 leaving their families,10 working, opening a
bank account and the like. The stringent restrictions on women make
cross-gender interaction guarded by men: public buildings have sepa-
rate entrances for men and women. Public space, parks, beaches,
transportation means are segregated in most parts of the country. Thus,
not the women but their guardians are empowered to make these de-
cisions. How can women be empowered while the guardianship system
6
The appointment happens to be on February 5, only two days before the
consideration of Saudi Arabia by CEDAW Committee (UNWebTV, 2018: 3: 37).
7
Although Saudi Arabia is party to CEDAW convention, the general re-
servation of the state party gives precedence to the Sharia in case of any conflict
between the provisions of the Convention and those of the Sharia. Such re-
servation indeed practically violates the object and purpose of the Convention
itself. “Concluding observations on the combined third and fourth periodic
reports of Saudi Arabia” CEDAW/C/SAU/CO/3-4.
8
The head of the Saudi delegation in the CEDAW 69th session noted, “Islamic
sharia sets down the marriage act. We cannot remove this condition.” For the
resilience of the power Wahabi clerics and their uncompromising version of
Islam in Saudi Arabia, see Al-Rasheed (2013, 2015).
9
A Saudi woman attempting to avoid a forced marriage by fleeing to
Australia was repatriated to Saudi Arabia because she did not have her guar-
dian's permission (Human Rights Watch, 2017).
10
To escape domestic violence, a Saudi woman left her family in Qassim and
travelled to Riyadh to live alone. Her father files a “disobedience” case against
her as she left without her guardian's permission. She was arrested and detained
for 104 days before she was released to her guardian's custody (The
Independent, 2017).
A. Topal
grants their male guardians unlimited power over their female re-
latives? Under such conditions, the environment of the household is the
sole determining factor of the implementation of the law (Nadaraia,
2018).
These reform efforts lack legal rigor to attain legal emancipation
and full enjoyment of women's right. Although public awareness for
domestic violence was addressed in 2005 with the launch of National
Family Safety Program, the first decree on Protection from Abuse was
passed in August 2013, and further improved in March 2017. Another
decree against trafficking was passed in 2013 protecting 1.2 million
women with foreign nationality employed as domestic workers.
However, codification of the law concerning “discrimination against
women” is quite ambiguous without a clear legal definition of the
discrimination. Similarly, there is no penal code or no clear crim-
inalization of rape or marital rape. The Kingdom authorities note “rape
is a criminal offense under the Islamic Sharia, as it is an assault on
honor” openly expressing the patriarchal perspective.11 Overly broad
definitions stemming from customs and traditions make it difficult to
identify instances of discrimination, abuse and violence. Such big
loopholes give way to immense failures in the enforcement and im-
plementation of the decrees. Even more overwhelmingly, these reg-
ulations might be further oppressive on women as the norms stigmatize,
and laws sanction the victim (Haddad, 2017). Finally, the courts typi-
cally execute harsher punishments for women to the extent that sorcery
and adultery deserve capital punishment!
Saudi women still remain excluded from full participation in so-
ciety. In fact, Saudi Arabia remains to be one of worst performing
countries in terms of gender gap. The country has a very high Global
Gender Gap score, ranked at 141st out of 149 countries in 2018.
Moreover, compared to the past years, the country has regressed in
closing its gender gap. Although the number of working women in the
private sector increased by 130% between 2012 and 2016, economic
participation and opportunity index score (145 out of 149) still remains
to be behind its education and political empowerment indexes (93 and
127 out of 149 respectively) (Gulf News, 2017; World Economic Forum,
2018). Under the National Transformation Programme 2020, the Min-
istry of Labour and Social Development initiated several projects that
would generate 141,000 new jobs allowing women to work from home
(Gulf News, 2017, emphasis added). The last information implies that
without eliminating the main causes of exclusion, these reforms would
only conform to existing patriarchal limits. That is to say, economic
participation and opportunity index may be improved in the forth-
coming years, while women would continue to be underrepresented in
many sectors of the economy.
At odds with the Saudi regime's purported strive for women's em-
powerment, women's movement is being harshly pressured. Women's
organizations are not permitted to participate in promoting and pro-
tecting women's rights. Moreover, they are overwhelmingly restricted
with regards to their approval procedure and control over their activ-
ities by the public authorities (Ameline, 2018). For instance, the Min-
istry of Labour and Social Development may easily disband civil society
organizations, if their activities are considered as contradicting public
morals, breaching national unity and violating Sharia. As several or-
ganizations have been shut down in the recent years for not having
license to operate, as of April 2016, there are no human rights or in-
dependent civil society organizations in Saudi Arabia (Human Rights
Watch, 2013). Since then, women's rights activists continued to be ar-
rested with treason accusations. In May 2018, just weeks before the ban
11
As Halperin-Kaddari (2018) succinctly put, “rape is not an issue of honor. It
is an issue of the very basic autonomy of women's will and integrity of her body,
personality and identity”. Women under patriarchal rule do not have “honor”
entailing autonomy and power to decide for oneself. Patriarchy defines wo-
man's honor with her virginity and fidelity of her sexual services to her husband
(Lerner, 1986: 80).
4
Women's Studies International Forum 76 (2019) 102253
on driving would be lifted, Saudi authorities arrested as least 11 women
rights activists for driving (The Guardian, 2017). Following the arrests,
Saudi authorities launched a smearing campaign to discredit the work
of Women Human Rights Defenders (WHRD) labeling them as “traitors”
(WHRD, 2018). As Middle East Director at Human Rights Watch puts
“the Saudi authorities appear to be punishing these women's rights
champions for promoting a goal bin Salman alleges to support – ending
discrimination against women” (Human Rights Watch, 2018). As Manal
Al-Sharif (2019), co-founder of women2drive movement in Saudi
Arabia, notes, “when the women were sent to jail in May 2018, it was a
clear sign from the government that these were not real reform. Put
simply: it's a war on women”. Therefore, existing forms discrimination
and exclusion and increasing pressure on civil society makes one
question the motivations behind the recent reforms.
The Vision 2030 for market integration
Saudi Arabia has 25% of world's oil reserves. Its economy is de-
pendent on oil production and oil products undertaken by large cor-
porations. After the discovery of oil, an American company, Standard
Oil undertook the extraction and production. Later, Standard Oil helped
the Kingdom establish ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Company) in
1979 and continued to be involved in Saudi oil production. ARAMCO is
the world's wealthiest company. This wealth has enabled the expansion
of the public sector in the economy creating most of the jobs and pro-
viding various subsidies. However, decreasing oil prices since 2014 on
top of increasing research and development for alternative energy re-
sources in the advanced capitalist countries have posed a serious
challenge for the economy. Putting an end to oil dependency through a
deeper economic integration with the global markets has become a
policy priority in the mid-2010s.
In April 2015, the Crown Prince Bin Salman launched the Vision
2030 of the Kingdom to make the Saudi Arabian economy an “invest-
ment powerhouse and a hub not only uniting the Arab and Islamic
worlds but also connecting three continents (Asia, Europe and
Africa)”.12 These long-term goals and expectations included harnessing
the investment capacities by diversifying the revenues. For this vision,
the Prince bin Salman called for “transforming ARAMCO from an oil
producing company into a global industrial conglomerate”. Improving
the competitiveness of the economy is the main emphasis: special
competitive zones would be created for logistic, tourism, industry and
financial sectors with special regulations to boost investment possibi-
lities. The Prince called for foreign investments with the promise “to
improve the business environment.” More specifically, the privatization
program of Vision 2030 is projected to lure foreign capital to the
country along with “qualified individuals from all over the world.” He
ensured that “the regime would respect them”. Apparently, ending the
dependence on oil revenues meant boosting the entrepreneurship and
providing “healthier employment opportunities for Saudi citizens.” Bin
Salman also noted that Saudi corporations would be encouraged to
expand across borders through new partnerships (Vision2030, n.d.). For
that purpose, small businesses and productive families would be sup-
ported with special training services, microfinance and venture-capital
resources.
In addition to economic reforms, business friendliness entails “an
enabling and high performing government.” The Vision 2030 signaled
the upcoming political reforms of transparency and accountability.13
12
This future vision was divided in five-year development plans. The tenth
Development Plan (2015–2019). Moreover, the National Transformation
Program 2020 was launched to reach the interim targets of the Vision 2030 by
2020 (Vision2030, n.d.).
13
As a sign of ambition in this aspect, the Prince cracked down on corruption
allegations detaining 11 Princes and 40 current officials in Ritz Calton Hotel for
40 days (Business Insider, 2018).
A. Topal Women's Studies International Forum 76 (2019) 102253

The Crown Prince specifically underlined that international legal norms media. During his US tour in early 2018, Prince Mohammad accepted to
and commercial regulations would be pursued strictly to “create a be interviewed by a western television channel for the very first time.
business environment conducive to long-term investment.” He implied On March 19, 2018, the interview on CBS' 60 min came just a day be-
political liberalization by saying “our vision is a tolerant country with fore his visit to the White House. In this interview, the reporter dubbed
Islam as its constitution and moderation as its method.” As a gesture on the reforms of the Crown Prince as “revolutionary” and commented that
this line, it is noted that to facilitate the movement of people and goods, “(h)e is emancipating women, introducing music and cinema and
the customs and visa procedures would be simplified. cracking down on corruption” (CBSNews, 2018).
As The Economist (2018) wisely points, “social liberalization is part In February 2018, during the consideration of the report of Saudi
of the Crown Prince's ambition to wean the economy away from oil.” “If Arabia by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
the Prince wants to follow the Dubai-model, major cultural sacrifices Women (CEDAW), the head of the Saudi delegation focused his report
are still necessary” adds the Economist.14 As the first steps of the Vision on the impact of the 2030 Vision for the Kingdom. He noted that
2030, the Kingdom Holding, the formal economic enterprise of the “women's autonomy is completely compatible with the Vision 2030” as
Saudi state, recently set out to invest – and to attract more foreign in- it includes programs that would strengthen and promote women's
vestment and finance – in tourism, entertainment and construction in- rights, particularly enhancing women's participation in labour markets.
dustries. A “Maldives-type-resort along the Red Sea coast”, a “Disney- How could such an economic reforms program be presented as “wo-
land-type” entertainment center in Riyadh and the construction of one- men's empowerment” without referring to social structure of gender
kilometer tower, as the highest skyscraper of the world, are such major relations in the country? To answer this question, the next section
projects. The information regarding these mega projects included a note traces the evolution of “women's empowerment”.
“these facilities will be built to conform with the “international stan-
dards”, which might be interpreted as “allowing gender-mixed bathing,
From right-based to development-oriented women's empowerment
bikinis, and even alcohol” (Henderson, 2017).
The recent pro-women reforms appear to be part and parcel of the
As the human rights perspective based on “negative liberal in-
economic opening. The Prince is undertaking the pro-women reforms
dividualist freedoms” could not address the specifically patriarchal
for emitting the message that the regime is making the required “cul-
bases of women's oppression (Jessop, 2004: 14), the United Nations
tural “sacrifices” for market integration. The Prince is aiming to im-
(UN) Commission on the Status of Women was formed in 1947 soon
prove the investment profile of the country using women's empower-
after the foundation of the UN. The emphasis in the Commission's first
ment as a code word. At this point, employing the term “women's
meetings was on women's political and civil rights. Consequently, came
empowerment” strengthens the position of the Kingdom. During the
the first international law recognizing and codifying the Political Rights
visit of the Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman to the United
of Women as the product of the UN convention in 1953 (UN Treaty
Kingdom in February 2018, a series of meetings were held between the
Collection, n.d.) This (political) right-based emphasis of the UN was
governments and business leaders of Saudi Arabia and Britain “to
later formalized in 1979 (albeit its initial stages date back to 1963) with
celebrate the close bonds between the two countries and strengthen
the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Dis-
future strategic and commercial relationships”. The meetings, orga-
crimination Against Women (CEDAW). Since then, CEDAW has been
nized by the Saudi Center for Strategic Partnerships, “aimed to set up
ratified by 189 parties of the 193 member states of the UN, making it
the future of economic and investment relations and open new aspects
the Universal Bill of Rights for Women.15 Despite overwhelming
of cooperation and partnership between the two countries in line with
number of reservations by a large number of parties, the Convention
the Kingdom's Vision 2030”. The panel discussions were titled “An Era
sets the international standards for gender equality (UN Women, n.d.-
of Transformation: From Vision to Implementation”; “Giga-projects: An
a).
Eye Towards the Future”; and “Ensuring Stability: Creating Thriving
One of the earliest academic usages of the term “empowerment”
Partnerships” last but not the least “Women in Leadership: Empowering
appeared in 1976 with the publication of Solomon's book Black Em-
Rising Leaders” (“Trust on transformation”, 2018). The discussions were
powerment: Social Work in Oppressed Communities. The word then began
focused on the ongoing transformations in Saudi Arabia and implica-
to be used in works concerning marginalized groups such as African
tions of these transformations for Saudi women's empowerment.
Americans, women, gays and lesbians, and people with disabilities
It appears that Western companies are also eager to further in-
(Calvés, 2009). The notion of power was subjected to a critical inter-
tegrate with the Saudi economy. The Economist (2018) notes, “…the
rogation and deconstruction. The pioneering source of inspiration for
world has a vital interest in Saudi Arabia's fate…. Successful reforms
these efforts was a book by Freire (1970), Pedagogy of the Oppressed.
would help spread stability to a region in chaos and dynamism to its
After these initial stems, the “empowerment approach” within the
economies…Failure, by contrast, could spread turmoil to the Gulf…”
feminist research followed the footsteps of Sen and Caren (1987) in
The Saudi economy has already started to be integrated with its western
Development, Crises and Alternative Visions: Third World Women's Per-
counterparts. For instance, as the Chairman of the Kingdom Holding
spectives.
Prince Alwaleed bin Talal notes, Goldman Sacks is interested in finan-
In the early 1990s, the academic discussions on gender equality
cing the above-mentioned mega-projects. Bin Talal also adds that fi-
revolved around the concept of “empowerment” with different con-
nancialization of the construction sector is attracting foreign invest-
ceptualizations of the concept of power. Rowland (1997) proposed four
ment as half of the Kingdom Holdings domestic assets would turn into a
forms of power - power over, power to, power with, power from within
REIT (real estate investment trust). The Saudi Arabian General Invest-
- and corresponding strategies for empowerment. Similarly, Friedmann
ment Authority (SAGIA) Governor Ibrahim bin Abdul Rahman Al-Omar
(1992) suggested three kinds of power – social, political and psycho-
said that “…bin Salman's visit to Britain was exceptional in regards to
logical – and distinct processes of empowerment. This debate laid out
investment and trade fields” with meetings over 160 companies (“Saudi
the dynamics of oppression and implied that empowerment could not
General investment”, 2018).
be attained simply through enhanced participation in decision-making
Arguably, it was the markets' positive expectations for integration
processes. Scholars proposed a redistribution of power (Moser, 1993)/
with the Saudi Arabia that help these reforms hailed in the Western
changing the balance of power (Batliwala, 1993)/radical transforma-
tion of power relations (Kabeer, 1994)/undoing social construction
14
It should be noted that the “male-stream” cover image used by the
15
Economist in this issue is utterly superficial and resenting. https://www. Palau and the USA are the only two states that have signed but not ratify
economist.com/printedition/covers/2018-06-21/ap-e-eu-me-uk. CEDAW. Iran and Sudan have neither signed nor ratified it.

5
A. Topal
(Rowland, 1997)/complete change of the processes and structures re-
sponsible for women's inferior status in the society (Young, 1993).
Parallel to these academic discussions, the term “empowerment”
entered the vocabulary of the UN in relation to poverty. While the first
two World Conferences of the UN in 1980 and 1985 have retained the
political and civil emphasis, the third conference in 1987 linked gender
equality with social and economic development. More concretely, wo-
men's empowerment has become a crucial concern in the 1990 World
Conference in Education for All.16 From that year on, the issue has been
emphasized in every major report prepared by UN agencies. Conse-
quently, the Fourth World Conference of Women in 1995 included, for
the first time, economic aspects and social issues for “women's em-
powerment”.17 The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action
adopted in the Fourth World Conference on Women could be identified
as a turning moment in the UN for its emphasis on poverty/under-
development as an obstacle for the empowerment of women.
The early mentions of women's empowerment in the UN documents
reflected the subtleties of the notion of power. It entailed five compo-
nents: women's sense of self-worth; their right to have and to determine
choices; their right to have access to opportunities and resources; their
right to have the power to control their own lives, both within and
outside the home; and their ability to influence the direction of social
change to create a more just social and economic order, nationally and
internationally (UN Inter-Agency Task Force, n.d.). As a continuation of
the original right-based UN approach, women's empowerment aspect
was attached to gender equality as a fundamental human right pro-
viding women and girls with equal access to education, health care,
decent work, and representation in political and economic decision-
making processes. The UN targets concerning women's empowerment
aimed at increasing capacities of women by ending all kinds of dis-
crimination, all forms of violence and harmful practices. The targets
also include recognizing and valuing unpaid care and domestic work,
promoting social policies to attain shared responsibilities within the
household. This would be accompanied by ensuring full and effective
participation of women at all levels of decision-making in political,
economic and public life. This approach was informed and reflected
into the UN Millennium Development Goals. In September 2015, the
UN member states agreed on ambitious agenda with 17 new Sustain-
able Development Goals and 169 targets to be accomplished by 2030.
There are seven relevant sustainable development goals for women's
empowerment, the Goal 5 being first-time “stand alone” goal specifi-
cally defined as “to achieve gender equality and empower all women
and girls” (UN, n.d.)
Women's engagement in economic life has become an important
development concern in the 1990s.18 Sparr (1994: 185) rightly ob-
served “the emerging problem of “co-optation of the word “empower-
ment”. She warned that the new twist of empowerment could mask the
market-oriented development perspective. Since then, the leading de-
velopment-oriented international agencies quickly adopted this frame-
work in their programs.
In the 2000s, the World Bank (WB) has fixed the meaning of wo-
men's empowerment with economic development emphasis. The main
message of the World Development Report in 2012 was entitled as
“Gender Equality and Development.” It was noted, “gender equality is a
core development objective in its own right.” “Gender equality is smart
economics enhancing productivity”, the report added (World Bank,
16
This interagency commission was comprised of UNDO, UNESCO, UNICEF
and The World Bank (“Meeting basic learning needs”, 1990).
17
See Articles 12 and 13 (“Fourth World Conference”, n.d.).
18
This perspective can be traced back to the Ester Boserup's (1970) pio-
neering work where she studied how development affects women's subordinate
position in society. Boserup's gender specific analysis on productivity and
growth failed to provide a feminist analysis of women subordination (Beneria &
Sen, 1981).
6
Women's Studies International Forum 76 (2019) 102253
2012). It was argued that “creating more, better and inclusive jobs for
women along with other measures would unlock enormous economic
growth potentials by breaking down barriers” (World Bank, 2012). This
argument was made part and parcel of the recent notion of “inclusive
growth” also framed as “shared prosperity” (World Bank, 2014). In
June 2016, the WB Group and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
held a flagship event on Boosting Women's Economic Empowerment
with the attendance of UNWOMEN Executive Director, finance minis-
ters and CEOs of the major international companies.
Thereby, women's economic empowerment – especially in devel-
oping countries – was defined as “providing equal access to financial
services, helping give women more power over income and assets like
land and technology and professionalizing the care-giving sector.” With
this event, it was made public that the WB began partnering with the
UN in achieving the Sustainable Development Goal 5 to expand the
economic opportunities of women. More particularly, this partnership
was said to explore “how to help women access financial solutions.”
The WB President Jim Yong Kim suggested doubling the amount of its
resources - from 1 billion to 2 billion dollars - in its Banking on Women
Program to be lent to women entrepreneurs.19 As noted by one of the
CEOs in the telecommunication sector, “[their] objective…is to include
[women] in the banking sector by providing them with a digital
banking solution. This is a tool to grow their economies, and make sure
that female (sic!) are also included in the financial sector” (World Bank,
2017). As a result of such a WB, IMF and UN partnership, the UN re-
ports on women's empowerment seem to coopt this development ap-
proach to empowerment (UN Women, n.d.-b). UN's “gender-sensitive
development” approach in the 2010s maintained that “gender equality
is not only a basic human right, but its achievement has enormous
socio-economic ramifications” (UN Women, 2010).
With the emphasis on economic development, “women's empow-
erment” became a shallow concept as it systematically underestimated
the intricacies of patriarchal gender relations and capitalist power
structures. As such, inclusion of women in development strategies
would not require any fundamental change in the existing social or
economic structures. Therefore, the notion of empowerment has lost its
emphasis on emancipation. In other words, the emphasis on eliminating
challenges that women face in accessing finance and local markets fell
short of conceptualizing women's emancipation. Rather, it was sug-
gested that development and women's empowerment have a mutually
reinforcing relationship (Duflo, 2012). More boldly, women are con-
sidered as “next emerging market” (Ernst & Young, 2013). It can be
argued that this framework focused only on elimination of obvious
oppressive practices oversimplifying gender discrimination and male
domination (Batliwala, 1994, 2007). This development-oriented em-
powerment with its emphasis on growth and inclusion provide an in-
dividual-level solution of provision of resources, assets and services.
Enhancing women's assets and resources alone misses the crucial pro-
cess of empowerment that entails contesting and resisting against the
mechanisms that perpetuate injustices and poverty (Cornwall, 2016:
350–56). Political actions implicated in the women's empowerment do
not directly address the deep-rooted dynamics of patriarchy and ca-
pitalism. Particular social structure of gender relations that subordinate
women in the family, class, caste, religion or society has been largely
overlooked. Furthermore, market relations that reproduce these forms
of subordination have been even bolstered.
When considered in detail, the Vision 2030 adopts this shallow
approach turning women's right to education and right to work into
upgrading human resources of the market. The foreword by Bin Salman
notes that the real wealth of the country is not its natural resources but
the “ambition of its people and potential of its younger generations.” He
announces that new investments in vocational training and education
19
Microcredit mechanisms have been designed in line with this purported
aim, since the mid-1990s.
A. Topal
system that is in line with market needs will equip “man and women for
jobs of the future”. Implicating the inexistence of equal opportunities, it
is noted “our economy will provide opportunities for everyone – men
and women, young and old” so that they contribute to the best of their
abilities.” Providing equal opportunities for women gets a separate
mention in the program: “Saudi women are yet another great asset.
With over 50 percent of our university graduates being female, we will
continue to develop their talents, invest in their productive capabilities
and enable them to strengthen their future and contribute to the de-
velopment of our society and economy.”
Conclusion
The notion of “women's empowerment” in line with the UN in-
itiatives is crucial to set universal principles for gender equality.
However, the concept with an emphasis on economic development has
been used to advance market-oriented processes diluting the UN's right-
based perspective to empowerment. Although integration with the
global markets may bring some degree of challenge to public patri-
archy, such business-friendly co-optation of the word “empowerment”
appears to set the bar of equality overwhelmingly low. Patriarchy may
be challenged by commitments to formal equality in market relations,
yet the logic and values of the capitalist market would not necessarily
undermine either public or private patriarchal domination. It is im-
portant to note that such necessary causality between development of
market relations and improvement of the gender relations would be
reminiscent of teleological reading of history of the modernization
theory.
Against realigning and redefining the key concepts such as em-
powerment for the advancement of the markets, we need to analyze
structural conflicts and contradictions for more just and equitable sys-
tems (Maguire, 1987: 12). Gender equality calls for a radical re-
organization of prevailing power structures, as empowerment of the
powerless necessarily goes in tandem with undermining the power of
the powerful. Starting from the family that reiterates discriminatory
gender relations, women's subordination should be contextualized in
political, social and economic relations.
Universal principles should not be overshadowed by the integration
of the global markets. Otherwise, discriminatory gender regimes and
practices may be tolerated as cultural specificities as long as market
integration may be successfully attained. Evidently, western ethno-
centrism has been despised for its inability to relate the cultural ethos of
the East (cf. Abu-Lughod, 2002). The absolute opposite of ethnocentric/
eurocentric bias may, however, lead to a toleration of the “peculia-
rities” of patriarchy outside Europe and North American hearth-lands,
thus, “othering” women in the developing countries. Assuming lower
standards of gender inequality would mean to accept women in those
countries as passive recipients and beneficiaries with few choices (cf.
Mohanty, 1997: 79). Employing universal right-based principles would
prevent conceptualizing women's empowerment as inclusion and in-
tegration into global markets.
The Vision 2030 indicates a larger reorganization of the Saudi State
with its modes of representation, internal articulation, modes of inter-
vention. From a wider perspective these reforms are also part and
parcel of changing balance of forces in political struggle in Saudi
Arabia. Therefore, such developments could potentially mould the
mode of political legitimation, or, where relevant, the state's hegemonic
project for the wider society. In this process, building of different blocs,
strategic alliances, or temporary coalitions would well lead to different
outcomes. Although very limited so far, state's gender selectivities ap-
pear to change too.
Future is open-ended. In so far as the reform process opens new
horizons of actions and help mobilize different sets of social forces, a
path-dependent alternative will be less likely. There are two future al-
ternatives: path-shaping and path-breaking. Path shaping refers to a co-
evolution of religious practices and market integration without bringing
7
Women's Studies International Forum 76 (2019) 102253
about significant improvement for women, without big changes in
state's gender selectivities. If resisting against patriarchy goes along
with bargaining with it, this would only bring about a new deal of
patriarchy. This study suggests that the way in which women's em-
powerment is conceptualized in relations to the Saudi reforms has been
far from being path-breaking. As Al-Rasheed (2013) notes there has
been change in self-identity of women as political forces, in their pur-
suit of different interests and development of different strategies.
Therefore, a path-breaking alternative could still be viable with the rise
of Saudi (and Middle Eastern) feminism confronting both the state and
market-led liberalization.
References
Abu-Lughod, L. (2002). Do Muslim women really need saving? Anthropological reflec-
tions on cultural relativism and its others. American Anthropologist, 104(3), 783–790.
Acar, F. (2018). CEDAW meeting1582, session 69. http://webtv.un.org/watch/
consideration-of-saudi-arabia-1582nd-meeting-69th-session-committee-on-the-
elimination-of-discrimination-against-women-/5740975840001/?term.
Ahmed, L. (1992). Women, gender and Islam. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Al-Rasheed, M. (2010). A history of Saudi Arabia. London: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Al-Rasheed, M. (2013). A most masculine state: Gender, politics, and religion in Saudi Arabia.
Press: Cambridge Univ.
Al-Rasheed, M. (2015). Muted modernists: The struggle over divine politics in Saudi Arabia.
London: Hurtst and Co.
Al-Sharif, M. (2019, 10 April). We finally won the right to drive in Saudi Arabia. But The
Kingdom's war on women is only getting worse. Retrieved from Timewww.time.com.
Ameline, Nicole (2018). CEDAW meeting1582, session 69, http://webtv.un.org/watch/
consideration-of-saudi-arabia-1582nd-meeting-69th-session-committee-on-the-
elimination-of-discrimination-against-women-/5740975840001/?term=.
A year after curbing its power. Retrieved from Arab Newshttp://arabnews.com.
National experts meet on Saudi ‘women's empowerment’ agenda. Retrieved from Arab
Newshttp://arabnews.com.
Saudi General Investments Authority Chief: We met over 160 UK companies. Retrieved
from Asharq al Aawsathttps://aawsat.com.
Batliwala, S. (1993). Empowerment of women in South Asia, concepts and practices. New
Delhi: FAO.
Batliwala, S. (1994). The meaning of women's empowerment: New concepts from action.
In G. Sen, A. Germain, & L. C. Chen (Eds.). Population policies reconsidered: Health,
empowerment, and rights (pp. 127–138). Boston: Harvard Center for Population and
Development Studies.
Batliwala, S. (2007). Taking the power out of empowerment: An experiential account.
Development in Practice, 17(4/5), 557–565.
BBC News (2002, 15 March). Saudi Police ‘stopped’ fire rescue. Retrieved from http://
www.news.bbc.co.uk.
Beneria, L., & Sen, G. (1981). Accumulation, reproduction, and “women's role in eco-
nomic development”: Boserup revisited. Development and the Sexual Division of Labour,
7(2), 279–298.
Bennett, A., & George, A. (2004). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences.
London: M.I.T. Press.
Boserup, E. (1970). Women's role in economic development. London: George Allen and
Alwin.
Business Insider (2018, 20 March). Saudi Arabia billionaire…. Retrieved from https://
www.businessinsider.com/.
Calvés, A.-E. (2009). Empowerment: The history of a key concept in contemporary de-
velopment discourse. Revue Tiers Monde, 4, 735–749.
CBSNews (2018). Saudi Arabia's heir to the throne talks to 60 minutes. Retrieved from
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/saudi-crown-prince-talks-to-60-minutes/.
Cornwall, A. (2016). Women's empowerment: What works? Journal of International
Development, 28, 342–359.
Duflo, Esther (2012). Women Empowerment and Economic Development. J. Econ. Lit.
50(4), 1051–1079.
Eco, U., & Sebeok, T. A. (Eds.). (1983). The sign of three: Dupins, Holmes, Peirce. Indiana:
Indiana University Press.
Ernst & Young (2013). Women: The next emerging market. Retrieved from https://www.
ey.com.
Freire, P. (1970). The pedagogy of the oppressed. Continuum: Translated by Myra Bergman
Ramos. New York.
Friedmann, J. (1992). Empowerment: The politics of alternative development. Cambridge:
Blackwell.
Gulf News (2017, 4 July) 130% spike in Saudi women joining workforce; 11.1 million
expats in private sector. Retrieved from www.gulfnew.com
Haddad, M. (2017, 9 May). Victims of rape and law: How the laws of the Arab world
protect rapist, not victims. Retrieved from Juristhttp://jurist.org/dateline/2017/05/
victims-of-rape-and-law-how-the-arab-world-laws-protect-the-rapist-not-the-victim.
php.
Halperin-Kaddari, R. (2018). CEDAW meeting1582, session 69. http://webtv.un.org/
watch/consideration-of-saudi-arabia-1582nd-meeting-69th-session-committee-on-
the-elimination-of-discrimination-against-women-/5740975840001/?term.
Hamdan, A. (2005). Women and education in Saudi Arabia: Challenges and achieve-
ments. International Education Journal, 6(1), 42–64.
A. Topal
Henderson, S. (2017, 27 September). Is Saudi Arabia really changing. Retrieved from The
Atlantichttps://www.theatlantic.com.
“Fourth World Conference on Women Beijing Declaration” (n.d.) Retrieved from http://
www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/declar.htm
Human Rights Watch (2013, 29 August). Saudi Arabia: Rights groups blocked from op-
erating. Retrieved from Human Rights Watchhttps://www.hrw.org/news.
Human Rights Watch (2017, 14 April). Fleeing woman returned Saudi Arabia against her
will. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org.
Human Rights Watch (2018, 5 May). Saudi Arabia growing crackdown womens rights
activists. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org.
Jessop, B. (2004). The gender selectivities of the state: A critical realist analysis. Journal of
Critical Realism, 3(2), 207–237.
Kabeer, N. (1994). Reversed realities: Gender hierarchies in development thought. London:
Verso.
Lerner, G. (1986). The creation of patriarchy. New York. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Littrell, R. F., & Bertsch, A. (2013). Traditional and contemporary status of women in the
patriarchal belt. Equality, Diversity and Inclusion, 32(3), 310–324.
MacFarquhar, Neil (2011, 25 September). Saudi Monarch grants women right to vote, The
New York Times. Retrieved from https://nytimes.com
Maguire, P. (1987). Doing participatory research: A feminist approach. Amherst: University
of Massachusetts.
Middle East Policy Council (n.d.) Saudi women gain representation on the Shura Council.
Retrieved from http://www.mepc.org/commentary/saudi-women-gain-
representation-shura-council
Mohanty, C. (1997). Under Western eyes: Feminist scholarship and colonial discourses. In
N. Visvanathan (Ed.). The women gender and development reader (pp. 83–89). London:
Zed Books.
Moser, C. (1993). Gender planning and development: Theory, practice and training. London:
Routledge.
Nadaraia, L. (2018). CEDAW meeting1582, session 69. http://webtv.un.org/watch/
consideration-of-saudi-arabia-1582nd-meeting-69th-session-committee-on-the-
elimination-of-discrimination-against-women-/5740975840001/?term=.
Nehme, G. M. (1994a). Saudi development plans between capitalist and Islamic values.
Middle Eastern Studies, 30(3), 632–645.
Nehme, G. M. (1994b). Saudi Arabia 1950–1980: Between nationalism and religion.
Middle Eastern Studies, 30(4), 930–943.
Quran (2004). Translated by Haleem. Abdel M.A.S.Oxford World's Classic edition. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Rowland, J. (1997). Questioning empowerment: Working with women in Honduras. Oxford:
Oxfam.
Trust on transformation empowerment of women. Retrieved from Saudi Gazettehttp://
saudigazette.com.sa/.
Sen, G., & Caren, G. (1987). Development, crises and alternative visions: Third World women's
perspectives. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Solomon, B. B. (1976). Black empowerment: Social work in oppressed communities. New
York: Columbia University Press.
Sparr, P. (1994). Morgaging women's lives. London: Zed Books.
Women's Studies International Forum 76 (2019) 102253
The Economist (2018). Why Gulf economies struggle to wean themselves off oil. June 21
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/06/21/why-gulf-economies-
struggle-to-wean-themselves-off-oil.
Saudi Arabia to allow women to obtain driving licenses. Retrieved from The
Guardianhttp://theguardian.com.
The Guardian (2017b). Saudi Arabia woman penalised driving car before ban lifted.
Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com.
The Independent (2017). Saudi Arabia: Women's rights activist freed after 104 days of de-
tention without her male guardian. 31 July. The Independent. Retrieved From http://
www.independent.co.uk.
UN (n.d.). About the sustainable development goals. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/
sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/
UN Inter-Agency Task Force. (n.d.). Guidelines on women's empowerment. Retrieved
from http://www.un.org/popin/unfpa/taskforce/guide/iatfwemp.gdl.html
UN Treaty Collection. (n.d.). Convention on the political rights of women. Retrieved from
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVI-1&
chapter=16&lang=en
UN Women (2010). UN creates new structure for empowerment of women. Retrieved
from http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2010/7/un-creates-new-structure-
for-empowerment-of-women.
UN Women Short history of CEDAW Convention (n.d.-a). Retrieved from http://www.un.
org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/history.htm.
UN Women Work and priorities (n.d.-b). Retrieved from http://www.unwomen.org/en/
about-us/about-un-women.
“Meeting basic learning needs: A vision for the 1990s” (n.d.) UNESDOC. Retrieved from
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000097552
UNWebTV (2018, 27 February). Consideration of Saudi Arabia - 1582nd Meeting 69th
Session Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. Retrieved
from http://webtv.un.org
Vision2030 (n.d.) Vision2030: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Retrieved from http://
vision2030.gov.sa
Walby, S. (1990). Theorizing patriarchy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Women Human Rights Defenders (2018, 23 May). Smearing Campaign report: Smear
Campaign against woman human rights defenders in Saudi Arabia. Retrieved from
https://whrdmena.org.
World Bank (2012). World development report 2012: Gender equality and development.
Washington D.C. World Bank.
World Bank (2014). Voice and agency: Empowering women and girls for shared prosperity.
World Bank: Washington D.C.
World Bank (2017). Accelerating women's economic empowerment. Retrieved from
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2017/06/26/accelerating-womens-
economic-empowerment
World Economic Forum (2018). The global gender gap report. Retrieved from www.
weforum.org
Young, K. (1993). Planning development with women: Making a world of difference. London:
MacMillan Press.