LEI ANN P.

VENTURA

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

CASE DIGESTS

ATTY. GIOVANNI BAQUIRAN

G.R. No. 164978 October 13, 2005

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., EDGARDO J. ANGARA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE,

LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, PANFILO M. LACSON,
ALFREDO S. LIM, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and SERGIO R. OSMEÑA
III, Petitioners 
vs.
EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, FLORENCIO B. ABAD, AVELINO J.
CRUZ, JR., MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR, JOSEPH H. DURANO, RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
ALBERTO G. ROMULO, RENE C. VILLA, and ARTHUR C. YAP, Respondents.

FACTS

President Arroyo issued appointments2 to respondents as acting secretaries of their

respective departments.

Date of Appointment
Department
Arthur C. Yap Agriculture 15
August
2004
Alberto G. Romulo Foreign Affairs 23
August
2004
Raul M. Gonzalez Justice 23
August
2004
Florencio B. Abad Education 23
August
2004
Avelino J. Cruz, Jr. National Defense 23
August
2004
Rene C. Villa Agrarian Reform 23
 August
2004
Joseph H. Durano Tourism 23
August
2004
Michael T. Defensor Environment and Natural 23
Resources August
2004
Through a letter, President Arroyo appointed the above-mentioned officials as Acting
Secretaries in their respective offices.

Two days after the Congress adjourned on September 22, 2004, PGMA issued ad
interimappointments3 to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they
were previously appointed in an acting capacity.

Hence, the petitions.

ISSUE

WON THE APPOINTMENT OF RESPONDENTS AS ACTING SECRETARIES

WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF CA WHILE CONGRESS IS IN SESSION VALID

RULING:

Yes.

The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17,
Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that "[t]he President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent
person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch." Thus, the
President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government
service, as long as the President deems that person competent.

The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-

gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a
permanent occupant to the office.16 In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter
ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must
necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent
appointee of her choice could assume office. 

Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether
temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in
the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,

G.R. NO. L-69137 August 5, 1986

FELIMON LUEGO, petitioner-appellant, 
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FELICULA TUOZO, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer 11, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu
City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on February 18, 1983. The appointment was described
as permanent. However, the respondent Commission approved it as “temporary: only
by virtue of the protest filed by private respondent Felicula Tuozo. Affter protracted
hearing, the Commission found the private respondent better qualified for the position
and directed that she be appointed. Thus, private respondent was appointed as such by
the new mayor, Ronald Duterte.

Thus, petitioner questions the order before the CSC.

ISSUE

WON ivil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on

the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis
of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?

RULING

No. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of
the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to
approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil
Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and authorizing the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws.

t is well settled that the determination of the kind of appointment to be extended lies in
the official vested by law with the appointing power and not the Civil Service
Commission. The Commissioner of Civil Service is not empowered to determine the
kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer. When the
appointee is qualified, as in this case, the Commissioner of Civil Service has no choice
but to attest to the appointment. Under the Civil Service Law, Presidential Decree No.
807, the Commissioner is not authorized to curtail the discretion of the appointing official
on the nature or kind of the appointment to be extended

Indeed, the approval is more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the fact that
the appointee is qualified for the position to which he has been named. As we have
repeatedly held, such attestation is required of the Commissioner of Civil Service merely
as a check to assure compliance with Civil Service Laws.
ppointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have
been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which
only the appointing authority can decid

On the contrary, the Civil Service Commission is limited only to the non-discretionary
authority of determining whether or not the person appointed meets all the required
conditions laid down by the law.

Section 9(h) of Article V of the Civil Service Decree because it says the Commission
has the power to "approve" and "disapprove" appointments. Thus, it is provided therein
that the Commission shag have inter alia the power to: 

9(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional

to positions in the civil service, except those presidential appointees,
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen,
and jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not
possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. 

he Commission was probably applying its own Rule V, Section 9, of Civil Service Rules
on Personnel Actions and Policies, which provides that "whenever there are two or
more employees who are next-in-rank, preference shall be given to the employee who
is most competent and qualified and who has the appropriate civil service eligibility."
This rule is inapplicable, however, because neither of the claimants is next in rank.
Moreover, the next-in-rank rule is not absolute as the Civil Service Decree allows
vacancies to be filled by transfer of present employees, reinstatement, re-employment,
or appointment of outsiders who have the appropriate eligibility.

G.R. No. 93064 June 22, 1992

AGUSTINA G. GAYATAO, petitioner, 
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and BAYANI I. FERNANDEZ, respondents.

Facts

Private respondent Bayani Fernandez was holding the position of Customs Operations
Chief I in a permanent capacity before he was reassigned to the aircraft Operations
Division as Acting Chief of the Export Division of the NAIA Customhouse.

On February 15, 1988, Commissioner Mision, purportedly acting pursuant to EO 127

appointed the petitioner Agustina gayatao to the position of Customs Operations Chief
at the NAIA Customhouse effective March 1, 19888 while respondent was designated
as Customs Operations Assistant Chief.

Aggrieved, private respondent filed a letter of protest before the Merit System Board of
the Commisision questioning the appointment and his demotion. Private respondent
alleges that he was unjustifiedly demoted since he has been holding the contested
position prior to the reorganization and he is more qualified than the petitioner.

The Commissioner of Customs commented that the appointment was non-protestatble,

being done pursuant to EO 127.

Later, The Commission revoked the appointment of petitioner and thus instead ordered
for the appointment of private respondent.

The request for reconsideration being denied, petitioner filed the instant petition for
certiorari.

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN REVOKING THE APPOINTMENT OF PETITIONER AND ORDERING
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN HER PLACE

RULING

Yes, As we stressed in Dario vs. Mison, et al., and its companion cases,20 removal from
office as a result of reorganization must pass the test of good faith. Upon the effectivity
of the 1987 Constitution, any reorganization undertaken by the Government must be
guided and circumscribed by the safeguards and provisions of the said Constitution and
the statutes' governing reorganization.21

In the instant case, the guidelines and standards provided in those laws were not
observed. The position of private respondent as COC of the Export Division was not
abolished with the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs. What happened was that
another person, herein petitioner who is lower in rank, was appointed in his stead. Such
fact is a clear indication of bad faith which would entitle herein private respondent to
reinstatement pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6656

As a civil service employee with a permanent appointment, Private respondent cannot

be removed, suspended or demoted except for cause" provided by law. Private
respondent's appointment to the lower position of COAC is a clear demotion in rank
without no valid cause and without being heard thereon. A demotion in office by
assigning an employee to a lower position on the same service is tantamount to
removal, if no cause is shown for it, more so, if it is not part of any disciplinary
action.23 The observance of the rules on bona fide abolition of public office is essential
before terminations and/or demotions from employment in the government service can
be made.

lthough it is true that the appointment of private respondent Fernandez as COC is

without any particular or fixed station and, generally he may be assigned anywhere as
the exigencies of the service may require,31 nonetheless his reassignment as Acting
Chief of the Export Division at NAIA does not make his appointment as Customs
Operation Chief I temporary and revocable at the pleasure of the appointing power. He
cannot be arbitrarily removed from a particular division without reassigning him to
another division nor can he be appointed to a lower position without cause and without
notice and hearing The appointing power cannot use the device of an ambiguous
designation to go around the security of tenure of a permanent employee.

 No vacancy having legally been created by the illegal dismissal no appointment may be
validly made to that position and the new appointee has no right whatsoever to that
office. She should be returned to where she came from or to given another equivalent
item.25 No person, no matter how qualified and eligible for a certain position, may he
appointed to on office which is not yet vacant. The incumbent must have been lawfully
removed or his appointment validly terminated,26 since an appointment to an office
which is not vacant is null and ab initio.27

G.R. No. 126661 December 3, 1999

JOSE S. ANDAYA and EDGARDO L. INCIONG, petitioners, 

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Cebu City, Branch 20, and THE CITY OF
CEBU, respondents.

Facts

On January 3, 1996, the position of City Director, Cebu City Police Command (chief of
police) became vacant after P/Supt. Antonio Enteria was relieved of command.

Sometime in January 1996, petitioner Andaya submitted to the City Mayor, Cebu City a
list of five (5) eligibles for the mayor choose one to be appointed as the chief of police of
Cebu City. The mayor did not choose anyone from the list of five (5) recommendees
because the name of P/Chief Inspector Andres Sarmiento was not included therein.

However, petitioner Andaya refused to include the name of major Andres Sarmiento
reasoning that based on NAPOLCOM MC No.95-04, the latter was not qualified for the
position of City Directpr for not having completed the officers Senior Executive Course
and the rank of Police Superintendent
Due to the impasse, the City of Cebu filed with the RTC Cebu City a complaint for
declaratory relief against the petitioners.

In their answer, petitioner stated that the power to designae chief of police of Cebu City
is vested with the Regional Director. However, the mayor is authorized to choose from
among the list of five (5) eligible. In case of conflict, the issue shall be elevated to the
Regional Director, NPC. Thus, petitioners pray for the dismissal of the complaint for lack
of legal basis and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent City of Cebu declaring that P/CInsp
Andres Sarmiento s qualified under RA 6975 to be appointed as Chief Director or Chief
of Police of the Cebu City Police Command and whose name must be included in the
list of five (5) eligibles recommended as regular replacement to the position of the Chief
of Police of said Cebu City Police Command.

On their motion for reconsideration, petitioner insists that the decision is contrary to
Section 51 of Republic Act 6975 which only empowers the mayor to choose one (1)
from the five (5) eligibles recommended by the Regional Police Director to be named
chief of police. The mayor cannot superimpose his will on the recommending authority
by insisting that his protégé be included in the list of five eligibles from which the chief of
police is to be chosen.

The trial court denied the motion.

Hnece, the pettion for review on certiorari.

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT he Mayor of Cebu City may require the Regional Director,
Regional Police Command No. 7, to include the mayor's protégé in the list of five (5)
eligibles to be recommended by the Regional Police Director to the mayor from which
the mayor shall choose the City Director, City Police Command (chief of police) City of
Cebu

RULING

No. Under Republic Act No. 6975, Section 51, the mayor of Cebu City shall be
deputized as representative of the Commission (National Police Commission) in his
territorial jurisdiction and as such the mayor shall have authority to choose the chief of
police from a list of five (5) eligibles recommended by the Police Regional Director. The
City Police Station of Cebu City is under the direct command and control of the PNP
Regional Director, Regional Police Command No. 7, and is equivalent to a provincial
office. 12 Then, the Regional Director, Regional Police Command No. 7 appoints the
officer selected by the mayor as the City Director, City Police Command (chief of police)
Cebu City. It is the prerogative of the Regional Police Director to name the five (5)
eligibles from a pool of eligible officers screened by the Senior Officers Promotion and
Selection Board, Headquarters, Philippine National Police, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
without interference from local executives. In case of disagreement between the
Regional Police Director and the Mayor, the question shall be elevated to the Regional
Director, National Police Commission, who shall resolve the issue within five (5) working
days from receipt and whose decision on the choice of the Chief of Police shall be final
and executory

As deputy of the Commission, the authority of the mayor is very limited. In reality, he
has no power of appointment; he has only the limited power of selecting one from
among the list of five eligibles to be named the chief of police. Actually, the power to
appoint the chief of police of Cebu City is vested in the Regional Director, Regional
Police Command No. 7. Much less may the mayor require the Regional Director,
Regional Police Command, to include the name of any officer, no matter how qualified,
in the list of five to be submitted to the mayor. The purpose is to enhance police
professionalism and to isolate the police service from political domination.

G.R. No. L-3081             October 14, 1949

ANTONIO LACSON, petitioner, 
vs.
HONORIO ROMERO, ET AL., respondents. Cruz, Puno and Lacson for petitioner.

Facts

Petitioner was appointed by the President of the Philippines as provincial fiscal of

Negros Orinetal. The appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
He later took his aoth of office and performed the duties of that office.

However, upon the recommendation of Secreatray of Justice, etitioner was nominated

by the President to the post of provincial fiscal of Tarlac. n the same date, the President
nominated for the position of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental respondent Romero.
Both nominations were simultaneously confirmed by the Commission on Appointments
on May 19, 1949.

Lacson neither accepted the appointment nor assumed the office of fiscal of Tarlac. But
respondent Romero took his oath of office and notified the Solicitor General of the fact,
and thereafter proceeded to his station. Upon his arrival in Dumaguete City, he notified
Lacson of his intention to take over the office but Lacson objected.

When petitioner asked his salary for the period June 16 to June 23, 1949, The
Provincial Auditor denied his claim on the ground that he is not the provincial fiscal of
Negros oriental but it is the respondent.

Hence, the present action.

ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VACANCY IN THE POST OF PROVINCIAL FISCAL

RULING

No. As held in the case of Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., 327, "there is no Power in
this country which can compel a man to accept an office." Consequently, since Lacson
has declined to accept his appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac and no one can
compel him to do so, then he continues as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no
vacancy in said office was created, unless Lacson had been lawfully removed as Such
fiscal of Negros Oriental.

t is obvious that the intended transfer of Lacson to Tarlac on the basis of his nomination
thereto, if carried out, would be equivalent to a removal from his office in Negros
Oriental. To appoint and transfer him from one province to another would mean his
removal or separation from the first province. The reason is that a fiscal is appointed for
each province (see. 1673, Rev. Adm. Code), and Lacson could not well and legally hold
and occupy the two posts of fiscal of Tarlac and Negros Oriental simultaneously. To be
fiscal for Tarlac must mean his removal from Negros Orienta

What is the nature of the office of provincial fiscal? Is it included in the Civil Service?
The answer is, undoubtedly, in the affirmative. Article XII, section 1 of our Constitution
provides that "a Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the
Government shall be provided by law." Section 668 of the Administrative Code as
amended by Com. Act No. 177, sec. 6, provides that "the Philippine Civil Service shall
embrace all branches and subdivisions of the Government;" and section 670 of the
same Code provides that "person in the Philippine Civil Service pertain either to the
classified or unclassified service." Section 671 of the same code as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 177, section 8 in part provides as follows:

Sec. 671. Person embraced in unclassified. — The following officers and

employees constitute the unclassified service:.lawphi1.nêt

(a) A secretary, a sergeant-at-arm, and such other officers as may be required

and chosen by the National Assembly in accordance with the Constitution.

(b) Officers, other than the provincial treasurers and Assistant Directors of
Bureaus or Offices, appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, and all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are by law vested in the
President of the Philippines alone.

(c) Elective officers.

.R. No. 92403 April 22, 1992

VICTOR A. AQUINO, petitioner, 
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and LEONARDA D. DE LA PAZ, respondents.

Facts

Petitioner Victor A. Aquino, then holding the position of Clerk II, Division of City Schools
of San Pablo City, was designated on July 20, 1984 as Officer-in-Charge of the Division
Supply Office by the DECS Regional Director Saturnino R. Magturo (Annex "H",
petition, p. 55, Rollo) in view of the retirement of the Supply Officer I, Mr. Jose I.
Aviquivil.

Prior to his designation, he was also designated as Property Inspector and In charge of
the Supply Office from Feb 16 to June 16,1984.
Two years thereafter, private respondent was issued a promotional appointment as
Supply officer I in the same DECS Division of San Pablo City. Prior to the appointment,
private respondent was holding the position of Clerk II. The CSC regional office
approved her appointment as permanent provided at there is no pending administrative
case against the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment, nor any
decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of (the)
appointment.

One monthe after the appointment, petitioner questions the qualification and
competence of private respondent before the DECS Secretary.

The DECS Secreatry sustained the petitioner and revoked the appointment of private
respondent

Private responded moved for reconsideration but same was denied by the DECS
Secretary.

Petitioner was later issued a permanent appointment on the basis of the DECS ruling.
He assumed the duties and functions of the position. His appointment was also
approved by the CSC regional Office.

Private respondent filed a notice of appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board.
Howeevr, the latter upheld the appointment of petitioner.

On appeal to the Commission, the latter found the conention of private respondent
meritorious. It revoked the appointment of petitioner Aquino.

The motion for reconsideration being denied, the petitioner seeks the reversal of the
Commission’s action.

ISSUE
 whether or not public respondent Civil Service Commission committed grave
abuse of discretion in revoking the appointment of petitioner Victor A. Aquino as
Supply Officer I in the DECS Division of San Pablo City as it found private
respondent Leonarda de la Paz better qualified.

RULING

No. Civil Service Commission revokedthe appointment of the successful protestant,

petitioner herein, principally because the right to security of tenure of the prior
appointee, private respondent herein, to the contested position had already
attached (see CSC decision, pp. 28-29, Rollo). It must be noted that public respondent
CSC did not direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. It merely restored the
appointment of private respondent who was first appointed to the contested position.

In consonance with the doctrine laid down in Villanueva v. Balallo, G.R. No. L-17745,
October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 407, that an appointment is complete when the last act
required of the appointing power has been performed, but later qualified in Favis
v. Rupisan, G.R. No. L-22823, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 190, that the acts of the head of
a department or office making the appointment and the Commissioner of Civil Service
acting together, though not concurrently, but consecutively, are necessary to make an
appointment complete, the permanent appointment extended to private respondent,
under the circumstances of the case, is deemed complete. As such, she is entitled to
the protection of the law against unjust removal.

It is well-settled that once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee
assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a
legal, not merely equitable right (to the position), which is protected not only by statute,
but also by the Constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of
the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing

G.R. No. L-32271 January 27, 1983

MARCIAL COSTIN, ESTANISLAO LAJER, LIONEL KANEN as Chief of Police;

FRANCISCO TISADO, OCTAVIO TRAYA as Municipal Mayor; DOMINGO IPONG as
Municipal Treasurer; and THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ABUYOG,
LEYTE, petitioners, 
vs.
HONORABLE LOPE C. QUIMBO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
and HIGINIO VERRA,

Facts

Petitioner Estanislao Lajer was a member of the municipal police force of Abuyog, Leyte
since January 1, 1949. He was extended a promotional appointment as sergeant of
police on October 15, 1958. On November 25, 1959, the outgoing municipal mayor of
Abuyog accorded Lajer another promotional appointment as chief of police. This last
appointment was not attested and approved as required by law.

On January 14, 1960, the new municipal mayor dismissed Lajer and eight other
members of the police department. On the same day, the municipal mayor extended to
respondent Higinio Verra a permanent appointment as Chief of Police of Abuyog with a
salary of P2,280.00 per annum. Verra immediately took over the position. His
appointment was eventually approved as permanent under Section 24 (b) of Republic
Act 2260 by the Commissioner of Civil Service. 

On January 19, 1960, Lajer and the eight members of the police force filed an action for
mandamus (Civil Case No. 2713) against the municipal mayor, municipal treasurer and
the municipal council of Abuyog, contesting their separation from the service.

While the mandamus was pending, the municipal administration of Abuyog changed
where the newly elected mayor dismissed Verra and replaced by Victoriano Silleza until
petitioner was appointed chief of police.

Respondent Verra filed a civil case for quo warranto against Costin, the municipal
mayor and municipal treasurer uestioning the legality of his separation alleging that he
could not be dismissed as chief of police because he was a civil service eligible and in
possession of an appointment to the position of chief of police of Abuyog, Leyte duly
attested "Permanent" by the Civil Service Commission.

In the first mandamus suit filed by Lajer and companions, the Court of Appeals decided
that Lajer and his companions were illegally dismissed from office and are thus entitled
to reinstatement.

Thus, Lajer was resinstated chief of police.

On the other hand, the civil case filed by Verra was promulgated to the effect that Verra
is entitled to reinstatement with slaalry to be paid for the whole period of his separation.

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the appointment of respondent Higinio Verra to the position of Chief of
Police of Abuyog, Leyte, was valid and consequently his removal therefrom illegal.

RULING

No. hen respondent Verra was appointed chief of police on January 14, 1960, Lajer had
just been dismissed from office with several other members of the police force. The
validity of Verras appointment, therefore, hinges on the legality of Lajers removal. It is
elementary in the law of public officers that no person, no matter how qualified and
eligible he is for a certain position may be appointed to an office which is not vacant.
There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be
legally removed or his appoint. ment validly terminated.

he private respondent is correct in asserting that when the promotional appointment of

Lajer was made in 1959, it could not be considered final or complete. Under Section
2(a) of Rule VI, the Civil Service Rules implementing Section 16(g) of Republic Act
2260, an appointment extended by an officer duly empowered to make it is not final and
complete until after the Commissioner of Civil Service has certified that such an
appointment may be made. (Gorospe v. Secretary of Public Works and
Communications et al. 105 Phil. 129L)

G.R. No. L-24761             September 7, 1965

LEON G. MAQUERA, petitioner, 
vs.
JUAN BORRA, CESAR MIRAFLOR, and GREGORIO SANTAYANA, in their
respective capacities as Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections,
and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

---------------------------

G.R. No. L-24828             September 7, 1965

FELIPE N. AUREA and MELECIO MALABANAN, petitioners, 

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Facts

G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989

SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner, 
vs.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondent.

Facts
In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner
Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other
accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and
sentenced them to imprisonment They were further ordered to jointly and severally
indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the
amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.

Petitioner appealed her conviction but same was denied. While the Motion for
Reconsideration was pending, she was extended by President Marcos absolute pardon
which she accepted on December 21, 1984.

y reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that
she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still
vacant. Her letter request was referred to the Ministry of Finance in view of the provision
of the LGC transferring power of appointment of treasurer to city governments. The
Ministry ruled that peititoner may be reinstated without need of a new appointment not
earlier than the date of pardon and after indemnifaction in favor of the government is
done.

Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry on April 17,
1985 stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which
implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the
date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension
which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her
suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the
amount of P4,892.50. 

The second letter was then referred to the office of the President. However, the latter
has a different view on the matter. According to the latter, cquittal, not absolute pardon,
of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and
entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the
period of his suspension pendente lite. Also, a pardon does not exempt her from paying
his civil liabilities.

er subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the
present petition

ISSUE

whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment.

RULING
NO. pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily
relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction 25 although such pardon
undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office. 26

he rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily for the collective
protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to
favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken
notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be
grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing
power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor
moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.

For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or
ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from the
authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her
pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply
for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in
considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her
offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately
whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the
pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding
public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant
city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.

Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are "historical" facts which,
despite the public manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, "ordinary,
prudent men will take into account in their subsequent dealings with the actor." 23

Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the
person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. 24 This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of
the true character and purpose of the privilege.

Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are "historical" facts which,
despite the public manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, "ordinary,
prudent men will take into account in their subsequent dealings with the actor." 23

Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the
person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. 24 This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of
the true character and purpose of the privilege.

G.R. No. 75025 September 14, 1993

VICENTE GARCIA, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE HONORABLE
MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner was a Supervising Lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of

Telecommunications in Lucena City. On 1 April 1975, petitioner was summarily
dismissed from the service on the ground of dishonesty in accordance with the decision
of the then Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications in Adm. Case
No. 975 for the loss of several telegraph poles which were located at the Sariaya-
Lucena City and Mauban-Sampaloc, Quezon, telecom lines. Petitioner did not appeal
from the decision.

A case for qualified theft was filed against petitioner but was acquitted of the offense charged.

Due to the acquittal, petitioner seeks reinstatement to his former position.However, His request
was denied by the Bureau of telecommunications. Thus, he pleaded to the President of the
Philippines for executive clemency.

By authority of the Presidnet, The Ministry of Transportation granted the executive clemency as
requested by the petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a claim to recover his back salaries for the periof from April 1, a975
to the date of his dismissal. This was denied by the COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 12
October 1982 on the ground that the executive clemency granted to him did not provide
for the payment of back salaries and that he has not been reinstated in the service.

 appears that petitioner was recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records do
not show whether petitioner's reinstatement was to the same position of Supervising
Lineman.

etitioner again filed a claim to recover his back salaries but same was denied by COA.
Aggrieved, petitioner appelaed to the office of the President. It was denied by the latter
due tolegal and constitutional constraint,"2 holding that this Court is the proper forum to
take cognizance of the appeal on certiorari from the decision of the COA.

Hence, the petition.

ISSUE

whether OR NOT he is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been
reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.

RULING

Yes. very civilized country recognizes, and has therefore provided for, the pardoning
power to be exercised as an act of grace and humanity, in proper cases. Without such a
power of clemency, to be exercised by some department or functionary of a
government, a country would be most imperfect and deficient in its political morality and
in that attribute of Deity whose judgments are always tempered with money.3

n the case at bar, petitioner was found administratively liable for dishonesty and
consequently dismissed from the service. However, he was later acquitted by the trial
court of the charge of qualified theft based on the very same acts for which he was
dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof
beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense
imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court
commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily,
petitioner's innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive clemency to
him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement by the Ministry
of Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service Commission.

he bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the

adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and
ordered his separation from the service. This can be inferred from the executive
clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby
directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This
signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment;
he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.

Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back

wages.8 This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to
make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the
service. To rule otherwise would defeat the very intention of the executive
clemency, i.e., to give justice to petitioner. Moreover, the right to back wages is afforded
to those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those
otherwise acquitted of the charges against them.9 There is no doubt that petitioner's
case falls within the situations aforementioned to entitle him to back wages.

G.R. No. 83896             February 22, 1991

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, 

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.

Facts

On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 with
pertinent provisions as follows:

Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a

member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive
officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold
not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and
receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation
shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies
of which the President is the Chairman.

Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other

appointive official of the Executive Department holds more positions than what is
allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor
of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold
more than two positions other than his primary position.

Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-

owned or controlled corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the
boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or
assistant secretary.

Petitioners maintain that he Executive Order runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution,2 which provides as follows:

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
 instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.

In addition to seeng a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284,

petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines further seeks in G.R. No. 83815 the
issuance of the extraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus, as well as a temporary
restraining order directing public respondents therein to cease and desist from holding,
in addition to their primary positions, dual or multiple positions other than those
authorized by the 1987 Constitution and from receiving any salaries, allowances, per
diems and other forms of privileges and the like appurtenant to their questioned
positions, and compelling public respondents to return, reimburse or refund any and all
amounts or benefits that they may have received from such positions.

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT EO 284 IS CONSTITUTIONAL

RULING

NO. It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that the 1987
Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or
employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself
and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in
an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of
their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during
the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials
should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitution's manifest intent and the people' understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7,
par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23,
1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary
position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and government
corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the
1987 Constitution itself.

.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990

MATEO CAASI, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.

G.R. No. 84508 November 13, 1990

ANECITO CASCANTE petitioner, 
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.

Ireneo B. Orlino for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508.

Montemayor & Montemayor Law Office for private respondent.

FACTS

A quo warranto case was fied against Merlito Miguel prior to the local elections on
January 18, 1988 on account that he is a green card holder, a permanent resident of the
United States of America, not of Bolinao.

n his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him
by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the
United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he
may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his
children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that
he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18,1987.

The COMELEC denied the petitions on the ground that he possession of a green card
by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his
residence in the Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his green card, Respondent
has sufficiently indicate is intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his
having voted in successive elections in said municipality.Thus, respondent meets the
basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective officials.

ISSUE

whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or

immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.

RULING
YES. espite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did
not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the
limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his
application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application
of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to
reside there permanently.

As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S.,
the country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the protection given to
him during the period of his residence therein.

e records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as
such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We,
therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office.

Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The
waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent
clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered
his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in
the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run
for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.

G.R. No. 157013            July 10, 2003

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, 

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity
as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management, respondents.

FACTS

Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003). Section 5 of said
law states that:

Sec. 5. Disqualifications. – The following shall be disqualified from voting under

this Act:

.........
 d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host
country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from
approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that
he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall
be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident
from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.

Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1,

Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least
six months immediately preceding an election.

The COMELEC refrained from commenting on the issue.

The Solicitor general contraposes that the constitutional challenge to Section 5(d) must
fail because of the absence of clear and unmistakable showing that said provision of
law is repugnant to the Constitution. He stresses: All laws are presumed to be
constitutional; by the doctrine of separation of powers, a department of government
owes a becoming respect for the acts of the other two departments; all laws are
presumed to have adhered to constitutional limitations; the legislature intended to enact
a valid, sensible, and just law.

ssues:
Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are
immigrants or permanent residents in other countries... by their mere act of executing an
affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency
requirement in
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?

R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of Section
2, Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall provide a system for voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad.
It must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the parameters of... the exercise
of legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of restrictions,
Congress is presumed to have duly exercised its function as defined in Article VI (The
Legislative Department) of the Constitution.
Such statutes are regarded as conferring a privilege and not a right, or an absolute right.
When the legislature chooses to grant the right by statute, it must operate with equality
among all the class to which it is granted; but statutes of this nature may be limited in...
their application to particular types of elections. The statutes should be construed in the
light of any constitutional provisions affecting registration and elections, and with due
regard to their texts prior to amendment and to predecessor statutes and... the decisions
thereunder; they should also be construed in the light of the circumstances under which
they were enacted; and so as to carry out the objects thereof, if this can be done without
doing violence to their provisions and mandates. Further, in passing on... statutes
regulating absentee voting, the court should look to the whole and every part of the
election laws, the intent of the entire plan, and reasons and spirit of their adoption, and
try to give effect to every portion thereof.
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same
time, both a resident and an absentee.[30] However, under our election laws and the
countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee... remains
attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with
domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law,
what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes... is used synonymously with domicile.
Thus, the Constitutional Commission recognized the fact that while millions of Filipinos
reside abroad principally for economic reasons and hence they contribute in no small
measure to the economic uplift of this country, their voices are marginal insofar as the
choice of... this country's leaders is concerned.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2
immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary
implication in statutory construction, which may be applied in construing constitutional...
provisions,... the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional
Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1
with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in... effect declared
that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even
though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution.
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling
or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the
intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the
Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in
fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of
the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes "provisional...
registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a
political exercise."
To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad
because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished
their intent to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of
abandonment of
Philippine domicile shall remain.
It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to
"resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years
from approval of his/her registration," the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they
have... not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, they must return to the
Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return "shall be cause for the removal" of their
names "from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in... absentia."
Thus, Congress crafted a process of registration by which a Filipino voter permanently
residing abroad who is at least eighteen years old, not otherwise disqualified by law, who
has not relinquished Philippine citizenship and who has not actually abandoned his/her...
intentions to return to his/her domicile of origin, the Philippines, is allowed to register
and vote in the Philippine embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishments of
the place which has jurisdiction over the country where he/she has indicated his/her
address for... purposes of the elections, while providing for safeguards to a clean
election.

LABO VS COMELEC

FACTS

.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989

RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner, 

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS L.
LARDIZABAL, respondents

FACTS

Petitioner was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City on January 20, 1988. A petition
for quo warranto was filed against petititoner on January 26, 1988 alleging lack of
citizenship.
Petitioner was married to an Australian national in 1976. He also does not deny that he
obtained Australian Passport No. 754705, which he used in coming back to the
Philippines in 1980, when he declared before the immigration authorities that he was an
alien and registered as such under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-323985. 16 He
later asked for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine
citizen and was granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 223809. 17 He also
categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn
statements voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the
barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner.

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES QUALIFIED

TO RUN INTO PUBLIC OFFICE

RULING

No. The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January
18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the
Constitution itself because of his alienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible as a candidate
for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local Government Code providing in
material part as follows: 

Sec. 42. Qualifications. — An elective local official must be a citizen of the

Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified
voter registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province
where he proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least one year
at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read and
write English, Filipino, or any other local language or dialect.

Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its
renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of
re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total
and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished
by election to public office.

G.R. No. 154829               December 10, 2003

ARSENIO A. LATASA, petitioner,  
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROMEO SUNGA, respondents
Facts

Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del
Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During petitioner’s third term, the
Municipality of Digos was declared a component city, to be known as the City of Digos.
A plebiscite conducted on September 8, 2000 ratified Republic Act No. 8798
entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur Province into a
Component City to be known as the City of Digos" or the Charter of the City of Digos.
This event also marked the end of petitioner’s tenure as mayor of the Municipality of
Digos. However, under Section 53, Article IX of the Charter, petitioner was mandated to
serve in a hold-over capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos. Hence, he took his
oath as the city mayor.

On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the
May 14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise
disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor.

On March 1, 2001, private respondent Sunga, also a candidate for mayor, filed a petition to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner . He argued that petitioner falsely represented
in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City since
petitioner had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms as mayor
from 1992 to 2001.

In his answer, petitioner argues that there was no false representation since he fully
disclosed that he had served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos for three consecutive
terms. He believes that this will not bar him to run as city mayor.

In its Resolution, the COMELEC stated that the certificate of candidacy should be
cancelled for being violative of the three-term rule proscribed by 1987 Constitution and
the Local Government Code of 1991.

Petititoner filed a motion for reconsideration which remained unacted until the day of
elections. Despite this, petitioner was proclaimed winner.

On July 1, 2001, petitioner was sworn into and assumed his office as the newly elected
mayor of Digos City. It was only on August 27, 2002 that the COMELEC en banc issued
a Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, the petition.

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ELIGIBLE TO RUN FOR CITY MAYOR AFTER

HE HAS SERVED AS MUNICIPAL MAYOR FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS
RULING

No. True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from
that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying
the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be
construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As
stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the
municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in
the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa
to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same
inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine
years.

In the present case, petitioner Latasa was, without a doubt, duly elected as mayor in the
May 1998 elections. Can he then be construed as having involuntarily relinquished his
office by reason of the conversion of Digos from municipality to city? This Court believes
that he did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has
been deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated
his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor. Unlike
in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped
down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the
local government unit. He never ceased from discharging his duties and responsibilities
as chief executive of Digos.

G.R. No. 116033 February 26, 1997

ALFREDO L. AZARCON, petitioner, 
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. BATAUSA, respondents.

Facts

Petitioner was engaged in an earth-moving business. Occassionally, he angages the

services of Jaime Ancla as a sub-contractor, whose trucks are left in petitioner’s
premises.

It appears that on May 25, 1093, a warrant of distraint personal property was issued
against Ancla as a delinquent taxpayer. The warrant was issued against petitioner.
G.R. No. 145368            April 12, 2002

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, respondent.