CSB News Release

Share

Final CSB Report on EQ Hazardous

Waste Fire and Community Evacuation
in Apex Calls for New Fire Protection
Standards, Improved Chemical
Information for Emergency Planners
April 16, 2008

Apex, North Carolina, April 16, 2008 - In a case study report released today on
the October 2006 hazardous waste fire at the Environmental Quality
Company (EQ), the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) called for a new national
fire code for hazardous waste facilities and for improving the information
provided to community emergency planners about the chemicals those
facilities store and handle.

The fire occurred on the night of October 5, 2006, at the EQ hazardous waste
transfer facility on Investment Boulevard in Apex, a suburb of Raleigh, North
Carolina. The facility was not staffed or monitored after hours, and no EQ
employees were present at the time of the fire. Emergency responders did not
have access to specific information on the hazardous chemicals stored at the
site and ordered the precautionary evacuation of thousands of Apex residents.
The evacuation order remained in place for two days, until the fire had
subsided.

The CSB also today released a new 16-minute CSB safety video, entitled
"Emergency in Apex - Hazardous Waste Fire and Community Evacuation,"
available on free DVDs and on the agency's video website, Safetyvideos.gov.

The CSB investigation found that a small fire originated in the facility's
oxidizer storage bay, one of six storage bays where different wastes were
consolidated, stored, and prepared for transfer off-site to treatment and
disposal facilities. Within the oxidizer bay were a number of chemical oxygen
generators, which had earlier been removed from aircraft during routine
maintenance at a facility in Mobile, Alabama. However, they had not been
safely activated and discharged before entering the waste stream. Solid
chlorine-based pool chemicals were stacked on top of the box containing still
functional oxygen generators.

Apex firefighters initially responded to a 911 emergency call from a resident

driving past the facility, who reported observing a haze with a "strong
chlorine smell." When firefighters arrived, they discovered what was still a
small "sofa-size" fire. But that fire spread quickly, most likely as the aircraft
oxygen generators discharged and accelerated the blaze.

"The only fire control equipment on-site consisted of portable, manually

operated fire extinguishers," said CSB Supervisory Investigator Rob Hall, P.E.,
who led the investigation. "The facility lacked fire walls and automatic fire
suppression systems. As a result, the fire spread quickly into other bays where
flammables, corrosives, laboratory wastes, paints, and pesticides were stored."
The bays were separated by six-inch-high curbs only designed to contain
liquid spills.

The facility was destroyed in the ensuing fire and explosions, which sent
fireballs hundreds of feet into the air. About 30 people, including one
firefighter and 12 police officers, required medical evaluation at local
hospitals for respiratory distress and other symptoms that occurred as a
plume from the fire drifted across the area.

Hazardous waste facilities like EQ's are regulated under the federal Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). The investigation noted that RCRA
regulations developed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) require
facilities to have "fire control equipment" but do not specify what equipment
and systems should be in place. In addition, there is no national fire code to
define good fire protection practices for hazardous waste facilities.

The CSB investigation identified 22 other hazardous waste fires, explosions,

and releases that have occurred at U.S. hazardous waste facilities in past five
years. More than a third had adverse community impacts, such as evacuations,
orders to shelter, and transportation disruptions.

Federal RCRA regulations require operators to "familiarize" local responders

in advance concerning facility hazards, but do not describe what specific
information must be shared about stored chemicals, or define the frequency
of communications. Similarly, EPA regulations under the 1986 Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act do not require facilities to share
information about hazardous wastes with local agencies, since those wastes
are generally exempt from Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) rules requiring preparation of material safety data sheets (MSDSs).

In fact, the investigation found that EQ had had limited contact with the Apex
Fire Department prior to the October 2006 fire.

"Specific, accurate, up-to-date information on chemical hazards is essential to

emergency response planning," said CSB Board Member William Wark, who
accompanied the investigative team to Apex in October 2006. "Communities
have a fundamental right to know about stored hazardous chemicals that may
affect their health and well-being. For first responders, having prompt access
to such information is a matter of basic life safety."

The CSB report recommended the EPA require that permitted hazardous
waste facilities periodically provide specific, written information to state and
local response officials on the type, approximate quantities, and location of
hazardous materials.

The Board called on the Environmental Technology Council, a trade

association representing about 80% of the U.S. hazardous waste industry, to
develop standardized guidance on waste handling and storage to prevent
releases and fires. The CSB also recommended that the Council petition the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) - an organization that authors
national fire codes - to develop a specific fire protection standard for the
hazardous waste industry. The new standard should address fire prevention,
detection, control, and suppression. Similar NFPA standards already exist for
other industries, such as wastewater treatment.

Earlier, in June 2007, the CSB issued a safety advisory and urgent
recommendations designed to ensure that chemical oxygen generators are
safely activated and discharged prior to transportation and disposal. The
advisory cited findings of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
following the 1996 ValuJet crash in Florida, which was caused when
generators activated and ignited in the plane's cargo bay.

The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating

industrial chemical accidents. The agency's board members are appointed by
 the president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB investigations look into all
aspects of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment
failure as well as inadequacies in regulations, industry standards, and safety
management systems. The Board does not issue citations or fines but does
make safety recommendations to plants, industry organizations, labor groups,
and regulatory agencies such as OSHA and EPA. Visit our website,
www.csb.gov.

For more information, in Apex contact Dr. Daniel Horowitz at (202) 441-6074.
In Washington, DC, contact Mr. Sandy Gilmour at (202) 261-7614 / (202) 251-
5496 or Ms. Hillary Cohen at (202) 261-3601 / (202) 446-8094.

Back to news

Related News

• Kesalahan! Nama file tidak ditentukan.

CSB Issues New Safety Alert Focused on the Potential Hazards of Emergency
Discharges from Pressure Release Valves

3/6/2023

New Safety Alert

read more

• Kesalahan! Nama file tidak ditentukan.

CSB Releases Final TPC Report

12/19/2022

Final Report Release into 2019 Explosions and Fires at the TPC Group
Chemical Plant in Port Neches, Texas
read more

• Kesalahan! Nama file tidak ditentukan.

 CSB Releases Investigation Update

12/14/2022

New Investigation Update into 2021 Fatal Explosion and Fire at Yenkin-
Majestic Plant in Columbus, OH
read more

• Inspector General
• Privacy Policy
• No Fear Act
• Legal/FOIA
• Performance and Accountability Reports
• Site Map

1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 910 | Washington, DC 20006

Website design & development by Americaneagle.com

© U.S. Chemical Safety Board. All Rights Reserved.

Pilih
BahasaIndonesiaAfrikansAlbaniaAmharaArabArmeniaAssamAymaraAzerbaijanBambaraBasqueBelandaBelarussiaBen
galiBhojpuriBosniaBulgariaBurmaCebuanoCekoChichewaChina (Aks. Sederhana)China (Aks.
Tradisional)DenmarkDivehiDogriEsperantoEstoniaEweFarsiFinlandiaFrisiaGaeligGaelik
SkotlandiaGalisiaGeorgiaGuaraniGujaratiHausaHawaiiHindiHmongIbraniIgboIlocanoIslanItaliaJawaJepangJermanKann
adaKatalaKazakKhmerKinyarwandaKirghizKonkaniKoreaKorsikaKreol HaitiKrioKroatKurdi (Kurmanji)Kurdi
(Sorani)LaosLatinLatviaLingalaLituaniaLugandaLuksemburgMagyarMaithiliMakedoniaMalagasiMalayalamMaltaMaoriM
arathiMeiteilon (Manipuri)MelayuMizoMongolNepalNorskOdia
(Oriya)OromoPashtoPolandiaPortugisPrancisPunjabiQuechuaRumaniaRusiaSamoaSanskertaSepediSerbSesothoShon
aSindhiSinhalaSlovakiaSloveniaSomaliSpanyolSundaSwahiliSwenskTagalogTajikTamilTatarTeluguThaiTigrinyaTsonga
TurkiTurkmenTwiUkrainaUrduUyghurUzbekVietnamWalesXhosaYiddiYorubaYunaniZulu

Diberdayakan oleh Terjemahan