WEP 2-23 / WP.

107

WORLD EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMME RESEARCH

Working Paper

INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMME

DECENTRALISED PLANNING IN
PAPUA NEW GUINEA

by

Diana Conyers

Note: WEP Research Working Papers are preliminary documents

circulated informally in a limited number of copies solely
a
to stimulate discussion and critical comment. They are
restricted and should not be cited without permission.

November 1981

iiitt iii iii titit ittt

46950
 Copyright International Labour Organication 198].

ISBN 92-2-302938-7
9

The CesSgnations of countries e loyed. which are in conformity

with United Nations practice), and the presentation of the
material in this paper do not imply the expression of any opinion
whatsoever on the part of the International Labour Office
concerning the legal status of any country or territory o of its
authorities, or concerning the delimitations of its frontiers.

The responsibility for opinIons expressed in WEP Research Working

Papers rests solely with their authors, and their circulation
does not in any way constitute an endorsement by the International
Labour Office of the opinions expressed in then,
 PREFACE

This is the hundred and seventh paper appearing in the Working Papers
series of the Research Programme on Income Distribution and Employment.
Within the framework of this programme, a number of studies are being
undertaken in different parts of the world aiming at the elucidation of
the various issues concerned with different types of income distribution
and at exploring the relationship between income distribution and employ-
merit. This programme is also concerned with the instruments of govern-
ment redistribution policy, such as government expenditure and. taxation,
with the area of wealth distribution and redistribution and with the problem
of poverty and satisfaction of basic needs.

A relatively recent emphasis of the Income Distribution and Employ-

ment Programme has been on the role of government services in the satis-
faction of basic needs. This work concentrates on two closely related
issues. The first concerns the identification of beneficiaries of pro-
grammes of government services under different institutional and socio-
economic systems. The work on this issue is thus similar to our work on
redistributive effects of government expenditures. The second issue concerns
the appraisal of different means to deliver basic needs services. Both
issues are studied with respect to housing services, road and transport
planning and education and health programmes.

Another new area of study of the Income Distribution and Employment

Programme concerns decentralised local-level planning. The purpose of this
new development is to investigate whether local-level planning holds out
promise for an alternative development path that will encourage the imple-
mentation and financing of poverty alleviation projects and programmes.
Several studies have been started in this field. The first paper to appear
was that of Professor Makhtar Diouf ("La planification rgionale au Sénégal"
WEP 2-23/WP.99, May 1961).

The present paper, by Dr. Diana Conyers of the Institute of Planning

Studies, University of Nottingham, first presents the situation of decen-
tralised planning in Papua-New Guinea, and then examines a number of issues
arising out of Papua_New Guinea's experience.

Felix Paukert
 Contents

PART ONE: TI ROLE OP DECENTRLISED PLANNING IN

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

The concept of decentralised planning 2

The Papua New Guinea environment 3

Planning in. Papua New Guinea 4

Early attempts to decentralise planning 5

The decentralisation programme 7

PART TWO: SPECIFIC ISSUES ARISING PROM PAPUA NEW GUINEA'S

EXPERIENCE IN DECENTPLLLISED PLANNING 9

Role of small-scale physical infrastructure development 10

Achieving a self-perpetuating financing system 12

Sectoral local planning versus over-all decentralisation 15

Loual autonomy and relations between lower and higher

planning and politioal levels 16

Degree of local popular control over the bureaucracy 1.7

Administrative level to which some local autonomy

is granted 19

Monitoring and evaluation 21

PART TEBEE: CONCLUSIONS 23

Footnotes 25.

References 26
 PART ONE

TIlE ROLE OP DECENTRALISED PLAJilING IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

 -2-

Since the achievement of internal self-government in 1973 - two years before

attaining full political independence - Papua New Guinea's official development
policy has been founded on eight basic objectives, usually referred. to simply as
the "Eight Aims". The third of these aims calls for: "Decentraliatiofl of
economic activity, planning and government spending, with emphasis on agricultural
development, village industry, better internal trade and more spending channelled
through local and area bodies." (Papua New Guinea, 1972.)

This part of the study swomarises the various efforts made by the Papua New
Guinea Government to achieve one part of that aim, the decentralisation of planning,
as a basis for a more detailed analysis of particular aspects of the country's
experience with d.ecentralised planning in. Part Two. However, it is necessary to
begin this section by looking briefly at, first, the concept of decentralised
planning and, second, the Papua New Guinean environment.

The concept of decentralised planning

"Planning" and "decentralisation" are both terms which have a variety of
meanings and so it is necessary to clarify what is meant by decentralised planning
in this study. Although there arc countless different definitions of planning,
most imply a process of decision-making about the best way of using or allocating
resources to achieve specific goals or objectives. And decentralisation usually
refers in general terms to the transfer of powers, functions or activities from
the national level to one or more sub-national levels.
Decentralised planning can therefore be interpreted as a particular process
of decision-making carried out at the sub-national level. It involves more than
merely local government or administration, since planning implies conscious decision-
making about the way to achieve specific objectives, whereas routine government or
administration may be a more ad hoc day-to-day process. However, it is often very
closely related to local government and administration, especially in a country like
Papua New Guinea, where - as will be demonstrated below - decentralised planning is
being achieved primarily through the decentralisation of' political and
administrative powers. It should also be noted that decentralised planning indicates
planning actually carried out at the sub-national level - not merely the preparation
of plans for sub-national areas by organisations or individuals based at the
national level.
Why should planning be decentralised? There are many reasons and each country
where decentralisod planning is attempted has its own particular objectives.
However, these may perhaps be generalised into two main objectives, both of which
have played a major role in encouraging decentralisation in Papua New Guinea.
Pirstly, decentralisation is frequently seen as a means of encouraging popular
participation in the planning process, either through the direct participation of
ordinary people or more indirectly through local politicians or administrators.
Such participation may be regarded as a desirable end in itself or as a means of
improving the preparation and implementation of plans. The latter view is based
on the assumption that plans are more likely to be relevant to local conditions and.
needs and to have the support of the people who will be responsible for, or directly
affected by, their implementation.
Secondly, decentralisation may be seen as a means of improving the efficiency
ci' planning and implementation, by providing greater flexibility and, at least
under certain conditions, facilitating co-ordination between the various agencies
involved in planning. The flexibility obtained by decentralising decision-making
powers means that decisions can be made and action taken more quickly, resources
can be transferred from one project to another more easily and national plans
adapted to meet local needs; while co-ordination encourages integrated planning
and more efficient use of' resources and helps to avoid duplication between different
agencies.
These potential benefits of decentralised planning are, of course, somewhat
theoretical. The extent to which they are actually realised depends a great deal
on the form of decentralisation and the effectiveness of its operation. Part Two
of' this study will examine the extent to which Papua New Guinea has achieved these
objectives and the lessons which have been learned in the process.
Papua New Guinea provides an interesting case study with regard to the design and
organisation of decentralised planning because, after attempting various forms of
decentralised planning, it has since independence embarked upon a major political
and administrative decentralisation programme, involving the establishment of a.
new tier of provincial level governments and the decentralisation o.0 significant
powers to these governments, including extensive powers to plan and implement their
own development programmes.

The Paua New Guinea environment

Papua New Guinea, with a land area of just under 500,000 sg.uare kilometres and
a population of three million, is a small country by world standards. However, it
i?considthably larger than most of its South Pacific neighbours (with the exception
of Australia and New Zealand) and it is very fragmented physically and culturally.
These two factors help to explain why, in spite of its size, it has attached
considerable importance to decentralisation.
The country consists of the eastern half of the large island of New Guinea,
most of which is rugged mountainous country, and a large number of much smaller
islands scattered over several hundred kilometres to the north and east. This has
created practical problems of transport and communication and has helped to account
for the great cultural diversity of its people. The population is divided into
about 700 distinct language groups and, although transport and communications are
now improving and there is considerable interaction between groups, especially in
urban areas, regional and local feelings remain strong and play a very significant
role in social and political life.
Colonial administration in Papua New Guinea lasted nearly 100 years. Until
the Second World War, the country was administered in two parts: Papua, which was
originally occupied by the British but became an Australian colony in 1905 and New
Guinea, which was originally part of German colonial territory but became a United
Nations Trust Territory, administered by Australia, after the First World War.
Even after the Second War, when a joint administration was established, the official
status of the two territories was different, Papua being an Australian colony while
New Guinea remained a United Nations Trust Territory. This historical difference
has not been entirely forgotten and, together with differences in culture and
language, natural resources and patterns of economic development, still causes
political tensions and adds to the country's fragmentary nature.

In contrast to the highly decentralised structure of traditional society,

which was based on a system of clan or village-level government, the political and
administrative structure established by the Australians in both Papua and New Guinea
was very centralised. Furthermore, as communications improved and the administrative
structure grew in size and complexity, centralisation tended to increase. A system
of local government councils was established during the l950s .nd l960s but, as will
be seen below, their powers were limited and in many cases they were unable to use
even these powers effectively because of inadeq.uate resources. Two consultauts who
a:dvised on. the preparations for provincial government in 1974 declared that:
"In our experience of political systems in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, we have
not come across an administrative system so highly cen.tra],ised and dominated by its
bureaucracy." (Tordoff and Watts, 1974, page 2/2)
Moreover, the problem was exacerbated by the fact that, because of the proximity
o± Australia and the particular characteristics of its colonial policy, a much higher
proportion of decision-making powers were retained in the metropolitan country than
was usual in colonial situations (compare Ballard, 1973).
Papua New Guinea obtained internal self-government in 1973 and full political
independence in September 1975. It is governed by a rather loose coalition of
political parties, the composition of which changes every now and again. The most
significant change in the structure of the coalition to date was in March 1980, when
Michael Somare, leader of the Pangu Party and Prime Minister since independence, lost
a vote of no-confidence in Parliament and was replaced as Prime Minister by the leader
of the People's Progress Party, Julius Chan. The absence of a very strong national
Goverument and the importance of regional and local issues in national politics
contributed to the move towards decentralisation which will be discussed later.

The country is at present divided into 19 provinces (known as districts before

independence), which vary in population from about 35,000 to 300,000.
 4

The provinces are sub-divided into districts (previously knom as sub-dfttricts)

and into local government areas, which sometimes - but by no means always - colncido
with districts. The capital city, Port Moresby, and its hinterland has se'arate
poiiLiva.L and. administrative s'bduu as a national capital district.

Planning in Papua New Guinea

The history of development planning in Papua New Guinea is rather different
from that of many Third World countries. Because of its relatively late independ-
ence and the fact that there was not a great deal of communication or interchange of
experience with other parts of the developing world during the colonial period, it
did. not experience the almost manic concern with development planning which occurred,
in so many countries during the 1950s and 1960s (Oonyers, 1975, page 8).
v

There were some attempts at planning during the colonial period, beginning as
a result of a World Bank mission to the country in 1963. In 1968 an official plan
document was published, covering the Live-year period from 1968/9 to 1972/3 (Papua
and New Guinea, 1968). However, it was not sufficiently detailed or comprehensive
to be really regarded as a full development plan (compare Langmore, 1973, page 13);
and substantial revisions were required in 1971, as a result of the commencement of
a major copper mining project in the island of Bougainville and a decision that
political independence would be achieved considerably earlier than previously
anticipated (Papua New Guinea, 1971).

In 1971 the first national planning agency, known as the Office of Programming
and Co-ordination (OPAC), was established and the preparation of another, more
comprehensive five-year plan began. However, these preparations were interrupted
at the end of 1972, when a major change of policy was announced by Michael Somare,
who had just been elected as Chief Minister in the country's first fully democratic
elections. The new policy, which as expressed in terms of the Eight Aims to which
reference has already been made, emphasised greater Papua New Guinean involvement
in economic development, self-reliance, rural development, equality and decentralisa-
tion.
These policy changes resulted in a significant change in the approach to planning.
In 1973 OPAC was abolished and replaced by a new Central Planning Office - later
renamed the National Planning Office (NPO) - and a Canadian management specialist
was appointed as its director. The new planning Qffice, influenced by the professi-
onal background and experience of its director and by the growing international
disillusionment with the type of development planning practised in many countries
during the l960s (compare Faber and Seers, 1972), pioneered an approach to planning
which later became recognised as public expenditure planning. The main aim of
this approach was to ensure that government spending was actually helping to achieve
baic national goals.
One of the first exercises initiated by the NPO, with the co-operation of other
government departments, was to expand the Eight Aims into a much more detailed policy
document, known as the National Development Strategy (Papua New Guinea, 1976), and
to introduce more central control over the annual budgeting process of individual
departments. This was followed in 1978 by the introduction of the National Public
Expenditure Plan (NPEP) process. This process, which is still in operation, requires
departments to submit all requests for additional expenditure (recurrent or capital)
to the NPO. These requests are assessed by the NPO and priority given to those
projects which are most in line with the National Development Strategy and which have
been thoroughly planned. The NPEP is prepared on a four year basis. However, it is
a "rolling" plan, in the sense that detailed plans are produced only for one year at
a time and each year the plan is reviewed and extended by one year.
The NPEP system has experienced some teething problems, including the amount of
time taken to prepare, assess and monitor the implementation of NPEP projects, the
lack of adequate staff to prepare departmental project submissions and a conflict -
which will be discpssed in more detail below - between the objectives of the NPEP
and those of decentralisation. Furthermore, the NPEP still covers only a relatively
small proportion o± total government expenditure, although the proportion is
increasing year by year. However, Papua New Guinea has nevertheless made signifi-
cant progress in terms of improving. the planhing and 'monitoring of government expendi-
ture and, in particular, directing government spending,, towards the achievement of
stated national goals. This is more than many countries have achieved through more
conventional planning methods.-
 -5-

Early attempts to decentralise planning

Various attempts to decentralise planning were made prior to the major
political and administrative decentralisation which occurred with the establish-
xnent of provincial government in 1976. These will be described briefly in this
section under four main headings:
decentralisation of national plan preparation;

ad hoc plans prepared for selected areas;

planning by provincial authorities;

planning by local government councils.

Decentralisation of national plan preparation

Tkie first national planning document, published in 1968, was prepared almost
entirely at the national level. It was intended that the second five-year plan,
due to coimnence in 1973, would include a much more substantial contribution from
the provinces (then still known as districts) and each province was asked to prepare
a fairly detailed plan which would then be incorporated into the national plan.
Most provinces did this but their efforts were in vain because, as already described,
the preparation of the second plan was abandoned after the Somare Government took
office.
During the subseq.uent period between the abandonment of the second five-year
plan and the formal introduction of the NPEP system in 1978, the scope for local
involvement in national planning was limited because the national planning system
was itself being subjected to major review and change. However, provinces were
encouraged to participate in the debate which led up to the publication of the
National Development Strategy and the NPO did give considerable attention to the
question of how the planning capacity at provincial level could be improved [see
(iii) below]. The introduction of the NPEP system has provided the opportunity
for more formal provincial involvement, since provinces are able to submit requests
for additional funds to the NO in the same way as national departments. This is
discussed in more detail in the next section, in the context of the planning
activities of the new provinciallevel governments, which came into being at about
the same time as the NPEP process.
Ad hoc plans prepared for selected areas

As in most countries, there have been a considerable number of ad hoc planning

exercises in Papua New Guinea. These have involved the preparation of plans for
one or more particular areas, usually because of the existence of special problems
or development potential in the areas concerned. There is some doubt as to
whether these exercises should really be classified as decentralised planning, since
the majority have been undertaken by national government personnel or hired consult-
ants, rather than by people in the local area. However, in most cases there has
been at least some local consultation or involvement.
These plans vary enormously in purpose, method of preparation, scope and format.
Plans for five provinces were produced in 1973/74 as part of a pilot study initiated
by OPAC in an attempt to establish a rural growth centre policy (Conyars, 1976, page
22); while more recently plans have been prepared for several provinces in connection
with the establishment of integrated rural development projects funded by the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Many of these planning efforts have had little
or no direct effect on actual development in the areas concerned and have therefore
really only been academic exercices. The main exceptions are those connected with
integrated rural development projects, where international funding has been tied to
the development plans; however, even in these cases considerable problems have arisen
in attempting to integrate the externally funded projects with normal ongoing activi-
ties conducted by the provincial administrations.
Planning by provincial authorities
A series of attempts to strengthen the administrative and political structure -
and therefore the capacity to plan and implement development programmes - at provin-
cial leve1 were niade prior to the establishment of proviflcial governments.
 -6-

The first serious attempt was in 1964, when: development committees, later renamed
co-.ordinating committees, were established in each province. The committees were
composed of the provincial heads of departments represented in the area and their
main functions were to co-ordinate departmental activities and prepare and maintain
provincial "plans". These "plans" were, however, not plans in the usual sense of
the term; they were merely records of all projects undertaken in the province
(Oon.yers, 1976, pages 10-11).

The achievements of the co-ordinating committees varied considerably from

province to province and over time. On the whole, however, their impact on
co-ordination and planning was very limited. The original "plans" died an early
death and in most provinces they were not replaced by any other systematic planning
efforts. All effective planning continued to be conducted on an individual
departmental basis, usually under tight natioal direction and control, although
some departments did delegate more responsibility to the provincial level than
others.

The limited, achievements of most of the co-ordinating committees can be

attributed mainly to the fact that they were only advisory bodies. Neither the
conmiittees as corporate bodies.nor their chairmen, the provincial (originally
district) commissioners, had any control over departmental staff and their control
over financial resources was very limited. The only money directly controlled by
the committees was a small minor new works fund, which was intended only for small
maintenance-type projects. The committees did. have some control over another fund,
known as the rural improvement programme (RIP), which was allocated for small
development projects carried out by local government councils or other community
level organisations [see (iv) below]; but for most of the period their role was little
more than an advisory one. Furthermore, the minor new works fund and the RIP
together never amounted to more than 2 per cent of total-government expenditure (Conyers,
1976, pages 15-21; Colebatch, 1979); all other capital and recurrent expenditure
was controlled through national government departments.

In 1970 legal provision was made for strengthening the organisational structure
at provincial level through the establishment of political bodies, known as area
authorities. The area authorities were indirectly elected bodies, composed of
representatives of each local government council in the province, and their main
functions were to co-ordinate the activities of the various councils (including the
allocation of RIP funds which had previously been handled by the co-ordinating
committees) and liaise with the co-ordinating committees. However, like the
co-orcu.nating committees, the area authorities were really only advisory bodies,
with very few statutory functions and no effective control over either central
government departments or local councils. Furthermore, for a variety o± reasons,
their establishment was slow and five out of the nineteen provinces never had an
area authority (Conyers, 1976, pages 12-14). In other provinces the area
authorities were eventually abolished when provincial governments were established.

(iv) Planning by local government councils

As already indicated, local government councils were established in most parts

of the country during the l950s and l960s; by 1969 there were 156 councils covering
almost 90 per cent of the population (Oram, 1973, page'2O). There has been consider-
able criticism of the councils' effectiveness as both' l,00al political bodies and
efficient arlmftistrative organisations. It is riot possible to consider these
criticisnE in detail here and perhaps, as one author has argued: "It is more helpful
to. consider what the.00uaicils are rather than what ithey are not, and the fact that.
observel's do riot feel councils have lived u to xpeotations iè not conclusive
evidence of failifre". (Qolebatch, 1979, page 52.

Nevertheless, it is probably fair to say that most councils have undertaken

little or no systematic planning activities, apart from the routine preparation of
an annual budget and the submission of req.uests for RIP funds. The main reasons
for this have probably been the lack of resources - especially capable and experi-
enced administrative staff - in most cou±icils an.0 the fact that most departmental
activities were the responsibility of central governnient departments. Furthermore,
it is also significant that, when the decision to decentralise was finally made,
the various political, administrative arid planning powers were decentralised to a
new tier of provincial level governments, rather than to the existing councils.
The reasons for this will be analysed in more detail later in the study.
 -7

The decentralisat ion programme

The possibility of a major decentralisation programme was conceived by a

parliamentary committee formed in 1972 to plan the country's constitution.
The Constitutional Planning Committee, as it was called, emphasised that:
'1Power must be returned to the people. Decisions should be made by the people to
whomthe issues at stake are meaningful, easily understood and relevant. The
existing system of government should therefore be decentralised, so that the energies
and aspirations of our peopli can play their full part in promoting our country's
development". (Papua New Guinea, 1974, page 1O/) And it recommended that the
best way of doing this was through the establishment of governments at provincial
level.

The Consitutional Planning Committee's recommendations on decentralisation

received a rather mixed reaction. There was a prolonged debate on the advantages
and disadvantages of provincial government and it was eventually decided that the
initial version of the constitution, which came into effect at independence, Bhould
not include any provision for its establishment. However, a year later, in 1976,
the constitution was amended to enable provincial governments to be set up and this
was followed by the introduction of a special constitutional law (known as an
"organic" law) which detailed the powers and functions of the new governments
(Oonyers, 1976). The long debate which preceded the introduction of provincial
government reflected the conflicting objectives behind the concept of decentral-
isation in Papua New Guinea. The main objectives, and those expounded by the
Constitutional Planning Committee, are to increase participation and, by strengthen-
ing and co-ordinating political and administrative structures at provincial level,
to increase the capacity to plan and implement local development programmes.
The advocates of provincial government maintain that it is the best way of:
"Building genuine unity and nationalism based on the recognition of our regional
cultural and ethnic diversities " (Haimett, 1974). However, decentralisation is
also a means of ensuring that individual areas or groups of people are not
dominated by others and receive their fair share of national resources. Although
this objective is seldom stated explicitly, it was one of the factors behind the
moves to obtain provincial government, particularly by the more economically
advantaged provinces, such as Bougainville. An attempted secession by Bougainville
(later renamed North Solomons) in 1975 had a major impact on the provincial
government debate (Conyers, 1976, Chapter 6) and on the powers and functions
eventually decentralised to the provinces.

Papua New Guinea's new system of government is sometimes described as a "quasi-

federal" system. The provincial governments have many powers similar to those of
state governments in a federal system but national legislation can ultimately over-
ride provincial legislation and the creation and suspension of provincial govern-
ments is a national government power. In practical terms, however, the system is
generallr regarded as a more flexible sharing of the powers and responsibilities
of government between the national and provincial levels, and, wherever possible,
problems and disputes are resolved through discussion and compromise, rather than
through formal legal channels.
The nineteen provincial governments are fully elected political bodies with
the power to pass legislation and make other policy decisions regarding a wide range
of activities, including agricultural extension, small-scale industrial and
commercial development, primary and vocational education, rural health services,
community development, provincial roads and other capital assets of provincial
rather than national importance. They are also responsible for local or community-
level government within their provinces.
The decentralisation of political and legal powers has been accompanied by a
major administrative and financial decentralisation. Because of the small size
o± the provinces, it was not considered practical to set up separate provincial
public services, as in a federal system. However, the national public service has
been decentralised through the establishment of a separate public service depart-
ment for each province. A provincial department includes all those public servants
in the province who are engaged wholly or mainly in the execution of provincial
government functions. It is headed by a senior public servant of departmental head
status (known as the administrative secretary) and it is politically responsible to
the executive of the provincial government, not to a minister of the national
government. However, its members are subject to all the normal conditions of the
national public service and can transfer from one province to another just as from
one national department to another. This administrative structure is designed to
meet two objectives: to ensure that public servants are responsive to local
political needs and. to improve administrative co-ordination and management at the
provincial level. Its implications will be discussed in more detail in Part Two
of the study.
Provincial governments have relatively few independent revenue sources,
although significantly more than those previously held by local political bodies.
They are allowed to levy a few local taxes (including a retail sales tax, land
tax and head tax) and the proceeds of certain national government taxes, including
royalty payments made by companies developing natural resources in a province and
a proportion of revenue from export goods produced in the province, are refunded
to provincial governments. However, the national government has retained control
over major forms of taxation, such as income and company taxes.

The most important sources of revenue for most provinces are grants from the
national government. Provincial government legislation provides for provinces to
receive guaranteed unconditional grants for financing provincial activities;
that is, for financing the operation of provincial departments. The value of these
grants is based on the amount of money which was spent on these activities by the
national government prior to the establishment of provincial government. In other
words, provinces are more or less guaranteed sufficient funds to at least maintain
existing levels of government services.
These grants have to be used to fund all activities carried out by provincial
departments and the construction and maintenance of provincial capital assets.
At the time of writing only a few provinces had assumed full financial powers.
All provinces received unconditional grants for capital expenditure but the majority
received conditional grants for financing recurrent departmental expenditure.
These grants were allocated to the provinces following the submission of annual
budgets, in the same way that the recurrent expenditure of national departments is
funded. It has been estimated that the proportion of the total government budget
currently allocated to provinces in the form of conditional or unconditional grants
in this way is between 2Oper cent and 25 per cent (Hincheliffe, 1980; Oonyers, 1981a).
The implications of these financial arrangements will also be discussed in Part Two
of the study, to which we now turn.
 PART TWO

SPECIFIC ISSUES ARISING FROM PAPUA NEW GUINEAtS

EXPERIENCE IN DECENTRAIISED PLAI1NING

 - 10 -

This part of the study examines in some detail specific issues related to the
decentralisation of planning in Papua New Guinea. It draws upon experience prior
to tlie introduction of provincial government, looking in particular at the factoro
which influenced the decision to establio.h provincial governments and their structure
and organisation, and it also cons.Ldors the likely implications of the new syotem of
government. Unfortunately, however, it is not possible to draw many definitive
conclusions about the problems and prospects of the provincial government system at
this stage, partly because it is still only in the formative stages and partly because
there has been no systematic evaluation of its performance to date.

Role of scal1-seale h sical infrastructure development

The most obvious example of a programme designed to decentralise the provision

of small-scale infrastructure in Papua New Guinea is the rural improvement programme
(RIP), which was described briefly in the first part of the study. It is possible
to exrnine the implications of this programme in some depth, due mainly to a
thorough study of its operation and achievements which was undertaken fairly recently
by Colebatch (Colebatch, 1979).
The programme involved the provision of small grants for capital works projects
to local government councils or other community organisations on an annual basis.
It began in 1967/68 (when it was knan as the rural development programme) with an
allocation of K200,000 and the amount of money allocated increased year by year until
1976/77, when it amounted to over K6 million (Colebatch, 1979, page 7).2 By this
time provincial governments were being established and RIP funds were subsequently
included in untied grants given to provinces for capital works projects. Consequently,
the RIP then disappeared as a programme in its own right, although many provinces have
continued the principle of allocating funds for small-scale projects to councils or
other local bodies.
In any attempt to evaluate the programme, it is necessary - as Colebatch points
out - to bear in mind that it was designed to achieve a variety of objectives and to
satisfy several different interest groips. Its success depend, %hrefore, from
what vi,ewpoint it is regarded.
?Iost people would probably agree that, although RIP projects did have some impact
on the quality of life in rural areas - particularly through the provision of basic
infrastructure, such as feeder roads and to a lesser extent school buildings, health
services and water supplies - this impact was not as great as might have been antici-
pated r desired. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the amount of
money allocated to the programme was small in terms of total government expenditure.
In the last few years of its operation it accounted for only about 1.5 per cent of
total government expenditure and less than 20 per cent of expenditure on capital
works (compare Colebatch, 1979, page 1; Conyers, 1976, page 18).

Secondly, the money was often not used as 'efficiently "- in terms of physical
output per Kina - as it might have been if administered differently. A considerable
proportion of' funds was unspent or, more often, used to subsidise the recurrent
expenditure of local councils and thany projects were either not completed or
(particularly in the case of feeder roads) not maintained properly after completion.
These problems can be explained mainly by the fact that most councils did not have
the manpower, funds or equipment to plan and execute the type of projects for which
there appeared to be the greatest need. This in turn was related to the fact that
control over most capital works projects remained at the national level. Consequent-
ly local authorities attempted to use RIP funds for projects which should really
have been executed by the national government's department of' public works but had
not been included in the national works programme. Thirdly, there is some doubt as
to whose perceived needs the programme was actually achieving. In many cases, the
choice of RIP projects appeared to reflect the demands of local political leaders,
the views of administrative officers who were responsible for advising the councils
or the anticipated preferences of officials at the national level by whom all projects
were vetted before funds were allocated. This does not, of course, necessarily mean
that they did not improve the quality of rural life; but it does mean that many
projects did not reflect perceived needs of village people.

The final problem, which is not unrelated, concerns the role of self-help in
the programme It was originally intended that local contributions, in the form of
cash or kind, would play a significant part in the execution of RIP projects; but in
most parts of the country such contributions were seldom forthcoming. The reasons
for this appear to include, on the one hand, the financial shortages suffered by
most councils and, on the other hand, the reluctance of individual village coinmu-
nities to contribute to RIP projects with which they did not really identify and
to work without any form of payment. The problem of identifying with the projects
was due not only to the way in which projects were selected but also io the way in
which the RIP system was operated, including the time gap between the submission o±
project requests to the council and the actual construction of the projects - if
they were approved at all. However, Colebatch points out that in terms of other
objectives the RIP was more successful. For example, the reluctance to contribute
free labour eventually resulted in the employment of paid labour to work on local
projects, thus increasing local employment opportunites and, in consequence, the
availability of cash in the area. Similarly at the council level, RIP funds
provided an additional source of money, which the councils could use either - as
intended - for capital works projects which they would not otherwise be able to
undertake or to subsidise their recurrent budgets. Furthermore, the programme
provided an incentive for trying to improve planning capacity at the council level -
and also at provincial level, where project requests were processed and implementation
monitored.
At the national level, the main achievement of the RIP was probably to demon-
strate that the government was allocating funds for rural development and, perhaps
even more important, that these funds were being channelled through local authorities,
thus helping meet the national objective of decentralisation of government spending.
Colebatch emphasises that, from the national government's point of view, the main
objectives of the RIP were that the government should be seen to be doing something
about rural development and financial decentralisation; consequently, it was much
less concerned about the efficiency with which this was done or its actual achieve-
ments. He concludes that:
"The RIP certainly was not a showpiece of governmental activity but
neither was it the disaster some observers believe. Undoubtedly,
it could have been run to achieve more in terms of the construction
of physical facilities and to waste less without sacrificing any of
the objectives in respect of political relationships. But one must
not lose sight of the question of priorities. This was a time of
dramatic change in the political structure - the lead-up to self-
government and independence and the first few years of the independ-
ent state. ... In this context, the RIP was of relatively minor
importance, particularly since it generated no crises. It had
arisen out of a perceived need to manifest a concern for rural areas,
to make resources available and to do this through local representa-
tive bodies. And, essentially this is what the RIP did."
(Oolebatch, 1979, page 137.)
Finally, the RIP was important as a way of learning some lessons about future
decentralisation of control over the planning and construction of physical infra-
structure projects. Three lessons were perhaps of particular importance.
The first was the need to decentralise more control over such projects, particular-T
ly medium sized projects, if local authorities were to have a significant impact
on. decisions regarding the type and location of new infra-structure in their areas.
The second was the fact that, when deciding how much decentralisation there shoula
be, to what level decentralisation should occur and how planning and implementa-
tion of projects should be organised at this level, it is necessary to weigh up the
two often conflioting objectives of maximising efficiency in terms of physical
output for money and maximising popular participation in the decision-making
process. The third lesson was that, however much decentralisation there is, it
is very difficult to obtain effective participation and commitment by ordinary
people at village level.
-.
The arrangements for financing capital works projects under the new provin-
oial government system represent an attempt to overcome some of the problems
associated with the RIP. Control over a much larger part of the capital works
programme, including both medium and small-scale projects, has been decentralised
in an attempt to obtain a compromise between the objectives of efficiency and
partipation. But this control has been decentralised to the provincial level,
where there is participation through elected members of the provincial govern-
ments and where the capacity to plan and implement projects is considerably higher
than at council level, especially since provincial governments have access to
provincial staff of the public works department. The provincial governments may
in turn, delegate control over smaller projects, particularly those requiring little
outside assistance, to councils or other community organisations. It remains to
be seen what effect these arrangements will actually have on the provision of
infrastructure. Preliminary evidence does suggest that, at least in some provinces,
 - 12 -

it has been. possible to meet local needs particularly for medium-sized projects,
without any loss of efficiency in terms of physical output per unit of capital
expenditure (comare Oonyers, 1975, and Conyers, 1976, dhapter 6). However, in
some provinces initial performance has been less encouraging, often due at least in
part to political problems within provinces (compare Standish, 1979). Further-
more, these conclusions are based on subjective assessment rather than any form of
objective measurement; further experience and more systematic monitoring are
required before any firm judgements can be made, especially with regard to the
construction of smaller projects.

Achieving a self-perpetuating financing system

The financial aspects of decentralised planning can be considered in two parts:
firsttly, decentralisation of revenue-raising powers, and secondly, decentralisation
of control over expenditure. This section examines Papua New Guinea's experience
in both these areas, beginning with the decentralisation of revenue-raising powers.
Prior to the estab1ishment of provincial governments, local revenue-raising
efforts could be divided into two categories. The first category consisted of
revenue raised by the local councils. Councils were empowered to levy and collect
a variety of minor taxes, of which the most important in all but a few areas was a
basic poll tax, and to charge fees for licences issued and services provided.
In most councils, with the exception of those in urban areas, the revenue raised from
these sources was very limited and often insufficient to meet the councils' basic
recurrent expenditure. This probably reflected the limited sources of revenue
available in rural areas and the problems of collection rather more than the lack
of revenue-raising powers. The main source of revenue in most areas was the poll
tax, which was unpopular with the taxpayers and expensive and time-consuming to
collect.

The other form of revenue raising consisted of collecting contributions, in

cash or kind, from local communities for specific projects in the community.
These projects varied from council projects financed through the RIP with the help
of contributions from the local community, to projects initiated and carried out by
local community groups. On the whole, experience with this form of revenue raising
suggests that local contributions are more likely to be forthcoming if projects are
initiated by the community and if the community can see direct and more or less
iimnediate benefits resulting from their contributions (compare Conyers and Simpson,
1978). This helps to explain the reluctance noted in the previous section of people
to contribute to RIP projects which had been initiated at the council level rather
than by the community itself. For the same reason, this form of revenue raising
tended to be more popular than the poll tax, because people saw little or no direct
benefit from the poll tax, most of which was used to meet the councils' administra-
tive overheads. Realising this fact, some councils did begin to experiment with
other methods of revenue raising, including the collection of taxes on a ward basis,
with part of the revenue retained in the ward for local use (Oonyers and Simpson,
1978).

As already indicated, provincial governments have more sources of local rev-

enue than the local government councils, although the national government has
retained control over major sources of revenue. The provincial governments'
local sources of revenue can be divided into two types: revenue levied and
collected by the provinces, such as the retail sales taxi and revenue levied and
colleoted by the national government but refunded to the province frQm which it was
collected, such as royalty payments and grants derived from export revenue.

The impact of the provincial governments' revenue-raising powers has some

important policy implications. On. the one hand, there is little doubt that most
provincial governments have already begun to make use of the new taxing power, by
for example introducing a variety of retail sales taxes, thus indicating that
decentralisation does encourage local authorities to look for additional sources
of revenue. However, the actual benefits of this to the nation as a whole are
rather more dubious.

In the first place, although provinces are making every effort to raise rev-
enue from new taxes, the scope for this is limited in most parts of the country and
many provincial governments, like the councils, may find that the costs of collec-
ting such taxes exceed the benefits obtained therefrom. The most important sources
of revenue raised in most provinces are likely to be those like licence fees and
royalty payments which represent revenue previously accruing to the national
government, not additional revenue to the nation as a whole.
 - 13 -

Secondly, any additional revenue obtained from local scurees rnuot be brtJ.,ancod
against the additional costs to the nation involved in the establishment and
operation of the provincial governments. Although it is difficult. to obtain
accurate data on such costs, it cannot be denied that considerable extra costs have
been incurred, if only in the form of payments to provincial politicians. The
amount o± criticism which it has aroused is perhaps unjistified since, as one recent
observer has pointed out, such expenditure is inevitable if political decentralisa-
tion is to be achieved in this way (Tordoff, 1981). Nevertheless, these costs
have to be weighed up against any additional revenue raised by provincial govern-
ments.

Thirdly, those provinces which are likely to benefit most from the financial
arrangements are those which are already better off in terms of the provision of
cgoyernment services and existing levels o± econQmic development (Hinchliffe, 1980;
Berry and Jackson, 1981). Table 1, for example, compares the revenue received
from such sources with an indicator of provincial development, which takes into
account a variety of factors.

Table 1: Relationship between level o± development and

'ocally raised revenue by province

Province Development indicator1 Locally raised evenue

per capita 1980
(ICina)

Western 31 0.3
Gulf 32 1.3
Central 53 3.9
Nilne Bay 40 1.0
Northern 40 1.4
Southern Highlands 18 0.3
Enga 22 0.5
Wescern Highlands 35 2.9
Simbu 32 1.9
Eastern Highlands 32 2.0
Norobe 40 2.5
Nadang 36 2.1
East Sepik 30 0.7
West Sepik 21 1.0
1anus 50 2.3
New Ireland 78 5.3
East New Britain 84 7.0
weSt New Britain 52 3.7
North Solomons 75 36.1
1
Based on indicators of education, health, land transport, smallholder
income and government staff.
2
Includes taxes, royalty payments and grants derived from export revenue.
Source: Adapted from Berry and Jackson, 1981, table 10.
 - 14 -

The relationship between revenue and level of development must be interpreted iith
some caution, sinoe,"development" is a complex process arid those provinces which are
most ltdeve1oped according to some criteria are less "developed" according to others
(compare Tordoff, 1981). Moreover, the pattern could change significantly in the
future, since some new natural resource developments are likely to occur in what are
at present the "least developed" provinces. Nevertheless, the inforniation in
table 1 does demonstrate the risk associated with decentralisation of revenue-
raising powers.

The decentralisation of control over expenditure raises rather different issues.

Prior to the establishment of provincial governments, control over all recurrent
expenditure and most capital expenditure was in the hands of the central goveri-
ment departments. Provincial departmental representatives submitted annual esti- g
mates of recurrent expenditure and suggestions for capital works projects; but
budgets were prepared at the national level and provincial representatives had to
seek national approval to make even minor changes in allocations. In contrast,
the provincial government system will, when fully established, provide for a far
higher degree of financial decentralisation than exists in most countries except
those with a federal system of government. As already indicated, a fairly signifi-
cant proportion of the national budget will eventually be allocated to provinces
in the form of unconditional grants.

Although it is not possible to draw any firm conclusions about the impact of
the financial decentralisation, since the system is being introduced in gradual
stages, it is possible to make some tentative predictions, based to some extent
on the experience prior to the decentralisation. On the positive side, the
decentralisation is likely to do a great deal to increase the flexibility of plan
preparation and implementation at provincial level. It will be easier to respond
to local needs, especially those which require immediate action, and to transfer
funds between projects or activities during the implementation stage. The lack
of any significant financial d.ecentraiisation prior to the establishment of provin-
cial governments was a major obstacle to effective provincial plannin. Further-
more there .j evidence that, at least in some provinces, the finaneiidcentra1isa-
tion will encourage more efficient lice bf funds, in the sense that local public
servants and policians feel agreater sense of personal responsibility for the
funds (compare Oonyers, 1975).

However, the degree of financial decentralisation which is being introduced

in Papua New Guinea is also likely to create some problems. Firstly, it demands
a fairly high level of trained financial staff at provincial level. One of the
main reasons for the delay in decentralising full financial powers to most provin-
ces is the lack of trained financial staff, which is acknowledged by both provin-
cial and national authorities.

Secondly, although financial decentralisation may encourage a more responsible

attitude to the use of funds, it also provides greater opportunities for the misuse
of funds by either politicians or public servants. This has already occurred in
a few provinces (compare Standish, 1979), resulting in considerable criticism of
the provincial government system. While this is a very real danger, it can to
some extent be controlled by proper national supervision of provincial accounts
and it should also be seen in perspective, in the sense that misuse of funds at
the local level tends to be on a smaller scale and easier to control - by national
supervision or by local political pressure - than misuse at the national level.

Thirdly, the allocation of large untied grants to provincial governments will

make it considerably more difficult to implement national government policies.
As already indicated, the arrangements for financing provincial governments were
introduced under considerable political pressure, particularly from the North
Solomons Province, and the fact that they were introduced at the same time as the
National Planning Office was attempting, through the NPEP system, to tighten
central control over government spending, reflects a basic conflict in Papua Ne
Guinea's national objectives (Hinchliffe, 1980). Some attempts are already being
made to overcome this dilemma, by encouraging provinces to plan their expenditure
in line with the policies of national government departments and requiring them to
submit requests for additional funds through the NPEP. However, the basic problem
will remain and, in countries where financial decentralisation is introduced under
different political conditions, it might be more practical to adopt a system in
which local authorities prepare and execute their own budgets but at least the
major components of these budgets have to be approved at national level.
 - 15 -

In terms of providing the scope and flexibility needed for effective local-level
planning, it appears that th preparation of an integrated inter-departmental
budget at provincial level and decentralisatioi o± control over day-to-day govern-
mont spending are perhaps more important than making major policy decisions.

Sectoral local planning versus over-all decentralisation

Prior to the introduction of provincial government, most decentralisation

was on a seotoral basis, within individual departments. The degree of decentral-
isation varied considerably. In some departments there was already a signifi-
cant decentralisation of powers over both policy and routine administration to the
provincial level. For example, the 1970 Education Act had resulted in the estab-
liehment of provincial education boards, composed of representatives of local
communities and agencies involved in the provision of education, which had con-
siderable power over local education matters (So,ngo, 1978). However, in some
other departments provincial staff had very little effective control over policy
or administrative matters, while in a few areas - such as provincial administration -
there had actually been increasing centralisation of many functions.

Over-all decentralisation at this time was confined to the provincial

co-ordinating committees, which had been established in 1964, and - during the
latter part of the period - the area authorities. As we have already indicated,
the achievements of the co-ordinating committees were in most cases very limited,
mainly because they were really only advisory bodies. They were established as a
means of co-ordinating the planning and implementation of development programmes in
the province and there were various attempts to improve their performance, ranging
from circulars and speeches emphasising the need for co-ordination to the tempo-
rary posting of special planning advisers to a few provinces. However, they had
very few specific planning functions and, even more important, no direct control
over either staff or money, with the exception of the minor new works fund and,
to a lesser extent, the RIP. Similar problems arose in the case of the area
authorities, which were also only advisory bodies and had very little direct control
over manpower or money.

In a few provinces special efforts were made to improve local planning by

provincial co-ordinating committees and area authorities. Some of these efforts
were initiated by local personnel - such as the provincial commissioner in the
Southern Highlands Province during the early l97Os - and others by national govern-
ment agencies, particularly the National Planning Office (Conyers, 1976, Chapter 3)
In some cases there was considerable success but this was generally short-lived,
since it was dependent on the efforts of a few individuals rather than on any
improvement in the plaming process as such. Following an attempt in 1973/74 to
improve planning in IIorobe Province (then Morobe District), I concluded that:

"Any ma:jor improvement is unlikely in the present circumstances.

Two possible occurrences could perhaps encourage more rapid
and radic1 change. If the conservative and radical political
groups in the District could renew their efforts to work to-
gether and if they were supported by a team of enterprising and
conscientious public servants, it is possible that the basic
structural obstacles could be overcome and significant progress
made. Alternatively, a substantial political and administrative
reorganisation throughout the counti'y might provide the necessary
incentive for change. However, ... such a reorgnisation is
unlikely in the near future." (Conyers, 1976, pages 36-37.

As it happened, the "substantial political and administrative reorganisation"

occurred considerably sooner than I then anticipated. The decentraLisation of
powers to provincial governments in 1976 was, as already indicated, followed by
a major administrative reorganisation, involving the establishment in each province
of a provincial department headed by a public servant (the administrative secretary)
with almost all the powers of a normal departmental head and responsible directly
to the provincial government. In other words, planning is now the responsibility
of an integrated political and administrative organisation at provincial level.
Moreover, in some provinces, this structure is now being reproduced on a smaller
scale at the district level, where the co-ordinating officer is known as the
district (Ballard, 1980; Scott, 1980.)
 -. 16

The introduction of the administrative decentralisation was by o ieans

easy. The administrative arrangements aesociated with the establishment of
provincial government had. been a subject of discussion for many years, with major
opposition to any significant decentralisation coming from many national govern-
ment departments. Agreement was not reached until well after the introduction of
the provincial government legislation and then only on the advice of a team from
an international finn of management consultants (McKinsey and Company), who were
employed at considerable expense in a last minute attempt to reach some solution.

Unfortunately, it is too early to draw any firm conclusions about the

effect of the new political and administrative structure on planning at provincial
level. Preliminary observations (Ballard, 1980; Bonney, 1981; Tordoff, 1981)
suggest that, even with a major administrative reorganisation of this nature, it
is not easy to break the traditional ties between departmental headquarters and
their staff in the field and to build an effective planning team at provincial
level. Furthermore, in many provinces progress has been hampered by the considera-
ble confusion and loss of morale which inevitably accompanies such a reorganisation
and by the lack of effective staff at provincial and district level, particularly
in the vital co-ordinating positions of administrative secretary and district
manager. In some provinces problems have also arisen because of confusion between
the roles of politicians and sivil servants and, in some cases, the abuse of politi-
cal power (Standish, 1979).

However, the evidence does also suggest that the: new system provides a
better basis for effective planning at provincial level and that some provinces are
already beginning to take advantage of this. In particular, the new structure
encourages more integrated planning and provides much greater flexibility in terms
of the use of local resources than could ever have been achieved if d.ecen.tralisation
had been introduced only on. a sectoral basis.

Local autonomy and relations between lower

and higher planning and political levels

The degree of autonomy enjoyed by local political and. planning bodies in

any country depends to a great extent on the political situation in that country,
and. in particular on the degree to which the national government wishei - or is able -
to exert its control over such bodies. In Papua New Guinea it has been accepted that,
at least .fer the time bei, provincial political bodies should have a far greater
degree of autonomy than is Aormally found in Third World nations, with the excep-
tion of those with a federal system of government. The history of the establish-
ment o± provincial government suggests that, although there was - and still is -
considerable opposition to such a high degree of decentralisation, their establish-
ment does reflect, at least in part, a genuine desire for decentralisatjon on the
part 0±' the national government - not merely a desperate response to political
pressure from provinces such as the North Solomons.

However, even in a country like Papua New Guinea which has opted for a
high degree of local autonomy, some form of national control over local political g.
and planning bodies is still required and. the way in which this control is exerted
can determine the success or failure of the decentralisation programme. In fact,
in many ways the more decentralisation there is, the more important relations
between different levels in the political hierarchy become.

Papua New Guinea's experience in this respect has been mixed. There has
at times been a tendency for both national and. local leaders to regard decentral-
isation as a question of "all or nothing", instead of trying to achieve a division
of responsibilities which will ensure that basic national policies are implemented
while at the same time enabling local political bodies to be responsive to local
needs and to plan and implement local policies and programmes as efficiently as
possible. Thus, for example, the Organic Law on Provincial Government,which was
enacted in 1976, gives provinces very considerable powers in relation to legislation
and control over finance, to the extent that the national government has lost direct
control over fairly large areas of policy making and, in particular, government
expenditure. However, the Organic Law is very vague about the decentralisation of
control over more mundane matters - such as control over provincial public servants
and determination of policies and programmes which are not likely to be enshrined
in provincial legislation - which have a much less direct impact on national policy
but are nevertheless essential for the effective planning and implementation of local
development programmes.
 - 17 -

This situation reflects the fact that the Organic liaw was formulated. under
considerable political pressure and at a time when many significant iscues -
particularly the question of administrative decentralisation - had, still to be
resolved. Since 1976 it has been necessary to make a number of modifications
to the system in order to reach a more reasonable division of reoponsibility
between the national and. provincial levels of government. These modifications
may be divided into four main groups.
Firstly, it was necessary to resolve the question of the degree and form of
administrative decentralisation. The major administrative reorganisation,
involving the creation of provincial departments, which was eventually introduced,
gave the provincial governments the "teeth" they needed to utilise their legal
powers; without some such reorganisation the decentralisation programme could have
become a mockery.
Secondly, it was decided. to move very slowly on the decentralisation of full
financial powers to provincial governments. The national government was concerned
to retain some control over government spending in the provinces as long as possible
and to avoid the risk of financial abuse at provincial level; while the majority
of provinces were reluctant to take on too much responsibility too soon. Further-
more, most provinces found that the interim financial arrangements, whereby
provinces prepared their own budgets for approval at the national level and con-
trolled. day-to-day expenditure, much like national government departments, gave
them much of the flexibility which they needed to plan and implement local develop-
ment programmes. As already indicated, this suggests that it is perhaps not
necessary for local political bodies to have complete financial autonomy in order
to have a major impact on planning at this level.
Thirdly, considerable effort is being made to define national government
policies more clearly, in order to provide a national policy framework within
which provincial governments may plan their own development programmes. This is
being done by individual departments at the national level, under the supervision
of the National Planning Office. Particular emphasis has been placed on sectors
such as education, health and communications, where some sort of national policy
framework is particularly important. In some cases this has resulted in conflicts
between national and provincial governments. For instance, in the case of
education, provincial government legislation allows provinces some flexibility in
adapting national curriculum to meet local needs and some provinces with signifi-
cantly different views on curriculum to those of the national government have
attempted to use this flexibility to introduce much greater changes than were
intended by the Ministry of Education.
Finally, the importance of monitoring and co-ordinating the activities of the
nineteen provincial governmem.ts at the national level has gradually been recognis-
ed. The efforts which are being made to provide such co-ordination through the
Ministry of Decentralisation are described in the last section of this part of the
report, which deals specifically with monitoring and evaluation. At this point it
is necessary only to emphasise the importance of co-ordinating the activities of
the various local political and planning bodie's, particularly when - 'asn Papua New
Guinea - these bodies have a high degree of local autonomy.

Degree of local popular control over the bureaucracy

Control over staff is one of the most important issues in any decentralisation
programme, since staff and. finance are together the most fundamental requirements
for the implementation of local development programmes. However, it is not merely
a question of decentralising as much control as possible.
In the first place, it is necessary to distinguish between a number of' differ-
ent aspects of staffing over which control may or may not be d.ecentraiised.
These include the power tQ deterin conditions of service, the payment of salaries,
the determination of the number of staff and. their location, the a.ppointment and
promotion of staff, the determination of the activities in which staff are engaged,
the provision of professional advice and training and staff discipline. It is more
important to decentralise control over some of these matters than others if the
objective is to improve the planning and implementation of local development
programmes.
Secondly, too much decentralisation of control over staff can be almost as
damaging as too little. Too much decentralisation, under certain conditions,
 - 18 -

result in inequalities in the distribution and conditions of service of staff -

generally favouring the more advantaged parts of the country, inadequate training
and supervision, undue political influence especially in matters related to
recruitment and promotion, and - mainly as a result of the other effects low
staff morale. Some of these problems are particularly likely to arise when
control is decentralised to semi-autonomous political bodies at the local level,
rather than to local representatives of the national government.

Before the introduction of provincial government in Papua New Guinea, most of

the government staff employed in the provinces were members of the national public
service. Control over most staffing matters was centralised either in the head-
quarters of the national functional departments to which all provincial staff were
attached or in the national public service commission. The latter controlled most
matters related to conditions of service, staff numbers within each department,
appointment and promotion and all cerious diociplinary cases. Individual depart-
mental headquarters controlled the transfer of staff within their departments,
determined the major activities in which they were engaged and provided professional
advice and training, and had some say in appointment, promotion and disciplinary
matters. This left little authority in the hands of staff at provincial level
(or below), except in relation to the location of staff within the province, the
day-to-day supervision of their activities and minor disciplinary matters.
Furthermore, as indicated earlier, the very limited powers over staff which were
decentralised to the provincial level were almost all vested in individual
departments, rather than in any co-ordinating body or individual, such as the
area authorities, provincial co-ordinating committees or provincial commissioners.
The only exceptions were a few disciplinary powers, which the heads of some depart-
ments - especially the smaller ones - delegated to the provincial commissioners.

In addition to the national public servants, there was also a separate cadre
of local government staff. These staff were employed direcily by the local
government councils but were members of a nationwide local government service.
The local government service commission, consisting of national and local govern-
inent representatives, determined the conditions of service of local government
employees and provided some assistance in the form of recruitment and training to
those councils which req.iiired it. However, individual councils were directly
responsible for the recruitment and promotion, payment, direction and discipline
of their staff.

The main problem associated with the employment of local government staff was
that most councils were so small and their financial resources so inadequate that
they did not provide attractive working conditions. Salaries were generally
lower than for equivalent posts in the public service and, since most rural councils
employed only one or two professional staff, promotion rospects were very limited
and the work environment was seldom professionally stimulating. In some councils
excessive political influence over staff also created problems. As a result the
Quality of staff in most councils was poor, staff morale was low and there was a
very high wastage rate within the local government service.4

The administrative decentralisation which accompanied the introduction of

provincial government was an attempt to achieve a compromise which would avoid the
worst of the problems previously encountered in both the national public service
and. the local government service. Considerable deoentralisation of the national
public service was required in order to enable provincial governments to operate
effectively but there was a general reluctance to go to the extreme of allowing
each province to employ its own staff, as would normally be the case in a full
federal system. The result was the creation of provincial departments, staffed
by national public servants but responsible to the provincial governments through
the administrative secretary. Provincial departments function in much the same
way as national departments. The Public Services Commission determines conditions
of service, numbers of staff within each province, most aspects of appointment and
promotion and serious disciplinary oases. And the administrative secretary, as
departmental head, controls movement of staff within the province, is responsible
for the direction, co-ordination and supervision of the activities of all staff and
has considerable say in appointment, promotion and disciplinary matters.

There are, however, two important features of provincial departments which

distinguish them from national departments and make the Papua New Guinea system
somewhat unusual. Firstly, staff in the provincial departments still receive
professional or technical advice, support and training from their former depart-
mental headquarters. or example, agricultural extension staff, although forma1y
 - 19 -

members of provincial departments, still refer to the headq.uarters of the Depart-

ment of Primary Industry (which has national responsibility for aricuitural matters)
for advice and assistance on professional matters, for supplies ci agricuiturJ.
inputs and equipment, and for training. Secondly, provincial departments -
through their administrative secretaries - are subject to the policy directives of
semi-autonomous provincial governments, instead of to ministers of the national
government. It remains to be seen whether this fairly radical administrative
restructuring will achieve its aims in terms of providing the degree of flexibility
required by provinces while at the same time retaining some national control over
staffing matters. There have, almost inevitably with such a reorganisation, been
some teething problems. It was not easy to work out the division of responsibili-
ties between the various individuals and organisations at national and provincial
level and there has been considerable confusion among both politicians and public
servants. For example, some national departments have been very reluctant to
reduce control over their (former) provincial staff, while others have tended to
go to the other extreme and cut off all support and assistance. Similarly, in
some provinces politicians have abused their new powers by interfering in technical
or public service matters, while in others the politicians have so far provided
little or no political direction at all. The situation has been further complicated
by the fact that the Organic Law on Provincial Government provides for each provin-
cial government to employ a maximum of six staff of its own choosing, outside the
public service structure, as a form of policy secretari. This provision, which
was made prior to the decision to decentralise the national public service, was
introduced to satisfy demands from a few provinces, who felt that they could not
rely entirely on the national public service for policy advice and support.
In some provinces this has resulted in confusion, and in some cases conflict, between
public servants and members of the policy secreta'iat.

Because of all these factors, the introduction of provincial government has

not been easy for many public servants, especially in some provinces. This has
sometimes resulted in a loss of morale, requests for transfers (often to the public
servant's home province, where he feels more secure) and low productivity.
In practice, a great deal has depended on the character and capability of individual
public servants, the more able and self-confident generally adapting more easily than
others. The need for confident and competent staff in senior positions, particularly
that of administrative secretary, has been especially apparent.
However, in spite of these problems, there are already some signs that the
new administrative structure may, in the long run, achieve its objectives. Some
provinces, particularly those with competent staff and good relations between
politicians, members of the policy secretariat and public servants, have begun
to use the new structure to their advantage. This is reflected in voluntary
movements of some senior public servants from national to provincial level, efforts
to improve the internal administrative organisation and establish systematic planning
within provinces, and the introduction of new development policies and programmes at
provincial level. Furthermore, at both national and provincial level efforts are
being made to overcome the more serious initial problems. For example, several
provinces have - with the support of the Public Services Commission - decided to
abolish the policy secretariats. Similarly, sone national departments have made a
major effort to help their former field staff during the transition stage and the
Department of Decentralisation, supported by some other departments, has emphasised
the need for the reorientation and training of both politicians and public servants
in the provinces.

In concluding this section it should be noted that so far very few changes
have been made to the local government service. However, this is likely to be only
an interim situation. The responsibility for local government now rests with
provincial governments and, as will be seen in the next section, a few provinces
have already introduced significant changes, including in some cases the incorpo-
ration of local government staff into the national public service. In other
provinces the lack of any major change.to date probably reflects the complexity
of the task of designing and introducing any alternative system and pressure of
other matters more than satisfaction with the existing system. A major review of
the whole local government system, including staffing matters, i currently being
undertaken by the Department of Decentralisation.

Administrative level to which some local autonomy is granted

It should be apparent from the previous discussion that Papua New Guinea has
chosen one particular level in the political and administrative hierarchy - the
province - on which to concentrate its decentralisation efforts. However, this does
 - 20 -.

not mean that this decision was made without considering any alternative or that,
having made such a choice, oter levels can now be pompletely ignored.

TIi onutItutionai Planning Committee, which played a very important role in

the initial planning of the d.ecentralisation programme, devoted considerable
attention to the choice of an appropriate level to which powers should be decentral-
isd (Papua New Guinea, 1974, Chapter 4). In addition to the provincial (then known
as district) level, the Committee considered the possibility of deoentralising to
the existing local government councils or to a smaller number of regional govern-
ments. The council level was rejected partlybecause it was considered too small
to be financially or administratively viable and partly because in some parts of
the country councils had a reputation for being both inefficient and. uirepresenta-
tive.
o

The possibility of establishing four or five regional governments, correspond-

ing to major physical and cultural divisions - such as the area formerly known as
Papua, the highland interior of the mainland and the islands - received more
serious consideration and is still advocated by some Papuan and highland politicians
(compare Aoae, 1978; Oknk, 1978). However, it was rejected by the Committee for
three reasons. Firstly, the regions were not established administrative units,
although they were used for some administrative purposes; consequently, it would
be necessary to establish a new tier of administration at this level and that could
prove to be a very costly exercise. Secondly, it was felt that the regional
governments would be too remote from people at village level. And thirdly, there
was a fear that some regions could seize this as an opportunity to try to secede
from the rest of the country.

Thus the province was eventually chosen because: "It was the main administra-
tive level, it was an area with which people were familiar and could easily identify
themselves; it was large enough to be able to exert some influence but no so large
that it would be able to threaten the central government." (Conyers, 1976, page 42.)

From the planning point of view the province probably also provides the best
basis for the decentralisation of planning powers. Planners are sometimes tempted
to identify special regions for planning purposes, instead of using existing
political or administrative areas. The particular characteristics of these regions
may make -them suitable for the preparation 0±' plans but such a choice frequently
results in additional costs and in lack of co-ordination or duplication between
the new planning structure and the existing administrative structure, particularly
during the implementation of plans. This could have occurred in Papua New Guinea
if the regions had been chosen as the basic units for the decentraisation of
planning powers.

However, the decentralisation of powers should not stop at the provincial

level. Although provincial governments are considerably nearer to the ordinary
villager than either regional or national governments, there is still a major
geographical, political and social gap between the provincial level and the village
level. In other words, although provincial government does bring government
closer to the people, both in the sense that it is easier for them to visit the seat
o± government and in the sense that it increases the number of people directly
involved in the process o± decision-making, it does not guarantee direct popular
participation in planning.

The Constitutional Planning Committee recognised this fact, emphasising that:

"Effective government at both national and district (=provincial) levels requires
that there be strong links with the villages. The government and development of
our country depend upon the village people. We attach the very greatest importance
to government at the village level." (Papua New Guinea, 1974, page 10/3.)

And more recently, both the national government - especially the Ministry of
Decentralisation - and some provincial governments have also accepted the need to
develop channels of communication between provincial and village level.

Some progress in this direction has been made. A few provinces have already
taken steps to reorganise the local government system, generally replacing the
former councils with smaller village or community level governments (Conyers and
Simpson, 1978; Tordof±', 1981). Others have chosen, at least for the time being,
to try to improve the existing local government system or to concentrate on
developing the political and administrative structure at district level.
 however, the task is not easy, since there is no simp'e way of achieving
e.r.t'eetivc popular participation in planning. Moreover, some provinces have So
far :woided. the issue altogether, concentrating only on building up he political
and, administrative structure at provincial level. This has led some observers to
predict that provincial government will result only in the establishment of
expensive political and. bureaucractic elites at this level, ignoring the needs of
the mass of people in the villages (compare Premdas, 1978; Standish, 1979).
In an attempt to emphasise the importance of decentralisation below the provincial
level and to provide some guidelines for provincial governmeits, the national
government is, as already mentioned, currently engaged. in a major review of local
level government. The results of this exeThise remain to be seen.

Monitoring and evaluation

S

Papua New Guinea's approach to planning emphasises the fact that planning
should be regarded not as an end in itself but as a means of providing more
effective development programmes. Consequently, considerable attention is
devoted to improving the relationship between planning and implementation and to
the iionitoring or evaluation of plan performance.

At the national level a monitoring system has been built into the national
public expenditure planning process. The implementation of all NPEP projects
is monitored on a quarterly and annual basis in conjunction with the normal
process of budgetary review and. the whole of the foui'-year NPEP programme is
reviewed every year as part of the "rolling-on" process.
The need for some sort of built-in monitoring system at the sub-national level
is also recognised but so far less progress has been made in actually establishing
such a system. Prior to the decentralisation programme considerable effort was
put into the monitoring of rural improvement projects at both provincial and
council level. In some provinces this was combined with the establishment of a
provincial "operations room", which was intended to serve as both a data store and
and means of monitoring development programmes. The concept of an operations
room, which was modelled on the well-known Malaysian "red book" system, was
encouraged by the National Planning Office in the early l970s (Conyers, 1974).
Neither effort met with a great deal of success in most parts of the country,
although there were some exceptions, due mainly to the efforts of particular
individuals. The main problem appeared to be the amount of 'time and. effort required
to establish and maintain an adequate monitoring system when there were many other
pressing tasks to be done.

Since the establishment of provincial governments, the need to monitor

provincial activities has greatly increased because a much wider range of
development programmes is now being planned and implemented at this level.
The national government monitors provincial i'PEP projects and those provinces
which still receive conditional grants for recurrent expenditure are subject
to the same process 0±' quarterly and annual budgetary review as national government
departments. However, when all provinces receive unconditional grants the national
government will not be able to conduct any form of budgetary review, unless asked
to do so by the provincial government. This could have fairly serious implica-
tions for 'both national and provincial governments.

The national government is now aware of this danger and it is encouraging

and assisting provinces to establish their own monitoring systems, as part of a
system of provincial planning and management based on a simplified version o±
the NPEP system. The problem will be to develop a monitoring system which
provides the information needed without a great deal of time and effort, so that it is
coniidered. both practicable and worthwhile by provincial authorities. Moreover, it
wil]. also be necessary to ensure that this information is communicated to the national
level, so that it can be used for monitoring activities in all provinces.

A number of national government agencies are involved in the co-ordination and

monitoring of provincial government activities. The most important of these are
the National Planning Office and the Department of finance, which are responsible
for monitoring financial and planning matters, the Public Services Commission, which
controls staffing matters, and the Department of Decêntralisatiofl, which has over-all
responsibility for the co-ordination of provincial affairs. The importance o±
having an over-all co-ordinating agency at the national level has emerged gradually.
Although a minister was made responsible for "provincial affairs", in January 1976,
very little effort to provide effective co-ordination was made until the introduction
of the administrative decentralisation programme at the end of 1977. At that time
 - 22' -

a special office was established within the ministry, which became known as the
Ninistry of Decentralisation, to implement the decentralisation programme and
co-ordinate the activities of' the various national government deptrtments involved
(Oonyers, 1979). The office was originally envisaged as a temporary body, which
would disappear when the decentralisation was completed. However, as this time
approached it became apparent that there was a need for a permanent body to monitor
and co-ordinate the activities of the various provincial governments, to co-ordinate
relations between national departments and provincial governments and. to provide
general advisory and support services for the provinces. Conseq.uently, the office
has now become a fully-fledged department with full-time responsibility for
provincial government matters.

In addition to the monitoring of provincial government activities, there is also

a need to monitor the operation of the whole decentralisation programme. The intro-
duction of provincial government has involved major changes in the whole system of
government and it is important, both for Papua New Guinea and for other countries that
may adopt somewhat similar decentralisation programmes, that there is some systematic
monitoring of its impact and an attempt to evaluate the extent to which it achieves
its original objectives. At present there is nnfortunately no such monitoring or
evaluation process.
PART THREE

OONCLUSIONS
 - 24 -

Although it is still too early to make many judgements about the effectiveness
of Papua New Guinea's new system of decentralised government, it is possible to
draw some important conclusions about decentralised planning from Papua New Guinea's
experience both before and after the introduction of the decentralisation programme.
These conclusions are summarised briefly in this part of the study.

First, Papua New Guinea's experience suggests that one cannot decentralise
responsiility for planning without also decentralising some degree of political
and administrative control. If political and administrative powers are highly
entr.lfsed, any attmpt to deàentralise planning is likely to be little more than
an "academic" exercise, since the people who make the plans do not have the power to
either approve or implement them. This was one of the factors - although by no means
the only one - which led to the recent decentralisation programme in Papua New Guinea.

Second, when deciding what sort of powers to decentralise and to what level
they should be decentralised, the basic principle should be to maintain national
control over those things which are considered essential for national development
and the maintenance of national unity and to decentralise to lower levels control
over those things which are most important for the planning and implementation of
development programmes at those levels. In the planning of Papua New Guinea's
decentralisation programme there was pressure to decentralise too much control over
important national policy matters, such as the distribution of resources between
provinces, while at the same time there was a reluctance to decentralise control
over such things as day-to-day control of staff and finance, which are not of
national importance but can make a great deal of difference to the effectiveness of
planning and implementation at the local level. The question of what is and what is
not of national importance will, of course, vary very much from one country to
another; however, this merely means that there will be more decentralisation in
some cases than in others, not that the basic principle does not apply.
Thir, when determining the degree of decentralisation, it is particularly
imporc tb weigh up the advantages of decentralisaticn against the importance of
minimising regional inequalities, since these two objectives may conflict with
each other. This is particularly important when considering the financial aspects
of any decentralisation programme. Thus in Papua New Guinea it will be difficult
to reduce the existing regional inequalities because the financial arrangements of
the provincial government system tend to favour the more affluent provinces.

Fourth, the establishment of provincial governments in Papua Nw Guinea is a

reminder that decentralisation to some sort of intermediate level in the administra-
tive hierarchy - in this case the province - does not guarantee any significant
increase in the direct participation of people at village level in the planning
process. In Papua New Guinea provincial government has brought decision-making
much nearer to the people but there will have to be considerable effort to improve
communication between the provincial and village levels if it is to increase direct
popular participation. This is particularly important in view of the fact that
many decentralisation programmes, including that in Papua New Guinea, are justified
primarily in terms of their supposed impact on such participation.
Fifth, Papua New Guineats experience suggests that an effective decentralisa-
tion programme has to involve a major reorganisation of the public service structure,
which breaks down the traditional hierarchical StrutUre of gQverrimellt ntinisties Q.r
departments and. emphasises the co-ordination of activities on an area basis. It is
interesting to note that the establishment of provincial departments in Papua New
Guinea resembles similar moves in other countries, such as Tanzania and Zambia,
where decentralisation. is occurring within a very different political framework
(compare aonyers, 198Th).
Sixth, the decentralisation of planning has major implications for staff
development and training, since local staff have to shoulder much greater, and
significantly different, responsibilities. The lack of capable staff at provincial
and district level in Papua New Guinea, especially to fill the key co-ordinating
roles of administrative secretary and district manager, is proving to be a serious
handicap during the early stages of provincial governrient. This does not mean that
inadequate staff capacity should - as is sometimes the case - be used as an excuse
for not decentralising; but it does mean that any decentralisation programme must
be accompanied by staff development and training efforts and, if necessary, the
movement of some senior staff from national to local level.
 - 25-

Finally, effective national co-ordination and direction is necessary in any

system of decentralised. planning. In Papua New Guinea some national departments
adopted the view that decentralisation meant the severing of all linkc betwecn
national and provincial levels. On the contrary, decentralisation means that
national government agencies hive a very important responsibility to issue policy
guidelines to the provinces and to co-ordinate and monitor their activities.
Moreover, the Papua New Guinea experience also demonstrates the need for a strong
co-ordinating agency at the national level - in this case, the Ministry of
Decentralisation - to oversee all aspects of national-provincial relations.

We may therefore conclude that, although it is too early to draw any definitive
conclusions about the impact of Papua New Guinea's decentralisation programme,
it is likely to have both positive and negative effects on the country's planning
sytem. On the negative side, it appears likely to cause some planning problems,
particularly in terms of the relationship between national and provincial planning
and the distribution of resources between provinces. However, on the positive
side,' it does seem that the new system will provide a better basis for integrated
planning at the local level and, although it does not guarantee direct popular
participation, it does bring the decision making process nearer to the people.
Moreover, whatever its impact, Papua New Guinea's provincial government system
does represent an attempt to introduce a significantly new approach to planning
which could have important implications for decentralised planning in other parts
of the world.

FOOTNOTES

1
Papua 1ew Guinea's experience with the NPEP system is described. in detail
in a forthcoming book by W. Allen and K. Hinchliffe. (Allen and Hinchliffe, 1982.)

2
The unit o currency in Papua New Guinea is the Kina (K), which is divided
into one hundred Toea (t). In March I9J Ki was equivalent to USl.5.

It is not entirely coincidental that a somewhat similar administrative

decantralisation was introduced in Tanzania in 1972 on the advice of McK.insey and
Company. However, there was in fact very little communication between the two
McKinsey projects or between the governments of the two countries.

This information is based on surveys of the conditions of service of

local government staff conducted by the author when in charge of local government
training at the Papua New Guinea Institute of Administration in l976/77
 -26 -

REFERENCES

Allen, W.amd K. HinchlisfXe,1982. Plannin Polic Anal sic and Public Ex.enditure:
Theory and the Papua New Guinea Experience Farnborough, Hants., Saxon House

Aoae, J,S.,1978. "Decentralisation: Papua Besena view" in Premdas, R. and S.

Pokawin (eds.), Decentralisation (Port Moresby, University of Papua New Guinea,
Waigani Seminar papers).

Ballard, J.A,,, 1973. "The relevance of Australian aid: some lessons from Papua
New Guinea", 45th Congress.of the Australian and New Zealand Association for the
Advancement of Science, Perth.

Ballard, J.A., 1980. "Indicators of administrative performance in the Southern a

Highlands Province", Administration for Development (Journal of the Papua New
Guinea Institute of Administration), ]o. 14 (January 1980), pages 46-55.

Berry, R. and R. Jackson, 1981. "Inter-provincial inequalities and decentralisation

in Papua New Guinea", Third World Planning Review, Vol. 3, pages 57-76.

Bonney, N., 1981. Provincial Government in Papua New Guinea (Port Moresby,
Institute of National Affairs).

Oolebatch, H., 1979. Policy1 Process and Outcome in Government: a Study of the
Rural Improvement Programme (Por Moresby, Papua New Guinea Institute of Applied
Social and Economic Research, Monograph 10).

Conyers, D., 1974. "The district planning process - the Morobe experience",
Seminar on Growth Centres in Pa ua New Guinea, Canberra.

Conyers, D., 1975. Planning for District Development in Papua New Guinea
(Port Moresby, New Guinea Research Unit, Discussion Paper No. 3).

Oonyers, D., 1976. The Provincial Government Debate (Port Moresby, Papua New
Guinea Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research, Monograph 2).

Conyer'e D., 1979. "The Office of Implementation: a cace sthdy of adminiutration

for development", Administration for Development (Journal of the Papua New Guinea
Institute of Administration), No. 13 (July 1979), pages 29-43.

Oonyers, B., l9Sla. "Papua New Guinea: decentralisation and development from
the middle" in Stohr, W.B. and D.R.F. Taylor (eds.), Development from Above or
Below? Radical Approaches to Spatial Planning in Developing Countries (London,
'lley), pages 209-229

Conyers, D., l98lb. "Decentralisation for regional development: a comparative

study of Tanzania, Zambia and Papua New Guinea", Public Administration and
Development, Vol. 1.
Conyers, D. and D. Simpson (eds.), The Future of Local Government in Papua New
Guinea special issue of Yagl-Ambu (Papua New Guinea Journal of the Social Sciences
and Humanities), vol. 5, No. 1.

Faber, M. and D. Seers, (eds.), 1972. The Crisis i4i Planning (London, Chatto
and Windus).

Hannett, L., 1974. Post-Courier, 5 December 1974, Arawa House Supplement, page 2.

Hinehliffe, K., 1980. "Conflicts between national aims in Papua New Guinea:
the case of decentralisation and equality", Economi'c Development and Cultural
Change, Vol. 28, pages 819-838.

Okuk, I., 1978. "Decentralisation: a eLtique and an alternative" in Promdas,

R. and S. Pokawin (eds.), Decentralisation (Port Moresby, University of Papua
New Guinea, Waigani Seminar papers), pages 21-25.

Orain, N., 1973. "Administration, development and public order" in Clunies-Ross,

A. and J. Langinore (eds.), Alternative Strategies for Papua New Guinea (Melbourne,
Oxford University Press), pages 1-58.
Papua and. New Guinea,1968. Pro.ranmies and Policies for the Economic Develo.ruent
of Papua and New Guinea (Port Tores.y, overnmen 'rin er

fapua New Guinea, 1972. The Eight Point Improvement Plan (official policy state-
nient reproduced in many forms; lafr usually referred to simply as the jht Aims).
.Papua Now Guinea, 1974. Report o the Constitutional P1annin Committee (Port
Moresby, Govermnent Printer).

Papua New Guinea, 1976. Papua New Guinea's National Development Strategy
(Port IVloresby, Goverument printer).

Premdas, R., 1978. a compendium of problems and opportunities"

in Premdas, R. and S. Pokawin (eds.), Decentralisation (Port Noresby, University
of Papua New Guinea, Waigani Seminar papers), pages 259-273.

Scott, E.N., 1980. "District administration and the district manager",

Administration for Development (Journal of the Papua New Guinea Institute of
Administration ), No. 14 (January 1980), pages 29-45.
Songo, B., 1978. "Power to the provinces? Education's past and present attempts
at decentralisation", in Premdas, R. and S. Pokawin (eds.), Decentralisation
(Port Moresby, University of Papua New Guinea, Waigani Seminar papers), pages
275-278.
Standish, W., 1979. Provincial Government in Papua New Guinea: Early Lessons
from Chimbu (Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea Institute of Applied Social and.
Economic Research, Monograph 7).
Tordoff, W., 1981. Decentralisation in Papua New Guinea (preliminary draft of
paper published by the University of Manchester in a series entitled Manchester
Papers in Development).

Tordoff, W. and R.L. Watts, 1974. Report on Central-Provincial Government

Relations (Port Noresby).
 WORLD EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMME

Working Papers
I

THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMME

WEP Research Working Papers are preliminary documents circulated infor-

mally in a limited number of copies solely to stimulate discussion and
critical comment. They are restricted and. should not be cited. without
permission. A set of selected WEP Research Working Papers, complete
by annual supplements is available in microfiche form for sale to th
public; orders should be sent to the ILO Publications, International
Labour Office, CH-1211 GENEVA-22 Switzerland. This list includes many,
but not all, papers which exist or may be issued im microfiche form.

WP 1 "Part des Salaires dans le Revenu National et Développement

Economique" (March 1974)
Jacques Lecaillon and Dimitrios Germidis

WP 2 "Les Disparités de Revenus entre Salaries et Travailleurs

Indépendants dans les Secteurs Non-Agricoles au Sénégal,
Cameroun, Madagascar et C6te-d'Ivoire (March 1974)
Jacques Lacai].lon and Dimitrios Gerinidis

WP 3 "Redistribution of Income, Patterns of Consumption and

Employment - A Case Study for the Philippines" (May 1974)
Felix Paukert, Jiri Skoika and. Jef Maton

WP 4 "Les Disparités de Revenus entre Travailleurs Ruraux et

Salaries Urbains dana is Dynamique de Développement"
(July 1974) .... Jacques Lecaillon and Dimitrios Germidis
WP 5 "Mexican Income Distribution within and between Rural and
'Urban Areas" (July 1974)
Wouter van Ginneken
WP 6 "The Pattern of Income Distribution in West Malaysia
1957-1970" (July 1974)
Lim Lin Lean
WP 7 "A Methodology for Estimating Statewise Size Distributions
of Income in Rural India" (September 1974)
Michael Farbman
WP 8 "Income Distribution in the Philippines : the Employed and
the Self-Employed (October 1974)
José Enoarnaoi6n, Jr
WP 9 "Changes in the Size Distribution of Income in Postwar
Japan (October 1974)
Richard Wada
WP 10 "Lea Disparités de Salaires au Sénégal, Cameroun,
Madagascar et C6te d'Ivoire (Octobre 1974)
Jacques Lecaillon and Dimitrios Germidis

WP II "Développement Economique et Politique des Revenus"

(November 1974)
Jacques Lecaillon and Dimitrios Germidis
VP 12 "The Rich, the Poor and the Taxes they pay in India : A
Study of Central Government Taxes and. their Impact on
Income Distribution" (December 1974)
Anand P. Gupta
WP 13 "Seotoral Employment and Income Distribution in Rural
India" (February 1975)
Michael Farbman
WP 14 "The Regional amd Rural-Urban Income Distribution in
the Sudan". (March 1975)
Wouter van Ginnekexi
VP 15 "Income Distribution and Em1oymerit Cbaracteristios :
Hong-Kong 1971" (March 1975)
Ronald Hsoa and. L.C. Chau
VP 16 "Characteristics of the Head. of Household and Income
Inequality in Mexico" (July 1975)
Wouter van Ginneken
WP 17 "Bibliography on Income Distribution (Volume I),
(August 1975)
Thomas S. Wjndmuller and. Farhad Mehran
VP 18 "Bibliography on Income Distribution (Volume II)
(August 1975) Thomas S. Windmuller and Farhad Mahran
WP 19 "Incidence of Central Government Expenditures in India"
(August 1975) Anand P. Gupta
WP 20 "Dealing with Grouped Income Distribution Data"
(August 1975) Parhad. Mehran
VP 21 "Health, Employment and Income Distribution"
(August 1975) Carl N. Stevens
VP 22 "Can Educational Policy Equalize Income Distribution in
Latin America?" (August 1975)
Martin Carnoy
VP 23 "The Changing Structural Distribution of Income and
Employment in Turkey and Kuznet's Hypothesis"
(September 1975)
Layla Ecevit and. Erd.ogan Czötn
VP 24 "Employment and Income Distribution in West Malaysia"
(September 1975)
Lim Lin Lean
VP 25 "Urban Development, Income Distribution and Employment
in Lagos" (September 1975)
O.J. Papohunda, N.P. van Dijk and Jaap Reijmerink
VP 26 "Taxation, Government Spending and Income Distribution
in the Philippines" (October 1975)
Edita A. Tan
WP 27 "Industrialisation and Income Distribution in Hong-Kong
1961-1971" (October 1975)
Ronald Hsja and. L.C. Chau
VP 28 "Solving India's Employment Problem : Role of Fiscal
Policy" (October 1975)
Anand P. Gupta
VP 29 "A Note on Income Distribution and Poverty in Trinidad and
Tobago" (October 1975)
Rapph N. Henry
VP 30 "Income Distribution in Iran : The Statistics of Inequality"
(October 1975)
Fahrad Mehran
VP 31 "Income in Kind and Redistribution of Income in Hong Kong"
(November 1975)
Ronald Hsia and L.C. Chau

WP 32 "Income Distribution and Employment in Turkey : Policies,

Practices and Prospects" (November 1975)
Duncan R. Miller
WP 33 "Taxes and Incomes : Distribution of Tax Burdens in Iran"
(December 1975)
Parhad Mehran
WP 34 "Aspects of Income Distributionin Turkey" (December 1975)
Duncan R. Miller

WP 35 "The Dynamics of Human Resources Development in Turkey and

Their Implications for Employment and Income Distribution"
(December 1975)
Duncan R. Miller
VP 36 "The Regional Distribution of Government Expenditures in
Botswana" (December 1975)
Richard J. Szal
WP 37 "Impact of Economic Growth on the Size Distribution of
Income : The Postwar Experience of Japan" (December 1975)
Richard 0. Wada
VP 38 "The Development of Manufacturing Industries in Ghana and
the Government's Role in it" (January 1976)
Kodwo Ewusi
WP 39 "Intersectoral Texms of Trade and Transfer of Resources from
Agriculture : The Case of Egypt" (January 1976)
Abdel-F adil
WP 40 "The Role of Asset Redistribution in Poverty-Focused Develop-
ment Strategies" (January 1976)
Alejandro Poxley, Eduardo Aninat, Jos4 P. Arellano
VP 41 "International Migration of Turkish Workers : A Special Case
in the Public Policy of Income Distribution and Employment"
(February 1976)
............,.,..e... Duncan R. Miller
WP 42 "What does Social. Security do to Incomes?" (July 1976)
Alejandro Foxley, Eduardo Aninat, José P. Arellano
VP 43 "Changes in Employment and the Distribution of Income during
the Brazilian 'Miracle" (July 1976)
Samuel A. Morley
WP 44 "Who Benefits from Government Expenditures?" (July 1976)
Foxley, Ethiardo Aninat, José P.Arel].ano
WP 45 "Changes in Income Distribution, Employment and Structure of
the Economy : A Case Study of Iran" (September 1976)
Jjrj Skolka and Nichel Garzuel
WP 46 "Inequality and. Basic Needs in Swaziland" (October 1976)
Richard J. Szal and Ralph van d.er Hoeven
WP 47 "Policy Planning for Employment and Income Distribution in
Rural India" (December 1976)
Michael Parbman 0

WP 46 "Underemployment and Basic Needs Satisfaction"

(January 1977) Peter Richards
WP 49 "Employment Performance of Ghanian Manuiacturing Industries"
(January 1977) Kodwo Ewusi
WP 50 "Unemployment in Developing Countries" (February 1977)
Harold Lydall
WP 51 "The Incidence of TaxatIon" (February 1977)
Alejandro Poxley, Eduardo Aninat, José P. Areilano
WP 52 "Income Distribution during the process of Development"
(February 1977) Harold Lydall
WP 53 "Net Incidence of Government Expenditures Taxation and
Social Security" (February 1977)
Alejandro Poxley, Eduardo Aninat, José P. Arellano
WP 54 "Zambia's Income Distribution during the Early Seventies"
(March 1977)
Roiph van der Hoeven
WP 55 "A Monetary Wili-.O'-The Wisp : Pursuit of Equity Through
Deficit Spending (Part i)" (March 1977)
Leopoldo Soils
WP 56 "A Monetary Will-O'-The Wisp : Pursuit of Equity Through
Deficit Spending (Part ii)" (March 1977)
Leopoldo Soils
WP 57 "DIstribution of Benefits from Public Consumption Expenditurep
Among Households in Iran" (July 1977)
Parhad Mehran
WP 58 "Rubber Technology and Exports in West Malaysia"
(August 1977) Jacques Gaude and Michel Garzuei
WP 59 "Education and Income Distribution in Asia : A Preliminary
Analysis" (September 1977) Peter Richards
WP 60 "Poverty : Measurement and. Analysis" (October 1977)
Richard Szal
WP 6]. Technology, Products and. Income Distribution : A Concep-
tualization and Application to Sugar Processing in India"
(November 1977) Jeffrey James
WP 62 "The Impact of Income Maintenance Programmes on Poverty in
Britain" (December 1977) Wilfred Beck*rinan
WP 63 "The Time-Distance Approaoh to the Analysis of Dynamic
Aspects of Inequalities" (December 1977)
Pavie Sicher3.

WP 64 "Patterns of Inequality in Education in Asia (Part i)"

(December1977) 0..,0....,, 0MauricioLeonor
WP 65 "Three Notes on the Concept of Poverty" (January 1978)
Amartya Sen
WP 66 "The Cha-Am-Road - Employment and Income Distribution

WP 67
.oes 0.. 0 ,
Effects of Rural Road Construction" (April 1978)
o o.e .. Christer Holtsberg
"Income Distribution by Size9 Employment and the Structure
of the Economy : A Case Study for the Republic of Kora"
(May 1978) Jiri Skolka and Michel Garzuel
WP 68 "General Equilibrium Analysis of the Colombian Income
Distribution : Applications to Rural Development, Wage and
Income Policies" (June 1978) a Prancois Bourguignon
WP 69 "Fiscal Incidence in Sri Lanka" (August 1978)
Patricia J. Alailima
WP 70 "Estimates of Poverty in Italy in 1975" (September 1978)
Wilfred Bockerman
WP 71 "Redistribution of Income9 Patterns of Consumption and
Employment : The Case Study for Malaysia" (October 1978)
Jef Maton and Hichel Garzuel
WP 72 "Income Distribution by size, Structure of the Economy and
Employment : A Comparative Study for Pour Asian Countries"9
(March 1979) Felix Paukert, Jiri Skolka and Jef Maton
liP 73 "Income Inequality and Fiscal Policies in Botswana"
(April1979) .....0.....,....,RiohardJ. Szal
WI' 74 "Static and Dynamic Indices of Income Inequality (May 1979)
Irma Adelman and Peter Whittle
WP 75 "Some Distributional Issues in Plauning for Basic Needs
Health Care" (Juxie 1979) ..,........ Peter Richards
WP 76 "Basic Needs in Mexico : Analysis and Policies (July 1979)
Wouter van Ginneken
WP 77 "Land Tenure, Government Policies and Income Distribution in
Sri Lanka (September 1979) W. Gooneratne
WP 78 "Dimensions and Targets in Basic Education (An illustrative
exercise in assessing the fulfilment of education as a basic
need)" (October 1979) M.D. Leonor, Jr.
WP 79
State-Wise Study" (November 1979) ...
"The Poor, the 1on-Poor and the Taxes they Pay in India : A
Anand P. Gupta
WP 80 "Estimates of Poverty in Greece, 1974" (December 1979)
Wilfred Beckernan
WP 81 "Stabilization Policies and Stagflation : The Cases of Brazil
and Chile" (December 1979)
S SO 0. .. . o.. s e e so.. Alejandro Poxley
WP 82 "Consumer Information from Public and Private Sources : Some
Canadian Results" (December 1979)
R.R. Kerton and Pe Chowdhury
WP 83 "Income Distribution Implications of the Thai Rice Price
Policy" (January 1980) ..... Christer Holtsberg
WP 84 " A Dynamic Analysis of Regional Disparities in Yugoslavia"
(January 1980) ............. Pavle Sicherl
WP 85 "Basic Needs and. the Provision of Government Services : An
Area Study of Ranaghat Block in West Bengal" (February 1980)
....e..o.o.00.000.,aseeoeeo T.N. VinodlCuivar and JatinDe
WP 86 "Consumer Income Distribution and Appropriate Technology :
The Case of Bicycle Manufacturing in Malaysia" (March 1980)
Pong Chan Onn
WP 87 "Basic Needs in Panama : The Health Sector (April 1980)
. . . .. Christoph Bunge
WP 66 "Product Choice and. Poverty : A Study of the Inefficiency of
Low-Income Consumption and the Distributional Impact of

... e.. . . ,,
Product Changes (May 1980)
.. .. .. o. Jeffrey James
WP 89 "Technological Choice, Employment Generation, Income
Distribution and. Consumer Demand : The Case of Furniture
Making in Kenya", (June 1980)
William J. House
WP 90 "Who Benefits from Government Expenditures in India?"
(June 1980) ...., Anand P. Gupta
WP 91 "The Impact of the Elimination of Food Subsidies on the Cost
of Living Egypt's Urban Population" (September 1960)
Karima Korayem
WP 92 "Lusaka Housing Project : A Critical Overview of Low Cost
Housing in Zambia" (September 1980)
...o.e.o...ssoees MaryTurokafldBishSaflyal
WP 93 "The Distribution of and Access to Basic Health Services in
Thailand" (September 1980)
.. .. . . . , Medhi Krongkaew
WP 94 "Appropriate Products, Employment and Income Distribution in
Bangladesh : A Case Study of the soap industry", (October 1980)
A.K.A. Mubin and David J.C. Forsyth

WP 95 "Politique économique et revenuz en C6te-d'Ivoire"

(Novembre 1980) Yolande Bresson

WP 96 "Income Distribution and Employment in the Footwear Industry",

(February 1981) George A. Aryee
WP 97 "The Distribution of Income in Thailand" (February 1961)
Carmel Uliman Chiawick
WP 98 "The impact of income maintenance programmes on poverty
in Canada, 1975" (Narch 1981)
a 0,000* *0 00 SO 0* Wilfred Beckerman

WP 99 "La planification régionale au Sénégal" (May 1981)

00 0 . , Makhtar Diouf

WP 100 "Effects of alternative measurement techniques on the

estimation of the inequality of income" (June 1981)
Harold. Lydall

WP 101 "Provision and distribution of selected public goods and

services in India" (June 1981)
0,,,,000,,00000000000.I4afoozAhmed,AusafAhmad

WP 102 "Implications of a basic needs strategy for the edible

oil industry" (July 1981)
RadhaSinha, S.P Sinha,
G,R. Mishra and Gautam Pingle

WP 103 "The impact of income maintenance payments on poverty

in Ireland" (August 1981)
5 0 00 05 00 Wilfred Beckerman

WP 104 "Poverty and unemployment in India: Is there light at

the end of the tunnel?" (September 1981)
0 00 Anand P. Gupta

WP 105 "Comparable income distribution data for Mexico (1968),

United Kingdom (1979) and The Federal Republic of Germany
(1974), (September 1981)
0500..,..,,0000000000.WoutervanGinneken, MichelGarzuel

WP 106 "The impact of rural roads on poverty alleviation: A review

of the literature" (November 1961)
S 5 0* a 0 5 00 aS 00 John Howe

WP 107 "Decentralised planning in Papua New Guinea (November

1981) aoe000,.ao..oaa.os Diana Conyers