INDIA AND AUSTRALIA:

STRENGTHENING
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
THROUGH THE
INDO PACIFIC OCEANS INITIATIVE
Edited By
Dr. Vijay Sakhuja & Anu Maria Francis
India and Australia
Strengthening International Cooperation through the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative
Edited by Vijay Sakhuja & Anu Maria Francis

ISBN 978-81-955180-0-5 (Ebook)

First published in 2022

Copyright © Centre for Public Policy Research and Monash University, 2022

Published by the Centre for Public Policy Research (CPPR) Elamkulam, Kochi,
Kerala - 682020, India (www.cppr.in) and Monash University, Wellington Road,
Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia (www.monash.edu)

Copy-edited by Haseena Hamsa

Design and Typeset by Aargee Communications, Ernakulam, Kerala, India.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission of the
publisher.

The views expressed in the book are the individual opinion(s) of the author(s), who
take individual and joint responsibility for its content. The book does not reflect the
official views of the Centre for Public Policy Research, Monash University or of any
government department, institution or agency. The publishers do not accept any
responsibility for the same in any manner whatsoever.
 CONTENTS
Abbreviations.........................................................................................................................................................7
Contributors..........................................................................................................................................................10
Foreword.................................................................................................................................................................11
Introduction...........................................................................................................................................................13
Section I: ASEAN, Australian and Indian Perspectives on Indo-Pacific

Chapter 1
The Convergent Identity Formation of the Idea of the Indo-Pacific:
ASEAN, Australia and Indian Perspectives - W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar..................................................16

Chapter 2
Understanding ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific - Vo Xuan Vinh..............................................................29

Section 2: Marine Litter and Debris in the Bay of Bengal

Chapter 3
Plastic pollution in the Bay of Bengal: Regulatory Approaches
to the Problem - Gerry Nagtzaam....................................................................................................................43

Chapter 4
Marine litter and Debris in the Bay of Bengal - Salom Gnana Thanga Vincent......................................65

Chapter 5
Marine Litter and its Impact on the
Ecology of Bay of Bengal - Akansha Tiwari...................................................................................................70

Chapter 6
Ocean and Climate as Influencers of Geopolitical Strategic
Importance in the Indian Ocean - Sali Jayne Bache.............................................................................,.......79

Section 3: Smart Ports and Supply Chains in the Indian Ocean

Chapter 7
A ‘Single Window Environment’ for Digital Trade Facilitation: Future of
Australia-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership
- Andrew D Mitchell and Vandana Gyanchandani.........................................................................................87

Chapter 8
Embracing Industrial Revolution 4.0: Smart Ports, Supply
Chain and the Developing Countries - Martin A. Sebastian......................................................................103

5
Chapter 9
Smart Ports and Supply Chains in the Indian Ocean:
India’s Smart Port Case Analysis - R P Pradhan............................................................................................112

Chapter 10
Digitalisation of Port Centric Supply Chains: Issues and Challenges
- Prashant Bhaskar and Peggy Shu-Ling Chen.............................................................................................122

Chapter 11
Oceans as Global Commons: Indo-Pacific Ocean:
Pathways to Prosperity and Corridor of Peace - C. Joshua Thomas........................................................131

6
 ABBREVIATIONS AND
ACRONYMS
AADMER : ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response
ABJN : Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction
ACE : Automated Commercial Environment
ACHS : Automated Container Handling System
ACMECS : Ayeyarwady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy
ADB : Asian Development Bank
ADMM-Plus : ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus
AHA centre : ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Centre
AI-CECA : Australia-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement
AIIPOIP : Australia-India Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative Partnership
AITTDF : Australian International Trade and Transport Industry Development Fund
AMS : ASEAN Member States
AOIP : ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
APEC : Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF : ASEAN Regional Forum
AS : Arabian Sea
ASEAN : Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM : Asia Europe Meeting
ASW : Australian Single Window
ASYCUDA : Automated System for Customs data
AUKUS : Australia United Kingdom United States
B2B : Business to Business
BIMSTEC : Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
BOB : Bay of Bengal
BOBLME : Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem
BRI : Belt and Road Initiative
CBP : Customs and Border Protection
CCP : Container Control Programmes
CDRI : Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure
CEO : Chief Executive officer
CEPA : Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements
CERT : Community Emergency Response Team
COP21 : 21st Conference of the Parties
COP26 : 26th Conference of the Parties
CPCB : Central Pollution Control Board
CPPR : Centre for Public Policy Research
CPS : Cyber Physical System
CPTPP : Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
CPV : Communist Party of Vietnam
CSI : Container Security Initiative
CSR : Corporate Social Responsibility
DEPA : Digital Economy Partnership Agreement
DFAT : Department of Foreign Trade
DPD : Direct Port Delivery
DPE : Direct Port Entry
DRRM : Disaster Risk Reduction Management
DWT : Dead Weight Tonnage

7
EAEG : East Asian Economic Group
EAMF : Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum
EAS : East Asia Summit
EDI : Electronic Data Interchange
EEZ : Exclusive Economic Zone
EICC : East Indian Coastal Currents
EPR : Extended Producer Responsibility
EU : European Union
FDA : Food and Drug Administration
FIPIC : Forum for India-Pacific Island Corporation
FOIP : Free and Open Indo-Pacific
G2B : Government to Business
G2G : Government to Government
GCC : Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP : Gross Domestic Product
GESAMP : Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection
GHG : Green House Gas
GoM : Gulf of Mannar
IAPH : International Association of Ports and Harbors
IASS : Institute for advanced Sustainability Studies
ICAO : International Civil Aviation Organization
ICE : Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICS : Integrated Cargo System
ICT : Information and Communication Technology
IFC-IOR : Indian Navy’s Information Fusion Centre for Indian Ocean Region
IMO : International Maritime Organisation
IO : Indian Ocean
IOC : Indian Ocean Commission
IORA : Indian Ocean Rim Association
IoT : Internet of Things
IPC : Indian Penal Code
IPCC : Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPOI : Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership
ISA : International Solar Alliance
ITDS : International Trade Data System
ITLOS : International tribunal on Law of the Sea
JNPT : Jawaharlal Nehru Port
LULC : Land Use/Land Cover
MBES : Multibeam Ecosounder
MDA : Maritime Domain Awareness
MFAT : Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
MGC : Meckong-Ganga Cooperation
MNC : Multinational Corporation
MPAC : Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity
MRAI : Materials Recycling Association of India
NGO : Non-governmental Organization
NII : Non-Intrusive Inspection
NLD : National League for Democracy
NLP : National Single Window Logistics Portal
NSW : National Single Window
NVOCCS : Non-Vessel Owning Common Carrier
OBOR : One Belt One Road
OECD : Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEM : Original Equipment Manufacturing

8
PCS : Port Community System
PDR : Peoples Democratic Republic
PIF : Pacific Islands Forum
POA : Plan of Action
PRO : Producer Responsibility Organization
PSU : Public Sector Undertaking
PUE : Power Usage Effectiveness
QUAD : Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
RC-BNPTT : BIMSTEC Network of Policy Think Tanks
RCEP : Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RIS : Research and Information System
RSW : Regional Single Window
RTA : Regional Trade Agreement
SAF : Society for Assistance to Fisherwomen
SAGAR : Security and Growth for all in the Region
SAR : Safety and Search and Rescue
SASP : South Asian Seas Programme
SCI : Smart Container Initiative
SDG : Sustainable Development Goals
SLOC : Sea Lanes of Communication
SME : Small to Medium Enterprises
SWIF : Single Window Implementation Framework
SWIFT : Single Window Interface for Facilitating Trade
SWS : Single Window System
TEU : Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit
TFA : Trade Facilitation Agreement
TICAD : Tokyo International Conference on African Development
TVET : Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UAE : United Arab Emirates
UHI : Underwater Hyperspectral Imaging
ULIP : Unified Logistics Interface Platform
UN : United Nations
UN/CEFACT : United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business
UNCLOS : United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea
UNCTAD : United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNEA : United Nations Environment Assembly
UNODC : United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSC : United Nations Security Council
US : United States
USD : US Dollar
WCO : World Customs Organisation
WEF : World Economic Forum
WICC : West Indian Coastal Currents
WTO : World Trade Organization

9
 CONTRIBUTORS
Dr. W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar, Advisor, Centre for Public Policy Research, Kochi, India.

Dr. Vo Xuan Vinh is the Deputy Director General, Institute for Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS Viet-
nam), Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS), Hanoi.

Dr. Gerry Nagtzaam, Associate Professor, Monash University, Australia.

Dr. Salom Gnana Thanga Vincent, Professor and Head, in the Department of Environmental Sciences,
University of Kerala, India.

Ms. Akansha Tiwari, A wildlife filmmaker and conservationist.

Dr. Sali Jayne Bache, Strategic Advisor at the Climate Works Centre, Australia.

Dr. Andrew D Mitchell, Professor, Faculty of Law, Monash University, Australia.

Ms. Vandana Gyanchandani, PhD Student, Faculty of Law, Monash University, Australia.

Captain Martin A. Sebastian, former Centre Head and Senior Fellow, Centre for Maritime Security and
Diplomacy, Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA), Malaysia.

Dr. R P Pradhan, Associate Professor at the Department of Humanities & Social Sciences, BITS Pilani
KK Birla Goa Campus, Goa, India.

Dr. Prashant Bhaskar, Associate Professor, Maritime & Logistics Management, and Australian Maritime
College, Australia.

Dr Peggy Shu-Ling Chen is Associate Professor and Director, Centre for Maritime & Logistics Manage-
ment, Australian Maritime College, Australia.

Professor C. Joshua Thomas, Distinguished Fellow in International Relations, Centre for Public Policy
Research, Kochi, India.

10
 FOREWORD
The twenty-first century is considered the Asian century and the region of Indo-Pacific forms a
pivot to it. The region is witnessing renewed interest from major industrial powers. It is becoming a
contestation point of various contending powers. In this context, the Indian Pacific Ocean Initiative
is in the right direction, with India, Australia and ASEAN taking the lead to show how a rule-based
international order is in the interest of all.

India, Australia and member states of ASEAN share a strong relationship underpinned by ongoing
cooperation across many areas of mutual interest. This cooperation includes the Framework for
Security Cooperation, regular dialogues involving Ministries responsible for foreign, defence and trade
policy, and a broad range of senior officials meetings, such as the Defence Policy Talks, Maritime
Dialogue and Navy to Navy Staff Talks.

India and Australia have committed to promoting peace, security, stability and prosperity in the Indo-
Pacific region, which is vital for the world. As two key Indo-Pacific countries, India and Australia are
enduringly interested in a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific region.

The joint declaration on a shared vision for a maritime corporation between the Republic of India
and the Australian Government states, “Both countries have a shared interest in ensuring freedom
of navigation and overflight in the Indo-Pacific region and maintaining open, safe and efficient sea
lanes for transportation and communication. With shared maritime geography and a deep and long-
standing friendship, India and Australia are natural partners in working together to realise this shared
vision. Both countries also share common concerns regarding the strategic, security and environmental
challenges in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain, including activities and actions in the maritime domain
that are inconsistent with international law, particularly UNCLOS, including terrorism, piracy, drugs
and arms smuggling, irregular migration, people smuggling, trafficking in human beings, poaching of
marine species, narcotics trafficking and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.”

Both countries recognise a shared interest in promoting maritime security and safety that will deepen
navy-to-navy cooperation and strengthen maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific region
through our enhanced exchange of information.

It is in this context that the Australia-India Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership (AIIPOIP)
grant program was launched. Centre for Public Policy Research (CPPR) and Monash University have
become the first recipients of the AIIPOIP grant program. Subsequently, CPPR signed a Research
Collaboration Agreement with Monash University, Australia, on Research into Maritime Cooperation
for a Sustainable Future in the Indo-Pacific Region.

With this grant, CPPR organised the conference in collaboration with Monash University, Melbourne,
on “Australia India Indo Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership, Dialogue on Indo-Pacific Oceans
Initiative (IPOI): Strengthening International Cooperation’’ on April 21 and 22, 2022 at Kochi, Kerala.
The conference was attended by 20 scholars from India, ASEAN countries and Australia. The
Conference sessions were based on three thematic areas under the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative:
Maritime Security, Maritime Pollution and Trade, Connectivity and Smart ports. The sessions were
very insightful and thought-provoking. Scholars outlined various opportunities and challenges in the
region. They highlighted the need for the collaboration and participation of the States to strengthen
stability and economic growth in the region. The enlightening sessions brought out 11 research articles
compiled into this compendium.

11
I am thankful for the support we received from Monash University to organise the conference. The
papers in this compendium speak a lot about the region’s understanding and the importance of
partnerships. I am grateful to the scholars for sharing their insights and experience on the theme.

I congratulate Dr Vijay Sakhuja and Ms Anu Maria Francis for compiling these papers and editing
them to the delight of the readers. I am sure this compendium of scholarly papers would significantly
contribute to the Australia-India Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership (AIIPOIP) literature and
discussions.

Dr D Dhanuraj PhD
Chairman

Centre for Public Policy Research

September 10, 2022

12
 INTRODUCTION
The “Australia-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” was announced on 4 June 2020 and
both countries agreed to work together bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally, including through
minilateral arrangements to support regional architecture in line with their shared values and interests.
Furthermore, among the many initiatives under their strategic partnership, the Australia-India Joint
Declaration on a shared vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, the Australia-India
Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership (AIIPOIP) has emerged as the flagship programme. It is
supported by the Department of Foreign Trade (DFAT), Government of Australia. The AIIPOIP aligns
with other bilateral arrangements, including Australia-India Maritime and two plus two Dialogues,
and with Australia’s cooperation with The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) under its
Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

An open inclusive, resilient, prosperous, and rules-based maritime order is what the AIIPOIP seeks to
support by helping to shape maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. In pursuit of that, the
AIIPOIP nurtures cooperation under the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership (IPOI) and links with
existing regional mechanisms and arrangements including ASEAN, the Indian Ocean Rim Association
(IORA) and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).

This edited volume emerges from the two-day Dialogue (hybrid mode) held at Kochi on 21st and 22nd
of April 2022. It was hosted by the Centre for Public Policy and Research (CPPR) in partnership with
the Monash University. The Dialogue included three technical and one plenary sessions and scholars
from Australia, India and Southeast Asian countries presented papers which have been included in
this volume under three sections.

Section 1 provides an analysis of the ongoing geopolitical and geostrategic contestation in the Indo-
Pacific region. India and ASEAN are promoting their respective versions of the Indo-Pacific and there
is convergence between Australia, India and the ASEAN to promote peace and stability in the Indo
Pacific region. In this section, Dr. W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar observes that there are currently two
persistent themes in the Indo-Pacific: the constructivist identity creation of new partnerships and the
neorealist pursuit of the power quotient of Great Power competitions. While China’s rise, assertive
claims to power, territorial disputes, and quest for regional hegemony have been quite noticeable,
there has also been a quest for converging ideas and identities of cooperation and convergence in the
Indo-Pacific that strengthens accents of peace, stability, and security through a variety of instrumental
factors of convergence and cooperation. Furthermore, ASEAN, Australia, and India have been in
dialogue and have strengthened the accents of the Indo-Pacific along these lines of convergence.
In fact, there has been a triangular convergence of the three actors strengthening the Indo-Pacific
partnerships as each actor’s security and economic interest is in increasing alignment with each other.

Meanwhile Vo Xuan Vinh observes that nearly two years after the Indo-Pacific concept was revived in
2017, the ASEAN Member States (AMS) officially announced their Outlook on Indo-Pacific. The Outlook
aims at ASEAN’s collective leadership in forging and shaping the vision for closer cooperation in the
Indo-Pacific, continuing to maintain its central role in the evolving regional architecture in Southeast Asia
and its surrounding regions, and continuing being an honest broker within the strategic environment of
competing interests. However, each AMS has different national interests from the others in their relations

13
with countries having stakes in Southeast Asia. For their parts, Quad countries must correctly read AMS
perceptions in order to properly and successfully implement their strategies in the region.

Section 2 of the volume is an exposition on the challenges posed by the growing volume of marine
litter and debris in the Bay of Bengal. Dr. Salom Vincent argues that the plastic garbage in the Bay
of Bengal originates from Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India. At least three important
factors i.e., high coastal population, lack awareness and education and poor waste management
practices can be attributed to the increasing ocean surface litter in the Bay of Bengal. Furthermore,
the impact of changing monsoonal patterns and its effect on transport of marine plastics is a big
challenge in the beaching pattern as well as deposition of marine debris of Bay.

Gerry Nagtzaam informs that the current extent and increasing rates of plastic pollution entering
the Bay of Bengal is an environmental and public health crisis and notes that this can be ascribed to
the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna River basin through which tonnes of plastic waste enters the Bay
from Bangladesh. This can be attributed to the absence of regulatory enforcements, which potentially
nullify the environmental benefit of the legal bans or taxes on single-use plastics announced by both
the counties. The author recommends regional transboundary response to the plastic pollution crisis
in the Bay.

Similarly, Akansha Tiwari observes that the magnitude of marine litter in the Bay of Bengal is alarming
and this challenge gets more complex due to the unreliable and tough nature of the sea. It necessitates
technological solutions to efficiently retrieve the marine litter and cleanup the debris. It is argued that
mutual understanding between stakeholders, their trust towards each other, efficient data gathering
and public awareness is essential.

Section 3 deals with smart ports and supply chains in the Indian Ocean. Some sea ports in the Indian
Ocean are advancing to emerge as ‘Smart Ports’ and have begun to use data-driven decision-making
tools to improve operational efficiency.
Martin A. Sebastian points out that the development of the maritime industry has been significantly
influenced by technological innovation, which has played a significant role. Smart ports have raised
the level of competitiveness and is highly intense among the industry’s players. In relation to this,
IR 4.0 demands a crucial reform that would ultimately improve seaport competitiveness and foster
the development of the industry. Also, Smart Ports need to cater for areas such as cargo tracking,
maritime supply chain security, environmental protection, navigating safety, planning, operations,
administration and monitoring.

R P Pradhan observes that technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI), Internet of Things (IoT), Machine
Learning, Big Data, Decision Tree, 5G spectrum, block-chain and virtual realities are now providing
tech-solutions to integrate ships, ports and supply chain towards business efficiency. In fact, “Smart
Port” ideas can be applied to enhance port operations and increase revenue.

Andrew D Mitchell and Vandana Gyanchandani highlight the advantages of a ‘single window system’
for a common digital interface to effectively manage customs-related information, stakeholders,
services and infrastructure for a seamless flow of cross-border trade. The authors point out that it
makes cross-border trade flows smoother. The authors provide an introduction on Australia and
India’s Single Window Systems.

14
Prashant Bhaskar and Peggy Shu-Ling Chen make the point that the supply chains continuously
strive to become more efficient, less wasteful, and environmentally sustainable, which necessitates
ports to remain competitive by becoming smarter and optimise their commercial operations and
administrative processes. Likewise, there will be fundamental changes in the competency and
knowledge requirements of the workforce and maritime institutions, both in the higher education, the
vocational education and training sectors, would have to be continually engaged in monitoring and
renewing their curriculums to suit industry requirements.

Finally, this volume has provided in-depth perspectives on the diverse subjects discussed during
the Dialogue. Many of these are under active consideration of policy makers, high on the agenda of
experts who delve deep into these issues and academics who study and teach.

We thank the Department of Foreign Trade (DFAT), Government of Australia, Centre for Public Policy
and Research (CPPR) and Monash University, Australia for facilitating this Dialogue. It is also our hope
that the volume would trigger implementable policy vectors.

Vijay Sakhuja

Anu Maria Francis

15
 1
The Convergent Identity
Formation of the Idea of the
Indo-Pacific: Asean, Australia
and Indian Perspectives
W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar

Introduction

Security convergence based on Identities and formation of Identities is a vital aspect of growing
regional relations among states and powers. The transforming contexts of the Indo Pacific now witness
two persistent trends of neorealist pursuit of the power quotient of Great Power rivalries as well as the
constructivist identity formation of emerging partnerships. While the rise of China and its assertive
claims in power, territorial disputes and the quest of regional hegemony has been quite pronounced,
there has also been the quest for converging ideas and identities of cooperation and convergence
in the Indo Pacific that builds stronger accents of peace, stability, and security through a variety of
instrumental factors of convergence and cooperation.

The Indo Pacific in the longer haul is demanding that each state and regional actor envisage an
Indo Pacific Outlook that is premised on security, ecology, resources, capacity building and
Resource Sharing, Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM), Science, Technology, maritime
transportation, academic Cooperation and Trade connectivity. These instrumentalities provide for
greater convergence and enduring partnerships among the states and the regional actors.

ASEAN, Australia, and India have been in dialogue and have strengthened the accents of the Indo
Pacific along these lines of convergence. In fact, there has been a triangular convergence of the three
actors strengthening the Indo Pacific partnerships as each actor’s security and economic interest is in
increasing alignment with each other.

The chapter endeavors to (a) analyse the issues of convergence of the three actors of the Indo Pacific

16
outlooks and identify the similarities and scope for cooperation; (b) Identify the areas of capacity-
building among the three actors to promote the Indo Pacific convergences; and (c) Examine common
interests among the three actors that would go into reinforce the partnerships.

The Indo Pacific has been referred to and well known as an immense region of conflicting interests,
complete with Great Prominence rivalries, Power Shift discussions involving China’s assertive ascent
to power and frequent threats to replace the United States. Threats from China to the regional
governments and powers have sparked economic and security reactions, and the post-COVID
environment has exacerbated China’s power play in the area. The littoral states and extra-regional
powers have responded by stepping up their deterrent efforts and increasing their capabilities and
resources to counter the assertive Chinese power.

Despite the neorealist prominence of the Indo-Pacific, alternative narratives of constructivist identity
have evolved as the basis of convergences in the region among various governments and entities that
strive to align with one another and adopt similar paradigms.

The quest of establishing stable and peaceful Indo Pacific is a common and convergent concern for
all powers in the region. It is to this objective that states, and powers often work out on parameters
of commonality for cooperation that aid in Capacity Building and mutual benefit among the actors
in the region. The main factors that have sparked these changes in the global economy and more
specifically in the Indo-Pacific region include increased trade, increased economic interdependence,
and the development of new regionalism.

Convergent Identity Formation in the Indo Pacific Region

The construction of a convergent identity in the Indo-Pacific area, which has led to the cooperation of
many states and regional actors for shared goals, is influenced by three key reasons.

The confluence of the seas has been one primary idea that had always evoked free, open, and inclusive
sense of the oceans and seas that has promoted the free transmission of people, goods and ideas
across the oceanic expanses and has promoted a greater convergence of regional interests (Hemmings:
2020).1 The confluence of seas has been very akin to the Indo Pacific oceans as they have brought out
greater convergences between different cultures, civilizations, and states in promoting uninterrupted
commerce and trade and facilitate greater people movement throughout the region.

The evocation of the Rules Based Order has been the second idea that has resulted in the incremental
development of norms and rules that conditions the regional order as well as the maritime order of
the Indo Pacific. Rules Based Order has catalysed the importance of code of conduct as well as the
establishment of operational procedures that are undergirded by International Law and practice so
to promote the smooth operation of maritime transport, maintenance of maritime order and the
promotion of peace and stability in the Indo Pacific region (Byrne: 2020).2

The crafting of Outlooks of the Indo Pacific as a Vision statement of each state actor and regional
actor has gone to a great extent of elucidating the vision and proposed action plan of each actor in
the region. Convergence is a common objective whereby the actors seek alignment and feasibility of
each outlook to be cooperative as well work out various modalities for achieving convergent identities
in the Indo Pacific (Dolven and Vaughn: 2020).3

17
Salience of Convergence of Identities: ASEAN, Australia and India
The Indo Pacific has several state actors as well as regional bloc actors that constitute the universe
of states and powers in the region. Regionalism and its variant of new regionalism has grown and
consolidated in the Indo Pacific region. Foremost among all regional actors has been the ten member
nations’ bloc called ASEAN. The ASEAN since 1967 has grown to be a well-integrated regional actor
that has promoted its norms and values of ASEAN Centrality as well as non-interference in the internal
affairs of other countries.

The ASEAN affirms its importance for ‘constructed values’ and its ‘inherited values’ in the quest of
establishing its own identity. ASEAN has been emphatic about its “One Vision, One Identity, One
Community” in the process to establish an integrated community and explore the three goals of the
ASEAN political-security community, the ASEAN Economic community, and the ASEAN socio-cultural
community by the year 2025 to achieve its purpose and objectives (Maria: 2017).4

ASEAN, Australia, and India have evolved their respective outlooks of the Indo-Pacific that has well
reinforced each actor’s regional maritime interests and has provided the essential means to align
with other Indo Pacific regional actors in aiming to enhance capacity building and synergies with one
another.

The ASEAN outlook on the Indo Pacific (AOIP) has its salience built on the ‘centrality’ of the regional
organization and its inclusiveness principle. Given the open access of seas in its regional geography,
ASEAN has evolved its own norms and principles that undergird its Indo Pacific outlooks. The main
goal of ASEAN is to develop and maintain an ‘inclusive’ regional architecture that complements its
collective leadership in advancing and defining the long-term vision for greater cooperation in the
Indo-Pacific while maintaining its central position in the new regional order in Southeast Asia and the
surrounding areas. The AOIP aims to enhance ASEAN’s Community building process and strengthen
and give new momentum for existing ASEAN-led mechanisms to better face challenges and seize
opportunities arising from the current and future regional and global environment (ASEAN Outlook:
2021).5

The ASEAN Indo Pacific vision envisages the close integrated and interconnectedness of the region
and emphasizes the ‘centrality’ of ASEAN in the process. ASEAN views the Indo Pacific region as a
premise to cooperation and dialogue rather than rivalries of the region. Given the maritime geography
of Southeast Asia, ASEAN emphasizes the importance of the seas and oceans and the confluence
that could emerge from it. ASEAN emphasizes in its Indo Pacific Outlook, the central importance of
the Rules Based Order, the Free Open and Inclusive nature and scope of the seas and oceans and the
underlying economic cooperation (Hanada: 2019).6

ASEAN envisages regional cooperation with other actors in the region and enhance ASEAN’s
Community Building process by strengthening various ASEAN regional mechanisms such as EAS
(East Asia Summit) the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus
(ADMM-Plus), the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) and others such as the relevant ASEAN
Plus One mechanisms and the nurture and sustaining of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
of the United Nations (Morada: 2017).7

The AIOP envisages the peaceful settlement of disputes, maritime safety, and security, addressing

18
transnational crimes and enhancing cooperation and sustainable management in marine resources. It
aims at the protection of coastal communities, develop Blue Economy objectives, and foster maritime
commerce. ASEAN Outlook also envisages the tackling of marine pollution, sea-level rises and the
protection of marine biodiversity. Augmenting all these would be through academic and technical
cooperation and capacity building (Liliansa:2021).8

ASEAN aims at enhancing regional connectivity by complementing with the existing Master Plan on
ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025. ASEAN aims Connectivity of Southeast Asia to be a seamless and
comprehensive connected and integrated region promoting competitiveness, inclusiveness, and a
greater sense of community (ASEAN Master Plan: 2017).9

The AOIP aims to achieve the SDGs Sustainable Development Goals 2030 with the aim to promote
digital economy. ASEAN Outlook envisions for complementarities and aligning regional development
agenda with the SDGs. It endeavors to sync with the ASEAN Community Vision 2025, the 2030 UN
Agenda for Sustainable Development. It also facilitates promotion of cooperation with the ASEAN
Center for Sustainable Development Studies and Dialogue and other relevant institutions in the region
(Martinus: 2020).10

Australia’s Outlook of the Indo Pacific draws on similar themes of evolving maritime cooperation and
the promotion of institutional complementarities with ASEAN and India. Australia looks at the Indo
Pacific with the objectives of a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific region. Australia
shares interest in ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight in the Indo-Pacific region, and the
maintaining of open, safe and efficient sea lanes for transportation and communication (Medcalf:
2019).11

Australia’s Indo Pacific Outlook has been well focused on ASEAN and India since 2013. Though
Australia has been a pillar of the QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) and engages with the AUKUS
(Australia, UK, US), it has placed high importance to its ties with ASEAN. Australia envisions ASEAN to
its central place in the entire region with immense geo-political, economic, and diplomatic importance
(Hayes: 2020).12

Australia and India converge on the cooperation on marine ecology and work on a variety of strategic,
security and environmental challenges in the Indo Pacific maritime domain. Australia’s Indo Pacific
Outlook has similar interest on activities and actions in the maritime domain that are contrary with
international law, affecting UNCLOS, that includes terrorism, piracy, drugs, and arms smuggling,
irregular migration, people smuggling, trafficking in human beings, poaching of marine species,
narcotics trafficking and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (Rajagopalan: 2021).13

Australia is concerned about a number of the environmental issues in the Indo-Pacific region, including
marine pollution, climate change, ocean acidification, a lack of potable water, habitat loss from storm
surges, and saline water intrusion. Australia’s Indo Pacific Outlook also features its engagement
with ASEAN emphasizing ASEAN Centrality and Unity and works to strengthen its coordination in
several regional and multilateral fora, such as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum,
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus, the Indian Ocean Rim Association, the Indian Ocean Naval
Symposium, the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, and the International Maritime Organization (Kien:
2020).14

19
The Indo Pacific Outlook highlights Australia’s cooperative role and breadth in important areas such
as maritime ecology with the goal of minimising the impact of marine pollution (particularly plastics);
maritime security; sustainable use of marine resources; capacity building and resource sharing;
disaster risk reduction and management; science, technology, and academic collaboration; and trade,
connectivity, and maritime transport.

India’s Indo Pacific Oceans Initiative forms the basis of India’s Outlook of the Indo Pacific. India since
2018 has always championed the Free, Open, and Inclusive Indo Pacific and has sought to override
regional disputes with cooperative accents. India views the Indo Pacific neither as a strategy nor a
club of members but emphasizes on the inclusive and open nature of all states engaging in the region.

India strongly espouses the centrality and unity of the ASEAN region and has reorganized the Indian
Ministry of External Affairs with a new division of the ‘Indo Pacific’ with a view to integrate the
Indo-Pacific, India-ASEAN relations, East Asia Summit, Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM), Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) and Ayeyarwady-Chao Phraya-Mekong
Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS). (Mishra: 2021).15

Given this reorganization, India has launched the IPOI to bridge with AOIP that has several similar
features as the IPOI. The IPOI has seven pillars that are areas of convergence and cooperation that
India envisages as an open, inclusive, non-treaty-based global initiative that aims to promote practical
cooperation. The seven pillars and areas of cooperation and convergence are: Capacity Building and
Resource Sharing; Disaster Risk Reduction and Management; Maritime Ecology; Maritime Resources;
Maritime Security; Science, Technology and Academic Cooperation; and Trade Connectivity and
Maritime Transport (Laskar: 2021).16

Widening the scope of cooperation and identifying elements of convergence has made the IPOI a
robust and dynamic plan of action and engagement of India with ASEAN and Australia since the
respective outlooks of the Indo Pacific espouses similar concerns. The IPOI also makes it clear that it
is not primarily stacked up in terms of addressing traditional security challenges like China’s rise and
hegemony, but more in terms of how regional cooperation could be expanded.

India’s IPOI is well embellished through the institutional framework of EAS, IORA, PIF and in bilateral
and multilateral institutional frameworks that transmits and funnels the objectives of the IPOI into
ASEAN and Australia Outlooks of the Indo Pacific thereby greater congruence is evident.

The salience of the three Indo Pacific Outlooks is premised on the following convergences.

Convergence of Identities envisions for ASEAN, Australia, and India to engage in a larger scope of
crafting identities that are similar and are based on practical aspects of aligning respective vision
of each actor with another. Given the broad consensus of Indo Pacific regional peace, security,
and stability with accents on conserving marine ecology and enhancing trade and commerce on
a sustainable basis, the three partners can craft identities that are converging as well as aligning.
Identities shape the perceptions and the objectives that are to be crafted, hence the ambient vision
of a ‘constructivist’ identities that does not overly rely on the power quotient, but on enduring
convergence and cooperation among states in the region is the basis of long-lasting peace, security,
safety, and stability.

20
Convergences of Objectives envisages the ability to craft objectives of practical action based on
the identities that each state espouses. Outlooks of the Indo Pacific among democratic states have
largely been peaceful and have aimed at achieving stability and prosperity in the region with greater
transmission of goods, services, and people movement in the region. Instruments like Comprehensive
Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPA), the aegis of regional forums like ASEAN and the ARF
and the host of dialogue partnerships provide the widest denominator for evolving convergent
objectives that recognises each other as well as accommodate states in terms of their interests. Joint
Statements between India and ASEAN and India and Australia have greatly aided India in defining its
IPOI objectives and similarly the same elucidation has greatly helped Australia and ASEAN.

Convergences of Cooperation emerge with the regional states with an agreed framework of cooperation
and Vision Statements that provide for practical realization of the outlined objectives. Cooperation
between ASEAN, Australia and India have grown over the years from the earlier phases of security
cooperation to economic cooperation, commerce, and trade to the present contexts of wide scope
cooperation on various sectors of maritime security, maritime trade, and connectivity.

The imperative for cooperation between ASEAN, Australia and India has increased due to the
turbulence of the Indo Pacific order given China’s assertive rise and the triggering of several regional
disputes. The Indo Pacific Outlooks of ASEAN, Australia and India provide for the positive accents
of cooperation amidst the prevailing challenges and issues and they also provide the ballast for long
term cooperation among the states of the Indo Pacific region.

Capacity Building in ASEAN, Australia, and India for Indo Pacific Convergences
The ASEAN-Australia-India Outlooks on the Indo Pacific has provided for converging areas of capacity
building between the players. This could be viewed from the dyadic as well triangular patterns of how
the actors have envisaged capacity building and how they work to realize it between ASEAN-India,
ASEAN-Australia, Australia-India.

ASEAN-India partnerships have been built and nurtured on the convergences of the AOIP and IPOI
in the areas of maritime cooperation, connectivity, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and
economic and other possible areas of cooperation. (ASEAN-India Joint Statement: 2021).17 ASEAN
and India are committed to narrow the development gap through capacity building, provision of
scholarships, training courses and workshops for professionals and proactive stakeholder engagement
and to support the implementation of the Initiative for ASEAN Integration Work Plans. ASEAN and
India are focused on the scope and momentum of the ASEAN-India economic relations with various
measures through enhancing trade facilitation and increasing the utilization of the ASEAN-India Free
Trade Area.

ASEAN and India aim at developing the social infrastructure development by targeting key social
sectors; it is expedited by enhancing support to the ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework;
to build and strengthen public health infrastructure; work on enhanced capacities for preparedness
and response to pandemics and public health emergencies; promotion of vaccine and pharmaceutical
research, development, manufacturing and distribution; and promote academic cooperation between
universities and research agencies in the health sector.(ibid)

ASEAN and India are focused on the process of human capital development, including through Technical
and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) and possible support for the ASEAN TVET Council

21
from India. ASEAN-India capacity development is evident in the Information and Communications
Technology (ICT) cooperation. This is yet another area of synergy that includes the strengthening
of ICT infrastructures addressing the various supply-chain risks and vulnerabilities of ICT products
and systems, ICT security, capacity building and knowledge sharing in areas such as digital economy,
digital connectivity, e-commerce, FinTech, Artificial Intelligence (AI), big data, cross-border data flows
in compliance with the existing national laws and regulations, and the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

ASEAN India cooperative efforts in capacity building is also reflected in maritime cooperation,
focusing on maritime security, India’s support in counter piracy operations and prevention of armed
robbery against ships, maritime safety and search and rescue (SAR) operations, and information
sharing administered through appropriate mechanisms under the ASEAN-India framework and other
appropriate ASEAN-led mechanisms. The various capacity building measures enhance the Indo Pacific
convergences between ASEAN and India (Bhattacharya: 2020).18

ASEAN-Australia Indo Pacific Outlooks has been focused on the Plan of Action that guides the
implementation of the goals and objectives of the ASEAN-Australia Strategic Partnership for 2020-
2024 (Plan of Action: 2019).19 The Plan of Action POA builds on the robust history of cooperation
and partnership between ASEAN and Australia that been in place since 1974. It was elevated to a
Strategic Partnership in 2014 reaffirming that ASEAN and Australia are partners with vital stakes in the
dynamic Indo Pacific region that is undergoing major changes. Capacity Building measures have been
comprehensive in the post-COVID period.

Australia and ASEAN are working on the implementation of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster
Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) Work Programme for the period 2016-2020 and
beyond, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management’s
ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Centre (AHA Centre) are the various ongoing initiatives that has
further exploration in other areas of collaboration.

ASEAN and Australia do have a robust partnership and capacity building in Maritime security through
the promotion of maritime security and safety, enhancing the freedom of navigation and overflight,
fostering of unimpeded commerce, the exercise of self-restraint, the non-use of force or the restraint on
the threat to use force, and the resolution of disputes by peaceful means, in accordance with universally
recognised principles of international law that includes the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the relevant standards and recommended practices of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and instruments and conventions of the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) (Prabhakar: 2009).20

ASEAN and Australia are endeavoring strengthening cooperation on the ASEAN Connectivity
agenda, through various plans of implementation and communication. Both parties do have outreach,
monitoring, and evaluation of the Master Plan on ASEAN. Connectivity (MPAC) 2025 and through
other regional fora. The Master Plan also envisages for the ASEAN-Australia Infrastructure Cooperation
programme and the ASEAN-Australia Smart Cities initiative, these are initiatives arising from the
ASEAN-Australia Special Summit to deliver the goals of MPAC 2025 sustainable infrastructure projects
(ASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation Program: 2016).21

ASEAN and Australia are also endeavoring to work on a secure, stable, accessible and peaceful
Information and Communication Technology by which they foster Cooperation on national CERT
(Community Emergency Response Team)-to-CERT cyber response, efforts, and cyber information

22
exchanges. Australia and ASEAN cooperate closely where cyber incidents have direct impact on
them by leveraging on the ARF Points of Contact Directory on Security of and In the Use of ICTs and
established contacts in the CERT community (ASEAN - Australia Digital Trade Standards Cooperation
Initiative: 2018).22

ASEAN and Australia have been working to strengthen dialogue and cooperation on sustainable
development, promoting complementarities between the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 and the
UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development through exchange of best practices and capacity
building in areas of poverty eradication, infrastructure and connectivity, sustainable management of
natural resources, sustainable consumption and production and resilience (ASEAN, Australia review
implementation of development cooperation: 2019).23

Australia-India shares a vision for the Indo-Pacific that is free, open, inclusive, resilient rules-based
order in the region. India’s vision of SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) has been
able to project its Indo Pacific Oceans Initiative that has several factors of economic development,
maritime ecology, maritime resources, resource sharing, academic cooperation, enhanced commerce
and trade and transportation. Australia and India had signed the AIIPOIP to sync the strategic and
security partnership comprehensively encompassing the various aspects of the respective outlooks of
the Indo Pacific (Joint Declaration on a Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation: 2020).24

Australia and India do have various capacity building initiatives in the South Pacific. India has its own
initiative of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). Australia has been engaging the South Pacific through its
‘Pacific Setup’ that has enlarged its outreach in the region. India has been able to reinforce its outreach
with Pacific Island countries. Cooperation and dialogue with these countries is through Forum for
India–Pacific Island Cooperation (FIPIC), which is an extension of India’s Act East Policy. India has
committed US $ 1 million for each of the Pacific Island state of a total of US$12 million grant towards
implementation of high impact developmental project, as also concessional Lines of Credit of US$
150 million (Singh: 2022).25 Australia and India are committed to various partnerships on various
mechanisms on climate change and energy security.

There is the India led International Solar Alliance (ISA) and Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure
(CDRI). Australia supported the cause with 1 million AUD for ISA and 10 million AUD for the CDRI.
Australia and India are leveraging their regional roles for maritime security cooperation and capacity
building in terms of providing security for the smaller states in the Indo Pacific region. Through their
regional leadership roles in IONS and IORA, Australia, and India work to provide peace, prosperity,
and regional security to island nations as well as their own island territories. Australia and India are
engaged in the development of bases in India’s Nicobar Islands and Australia’s Cocos (Keeling) Island
along with Indonesia (Eurasian Times Global Desk: 2020).26

Australia and India have been engaged substantially in operational exchange at naval fleet levels.
Given the advantage of some common equipment platforms between the two navies they benefit
from greater interoperability and enhanced maritime domain awareness. The Australia-India AIIPOIP
has synergies with ASEAN’s Outlook on Indo-Pacific, Australia–ASEAN Plan and India–ASEAN Plan of
Action thus brings greater synergies (Saha & Singh: 2022).27

The matrix of Capacity Building among ASEAN, Australia and India reveals that the common pillars of
digital economy, maritime safety, maritime ecology, ICT, and the pursuit of UN Sustainable Development
Goals are evident. The convergences in the outlooks and objectives of the Indo Pacific among the three

23
states provide for the emerging of common interests by which the triangular relations between the
actors are well established. Building the Outlooks of the Indo Pacific essentially rests on the nature
and scope of mutual capacity building and responses that ASEAN, Australia and India sustain.

Common interests in the Indo Pacific

ASEAN, Australia, and India are thus partners that are operating from the same page of their outlooks
of the Indo Pacific. What are the common interests that converge the three actors? How do these
common interests enable the operationalizing of the respective outlooks of the Indo Pacific?

Five common interests are the converging factors among the ASEAN, Australia, and India that
predominate the focus of the actors and determine the larger agenda of the Indo Pacific that is apart
from the traditional security concerns. These common interests are the common features that are
reflective in the respective Indo Pacific Outlooks.

Maritime security, safety, connectivity and transportation constitute the vital aspect of the Indo Pacific
region. Given the geographic centrality of Southeast Asia, ASEAN enjoys the connectivity with India
and Australia in terms of the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) and the interconnectedness of the
seas and the oceans.

Cooperation on traditional and nontraditional spheres of maritime security has been increasing among
the three actors. This has resulted in the navies and coastguards exercising with each other as well
as routine Freedom of Navigation Patrols in the region. Besides, the three actors have converged
on a variety of navigational safety measures and have also looked to enhance Maritime Domain
Awareness (MDA) of the region through constant exchange of information. Maritime connectivity and
Transportation are a vital factor that has seen growth of the container traffic between the actors and
has been vital in the free flow of maritime trade and commerce across the three actors in the region
(De: 2021).28

Trade and Commerce constitutes the vital lifeline among the three actors. The maritime based trade
and commerce has been smooth and has progressed well. The Comprehensive Economic Partnerships
and the Free Trading Areas have facilitated the three-way trade between ASEAN, Australia, and India
(Tyler: 2021).29 Although India had not joined the RCEP, yet trade volumes between India-ASEAN
and India-Australia have not flagged. ASEAN has been urging India to join the RCEP for the sake
of enhanced regional economic integration and enhanced regional trade partnerships. Trade and
commerce between ASEAN, Australia, and India would serve as an effective offset against any regional
trade issues (Seshadri: 2019).30

Digital Economy and ICT Infrastructure Development emerges as the vital template of the regional
economies with the associated ICT infrastructure development. As the economies transform with
various measures and protocols in cyberspace, the Digital Economy emerges on the platforms of
the transforming ICT infrastructure (Anukoonwattaka, W., P. Romao, P. Bhogal, T. Bentze, and R.S.
Lobo (2021).31 The growing ICT cyberspace and its infrastructure developments would result in the
enhanced regional digital connectivity as well as the permeation of the ICT networks in the various
sectors of the economy that brings about the transformative impact in the actors` economies as well
as the digital economy. The Indo Pacific of the emerging future would thus have digital economies and
the growing cyberspace presence and impact (Ray, Jain, Jayakumar & Reddy: 2021).32

24
Contending Climate Change Risks are real challenges as the Indo Pacific region - especially the Pacific
is known to be the ‘Ring of Fire’ with extreme seismic volatility and the severe weather changes that
have come in the region (Fetzek & McGinn: 2020).33 Sea level rise and the accompanied littoral erosion
has been very much evident in the region. Pollution is yet another source that has its adverse impact
on climate. Marine pollution and air pollution have been persistent threats that have threatened the
region (World Meteorological Organization: 2021).34 The Indo Pacific Outlooks do focus on the task
of contending the climate change challenges and risks. Cooperation on Climate Change is a vital task
that the ASEAN, Australia, and India are prioritizing for mitigating the various risks.

Sustainable Development Goals emerges as the common denominator for the ASEAN, Australia, and
India even as the pace of change warrants it. However, the three actors have varied interpretations of
what constitutes the acceptability of all the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Grunbuhel &
Melati: 2020).35 The norms and values of ASEAN on its inclusiveness and noninterference in internal
affairs may lead to partial acceptance of the SDGs. Australia on its part has its full conformity with the
SDGs as evidenced by the 56 indicators of the SDG programme (Munro: 2021).36 India for its part has
adopted eight goals of the SDGs for attainment of its sustainability (India Voluntary National Review:
2020).37 In the long run, the three actors are working for the total objectives of the UN Sustainable
Development Goals programmes. The three actors thus endeavor for the attainment of the above-
mentioned common interests that align with their respective outlooks of the Indo Pacific.

In summation, the Indo Pacific outlooks of ASEAN, Australia and India reflect the growing sense
of identity-based convergence of their objectives that augur for the greater regional identities and
exclusive characteristics being grafted into the Indo Pacific vision statements. Given the uncertainties
of the great power rivalries in the region, the middle powers of ASEAN as a bloc actor, Australia and
India seem to navigate the convergent path of identities as a basis of working synergies to build their
respective social, economic, ecological and infrastructure development that is non-treaty based as
well non-confrontational aiming towards enhanced regional integration. ASEAN, Australia, and India
also share the common axes of maritime contiguity and have affirmed their interest on the importance
of Free Open and Inclusive Indo Pacific that is the larger interest of peace, security, stability, and the
prosperity of the Indo Pacific.

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36. Munro, Virginia (2021) Creating genuine change through SDG implementation, ProBono Australia, accessed at
https://probonoaustralia.com.au/news/2021/08/creating-genuine-change-through-sdg-implementation/.

37. India: Voluntary National Review Report 2020, Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Platform,
accessed at
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/memberstates/india

28
 2
Understanding Asean Outlook
on the Indo-Pacific

Vo Xuan Vinh

Introduction

Proposed by Japanese Prime Minister ABE Shinzo in 2007, the Indo-Pacific concept was revived by
U.S. President Trump’s remarks at the APEC CEO Summit held in Vietnam in November 2017. The first
U.S.-Japan-India-Australia Consultations (Quad) began in the Philippines that same month, marking a
significant advance in the Quad. However, about a year before that, in August 2016, Japanese Prime
Minister ABE Shinzo announced his vision for “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” in his keynote address at
the sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) held in Kenya. Japan
has then in 2017, 2018 and 2019 respectively released Diplomatic Bluebooks with the main theme of
Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. Other Quad members have also announced their own versions
of Indo-Pacific to affirm their strategy in the region.

The US has gradually shaped its Indo-Pacific strategy through published documents such as Indo-
Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region released
by the Department of Defense in June 2019, Department of State’s A Free and Open Indo-Pacific:
Advancing a Shared Vision (November 4, 2019), United States Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific
(January, 2021), and Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States (UN) (February, 2002), among others.
Not as much as Japan and the US have done, Australia and India have both given their perspectives
on the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s most significant documents on the Indo-Pacific are its 2016 Defence
White Paper, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, and 2020 Defence Strategic Update (Matthew Parry:
2022).1 India eventually embraced the concept of a free, open, inclusive Indo-Pacific through Modi’s
speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue (Ministry of External Affairs (Government of India: 2018)2 in 2018.
In terms of mechanism, Indo-Pacific began with the senior official-level meeting in November, 2017 in

29
the Philippines, which was then upgraded to Foreign Ministers’ Meetings (the first meeting held on 26
September 2019 in New York), and Leader’s Summit of Quad (the first meeting was virtually held on
March 12, 2021). For its part, China, the country has important role in maintaining peace and security in
the Indo-Pacific considered Quad as ‘essentially a tool for containing and besieging China to maintain
US hegemony’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China: 2022).3

ASEAN and its member states-the heart of the Indo-Pacific region, strongly supported by Quad
countries for the former’s unity, centrality and its Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (The White House.:2021).4
‘ASEAN-China relations are among the most dynamic, substantive, and mutually beneficial partnerships
between ASEAN and its dialogue partners’ (Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 2021).5 The
ASEAN-China relationship was upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2021, and since
2009 China surpassed the EU-27 and Japan to become ASEAN’s largest trade in goods partner (The
Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 2010).6 While all four partners, the US, Japan, India and
Australia combined, accounted for 23.45 per cent of ASEAN’s the total value of trade in goods in
2019, China alone accounted for 17.55 per cent of the grouping’s total trade in the same year (ASEAN
Statistical Yearbook: 2020).7

Although ASEAN faces security challenges, especially the South China Sea issue, its member states,
including allies of the US such as the Philippines and Thailand, have not risked taking sides due to their
close trade relationship with direct neighbor China. ASEAN has strived to maintain its centrality in the
evolving architecture in the Asia-Pacific, now Indo-Pacific through ASEAN-led mechanisms such as
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), and ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus
(ADMM-Plus). AOIP released bases on that goal. Therefore, in order to make implications for Australia
and India, the article will clarify perspectives of ASEAN Member States (AMS) on the Indo-Pacific
concept and give a local interpretation of AOIP.

Perspectives of ASEAN Member States on Indo-Pacific Concept

Because each AMS has its national interests in the evolving Indo-Pacific order, especially in their
relationship with major countries that have influence on the region, each AMS has its own perspective
on the Indo-Pacific concept.

Brunei Darussalam
To date, Brunei Darussalam has not made any unilateral official position on the Indo-Pacific. The
country has only expressed its view within the framework of ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms. As a
microstate, Brunei cannot escape the actions of the great powers in the region, particularly the rivalry
between the United States and China (Omar, Abdul Malik: 2018).8 but taking the advantages created
by the rivalry. While heavily relying on American security protection (The US Navy:2018).9 in the
region and depending on international law to sustain and guarantee its sovereignty and independence
(Omar, Abdul Malik: op cit),10 Brunei has been looking for ways to diversify its economy and promote
investments into the country (Gnanasagaran A: 2018).11 Favorable foreign direct investments from
China throughout the years leads Brunei to establish stronger alignment with China, rather than going
against it (Putra, B. A: 2021).12 However, China’s overtly aggressive stance in the South China Sea has
also made the Southeast Asian country cautious because Brunei does not want to be seen as too
friendly to China. At the same time, hurdles between Brunei and the US have also arisen after Brunei
decided to implement phases two and three of the Sharia Penal Code in 2019. As a result, Brunei
engages the strategy of Omni-enmeshment of ASEAN peaceful norms in the region (Ibid).13

30
Laos PDR
Due to its strong influence on Laos PDR in recent years, China was reportedly evaluated as ‘one
of Laos’ closest political allies and trade partners’ (Hutt, David: 2021).14 Implemented Indo-Pacific
strategy, the U.S. has approached Laos PDR (US Embassy in Laos: 2018)15 but so far it seems that there
is no official document from Laos PDR that mentions of Indo-Pacific. Laos’ official stance on the Indo-
Pacific is reflected in ASEAN documents, notably the AOIP.

Taking power in 2015, the NLD-led civilian government in Myanmar was quickly condemned by the
US and the West for its silence on Myanmar military’s actions against Rohingyas. Sanctions have
been posed on key figures of Myanmar military for their role in “ethnic cleansing” against Rohingya
Muslims and ‘widespread human rights abuses’ against other ethnic minority groups (Wong, Edward:
2018).16 As a result, pro-democracy Aung San Suu Kyi has moved closer to China, the country along
with Russia have defended Myanmar by blocking UNSC statement on the situation in Rakhine State
of Myanmar (The Irrawaddy. 2017).17 Pressure on Myanmar after the coup in February 2021 has pushed
Myanmar closer to China. In that context, Myanmar seems to have never officially mentioned the Indo-
Pacific, but only expressed its perspective through the AOIP.

Cambodia
In recent years, Cambodia has been judged as pro-China. Chinese political influence in Cambodia is
strong (Vannarith, Chheang: 2018).18 A survey report released by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Office
Cambodia in May 2021 highlighted that ‘Cambodians point to China as the best foreign partner for
their country across a range of issues’ (Southall, Emily et al.: 2021).19 In the meantime, unlike Brunei,
Cambodia does not choose to be silent in expressing its unilateral views on Indo-Pacific by raising
voice to support Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. Prime Minister Hun Sen was the first
ASEAN leader to express full support for Japan’s FOIP during his official visit to Tokyo in August
2017 (Chanborey, Cheunboran.:2021).20 Hun Manet, the eldest son of Prime Minister Hun Sen and the
Commander of Cambodia’s Army said he supported the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific (of Japan)
during his visit to Tokyo in February 2022 (The Japan Times: 2022).21 Facing with challenges posed
by the U.S. criticizes and sanctions, Cambodia has become pro-China but it ‘prioritizes its domestic
agenda and interests, exercises a hedging strategy to mitigate risks, advances multilateralism and
strengthens ASEAN-driven regional architecture’ (Vannarith Chheang:2022).22 That is why Cambodia
has endorsed the AOIP, especially the principles pertaining to ASEAN centrality, openness, inclusivity,
and respect for sovereignty( Chanborey, Cheunboran: op cit, p.22).23

Traditionally pursuing East Asian regionalism with Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s proposal of
East Asian Economic Group (EAEG), and then Prime Minister Abdulla Badawi supported for East Asia
Summit including countries from East Asia (Frost, Frank: 2016).24 Malaysia seems to be wary of a US-
led Indo-Pacific discourse which is anti-China. To mitigate the risks and maximize the opportunities
arising from China’s great power behavior, Malaysia employed a hedging strategy, at the same time
well-balanced relations with the U.S., Japan, and ASEAN (Gerstl, Alfred: 2020).25 That is the reason
why Malaysian leaders and officials have largely been silent on the Indo-Pacific discourse (Kuik,
Cheng-Chwee: 2019).26 After having agreed with ASEAN to develop the AOIP, Malaysia began to refer
to the Indo-Pacific but with a less sensitive term ‘Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions’. The term was
mentioned 13 times in its Defense White Paper 2020 (Ministry of Defence of Malaysia: 2020).27

31
The Philippines
Despite being an ally of the U.S., the Philippines still avoids using the term Indo-Pacific in its official
unilateral documents. Perhaps one of the most important reasons is the Beijing-cozy up policy
under President Duterte. However, in the face of China’s resolute actions in the South China Sea in
recent times, the Duterte administration has begun to make more balanced moves. On one hand, the
Philippines strengthens defense ties with the United States and its regional allies such as Japan, South
Korea, and Australia (Kumar, Yogendra: 2022).28 with commitments to supporting the security, stability
and prosperity of a free and open Indo-Pacific (US Defense Secretary: 2021).29 and strengthening
coordination in realizing free and open Indo-Pacific based on the rule of law, (Vietnam+: 2019).30 on
the other hand, it still wants to strengthen economic ties with China since China is its number one
largest trading partner (accounted for 19.1 per cent of Philippines’ total trade value in 2020, before
Japan-12.5 percent, and the US 11.5 per cent respectively) (Philippine Statistics Authority: 2021).31 At
the same time, the Philippines attached the importance of ASEAN in its foreign policy while jointly
with the US upheld the central role of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific region, recognized ASEAN as being
vital to regional security and prosperity (US Department of States: 2021).32

Thailand
As an ally of the US but facing US criticism, especially the US exclusion its strategic actions in the
Asia-Pacific after the 2014 coup, Thailand has subsequently constructed an alliance with China
(Chachavalpongpun, Pavin: 2020).33 However, in reviving the Indo-Pacific strategy, the US has increased
its engagement with Thai government of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-Ocha. Strong political-economic
and security ties with China and the benefits that come from being an ally of the US have made
Thailand to adopt a balancing strategy in handling its relations with the two superpowers (Ibid).34
Thailand on one hand has strongly supported China’s Belt and Road (BRI), it actively participated in
the US. Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Strategy in the other by reaffirming the importance of the
enduring alliance with the US and discussing their shared commitment to promoting peace, security,
and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond (The American Presidency Project:2017).35
organizing Thailand-Australia Indo-Pacific Strategic Dialogue (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kingdom
of Thailand): 2021).36 or joining 57 other countries from the Indo-Pacific region to discuss a range of
issues at the Indo Pacific Ministerial Forum 2022 (Thai PBS World: 2022).37

However, like many other ASEAN countries, in Thailand’s Indo-Pacific approach, ASEAN plays an
important role. Thai’s 20-Year “5S” Foreign Affairs Masterplan (2018-2037) seeks to step up the
nation’s role in helping to advance stability in the region, and to strengthen ASEAN centrality in
the evolving geopolitical landscape (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kingdom of Thailand): The 20-Year
“5S”).38 In declaring Thailand-Australia Strategic Partnership 2020, two countries reaffirm their strong
commitment to the ASEAN-centered regional architecture (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(Australian Government): 2020).39

Singapore
Singapore is among the most strategic partners of the U.S. in the region but we have rarely heard the
term Indo-Pacific unilaterally announced from this Southeast Asian country’s leader. In the context
of the rapid rise of China, with the view that the US presence in the Asia-Pacific region has fostered
peace and stability which is generally beneficial to the countries in the region, Singapore emphasized
that it is more important for the US to remain anchored in the Asia-Pacific, and play an active role

32
in upholding peace and stability in the region (Yeo, Lay Hwee: 2018).40 For Singapore, acceleration
of ASEAN regional cooperation is the second most important goal of its foreign policy, immediately
following protection of its national security and interests (Grzywacz, Anna: 2019).41 Therefore, when
talking about Indo-Pacific, the Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue
in 2018 placed Indo-Pacific on a par with China’s BRI, and ASEAN centrality ( CAN: 2019).42

The Indonesian leader seems to be the only one in ASEAN who has publicly announced the Indo-
Pacific term. Even before Japan announced their own IP in 2016, in a keynote address to an Indonesia
conference at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on 20 May 2013,
Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa laid out ‘An Indonesian Perspective on the Indo-Pacific’
(Natalegawa, Marty: 2013).43 Aiming at being a peace-maker, confidence-builder, problem-solver, and
bridge-builder’, (Agastia, I Gusti Bagus Dharma: 2020).44 and decades of being the de facto leader
of ASEAN, after the Indo-Pacific concept had been revived by US President Donald Trump, in January
2018, Indonesia conveyed a proposal of the concept of Indo Pacific at ASEAN Foreign Ministers
Retreat Meetings, namely Indonesia’s perspective for an ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific: towards
a peaceful, prosperous, and inclusive region. Then, on 9th August 2018, Foreign Minister Retno formally
presented the Indonesian Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept to the 8th Ministerial Meeting of the East
Asia Summit (The Free Library. Introducing the Indo-Pacific Concept).45 After rounds of discussions,
ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific, based on Indonesian Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept. Aiming to
offset great power politics (Tham, Jansen: 2018).46 in the region, Indonesia promotes a non-aligned
and ASEAN-centered Indo-Pacific (Hoang, Thi Ha: 2021).47 which could cement Indonesia’s status
as ASEAN’s leader and as a global middle power (Weatherbee, Donald E: 2019).48 On the basis of
Indonesia’s initiative, ASEAN has built ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific.

Sharing borderline with China, the same political system and having close economic relations with
the world’s second largest economy (Trade with China accounted for 24.41 per cent of Vietnam’s
total trade value: 2020),49 although realizing benefits from good relations with Quad members,
Vietnam has been very cautious at least from publicly and directly mentioning of the term Indo-
Pacific. Officially, Vietnam still uses the term “Asia-Pacific region” as reflected in the Political Report
of the recent 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) (Communist Party of
Vietnam: 2021).50 When the term Indo-Pacific is used in the Vietnam National Defense White Paper
2019, the balance-of-power strategy is clearly reflected when assessing the changes of Asia-Pacific
region, the Defence White Paper of Vietnam 2019 mentions of some new initiatives such as the “Free
and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”, “Belt and Road Initiative”, and “Act East Policy” (Ministry of National
Defence (Socialist Republic of Vietnam): 2019).51 Interestingly, in Vietnam National Defense White
Paper 2019, the term Indo-Pacific is used to refer to Vietnam’s readiness ‘to participate in security
and defence cooperation mechanisms suitable to its capabilities and interests, including security and
defence mechanisms in the Indo-Pacific region as well as those of the European Union and the United
Nations’ (UN). (Ministry of National Defence (Socialist Republic of Vietnam): op cit., p.29).52 However,
for Vietnam, ASEAN centrality in the region is very important. The Political Report of the recent 13th
National Congress of the CPV affirms that Vietnam works to firmly maintain ASEAN centrality in
regional security architecture. (Communist Party of Vietnam: Ibid).53 Before that, the Defence White
Paper of Vietnam 2019 highlights Vietnam’s advocacy of ‘expanding cooperation between ASEAN with
external partners within the ASEAN-led multilateral security mechanisms on the basis of respecting
fundamental principles, standards and norms of ASEAN’ (Ministry of National Defence: Op cit., p.29).54

33
The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: A Local Interpretation
To adapt to the new context, especially after ASEAN member countries agreed to participate in China’s
BRI, discussing and reaching the consensus on Indonesia-proposed Indo-Pacific Concept, ASEAN
announced AOIP in June 2019.

AOIP is based on the principles of strengthening ASEAN Centrality, openness, transparency,

inclusivity, a rules-based framework, good governance, respect for sovereignty, non-intervention,
complementarity with existing cooperation frameworks, equality, mutual respect, mutual trust, mutual
benefit and respect for international law, such as UN Charter, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea, and other relevant UN treaties and conventions, the ASEAN Charter and various ASEAN
treaties and agreements and the East Asia Summit Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations (2011).
The Outlook is also guided by the purposes and principles contained in the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).

The key elements of the Outlook are:

(a) A perspective of viewing the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, not as contiguous territorial
spaces but as a closely integrated and interconnected region, with ASEAN playing a central and
strategic role;
(b) An Indo-Pacific region of dialogue and cooperation instead of rivalry;
(c) An Indo-Pacific region of development and prosperity for all;
(d) The importance of the maritime domain and perspective in the evolving regional architecture.

The Outlook aims at:

(a) Offering an outlook to guide cooperation in the region;
(b) Helping to promote an enabling environment for peace, stability and prosperity in the region in
addressing common challenges, upholding the rules-based regional architecture, and promoting
closer economic cooperation, and thus strengthen confidence and trust;
(c) Enhancing ASEAN’s Community building process and further strengthening the existing ASEAN-
led mechanisms;
(d) Implementing existing and exploring other ASEAN priority areas of cooperation.

The UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030, maritime cooperation, connectivity, and economic
cooperation are some of the areas of cooperation that have been identified in order to realise the key
components of the Outlook. Other possible areas of cooperation are also included.

The Outlook is the ASEAN’s adaptation to the strong competition for influence between the US and
China in Southeast Asia, a geographical centre of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. The FOIP
could create a new regional mechanism which could marginalise ASEAN and erode its centrality
(Chanborey, Cheunboran: op cit., p.22).55 Therefore, ASEAN countries worked to come up with a
common position on a geopolitical framework for the Indo-Pacific to ensure that the 10-member
grouping is not marginalized (Nikkei Asia: 2018).56 At the same time, the countries of Southeast Asia
are unwilling to support one side in the rivalry between the US and China.

34
However, the term Indo-Pacific was something sensitive, especially with China. Therefore, as mentioned
above, Foreign Minister Retno formally presented the Indonesian Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept
to the 8th Ministerial Meeting of the East Asia Summit in August 2018, after Indonesia conveyed the
proposal of Indonesia’s perspective for an ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific to ASEAN Foreign
Ministers Retreat Meeting in January 2018. ASEAN wanted to make clear to China that Indo-Pacific
was merely a geographical term, not a political one. Obviously, ASEAN also sent a signal to the US that
it supported the US Indo-Pacific concept in its own way. From ASEAN perspective, the Indo-Pacific is
a ‘region of dialogue and cooperation instead of rivalry’.

A point of primary concern is the central role of ASEAN. In this document, there are two key highlights
of the AOIP associated with ASEAN centrality. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is founded
on the concepts of enhancing ASEAN Centrality, according to the first tenet indicated. And second,
‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific envisages ASEAN Centrality’. ASEAN hopes that AOIP will help
maintain its central role in the evolving regional architecture in Southeast Asia and its surrounding
regions. In the AOIP, ASEAN centrality is placed in ASEAN-led mechanisms, including the East Asia
Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus
(ADMM-Plus), the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF), and ASEAN Plus One mechanisms. The
ASEAN-led multilateral system has enabled smaller states to have their own voices in regional affairs,
strengthened ASEAN’s leverage vis-à-vis great powers (CHOI, Ina: 2020).57

In terms of areas of cooperation, bringing maritime cooperation to the forefront, on the one hand, shows
ASEAN’s priority in responding to challenges from marine space, on the other hand it harmonizes the
common interest in this space of the Quad (In the Joint Statement on Quad Cooperation in the Indo-
Pacific: 2022)58 as well as those of China (In the ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea’:2002).59 For AMS, naming international law, freedom of navigation and overflight, and the
settlement of disputes by peaceful means in the Outlook is due to the fact that China has refused
to recognize the PCA’s 2016 rulings regarding the Philippines-China case, conducted more resolute
activities in the South China Sea, such as militarizing the features it occupied by force in the Spratlys
or carrying out many activities in the exclusive economic zones of other claimants in the South China
Sea. This also reflects the fact that ASEAN is more interested in dispute resolution before discussing
joint development with China while the latter wants to have joint exploration with other claimants.

Connectivity is also a strategic element that demonstrates ASEAN’s calculation in taking advantages
of China’s BRI, and the Quad’s FOIP since it locates at the heart of Indo-Pacific region, at least from
geographical perspective, especially since the AOIP identifies that ‘the Declaration on the 6th East
Asia Summit on ASEAN Connectivity should guide the ASEAN outlook on connectivity in Indo-Pacific
region’.

The contents about SDGs targets and economic cooperation represent the goals of economic
development and improvement of people’s lives, which are the goals of all AMS. It further affirms
ASEAN’s desire to achieve the SDGs as well as enhance the competitiveness of its members’ economies
with external support, especially partners within the framework of ASEAN-led mechanisms.

Implications for Australia and India

The AOIP announcement has had an influence on nations with strategic interests in the area, including
Australia and India, two Quad members and nations that emphasize ASEAN’s crucial role in their
regional strategies. In 2012, Australia released the White Paper titled ‘Australia in the ASEAN Century,

35
(Australian Government: 2012).60 in which ‘members of ASEAN are of special relevance to Australian
interests (Australian Government: Op cit, p.72).61 India for its parts upgraded its Look East Policy
(LEP) to Act East Policy (EAP), which ‘is an important part of India’s Indo-Pacific vision’ and ‘ASEAN
is and always will be the heart of AEP’ (Ministry of External Affairs (Government of India): 2019).62
In that context, a better understanding of AOIP is important for the implementation of Indo-Pacific
strategy of each country. The following are some implications drawn from the AOIP analysis from the
perspectives of every AMS.

First, ASEAN does not want to take sides, including US allies, in the US-China strategic competition.
Instead, they carry out policies of balance of great power. ASEAN and its member countries only want
to take advantage of the economic and investment benefits brought by China’s BRI, and at the same
time they want the Quad countries to be more involved in security to ensure the rules-based order,
especially in the South China Sea to limit China’s unreasonable ambitions in this sea. Therefore, the
constructive engagement, observance and protection of international law carried out by the Quad is
really important to the maintenance of the rules-based order, security, peace and prosperity in the
region.

Second, the introduction of the AOIP once again affirmed ASEAN’s desire to maintain its centrality
in the evolving regional architecture. The history of multilateral integration in the Indo-Pacific region
has shown the importance of ASEAN through ASEAN-led mechanisms such as ARF, EAS, ADMM+,
EAMF. The Quad’s strong support for ASEAN’s unity and centrality and for ASEAN’s Outlook on
the Indo-Pacific, (The White House: 2021)63 and ‘support ASEAN partners to advance the practical
implementation of ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’ (US Mission to ASEAN: 2022).64 demonstrate
the Quad’s support and recognition of ASEAN centrality in the region.

Third, the imbalance of power influence in Southeast Asia, especially in strategic spaces such as the
South China Sea and Mekong subregion, can increase the risk of insecurity in the region. Therefore,
multilateral participation of other nations with interests in the region, including Australia and India,
is crucial. If the South China Sea has experienced efforts of outside countries in establishing a legal-
based order, or at least, this goal is being pursued with actual commitments and actions by the outside
countries, the Mekong sub-region seems to be a new competitive front between countries having
interests in the region. Over the years, Australia and India, among others have engaged in the region,
but the extent of involvement appears to be limited. Sustainable technology-based support with the
long-term vision of each country for the region is extremely important. In the South China Sea issue,
ASEAN has conducted bilateral maritime exercises within the framework of China (2018) and the US
(2019) respectively. Bilateral maritime exercises in the South China Sea between ASEAN and other
dialogue partners such as Australia and India in the framework of EAS also need to be released soon,
demonstrating cooperation efforts between ASEAN countries and its partners in ensuring maritime
space security for all.

Fourth, besides security and connectivity, the economy is also an important area. If Australia is an
important and active leading partner in Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)
negotiations, India had withdrawn from this process a year before the RCEP was concluded. India’s
withdrawal from RCEP was explained that ‘the present form of the RCEP Agreement does not fully
reflect the basic spirit and the agreed guiding principles of RCEP’ and ‘it also does not address
satisfactorily India’s outstanding issues and concerns’, including, among others, challenges put India’s
‘domestic industry and agriculture at risk’ (The Economic Times: 2019).65 However, India’s absence in

36
the RCEP, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)
means India’s absence from one of the key multilateral economic platforms in the Asia-Pacific. If
India really wants to become a ‘key factor’ in the Indo-Pacific space, as the 6th largest economy in the
world. However, India’s absence in the RCEP, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) means India’s absence from one of the key multilateral economic
platforms in the Asia-Pacific. If India really wants to become a ‘key factor’ in the Indo-Pacific space,
as the 6th largest economy in the world (IMF, 2021),66 India should not be absent from the economic
multilateral game in this region. Although India has concluded free trade agreements (FTAs) with
ASEAN, with some AMS, Japan, and South Korea, it is clear that the economic power game in the
Indo-Pacific is much more than that with the new generation FTAs such as CPTPP and RCEP, where
India is completely absent.

Last but not least, ASEAN has also worked closely with its dialogue partners to promote its Indo-
Pacific version (Chanborey, Cheunboran: Op cit., p.22).67 Given the diplomatic and political significance
of the AOIP, a high-level joint statement between ASEAN and its dialogue partners on cooperation
within the framework of the AOIP is very important, affirming the recognitions of ASEAN’s dialogue
partners of ASEAN centrality. The Joint Statement of the 23rd ASEAN-Japan Summit on Cooperation
on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific was released in November 2020. One year later, ASEAN-India
Joint Statement on Cooperation on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific for Peace, Stability, and
Prosperity in the region was also announced (28 October 2021). It is obvious that ASEAN is waiting
for an edition of the ASEAN-Australia Joint Statement on Cooperation on ASEAN Outlook on the
Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion
AOIP was built at the initiative of Indonesia but is the product of the common strategic calculations
of ASEAN as a bloc, and as those of member countries to adapt to the strategic competition among
powers in the region. As small countries, receiving a lot of economic benefits from China, and security
and economic benefits from the US, AMS have chosen the path of balance of power or hedging
instead of taking sides. In that choice, each AMS has considered the important role of ASEAN in their
foreign policy. To ensure the interests of each member state, maintaining the central role of ASEAN is
paramount, whether this role may be implicitly given by major powers or because of the disagreement
in the distribution of spheres of influence among major powers. It is very important for Australia
and India, the key partners of ASEAN, and members of the Quad to understand the foreign policy
of each AMS, which is partly reflected in the AOIP. Efforts to maintain a rules-based regional order,
ensure freedom of navigation, overflight, unimpeded commerce, and enforce and protect UNCLOS
have been undertaken by Australia and India unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally is essential.
While Australia should have a joint statement on cooperation with AOIP, India should consider deeper
its integration into Indo-Pacific economic life. Substantial engagement with a clear strategic vision of
countries having interests in the region, including Australia and India in the Mekong sub-region, will
make significant contributions to maintaining the balance of power in the region, an important factor
to ensure security and maintain regional peace.

37
References:

1. Matthew Parry 2022, Australia’s strategic view of the Indo-Pacific, European Parliamentary
Research Service, February,4. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
BRIE/2022/698917/EPRS_BRI(2022)698917_EN.pdf (Accessed on 10 March 2022).
2. Ministry of External Affairs (Government of India), 2018, Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at
Shangri La Dialogue, 01 June.
https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/
Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018 (Accessed on 11
March 2022).
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2022. Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Conference on February 11. https://www.fmprc.gov.
cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202202/t20220211_10641714.html
(Accessed on 11 March 2022).
4. The White House. 2021. Joint Statement from Quad Leaders, 24 September. https://www.
whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/joint-statement-from-quad-
leaders/ (Accessed on 11 March 2022).
5. Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 2021. ASEAN, Joint Statement of the ASEAN-
China Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue
Relations: Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Peace, Security, Prosperity and Sustainable
Development, 22 November, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Joint-Statement-
30th-Anniversary-of-ASEAN-China-Dialogue-Relations-Final.pdf (Accessed on 11 March 2022).
6. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 2010. ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2010, Jakarta:
ASEAN Secretariat, December, 69.
7. ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2020, Calculated by the author from The Association of Southeast
Asian Nations. 2020, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, December, 65.
8. Omar, Abdul Malik. 2018, Brunei Between Big Powers: Managing US-China Rivalry in Asia,
The Diplomat, 30 November, https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/brunei-between-big-powers-
managing-us-china-rivalry-in-asia/ (Accessed on 15 March 2022).

9. The U.S. Navy carried out its 24th annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT)
maritime exercise at Brunei’s Muara Naval Base in November 2018.
10. Omar, Abdul Malik, op cit.

11. Gnanasagaran A. 2018, Brunei’s balancing act. The ASEAN Post, 15 February, https://
theaseanpost.com/article/bruneis-balancing-act (Accessed on 15 March 2022).
12. Putra, B. A. 2021, Comprehending Brunei Darussalam’s vanishing claims in the South China
Sea: China’s exertion of economic power and the influence of elite perception. Cogent Social
Sciences, Vol.7, No.1, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2020.1858563
(Accessed on 16 March 2022).
13. Ibid.

38
14. Hutt, David. 2021, How Mekong River is turning into a new flashpoint in Indo-Pacific, DW, 12
August, https://www.dw.com/en/how-mekong-river-is-turning-into-a-new-flashpoint-in-indo-
pacific/a-58842727 (Accessed on 17 March 2022).
15. U.S. Embassy in Laos. 2018, Senior US Official Meets with Lao Government to Discuss Indo-
Pacific Strategy, 16 October, https://la.usembassy.gov/senior-u-s-official-meets-with-lao-
government-to-discuss-indo-pacific-strategy/ (Accessed on 17 March 2022).

16. Wong, Edward. 2018, US Imposes Sanctions on Myanmar Military Over Rohingya Atrocities,
The New York Times, 17 August, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/17/us/politics/myanmar-
sanctions-rohingya.html (Accessed on 18 March 2022).

17. The Irrawaddy. 2017, Analysis: China Backs Myanmar at UN Security Council, 1 September,
https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/analysis-china-backs-myanmar-un-security-council.
html (Accessed on 18 March 2022).

18. Vannarith, Chheang. 2018, The Indo-Pacific Strategy and Small States’ Diplomacy. Outcome
Report, Regional Conference on Whither “The Indo-Pacific Strategy?”: Shifting Strategic
Landscape in the Asia-Pacific Region, 20-21 September, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 86.
19. Southall, Emily et al. 2021, Insights and Attitudes towards Society and Politics in Cambodia,
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 26 May, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung - Foundation Office Cambodia -
What Do Cambodians Think? (kas.de) (Accessed on 18 March 2022).
20. Chanborey, Cheunboran. 2021, Free and Open Indo-Pacific: A Cambodian Perspective, in Pich
Charadine Maurizio Paciello, Yet another Great Game? Indo-Pacific Strategies and Southeast
Asia, Diplomatic Briefing — KAS Cambodia and CICP, Issue 03/2021 – July, p.22.
21. The Japan Times. 2022, Japan and Cambodia affirm security cooperation in Indo-Pacific,
16 February, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/02/16/national/cambodia-security-
cooperation-indo-pacific/ (Accessed on 18 March 2022).

22. Vannarith Chheang, Cambodia’s multifaceted foreign policy and agency in the making, The
Pacific Review, Vol.35, No.2, 2022, 342.
23. Chanborey, Cheunboran, op cit, 22.
24. Frost, Frank. 2016, Engaging the neighbours: Australia and ASEAN since 1974. Canberra: The
Australian National University Press, 132-140.
25. Gerstl, Alfred. 2020, Malaysia’s Hedging Strategy Towards China Under Mahathir Mohamad
(2018–2020): Direct Engagement, Limited Balancing, and Limited Bandwagoning, Journal of
Current Chinese Affairs 2020, Vol. 49, No.1, 106-131.
26. Kuik, Cheng-Chwee. 2019, Mapping Malaysia in the Evolving Indo-Pacific Construct, Council for
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: CSCAP Regional Security Outlook 2020, http://www.
jstor.com/stable/resrep22261.14 (Accessed on 18 March 2022).
27. Ministry of Defence of Malaysia. 2020, Defence White Paper. Kuala Lumpur: ETM Prima Sdn.
Bhd.
28. Kumar, Yogendra. 2022, Philippines and the South China Sea, ICWA, 07 January, https://www.
icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=1&ls_id=6900&lid=4693 (Accessed on 21 March 2022)

39
29. US Defense Secretary. 2021, Philippines counterpart vow to support free, open Indo-Pacific,
ANI, 11 September, https://www.aninews.in/news/world/us/us-defense-secy-philippines-
counterpart-vow-to-support-free-open-indo-pacific20210911214923/ (Accessed on 19 March
2022).
30. Vietnam+. 2019, Japan, Philippines to work for free, open Indo-Pacific, 01 June, https://
en.vietnamplus.vn/japan-philippines-to-work-for-free-open-indopacific/153610.vnp (Accessed
on 19 March 2022).

31. Philippine Statistics Authority. 2021, The 2020 Foreign Trade Statistics of the Philippines,
Quezon City: Philippine Statistics Authority, August.
32. US Department of States. 2021, Joint Vision for a 21st Century United States-Philippines
Partnership, 16 November, https://www.state.gov/joint-vision-for-a-21st-century-united-states-
philippines-partnership/ (Accessed on 21 March 2022).
33. Chachavalpongpun, Pavin. 2020, Thailand in the midst of a US-China rivalry, Strategic Review,
22 October, https://sr.sgpp.ac.id/post/thailand-in-the-midst-of-a-us-china-rivalry (Accessed on
21 March 2022).

34. Ibid.

35. The American Presidency Project. 2017, Joint Statement by President Trump and Prime Minister
Prayut Chan-ocha of Thailand, 2 October, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/joint-
statement-president-trump-and-prime-minister-prayut-chan-ocha-thailand (Accessed on 21
March 2022).

36. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kingdom of Thailand). 2021, The 1st Indo-Pacific Strategic Dialogue
between Thailand-Australia, 5 August, https://www.mfa.go.th/en/content/indo-pacific-thai-aust
ralia?cate=5d5bcb4e15e39c306000683e (Accessed on 21 March 2022)
37. Thai PBS World. 2022, Thailand to attend Indo-Pacific Forum in Paris, 17 February, https://
www.thaipbsworld.com/thailand-to-attend-indo-pacific-forum-in-paris/ (Accessed on 21 March
2022)
38. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kingdom of Thailand). The 20-Year “5S” Foreign Affairs Masterplan
(2018-2037), https://www3.mfa.go.th/main/contents/files/policy-20200602-165400-237440.
pdf (Accessed on 21 March 2022).
39. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australian Government). 2020. Joint Declaration on
a Strategic Partnership between the Kingdom of Thailand and Australia, 13 November, https://
www.dfat.gov.au/geo/thailand/joint-declaration-strategic-partnership-between-kingdom-
thailand-and-australia (Accessed on 21 March 2022).
40. Yeo, Lay Hwee. 2018, Diplomacy, International Relations and Singapore’s Foreign Policy, in Yeo,
Lay Hwee et al., Tommy Koh : serving Singapore and the world, Singapore : World Scientific
Publishing Co. Pte Ltd., 7.

41. Grzywacz, Anna. 2019, Singapore’s Foreign Policy toward Regional and Inter-regional
Institutions, Asian Perspective, Vol.43, No.4, Fall, p.655.

40
42. CAN. 2019. In full: PM Lee Hsien Loong’s speech at the 2019 Shangri-La Dialogue, 31 May,
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/lee-hsien-loong-speech-2019-shangri-la-
dialogue-882451 (Accessed on 22 March 2022).

43. Natalegawa, Marty. 2013, An Indonesian perspective on the Indo-Pacific, The Jakarta Post,
20 May, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/05/20/an-indonesian-perspective-indo-
pacific.html (Accessed on 23 March 2022).
44. Agastia, I Gusti Bagus Dharma. 2020, Understanding Indonesia’s role in the ‘ASEAN Outlook on
the Indo-Pacific’: A role theory approach, Asia&the Pacific Policy Studies, Vol.7, No.3, 299.
45. The Free Library. Introducing the Indo-Pacific Concept, Indonesia Set the Tone at the East Asia
Summit, https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Introducing+the+Indo-Pacific+Concept%2C+Indonesia
+Set+the+Tone+at+the...-a0552412600 (Accessed on 24 March 2022).

46. Tham, Jansen. 2018, What’s in Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept? The Diplomat, 16
May, https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/whats-in-indonesias-indo-pacific-cooperation-concept/
(Accessed on 24 March 2022).

47. Hoang, Thi Ha. 2021, ASEAN Navigates between Indo-Pacific Polemics and Potentials, ISEAS
Perspective, No.49.
48. Weatherbee, Donald E. 2019, Indonesia, ASEAN, and the Indo฀Pacific Cooperation Concept.
ISEAS Perspective No. 47.
49. Trade with China accounted for 24.41 per cent of Vietnam’s total trade value in 2020
(US$133.092 billion out of US$545.320 billion) while commodity trade accounted for 201.100
per cent of Vietnam’s GDP in the same year. Calculated by the author from data of General
Statistic Office (Socialist Republic of Vietnam), Statistical data, https://www.gso.gov.vn/en/
statistical-data/ (Accessed on 24 March 2022).
50. Communist Party of Vietnam. 2021, Documents of the 13th Party Congress. Hanoi: National
Political Publishing House, https://file1.dangcongsan.vn/data/0/documents/2022/01/28/
phongnh/van-kien-dai-hoi-dai-bieu-lan-thu-xiii-tieng-anh.pdf (Accessed on 24 March 2022).
51. Ministry of National Defence (Socialist Republic of Vietnam), 2019, 2019 Vietnam National
Defence, Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 11.
52. Ministry of National Defence (Socialist Republic of Vietnam), op cit., p. 29.
53. Communist Party of Vietnam, Ibid.
54. Ministry of National Defence (Socialist Republic of Vietnam), op cit., p. 29.
55. Chanborey, Cheunboran op cit., p.22
56. Nikkei Asia. 2018, ASEAN crafts position on US ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ strategy, 2 August,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/ASEAN-crafts-position-on-US-Free-and-
Open-Indo-Pacific-strategy (Accessed on 25 March 2022).

57. CHOI, Ina. 2020, ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and Korea’s New Southern Policy.
KIEP Opinions, 30 March, 1.
58. In the Joint Statement on Quad Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (11 February 2022), Quad
countries ‘are determined to deepen engagement with regional partners, including through

41
 capacity-building and technical assistance, to strengthen maritime domain awareness; protect
their ability to develop offshore resources, consistent with UNCLOS; ensure freedom of
navigation and overflight; combat challenges, such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated
fishing; and promote the safety and security of sea lines of communication’. See U.S. Mission
to ASEAN. 2022, Joint Statement on Quad Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, 11 February, https://
asean.usmission.gov/joint-statement-on-quad-cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific/ (Accessed on
25 March 2022).
59. In the ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’ (2002), ASEAN countries
and China agree: ‘6. Pending a comprehensive and durable settlement of the disputes, the
Parties concerned may explore or undertake cooperative activities. These may include the
following:
a. marine environmental protection;
b. marine scientific research;
c. safety of navigation and communication at sea;
d. search and rescue operation; and
e. combating transnational crime, including but not limited to trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy
and armed robbery at sea, and illegal traffic in arms.
The modalities, scope and locations, in respect of bilateral and multilateral cooperation should
be agreed upon by the Parties concerned prior to their actual implementation’.
See Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea, https://asean.org/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2/
(Accessed on 25 March 2022).
60. Australian Government. 2012, Australia in the Asian Century: White Paper 2012.
61. Australian Government. Op cit, p.72.
62. Ministry of External Affairs (Government of India). 2019, Address by Prime Minister at the
inaugural ceremony of the 16th India-ASEAN Summit, 03 November, https://www.mea.gov.
in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/31996/Address_by_Prime_Minister_at_the_inaugural_
ceremony_of_the_16th_IndiaASEAN_Summit (Accessed on 26 March 2022)
63. The White House. 2021, Joint Statement from Quad Leaders, 24 September, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/joint-statement-from-quad-
leaders/ (Accessed on 26 March 2022).

64. US Mission to ASEAN. 2022, Joint Statement on Quad Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, 11
February, https://asean.usmission.gov/joint-statement-on-quad-cooperation-in-the-indo-
pacific/ (Accessed on 27 March 2022).
65. The Economic Times. 2019, India decides to opt out of RCEP, says key concerns not
addressed, The Economic Times, 5 November, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/
economy/foreign-trade/india-decides-to-opt-out-of-rcep-says-key-concerns-not-addressed/
articleshow/71896848.cms?from=mdr (Accessed on 27 March 2022).
66. IMF. 2021, World Economic Outlook Database: Report for Selected Countries and Subjects:
October, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2021/October (Accessed
on 27 March 2022).
67. Chanborey, Cheunboran, Op cit., p.22.

42
 3
Plastic Pollution in
the Bay of Bengal: Regulatory
Approaches to the Problem

Gerry Nagtzaam

Introduction
In the twentieth century plastics became ubiquitous globally (Richard C. Thompson: 2009).1 They
were marketed as the miracle product, lightweight, cheap and available in a myriad of forms for
countless uses. Plastic production has increased from two million tonnes in 1950, to 348 million tonnes
in 2017, characterised accordingly as “a global industry”, which is valued at US$522.6 billion, which is
expected to double in capacity by 2040 (United Nations Environment Programme, 2022).2
But such acceptance into society has come with a price. Macro plastics clog our waterways, and
oceans, foul the land and are even to be found in micro and nano form in the air we breathe (Valeria
Hidalgo-Ruz: 2012).3 Such macroplastics are the most obvious form of marine pollution and have the
most visible impact both because of their size and because they degrade over time into microplastics
(United Nations Environment Programme, 2016).4 Plastic pollution has become both omnipresent
in that as scientists have noted “plastic is literally everywhere”, from the atmosphere to the Mariana
Trench (Joanna Khan: 2019).5

Further, the legal and regulatory responses to the issue are still in their infancy. The Bay of Bengal
(the Bay) is a microcosm of the global plastic pollution crisis. The endemic levels of marine plastic
pollution entering the region warrant a diagnosis of its causes and assessment of the scope of, or
available mechanisms for, mitigating existing plastic waste in the Bay and preventing further waste.
Problematically, the Bay region has been subject to only few proper studies on the nature of its
marine plastic waste and little critical examination of regulatory measures ‘covering this field (Charitha
Pattiaratchi: 2021).6

43
This chapter starts by outlining the current plastic pollution problem in the Bay of Bengal (BOB)
with a particular emphasis on the issue of microplastics in the region. It will then briefly examine the
pre-existing plastic regulatory instruments at the international level. It will then turn to scrutinize
current national plastic pollution regimes. The paper then examines the scope for developing
a regional regulatory infrastructure followed by the regional laws regulating plastic pollution and
recommendations to improve the regional legal framework covering plastic pollution. Lastly, in the
conclusion, it will outline the status of the current global plastic treaty negotiations and its potential
impact on the BOB littoral states.

Plastic Pollution in the Bay of Bengal

The current extent and increasing rates of plastic pollution entering the Bay represent an environmental
and public health crisis. Recent findings estimate approximately three billion microplastic particles
enter the Bay each day from the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna River basin (Alan Williams: 2021),7 as
part of the 200,000 metric tonnes of plastic waste entering the BOB from Bangladesh (Arun Sankar:
2019).8

This creates not only a “heavily littered” bay area, but dangerously pollute the Ganges basin, relied on
by 655 million inhabitants (Sankar: 2019).9 Once consumed, these plastics release harmful chemicals
“slowly [infecting] organs” among other effects (Consumer Reports: 2021).10 Moreover, of these
microplastics, filaments, granules, tubules and films are also produced as “secondary microplastics”
from the “disintegration or degradation of macroplastics from physical, chemical or biological
processes (Utpal Kumar Raha: 2020).11 Nelms’ finding that fishing gear is also a significant pollution
source in the Ganges system, alluding to the related issue of macroplastics (S E Nelms: 2016).12

The subtropical gyre in the Bay, which is 2.1 million square km body of water that is “filling with
thousands of tonnes of plastics and other pollutants”, is bounded by Bangladesh, India and Myanmar
(Our Correspondent: 2020).13 Although research did not identify the proportions of plastics originating
from proximate states, the approximate 1-3 billion microplastics entering the Bay each day move
through China, India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal” (Correspondent: 2020).14

Accordingly, a study led by the University of Western Australia in 2020 identified that beaches of
Bangladesh, Myanmar, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Pakistan and the Maldives were
polluted by plastic waste drifting from the Bay (Seema Prasad: 2021).15 The “beaching probability”
of this plastic waste is determined by “wind”, “wave conditions at specific times or places [times] or
[places]” and the “type of beach or coastline” (more likely beached on rocks or mangroves, but less
likely beached on sandy beaches) (Prasad: 2021).16 This data clearly identifies the trans-boundary
source and consequences of plastic pollution in the Bay region. This is a concerning aspect of the
issue, as scientific consensus supports mitigating this scale and extent of plastic discharge in the short
term is fanciful (Prasad: 2021).17

The impact of plastic pollution in the Bay on local fisheries is also stark. The Bay produces approximately
6 million tonnes of fish, equivalent to four percent of global catch (Majedul Islam: 2019).18 The region
also has a US$4 billion fishery production value and three million seven hundred thousand local
inhabitants working as fishermen (The Bay of Bengal Crisis: 2022).19 However, both the Bay’s waters
and mangroves in the region are filled with microplastics, harming fish species such as Marlin and
thus, jeopardising livelihoods and fishing enterprises (The Bay: 2022).20 Marine plastic waste also
affects ocean biota via exposure of plastic chemicals to the marine environment. Plastic waste is often
consumed by fish and marine life, causing death (Islam: 2021).21

44
Interestingly, there also appears to be a relationship between monsoon seasons and reductions in
microplastics in the basin (Napper: 2021).22 Two research expeditions by the National Geographic
Society’s Sea to Source in 2019 analysed 60 pre-monsoon and 60 post-monsoon water samples, and
identified microplastics in 71.6 percent of pre-monsoon samples, and 61.6 percent of post-monsoon
samples (see Figure 1) (Napper: 2021).23 Moreover, pre-monsoon samples collected at the Ganges
mouth at Bhola, Bangladesh, were identified as having four times as many particles as those collected
at Harsil, which had double as many particles (Napper: 2021).24 Figure 1 identifies the changes of
plastic waste concentration areas along the Ganges, during pre- and post-monsoon periods, with
relative concentration indicated by point size (Napper: 2021).25

Attempting to understand the nature and various sources of plastic waste pollution in the region is
problematic at present. There are limited studies and empirical field data on the Bay region (Raha:
2020).26 However, in the case of Bangladesh, Aziz notes the close physical proximity between
Bangladesh’s industrial district and the Ganges River results in “all … the untreated waste ending up in
the BOB further increasing pollution” (Abdul Aziz: 2022).27 As such, disposal of industrial waste into
the river has been identified as a key cause of pollution in the Ganges basin and Bay (Aziz: 2022).28

Figure 1. Changes of plastic waste concentration areas along the Ganges

Source: Napper et al., ‘The abundance’ 1.

45
The staggering 190-fold production increase in plastic production from 1950 to 2015 is a causal factor
of this global industrial waste production (Sunitha: 2021).29 Other nations estimated to be similarly
responsible for dumping industrial waste into the Ganges are China, India, Bhutan, Bangladesh and
Nepal (Prasad: 2021).30 Of this volume of plastic waste that enters the Bay, approximately 90 percent
of the microplastic pollutants are clothing fibres, such as rayon (54 percent) and acrylic (24 percent)
particles (Open Access: 2021).31 Research has also confirmed that 80 percent of the plastic waste
entering the Bay are from land-based sources, whereas the remaining 20 percent is from ocean-based
sources, both accumulating in the marine ecosystem, as depicted in the below figure (Raha: 2020).32

The South Asian Seas Program (SASP) identified in 2018 that 6,705 pieces of waste products were
found on a 18.5 km stretch of the four sea beaches, of which approximately 63 percent were identified
to be plastic waste (Aziz: 2022).33 The rates of other types of solid waste pollution were also analysed,
including as 2,182 pieces of plastic bags, 589 pieces of insulation and packaging foam, 470 fragments
of cigarette butts and filters and 300 bottles (Aziz: 2022).34 Interestingly, the highest pollutant
concentrations were found in the Bhola delta, Bangladesh (Aziz: 2022).35 The Ganges, Brahmaputra
and Meghna rivers collect huge plastics that ultimately flow into the Bay (Lebreton: 2017).36 The
Bay has accordingly become “the new hotspot for plastic litter”, “ [overcoming] the Indian Ocean
regarding plastic debris accumulation” (Viyaj Sakhuja: 2016).37 Notably, 8 among 10 in Asia contribute
to approximately 90 percent of the world’s marine plastics (C Schmidt: 2017).38

Microplastics
Microplastics in the form of marine plastic pollution have been subject to significant scientific focus
based on their volatility as a pollutant (Xiao Zhi Lim: 2017).39 This is due to the ease with which
microplastics can be ingested by marine animals and fish, and ability to move freely in the open ocean
(Raha: 2020).40 Microplastics are plastics 5mm in size and produced as fragments of industrial waste
or larger plastic waste products (Raha: 2020).41 Various studies have indicated the adverse impacts of
microplastic ingestion, which can cause “cellular disruption” and “tissue degradation” due to the toxic
nature of microplastic particles (Lim: 2021).42 A significant number of microplastics exist in the Bay,
and as such, these health and environmental effects brought about by microplastics are a live concern
for regulators (Lim: 2021).43

Consistent with the scale and volume of plastic waste entering the Bay region, experts have estimated
that the Bay will be “unusable” as a water source in between 30-50 years if the current volume of plastic
pollution continues and its ecological effects are not addressed (Raha: 2020).44 Figure 2 illustrates the
underlying effects of continuous pollution on public health, as well as some potential alternatives
(Lim: 2021).45 However, as a result of the extent, complexity and various sources of pollution explained
above, it is clear that curbing plastic pollution in the Bay likely requires a coordinated multi-state
undertaking (Raha: 2020).46

46
 Figure 2. The fundamental effects of ongoing pollution on public health
Source: Raha et al., ‘Policy Framework’.

Pre-Existing Plastic Regulatory Instruments

A holistic assessment of plastic pollution in the Bay requires analysis of existing regulatory instruments,
or – in lieu – identification of a lack of regulatory force, on both an international and domestic scale.

International Regulatory Landscape/Regimes

Broadly, whilst international regulatory instruments extend to encouraging states to curb plastic
pollution, polluters in the Bay do not appear to strictly adopt and enforce these recommendations
(Raha: 2020),47 such is the consent-based system and anarchic nature of international law. International
rule of law principle imposes state obligations to adopt appropriate measures for transnational
environmental threats including land-based marine pollution (Schroeder: 2010).48 As such, whilst the
international marine environmental regime provides an authentic basis for national anti-pollution
initiatives, there are critical problems with domestically enforcing regulatory measures.

47
A series of international treaties which intend to address marine plastic pollution have been developed
and ratified/assented to since the 1970s (Raha: 2020).49 These include: the London Dumping
Convention 1972; MARPOL 1973; UN Conventions on the Law of the Sea 1982; Stockholm and Basel
Conventions; Washington Declaration; and the Montreal Guidelines. Each of these agreements (usually
or incidentally) addresses plastic pollution with the power of international law, although they have
also received justifiable criticism for only offering a piecemeal and inefficient regulatory strategy that
has not addressed the ongoing issue of plastic pollution.

National Regulatory Regimes

Regulatory attempts to address marine plastic pollution in the Bay are also evident from national
law. The most common albeit somewhat ancillary regulatory instrument with respect to regulating
plastic pollution in the Bay region are legal bans or taxes on single-use plastics, which are planned to
be implemented in Bangladesh, India. As both countries make up the coastal areas of both India and
Bangladesh, these two nations will be examined in respect of their regulatory efforts.

Since 2002, India and Bangladesh have introduced bans on plastic bag use (Raha: 2020).50 India
passed bans in 2002 and 2005 relating to the use of plastic bags of different thicknesses (Raha:
2020).51 The South Indian state of Karnataka also imposed a complete ban on plastic bags in 2016
(Reuters: 2018).52 This was implemented as a preventative measure from cows from consuming foods
containing plastics, and to avoid clogs in municipal drain systems (Raha: 2020).53 In Bangladesh,
legislation was passed in 2002 that prohibited the production and use of plastics (Raha: 2020).54 The
key reason for this ban was the tendency of submerged plastic bags to aggravate the cause of major
flooding events (Raha: 2020).55

Rathi has indicated that India also requires a “recycling revolution” to address the “huge volumes of
leakages in plastic wastes” (Vaibhav Rathi: 2021),56 noting that the Indian Ministry of Environment has
stated that “Plastic is not a problem per se”, but “it is uncollected plastic waste” that is responsible
for India’s plastic crisis (Rathi: 2021).57 The Materials Recycling Association (MRAI) has identified
that India’s recycling rates are only 30 percent, although recycling of materials is not effectively
documented (Central Pollution Control Board : 2019).58 India’s primary authority on recycling, the
Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) estimated that India generated 13 Lakh tonnes of plastic
annually, and noted that there were approximately 5,000 registered plastics manufacturing/recycling
units, and approximately 100 unregistered units (Raha: 2020).59 Research indicates that many Indian
states do not report recycled plastics, with no information relating to records of the capacity of these
plastic recycling units in terms of volume of waste that can be dealt with (CPCB: 2019).60

In both countries, there is an absence of regulatory enforcement, nullifying the potential environmental
benefit of the ban (CPCB: 2019).61 In Bangladesh, the single-use ban was not strictly enforced due
to the lack of national and regional policy frameworks (CPCB: 2019).62 Similarly, for India, Goel has
noted that, even where India’s ban is enforced strictly, it is “not enough” to appropriately curb plastic
pollution, noting that the ban is planned to take effect on 1 July 2022.63 In particular, “[a] lack of
quality recycling and waste segregation also needs to be addressed to improve the percentage of
plastic that is recycled”, despite the promotion of “biodegradable alternatives” in lieu, which are less
environmentally harmful (Goel: 2021).64

However, Swati Singh Sambyal, a New-Delhi based independent waste management expert, noted
that there is “no guideline in plastic for alternatives to plastics”, consistent with India’s existence

48
of policy interest in developing a sustainable regulatory infrastructure for plastic waste, but lack of
enforcement (Goel: 2021).65 Therefore, whilst compliance with Article 207(5) UNCLOS is somewhat
evident from these regulatory efforts, the clear lack of enforcement reaffirms the lacuna of effective
plastic pollution regulation of both Bangladesh and India.

Scope for Developing Regional Regulatory Infrastructure

The transboundary nature of pollution in the Bay warrants the migratory efforts of various co-
operating states pursuant to a multi-state undertaking to address the pollution issue United Nations
Environment Assembly (UNEA).66 With international efforts and collaboration between nations in both
the region, such as India and Bangladesh, but also other nations responsible for polluting the region,
such as China (Beatriz Garcia: 2019),67 mechanisms to form a regional regulatory infrastructure are
more palatable (The Bay: 2022).68 Beyond the data collection and domestic barriers identified in this
report, these conceptual and practical challenges below are equally prevalent.

Conceptual Challenges for a Regional Regulatory Infrastructure

Scholarship has addressed the role and scope of potential regulatory mechanisms for marine pollution
in the Bay of Bengal (Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies: 2021).69 A study by the Institute
for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) in February 2021 identified key challenges with the task of
addressing marine plastic pollution at the regional level (IASS: 2019).70 These four common challenges
are identified by the IASS to be the key barriers against effective implementation, although this may
change in the near future depending on -5 (UNEA-5) progress (IASS: 2019).71 These barriers, explained
below, are elaborated as:

(a) Level of implementation;

(b) Private sector engagement;
(c) Monitoring and assessment; and
(d) Multi-stakeholder approach (IASS: 2019).72

Level of Implementation
The level of implementation of politics, programmes, action plans and projects relevant to marine
plastic pollution is subject to regional variance (IASS: 2019).73 This is inter alia based on differences
in mandates, jurisdiction, scope, governance arrangements, capacities and resources of different
regional instruments (IASS: 2019).74 Due to this level of variance, the key implementation challenge
is a lack of resources required for successful implementation of regulatory measures, particularly
regarding monitoring compliance (IASS: 2019).75 This is likely to be a basis for why states such as India
have failed to effectively enforce UNCLOS regarding marine pollution.

Similarly, for some regions, no regionally-agreed action plans or strategies to address marine plastic
pollution exist. This typically involves most Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (ABJN), areas within
the Southwest Atlantic, Northwest Atlantic, Northeast Pacific, Arctic, Western Africa, the ROPME Sea
Area and the Caspian Sea (IASS: 2019).76 Several of these regions are not mandated by any regional
instrument to facilitate an “integrated” policy response to plastic pollution, complicating the task of
“[closing] the gap”, although Figure 3 outlines recommendations for mitigating challenges related to
these varying levels of implementation (IASS: 2019).77

49
 Figure 3. Strategies to mitigate varying levels of implementation
Source: IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 25.

Monitoring and Assessment

Monitoring and assessment of compliance with regulatory regional agreements is a further key
challenge. Substantial differences exist in marine plastic litter monitoring and assessment standards
between different regions (Peter Ryan: 2009).78 While in certain regions, assessment of sources,
sinks, and economic costs concerning the impacts of marine plastic pollution were conducted, similar
studies have not been undertaken comprehensively across all (IASS: 2019).79

At present, few regions have established long-term monitoring and assessment programmes that
produce comparable data on marine plastic pollution, conveyed by member countries or parties (IASS:
2019).80 However, despite this progress, reporting is merely descriptive in most regions, not referable
to “measurable targets and indicators” (IASS: 2019).81 Certain regions are totally absent national
reporting procedures (IASS: 2019);82 although GESAMP have published guidelines on monitoring and
assessment practices for plastic pollution, these geopolitical issues subsist (GESAMP: 2004).83

Notwithstanding the establishment of regional monitoring and assessment programmes in certain

regions, significant difficulties persist with ensuring member states’ provision of reliable data (IASS:
2019).84 Several nations cannot establish and sustain assessment and monitoring programmes and
manage increasing data requirements on their regional and global commitments without economic
and capacity-building support (IASS: 2019).85 Monitoring marine plastic litter on the high-seas, for
example, is especially costly and logistically burdensome, due to the laborious sampling that must be
undertaken to detect measurable changes between samples of marine plastic pollution (IASS: 2019).86

50
Monitoring procedures for marine pollution can also vary within and across different locations (IASS:
2019).87 This complicates (if not prevents) a “comparison of absolute pollution indicators and spatial
or temporal assessments” (Bergmann: 2015).88 Accordingly, establishing a streamlined effective
monitoring and assessment programme regulating the Bay may incidentally deal with these issues.
Figure 4 outlines recommendations to mitigate like monitoring and assessment challenges (IASS:
2019).89

Figure 4. Strategies to mitigate monitoring and assessment challenges

Source: IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 26.

Multi-Stakeholder Approach
Although scholarship has indicated that a multi-stakeholder approach is critical to address the various
sources of marine plastic pollution in the Bay, this is similarly problematic (Rider Foley: 2017).90 Local
governments, the private sector, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and academia should
collaborate for a coordinated preventative response to marine plastic pollution (IASS: 2019).91 Global,
regional, sub-regional, and national management mechanisms must be coordinated at the municipal
levels, where changes and improvements in plastic waste management can be made and measured
(IASS: 2019).92 However, present approaches to this issue are regularly “directed to specific parts of
a source-to-sea system and/or a single sector”, an approach that would fail to address all plastic
pollution sources in the Bay (IASS: 2019).93

Regionally, stakeholders operate at various different levels. Several regional institutions such as the
Regional Marine Litter Nodes have commenced mechanisms that are suitable for this multi-stakeholder
engagement approach (GPML: 2022).94 Alike mechanisms for engagement must be designed and

51
implemented in a manner that allows other stakeholders to adopt any such mechanism. However,
scholarship suggests regional organisations experience difficulty engaging with a range of actors at
national, regional and international levels, partly due to limited capacities for “continuous, sustainable
engagement” (IASS: 2019).95 Figure 5 outlines various strategies for addressing these above issues
related to a multi-stakeholder approach (IASS: 2019).96

Figure 5. Strategies to mitigate difficulties with the multi-stakeholder approach

Source: IASS, ‘Stronger Together’.

Private Sector Engagement

The private sector is a crucial stakeholder in mitigating marine plastic pollution as the source of
plastic products as well as comprising entities that develop and fund means to address plastic waste
(IASS: 2019).97 Engaging the private sector necessitates capacity development for both public and
private sectors, and facilitates their cooperation on developing economically feasible strategies to
prevent further plastic pollution (IASS: 2019).98 While engaging private entities is considered critical
for developing these approaches, scholarship indicates private sector engagement is generally poor
(IASS: 2019).99 This is based on “limited capacities to engage, in addition to a lack of financial resources
required to both improve waste management and support the development of innovative solutions
by the private sector” (IASS: 2019).100 Figure 6 outlines recommendations for overcoming difficulties
related to private sector engagement (IASS: 2019).101

52
 Figure 6. Strategies to mitigate issues with private sector engagement
Source: IASS, ‘Stronger Together’.

Mechanisms for Regional Regulatory Infrastructure

In relation to particular mechanisms to address the plastic pollution issue, ‘The BOB Crisis’ webpage
notes that “[t]he installation of waterway sea bins and plastic interceptor systems could slash the
volume of plastics entering from rivers and streams” (The Bay: 2022).102 GESAMP have similarly
emphasised the potential role that may be played by local waste management, identifying that
the leakage of plastic litter entering the sea majorly depends on the adequacy of regional waste
management infrastructure (GESAMP: 2016).103 Further, ‘The Bay of Bengal Crisis’ web page similarly
outlines that:

“By employing a local workforce, and by recording data as rubbish collected, the local economy will
benefit, poverty can be reduced, and the data can be used by software to reinforce rubbish filtering in
critical locations… Currently the policy of the 3Rs – reduce, reuse and recycle – isn’t effective in removing
plastic emissions. Two other Rs – reuse and redesign – need to be enforced, banning packaged food,
redesigning the food market in dense cities and slums, and providing proper, accessible disposal sites
at the market” (The Bay: 2022).104

However, there are inherent issues with these mechanisms:

“The waterway plastic collectors option [are] affordable and adaptable, but also has its own negative
impact on biota, stopping movement up and down the restricted waterways. The filters also can’t
cover all waterways, or paths that take litter into the bay, reducing their overall effectiveness. Broad
public education campaigns and the restructuring of industries may be drastic, in both scale and cost,
but their long-term benefits on the economy, local people, and the environment is immeasurable. The
first option is a short-term fix, while the system redesign is something that will benefit the nations of
the Bay of Bengal forever” (The Bay: 2022).105

53
Regional Laws and Regulation of Plastic Pollution
Scholarship indicates that the crux of the pollution issue is based on a lack of regulation from Bangladesh
and ineffective legal regulation from India (Hossain: 2021).106 Recent data also supports that tributaries
in both India and Bangladesh in the Gangetic delta region “receive and emit an enormous amount of
plastics to the Bay of Bengal”, accounting for 0.10-0.17 million tonnes of plastic pollution released into
the ocean each year (Kumar: 2020).107 “[P]oor large scale awareness”, “[flaws] in management of land-
based plastic pollution” and “corruption” have collectively presented obstacles to a comprehensive
regulatory regime by “[weakening]” the relevant legal and policy apparatuses in both countries (Raha:
2020).108 However, research identified little information regarding plastic waste discharge by Sri Lanka
into the Bay region.

Bangladesh
Alam, Xiangmin and Ahamed have analysed the “national and international regulations for controlling
the land-based marine pollution … in Bangladesh” (Wahidul Alam: 2021).109 Their conclusion is that
Bangladesh “has no rules to govern solid waste and land dumping”, noting that both sources of
pollution are “critical causes of [land-based marine pollution] in the [BoB]” (Alam: 2021).110 Hossain
and Mamum also contend that, “due to lack of environmental law in general and marine pollution law
in particular, the seas and inland waterways are being rapidly polluted” (Hossain: 2021).111 The below list
outlines the several underpinning reasons identified to be the basis for the absence of the appropriate
“legal and management framework”, which include:

(a) “[T]he improper disposal of solid wastes from industry and households”;
(b) “[M]ass illiteracy about marine and coastal water protection from pollution”;
(c) “[A] lack of public awareness about the impacts of land-based pollution and a lack of suitable
industrial and domestic waste disposal measures in the city area” (Alam: 2021).112

Recent scholarship also confirms that “Bangladesh has not yet taken any step to enact national laws
consistent with its international commitments”, and that whilst the nation’s ‘The Port Rules 1966’
govern Bangladesh’s marine port, this statute does not provide for marine plastic pollution (but
rather, ships’ entry into the port) (Alam: 2021).109 Accordingly, there is a lacuna of marine conservation
protection in Bangladesh; despite the breadth of Bangladesh’s environmental protection statutory
regime, it does not appear to contemplate marine pollution (Alam: 2021).114

Despite the current lack of promise in the state of efforts to curb pollution in the Bay, diverse
recommendations for creating an efficient regulatory infrastructure have been proposed (Alam:
2021).115 These include that for Bangladesh it is necessary for:

(a) “… [T]he protection of this marine and coastal environment from land-based pollution [that it]
should be implemented through a proper legal and management framework”;
(b) “[T]ake necessary action plans and policy guidelines under the [DOE] with separate marine
protection cells”;
(c) “[Allocating] [a] section of the budget … on a priority basis for the capacity building projects, the
establishment of reception and collection facilities and pollutants, pollution detection equipment,
etc.”;

54
(d) “[E]nact a comprehensive law focused on protecting marine and coastal water from marine
pollution, especially land-based sources …” (Alam: 2021).116
Other recommendations that more directly involve the international community also include:
(a) “[Improving] … international cooperation, regional frameworks, public participation, and
awareness would have to be built to protect Bangladesh’s marine and coastal water from land-
based pollution” (Alam: 2021).117

India
Despite ambitious goals for plastic waste regulation, the effectiveness of India’s regulatory
infrastructure is undermined by the common barriers of “inadequate policy measures” and “lack of
scientific knowledge” (Raha: 2020).118 Despite India’s development of a “specific” and comprehensive
waste management regime – spearheaded by its Plastic Waste Management Rules 2016 – the National
Green Tribunal has separately penalised local municipal authorities in India and the Government of
National Capital Territory of Delhi for failing to enforce these regulatory rules and/or comply with
court directions regarding the management of plastic waste (Raha: 2020).119 Nonetheless, scholarship
indicates that despite India’s lack of “an appropriate national marine litter policy”, the Indian
Government has identified various priorities that should be considered for urgent policy attention
(Raha: 2020).120

(a) “To understand the source, transport and the end place of the marine litter over the country
using hydrodynamic models”;
(b) “To understand and assess the nature, [behaviour], and rate of degradation of the debris
in the marine ecosystem”;
(c) “To study the adverse effects of marine litter on marine organisms”;
(d) “To [s]standardize and strengthen the existing protocols and policies for controlling marine
litter” (Raha: 2020).121

Recommendations to Improve Plastic Pollution Regulation

Marine plastic pollution is fundamentally a “transboundary issue”, as research indicates it has spread
to all oceans (IASS: 2019).122 On a basic level, discussions on improving plastic regulatory infrastructure
have focused on counteracting the “plastic [ecosystem]” is developing in the Bay, which refers to a
massive accumulation of synthetic plastic products in the natural environment (Sakhuja: 2020).123 As
the largest bay in the world, not only does the survival of the Bay’s ecosystem depend on the ability
of regulatory instruments and/or policies to curb presently existing plastic pollution, but preventing
additional plastic waste from entering the Bay which would exacerbate the current adverse effects on
the environment and enterprise (IASS: 2019).124 The accumulation of plastic waste in the Bay is thus a
major ecological and financial risk to the region, which requires a comprehensive inter-state response
(IASS: 2019).125

Need for Further Research and Initial Data Collection

One of the most common and arguably the most impeding barrier to an adequate policy response to
plastic pollution in the Bay region is a lack of understanding about the complexity, nature and sources
of plastic pollution in the Bay (Sakhuja: 2020).126 The strengthening of a scientific understanding on

55
these factors would be a sound preliminary step to develop any regulation (IASS: 2019).127 As such,
prior to engaging in remedial policy approaches, further studies in the Bay region should be completed
to understand the most appropriate policy approach to plastic regulation, particularly focusing on:

(a) The distribution of plastics in the water column;

(b) The specific biological and ecosystem impact of plastics to the local biota;
(c) Development of deep-sea research projects for “biological observation inside the deep sea”;
(d) Surveys identifying the route of plastic floating pathway through ocean circular model studies
(IASS: 2019).128

Initial Steps: Bolstering Domestic Legal Infrastructure

Beyond the need for further data, the findings canvassed above confirm that there are various other
practical barriers to implement an effective regulatory infrastructure. In particular, both India and
Bangladesh lack effective legal/regulatory enforcement to adequately regulate plastic waste, despite
the jurisprudence and policies encouraging strict application of plastic regulatory rules, and the region’s
long history of environmental protection measures dating to the 1970s (Raha: 2020).129 To address the
lacuna of marine plastic pollution regulation in both countries, scholarship has emphasised that the
below practices would form an effective basis to holistically improve plastic regulation in the region:

(a) Reducing reliance on use of plastic generally;

(b) Enhancing waste management strategies;
(c) Strengthening of national legal and policy measures to combat further marine plastic pollution;
(d) Imposing restrictions on manufacturing/trading in plastic waste;
(e) Supplement plastic bags for bags manufactured from alternative materials;
(f) Prohibit plastic dumping in marine ecosystems (Raha: 2020).130

Raha, Kumar and Sarkar poignantly note that there is a lack of research and study on the distribution
of plastics in the Ganges’ basin water column, and what the specific biological and ecosystem impact
of plastics to the local biota (Raha: 2020).131 Accordingly, the need for further empirical research
on marine plastic pollution in the Ganges region is encouraged as necessary information for the
development of appropriate plastic waste mechanisms (Raha: 2020).132

Partnerships, Targets, and Data Harmonisation

The IASS have developed a plan for future steps to addressing plastic pollution in the Bay (IASS: 2019).133
Firstly, it notes that it would be “crucial to advance the harmonisation of data collection protocols
and methods within and across regions”, in accordance with the trans-national nature of plastic
pollution issues in the Bay (IASS: 2019).134 It also encourages a “system to assess the effectiveness of
measures” be established, and be based on “clear targets, and timelines which progress is measured”
(IASS: 2019).135 It will also be necessary to “advance towards integrated assessments of marine plastic
pollution from source-to-sea, across thematic areas and sectors” (IASS: 2019).136

Partnerships and agreements with other relevant institutions in the region should be concluded
where beneficial to facilitate data exchanges and the joint preparation of assessments (Bagai: 2021).137

56
Automatised approaches that may assist the autonomous large-scale monitoring of marine plastic
pollution should be further developed and employed and the accessibility and exchange of data
should be improved through appropriate database formats (IASS: 2019).138

Conclusion
Despite the universal nature of the challenges faced by states in implementing regulatory infrastructure
for plastic pollution, the absence of scientific data on the sources, nature and other details regarding
plastics in the Bay obfuscates the applicability of lessons from the Australian or US cases with plastic
regulatory regimes. Where the US and Australia struggle with marine plastic pollution, the unique
complexity for developing a regional infrastructure in the Bay region is the interconnected nature of
its Basin, and the trans-national discharge of plastic waste, which is not appropriately recorded (Raha:
2020).139

At present, the key issue to appropriately preventing and addressing pre-existing plastic pollution is
not based on to absence of policy, but a lack of enforcement infrastructure and commitment by state
actors and a lack of appropriate understanding of the nature of plastic pollution in the Bay and its
sources (Raha: 2020).140 An effective multi-state undertaking to prevent plastic pollution or mitigate
their activities in the Bay, contributing to less pollution, is unlikely to address the root cause: namely,
the lack of enforcement of domestic plastic regulatory policies and restrictions, in regions such as
Bangladesh and India (Raha: 2020).141

Accordingly, for a short-term response to the global plastic problem, the plastic pollution crisis in
the Bay would be better addressed by a more regional transboundary response, consistent with the
intentions of the pre-existing international law landscape, rather than standing-by pending completion
of the UNEA agreement.
A prospective regional anti-plastic pollution instrument should first, put a cap on environmentally
harmful trade on plastics production; second, impose regulation on the use of harmful content in
plastic production; and third, enhance recycling or proper solid waste management with a targeted
basis (Raubenheimer: 2017).142 This appears to be the most comprehensive and promising approach
for regulating plastics in the Bay, accounting for the above problems. However, what must come
before these regulatory efforts is a more scientific and therefore comprehensive understanding of
plastic pollution in the Bay.

Raha, Kumar and Sarkar also poignantly observed the following in relation to how individual actions
can support the overarching task of bringing about a regulatory regime to address plastic pollution
in the Bay:

Governments, without the help of the public, cannot accomplish this huge task. It is the responsibility
of individuals to create awareness about the use of plastics and its detrimental effects on human
health and marine environment. The authors urge the common public to come up with individual
commitments and support government initiatives through their responsible action and curb the
menace of plastic pollution. This approach can resolve this long-standing problem and will be fruitful
to achieve a cleaner marine environment (Raha: 2020).143

57
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58
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51. Raha et al., ‘Policy Framework’ 9.

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52. Reuters, India, ‘Despite state-level bans, plastic bags still suffocate Indian’s cities’ Alarabiya News (online,
26 February 2018) < https://english.alarabiya.net/features/2018/02/26/Despite-state-level-bans-plastic-
bags-still-suffocate-India-s-cities#:~:text=In%20March%202016%2C%20the%20Karnataka,%2C%20
transported%2C%20sold%20or%20distributed.>.

53. Raha et al., ‘Policy Framework’ 9.

54. Raha et al., ‘Policy Framework’ 9.

55. Raha et al., ‘Policy Framework’ 9.

56. Vaibhav Rathi, ‘Why India Needs a Plastic Recycling Revolution’ Outlook (online, 3 July 2021) <https://www.
outlookindia.com/website/story/society-news-why-india-needs-a-plastic-recycling-revolution/386902>
(Rathi, ‘Why India Needs’).

57. Rathi, ‘Why India Needs’.

58. Central Pollution Control Board, ‘Annual Report for the year 2018-19 on Implementation of Plastic Waste
Management Rules’ (Industry Report, October 2019, Delhi) <https://cpcb.nic.in/uploads/plasticwaste/
Annual_Report_2018-19_PWM.pdf> 23 (CPCB, ‘Annual Report’).

59. Raha et al., ‘Policy Framework’ 9.

60. CPCB, ‘Annual Report’.

61. CPCB, ‘Annual Report’.

62. CPCB, ‘Annual Report’.

63. Shubhangi Goel, ‘India will ban single-use plastics next year to cut pollution – experts say that’s not enough’
Asia-Pacific News (CNBC, 10 October 2021) <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/11/india-to-ban-single-use-
plastics-but-experts-say-more-must-be-done-to.html> (Goel, ‘India will ban’).

64. Goel, ‘India will ban’.

65. Goel, ‘India will ban’.

66. UNEA, ‘Historic day’.

67. Beatriz Garcia, Mandy Meng Fang and Jolene Lin, ‘All Hands on Deck: Addressing the Global Marine Plastics
Pollution Crisis in Asia,’ NUS Law Working Paper No. 2019/2 (2019) 3(1) (Forthcoming) Chinese Journal of
Environmental Law <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3387269> 3 (Garcia et al., ‘All
Hands’).

68. The Bay, ‘The Bay’.

69. Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies, ‘Stronger Together: The role of regional instruments in
strengthening global governance of marine plastic pollution’ (Industry Report, February 2021) <https://
publications.iass-potsdam.de/rest/items/item_6000714_5/component/file_6000717/content> (IASS,
‘Stronger Together’).

70. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 6.

71. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 6.

72. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 6.

73. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 25.

74. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 25. For a discussion on these differences and the implications for regional

61
 cooperation, see Kristina Gjerde and Siddharth Shekhar Yadav, ‘Polycentricity and Regional Ocean Governance:
Implications for the Emerging UN Agreement on Marine Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction’ (2021)
Marine Affairs and Policy <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2021.704748/full >.

75. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 25.

76. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 25.

77. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 25.

78. See generally Peter Ryan et al., ‘Monitoring the abundance of plastic debris in the marine environment’
(2009) 364(1526) Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences <https://doi.
org/10.1098/rstb.2008.0207> (Ryan, ‘Monitoring’).

79. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 25.

80. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 25.

81. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 25. For a discussion of an “ethical” environmental report, see Carol Adams, ‘The
ethical, social and environmental reporting-performance portrayal gap’ (2014) 17(5) Accounting, Auditing
& Accountability Journal <https://drcaroladams.net/the-ethical-social-and-environmental-reporting-
performance-portrayal-gap/>.

82. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 25.

83. See generally GESAMP, ‘Guidelines for the Monitoring and Assessment of Plastic Litter in the Ocean’
(2004) Reports and Studies 99 <https://wesr.unep.org/media/docs/marine_plastics/une_science_dvision_
gesamp_reports.pdf>.

84. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 26.

85. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 26.

86. See generally Ryan, ‘Monitoring’ (n 128).

87 IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 26.

88. See generally M Bergmann et al., ‘Marine Anthropogenic Litter’ (2015) Springer International Publishing
<https://doi.org.10.1007/978-3-319-16510-3>.

89. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 26.

90. See Rider Foley et al., ‘Ideal and reality of multi-stakeholder collaboration on sustainability problems:
a case study on a large-scale industrial contamination in Phoenix, Arizona’ (2017) 12(1) Sustainability
Science <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308343408_Ideal_and_reality_of_multistakeholder_
collaboration_on_sustainability_problems_a_case_study_on_a_large-scale_industrial_contamination_in_
Phoenix_Arizona> 5.

91. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 26.

92. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 26.

93. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 26.

94. GPML, ‘Regional Nodes’ The Global Partnership on Marine Litter Platform (Web Page, 2022) <https://
marinelitternetwork.engr.uga.edu/regional-nodes/>.

95. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 6.

96. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 9.

62
97. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 26.

98. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 26.

99. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 26.

100. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 26.

101. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 9.

102. The Bay, ‘The Bay’.

103. GESAMP, ‘Sources, fate and effects of microplastics in the marine environment: part 2 of a global assessment’
(2016) Reports and Studies (Report, No. 93) <http://www.gesamp.org/site/assets/files/1275/sources-fate-
and-effects-of-microplastics-in-the-marine-environment-part-2-of-a-global-assessment-en.pdf> 33.

104. The Bay, ‘The Bay’.

105. The Bay, ‘The Bay’.

106. Milan Hossain and Shahidullah Mamun, ‘Marine pollution in Bangladesh-framing legal responses:
A critical study’ (2021) 23(3) Environmental Law Review <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/
abs/10.1177/14614529211023458> 210.

107. Utpal Kumar Raha, Ramesh Kumar and Santosh Kumar Sarkar, ‘Policy Framework for Mitigating Land-based
Marine Plastic Pollution in the Gangetic Delta Region of Bay of Bengal- A review’ (2020) 278 Journal of Cleaner
Production <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0959652620334545?via%3Dihub> 2.

108. Raha et al, ‘Policy Framework’ 12.

109. Wahidul Alam, Xu Xiangmin and Raiyan Ahamed, ‘Protecting the marine and coastal water from land-
based sources of pollution in the northern Bay of Bengal: A legal analysis for implementing a national
comprehensive act’ (2021) 4 Environmental Challenges <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S2667010021001335> 1.

110. Alam et al, ‘Protecting the marine’ 6.

111. Hossain et al, ‘Marine pollution’ 210.

112. Alam et al, ‘Protecting the marine’ 6.

113. Alam et al, ‘Protecting the marine’ 3.

114. Alam et al, ‘Protecting the marine’ 3-4.

115. Alam et al, ‘Protecting the marine’ 6.

116. Alam et al, ‘Protecting the marine’ 6.

117. Alam et al, ‘Protecting the marine’ 7.

118. Raha et al, ‘Policy Framework’ 12.

119. Raha et al, ‘Policy Framework’ 12. For examples of court orders regarding the failure to properly enforce
India’s plastic regulatory rules, see Satish Kumar V/s Union of India & Ors (10 July 2020) and Mahavir Singh
v Union of India & Ors (9 November 2001).

120. Raha et al, ‘Policy Framework’ 10.

121. Raha et al, ‘Policy Framework’ 10.

122. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 10, 16.

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123. Sakhuja, ‘Fisheries’ (n 32); Kaniz Fatema, ‘Plastic Pollution in the Northern Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh Coast’
SETAC North America 41st Annual Meeting (Conference Paper, November 2020) <https://www.researchgate.
net/publication/346449386_Plastic_Pollution_in_the_Northern_Bay_of_Bengal_Bangladesh_Coast>.

124. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’.

125. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’.

126. Shafiul Hossain et al., ‘Plastic pollution in Bangladesh: A review on current status emphasizing the impacts
on environment and public health’ (2020) 26(6) Environmental Engineering Research (see ‘Conclusion’).

127. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 25.

128. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’ 25.

129. Raha et al, ‘Policy Framework’ 3.

130. Raha et al, ‘Policy Framework’ 13.

131. Raha et al, ‘Policy Framework’ 13.

132. Raha et al, ‘Policy Framework’ 13.

133. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’.

134. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’.

135. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’.

136. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’.

137. Atul Bagai et al., ‘Beating Plastic Pollution: UNEP’s Priorities and Partnership in India’ (2021) 51(4)
Environmental Law and Policy <https://content.iospress.com/articles/environmental-policy-and-law/
epl201069> 266.

138. IASS, ‘Stronger Together’.

139. Raha et al., ‘Policy Framework’.

140. Raha et al., ‘Policy Framework’.

141. Raha et al., ‘Policy Framework’.

142. See Karen Raubenheimer and Alistair McIlgorm, ‘Is the Montreal Protocol a model that can help solve the
global marine plastic debris problem?’ (2017) 81 Marine Policy 322-329.

143. Raha et al., ‘Policy Framework’.

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 4
Marine Litter and Debris
in the Bay of Bengal:
Strategies for Monitoring
and Management
Salom Gnana Thanga Vincent

Introduction
The amount of marine plastic debris is on the rise, and it is estimated that nearly 250,000 tons of
plastic pieces are floating in the world’s oceans. The origin of 80 percent of marine plastic debris
is terrestrial, which reaches the oceans through rivers and runoff. The marine sources include the
plastic wastes disposed of ships, other vessels and discarded fishing gear. With an increasing coastal
population and improper management of solid wastes, India is ranked as the 12th largest contributor to
marine plastic pollution (Jambeck et al.: 2015).1 Land-based sources are contributed by the population
living within 50 kilometers of the coastline. In India, the coastline is inhabited by a dense population
of 250 million living within 50 kilometers of the coast.

The Land Use/Land Cover (LULC) changes in the upstream due to urbanization are also major drivers
of increased population leakage from land to the ocean through the number of rivers that drain into
the sea. For example, the Bay of Bengal (BoB) subtropical gyre is fed by Ganges, Brahmaputra and
other major rivers originating from the Himalayas. The rivers bring huge amounts of pollutants while
flowing through densely populated countries like India, Myanmar and Bangladesh, thus filling the two
million one hundred thousand square kilometres stretch of the bay with thousands of tons of plastics.

The accumulated trash continues to grow in the absence of prevention and mitigatory measures,
thus threatening the blue economy of maritime countries in the BoB. The continuous input of plastic
wastes into the oceans is a threat to the ecological and economic services (provisioning, supporting,
regulating and cultural) provided by the oceans. Reduced fish production, the destruction of marine
diversity, damage to ships and marine vessels and reduced tourism are some of the common impacts
of marine plastic debris. The threat of micro and meso-plastics, which are in seafood, has been

65
reported globally, including the BoB (Karuppusamy et al.: 2020).2 4 of the 17 Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) are related to marine litter, in particular, objective 14.1 is linked to the prevention of
marine pollution from land-based sources, hence addressing the issue of marine plastic garbage is
essential.

Understanding and Estimating the Amount of Marine Litter in the BoB

The river Ganges releases 0.1 to 0.17 million tons of plastic waste per year and is reported to be
the second-largest contributor to marine pollution after the River Yangtze of China (Leberton et al.:
2017).3 The role of monsoons is very phenomenal in the quantity of plastics wastes entering the BoB
through the rivers. For example, the Ganges releases 33,500 tons of plastic wastes during monsoon
as against 150 tons per month during non-monsoon into the BoB.

Urbanization and population growth are the main causes of increased plastic pollution in the ocean
by rivers. Less urbanised areas produced less plastic waste than more urbanised areas (Kaladharan
et al.: 2017).4 However, sea currents have an important role in the dispersal of plastic wastes, thereby
increasing the marine debris in isolated and less inhabited areas. For example, the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands are more polluted with marine plastics that are mainly transported through sea
currents from the adjoining East Asian Countries. The maritime sources are contributed by the fishing
industry, tourism and offshore petroleum industries. These include unintentional spills from vessels
during transport, littering by fishing boats, ships, discarded fishing gear and aquaculture installations.

Identification of Source Marine Litter: Role of Technology

Floating Litter
A traditional method of determining the types of plastics is by conducting a “beach” survey. This is
done by incorporating a civic science approach involving locals and volunteers who can provide an
overall estimate of the amount of plastic waste flowing into coastal waters. Traditional monitoring also
includes data collection by visual ship-based surveys, which may be not consistent due to changing
meteorological conditions and ocean dynamics (Suaria and Aliani: 2014).5

Recently, the use of remote sensing techniques using satellite data has proved to be promising to
detect marine litter (Topouzelis et al.: 2021).6 Pixels containing floating plastics would be screened and
discriminated from non-plastic materials using a variety of techniques ranging from band indices to
machine learning. Several studies have been conducted using remote sensing techniques for detecting
marine floating plastics. Several restrictions including specifications of the available satellite sensors
and essential data processing methodologies can affect the remote detection methods. In addition,
clouds, shadows and smoke plumes also interfere with the detection of floating plastic particles.

Seafloor Litter
Detection of marine litter on the seafloor can be done by litter collection with bottom trawlers, optical
mapping and acoustic mapping. Seafloor trawling has several inhibitions and disadvantages such
as the presence of rocky floors and the absence of proper spatial distribution data of plastic debris.
Optical methods are based on videos and photographs collected by divers or by cameras installed in
remotely operated vehicles, manned or unmanned submarines. (Gerigny et al.: 2019).7 Optical methods
have several advantages such as availability of quantitative data, interpretation of 3D morphology
of objects using stereo photographic cameras or combining overlapping consecutive photographs.
However, the hydrodynamic conditions may restrict visibility and photography can cover only certain
points in the transects. Recently, Underwater Hyperspectral Imaging (UHI) and acoustic techniques

66
have been used to detect seafloor plastics. In addition, the use of Multibeam Echosounder (MBES)
systems for the detection of plastic debris in the seabed have also been used. These findings influence
the direction of efforts to resolve the issue.

Strategies to Reduce Marine Plastic Pollution: The Role of Governance

Plastic pollution, now described as a “tragedy of commons” requires to be managed with a combination
of regulations, economic and market-based instruments and community-based solutions (Vince and
Hardesty: 2018).8 The policies relating to controlling and managing plastic wastes are expanding
at the global, national and regional levels. However, the implementation of technologies to reduce
plastic pollution may be inhibited by financial constraints. The strategies for reducing marine plastic
pollution should be scientific and diverse (Rochman: 2016).9 Encouraging research and development
on bioplastics, while being cautious about the use of the term “bioplastics” by companies to validate
their corporate social responsibility is the need of the hour (Geetika et al.: 2020).10 Multiple level
interventions from all stakeholders including those from government, industry, non-government
and public are required for the proper management of plastic wastes. Involving site-specific circular
economy models provide a solution to marine plastic waste.

Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR)

EPR is a model developed by some European countries for the management of plastic wastes. This
is achieved by shifting the financial responsibility of plastic waste management from consumers to
the manufacturers through reuse, recycling and product design improvements. A take-back policy
is implemented through EPR, thus requiring the manufacturers to recover the plastic wastes after
the product is consumed. In some cases, the producers engage certain organizations Producer
Responsibility Organisations (PRO) to collect and recycle the plastic wastes after consumption. A
PRO is paid by the manufacturer for the collection and safe disposal of plastic waste. Since EPR
has shifted the burden of waste disposal from governments to these product manufacturers, it has
driven the adoption of innovative product and packaging strategies leading to a reduction in plastic
waste. In Kerala, the milk-producing company, Milma is associated with the Clean Kerala Company, an
organisation, formed under the local self-government to collect and recycle plastic milk packets as a
part of EPR.

Circular Economy Approach

Circular economy models can be used to reduce the amount of mismanaged plastic waste and meet
the plastic pollution reduction goals in developing countries. Local self-governments (Corporations,
Municipalities, Panchayats) can partner with non-government organizations, local people and the
private sector to tackle the leakage of plastics into the marine environment.

Case study in Kerala (Clean Sea Mission: Suchitwa Sagaram)

Clean Sea mission is a success story of managing marine plastic waste by introducing a creative
response to combat marine plastic pollution at the local level involving partnerships between
government, public and private companies (recyclers (Suchitwa Sagaram in local language) was
started by the Government of Kerala to encourage the fishermen to collect plastic waste, particularly
those trapped in their fishing nets, which they used to dispose into the sea previously. Clean Kerala
Mission under the Ministry of Panchayati Raj provided a shredding machine (US$ 11,300) and working
capital of US$7000 for the salaries of 30 fisherwomen for the first six months from the Society for
Assistance to Fisherwomen (SAF), a group set up under the Department of Fisheries in Kerala to
empower women in the region. Now the project relies primarily on Corporate Social Responsibility

67
(CSR) funding from several companies.

The management methods should have specific, measurable outcomes

(a) Improved collection systems to eliminate plastic waste leakage
(b) Increased waste and plastic processing capabilities to capture additional value
(c) Supported behavioural change and capacity building
i) Strengthening the existing local Self-Help Groups and capacity building of youth and women in
the concept of “wealth from waste”, thus promoting a Circular Economy
ii) Training sessions will be organised, and public participation will be ensured to disseminate ideas
as widely as possible. Awareness programs for local fishermen on plastic pollution in the marine
environment to reduce the quantum of plastics thrown into the environment
iii) Programs such as the existing “Clean Sea Mission” should be replicated in several coastal
areas, and fishermen should be encouraged to bring more plastics from the ocean and manage
(segregating and recycling) them on the land
iv) Engage and create jobs for local women in women’s self-help groups

Conclusion
Prevention is preferable to cure, and the greatest opportunity to prevent plastic from entering the
ocean is to take steps to reduce plastic litter on land. Carrier bag charges have already proved a cost-
effective step in the right direction. The same approach could be taken to other commonly littered
plastic items, like takeaway cups and disposable cutlery. Deposit refunds on beverage containers
would help incentivise people to return them for recycling and reduce the amount littered. Removing
plastic from the oceans will be difficult. Despite the high profile of projects intended to clean up
plastics floating in mid-ocean, relatively little ends up there, and this approach appears to be of
limited value. The most practical measure that can be deployed is to focus efforts on reducing and
managing plastic usage in the hinterland. There is an urgent need to explore the use of existing
legally binding international agreements to address marine plastic pollution. Recycling and reusing
plastic products and supporting research and innovation to develop new products to replace single-
use plastics are also necessary to prevent and reduce plastic pollution. Apart from managing plastic
wastes, reduction in plastic production has to be addressed. In a nutshell, (a) constant monitoring with
advanced technologies: (b) identifying the source to propose management options and (c) following
a “cradle to grave” approach for better decision making is required to solve the problem at the root
level.

68
References:
1. Jambeck, J R, R Geyer, C Wilcox, T R Siegler, M Perryman, A Andrady, R Narayan and K L Law
(2015): “Plastic waste inputs from land into the ocean”, Science, 347(6223), pp.768-771.
2. P.K. Karuppusamy, Aditya Ravi, Logeshwaran Vasudevan, Mahesh Prabu Elangovan, Dyana Mary,
Salom G.T.Vincent and Thava Palanisami. 2020. Baseline survey of micro and mesoplastics in
the gastro-intestinal tract of commercial fish from Southeast coast of the Bay of Bengal. Marine
Pollution Bulletin, 153: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpolbul.2020.110974.
3. Lebreton, L., van der Zwet, J., Damsteeg, JW., Damsteeg,J., Slat,B., Andrady,A. and Reise,J.
(2017) River plastic emissions to the world’s oceans. Nature Communications 8, 15611. https://
doi.org/10.1038/ncomms15611
4. Kaladharan, P, P K Asokan, M Koya and H M Bhint (2014): Plastic debris in the stomach of a
Longman’s Beaked Whale, Indopacetuspacificus (Longman, 1926) stranded off Sutrapada,
Veraval, Saurashtra coast, India”, Journal of the Marine Biological Association of India, 56(2),
pp.92-94.
5. Suaria, G., Aliani, S., 2014. Floating debris in the {M}editerranean {S}ea. Mar. Pollut. Bull. 86 (1),
494–504.
6. Topouzelis, K., Papageorgiou,D., Suaria,G. and Aliani,S. 2021. Floating marine litter detection
algorithms and techniques using optical remote sensing data:A review. Marine Pollution Bulletin,
170: 112675. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpolbul.2021.112675.
7. Gerigny, O., M.Brun, M.C.Fabri, C.Tomasino, M.Le Moigne, A. Jaduad et al. (2019). Seafloor litter
from the continental shelf and canyons in French Mediterranean water: Distribution, typologies
and trends. Mar. Pollut. Bull. 146, 653-666. Doi: 10.1016/j.scitotenv.2019.06.123.
8. Vince J. and B. D. Hardesty, 2018. Governance solutions to the tragedy of the commons that
marine plastics have become. Frontiers in Marine Science, Policy and Practice Reviews. 19:
10.3389/fmars.2018.00214.
9. Rochman, C.M. 2016. Strategies for reducing ocean plastic debris should be diverse and guided
by science. Environ. Res. Lett. 11: 041001.
10. Geetika Bhagwat, Kelsey Gray, Scott P.Wilson, Sudhakar Muniyasamy, Salom G.T.Vincent,
Richard Bush and Thava Palanisami. 2020. Benchmarking Bioplastics: A Natural Step Towards a
Sustainable Future. Journal of Polymers and the Environment.

69
 5
Stakes and Stakeholders
of Marine Debris on the
East Coast of India

Akansha Tiwari

What makes the Bay of Bengal different?

India is surrounded by the sea on three sides and has over nine coastal states of Gujarat, Maharashtra,
Goa, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha and West Bengal, as seen in figure 1. The
blue color in the image represents the water bodies around the subcontinent of India.

Figure 1. Water bodies around the subcontinent of India

Source: Maps of World.com

70
BoB is the north eastern part of the Indian Ocean, and experiences five times more cyclonic events
than the Arabian Sea (AS) (Singh: 2000).1 In addition, cyclones in the Bay are stronger and deadlier
(Ibid). Moreover, nearly 58% of cyclones formed in the BoB reach the coast as compared to only 25%
of those formed on the western coast of the country (Francis: 2007).2

Tropical cyclones—also called typhoons or hurricanes—are intense water-rotating systems formed by

strong winds (of speeds at least 62 kilometers per hour) around low-pressure areas having a spiral,
anticlockwise movement. Weather conditions like high sea surface temperature, vertical changes in
wind speed inside the spiral, and high relative humidity contribute to the formation and intensity of
cyclones (Knutson: 2010).3

Owing to the direct correlation of sea surface temperatures and humidity with chances of cyclone
formation (Ibid), the BoB is more susceptible due to its high rainfall and sluggish winds that keep the
temperatures almost about 28 degrees high around the year (Behara and Vinayachandran: 2016).4

Since high water and air temperatures are crucial to the formation and intensification of cyclones,
they are most commonly reported, or expected, in summer, BOB being an exception as it experiences
cyclones both pre-monsoon and post-monsoon (Singh: 2000).5

In addition, BoB receives higher rainfall and constant inflow of fresh water from the perennial rivers of
Ganges and Brahmaputra ensuring that surface water keeps circulating making it ideal for a depression
where warm water on the surface does not mix with the cooler water below (Das et al.: 2020).6

The pre-monsoon period sees a lesser number of cyclones than post monsoon because the dry and
hot summer air moves from north-western India towards BoB blocking the rise of air from the water,
and the subsequent formation of clouds, preventing cyclone-friendly conditions while the absence
of this air movement in the post-monsoon phase increases the chances of cyclones. All these factors
make the BoB the one of the most sensitive areas in the world when it comes to cyclones.

Coastal Ecology and Marine Life

The BoB is home to dynamic species from blue whales to barracuda (Begum et al.: 2020).7 The author
states that Blue Whales and whale sharks are regularly seen migrating near the southeastern border
of the country towards Sri Lanka. Also, it is observed that Manta and Mobula Rays are spotted in
different parts of the Bay of Bengal mostly close to the coasts of Andhra Pradesh (Ibid). The Indian
state of Odisha also witnesses the yearly phenomenon of mass nesting by the Olive Ridley Sea Turtles
along with the individual nesting in other regions of the coast (Jeyabaskaran et al.: 2018)8

The Wildlife Protection Act in India of 1971, classifies animals into various categories called ‘schedules’.
The species with the highest protection under the Indian law (IPC - Indian Penal Code) is considered
to be a schedule one species and most of those mentioned above fall under that category. A large part
of India’s marine wildlife, and almost all marine mammals are categorized as schedule one species
(https://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1972-53_0.pdf, April 2022).9

The Stakes of Marine Debris in the Bay of Bengal

Marine debris is the scientific term used to describe solid trash that is found in the ocean. Marine litter
originates from many sea-based and land-based sources and causes a wide spectrum of environmental,
economic, safety, health and cultural impacts. The very slow rate of degradation of most marine litter
items, mainly plastics, together with the continuously growing quantity of the litter and debris, is

71
leading to a gradual, but dramatic increase in the quantities of marine litter in our oceans and world
shores (Cheshire et al.: 2009).10

It can be benthic, floating i.e., pelagic or beach litter, the cleanup requirements and technologies
used to retrieve litter from each region varies differently even though their long-term impacts are
largely circular in nature pertaining to disintegration or becoming an extension of the floating garbage
patches (Sivadas: 2021).11

Since most of the litter has a land-based origin, including fishing gear in this context, marine debris
has the capacity to injure marine animals physiologically having long term or permanent effects (Ibid).
Marine litter is extremely harmful to the ecosystem first because its constituents are alien to that
environment, sometimes but not always changing the composition and chemistry of the water (Ryan:
2013).12The pelagic litter cuts the access to sunlight that is essential for the growth of planktons that
are a major source of food for marine animals and responsible for over 70% of oxygen generated on
the planet essential to all living beings that undergo respiration (Raha et al.: 2020).13

Marine debris become a physical barrier for commercial and fishing boats entangling their propellers
and nets as well interrupting their efficiency of output by slowing them down or mixing with the catch
while fishing. The garbage patches become a geographic anomaly causing interruptions in migratory
routes of migrating species and are also responsible for transportation of invasive species that might
threaten the survival and existence of the original inhabitants of that region by taking their place
(Cheshire: 2009).14

Marine debris also poses a threat to divers that are regularly underwater for research or recreational
purposes. The magnitude of difference between the size of the diver and the debris usually in the form
of discarded nets in this underwater landscape is enough to cause fatal injuries.

Perhaps what is worse is that every plastic created from its discovery and production still exists in the
ocean and will not decompose at any point but disintegrate (Raha et al.: 2020).15 In addition to this
quantity, there is a tonne of debris being added every single year (Ryan: 2013).16

Due to the presence of the Indian Ocean Dipolea , proximity to the equator and the presence of ocean
currents around the Bay of Bengal, marine debris in this region does not necessarily find its origin in
this geography.

Generation of litter on the east coast

Along with stormwater runoff and the waste generated by the coastal cities, effluents from industries
either treated or untreated enter the Bay of Bengal throughout the year (Ibid).
The Indian rivers of Ganges, the Meghna, the Brahmaputra, the Mahanadi River, the
Godavari, the Krishna, the Irrawaddyr, the Kaveri, the Cooum, and the Ayeyarwady carry trash
when they empty into the Bay of Bengal (Raha et al.: 2020).17

72
 Figure 2: Countries around the Bay of Bengal
Source: WorldAtlas.com (April, 2022)

The BoB also receives litter from the countries of Myanmar, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Thailand, Malaysia
and Indonesia most of which are popular tourist destinations implying that their garbage output
would be largely affected by that factor.

Accumulation Zones along the coast of India

The potential accumulation zone along the Indian coast is the Marine Protected Area of Gulf of Mannar
(GoM), an area of religious and economic importance. Circulation of currents in the region shows
seasonal variation during the Southwest monsoon where they become stronger compared to the
Northeast Monsoon and Spring Intermonsoon (March–May) when the ocean currents are relatively
weak (Sivadas; 2021).18 As a result of the weak currents and subsurface barrier effect of the Palk Strait,
the waters in the GoM and north Palk Bay do not mix (Rao et al., 2011; Jagadeesan et al.: 2013).19

Factors such as the limited southern flow of BoB water, coastal currents and characteristics of plastic
might cause plastics to get trapped in this region. However, most of these plastics are also highly
likely to be retained due to the weak circulation, shallow depth, subsurface barrier effect, and diverse
habitat (Sivadas: 2021).20 Higher micro plastics in the coral reef and seagrass sites than the near shore
locations in the Rameswaram Island confirms the sedimentation of plastics in the region (Jeyasanta
et al.: 2020).21

The boundary currents along the east (East Indian Coastal Currents-EICC) and west (West Indian
Coastal Currents-WICC) coast of India also reverses seasonally and play a critical role in connecting
the AS and BoB.

The Indonesian throughflow connects the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean and because the north
Indian Ocean is landlocked, there is no northern subtropical gyre and associated garbage patch, as
observed in the Pacific and Atlantic Ocean (van der Mheen et al.: 2019)22.

a1 The Indian Ocean Dipole - often called the “Indian Niño” because of its similarity to its Pacific equivalent - refers to the
difference in sea-surface temperatures in opposite parts of the Indian Ocean.

73
Numerical modeling studies show a garbage patch forming in the BoB (Ibid) and corroborates
with the study of Ryan, (2013) 23and Li et al (2021). The coastal ecosystem is prone to become a
major sink of marine garbage because of its nature (Onink et al.: 2021)24 mangroves, seaweeds,
sea grass, and coral reefs, facilitates plastic accumulation. Geological structures such as rocky
and sandy shores may become a temporary or permanent garbage storage (Brennan et al.,
2018).25 The coastal circulation around the Andaman and Nicobar is driven by equatorial forcinga
(Jagadeesan et al.: 2013).26 Local winds force a weak sea-level signal along the continental boundaries
and islands (Chatterjee et al.: 2017).27

The seasonal reversal of currents in the Indian Ocean is followed by surface circulation. The topography
of the areas adds complexity. The islands also have a wide range of habitats (coral reef, mangroves,
seagrass) and are influenced by four rivers (Ganga, Brahmaputra, Irrawaddy, and Salween) that show
strong seasonal variability in the discharge rate.

Remote islands also should be taken into consideration to understand the dynamics of plastic as litter
(Dunlop et al: 2020).28 Relatively small polluted river basins contribute more compared to large basins
because of the amount of mismanaged plastic waste generation within the river basins (Meijer et al.:
2021).29

Furthermore, small urban rivers are among the most polluting. India was the second-largest contributor
to mismanaged plastic in the ocean. The Ganges-Brahmaputra ranked sixth among the 10 top-ranked
rivers transporting the highest plastic loads to the sea (Schmidt et al.: 2017).30

The Lagrangian particle tracking simulation of plastics indicates that under the influence of the
reversing monsoonal currents, plastics move back and forth between the AS and the BOB (Van Der
Mheen et al.: 2020).31 As a result, a large number of particles are present in the AS during the Northeast
monsoon (December to February), while during the Southwest Monsoon (June–September), particles
are higher in the BoB.

Particles are present throughout the year in the BoB, probably due to the annual mean eastward flow
in the equatorial region and the anticyclonic and cyclonic gyres that develop throughout the year.

Global Efforts
Among the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that encompass the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, adopted by the General Assembly in September 2015, goal 14 addresses the need for,
inter alia, the sustainable use and conservation of life below water i.e., to “Conserve and sustainably
use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development”.

SDG 14 targets seek to prevent and reduce marine pollution; further the sustainable management and
protection of marine and coastal ecosystems; address the impacts of ocean acidification; regulate
harvesting and end overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and destructive fishing
practices; conserve coastal and marine areas; increase the economic benefits to small island developing
States and least developed countries from the sustainable use of marine resources; and strengthen the
means of implementation, including increasing scientific knowledge, the transfer of marine technology and
implementation of international law as reflected in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOSa)
(Soares: 2017).32

74
Stakeholder Management and Involvement
Stakeholders of a conservation issue such as marine debris is inclusive of but not limited to those that
depend upon the oceans for a livelihood such as fishermen and recreational divers but also those that
study these ecosystems such as scientists, biologists and ecologists as well as those that instigate
policy decisions such as bureaucrats, politicians, industrial conglomerates and science communicators
(Raha et al.: 2020).33

According to a literature review by Raha et al, in 2020, it has been the norm though not always to
consult scientific experts during policy decisions without considering the stakeholders that directly
depend on this ecology for their survival. Even in case of consideration, stakeholders such as fishermen
are represented by privileged spokespersons from that group or via secondary stakeholders such as
biologists who have had access to them.

Divers are a primary stakeholder because of their proximity to marine debris and access to the
underwater ecosystem but occasionally academic considerations do not include those that are
involved in a non-research set up i.e., recreationally (Hermoso: 2021).34

The number of divers that are underwater recreationally and involved with clean up initiatives such
as the dive against debris by Padi Aware, an Australian diving association is statistically far more and
regular than those that might be underwater for research with or without professional equipment and
aid.

Policy decisions and suggestions should be made on a local level as well as global level to ensure long
term impactful change, which includes standardization of collection and storage of nets and other
marine debris considering the resources in the region, geographical structure of the sea, and the
stakeholder involved in retrieval (Raha et al.: 2020).35

Policy Suggestions
(a) Public access to data is essential for smaller scale projects to happen on their own. Clean ups
are seen as collaborative efforts between nations when they should also be handled on a smaller
scale because once the debris reaches the garbage patches, it becomes a long term if not
permanent problem which involves comparatively higher costs, need for advanced technology
and scientific research.

(b) Despite there being a format, most data portals and clean ups follow, there is a lack of standardized
documentation because of unreliable collection after storage. At least in the case of India, those
involved in retrieval and clean ups are hardly aware of what happens with the debris once it has
been reported, documented and collected to be handed over to a local government authority or
stored in a public space.

(c) Disparity between stakeholders and lawmakers should be reduced if not eradicated for long term
impact that is carried out at all times at least by one or several stakeholders without it becoming
a larger issue for fewer stakeholders to deal with within a specific period of time.

a3 UNCLOS is frequently referred to as the ‘constitution for the oceans’. It sets out, as recognized by the General Assembly, the
legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out, including with regard to the conservation
and sustainable use of the oceans and their resources.

75
(d) Marine debris for those who are not studying or working with ocean ecosystems is a relatively
lesser-known concept. Awareness and sensitization are is important to understand why not to
create litter instead of being forced to follow laws within rules and regulation.

(e) Non coastal cities except metros are the ones that create the most trash that enters the sea
through waterways which is why communication about litter generation should be considered
even in this region and not be limited to areas close to the coast (Chatterjee: 2017).36

(f) Outlets of rivers into the sea must be monitored and regulated to reduce the amount of marine
debris that is comparatively location specific than having to identify accumulation zones in the
ocean.

(g) Funding should be provided for mechanical clean ups of benthic and underwater trash by
individuals such as divers too instead of just surface retrieval by machines because not only are
the pelagic species are at risk during surface clean ups but divers are able to separate and sort
out trash as well as rescue trapped marine life because of their individual access, knowledge of
the landscape and cost efficiency. Their safety should not be compromised because of the lack
of finances which might also discourage them from regular retrieval which they otherwise carry
out voluntarily.

(h) Research should be aided to change the source material of the litter i.e., look at biodegradable
alternatives if nothing else and producers who violate safety standards repetitively should be
heavily taxed and penalized.

References:

1. Singh, O. P., Khan, A. T., & Rahman, M. S. Changes in the frequency of tropical cyclones over the North Indian
Ocean, 20, 11–20 (2000).

2. Francis, P. A., Gadgil, S., & Vinayachandran, P. N. Triggering of the positive Indian Ocean dipole events by
severe cyclones over the Bay of Bengal, 461–475 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1600-0870.2007.00254.x

3. Knutson, T. R., McBride, J. L., Chan, J., Emanuel, K., Holland, G., Landsea, C., … Masato, S. Tropical cyclones
and climate change. Nature Geoscience, 3(MARCH), 157–163 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1038/ngeo779.

4. Behara, A., and Vinayachandran, P. N. An OGCM study of the impact of rain and river water forcing on the
Bay of Bengal, J. Geophys. Res. Oceans, 121, 2425– 2446, (2016), doi:10.1002/2015JC011325.

5. Singh, O. P., Khan, A. T., & Rahman, M. S. Changes in the frequency of tropical cyclones over the North Indian
Ocean, 20, 11–20 (2000).

6. Das, Bijan Kumar, T. S. Anandh, J. Kuttippurath, and Arun Chakraborty. “ Influence of River Discharge and Tides
on the Summertime Discontinuity of Western Boundary Current in the Bay of Bengal”, Journal of Physical
Oceanography 50, 12 (2020): 3513-3528, accessed Apr 13, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1175/JPO-D-20-0133.1

7. Begum, A., Sarker, S., Uzzaman, M. S., Shamsuzzaman, M. M., & Islam, M. M. (2020). Marine megafauna in the
northern Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh: Status, threats and conservation needs. Ocean & Coastal Management,
192. (2020). https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2020.105228.

76
8. Jeyabaskaran, R., and V. Kripa. “Status of sea turtle conservation in India and the way forward.” Marine
Fisheries Information Service; Technical and Extension Series 238 (2018):

9. https://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1972-53_0.pdf, April 2022.

10. Cheshire, Anthony, and Ellik Adler. “UNEP/IOC guidelines on survey and monitoring of marine litter”, 5 - 19
(2009).

11. Sivadas, S. K., Ramu, K., Mishra, P., & Mv, R. M. Potential Plastic Accumulation Zones in the Indian Coastal
Seas, 8(November 2021), 1–6. https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2021.768001

12. Ryan, P. G. A simple technique for counting marine debris at sea reveals steep litter gradients between the
Straits of Malacca and the Bay of Bengal. Marine Pollution Bulletin, 69 (1–2), 128–136 (2013). https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.marpolbul.2013.01.016

13. Raha U, Kumar BR, Sarkar SK, Policy Framework for Mitigating Land-Based Marine Plastic Pollution in the
Gangetic Delta Region of Bay of Bengal- A Review, Journal of Cleaner Production, (2020). https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.123409.

14. Cheshire, Anthony, and Ellik Adler. “UNEP/IOC guidelines on survey and monitoring of marine litter”, 5 - 19
(2009).

15. Raha et al., ‘Policy Framework’.

16. Ryan, P. G., ‘A simple technique’.

17. Raha et al., ‘Policy Framework’.

18. Sivadas, S. K. et al., ‘Potential Plastic Accumulation’.

19. Rao, R. R., M. S. Girishkumar, M. Ravichandran, V. V. Gopalakrishna, and P. Thadathil. “Do cold, low salinity
waters pass through the Indo-Sri Lanka Channel during winter?.” International Journal of Remote Sensing
32, no. 22 (2011): 7383-7398.

20. Sivadas, S. K. et al., ‘Potential Plastic Accumulation’.

21. Jeyasanta, K. Immaculate, Jamila Patterson, Gabriel Grimsditch, and JK Patterson Edward. “Occurrence and
characteristics of microplastics in the coral reef, sea grass and near shore habitats of Rameswaram Island,
India.” Marine Pollution Bulletin 160 (2020a): 111674.

22. Van der Mheen, Mirjam, Charitha Pattiaratchi, and Erik van Sebille. “Role of Indian Ocean dynamics on
accumulation of buoyant debris.” Journal of Geophysical Research: Oceans 124, no. 4 (2019): 2571-2590.

23. Ryan, P. G., ‘A simple technique’.

24. Onink, Victor, Cleo E. Jongedijk, Matthew J. Hoffman, Erik van Sebille, and Charlotte Laufkötter. “Global
simulations of marine plastic transport show plastic trapping in coastal zones.” Environmental Research
Letters 16, no. 6 (2021): 064053.

25. Brennan, Eavan, Chris Wilcox, and Britta Denise Hardesty. “Connecting flux, deposition and resuspension in
coastal debris surveys.” Science of the total environment 644 (2018): 1019-1026.

77
26. Jagadeesan, L., R. Jyothibabu, A. Anjusha, Arya P. Mohan, N. V. Madhu, K. R. Muraleedharan, and K. Sudheesh.
“Ocean currents structuring the mesozooplankton in the Gulf of Mannar and the Palk Bay, southeast coast
of India.” Progress in Oceanography 110 (2013): 27-48.

27. Chatterjee, Abhisek, Shankar, D. & McCreary, J. & Vinayachandran, Pn & Mukherjee, A. Dynamics of Andaman
Sea circulation and its role in connecting the equatorial Indian Ocean to the Bay of Bengal. Journal of
Geophysical Research: Oceans, 122 (2017).

28. Dunlop, S. W., B. J. Dunlop, and M. Brown. “Plastic pollution in paradise: Daily accumulation rates of marine
litter on Cousine Island, Seychelles.” Marine Pollution Bulletin 151 (2020): 110803

29. Meijer, Lourens JJ, Tim van Emmerik, Ruud van der Ent, Christian Schmidt, and Laurent Lebreton. “More
than 1000 rivers account for 80% of global riverine plastic emissions into the ocean.” Science Advances 7,
no. 18 (2021): eaaz5803.

30. Schmidt, Christian, Tobias Krauth, and Stephan Wagner. “Export of plastic debris by rivers into the sea.”
Environmental science & technology 51, no. 21 (2017): 12246-12253.

31. Van der Mheen, Mirjam, Charitha Pattiaratchi, and Erik van Sebille. “Role of Indian Ocean dynamics on
accumulation of buoyant debris.” Journal of Geophysical Research: Oceans 124, no. 4 (2019): 2571-2590.

32. Soares, Miguel De Serpa. “Achieving SDG 14: The Role of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea.” United Nations. United Nations, May 2017.

33. Raha et al., ‘Policy Framework’.

34. Hermoso, María Isabel, Victoria Y. Martin, Stefan Gelcich, Wolfgang Stotz, and Martin Thiel. “Exploring
diversity and engagement of divers in citizen science: Insights for marine management and conservation.”
Marine Policy 124 (2021): 104316.

35. Raha et al.,’ Policy Framework’.

36. Chatterjee, Abhisek, Shankar, D. & McCreary, J. & Vinayachandran, Pn & Mukherjee, A. Dynamics of Andaman
Sea circulation and its role in connecting the equatorial Indian Ocean to the Bay of Bengal. Journal of
Geophysical Research: Oceans, 122 (2017).

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 6
Ocean and Climate as
Influencers of Geopolitical
Strategic Importance
in the Indian Ocean
Sali Jayne Bache

Introduction
Recent years have seen a heightened interest in the regional positioning and global influence of the
Indo-Pacific. Interest in this large maritime area, comes from states both within and beyond, including
the members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) of India, Japan, the United States and
Australia. While ASEAN still holds the top spot among Asian trade blocs, this increase in attention
has caused it to share its voice with the newly growing Indo Pacific multilateral architecture. The
positioning of the Indo-Pacific as free, open and resilient has been perpetuated by India’s leadership
both in the region and on the international stage.a4 This includes India’s initiation of the Security and
Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) forum,a4 and through their chairing of the August 2021’s security
council session on maritime security, which underlined the central role of the United National Law of
the Sea Convention (LOSC).a6 This rising importance of the Indo Pacific has led to a reimagining of
regional boundaries and the conceptualising of state groupings as more fluid, in particular in looking
at the overlaps and shared objectives of ASEAN and the Indo Pacific.a7

a4 Examples of this between Australia and India include the Australia-India Joint Declaration on a Shared Vision for Maritime
Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and the Australia-India Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership (AIIPOIP). https://india.
highcommission.gov.au/ndli/AIIPOIP1.html
a5 Prime Minister Modi first articulated the “Security and Growth for All in the Region” doctrine for the Indian Ocean region on
12 March 2015 in his speech on the occasion of the Commissioning Ceremony of Mauritius National Coast Guard Ship Barracuda
which remains the only source of reference to SAGAR. Subsequently, he announced the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) at
the East Asia Summit (EAS) held in Bangkok, Thailand on 4 November 2019.
a6 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, UN/Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 7 October 1982,
21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982). See also “Maritime Security” August 2021 at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2021/08/
maritime-security-vtc-open-debate.php

79
Recent years have also seen geopolitical discussions shift in focus, from landscapes to that of
seascapes. Ocean based activities are increasingly reflective of broader geo-political tensions and
relations. Focusing around the shared maritime dimension provides an opportunity for greater regional
cohesion and connectivity than was previously available when states were reluctant to acknowledge
shared maritime interests and focused instead on individual state ownership (Bhattacharya J: 2017).1
Support for a maritime order based on norms is important in the Indo-Pacific area in order to advance
the objectives of regional security and stability.

Support for a rules-based maritime order, predominantly through the system established under the
LOSC, is well reflected in the region’s approach to maritime boundary delimitation arrangements.
The Indo Pacific’s peaceable determination of disputes resolved through bilateral negotiation
mechanisms and International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) determinations and arbitral
tribunal (Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary: 2014)2 sits in stark contrast to the situation in the
South China Sea,a8 and has allowed countries in the region to avoid the scenario wherein the Bay
of Bengal became a ‘new sea of trouble’ (Bateman S: 2010).3 There are now no major disputes over
claims of territorial and maritime spaces in the Bay of Bengal (BoB) thus paving the way for greater
maritime cooperation and the progression of regional governance systems. This may prove to be one
of the great strengths of the region.

In discussing maritime stability and security in the Indian Ocean, and in particular the BoB, recognition
must be paid to the influence that has come from China’s growing assertiveness and broad expansionist
agenda. The BoB subregion has seen increased attention from China due to its proximity to littoral
states, and the Bay’s strategic location as a maritime gateway from the Indian Ocean to Southeast
Asia.a9 The BoB adjoins one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, the Straits of Malacca, which
sit at the intercept of the Andaman Sea at the eastern base of the BoB and the South China Sea. This
gives the region significant geo-strategic importance and makes it a priority pathway in respect of
China’s Belt and Road initiative and critical to trade in fossil fuels. China’s sovereignty assertions in the
South China Sea and its increasing presence with investments in major ports in the Indian Ocean a10
have added to the Indo Pacific’s regional disquiet.

A countermeasure to individual countries’ expansionist ambitions is the adoption of clear regional

collaborative institutional structures. One such example is the regional unity displayed in terms of
navigation in the Straits of Malacca, where Article 43 of LOSC has been implemented to establish the
Cooperative Mechanism for the enhancement of security, safety, and environmental protection of the
Straits of Malacca (Beckman R: 2009).4 Countries beyond the region have cooperated wherein, among
others, the Quad nations have demonstrated their support through joint naval exercises, patrols, and
air surveillance (Ho J and Chan J: 2011).5 Indeed India and Australia share a philosophical position
on their belief in an open inclusive resilient multilateral maritime system, with no single dominant
state dictating outcomes for others. In the broader Indian Ocean region India has assumed fiduciary
responsibility, responding with an elevated level of outreach to other Indo Pacific states and capability
extension. The ongoing response from India, and policy support of other interested states such as
Australia, will be critical in determining how this agenda plays out as relates to both regional institutions
and global rules-based structures. One such measure is the multilateral Indo Pacific Oceans Initiative
(IPOI) which strives to operate as an open, inclusive, non-treaty-based global initiative for mitigating
challenges with a focus on the maritime domain.

In addition to traditional sovereign concerns, there is a global trend whereby wider maritime security
and stability issues now often align instead with non-state specific security threats. Maritime security

80
and stability have expanded to include issues of bio-physical security, environmental migration, illegal
fishing, piracy, and natural disasters. Many of these dangers fall under the category of “human and
environmental security,” which is concerned with, among other things, how the environment affects
people’s capacity for survival. Two important examples of this are food security and the frequency
and intensity of severe weather occurrences. Climate change is a threat multiplier in regard to many
such security concerns.

The BoB is one of the most climate vulnerable areas in the world. Climate change impacts are
expected to be greater in the Bay of Bengal than other regions with surface warming anticipated to
continue to be one of the highest globally, leading to a heightened likelihood of natural disasters in
this region as well as intensified droughts and monsoons (Hoegh-Guldberg O and et al.: 2018).6 This
is further intensified by the large quantity of low-lying delta lands and islands in the region and their
susceptibility to rising sea levels or storm surge events. Arising issues of land loss and competition for
natural resources due to climate induced change, lead to increased poverty, which has the ultimate
effects of increasing migration and escalating conflicts. On the scale of both climate induced migration
risk and vulnerability indexes this area is one of the most severely impacted in the world.a11

Estimates suggest that 1.2 million people in the Indian Sundarbans alone will become climate refugees
due to sea level rise between 2030 and 2050 (Anurag D and et al.: 2011).7 Significant investment
in climate adaptation is needed a as are more traditional strategies of education and increased
employment opportunities, including through the application of more nascent economic models
such as private-public partnership initiatives. These regions epitomise why transformational change
is needed to manage the human and environmental impacts of climate change. The scale of these
challenges has led to a rise in the contemplation of regional action. Launched at the end of 2019 at
the east Asia summit the IPOI has the objective of ensuring the safety, security and stability of the
maritime domain. Relying on seven pillars, India and Australia are partnering on the marine ecology
pillar.

The Indo Pacific, in addition to its significant strategic position and shared security threats, is increasingly
recognised as an area of substantial economic maritime potential. Blue economic development is
taking centre stage in national and regional policies (Bhattacharya J: 2017).8 If this can be harnessed
in a long term ecologically sustainable manner it will significantly contribute to stability and security
in the region.

In examining issues of the broader region, it is helpful to reduce our lens and to examine the situation
in the BoB. Located at the northern end of the Indian Ocean, the BoB provides an interesting example
of maritime security and prosperity challenges and opportunities, as well as the range of actions and
the positive developments that are possible and necessary in the broader region.

Bay of Bengal

The BoB is one of the largest marine ecosystems in the world, extending from the mouth of Ganges
River to the bottom of Sri Lanka on one side and the Strait of Malacca on the other. It is bordered on
continental Asia by Malaysia, Thailand. Myanmar, Bangladesh and India as well as the island States of
Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The maritime territory is split between these seven States which represent
just under a quarter of the global population, of which approximately 400 million depend on coastal
and maritime resources for their livelihood and security (Ibid).9 It is fascinating to note that the region’s
complex human geography in terms of religion, language, ethnicity, culture, and political systems has

81
not manifested in the possible depth of division that could have been anticipated. Good relations and
an acceptance of the socio-cultural diversity characterises regional maritime relations, however this
has not been significantly leveraged to improve the political economy of the BoB nor has an enduring
sense of security been established.

The BoB has the particular international legal status of a semi enclosed sea under the LOSC from
which arise particular state obligations. The scenario of semi enclosed seas and state rights and
responsibilities is contemplated under LOSC Article 123.a13 All BoB states are members of the LOSC,
which does not allow for reservations. Article 123 holds that states bordering a semi enclosed sea such
as the BoB should cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance
of their duties. In this regard, concomitant to embracing the rules-based order of the LOSC, Article
123 confers a responsibility for coordinated management, conservation, exploration and exploitation
of the living resources of the sea, and the protection and preservation of the marine environment.
Coordinated scientific research policies and joint programmes of scientific research are encouraged
and the invited participation of states or international organisations from outside the region is provided
for.

With nearly a quarter of the world population and combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of
US$3.8 trillion, the BoB Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)
has emerged as an influential engine of economic growth and regional governance.a14 It was initiated
to carve out a preferential trading arrangement, and establish a Free Trade Area “with the objective of
promoting “harmonious development of economic relations among member countries”.a15

Trade is a logical starting point, especially given the previously noted role of the Straits of Malacca
as one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. Notwithstanding the intensity of regional shipping,
there remains a strong need for greater capacity and efficiency in port infrastructure and investment
in the BoB region.a16 In this regard, and in addition to China’s investment, India has made considerable
commitments to enhanced regional connectivity through port modernisation, and the development
of industrial clusters and coastal communities.a17 Other countries such as Japan have also established
economic relationships through the support of port development in the region.

Recently BIMSTEC has evolved into a more comprehensive policy forum. After a gap of four years,
the fifth BIMSTEC summit was held in 2022. At the moment BIMSTEC is a sector-driven cooperative
organisation with a current focus at the political and bureaucratic levels. This forum, however, has
the potential to respond to more comprehensive challenges such as the promotion of a blue/green
economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and other regional collective response strategies
embedded in the physical-human-ecological geographies of the Bay of Bengal. The launch of the
‘BIMSTEC charter’, described as a roadmap for connectivity, establishment of basic institutional
structures and mechanisms of the group. This will include a streamlining of the focus areas back
to seven key pillars, with each country taking charge of a specific area.a18 The sectors are science,
technology and innovation; trade and investment; environment and climate change; agriculture and
food security; security; people-to-people contacts; and connectivity. Developments such as the
BIMSTEC Network of Policy Think Tanks (RC-BNPTT) will allow for the engagement of a broader
audience and mechanism for regional consultations on policy matters.a19

As with the broader Indo-Pacific area, there are imperatives to both ensure security in the BoB
region and to develop a sustainable blue economy which has become an increasing policy priority
across the region.a20 Herein States are reorienting their policy attention to include the role that the

82
maritime space can play in national development as a source of economic growth and livelihoods,
including through the BIMSTEC grouping.a21 A serious emerging concern in BoB is the focus on blue
economic development with inadequate contemplation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals
(SDG) framework or sustainability consideration. There is an urgent need to link the development of
the blue economy with the goals of Agenda 2030. This is aligned to the LOSC Article 123 requirements
for parties bordering semi enclosed seas. To date, however, sustainability has not been a key feature
of maritime development ambitions, an omission which will significantly undermine the stability and
security of the region.

Evidence of this is available from the emergence of a significant dead-zone of concern, an area of
60,000 km2 in which the ocean has become so degraded by deoxygenation that it is no longer able to
support aquatic life (Bristow L A and et al.: 2016).10 Caused by a combination of the effects of climate
change and warming oceans, and introduced nutrients and chemical runoff, this as with many issues
in the BoB can only be remedied through a collaborative approach that directly contemplates the
environmental impacts of both land based and marine policy choices. In terms of stability impacts
the dead zone has a significant impact on food security in the region. The fact that over half of
the world’s fisheries are at their limit and one third exploited at unsustainable levels (FAO: 2020),11
combines with the dependence of the region on marine resources for coastal food security, to make
it particularly vulnerable. If the development of a prosperous sustainable blue economy is to be
achieved, then the transboundary nature of these resources must be recognised through improved
environmental regulation, habitat protection and regional fisheries management. Moreover, the region
is home to one of the largest contiguous mangrove forests in the world, the Sunderbans, which offers
significant ecosystem benefits, as well as blue carbon stores that afford it a high climate significance.
This is the same location that is of particular concern in regard to future human security issues due to
environmental and climatic vulnerability and migration.

For BoB states, combating the threats of climate change and marine pollution, as well as exploring
avenues for economic prosperity are critical. There has emerged a regional emphasis on commitment
to climate change resilience. Issues that are of priority include the security of natural resources,
sustainable development, protection from natural disasters, and controlling the ill effects of marine
pollution. India’s leadership has seen enhanced security, economic and technological capacity of
other regional states in modest but relevant ways. Where ASEAN has traditionally struggled with
the goal of regional economic cooperation and has tended towards a more competitive ethos (Frost
F: 2013).12 BIMSTEC under the guidance of India has an opportunity to invent itself in a new way, to
harness complementary activities and planning. Efforts include those aimed at enhanced regional
solar capacitya22 and disaster resiliencea23 are undertaken in an open and transparent manner and
resonate with states around the BoB. In this way a pathway is being paved to allow enhanced external
collaboration from countries outside the region.a24

Regional platforms such as BIMSTEC can facilitate the pursuit of a range of emerging markets and
technologies such as renewable offshore energy generation, marine bio-technology, and sustainable
aquaculture and fisheries.a25 It may also enhance access to new and emerging markets, including
carbon trading and blue bonds. Ecotourism remains a somewhat fledgling industry in this region –
with the area impacted heavily by the 2004 tsunami, subsequent cyclonic events, and most recently
the COVID 19 pandemic. It is an area of potential growth that could take lessons from other regions to
minimise negative impacts of tourism on both indigenous communities and the environment. Global
wind analysis through data base assemblages suggests that the BoB has multiple sites where wind
farms are feasible at low sea depth locations with high power density requirements and proximal to

83
shore (Nadi R and et al.: 2019).13 Emerging technologies such as wave and tide energy may be more
appropriate to other areas with inconsistent wind profile but high tidal variability. With a national
commitment to renewable energy this is a perfect area for capacity building to be provided by India
and other supporting states.

Finally, is the need for improved science in the region, a fact widely acknowledged through the UN
Declaration of this as the Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development. Scientific research
in both the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and high seas regions of BoB and the Indian Ocean is
needed. Facilitation of an assessment of the sustainability of the maritime sector is possible through
the Australia India partnership on ecosystems within the IPOI regime, and the Bay of Bengal Large
Marine Ecosystem (BOBLME) Project. The BoB is described as being at a tipping point, but further
research is urgently needed –– little is known of the biochemistry of the Bay’s water and sediments, and
there is an incomplete picture of the patterns and influences on upwelling processes. This compounds
the high degree of unknowns in the BoB in regard to environmental change. High amounts of these
substances raise questions about how the BOB may react to environmental change.

Issues of human and environmental security are intrinsically linked to the broader sustainable
development framework as enunciated under Agenda 2030. The negotiation of a successor to Agenda
2030 is a key opportunity for BoB littoral states to align their ecological and the geopolitical spaces
and narratives. The exertion of high-level influence by these states to shape the global priorities
given to the range of SDG issues is valid, as based on the significant population of the region, the
vulnerability of those living there and the severity of climate impacts. These global decisions will
impact the region’s future due to the breadth and intensity of security and stability impacts climate
change and environmental degradation will have here. Notwithstanding the challenges, the region
along with its partners have a great opportunity to enhance the natural maritime features and embrace
a prosperous sustainable blue economic future.

a1 The Indian Ocean Dipole - often called the “Indian Niño” because of its similarity to its Pacific equivalent - refers to the
difference in sea-surface temperatures in opposite parts of the Indian Ocean.
a2 Equatorial Forcing is the mechanism by which planets and other bodies within the sun’s gravitational reach are gradually
forced into the sun’s equatorial plane of rotation.
a3UNCLOS is frequently referred to as the ‘constitution for the oceans’. It sets out, as recognized by the General Assembly,
the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out, including with regard to the con-
servation and sustainable use of the oceans and their resources.
a4 Examples of this between Australia and India include the Australia-India Joint Declaration on a Shared Vision for Maritime
Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and the Australia-India Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership (AIIPOIP). https://india.high-
commission.gov.au/ndli/AIIPOIP1.html
a5 Prime Minister Modi first articulated the “Security and Growth for All in the Region” doctrine for the Indian Ocean region on
12 March 2015 in his speech on the occasion of the Commissioning Ceremony of Mauritius National Coast Guard Ship Barra-
cuda which remains the only source of reference to SAGAR. Subsequently, he announced the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative
(IPOI) at the East Asia Summit (EAS) held in Bangkok, Thailand on 4 November 2019.
a6 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, UN/Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 7 Octo-
ber 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982). See also “Maritime Security” August 2021 at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsin-
blue/2021/08/maritime-security-vtc-open-debate.php
a7 In pursuit of shared objectives, the AIIPOIP nurtures cooperation under the IPOI and links with existing regional mecha-
nisms and arrangements including ASEAN, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).
a8 South China Sea Arbitration, Philippines v China, Award, PCA Case No 2013-19, ICGJ 495 (PCA 2016), 12th July 2016,

84
Permanent Court of Arbitration [PCA]. Wherein China dismissed the International Court of Arbitration ruling that Chi-
na had no legal basis for its claim as an illegitimate verdict. See also Peng, N. and Ngeow C., “Managing the South Chi-
na Sea Dispute: Multilateral and Bilateral Approaches” (2022) Ocean Development & International Law, 53:1, 37-59, DOI:
10.1080/00908320.2022.2034555
a9 The region links the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific, through the Straits of Malacca to the South China Sea.
a10 For example, those of Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Kyaukpyu (Myanmar) and Chittagong (Bangladesh).
a11 Climate Change Vulnerability Index, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-climate-risk-index-2021.
a12 The people of this region are living under the constant threat of climate change-induced disasters like cyclones, storm
surges and coastal flooding. Their safety and socio-economic security continue to hang in the balance because the govern-
ment has not undertaken remedial protective measures such as reconstruction of earthen embankments. Dey, Sunita, Asish
Kumar Ghosh and Somnath Hazra (2016): “Review of West Bengal State Adaptation Policies, Indian Bengal.
Delta,” DECCMA Working Paper, Deltas, Vulnerability and Climate Change: Migration and Adaptation, IDRC Project No
107642,
viewed on 10 August 2017, http://www.deccma.com/deccma/uploads_working_papers/Final_India_West_Ben....
a13 Art 123: States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each other in the exercise of their
rights and in the performance of their duties under this Convention. To this end they shall endeavour, directly or through an
appropriate regional organization: (a) to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living
resources of the sea; (b) to coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with respect to the protection and pres-
ervation of the marine environment; (c) to coordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where appropriate joint
programmes of scientific research in the area; (d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international organiza-
tions to cooperate with them in furtherance of the provisions of this article.
a14 This is in part related to India’s refocusing on BIMSTEC due to problems encountered in efforts to revitalise the SAARC
(South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) due to the ongoing India-Pakistan dispute, and a desire to avoid major
disputes leading to regional policy blockages in regard to Myanmar. Given current relations and the response to Pakistan’s
offer to host there is little current chance of SAARC being revitalised.
a15 Future Directions of BIMSTEC, 2004, p. 1
a16 India has implemented a major investment program (sargamala) which is focused on improving port infrastructure.
a17 https://usiofindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/USI-Occasional-Paper_2_19-Unpacking-SAGAR-Final-print-File-1.pdf
a18 Indian tweet “Emphasized our commitment to intensify and expand areas of cooperation, especially connectivity, energy
and maritime cooperation” Dr. S. Jaishankar External Affairs Minister, India.
a19 Read more at: https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/in-perspective/realising-the-potential-of-bimstec-1095827.html
a20 Bangladesh has convened a number of recent meetings on the blue economy. Pushed for more regional cooperation on
the issue in multilateral organisations.
a21 BIMSTEC is the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation. Members are Bangladesh,
Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand.
a22 International Solar Alliance (ISA)
a23 Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, setting up of Climate Disaster Warning centres, SAR and HADR efforts
a24 https://usiofindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/USI-Occasional-Paper_2_19-Unpacking-SAGAR-Final-print-File-1.pdf
a25 https://usiofindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/USI-Occasional-Paper_2_19-Unpacking-SAGAR-Final-print-File-1.pdf

85
References:

1. Bhattacharya, J.”,The Sea of Changes: Shifting Trajectories Across the Bay of Bengal” Asian Politics & Poli-
cy—2017, Volume 9, Number 2—Pages 245–267.
2. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangl./Myan.), Case No. 16, Judgment of Mar.
14, 2012, 12 ITLOS Rep. 4; and Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangl. v. India), Award (July
7, 2014).
3. Bateman, S. “Bay of Bengal: A New Sea of Troubles”, RSIS Commentaries (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, 21 May 2010), p. 2.
4. Beckman, R. “The Establishment of a Cooperative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
under Article 43 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” in The Future of Ocean Re-
gime-Building: Essays in Tribute to Douglas M. Johnston, Chircop, A., McDorman, T. and Rolston, S. (eds)
(Brill, Boston, 2009).
5. Ho, J. and Chan, J., “Cooperative arrangements in the straits of Malacca and Singapore.” in Uday, B. and
Shishir U. (ed.) Furthering maritime connectivity: India and Southeast Asia. (New Delhi: National Maritime
Foundation, Matrix Publishers. 2011), pp. 60–61.
6. Hoegh-Guldberg, O., D. Jacob, M. Taylor, M. Bindi, S. Brown, I. Camilloni, A. Diedhiou, R. Djalante, K.L. Ebi,
F. Engelbrecht, J. Guiot, Y. Hijioka, S. Mehrotra, A. Payne, S.I. Seneviratne, A. Thomas, R. Warren, and G.
Zhou, “Impacts of 1.5ºC Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems”. In: Global Warming of 1.5°C.
An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and relat-
ed global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the
threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty (IPCC, 2018).
7. Anurag, D., Sriskanthan. G., Ghosh, A., Bandyopadhyay, J. and Sugata Hazra, S. Indian Sundarbans Delta:
A Vision. (New Delhi: World Wide Fund for Nature-India, 2011).
8. Bhattacharya, J.”,The Sea of Changes: Shifting Trajectories Across the Bay of Bengal” Asian Politics & Poli-
cy—2017 Volume 9, Number 2—Pages 245–267.
9. Bhattacharya J.”,The Sea of Changes: Shifting Trajectories Across the Bay of Bengal” Asian Politics & Poli-
cy—2017 Volume 9, Number 2—Pages 245–267.
10. Bristow L. A.; Callbeck, C. ; Larsen, M. ; Altabet, M. ; Dekaezemacker, J. ; Forth, M. ; Gauns, M. ; Glud, R. ;
Kuypers, M. ; Lavik, G. ; Milucka, J. ; Naqvi, S.. ; Pratihary, A. ; Revsbech, N. P. ; Thamdrup, B. ; Treusch, A.
; Canfield, D., “N2 production rates limited by nitrite availability in the Bay of Bengal oxygen minimum
zone” Nature geoscience, (2016) Vol.10 (1), p.24-29.
11. FAO, 2020. The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2020. Sustainability in action. Rome. https://doi.
org/10.4060/ca9229en
12. Frost F., “ASEAN and regional cooperation” (Parliamentary Library of Australia, Canberra, 2013).
13. Nadi R., Bingol, F. and Badger, M. “Offshore Wind Energy Estimation in the Bay of Bengal with Satellite
Wind Measurement” 2019 1st International Conference on Advances in Science, Engineering and Robotics
Technology (ICASERT), DOI: 10.1109/ICASERT.2019.8934915.

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 7
A ‘Single Window Environment’
for Digital Trade Facilitation:
Future of Australia-India
Comprehensive Economic
Partnership
Andrew D Mitchell and Vandana Gyanchandani

Introduction
The OECD has estimated that implementing the WTO’s trade facilitation provisions will reduce global
trade costs by 12.5-17.5% (OECD, Trade Facilitation and the Global Economy Report, 2018).1 The
concept of digital trade facilitation complements various trade facilitation measures encapsulated
within the WTO’s trade facilitation agreement (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian
Government, Trade Facilitation Agreement, 2022).2 The COVID-19 global pandemic has led to various
disruptions in international trade, notably in the sphere of trade logistics and supply chain disruptions
(Bill Gain, Trade Facilitation: Critical to COVID-19 Recovery, World Bank Blogs, 2022).3

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of enabling digital technologies and
connectivity across the global economy. In the sphere of trade facilitation, these disruptions can
critically imperil the operation of trade logistics and customs-related procedures (OECD, Trade
Facilitation, and the COVID-19 Pandemic Report, 2020).4 In support of developing digital solutions for
an integrated, data-driven international trade logistics - this chapter focuses on the ‘Single Window
‘System’ and ‘Environment’’. Briefly, the concept of ‘Single Window System’ refers to the digital
integration of all fragmented customs-related information, stakeholders, services, and infrastructure
through a common digital interface (UNECE, Trade Facilitation Implementation Guide, 2022).5

87
In this chapter, section 2 provides the list of main digital trade facilitation measures which enables
the creation and operation of the ‘Single Window ‘System’ and ‘Environment’’. Section 3 highlights
the most pertinent provisions in trade agreements to support the development of ‘Single Window
‘System’ and ‘Environment’’. Section 4 introduces the Single Window Systems of Australia and India.
It highlights key issues for a mutually beneficial trade facilitation environment between Australia and
India. Section 5 concludes this chapter.

Digital Trade Facilitation in Trade Agreements

Trade facilitation measures are essential to support the development and operation of resilient supply
chains in a global economy (UNECE, Trade Facilitation Implementation Guide, 2022).6 There are
four types of trade facilitation measures: (a) ‘general trade facilitation’; (b) ‘digital trade facilitation’
(c) ‘sustainable trade facilitation’ and (d) ‘other trade facilitation’ measures (UNESCAP, Digital and
Sustainable Trade Facilitation: Global Report, 2021).7

The ‘‘general’ trade facilitation’ represents basic transparency mechanisms, formalities, institutional
arrangements and physical transit infrastructure to broadly facilitate trade (UNESCAP, Digital and
Sustainable Trade Facilitation: Global Report, 2021).8 The ‘‘digital’ trade facilitation’ suggests the
application of information and communication technologies and new digital solutions to streamline trade
procedures (UNESCAP, Digital and Sustainable Trade Facilitation: Global Report, 2021).9 The concept
‘‘sustainable’ trade facilitation’ refers to a sustainable and inclusive trade facilitation mechanism, e.g.,
trade facilitation for SMEs, agricultural trade facilitation and women in trade facilitation (UNESCAP,
Digital and Sustainable Trade Facilitation: Global Report, 2021).10 ‘‘Other’ trade facilitation’ refers to
‘‘trade finance’ facilitation’ and ‘‘specific’ trade facilitation’ in times of crisis (UNESCAP, Digital and
Sustainable Trade Facilitation: Global Report, 2021).11

The UN-ESCAP report on ‘Digital and Sustainable Trade Facilitation, 2021’ (UNESCAP, Digital and
Sustainable Trade Facilitation: Global Report, 2021)12 provides that ‘digital trade facilitation’ specifically
constitutes of the following measures:

‘‘Paperless Trade’:
1. ‘Automated Customs system (e.g., ASYCUDA);
2. Internet connection available to Customs and other trade control agencies at border crossings;
3. Electronic Single Window System;
4. Electronic submission of Customs declaration;
5. Electronic application and issuance of import and export permits;
6. Electronic submission of Sea Cargo manifests;
7. Electronic application and issuance of Preferential Certificate of Origin;
8. E-payment of Customs duties and fees; and
9. Electronic application for Customs funds.’

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‘Cross-Border Paperless Trade’
1. ‘Laws and regulations for electronic transactions are in place (e.g., e-commerce law,
e-transaction law);

2. Recognised certification authority issuing digital certificate to traders to conduct electronic

transactions;

3. Electronic exchange of Customs declaration;

4. Electronic exchange of Certificate of Origin;

5. Electronic exchange of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Certificate; and

6. Paperless collection of payment from a documentary letter of credit.’’

We note from the specific list of digital trade facilitation measures, that the ‘digital’ aspect of trade
facilitation envisages complete ‘digitalisation’ of national/regional/global trade facilitation mechanisms,
i.e., the introduction of latest technologies at every level of transaction to promote better efficacy
of trade flows across borders. The UN-ESCAP’s Report on ‘Estimating the Benefits of Cross-Border
Paperless Trade’, 201413 states that:

‘…fully region-wide (Asia-Pacific region) implementation of cross-border paperless trade, the export
gain would be of the order of $257 bn annually. The time required to export would fall by 24 percent
to 44 percent, and the cost by 17 percent to 31 percent, depending on the reform scenario considered.
Total direct cost savings across all trade would be approximately $1bn annually for partial reform, and
$7bn annually for full implementation.’

Thus, it is important for the new generation of trade agreements to promote three types of trade
facilitation measures credibly, especially as relating to the digital trade facilitation. The Asian
Development Bank Report on Trade Facilitation in the Asia-Pacific provides that ‘full digital trade
facilitation implementation beyond the WTO TFA could cut average trade cost in the region by over
13 percent, 7 percent points more than what could be expected from implementation of the WTO TFA’
(Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asia-Pacific Trade Facilitation Report 2021: Supply Chains of Critical
Goods amid the COVID-19 Pandemic: Disruptions, Recovery, and Resilience Report, 2021).14 Further,
the report highlights that the ‘implementation of cross-border paperless trade remains challenging,
with a regional average implementation rate below 40 percent’ (Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asia-
Pacific Trade Facilitation Report 2021: Supply Chains of Critical Goods amid the COVID-19 Pandemic:
Disruptions, Recovery, and Resilience Report, 2021).15

Digital Trade Facilitation through Single Window embedded with ICT solutions
Chapter 5 of the Australia-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (AI-CECA)16
‘Customs Procedures and Trade Facilitation’ contains several important provisions on digital trade
facilitation (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, Australian-India CECA
(AI-CECA) Official Text, 2022).

Article 5.3.1 of the AI-CECA states that both parties ‘shall endeavour to apply its customs procedures
and practices in a predictable, consistent, and transparent manner, and to facilitate trade including
through the expeditious clearance of goods where possible’ (Department of Foreign Affairs and

89
Trade, Australian Government, Australian-India CECA (AI-CECA) Official Text, 2022).17 Reference to
the ‘predictable, consistent, transparent and expeditious clearance of goods’ clearly supports the
benefits derived from digital trade facilitation.

Article 5.4.1 of the AI-CECA emphasises transparency of regulations and procedures relating to
customs for all the stakeholders and online enquiry points for information online (Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, Australian-India CECA (AI-CECA) Official Text,
2022).18 A single online platform for information on customs procedures and clearance to increase
transparency is one of the most important features of digital trade facilitation.

Article 5.3.3 of the AI-CECA provides that ‘the customs administration of each Party shall, to the
extent possible, review its customs procedures with a view to simplifying such procedures to facilitate
trade’ (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, Australian-India CECA
(AI-CECA) Official Text, 2022).19 The ‘simplification of procedures’ is further supportive of the main
benefits as derived from digital trade facilitation. Similarly, Article 5.5 of the AI-CECA provides that
‘the parties shall adopt or maintain simplified customs procedures for the efficient release of goods to
facilitate trade between the Parties’ (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government,
Australian-India CECA (AI-CECA) Official Text, 2022).20 This simplification of custom procedures
through electronic means is further emphasised by Article 5.5.2, which provides that the parties:

‘…shall adopt or maintain procedures that: (b) if applicable and to the extent possible, provide for
electronic submission and processing of customs information relating to an import in advance of
the arrival of the goods to expedite the release of goods from customs control upon arrival’; (e)
if applicable and to the extent possible, provide for, in accordance with its laws and regulations,
clearance of certain goods with a minimum of documentation’ (Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, Australian Government, Australian-India CECA (AI-CECA) Official Text, 2022).21

The AI-CECA in different provisions under Chapter 5 emphasises on the availability and access
to ‘electronic payment’ mechanisms apart from ‘electronic submission’ of documents in custom
operations. Article 5.7 of the AI-CECA titled ‘Data, Documentation and Automation’ provides that the
parties:

‘…shall endeavour to provide a facility that allows importers and exporters to electronically provide
standardised information related to imported goods and export goods at the single-entry or Single
Window that: (a) uses international standards with respect to procedures for the release of goods;
(b) makes electronic systems accessible to customs users; (c) allows a customs declaration to be
submitted in electronic format; (d) employs electronic or automated systems for risk analysis and
targeting; (e) implements common standards and elements for import and export data in accordance
with the WCO Data Model; and (f) takes into account, as appropriate, standards, recommendations,
models and methods developed by various international organisations such as the WCO, United
Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business, and the WTO’ (Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, Australian-India CECA (AI-CECA) Official Text, 2022).22

Article 5.7 of AI-CECA is an important provision to support digital trade facilitation for the economic
partnership between Australia and India. It emphasises the latest Information and Communications
Technology (ICT) solutions for paperless trade with the development of a ‘Single Window System’
within Australia and India. The Single Window, as envisaged under the AI-CECA, ensures digitalisation
of all the customs-related procedures by India and Australia.

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The concept of the ‘Single Window’ enlarges the scope and importance of paperless cross-border
trade flows within the trade agreements. The idea of ‘Single Window’ for all customs-related processes
expands the significance of digital trade facilitation measures as listed in section 2.1 of this chapter.
As any single point of digital interface in the customs environment can be only enabled by digitally
integrating all other customs procedures. The concept of ‘Single Window’ gives prominence to the
rapid digitalisation of all customs-related processes, which can then be integrated with a common
singular point interface to dramatically increase the efficiency, effectiveness and coherence of all the
customs procedures. Hence, we believe, the concept of the ‘Single Window’ is one the most pertinent
forms of digital trade facilitation.

The UN Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business UN/CEFACT Recommendation 3323
defines a ‘Single Window’ as:

‘…a facility that allows parties involved in trade and transport to lodge standardized information
and documents with a single-entry point to fulfil all import, export, and transit-related regulatory
requirements. If information is electronic, then individual data elements should only be submitted once
(United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT), Recommendation
and Guidelines on Establishing a Single Window: To enhance the efficient exchange of information
between trade and government’ Recommendation No. 33, 2005).

In light of the various models of this ‘Single Window System’ which are at different stages of development;
the World Customs Organisation (WCO) has tried to elaborate the concept of ‘Single Window’ further
with a new terminology - ‘Single Window ‘Environment’’ (World Customs Organization (WCO), How
to build a Single Window Environment – Supplement Edition (WCO Compendium), 2022).24 According
to WCO, the concept ‘single window environment’ is:

‘…an intelligent, facility that allows parties involved in trade and transport to lodge standardized
information, mainly electronic, with a single-entry point to fulfil all import, export and transit related
regulatory requirements, which are largely in line with the UN/CEFACT Recommendation 33’ (World
Customs Organization (WCO), How to build a Single Window Environment – Supplement Edition
(WCO Compendium) 2022).25

The emphasis is on the term ‘Environment’ because a ‘Single Window System’ is operationalised
with the interconnection of federated interdependent facilities and an interoperable interface for
all customs-related business processes (World Customs Organization (WCO), How to build a Single
Window Environment – Supplement Edition (WCO Compendium) 2022).26

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 Figure 1: Single Window for Digital Trade Facilitation

Source: David Widdowson, et al., ‘Single window in the context of the WTO Trade Facilitation
Agreement’, World Customs Journal, 2019.

Apart from AI-CECA, we have the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA)27 between
Singapore, Chile and New Zealand as well as the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA)28, which
specifically promotes the development of ‘Single Window System’ for digital trade facilitation (New
Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA)
text and resources, 2022 and WTO, Agreement on Trade Facilitation (WT/L/940) 2017).

The DEPA under Article 2.1 defines ‘Single Window’ as ‘a facility that allows Parties involved in a trade
transaction to electronically lodge data and documents with a single entry point to fulfil all import,
export and transit regulatory requirements’ (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(MFAT), Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) text and resources, 2022).29 Specifically, the
DEPA Article 2.2, titled ‘Paperless Trading’ states:

‘(4) Noting the obligations in the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, each Party shall establish
or maintain a single window, enabling traders to submit documentation or data requirements
for importation, exportation, or transit of goods through a single-entry point to the participating
authorities or agencies. (5) The Parties shall endeavour to establish or maintain a seamless, trusted,
high-availability (ability to continuously operate) and secure interconnection of each Party’s single
window to facilitate the exchange of data relating to trade administration documents…’ (New Zealand
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) text
and resources, 2022).30

We specifically note that DEPA promotes interoperability among the national single window systems
of parties. The WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) promotes the national development of ‘Single
Window System’ within a best endeavour clause to facilitate trade flows. The WTO TFA, Article 10
titled ‘Formalities Connected with Importation, Exportation and Transit’, sub-part 4 states:

92
‘Single Windows’

‘4.1. Members shall endeavour to establish or maintain a single window, enabling traders to submit
documentation and/or data requirements for importation, exportation, or transit of goods through
a single-entry point to the participating authorities or agencies. After the examination by the
participating authorities or agencies of the documentation and/or data, the results shall be notified to
the applicants through the single window in a timely manner.

4.2. In cases where documentation and/or data requirements have already been received through
the single window, the same documentation and/or data requirements shall not be requested by
participating authorities or agencies except in urgent circumstances and other limited exceptions
which are made public.

4.3. Members shall notify the Committee of the details of operation of the single window.

4.4. Members shall, to the extent possible and practicable, use information technology to support the
single window.’

The WTO TFA supports the development of a ‘Single Window’ for trade on a best endeavour basis.
The AI-CECA, DEPA and WTO TFA do not make the development of ‘Single Window’ mandatory for
digital trade facilitation.

Similarly, the UN Framework Agreement on Facilitation of Cross-Border Paperless Trade in Asia and
the Pacific defines ‘Single Window’ as ‘a facility that allows parties involved in a trade transaction
to electronically lodge data and documents with a single entry point to fulfil all import, export and
transit-related regulatory requirements’ (United Nations, Framework Agreement on Facilitation of
Cross-Border Paperless Trade in Asia and the Pacific, 2016).31 Article 1 and 7 of the UN Framework are
quoted below:

Article 1: Objective

The objective of the present Framework Agreement is to promote cross-border paperless trade by
enabling the exchange and mutual recognition of trade-related data and documents in electronic
form and facilitating interoperability among national and subregional single windows and/or other
paperless trade systems, for the purpose of making international trade transactions more efficient and
transparent while improving regulatory compliance.

Article 7: Facilitation of Cross-Border Paperless Trade and Development of Single Window Systems

The Parties shall endeavour to facilitate cross-border paperless trade by enabling exchange of trade-
related data and documents in electronic form, utilizing the existing systems in operation or creating
new systems.

The Parties are encouraged to develop single-window systems and use them for cross-border paperless
trade. In developing single-window systems or upgrading existing ones, the Parties are encouraged
to make them consistent with the general principles provided in the present Framework Agreement.

Digital trade facilitation measures and regulatory provisions to promote cross-border flow of data are
highly relevant for the development and operation of the ‘Single Window Environment’ (European

93
Commission, Commission Staff Working Document – Impact Assessment Report on ‘EU Single
Window’, 2020).32 The concept of ‘Single Window Environment’ as envisaged by the World Customs
Organisation broadens the scope for an integration of all the federated complex infrastructures,
services and stakeholders that encompasses the customs-related processes through ‘digitalisation
at all levels of custom operations’ and ‘smart digital integration’ across national and international
frontiers for digital trade facilitation (European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document
– Impact Assessment Report on ‘EU Single Window’, 2020).33 The AI-CECA, DEPA, TFA or the UN
Framework on Paperless Trade in the Asia-Pacific have to broaden their conception of ‘Single Window
System’ as ‘Single Window Environment’ beyond ‘common digital interface’ for information only. The
rapid digitalization of custom procedures will create and enable digital ‘Single Window Environment’
in the future (European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document – Impact Assessment
Report on ‘EU Single Window’, 2020).34 Although the formulation of Single Window Environment for
digital trade facilitation is one of the most expensive and time-consuming endeavours to harmonise
and upgrade the relevant processes, it will also define the future of digital trade facilitation through a
smart and integrated management for international trade flows (European Commission, Commission
Staff Working Document – Impact Assessment Report on ‘EU Single Window’, 2020).35

The best-case examples for the ‘Single Window Environment’ are: (a) the Automated Commercial
Environment/International Trade Data System (ACE/ITDS) systems by the United States which
provides a single electronic interface for traders to submit documents/information to different
US governmental agencies (47 agencies) (US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Automated
Commercial Environment/International Trade Data System (ACE/ITDS) 2022)36, (b) the ‘Single Window
System’ for Trade (Trade Net) by Singapore which assimilates trade procedures and information
processing within a single platform for all the stakeholders (Singapore’s TradeNet Single Window
System, 2022)37, (c) the World Economic Forum has dedicated a special study on the experience of
Brazil in the development of its own (Siscomex-Brazil) as the single-window (World Economic Forum
(WEF), Enabling Trade: Catalysing Trade Facilitation Agreement Implementation in Brazil, 2015)38, and
(d) Thailand’s National ‘Single Window System’ which facilitates flow of information and integration of
services between government-to-government (G2G), government-to-business (G2B) and business-
to-business (B2B) for all customs-related processes (Thailand Single Window System, 2022)39. It also
enables cross-border data sharing between governments and businesses located in other countries
(Thailand Single Window System, 2022).40

As noted in figure 1, the development of a ‘Single Window System’ for digital trade facilitation is a long
process. The first step is to create a common policy framework through constructive deliberations
among all the stakeholders. A coherent policy framework should encompass evidence-based
regulations, data-driven latest digital technologies and proper allocation of responsibilities among
stakeholders for the robust development of ‘Single Window System’. A ‘Single-Window System’
critically requires an appropriate ICT framework to digitalise and integrate the fragmented customs-
related processes to enable ‘Single Window System’.

The UN-ESCAP’s Single Window implementation guide41 provides ten steps to implement the Single
Window vision:

‘(a) stakeholder requirements identification and management; (b) stakeholder collaborative platform
establishment; (c) single window vision articulation; (d) business process analysis and simplification;
(e) data harmonisation and documents simplification; (f) service functions design (or application
architecture design); (g) technical architecture establishment including standards and interoperability;

94
(h) legal infrastructure institution; (i) business and governance models enforcement including finance,
implementation and operation governance; and (j) information technology (IT) infrastructure and
solutions execution (UNESCAP, Single Window Planning and Implementation Guide – Manuals and
Training Materials, 2012).

Figure 2: Ten components for Single Window System Development

Source: Single Window Planning and Implementation Guide, 2012.

The ‘Single Window Implementation Framework’ (SWIF) as published by the UNECE in 2011 has
formulated the key challenges as presented in figure 2 for the implementation of a Single Window
in a country (UNESCAP, Single Window Planning and Implementation Guide – Manuals and Training
Materials, 2012).42 The two key areas mentioned are: ‘(a) alignment of business strategy and IT strategy;
and (b) the systematic transformation of the pre-defined strategies into well-governed IT solutions’
(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Study on ‘Single Window Systems’ International
Interoperability: Key Issues for its Implementation, 2018).43

Apart from the development of Single Window Systems, nationally, the authors noted that there is an
incentive to develop Regional Single Window Systems in the EU Single Window (EU Single Window
System Environment for Customs, 2022)44, APEC Single Window (CustomsCity, APEC – Regional
Single Window (RSW) 2022)45, ASEAN Single Window – it is already in operation) (ASEAN Single
Window System, 2022)46, the Pacific Alliance Single Window (Isabel Mejia Rivas and Mónica Maday,
How the Pacific Alliance linked up its Single Windows for Foreign Trade, Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB) Blogs, 2019)47 and among the member states of the Indian Ocean Commission (Japan
recently donated US$875,000 to the IOC to strengthen maritime connectivity for regional economic
integration wherein one of the goal is to ‘establish a single maritime window as a regional trade
facilitation instrument’) (allAfrica, East Africa: Indian Ocean Commission Kicks-off Initiative to Enhance
Regional Maritime Connectivity, 2022)48.

The authors believe that evidence-based regulations and data-driven technologies will transform and
lay the foundations for the ‘Single Window for Digital Trade Facilitation’, nationally, regionally, and
internationally in the near future.

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 Figure 3: Key alignment principles of SWIF

Source: Study on Single Window Systems’ International Interoperability: Key Issues for its
Implementation by APEC Policy Support Unit in 2018.49

The APEC Policy Support Unit Report titled the ‘Study on Single Window Systems’ International
Interoperability: Key Issues for Its Implementation’ in 201850 states:

‘As of 2013, over seventy economies have implemented (Single Window System) SWS for foreign
trade. The notion of Single Window platform has proven to become a strategic domestic catalyst
to facilitate trade. In 2014, an estimated 89% of 107 economies made SWS a domestic priority. By
removing the administrative bottlenecks in the trade process, economies recognize that SWS can
reduce the cost of trade and propel further economic growth. Noteworthy to identify that SWS is
becoming more common in developing economies as they use ICT to institute reforms and increase
their global competitiveness, while the developed economies recognize that SWS could enhance
efficiency of the trade services provided.

On the other hand, Regional Single Window (RSW) experience is relatively small globally. Consequently,
articles or published literatures about RSW models are scarce. However, Regional Economic Forums
such as APEC continue to explore the use of SWS concepts. It is noteworthy to mention that Custom
SWS systems, SWS for foreign trade and the broader NSW initiatives are just one of the many measures
in trade agreements, that in general, are not mandatory and only require the members’ best efforts in
its implementation.

SWS for foreign trade, as one of trade facilitation measures, is included under regional trade
agreements…. However, the occurrence is relatively small. …the occurrence of SWS under Regional
Trade Agreements (RTAs) is only around 4.7%’ (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Study on
‘Single Window Systems’ International Interoperability: Key Issues for its Implementation, 2018).

There is a need for the new generation trade facilitation chapter in trade agreements to develop specific
provisions on the aid, development and management of ‘Single Window ‘Systems’ and ‘Environment’’
within national jurisdictions and its interoperability both regionally and globally. It has been noted
that the WTO’s TFA can be formulated as the guiding principle for future deliberation on the need
for a globally harmonised approach for Single Window Systems (David Widdowson, et al., Single

96
Window in the context of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, World Customs Journal, 2019).51
Further, the conceptualisation of ‘Single Window for trade’ as a mere common electronic interface
for customs-related documentation is too narrow. The concept of ‘Single Window ‘Environment’’ as
proposed by the WCO is more appropriate in this context as it clearly delineates that ‘Single Window
for digital trade facilitation’ involves digitalisation and integration of all the fragmented customs-
related communications, services and infrastructure for an efficacious operation of trade logistics at
scale.

Way forward
India and Australia are parties to the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement and recently concluded
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CECA) (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(DFAT), Australian Government, Australia-India CECA (AI-CECA) Official Text, 2022).52 Both trade
agreements provide that India and Australia should on a best endeavour basis develop their national
Single Window Systems for digital trade facilitation. In a study conducted by the Centre for Customs
and Excise Studies, Charles Sturt University for the Australian International Trade and Transport
Industry Development Fund (AITTDF)53, certain key aspects as regards the development of a Single
Window System in Australia were highlighted (Charles Sturt University, Review of Australia’s Progress
Towards Implementation of the Single Window Concept, 2018). In an interview with the officials from
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australia, the study provided that the:

‘DFAT confirmed that the department has been actively working on the prospect of a single window
for several years, along with numerous other Federal Government agencies.

Challenges anticipated by DFAT in progress towards a Single Window include:

Funding: what is to be paid, how and by whom? Other countries have used a variety of means to fund
their Single Window initiatives including full government funding, public-private partnership, cost
recovery by user fees and outsourcing management to a private sector company.

Business in not homogenous – an effective Single Window would need to be able to accommodate
the different requirements of Small to Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and Multinational Corporations
(MNCs), across different industry sectors.

Reimagining the traditional scope of a single window to include aspects such as ‘know your customer’
or including port authorities and State permit-issuing agencies.

Quantifying the benefit to industry of a Single Window.

DFAT takes the view that, while interoperability between different countries’

Single Windows is a highly desirable long-term goal, attempting that in the short term would be
extremely complicated and would likely jeopardize the prospects of early success.

DFAT’s strong message is that, given the size and complexity of the task of designing a Single Window,
it is essential that the process be informed by high quality input from the private sector, and DFAT
actively seeks and welcomes that input.

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Australia’s ‘Integrated Cargo System (ICS)’54 is sometimes noted as its Single Window System but the
DFAT has later commissioned key studies on ‘domestic Single Window System’ and the ‘international
Single Window Study’ for the development of an integrated Australian Single Window (ASW) indicating
that the Single Window Environment for Australia has not been achieved yet (David Widdowson et al.,
Single Window in the context of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, 2019).55

India has initiated to develop its own ‘Single Window Interface for Facilitating Trade’ (SWIFT)56. The
project is stated to be in its implementation stage (Single Window Interface for Facilitating Trade
(SWIFT) of India, 2022).57 The SWIFT aims to enable traders to submit e-documents online on a
single platform in India (Single Window Interface for Facilitating Trade (SWIFT) of India, 2022).58
The system is mainly focused on establishing a single point of digital interface for customs-related
information exchange across various governmental agencies by stakeholders (Government of India,
‘Single Window Interface for Facilitating (Single Window Interface for Facilitating Trade (SWIFT) of
India, 2022).59 According to the government, there was a close partnership between the businesses
and public sector bodies, which made such a complex interface platform operational (Single Window
Interface for Facilitating Trade (SWIFT) of India, 2022).60 The importance of suitable IT systems and
solutions to operate such a complex system is highlighted by the Indian government in a statement
below:

‘Single Window is by far one of the most complex systems integration efforts that had been taken-
up by department. To introduce the Single Window and the ‘Integrated Declaration’, a number of IT
Systems from various government departments and private sector agencies had to be changed.61 …
While the individual agencies have been addressing issues to help overcome bottlenecks in cargo
clearance, the Single Window initiative would have a greater positive impact as it represents the
joined-up efforts of all stakeholders (SWIFT).’

The way forward is for Australia and India to forge bilateral cooperation through their ‘Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership’62 in the fields of ‘science, technology and research collaboration’, ‘maritime
cooperation’ and ‘regional and multilateral economic and technological cooperation’ to build mutual
capacity for the development and operation of national Single Window Systems in order to reduce
bilateral trade costs (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australian Government,
Australia-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, 2020). Australia and India should support an
interoperable Single Window Environment, bilaterally and regionally in support of trade facilitation.

The authors emphasise on the importance of utilizing the ‘Australia-India Cyber and Critical Technology
Partnership’63 by interested stakeholders to enable mutual cooperation and collaboration on the latest
technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), next-generation telecommunications (5G/6G), Internet
of Things (IoT), quantum computing, blockchain and big data (Australian Government, Australia-India
Cyber and Critical Technology Partnership Grants, 2022). The deployment of such technologies will
optimise the national Single Window System in Australia and India and make their Single Window
Systems resilient and interoperable in long-term.

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Conclusion

The future of the Australia – India partnership in the field of digital trade facilitation is essential for a
reduction in bilateral as well as regional trade costs caused by fragmented customs-related practices.
This chapter introduced the concept of ‘Single Window Environment’ as defined by the World Customs
Organisation (WCO) which goes beyond the current understanding of ‘Single Window System’ in
trade agreements as mainly an electronic interface for the submission of customs-related documents.
The concept of ‘Single Window Environment’ – nationally, regionally and globally will significantly
boost the cross-border flow of trade by reducing the costs relating to fragmented transit processes.
It will support the growth and resiliency of the global supply chains in future. With the development
of adequate national Single Window Environment, the focus needs to shift towards developing
interconnected regional and global Single Window Environments.

References

1 OECD, ‘Trade Facilitation and the Global Economy’ (30 May 2018) https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/
trade-facilitation-and-the-global-economy_9789264277571-en (accessed on 17 August 2022).

2 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, ‘Trade Facilitation Agreement’, https://
www.dfat.gov.au/trade/organisations/wto/tfa/trade-facilitation-agreement#:~:text=Benefits%20of%20
the%20TFA&text=The%20OECD%20estimates%20the%20agreement,cent%20and%2017.5%20per%20
cent (accessed on 17 August 2022).

3 Bill Gain, ‘Trade Facilitation: Critical to COVID-19 Recovery’ (2 November 2021) World Bank Blogs, https://
blogs.worldbank.org/trade/trade-facilitation-critical-covid-19-recovery#:~:text=As%20we%20emerge%20
from%20the,help%20countries%20recover%20more%20quickly (accessed on 17 August 2022).

4 OECD, ‘Trade Facilitation and the COVID-19 Pandemic’ (OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus) COVID-19
(April 2020) https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/trade-facilitation-and-the-covid-19-
pandemic-094306d2/ (accessed on 17 August 2022).

5 UNECE, ‘Trade Facilitation Implementation Guide’, https://tfig.unece.org/contents/single-window-concept.

htm (accessed on 17 August 2022).

6 UNESCAP, ‘Digital and Sustainable Trade Facilitation: Global Report 2021’ (Based on the UN Global Survey
on Digital and Sustainable Trade Facilitation), https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/knowledge-
products/UNTF-Global%20Report-web.pdf (accessed on 17 August 2022).

7 ibid.

8 ibid.

9 ibid.

10 ibid.

11 ibid.

12 ibid.

13 UNESCAP, ‘Estimating the Benefits of Cross-Border Paperless Trade’ (2014) https://www.unescap.org/sites/

default/files/Benefits%20of%20Cross-Border%20Paperless%20Trade.pdf (accessed on 17 August 2022).

14 Asian Development Bank (ADB), ‘Asia-Pacific Trade Facilitation Report 2021: Supply Chains of Critical

99
 Goods amid the COVID-19 Pandemic: Disruptions, Recovery, and Resilience’ (October 2021) https://www.
adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/737991/asia-pacific-trade-facilitation-report-2021.pdf (accessed on
17 August 2022).

15 ibid.

16 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, ‘Australia-India CECA (AI-CECA)
Official Text’,ttps://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/negotiations/aifta/australia-india-ecta-official-text
(accessed on 17 August 2022).

17 ibid at Article 5.3.1, AI-CECA.

18 ibid at Article 5.4.1, AI-CECA.

19 ibid at Article 5.3.3, AI-CECA.

20 ibid at Article 5.5, AI-CECA.

21 ibid at Article 5.5.2, AI-CECA.

22 ibid at Article 5.7, AI-CECA.

23 United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT), ‘Recommendation and
Guidelines on Establishing a Single Window: To enhance the efficient exchange of information between
trade and government’ Recommendation No. 33 (2005) https://unece.org/DAM/cefact/recommendations/
rec33/rec33_trd352e.pdf (accessed on 17 August 2022).

24 World Customs Organization (WCO), ‘How to build a Single Window Environment – Supplement Edition’
(WCO Compendium) http://www.wcoomd.org/-/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/facilitation/
instruments-and-tools/tools/single-window/sw-compendium-supplement-edition.pdf (accessed on 17
August 2022).

25 ibid.

26 ibid.

27 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), ‘Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA)
text and resources’ https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-
force/digital-economy-partnership-agreement-depa/depa-text-and-resources/ (accessed on 17 August
2022).

28 World Trade Organisation (WTO), ‘Agreement on Trade Facilitation’ (WT/L/940, 2017) https://docs.wto.
org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/L/940.pdf&Open=True (accessed on 17 August
2022).

29 Article 2.1, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), ‘Digital Economy Partnership
Agreement (DEPA) text and resources’ https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements-in-force/digital-economy-partnership-agreement-depa/depa-text-and-resources/
(accessed on 17 August 2022).

30 ibid at Article 2.2.

31 United Nations, ‘Framework Agreement on Facilitation of Cross-Border Paperless Trade in Asia and the
Pacific’ (2016) https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2016/05/20160519%2012-16%20PM/Ch_X-20.pdf
(accessed on 17 August 2022).

32 European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document – Impact Assessment Report’ (Accompanying
the document – ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the

100
 European Union Single Window Environment for Customs and amending Regulation (EU) No. 952/2013
(SWD(2020) 238 final) https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-10/201028_single_
window_impact.pdf (accessed on 17 August 2022).

33 ibid.

34 ibid.

35 ibid.

36 US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), ‘Automated Commercial Environment/International Trade

Data System (ACE/ITDS)’ https://www.fda.gov/industry/import-systems/automated-commercial-
env iron m e nt i nte rnat i o nal - t rad e - d ata-syste m-ace itds#:~:text= ACE % 2FI T DS % 20is% 20 a%2 0
single,Automated%20Commercial%20System%20in%202016.

37 Singapore’s TradeNet Single Window System, https://www.tradenet.gov.sg/tradenet/login.jsp (accessed on

17 August 2022).

38 World Economic Forum (WEF), ‘Enabling Trade: Catalysing Trade Facilitation Agreement Implementation
in Brazil’ (2015) https://reports.weforum.org/enabling-trade-catalysing-trade-facilitation-agreement-
implementation-in-brazil/ (accessed on 17 August 2022).

39 Thailand Single Window System, http://www.thainsw.net/INSW/index.jsp?nswLang=E (accessed on 17

August 2022).

40 ibid.

41 UNESCAP, ‘Single Window Planning and Implementation Guide – Manuals and Training Materials’ (2012) https://www.
unescap.org/resources/single-window-planning-and-implementation-guide (accessed on 17 August 2022).

42 ibid.

43 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ‘Study on ‘Single Window Systems’ International Interoperability:
Key Issues for its Implementation’ (2018) https://www.apec.org/publications/2018/08/study-on-single-
window-systems-international-interoperability (accessed on 17 August 2022).

44 European Union Single Window Environment for Customs, https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/eu-

single-window-environment-customs_en#:~:text=The%20%E2%80%9CEU%20Single%20Window%20
Environment,regulatory%20authorities%20across%20policy%20domains (accessed on 17 August 2022).

45 CustomsCity, ‘APEC – Regional Single Window (RSW) – A Path Forward for Implementation’ https://
customscity.com/apec-regional-single-window-rsw-a-path-forward-for-implementation/ (accessed on 17
August 2022).

46 ASEAN Single Window System, https://asw.asean.org/ (accessed on 17 August 2022).

47 Isabel Mejia Rivas and Mónica Maday, ‘How the Pacific Alliance linked up its Single Windows for Foreign
Trade’ Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Blogs (2019) https://blogs.iadb.org/integration-trade/
en/pacific-alliance-single-windows-trade/#:~:text=The%20Pacific%20Alliance%3A%20Pioneering%20
the,fees%20for%20foreign%20trade%20operations (accessed on 17 August 2022).

48 allAfrica, ‘East Africa: Indian Ocean Commission Kicks Off Initiative to Enhance Regional Maritime
Connectivity’ (2022) https://allafrica.com/stories/202208040052.html (accessed on 17 August 2022).

49 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ‘Study on ‘Single Window Systems’ International Interoperability:
Key Issues for its Implementation’ (2018) https://www.apec.org/publications/2018/08/study-on-single-
window-systems-international-interoperability (accessed on 17 August 2022).

101
50 ibid.

51 David Widdowson, et al., ‘Single window in the context of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement’, World
Customs Journal, 2019, https://worldcustomsjournal.org/Archives/Volume%2013%2C%20Number%201%20
(Mar%202019)/1877%2001%20WCJ%20v13n1%20Widdowson%20et%20al.pdf?_t=1563333690 (accessed
on 17 August 2022).

52 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, ‘Australia-India CECA (AI-CECA)
Official Text’, https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/negotiations/aifta/australia-india-ecta-official-
text (accessed on 17 August 2022).

53 Charles Sturt University, ‘Review of Australia’s Progress Towards Implementation of the Single Window
Concept’ (2018) http://www.aittidf.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Single-Window-Final-Report.pdf
(accessed on 17 August 2022).

54 Australian Border Force, ‘Integrated Cargo System (ICS)’, https://www.abf.gov.au/help-and-support/ics/

integrated-cargo-system-(ics) (accessed on 17 August 2022).

55 David Widdowson, et al., ‘Single window in the context of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement’, World
Customs Journal, (2019) https://worldcustomsjournal.org/Archives/Volume%2013%2C%20Number%20
1%20(Mar%202019)/1877%2001%20WCJ%20v13n1%20Widdowson%20et%20al.pdf?_t=1563333690
(accessed on 17 August 2022).

56 Government of India, ‘Single Window Interface for Facilitating Trade (SWIFT, India)’, https://www.icegate.
gov.in/SWIFT/ (accessed on 17 August 2022).

57 ibid.

58 ibid.

59 ibid.

60 ibid.

61 ibid.

62 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australian Government, ‘Australia-India Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership’ (2020) https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/india/joint-statement-comprehensive-
strategic-partnership-between-republic-india-and-australia (accessed on 17 August 2022).

63 Australian Government, ‘Australia-India Cyber and Critical Technology Partnership Grants’ (2022) https://
www.internationalcybertech.gov.au/AICCTP-grant-round-two (accessed on 17 August 2022).

102
 8
E-Industrial Revolution 4.0:
Smart Ports, Supply Chain and the
Developing Countries –
The Security Conundrum
Martin A. Sebastian

Introduction
The oceans are a key medium and vital to the survival of the world economy and population, and to
the continued economic integration of nations. The oceans connect us to sources of food, energy, and
transportation, and therefore are key requirements for the survival of humanity in an interconnected
world. The sea is also an essential source and medium to meet the energy security requirements
(Sakhuja:2019).1

Ports are the nexus between land and sea in driving economic activity and survivability of nations.
Ports ensure that the world’s medical supplies, food, energy raw materials, as well as manufactured
goods and components vital to the preservation of employment, continue to reach their intended
destinations (Rosni:2018).2 In this context, operation at ports was vital to face the COVID19 pandemic.

Smart Port
Modern ports function in the context of complex infrastructure, business transactions, and regulations
and have a broad range of stakeholders including but not limited to port operators, port authorities,
haulers, and shipping companies (Violetta Sema:2022).3 There is a recent trend in the ports toward
adopting technology-based solutions as well as new approaches to port operations planning and
management. Ports are becoming increasingly interested in smart solutions to optimize operations,
promote efficiency, enhance sustainability, and avoid safety and security incidents. The adoption of
such solutions to address recent problems is known to be switching to smart ports. Moreover, smart
ports help in addressing the current and future challenges faced by seaport authorities, including spatial
constraints, pressure on productivity, fiscal limitations, safety and security risks, and sustainability.

103
A ‘connectivity eco-system’, a process which facilitates movement of goods that are transported
onboard carriers which move on road, on the rails, in the air, over the seas through sea ports and dry
ports, and services that are delivered through digital platforms including fiber optic cables in support
of port operations.

According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB:2020)4, a smart port is a port equipped with sensors,
cameras, and different types of devices, which help to eliminate wastage of space, time, capital, and
natural resources. Smart ports use smart technologies such as the Internet of Things (IoT), blockchain,
Artificial Intelligence (AI), and process automation that help in enhancing the operational efficiency,
cargo handling, passenger services, and performance of the ports, which ultimately reduces costs.
These technologies allow in connecting the digital and physical world by providing real-time data and
optimizing resources. Some of the major advantages associated with smart ports include elimination
of human errors, faster turnaround time (boost productivity), and reduced port congestions.

Hence, the subject of smart ports and smart logistics have been fundamental to the global economy,
with respect to ports transferring up to 90 percent of the world’s goods. With rapid and more accessible
technological advances and innovation, the argument for the development of smart ports have been
ongoing in various fora and conference papers. A smart port is one that uses automation and new
technologies such as AI, Big data, IoT and blockchain to improve its performance (Shabaksh:2018).5

The aim is to boost a port’s safety and security, optimise management and allow for better planning.
Automation is critical for enhancing the competitiveness and efficiency of a port, with programmed
equipment handling day-to-day operations. These include cranes, self-driving trucks and pallet
sensors. Big data enables new planning guides and facilitates port logistics through the collection
and correlation of information on ship positions as they arrive at or leave the port. Through the IoT
ports are transformed into maritime information-network hubs. Relevant data about vehicles, ships
and cargo movement is collected and used in real time to coordinate with shipping and logistics
partners. Ultimately this will lead to near-complete automation of processes, connected through
the IoT optimising the costs and time for many operational activities (Markets&Markets:2022).6
Asia Pacific dominated the global smart ports market in 2020. It was followed by Europe and North
America. According to the Journal of Commerce annual list of the Top 50 Global Container Ports, Asia
accounted for 9 of the top 10.

The Asia Pacific maritime information market is currently witnessing healthy growth. Maritime
information refers to the services that provide vital information and data required for understanding
the events occurring in marine transportation. Maritime knowledge has gained momentum in the
Asia Pacific region because of increased sea trade and rapid globalization. In addition, technical
advances are allowing the provision of real-time data in the port industry. Yet, most of these ports,
especially in developing nations, need rapid, large-scale modernization, with operations being slowed
down by vessel and truck congestion (OECD:2022).7 The problem is being addressed by using and
integrating innovative technologies found in smart ports. Existing ports, as part of the ongoing a
digital transformation, may need to integrate a blockchain terminal-to-terminal cargo transit system
which is expected to prevent smuggling. Smart ports are equipped with sensors, cameras, and devices,
fully connected to a network infrastructure, creating a completely integrated communications system.

This connectivity allows for remote control of heavy machinery and automated port vehicles and
creates a hugely more efficient and secure way of connecting and tracking all shipments and

104
goods. Automated container weighing systems will reduce weighing times while remote controlled
quay cranes will lower vessel completion time, increasing productivity by up to 25 percent. Digitalisation
improves the efficiency and effectiveness of port operations while increasing security and resilience.
How effective is technology in addressing security?

Smart Ports and Maritime Security

Figure 1. Types of concealment to hide the trafficking of Drugs

Source: Malaysian Police. Narcotics Criminal Investigations Division 2018

In the effort to increase technological capacity in the handling of shipping and logistics, due cognizance
must be given to the fact that shipping has become the premier mode for smuggling large quantities of
illegal material including contraband, drugs, prohibited meat, and a wide range of globally threatening
weaponry. Technology will be unable to differentiate between illegal and legal meat, concealed drugs
using various methods like compressed doors, crayons, insects, diluted holy water, canned fruit juice
and statues. Even diapers are injected with diluted drugs.

As the global economy becomes increasingly interconnected, opportunities for trade have spread
around the world. Shipping lanes are the superhighways of international commerce; more than 750
million Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (TEU) movements are recorded, accounting for 90 percent of
the global cargo trade. However, this presents opportunities not only for governments and legitimate
businesses but also for terrorists and transnational organized crime groups to transport anything from
legal goods used for money laundering, to prohibited drugs and even materials for weapons of mass
destruction. These actors benefit from the sheer volume of global trade because this makes effective
monitoring extremely difficult; less than two percent of shipping containers are ever screened.
Moreover, the rise of Darknet technologies has enabled any individual to access crypto markets
that exploit standard postal and commercial shipping services.

The challenge is made even greater by the proliferation of sophisticated concealment measures,
corruption, limited resources, complex and diverse port processes, and systems and a lack of trust
and coordination between state agencies and actors in the private sector.8 Thus, this situation poses

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grave dangers to international security and to the international trade supply chain which is vital for
sustainable development.

COVID-19 measures which restricted air and land transportation making maritime routes the preferred
target for drug smugglers. Seizures of large quantities of drugs such as cocaine, heroin and others at
seaports have risen worldwide. The increase in shipping operations coupled with large container ships
doubling in size in the past few years has provided an attractive mode of transport for drug traffickers.
Whilst all eyes are on the efficiency and effectiveness of port and logistics operations, significant
steps have been taken by US and the UNs in addressing maritime security in ports.

According to the latest United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report, drug supply
chains were disrupted in countries that opted for hard COVID-19 lockdown measures. This pushed
up demand and prices. The reduction in air traffic and increased security on roads due to COVID-19
restrictions have redirected drug shipments to the sea and authorities are struggling to respond.
Cargo ships are preferred as they provide the safest options for drug traffickers. These vessels are the
cheapest mode of transport because around 90 percent of global trade is seaborne. Drug traffickers
conceal the drugs among other products, making them almost impossible to detect. A popular tactic
is to hide drugs between fruit and vegetable shipments as these are handled faster due to spoilage
risks.

Figure 2. Type of Illegal Stores Smuggled through Containers

Source: UNODC Report 2016

Developing Countries and Ports – Maritime Security Concerns

The likelihood that a container will be searched is low. Only around 2 to 10 percent of containers are
inspected worldwide. Port operators are under pressure to process huge volumes of cargo in short time.
On average, 1 in 10 containers is searched due to the sheer volume of transported goods. Increasing
the number of containers checked before loading seems like an obvious solution that would push up
the risk for traffickers or smugglers.

While the probability of detecting illicit cargo would increase, shipping operations would slow down,
meaning higher costs that most operators try to avoid. Dwell-time at ports of developing countries

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are already on average longer than two weeks. Inefficiencies and high logistical costs from a further
slow-down of operations would negatively affect supply chains and in turn, economies. Maritime
piracy imposes both human costs and economic costs on maritime shipping. Human costs come in
the form not only of seafarers being hijacked and held hostage, but injury during attacks and even
death. Examples of economic costs include transiting at increased speeds, the costs of military guards
and equipment, insurance and labor costs, ransoms, and the costs of operating and maintaining the
international task forces. Maritime safety is concerned with the protection of life and property through
regulation, management and technology development of all forms of waterborne transportation.
In theory, this produces a maritime ecosystem defined by greater cooperation between all those
involved in port operations. In short, maritime security and safety concerns have cost implications to
developing countries.

Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

While there is universal agreement on the need to enhance maritime transport security, security
requirements may have serious impacts. Concerns, particularly for developing countries, fall broadly
into four categories i.e., costs and expenses, both direct and indirect; delays and disruption of legitimate
trade; difficulty in the implementation of diverse and detailed requirements, due to lack of technical
infrastructure, expertise and know-how; and competitive imbalances and marginalization.

As has been pointed out by the OECD report, the concerns imply that even a relatively small increase
in the costs of trading internationally in the order of 1 percent would lead to a drop in trade flows of
between 2 and 3 percent. The effect of the proposed tightening of security on the cost of trading
internationally is likely to be asymmetrical. Security measure have increasing relative compliance costs
and erode their competitiveness.

Container Control Programme (UN Office of Drugs and Crime and World Customs
Organisation)

Figure 3. Container Control Programme

Source: www.unodc.org
The UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme (CCP) was established as a joint initiative of the
UNODC and the WCO in 2004. Faced with such a complex and globalized problem, the CCP embraces

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a nuanced, holistic and multi-sectoral approach by providing continuous monitoring and oversight,
offering a plethora of context-specific training programmes and strengthening cooperation between
state agencies and with the private sector. The mission of the CCP is to build capacity in Member
States seeking to improve risk management, supply chain security and trade facilitation in seaports,
airports and land border crossings in order to prevent the cross-border movement of illicit goods.

In its World Drug Report 2020 the UNODC states that illicit drug use has been on the increase in the
five-year period to 2019. Drug use is more widespread in developed countries but rising more rapidly
in developing countries. The UNODC report is based in part on global drug seizure data to analyze
trends including smuggling routes. UNODC reports that Colombia remains the country where most
coca leaf (used to produce cocaine) is grown, accounting for about 70 per cent of the global area
under coca cultivation followed by Peru and Bolivia. Afghanistan accounts for the majority of global
opium production. Opium is used to produce heroin and morphine.

According to the report’s 2018 seizure data, cannabis topped the list for the amount of drugs seized
followed by cocaine and opium. Unlike other plant-based drugs, for which cultivation and production is
concentrated in a limited number of countries, cannabis is produced in almost all countries worldwide.
Most of the cannabis herb produced in a region continues to be consumed within that same region.
Thus, a region’s cannabis trafficking remains mainly intraregional and is mostly by road, rather than by
sea or air. This article looks at maritime trafficking routes for cocaine and opium derivatives - heroin
and morphine.

Drug traffickers also conceal packages within bulk cargoes. In 2019, Malaysian authorities seized
twelve tons of cocaine concealed in a bulk shipment of coal.

Fig 4: Malaysia Police seize drugs in Coal Sacks.

Source: Royal Malaysia Police
Smugglers also use the ship’s external structure by attaching a box to the hull or drugs can be
concealed by a diver in the rudder trunk in water-tight bags. Void spaces within the ship can also be
exploited as hiding places. There is no end to the ingenuity of the smuggler. We have even seen drugs
hidden within the core of pineapples. The authors have even discovered medicines concealed inside
pineapple cores.

CCP efforts have resulted in seizures of a wide range of prohibited goods, such as weapons and
ammunition, proceeds of fisheries, forest, wildlife and other environmental crime, prohibited drugs,

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strategic goods, falsified or unlicensed medicines, precursors for drugs and explosives, cigarettes,
alcohol, stolen vehicles and goods which are counterfeit or otherwise violate intellectual property law.
The CCP remains ideally placed to support the strengthening of international supply chain security by
building national border administrations’ capacities to tackle threats related to sea, land and air cargo.
Container Security Initiative - United States

According to the review of maritime transport by UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
world seaborne trade as well as large vessels have been growing in numbers during the last decade.
In the US, the coastal port system currently contributes $5.4 trillion to the nation’s economy, this
amount has increased by about 17 percent since 2014 and now forms about 26 percent of the U.S.
GDP. There has also been an 18 percent increase in the US container traffic and both the import and
export handled by maritime transportation have incremented significantly from 2011. This growth
in demand for maritime transportation and the high influence of port service on the economy have
caused several problems and challenges for the ports.

The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is a unique system of bilateral information transfer. This is a
reciprocal system of services between the US coast guard and a foreign port country. It was started in
2002 as an initiative to increase the security of US coast with cooperation of foreign ports. The main
aim of CSI, in words of the authorities of US Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is – the
intent of Container Security Initiative is to extend the zone of security outward so that American
borders are the last line of defense, not the first. The cargo containers inspected at a host port can
further move freely throughout the US ports without facing any interruptions. This system is a dual
system which offers higher security without putting trade in jeopardy.

US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has stationed multidisciplinary teams of officers from both
CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to work together with host foreign government
counterparts. Their mission is to target and prescreen containers and to develop additional investigative
leads related to the terrorist threat to cargo destined to the US.
The three core elements of CSI are:

(a) Identify high-risk containers. CBP uses automated targeting tools to identify containers that
pose a potential risk for terrorism, based on advance information and strategic intelligence.
(b) Prescreen and evaluate containers before they are shipped. Containers are screened as early in
the supply chain as possible, generally at the port of departure.
(c) Use technology to prescreen high-risk containers to ensure that screening can be done rapidly
without slowing down the movement of trade. This technology includes large-scale X-ray and
gamma ray machines and radiation detection devices.

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In view of the increasing threats to maritime security at a global level, CSI was started as a means to
fight against the terror threats that can easily be spread through container shipping. This is a bilateral
system of information exchange, which means that a host country offers to conduct a security check
on cargo containers leaving for a US port. In return, the host country can send its officers to any US
port to target ocean-going containerized cargo being exported to their own country.

Under this system, container cargos leaving for US port from the host country are inspected at the
leaving port using Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology which includes X-ray imaging, Gamma
ray inspection etc. along with other methods like radiation check. These checks are conducted with
specialized equipment designed to handle such high-risk security checks without damaging the
content of the cargo containers. And in return, under this bilateral system, the host countries can
perform checks on containerized cargo leaving for their country from a US port.

Conclusion
With the implementation of new digital strategies, some crucial issues should be taken into account.
Maritime Security issues should supersede all issues towards digital maturity using small steps. Port
authorities may need to capture a broader shared group to improve on common issues through
developing partnerships for effective and efficient port and logistics operations. These include external
and internal stakeholders in the commercial and security parameters. Periodic security exercises need
to be carried out while implementing smart port and smart logistics to identify gaps in processes that
may be exploited by syndicates.

Periodic change of duty stations for those responsible for security can minimize or deter corrupt or
rogue officials. Systems cannot guarantee security when those responsible are corrupt in carrying out
their duties. Punitive measures like immediate termination and seizure of assets must complement
domestic laws when addressing corruption.

Deterrence must the key to all measures taken in smart port operations. In doing so, due concern must
be given to the cost of security for developing countries. Financial assistance and capacity building
support will be required to enable developing countries to build the nexus between commercial
aspirations and security needs.

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References:
1. Sakhuja, Vijay, The Indian Ocean and Smart Ports, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol 14, No.3, JSTOR, July-
Sep 2019.

2. Mohd. Rosni Othman, Jagan Jeevan et al, An Evolution of a Nexus between Malaysian Seaport Centric
Logistic and Industrial Revolution 4.0: Current Status and Future Strategies, International Journal of
e-navigation and maritime economy, University Malaysia Terengganu, Malaysia, 2018.

3. Violeta Sima et al. Influences of the Industry 4.0 Revolution on the Human Capital Development and
Consumer Behavior: A Systematic Review, Sustainability, 12 www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability. Accessed
Feb 2022.

4. Asian Development Bank. Smart Ports in the Pacific, Philippines, 2020.

5. M. Shahbaksh et al. Industrial revolutions and transition of the maritime industry: The case of Seafarer’s role
in autonomous shipping, Australian Maritime College, University of Tasmania, 2018.

6. Market&Markets, Smart Port Market, Global Forecast 2026, www.marketsandmarkets.com, 2022.

7. ECD Report. https://data.oecd.org/transport/container-transport.htm, accessed 1 March 2022.

8. www.unodc.org. accessed May 2022.

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 9
Smart Ports and Supply Chains
in the Indian Ocean: India’s
Smart Port Case Analysis

RP Pradhan

Introduction
‘Smart Ports’, ‘Green Shipping’ and ‘Net Zero’ (Greenhouse Gas or GHG emission free) are now emerging
themes and mandate for future international port and shipping economy. Asian Development Bank
defines Smart Port as: “one that ensures no waste of space, time, money and natural resources” (ADB:
2020).1 Future seaports and shipping in the world are expected to be operationally autonomous,
functionally greener and Net Zero compliant while being able to handle more goods and vessels in
less time and cost- a Smart Port phenomena (Ibid).

Smart Ports are a new generation development model. They use modern technologies like AI, IoT,
Machine Learning, Big data, Cloud Computing, Decision Tree and 5G spectrums for port automation,
operational integration and ship handling efficiency. New business models like block-chain and virtual
realities further deliver supply-chain and business integration resulting in port operational efficiency
and business transparency. Green Shipping drive in the maritime sector is a movement towards
reduction of Greenhouse Gas emission and energy efficiency in the international shipping sector. The
entire seaport and shipping economy shall be incrementally moving to Net Zero compliance for better
ocean health and sustainable maritime ecosystem.

In the context of these prominent and high impact structural and functional developments occurring
in the maritime sector, this article analyses on smart ports and supply chains in the Indian Ocean
Region (IOR) and India’s smart port case.

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IOR Seaports Business Geography
Given the strategic location of India in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), India’s Smart Port strategy could
well connect and correlate to the ports of East Africa, West Asia, BIMSTEC Region and Southeast Asia
in the immediate neighbourhood. If we further stretch, the scope of India’s port business could expand
to Oceania and Far East too (Far East is not captured here). Neatly, it represents seaport business
geography of around 40 countries which can be the operational canvas and business scope area
for the regions smart ports as shown in Figure 1. These countries cumulatively have 676 seaports of
varying size and functional profile (Figure 1).

Figure 1. seaports in the IPOI

Source: www.marinetraffic.com

As the Smart Port models are catching up, in 2021, the Vladivostok Commercial Sea Port in Russia
(led by FESCO Transport Group, Russia and BINOM, its IT partner, and NtechLab- a world leader in
video analytics) signed a major agreement with India’s Chennai Port (Chaudhury: 2021).2 Plan is to
revive shipping linkages with India through Smart Port initiatives. Similar such initiatives are being
experimented in many parts of the world now. Smart Port scope therefore is very high.

Port Classification & Characterization

While 40 countries and 676 ports represent a gross profile as shown in Figure 1, further classification
of seaports leads us to know that more than 80 percent of the regions ports are either small or very
small in size as represented in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Port types and categorization

Source: www.worldports.com

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When we further characterize the 676 seaports, we find that 30 percent of them are only seaports,
roughly around 20 percent are harbours, and 36 percent are pier, jetty or wharf types while 69 percent
are Marinas. It may be noted that ‘marinas’ have been a typical phenomenon of developed countries
maritime economic planning. The concept of marina is yet to receive attention among developing
countries.

Figure 3. Port Characterization

Source: Author’s graph using data from http://www.marinetraffic.com

For instance, the US has over 12,000 Marinas (Chapman: 2002).3 India has only one functional
international Marina - Cochin International Marina (Tidings: 2018)4. Most identified Marinas in the Indo-
Pacific are located in Australia and East-Asia.

Smart Ports: Orientation and Background

Background drive for the rise and growing attention on “Smart Ports” is provided by two significant
factors. The primary change is the global shift in mode of production methodology. New generation
technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI), IoT, Machine Learning, Big Data, Decision Tree, 5G
spectrum, block-chain and virtual realities have changed the way world produced and supplied goods
and services. While Geneva School of Economics Professor Richard Baldwin called it as the ‘Fourth
Industrial Revolution’ and the phenomena of ‘Great Convergence’ (Baldwin: 2016),5 it is popularly
referred as Industry 4.0. World over, technology has now integrated industrial production and supply
chain facilitating optimization of industrial output. ‘Smart Port’ concept is intrinsically linked to this
technology change.

The second impetus came from the rising international sensitivity to issues of climate change and
its devastating impacts visible all over the world. For good reasons, climate change diplomacy and
action plan has emerged as a compelling international agenda today. The United Nations Paris Climate
Agreement (COP21) and last year’s Glasgow session (COP26) became the powerful vehicles to translate
this sensitivity and agenda to a set of international climate mitigation action plans and diplomacy.
‘Smart Ports’, ‘Blue Economy’, ‘Green Shipping’ and ‘Net Zero’ are reflections of such action plan in the
maritime sector. COP21 or ‘Paris Climate Agreement 2015’ initiated a new legally binding international
protocol that is now ratified by 193/197 UN member countries. As per IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change) recommendations, COP21 advocated to keep global warming at 1.5°C -2°C (The
UNO: 2015).6 Glasgow COP26 further intensified maritime sector international climate action plan with
host of finer time line-based agenda and specific action plans. COP21 and COP26 proposed number
of climate mitigation and GHG emission reduction action plans with huge ramification on the global
maritime economy.
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Green Shipping is Global Future
The industry 4.0 new generation technology along with COP21 and COP26 action plan opened up a
range of integration prospect in the port, shipping and maritime sector to optimize port efficiency
while ensuring that the port-shipping economy evolves to be more sustainable and greener. The
bylines of COP26 had a very interesting action plan facet too. Led by the United Kingdom and USA, 19
countries (13 European and 06 other countries) emerged with a ‘Clydebank Declaration’ which called
for ‘Net Zero’ compliance action plan. Net zero compliance refers to a time bound ‘GHG Emission
Reduction Commitment’ and proactive national action plan.

Scandinavian ports are known for very innovative shipping modules including launching of autonomous
vessels. Building on the Zero-Emissions Shipping Mission created in July 2021 by Denmark, Norway
and the US (Toby Royal & Keys: 2022),7 the Clydebank Declaration signatories proposed to develop
at least six green shipping corridors between two or more ports by 2025 (Dept. of Transport, UK:
2021).8 These are called Green Shipping Corridors. They have also coordinated with over 200 plus
business houses to increase and commercialize zero emission fuels and vessels by 2030. Buyers like
Ikea, Amazon, Patagonia, and Michelin have already announced to buy only zero carbon freight from
2040 onwards (Ibid). Clydebank declaration goes further to facilitate establishment of partnerships/
operators along the value chain; accelerate de-carbonization of shipping sector; reduce fuel supply
to shipping sector by establishing green shipping corridors; identifying barriers in green corridor
establishment including regulatory framework, information sharing etc. Also, a plan for green corridors
as ‘National Action Plans’ and a five-year review based on international benchmarks and protocols are
also part of the agenda.

India: Green and Smart Port Initiative

Addressing the COP26 session at Glasgow; Prime Minister Narendra Modi committed that India will be
‘Net Zero’ compliant by 2070. While the US and European Union (EU) committed to achieve Net Zero
or carbon neutrality by 2050, China pledged to reach zero-emission by 2060 (BBC: 2021).9 India ranks
as the world’s fourth biggest carbon dioxide emitter after China, the US and the EU. However, given
India’s huge population, its per capita emissions are far lower than other major world economies.

Prime Minister Modi’s ‘Net Zero’ pledge was one of five commitments from India. Other commitments
include a promise for India to get 50 percent of its energy from renewable resources by 2030, and
by the same year to reduce total projected carbon emissions by one billion tons. By 2030 India will
reduce the emissions intensity of its economy by 45 percent (Menon: 2021).10 Based on new generation
technology and innovations, seaport and shipping sector all over the world are now gearing up towards
smart ports and green shipping. Baring few structural limitations, Indian maritime economy sector is
also in equal technology modification mode today.

Figure 4. Prominent GHG emitters of the world.

Source: Global Carbon atlas

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India: Sagarmala to Smart Port & Green Shipping
To meet the growing economic demands for efficient connectivity and market access, government of
India has now embarked on its most ambitious maritime modernization programme called Sagarmala
2015-35 (PIB: 2015).11 Sagarmala is a grand maritime geo-economic vision for India. In a timeline
of twenty years and projected cost of around US$ 82.7billion, Sagarmala promises to revamp and
modernize India’s maritime infrastructure, build port-led maritime economy and coastal connectivity
which also could generate over 10 million new jobs (Bureau: 2016).12

At the structural level, Indian ports are generally small and lack necessary draft (port depth) to handle
large (Capesize) vessels which require a minimum draft of 16 meters and above depending on the
vessel size and Dead weight Tonnage (DWT) which can range from 1.5 million to 4 million DWT. Most
Indian ports handle vessels up to 5000 TEU while Singapore, Hong Kong and several Chinese ports
handle vessels up to 12,000TEU (McKinsey: 2016).13 Mumbai Port which is the largest container port
in India has a port draft of only 14 meters. As a result, India depends on transshipment that adds to
time and cost. Sagarmala vision is expected to revise this limitation. And now the growing demand
for Smart Port, Green Shipping, Net Zero and Blue Economy are additional challenges as well as
opportunities for India’s port and shipping sector.

Prominent seaports like Rotterdam, Hamburg, Singapore or Shanghai are the smart ports of the
world today. While all the 76 functional seaports of India cumulatively handle 600-800 vessels a day,
Singapore port alone handles around 3000 vessels on daily basis as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5. India- Singapore Comparative Vessel Traffic Pattern Aug. 2017- July 2021
Source: Author’s Graph using data from http://www.marinetraffic.com

Indian seaport challenges therefore are multifold. Port physical structure to efficiency limitations and
rising international competition deem India to initiate massive forward-looking infrastructure revision
and modernization.

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Now Sagarmala is also incorporating Smart Port agenda and India is gearing up to smart port
designs and shipping sector energy efficiency missions and Net Zero compliance modifications.
Correspondingly India has also slated several timeline bench marks so that India is incrementally
ready with smart and energy efficient ports/shipping as per designated time line.

Smart Port: A Big Market

A smart port concept is primarily built on the Cyber Physical System (CPS), consisting of a three 3Cs
model: (1) computation, (2) communication, and (3) control technologies. Successful and automated
ports empirically demonstrate that with proper planning and management, port operating costs could
be reduced by 25 to 55 percent, while vessel handling efficiency could be increased by 10 to 35
percent (Markets & Markets: 2021).14 Further, operating expenses in an automated port reduces by 15-
35 percent on average. Many organizations are funding the projects to realize the effect of Industry
4.0 in the automation of ports. Corresponding to the demand and prospect, the global smart ports
market is projected to reach a size of USD 5.1 billion by 202 while growing at a CAGR of 23.9 percent
(Ibid).

Growing focus to reduce carbon emission from the maritime industry and green shipping and the
adoption of industry 4.0 by seaports to enhance the capacity of seaports are key factors driving the
growth of the smart ports market. It is evident therefore that there is a need for smart port technology
while green shipping alternative fuel/tech is a big market in itself.

Smart Ports: Arabian Sea Region

It is empirically evident that the UAE ports handle more vessels than Indian ports as given by Figure 6.

Figure 6. Arabian Sea Trade Triangle

Source: Graph using data from http://www.marinetraffic.com

Since September 2020, as part of its ongoing digital transformation drive, Abu Dhabi Ports
have launched ‘Smart Container Initiative’ (SCI) that will house its digital solutions in a resilient, safe

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and optimized eco-friendly mobile environment. Abu Dhabi ports are proposing to be powered by
clean energy. The solar-panelled steel and aluminium smart containers shall use environment friendly
technologies like in-row cooling, renewable energy and efficient space allocation which will reduce
Power Usage Effectiveness (PUE) by more than 20 percent while slashing shipping carbon emissions
by half.

In August 2021, Dubai’s Jebel Ali port had a very successful and fascinating experimentation of
‘Automated Container Handling System’ (ACHS) which may revolutionize port operations all over
the world. In the neighbourhood, MAWANI (the Saudi Ports Authority) has launched its Smart Ports
initiative that aims to automate operations at all Saudi ports. Net result of this efficiency up gradation
is visible in terms of vessel handling. UAE ports handle far more vessels per annum than all the Indian
ports cumulative vessel traffic (Figure 6). However, capital heavy Arabian countries simply buy out
efficiency through sheer investments. India on the other hand lacks investment capital. India also
follows a mixed economic planning model including the Make-in-India mode which is time consuming.

India’s Smart Port Initiative

India has 12 major ports and most of them are under Sagarmala modernization scheme for modernization
to revamp their productivity. However, Adani Group has meanwhile emerged as a major private sector
port players. The group operates 13 ports/terminals in India and abroad (Myanmar, Sri Lanka and
Australia). Adani Group’s 13 strategically located ports/terminals represent 24 percent of India’s port
capacity. Adani port facilities are equipped with the latest cargo-handling infrastructure which is not
only best-in-class, but also capable of handling the largest vessels calling at Indian shores. Adani ports
are equipped to handle diverse cargos - dry, liquid, crude and containers. As per the group claims,
Adani ports are some of the finest and most automated ports in India, and Figure 7 shows that their
port-vessel handling efficiency is comparable to Singapore ports.

Figure 7. Adani Group of Private Ports

Source: Adani Group Office
While none of the Indian ports can be designated as ‘Smart Ports’ per se, random cross-country
ports sample vessel traffic indicates that Indian ports are as good. Latest live vessel traffic data from
www.marinetraffic.com indicates that the Adani Group’s Mundra and Hazira Ports in Gujarat handled

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696 & 1267 vessels in 14 days (26 March-8April 22) which are as comparable with most ports in the
world barring the biggest ports like Singapore or Shanghai. Figure 8 shows how much fewer vessels
were handled by PSU ports like Vishakhapatnam and Chennai port throughout the data period in
comparison to Adani Group ports.

Figure 8. Select Mixed Country Port Sample Vessel Traffic Pattern, 26 March-08 April 2022
Source: Author’s Graph using data from http://www.marinetraffic.com

While the Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) ports have substantially improved their performance and
gearing up to latest technology to be smart and efficient, India’s small ports need strategic redefinition.
The Major Port Authorities Act, 2021 envisages to align port governance with international best practices
(Tomar: 2022).15 Already a slew of digital transformation measures are successfully introduced across
India’s major ports, including Direct Port Delivery (DPD), Direct Port Entry (DPE), development of
the Port Community System (PCS), the installation of container scanners and RFID systems, and
eliminating paper forms. In December 2018, an upgraded version- PCS1x -was launched as an open
platform which is now evolving into a National Single Window Logistics Portal (NLP Marine) and
about 24 Digital Systems of 6 Ministries are being integrated through ULIP (Unified Logistic Interface
Platform). This will integrate entire port logistics and reduce logistics cost. NLP integrated with ULIP
shall standardize and speed up the entire port-vessel handling procedures. Port Community System
(PCS) was initiated in 2006 to make port ecosystem more efficient and ‘Ease of Doing Business’
friendly. More than 16,000 plus corporates now use PCS beneficially accessing real time data/business
information even through mobile phones (IPCSA: 2021).16

In the commercial segment, Indian Ports are also increasingly operating in sister-port modes. Mumbai
Port has signed MoU with Port of Marseille (France). Adani Group’s Mundra Port has signed partnership
with Baltimore port (US), Guangzhou Port (China), Antwerp Port (Belgium) while Orissa’s Dhamra
Port has sister-port agreement with Seattle Port (US). Results of such modernization are visible in
Figure 8 port- vessel handling efficiency graph.

While Direct Port Delivery (DPD) has increased from 39.15 percent in FY2018 to 62.48 percent in
FY2021, there is 64.66 percent increase in container traffic at Indian ports in 2020-21 as compared to
2014-15 data. Multinationals like DP World and Maersk have also invested in container terminals in local
ports like JNPT and Pipavav. Private sector investments in non-major ports have already increased
with investments in Mundra, Pipavav, Hazira, Gangavaram and Krishnapatnam, among others.

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India is also actively investing on regional maritime domain awareness and creating a common operating
process through the work of the Indian Navy’s Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region
(IFC-IOR). Launched in 2018, IFC-IOR processes radar and sensor data from participating countries
and offers the data to partners, including all IORA members.

Conclusion
There is a growing global demand for seaport efficiency and moving the shipping sector to green
shipping channel. While the GCC countries are experimenting high value port modernization, in the
African shores, Mozambique hosted one of the biggest ‘Blue Economy’ conventions in 2018. South
Africa since 2014 is experimenting with ‘Ocean (or Operation) Phakisa - 2014-2033’ - a maritime
modernization drive. Since 2018, Royal Haskoning DHV (Engineering Consultancy MNC) undertook a
Smart & Innovative Port Development Study for North Queensland Bulk Ports-NQBP, Australia.

India is also equally gearing up in all dimensions to modernize the country’s seaports while India’s
energy mission is incrementally setting up target-based mechanism towards clean and green energy
and empirical evidences are now beginning to be seen.

References:

1. ADB. (2020, Nov), Asian Development Bank. Smart Ports in the Pacific. Manila: ADB.

2. Chaudhury, D. R. (2021). India’s gateway to Far East Russia Vladivostok Port to emerge as smart port. ET
Bureau.

3. Chapman, D. S. (2002), Improving the Accessibility Of Fishing And Boating Facilities. (N. UD
Marine Public Education Office, Editor, & U. University of Delaware, Producer) Retrieved April
07, 2022, from SeaGrants: https://udspace.udel.edu/bitstream/handle/19716/187/accessibility.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y#:~:text=Page%201-,There%20are%20approximately%2012%2C000%20
marinas%20and%201.1%20million%20boat%20slips,people%20with%20disabilities%20is%20limited.

4. Tidings. (2018, July-Sep). Marinas In India: Present And Future. Tidings(xxii).

5. Baldwin, R. (2016). The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization. Harvard
University Press.

6. The UNO. (2015). The Paris Agreement. UNFCCC.int.

7. Toby Royal, D. H., & Keys, V. (2022, MARCH 28). The Clydebank Declaration: Green corridors kickstarting
the adoption of long-term solutions. Lexology.

8. Dept. of Transport, UK. (2021, Nov 10). COP 26: Clydebank Declaration for green shipping corridors. Policy
paper. London, UK: Dept of Transport, Govt. of UK.

9. BBC. (2021). COP26: India PM Narendra Modi pledges net zero by 2070. London: BBC News.

10. Menon, S. (2021). Climate change: What emission cuts has India promised? New Delhi: BBC.

11. PIB. (2015). Sagarmala: Concept and implementation towards Blue Revolution. GOI, PIB.

12. Bureau, E. (2016). Sagarmala project to be completed in 5 years. Bennett, Coleman & Co. Ltd.

13. McKinsey. (2016). Final Report for Sagarmala (Vol. III). Ministry of Shipping. New Delhi: GOI.

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14. Markets & Markets. (2021). Smart Ports Market. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from MarketsandMarkets Research
Private Ltd: https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/smart-ports-market-165784113.html

15. Tomar, V. (2022). India’s Shipping Industry and Port Infrastructure: Ready for future. Centre for Security
and Strategy Studies.

16. IPCSA. (2021). Indian Ports Association leads the effort in digitalisation for efficiency, transparency and
‘Ease of Doing Business’. Indian Ports Association (IPA).

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 10
Digitalisation of Port
Centric Supply Chains: Issues
and Challenges

Prashant Bhaskar and Peggy Shu-Ling Chen

Introduction
Digital technologies are at the forefront of transformational change occurring in society and indus-
try (Kern: 2021).1 Sullivan (2021, p.4) explains digital transformation as the “shift in work, jobs, and
products through the use of technology in a company”. Similar to other sectors of the economy,
the so-called Industry 4.0 technologies such as Internet of Things (IoT), Artificial Intelligence (AI),
Blockchain, Cloud Computing, and Robotics, are increasingly challenging the status-quo in logistics
infrastructure, processes, operations and customer behaviour. These technologies potentially offer
transparency, real-time visibility, efficiency and productivity gains including environmental benefits
throughout the supply chain via reduction in wasteful activities and more efficient utilisation of assets.
Today, Industry 4.0 technologies are being applied in a range of settings within supply chains – from
last mile transport optimisation to warehouse management (Berns et al.: 2017).2 The maritime industry
is not immune to this transformative change, although the progress has been slow compared to some
other industries (Breskin and Pandey: 2021).3

Ports are one of the most important nodes in international supply chains. Ports are locations that see a
convergence of transport modes and stakeholders ranging from shippers, logistics service providers,
transport operators, infrastructure owners and government agencies such as customs and quarantine.
This convergence also takes the form of a merging of information flows that accompany logistics
operations. Modern ports are under competitive and stakeholder pressure to continuously improve
and optimise their commercial operations and administrative processes. As supply chains strive to
become more efficient, less wasteful, and environmentally sustainable, ports are being pushed to be-
come smarter. Figure 1 illustrates port evolution from a first-generation loading/unloading port to the

122
fourth-generation smart port. According to Berns et al. (Berns S and Vonck I J et al: 2017),4 becoming
a smart port means “developing solutions to address the current and future challenges faced by sea-
ports including spatial constraints, pressure on productivity, fiscal limitations, safety and security risks
and sustainability”.

As (Min H:2022)5 explains, a smart port utilises digital technology to create port infrastructure and lo-
gistics that enables increased productivity through automatic operations while also enabling greater
collaboration with stakeholders through digital connectivity. Unlike a third-generation port with its fo-
cus on being a landlord or facilitator, the fourth-generation smart port goes beyond being a provider
of cargo transfer services to being a data service provider.

Figure 1: Port Evolution

Source: Bernes et al., 2017

From a port operation perspective, three digitalisation trends have become prominent in recent years.
First, ports are utilising digital technologies to improve administrative processes that are important
for trade facilitation. Second, ports are increasingly automating equipment, procedures and control
systems, especially in container terminals. Third, there is growing realisation among stakeholders that
ports need to be more intimately integrated into supply chains. However, the implementation of dig-
italisation varies considerably between ports. This chapter examines some of the main digitalisation
issues and challenges being faced by ports and concludes with some recommendations for address-
ing those challenges.

Administrative Procedures for Trade Facilitation

Governments and international organisations like the World Trade Organization have long sought to
streamline processes and procedures in order to make them as effective as feasible for business peo-
ple and government officials. Government authorities require a multitude of documents and informa-
tion from businesses to comply with import, export and transit-related regulations. These compliance
requirements can tie up resources in red tape and make the trade process inefficient. The concept of
a ‘Single Window’ (SW) has been promoted by the United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and
Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT) whereby trade-related information and documents need only be
submitted once to meet regulatory requirements. The UN/CEFACT Recommendation No. 33 (2005,
p.3) 6 defines SW as a “facility that allows parties involved in trade and transport to lodge standard-

123
ized trade-related information and/or documents to be submitted once at a single-entry point to fulfil
all import, export, and transit-related regulatory requirements”.

In the maritime context, Singapore was a pioneer in single windows, implementing its ‘TradeNet’
(later upgraded to the Networked Trade Platform) national single window in 1989 (Tijan et al.: 2019).7
The implementation of Trade Net significantly reduced information processing time, which decreased
from between two to seven days to a maximum of ten minutes (Ibid).8

In an ideal situation, there would only be one national SW. In practice however, it can be difficult to
establish a single platform to handle all freight-related documentation. There is wide variation among
nations in the way the SW concept has been implemented or planned to be implemented. For exam-
ple, India has implemented the SW Interface for Facilitation of Trade (SWIFT) system for exporters
and importers to lodge their clearance documents online at one point only (WTO: 2022).9 Republic
of Korea, also among the pioneers of SW, uses two separate systems – UNIPASS and uTradeHub – to
cover trade procedures (Ha & Koh: 2018).10 Singapore’s TradeNet SW handles almost all documents
that are required for customs import and export procedures, but does not handle other cargo-related
documents required for transportation such as such as sea manifests that are handled by a port com-
munity system called PortNet (Ibid).11

It is expected that from January 1, 2024, it will be mandatory for public authorities to establish, main-
tain and use SW systems for the electronic exchange of information required on arrival, stay and
departure of ships in ports (IMO: 2022).12 Since April 2019, Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) is a
mandatory requirement under the IMO’s International Convention on Facilitation of International Mar-
itime Traffic (the FAL Convention). Port authorities, customs, police, immigration, maritime regulators,
health and agricultural authorities must be part of the port EDI system but other relevant stakeholders
such as terminal operators, ships’ agents, tug and pilot services providers can also be included. Under
an SW, authorities will need to ensure that information is submitted or provided only once and reused
to the maximum extent possible (Ibid).13

Within supply chains, ports are positioned as a place where supply and demand meet (Berns et al.,
2017).14 Ports create the ecosystem, or in other words a platform, where two parties can meet to cre-
ate value (Ibid).15 The large amount of data being shared by public and private entities is transforming
port systems into PCSs (Caldeirinha et al.: 2022).16As per the definition provided by the International
Port Community System Association (2022),17 a PCS is a neutral and open electronic platform en-
abling intelligent and secure exchange of information between public and private stakeholders in
order to improve the competitive position of the sea and air ports’ communities. Furthermore, it opti-
mises, manages and automates port and logistics processes through a single submission of data and
connecting transport and logistics chains.

A PCS handles electronic communication in ports between the maritime supply chain stakeholders
such as shipping lines, freight forwarders, Non-Vessel Owning Common Carrier (NVOCCs), agents,
stevedores, terminals, trucking companies, rail operators, exporters, importers, port authorities and
government agencies like customs and immigration. By providing a single digital platform for com-
munication and collaboration between stakeholders, the PCS reduces the inefficiencies that would
otherwise be present due to multiple channels of communication and the need for entering the same
information on multiple isolated systems. The PCS concept is illustrated in Figure 2.

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The true value of a PCS lies in how data from this interactive communication can be used to improve
supply chain visibility, optimise freight movement, cut wasteful expense, and improve environmental
performance. Notteboom et al. (2022)18 provide some illustrative examples: vessel call authorisation
by the terminal operator can automatically lead to service requests for tugs, pilots and moorings as
well as notification to port authorities and government agencies; cargo manifest is simultaneous-
ly provided to the carrier and the terminal operator as well as to port authorities and government
agencies leading to faster clearance; inbound and outbound logistical movements at the terminal
gate can be managed by a single electronic document leading to more efficient gate management;
optical character recognition of license plates and container identification numbers as well as use of
other scanning devices such as radiation detection or RFID improves security procedures; through IT
integration, containers can be tracked throughout their journey. Sensor technology and automation
of supply chain processes are further enhancing ports’ ability to collect and analyse large volumes of
machine-to-machine data for value creation.

Figure 2: Simplified PCS

Source: Adapted from Port Community System (PCS) summary –
concise overview – November 2014

Although PCS have existed since the 1970s, major ports such as Singapore, Hamburg and Antwerp
have invested heavily into digital technologies in recent times while other ports around the world are
implementing PCS to varying degrees of capability. For example, in India, a web-based PCS has been
implemented in 12 major ports and progressively in non-major ports to provide a paperless single
window for the port community to exchange messages electronically in secure fashion (Indian Ports
Association: 2016).19

Automation
Large scale automation of port equipment and control systems is becoming more and more apparent
in container terminals. A typical container terminal has three operational areas: 1) a quayside area
where ships berth and containers loaded or unloaded from ships; 2) a landside area where the termi-
nal receives or dispatches containers to the hinterland via road or rail; 3) a yard area where containers

125
are temporarily stored while awaiting dispatch to an ocean-going ship or hinterland transport. Tempo-
rary storage of container in the yard area is essential to decouple quayside and landside operations.
Decoupling enables the terminal to handle individual modes of transport in the most optimum way
independent of other modes.

A terminal requires loading/unloading equipment suited to particular modes, that is, ships, barges,
trucks and trains, stacking equipment for storing containers in the yard as well as vehicles to transfer
containers between quayside, yard and landside operational areas. Ship to shore gantry cranes are
used to load/unload containers from ships. For other operations, a variety of equipment and vehicles
can be used depending upon the needs of the terminal such as straddle carriers, rubber tyred gantry
cranes, rail mounted gantry cranes, reach stackers, terminal tractors and trailers. Most of this equip-
ment is also available from Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) in automated form plus some
terminals use dedicated automated guided vehicles or robots.

Automation, especially in container terminals, has become a trend (Chu et al.: 2018).20 According to
ITF 2021, the most cited objectives for port automation are productivity, efficiency, handling (labour)
costs and safety. Despite the perceived benefits, only around four percent of all container terminals in
the world have been automated (ITF: 2021).21 The low level of automation suggests that the business
case for universal terminal automation may not be very strong. A McKinsey survey of port practi-
tioners in 2017 indicated that operating expenses at automated terminals have fallen less than expect-
ed, and worse, productivity has also fallen (Chu et al.: 2018 ).22 The survey respondents were expecting
operating expenses to reduce by 25-55 percent and productivity to increase by 10-35 percent, but the
survey indicated that operating expenses have only fallen by 15-35 percent and the productivity has
actually fallen by 7-15 percent (Ibid: p.3).23 Automation requires high upfront capital outlay.

To justify the upfront expenditure, (Ibid: p.3)24 estimate that “the operating expenses of an auto-
mated greenfield terminal would have to be 25 percent lower than those of a conventional one or
productivity would have to rise by 30 percent while operating expenses fell by 10 percent”. Smaller
than anticipated returns on invested capital may not be the only barrier to greater uptake of port
automation. Automation is often accompanied by a reduction in labour force. Some decision-makers
may be hesitant to purse an automation strategy given that historically, there has been a very strong
and vocal public opposition to loss of jobs as a consequence of automation, especially by unionised
labour force.

Supply Chain Integration

While the general benefits of digitalisation are clear, the scope and extent of digital transformation
of individual ports can depend on a number of factors. The type of port and its position in the supply
chain are key considerations for a digitalisation strategy. It is unlikely that a port will have as dominant
a role in controlling supply chains as, for example, large producers, whole sellers, third-party logis-
tics(3PLs) and shipping lines (Saanen: 2019).25 Nevertheless, from a supply chain perspective, port
performance is integral to supply chain performance. Hence ideally, investment in port infrastructure
and digitalisation must be driven by the needs of the supply chain. Taking Australia as an example,
the maritime supply chains for bulk commodities and containers are quite distinct. Export-oriented
commodity supply chains are primarily based on bringing raw materials such as iron ore and coal
from mines via trains to ports where they are loaded into large bulk carriers. Large resource compa-
nies have control over the rail and port infrastructure. Therefore, it makes sense for them to invest in
high-capacity and efficient port and hinterland facilities so as to maintain their competitive advantage

126
over competing resource companies located in other countries. For example, since 2019, Rio Tinto
has been operating automated and unmanned trains to bring iron ore from its mines to the ports of
Dampier and Cape Lambert. Each 240-wagon, 2.4km-long train can haul 28,000 tonnes of iron-ore
(Smith: 2019).26

Continuing the Australian example, the container freight supply chain in Australia consists of export-
ing agricultural products and importing mainly manufactured goods. However, Australia imports more
than it exports and the resulting imbalance in containers necessitates setting up empty container
parks at all major container ports to manage the flow of empty containers in and out of the ports
(ACCC: 2021).27 Enhanced competition among Australia’s container terminal operators – Patrick, DP
World, Hutchisons and VICT – over the past decade has led to increased investment in equipment
and infrastructure (Ibid).28 Unsurprisingly, six of the world’s 53 automated container terminals are in
Australia ( Ibid).29

The preceding examples illustrate some of the variety that exists between ports and consequently a
single model of digitalisation will not fit all situations. A true smart port needs to add value through
digitalisation by taking advantage of its position in the supply chain (Berns et al.: 2017).30 Due to
differences in supply chains, the drivers for digitalisation will be different. The scope and scale of
digitalisation in ports needs to be appropriate to individual contexts. Comparisons between ports
using the usual metrics of port productivity and efficiency such as crane rate may not necessarily be
indicative of areas of improvement in supply chain performance. For example, supply chain perfor-
mance involving a port such as Jawaharlal Nehru Port (JNPT) (Mumbai) is likely to be affected by the
efficiency of the dedicated freight corridor being built between Dadri and Mumbai, unlike Singapore
which is a transshipment port. Nevertheless, ports cannot ignore the digitalisation occurring in other
areas of supply chain. For existing ports, Gardeitchik et al.: 2019 31 suggest a four-level digital maturity
model to transition towards a digital port in a step-by-step manageable process. Level 1 refers to dig-
italisation of individual parties in the port; level 2 is achieved with the establishment of a PCS; level 3
indicates the integration of logistics chain with hinterland; level 4 is achieved when different ports are
connected in the global logistics chain (Ibid).32

While some ports are clearly at level 2 and beginning to transition towards level 3, there are numerous
challenges that need to be overcome before a higher level of supply chain integration is achieved.
There is a lack of industry standards for data sharing without which establishing common platforms
for information sharing is difficult (Kirstein: 2018).33 Furthermore, many businesses are hesitant to
share data. According to Kirstein (2018),34 supply chain participants are hesitant to share data due
to concerns regarding commercial sensitivity, intellectual property liability, privacy, data ownership,
data security and level of trust. Some of these issues can be addressed through the use of distributed
ledger technologies such as blockchain. Small but significant steps have already been taken in this
regard such as the establishment of the Maersk-IBM joint venture Trade Lens which is underpinned by
blockchain technology. The use of blockchain is not yet widespread in the maritime industry however,
and the risk remains that several competing blockchain platforms may emerge, leading to duplication
(Rodrigue: 2019).35 Last but not least, digitalisation increases vulnerability to cyber-attack. The Inter-
national Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) has published comprehensive IAPH Cybersecurity
Guidelines for Ports and Port Facilities to assist senior-decision makers in safeguarding their organi-
sation from cyber-attacks.

127
Conclusion
Ports are currently utilising, or seeking to utilise, digital technologies for two main purposes. First, to
improve connectivity and collaboration with stakeholders and second, to automate terminal equip-
ment operations. In general terms, public authorities are interested in creating SW to streamline trade
compliance related administrative procedures. Governments should strive to create SW with no dupli-
cation. Ports, in many cases, are investing in digital platforms for sharing commercial and operational
data by establishing PCS. To become truly smart however, ports need to fully integrate with their sup-
ply chain. This may require collaboration with other ports in the region, some of whom may be com-
petitors. Collaboration will likely involve both public and private stakeholders, hence governments
should support ports’ efforts in this regard (Kirstein L :2018).36

Full automation in terminals can potentially lead to greater productivity, efficiency and safety as well
as reduction in operating costs. However, there is little information available in the public domain to
empirically confirm the perceived benefits of automation. The limited information available suggests
that benefits may not be as great as imagined. Due to the diversity of operating circumstances, loca-
tion, and position in the supply chain, there is unlikely to be a one-model-fits-all type of automation
solution for ports. The focus should be on optimisation rather than automation for automation’s sake,
especially where there is no shortage of labour. Automation decisions need to be made to suit indi-
vidual circumstances. Where investment by government is concerned, a whole of supply chain focus
may deliver better return on investment as it can identify areas in need of greatest improvement such
as road/rail infrastructure, and not necessarily ports.

Automation, and its impact on existing jobs, is a sensitive subject in many countries. To obtain social
licence for automation projects, the full cost/benefit analysis should be shared with stakeholders.
However, such cost/benefit analyses are unlikely to be made available by terminal operators (ITF
2021).37 Where governments have access to such information or the underlying assumptions, sharing
such information explicitly with stakeholders will assist in creating consensus (Ibid).38

As digitalisation spreads through the maritime industry, it will lead to fundamental changes in the
competency and knowledge requirements of the workforce. Maritime institutions, both in the high-
er education and the vocational education and training sectors, should be continually engaged in
monitoring and renewing their curriculums to suit industry requirements. In addition, employers will
invariably seek digital literacy during staff recruitment and staff development activities. Due to rapid
changes in the digital landscape and its impact on work practices, rigid workplace conditions and job
descriptions are unlikely to be the most suitable employment arrangement in future.

128
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1. Kern J, 2021, ‘The digital transformation of logistics a review about technologies and their implementation
status’, in M Sullivan & J Kern (eds) The digital transformation of logistics, IEEE Press Wiley, pp. 363-393,
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3. Breskin I & Pandey A, 2021, ‘Marine terminal operating systems’, in M Sullivan & J Kern (eds) The digital
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8. Tijan E and Agati฀ A et al., 2019.

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face%20for,at%20a%20single%20point%20only>.

10. Ha, SH & Koh J, 2018, Single window for trade facilitation: regional best practices and future development,
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Single%20Windows_updated.pdf>.

11. Ha, SH and Koh J, 2018.

12. IMO 2022, ‘Single window for ship data exchange to become mandatory’, Press Briefings, 23 May, viewed
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13. IMO 2022.

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services-smart-ports.pdf>.

15. Berns S and Vonck I J and et al, 2017.

16. Caldeirinha V, Nabais JL and Pinto C 2022, ‘Port community systems: accelerating the transition of seaports
toward the physical internet—the Portuguese case’, Journal of Marine Science and Engineering, 10, 152,
<https://doi.org/10.3390/jmse10020152>.

17. International Port Community Systems Association (IPCSA) 2022, Port community systems in sea ports and
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April 2022, <https://porteconomicsmanagement.org/>.

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20. Chu F, Gailus S, Liu L and Ni L, 2018, The future of automated ports, McKinsey & Company, viewed 12
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22. Chu F, Gailus S, Liu L and Ni L, 2018, The future of automated ports, McKinsey & Company, viewed 12
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the-future-of-automated-ports>.

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26. Smith K, 2019, ‘Rise of the machines: Rio Tinto breaks new ground with AutoHaul’, International Railway
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 11
Oceans as Global Commons:
Indo-Pacific Ocean –
Pathways to Prosperity and
Corridor of Peace
C. Joshua Thomas

The American strategic thinker S. Ashley J Tellis (Ashley J. Tellis:2012)1 observes that the US considers
Indian Ocean as a “Global Common” as Alfred Thayar Mahan (Francis P. Sempa:2014), 2 another great
American Strategic thinker terms as “great highway” – a wide common. In this Chapter the term
Oceans as Global Commons, signifying that the Ocean, particularly referring to the Indian Ocean
and the Indo-Pacific Ocean as a distinct cultural, civilizational and historical link with commonness
among the littoral states. This address would like to dwell on the importance of Indo-Pacific Ocean
economically and strategically, and how India’s geographical destiny has placed the Country in the
strategic place. It would stress that the Indo-Pacific can be transformed as the “pathways to prosperity”
and “corridors of peace” (17th Asia Security Summit:2018).3

To quote Alfred Mahan, the great American Strategist who wrote more than a hundred years ago
about the Indian Ocean that, “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. The Ocean is the
key to the seven seas. In the 21st century the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters” (Ajay
Patnaik:2015).4

The deeply perceptive and almost prophetic vision of Alfred Mahan, signifies the importance of the
Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and now it is true of Indo-Pacific Ocean too - the Indo-Pacific region
symbolizing the ‘confluence of Indian and the Pacific Ocean’ (Sanjay Pulipakka and Mohit Musaddi:2021).5
The statement when made was perhaps related to the control of the seas at its surface. However,
technological advances force us to see the thought is a multidimensional context which extends to the
depth of the Ocean as well as to the space above it. In the horizontal dimension the littoral states of the
region become key actors, hence the relevance of the region as opposed to the ocean by itself. Today, in
the 21st century, the Indo-Pacific region emerges as one of the most significant contested regions in the
world due to its geographical, political, economic and strategic characteristics.

131
It was Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India who once said that India is curiously situated
from geographical view as well as many other points of view. He further said, India belongs to
Southeast Asia, it belongs to South Asia and it belongs to East Asia. Thus, India’s geographical destiny
has placed the country right in the middle of it. K.M. Panikkar (Kavalam Madhava Panikkar:1951),6 the
amateur historian, administrator, and diplomat, who in his book on “India and the Indian Ocean: An
Essay on the influence of sea power on Indian History” published in 1945 highlighted the importance
of Indian Ocean. Kishore Mahbubani, the famous diplomat of Singapore in one of his recent works,
“ASEAN Miracle” (Kishore Majbubani and Jeffery Sng:2017) 7 has given extensive references to Indian
Ocean trade in the colonial times to the present era. It should be mentioned on the contribution of
C. Raja Mohan, “Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific” (C. Raja Mohan, Samudra
Manthan:2013) 8 where in, he articulated why Indian Ocean (IO) has attracted so much attention. The
IO has played a significant role in influencing socio-economic and political developments of the littoral
countries as well as in the strategies of leading powers since ancient times. So also, the Indo-Pacific
Ocean offers important minerals and raw materials. The single most important item which the region
provides is petroleum. The economic development and industrial progress of the developed and non-
oil producing developing countries are crucially dependent upon the oil supply from the Gulf and the
Arabian Peninsula.

Apart from oil, the region abounds in more than 40 raw materials of strategic importance imported by
the West. These include uranium, thorium, beryllium, coal, iron, copper, manganese, tin, mica, bauxite,
chromites, nickel, cobalt, antimony, etc. The latest discovery of rich mineral nodules from the Indo-
Pacific seabeds has further increased the importance of the Ocean area (Dhruva Jaishankar:2016).9
Moreover Indo-Pacific Ocean offers a variety of rich marine resources. The vast and untapped mineral
resources and raw materials offers an allurement to the developed nations located outside the region.
The desire to exploit these resources not only creates rivalry among the big powers but also provokes
regional and intra-regional conflicts.

Prabir De and Durairaj Kumarasawmy in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Indian
Centre Commentary on “Emerging Perspectives of Indo-Pacific Initiatives” (Prabir De and Durairaj
Kumarasawmy:2020) 10 mentioned that, “Indo-Pacific is the multi-polar region with the geographical
coverage of a number of countries in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. The coverage includes
43 countries from South East Asia, South Asia, Africa, Pacific, Middle East, Latin and North Americas,
and two EU countries. Indo-Pacific contributes more than half of the world’s GDP and population and
has huge natural resources and potential for new economic opportunities. Joe Biden, the President of
the United States in his Indo-Pacific Strategy of the USA in February 2022 said, “The future of each of
our nation – and indeed the world – depends on a free and open Indo-Pacific enduring and flourishing
in the decades ahead” (Joe Biden:2022). 11 In a sense it defines the very nature of international order.

Vision & Perspectives on Indo-Pacific: IPOI & AOIP

The Indo-Pacific, the region covering the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Region, is concurrently shaping
the posture of international affairs (Suthiphand Chirathivat, and Prabir De:2020).12 For nearly a decade
Indo-Pacific has been gaining a new geo-political and geo-strategic importance and represents the
new strategic reality in the 21st century. Many viewed Indo-Pacific as a challenge to China’s rise. The
major players in the IP region, such as Japan, the USA, Australia, and India all have their own vision
statement. Although the term IP was used by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during ASEAN 10th
Commemorative summit held in New Delhi in December 2012, “I feel, our India-ASEAN future is
inter-linked and a stable, secure and prosperous IP region is crucial for our progress and prosperity”

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(Manmohan Singh: 2012).13 But it was Prime Minister Modi in his address at the Shangri La Dialogue on
June 1, 2018 who shared India’s vision of “Free, Open, Prosperous and Inclusive (FOPI) IP (Shangri La
Dialogue: f.n.3).14 He said, “The Indo-Pacific is a natural region. It is also home to a vast array of global
opportunities and challenges. I am increasingly convinced with each passing day that the destinies
of those of us who live in the region are linked. Today, we are being called to rise above divisions and
competition to work together. The ten countries of South East Asia connect the two great oceans
in both the geographical and civilizational sense. Inclusiveness, openness and ASEAN centrality and
unity, therefore, lie at the heart of the new Indo-Pacific. India does not see the Indo-Pacific Region as a
strategy or as a club of limited members. Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate. And by no means
do we consider it as directed against any country.

A geographical definition, as such, cannot be. India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific Region is, therefore,
a positive one” (Ibid).15 It is premised upon the principle of ‘ASEAN-Centrality’ and India’s approach is
based on cooperation and collaboration, given the need for shared responses to shared challenges in
the region. Further to deepen the cooperation among the IP countries, Prime Minister Modi proposed
the Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative (IPOI) at the 14th East Asia Summit, held at Bangkok on November 4,
2019 (Indo-Pacific Division Briefs:2020).16 The IPOI focuses on seven pillars, namely, Maritime security;
Maritime Ecology; Maritime Resources; Capacity Building and Resource Sharing; Disaster Risk
Reduction and Management; Science, Technology and Academic Cooperation; and Trade Connectivity
and Maritime Transport. We need to note the Delhi Dialogue-XI held on December 13-14, 2019 with
ASEAN (Report on the Delhi Dialogue-XI:2019) 17 Member States on the theme “Advancing partnership
in the Indo-Pacific “also focused on India’s vision and perception on IP. The main element in IP vision
of India is 3-fold: it is an opportunity to expand its footprint across the region, it is an opportunity for
partnership at the core of IP initiatives and it is an opportunity for India’s great power ambition.

Again when we look at the IPOI we can notice the following four important features; 1) to give
importance of partnership and the benefit of collaboration, from isolation to active engagements
in its foreign policy outreach; 2) to distance it from any kind of groups or alliances of containment
(Sino-Indian or China-US geo-political rivalry), 3) to acknowledge the emergence of new security
architecture – the new order should be free, open and inclusive, with strong values and principles
that respect law, dialogues, rules, customs and norms, and 4) to extended India’s support to regional
architecture and groups as one of the pillars of the new order, it placed ASEAN at the heart of its IP
vision, pushing forward for a multi-polar world. It is interesting to note that in a paper published by the
Carnegie Endowment for international peace on “India in the IP: New Delhi’s Theater of Opportunity”
D.M Baruah argues that, “IPOI has provided the platform for New Delhi to pursue its global strategic
ambition” (Darshana M. Baruah).18

In the AIC Commentary of the Research and Information System (RIS) for developing countries on
“IPOI: Providing Institutional Framework to the Indo-Pacific Region” Rahul Mishra argues: ”The IPOI
aims to provide a comprehensive institutional framework to the IP architecture and is poised to lend
greater credibility to the IP construct while establishing India as a responsible stakeholder and ‘rule-
maker’ rather than a ‘rule-taker’ (Rahul Mishra:2021).19 Thus, IPOI is a response to a changing world
order and it has strategically attuned India’s foreign policy priorities and engagements.

ASEAN is geographically located at the centre of Indo-Pacific. The 10 member countries of the
ASEAN are well integrated in terms of trade and investment with major economies of IP region.
ASEAN has also been engaging with most of the IP countries at bilateral, regional and multilateral
levels. To promote rules-based regional order, ASEAN had adopted the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-

133
Pacific (AOIP) at the 34th ASEAN Summit held at Bangkok in June 2019 (AIC-RIS: 2020).20 The AOIP
does not take sides between major powers, which conform to India’s IPOI being neither a club of
limited members, nor a military strategy against any country. Its aim is based on the proven Strengths-
Weakness-Opportunities-Threats (SWOT) model. The AOIP promotes ASEAN inclusivity and ASEAN
centrality and emphasizes on the ASEAN-led mechanism to strengthen the regional and sub-regional
cooperation to achieve the common interest in the IP. It is also intended to work as guiding principle
of IP regional cooperation, promote peace stability and prosperity in the region as well as building
connectivity, maritime cooperation, achieve UN SDGs and economic cooperation (AIC-RIS: 2020).21 It
is sine qua non for India’s Indo-Pacific vision. In his address at the 18th ASEAN-India Summit held on
October 28, 2021, Prime Minister Modi emphasized on building synergies between India’s IPOI and the
ASEAN’s AOIP. This synergy which stresses on building partnerships for free trade and sustainable
use of marine resources would enhance the scope of cooperation which would be crucial in the post
pandemic economic recovery (PremeshaSaha: 2022).22 Further, building on the complementarities
between IPOI and AOIP would be crucial in order to ensure faster and better recovery and promote
sustainable growth.

The Way forward

Indo-Pacific is closely linked with South China Sea, the contested area between China and other
countries in the Indo-Pacific – which is why close regional understanding, cooperation and coordination
between India, Australia, ASEAN and other major players in the IP region is very much required.

Although China and other major players in the Indo-Pacific increasingly vie for strategic advantage
in the Indo-Pacific region, while also cooperating on some transnational security issues such as, anti-
piracy, disaster relief, drug smuggling, search and rescue, etc. China and India have expressed eagerness
to assume greater responsibility in policing maritime commons and to be recognized as major powers.
China’s activities are likely to expand in conjunction with its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, but
this does not have to come at India’s expense. Broader initiatives like the BRICS Development Bank
and the AIIB are also pulling India into a larger leadership role alongside China in the Indo-Pacific.

The biggest challenge to creating coordinated effective action across the Indo-Pacific region is the lack
of institutions of governance that cover the whole space. It may sound mundane, but institutionalized
organizations with a regular diplomatic calendar and senior officials meeting to work on an agenda
driven processes of consultation and action (C. Joshua Thomas:2017).23The sub-regional cooperation
initiatives such as Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
(BIMSTEC) needs to strengthened to play a vital role in the Indo-Pacific vision of India and ASEAN (C.
Joshua Thomas:2020).24

Prime Minister Modi in his address at the Shangri La Dialogue (Shangri La Dialogue: f.n.3) 25 while
sharing on India’s vision on Indo-Pacific eloquently said, “Our sea lanes will be pathways of prosperity
and corridors of peace”. To make the pathways of prosperity and corridor of peace in the Indo-Pacific
region we may think of the following ways and means to address to each one’s concern:

1 to address security concern

2 to advocate economic interests

3 to settle border disputes

4 to show genuine friendship

134
5 to encourage mutual cooperation building mechanism

6 to treat all international waterways as global commons and

7 to have time for strategic benevolence

According to Chirayu Thakkar of National University of Singapore, “Strategic benevolence implies

the provision of public goods for strategic purposes. It is benign, as it increases the prosperity of the
recipient without being extractive. It is, however, strategic. The patron expects certain geopolitical
alignments from the recipients of its largesse” (Shangri La Dialogue, f.n.3:2022).26 The US’s Marshall
Plan was an exercise in strategic benevolence. Also, Molotov Plan of the Soviet Union for its satellites.
Provision for public goods may include: vaccines, climate finance and infrastructure funds.

There is a need to have the Indo-Pacific Order (Ranil Wickremesinghe:2016) 27 and this Order needs
to be built on a consensual agreement and no singular State should dominate the system. The
order would have the primary responsibility of upholding the freedom of navigation in the entire
Indo-Pacific region, ensuring that shipping and air routes to East Asia and beyond are kept open
building closer economic cooperation amongst countries in the region, incorporating an Indo-Pacific
Ocean Development Fund for the development of the region, and in particular, establishing a strong
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Management mechanism to deal with natural and manmade
disaster.

India’s role in the Indo-Pacific could be that of “balancer” and India should follow a “middle path” by
way of engaging all the major powers (C. Joshua Thomas:2017)28 the US, China, Japan, Australia, and
ASEAN. India should chart an independent path for herself, combining the tool of geo-politics, geo-
economics and geo-strategic in furthering the national development interests. The situation in the
Indo-Pacific is a unique opportunity for India to prove herself as a serious player to shape Indo-Pacific
economic and strategic architecture. Along with its IPOI vision India needs to have a Grand Strategy
and not a reactive strategy.

Conclusion
As America is struggling and in a retreat for a prospective offshore balancing; Europe is failing and
faltering; India, Australia and ASEAN are emerging and rising, it is time that all these three along with
China to stand up and strive for peace & prosperity and growth & stability in the Indo-Pacific Region
and make 21st Century as the Asian Century! (C. Joshua Thomas) 29

India and the countries in the ASEAN had close relations while there were huge land and physical
and ocean barriers no longer there, ideas could travel from India to change life in the ASEAN and
in China and traders, travelers and scholars even braved the mighty Oceans and the Himalayas to
come down to India in search of knowledge (Elizabeth Rosalind Thomas:2013).30 Now, the physical
and sea barriers are no more with the onset of several initiatives and inter-continental corridors, and
waves of regional and sub-regional cooperation; but the minds are apart. Therefore, we need to work
out exhaustively to bring them together. What people can do on the ground, sometimes it is not
possible for the states/governments to achieve that. We sincerely hope that people to people contact
and the exchange programmes between universities, educational institutions, think-tanks and media
personnel will bring language, culture and relationship much closer for the promotion of universal
brotherhood, peace, and prosperity of Asia and of the world! In this regard the CPPR can play the
leading role.

135
References:
1. Ashley J. Tellis, “Indian Ocean and U.S. Grand Strategy”, lecture delivered at the National Maritime
Foundation, at India International Centre on 17 January 2012, https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/01/17/
indian-ocean-and-u.s.-grand-strategy-pub-47437.

2. Francis P. Sempa, “The Geopolitical Vision of Alfred Thayer Mahan”, The Diplomat, December 30, 2014,
https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-geopolitical-vision-of-alfred-thayer-mahan.

3. 17th Asia Security Summit, The IISS Shangri-La-Dialogue, Keynote address by Narendra Modi, Prime Minister
of India on June 1, 2018, https://www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2018.

4. Ajay Patnaik, “Indian Ocean: The Key to India’s Look East Policy”, The Economic Times, March 21, 2015,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/blogs/et-commentary/indian-ocean-the-key-to-indias-look-east-
policy

5. Sanjay Pulipakka and Mohit Musaddi, “In Defence of the Indo-Pacific Concept,” Issue Brief, Observer Research
Foundation, September 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/research/in-defence-of-the-indo-pacific-concept/

6. Kavalam Madhava Panikkar,” India and The Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian
History”, London: Georege Allen & Unwin Ltd., Second edition, 1951, https://ignca.gov.in/Asi_data/2745.pdf

7. Kishore Majbubani and Jeffery Sng, “The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace”, NUS Press, Singapore, 2017.

8. C. Raja Mohan, Samudra Manthan: “Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific”, New Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 2013.

9. Dhruva Jaishankar, “Indian Ocean region: A pivot for India’s growth”, September 12, 2016 September 12,
2016, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/indian-ocean-region-a-pivot-for-indias-growth/

10. Prabir De and Durairaj Kumarasawmy, “Emerging Perspectives of Indo-Pacific Initiatives”, AIC Commentary,
No.9, September 2020, RIS, New Delhi, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344440842_Emerging_
Perspectives_of_Indo-Pacific_Initiatives

11. Joe Biden, the President of the United States address on “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the USA’ in February
2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf

12. Suthiphand Chirathivat, and Prabir De, Editorial in the Journal of Asian Economic Integration, August 27,
2020, New Delhi: Sage Publications, https://doi.org/10.1177/2631684620954963.

13. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, address at the ASEAN 10th Commemorative Summit
held New Delhi in December 2012, https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/20981/
Statement+by+Prime+Minister+at+Plenary+Session+of+IndiaASEAN+Commemorative+Summit
14. Shangri La Dialogue, f.n.3

15. Shangri La Dialogue, f.n.3

16. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 15, “Indo-Pacific Division Briefs”, see,https://mea.
gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indo_Feb_07_2020.pdf; Tenjameran A O, “Emerging Convergences in the
Indo-ASEAN Partnership,” AIC Commentary, https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_
id=6676&lid=4579

17. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Report on the Delhi Dialogue-XI”, December 13-14, 2019,
https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/32212

18. Darshana M. Baruah, “India in the Indo-Pacific: New Delhi’s Theatre of Opportunity”, Carnegie Endowment
for Indo-Pacific, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/30/india-in-indo-pacific-new-delhi-s-theater-

136
 of-opportunity-pub-82205.

19. Rahul Mishra, “Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative: Providing Institutional Framework to the Indo-Pacific
Region,” AIC Commentary, No.20, August 2021, RIS, New Delhi, See, https://aei.um.edu.my/img/files/
AIC%20commentary%20No%2020%20August%202021%20final.pdf; Also see, “ASEAN Outlook on the
Indo-Pacific,” See, https://asean.org/asean2020/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-
Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf

20. AIC-RIS, 2020, “ASEAN-India Development and Cooperation Report 2021: Avenues for Cooperation in Indo-
Pacific,” ASEAN India Centre (AIC) – Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), New
Delhi, p.309, https://aic.ris.org.in/sites/aic.ris.org.in/files/Publication/AIDCR%202021.pdf

21. AIC-RIS, 2020.

22. PremeshaSaha, “ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook: An Analysis,” https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/

aseans-indo-pacific-outlook-an-analysis-52542/

23. C. Joshua Thomas, “Indian Ocean-Asian Prosperity,” Keynote address at the 7th international conference on
Great Power’s Strategy and its Regional Role in the Indian Ocean: From the Perspective of Security and
Economy held on 9-10 November 2017 at the Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economics (RIIO), Yunnan
University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, China.

24. C. Joshua Thomas (2020) “North East of India and BIMSTEC: A Reality Check”, in De, Prabir (ed) Twenty
Years of BIMSTEC: Promoting Regional Cooperation and the Integration in the Bay of Bengal, New Delhi:
Bookwell, pp. 193-212.

25. Prime Minister Modi’s address at the Shangri La Dialogue, f.n.3

26. Shangri La Dialogue, f.n.3, “Time for Strategic Benevolence,” The Telegraph, 13 April 2022.

27. Ranil Wickremesinghe, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka suggested at the Indian Ocean Conference held in
Singapore on 1 September 2016 wherein he suggested that there is a need to have Indian Ocean Order
(IOO)https://maritimeindia.org/sri-lankas-proposal-for-an-indian-ocean-order-an-assessment/ and in the
present context at the Indo-Pacific we may suggest to have a similar order and we can call it as Indo-Pacific
Order for the purpose suggested in the article.

28. C. Joshua Thomas, “Developments in ASEAN-China Relations, Implications for Regional Stability,” paper
presented at the Seminar on Focus on China: Current Issues and Developments, organized by the Chennai
Centre for China Studies and the Press Institute of India at PII, Chennai on 20-21 April 2017.

29. C. Joshua Thomas, “India-China Relations: Heading for a New Era”, Tenth Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew Lecture,
The Centre for North East Studies and Policy Research, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, on 12 March 2019.

30. Elizabeth Rosalind Thomas, “Rabindranath Tagore & China” paper presented in the Research Institute
for Indian Ocean Economics (RIIO), Yunnan University of Finance & Economics, Kunming, China in the
University Exchange Programme from Tezpur University, Assam on 7 September 2013.

137
Endnotes

1 OECD, ‘Trade Facilitation and the Global Economy’ (30 May 2018) https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/
trade-facilitation-and-the-global-economy_9789264277571-en (accessed on 17 August 2022).

2 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, ‘Trade Facilitation Agreement’, https://
www.dfat.gov.au/trade/organisations/wto/tfa/trade-facilitation-agreement#:~:text=Benefits%20of%20
the%20TFA&text=The%20OECD%20estimates%20the%20agreement,cent%20and%2017.5%20per%20
cent (accessed on 17 August 2022).

3 Bill Gain, ‘Trade Facilitation: Critical to COVID-19 Recovery’ (2 November 2021) World Bank Blogs, https://
blogs.worldbank.org/trade/trade-facilitation-critical-covid-19-recovery#:~:text=As%20we%20emerge%20
from%20the,help%20countries%20recover%20more%20quickly (accessed on 17 August 2022).

4 OECD, ‘Trade Facilitation and the COVID-19 Pandemic’ (OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus) COVID-19
(April 2020) https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/trade-facilitation-and-the-covid-19-
pandemic-094306d2/ (accessed on 17 August 2022).

5 UNECE, ‘Trade Facilitation Implementation Guide’, https://tfig.unece.org/contents/single-window-concept.

htm (accessed on 17 August 2022).

6 UNESCAP, ‘Digital and Sustainable Trade Facilitation: Global Report 2021’ (Based on the UN Global Survey
on Digital and Sustainable Trade Facilitation), https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/knowledge-
products/UNTF-Global%20Report-web.pdf (accessed on 17 August 2022).

7 ibid.

8 ibid.

9 ibid.

10 ibid.

11 ibid.

12 ibid.

13 UNESCAP, ‘Estimating the Benefits of Cross-Border Paperless Trade’ (2014) https://www.unescap.org/

sites/default/files/Benefits%20of%20Cross-Border%20Paperless%20Trade.pdf (accessed on 17 August
2022).

14 Asian Development Bank (ADB), ‘Asia-Pacific Trade Facilitation Report 2021: Supply Chains of Critical
Goods amid the COVID-19 Pandemic: Disruptions, Recovery, and Resilience’ (October 2021) https://www.
adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/737991/asia-pacific-trade-facilitation-report-2021.pdf (accessed on
17 August 2022).

15 ibid.

16 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, ‘Australia-India CECA (AI-CECA)
Official Text’, https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/negotiations/aifta/australia-india-ecta-official-
text (accessed on 17 August 2022).

17 ibid at Article 5.3.1, AI-CECA.

18 ibid at Article 5.4.1, AI-CECA.

19 ibid at Article 5.3.3, AI-CECA.

20 ibid at Article 5.5, AI-CECA.

21 ibid at Article 5.5.2, AI-CECA.

138
22 ibid at Article 5.7, AI-CECA.

23 United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT), ‘Recommendation
and Guidelines on Establishing a Single Window: To enhance the efficient exchange of information
between trade and government’ Recommendation No. 33 (2005) https://unece.org/DAM/cefact/
recommendations/rec33/rec33_trd352e.pdf (accessed on 17 August 2022).

24 World Customs Organization (WCO), ‘How to build a Single Window Environment – Supplement Edition’
(WCO Compendium) http://www.wcoomd.org/-/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/facilitation/
instruments-and-tools/tools/single-window/sw-compendium-supplement-edition.pdf (accessed on 17
August 2022).

25 ibid.

26 ibid.

27 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), ‘Digital Economy Partnership Agreement
(DEPA) text and resources’ https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements-in-force/digital-economy-partnership-agreement-depa/depa-text-and-resources/ (accessed
on 17 August 2022).

28 World Trade Organisation (WTO), ‘Agreement on Trade Facilitation’ (WT/L/940, 2017) https://docs.wto.
org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/L/940.pdf&Open=True (accessed on 17 August
2022).

29 Article 2.1, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), ‘Digital Economy Partnership
Agreement (DEPA) text and resources’ https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements-in-force/digital-economy-partnership-agreement-depa/depa-text-and-resources/
(accessed on 17 August 2022).

30 ibid at Article 2.2.

31 United Nations, ‘Framework Agreement on Facilitation of Cross-Border Paperless Trade in Asia and the
Pacific’ (2016) https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2016/05/20160519%2012-16%20PM/Ch_X-20.pdf
(accessed on 17 August 2022).

32 European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document – Impact Assessment Report’

(Accompanying the document – ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council establishing the European Union Single Window Environment for Customs and amending
Regulation (EU) No. 952/2013 (SWD(2020) 238 final) https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/system/
files/2020-10/201028_single_window_impact.pdf (accessed on 17 August 2022).

33 ibid.

34 ibid.

35 ibid.

36 US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), ‘Automated Commercial Environment/International Trade

Data System (ACE/ITDS)’ https://www.fda.gov/industry/import-systems/automated-commercial-
environmentinternational-trade-data-system-aceitds#:~:text=ACE%2FITDS%20is%20a%20
single,Automated%20Commercial%20System%20in%202016.

37 Singapore’s TradeNet Single Window System, https://www.tradenet.gov.sg/tradenet/login.jsp (accessed

on 17 August 2022).

38 World Economic Forum (WEF), ‘Enabling Trade: Catalysing Trade Facilitation Agreement Implementation
in Brazil’ (2015) https://reports.weforum.org/enabling-trade-catalysing-trade-facilitation-agreement-
implementation-in-brazil/ (accessed on 17 August 2022).

139
39 Thailand Single Window System, http://www.thainsw.net/INSW/index.jsp?nswLang=E (accessed on 17
August 2022).

40 ibid.

41 UNESCAP, ‘Single Window Planning and Implementation Guide – Manuals and Training Materials’ (2012)
https://www.unescap.org/resources/single-window-planning-and-implementation-guide (accessed on 17
August 2022).

42 ibid.

43 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ‘Study on ‘Single Window Systems’ International

Interoperability: Key Issues for its Implementation’ (2018) https://www.apec.org/publications/2018/08/
study-on-single-window-systems-international-interoperability (accessed on 17 August 2022).

44 European Union Single Window Environment for Customs, https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/eu-

single-window-environment-customs_en#:~:text=The%20%E2%80%9CEU%20Single%20Window%20
Environment,regulatory%20authorities%20across%20policy%20domains (accessed on 17 August 2022).

45 CustomsCity, ‘APEC – Regional Single Window (RSW) – A Path Forward for Implementation’ https://
customscity.com/apec-regional-single-window-rsw-a-path-forward-for-implementation/ (accessed on 17
August 2022).

46 ASEAN Single Window System, https://asw.asean.org/ (accessed on 17 August 2022).

47 Isabel Mejia Rivas and Mónica Maday, ‘How the Pacific Alliance linked up its Single Windows for Foreign
Trade’ Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Blogs (2019) https://blogs.iadb.org/integration-trade/
en/pacific-alliance-single-windows-trade/#:~:text=The%20Pacific%20Alliance%3A%20Pioneering%20
the,fees%20for%20foreign%20trade%20operations (accessed on 17 August 2022).

48 allAfrica, ‘East Africa: Indian Ocean Commission Kicks Off Initiative to Enhance Regional Maritime
Connectivity’ (2022) https://allafrica.com/stories/202208040052.html (accessed on 17 August 2022).

49 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ‘Study on ‘Single Window Systems’ International

Interoperability: Key Issues for its Implementation’ (2018) https://www.apec.org/publications/2018/08/
study-on-single-window-systems-international-interoperability (accessed on 17 August 2022).

50 ibid.

51 David Widdowson, et al., ‘Single window in the context of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement’, World
Customs Journal, 2019, https://worldcustomsjournal.org/Archives/Volume%2013%2C%20Number%201%20
(Mar%202019)/1877%2001%20WCJ%20v13n1%20Widdowson%20et%20al.pdf?_t=1563333690 (accessed
on 17 August 2022).

52 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, ‘Australia-India CECA (AI-CECA)
Official Text’, https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/negotiations/aifta/australia-india-ecta-official-
text (accessed on 17 August 2022).

53 Charles Sturt University, ‘Review of Australia’s Progress Towards Implementation of the Single Window
Concept’ (2018) http://www.aittidf.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Single-Window-Final-Report.pdf
(accessed on 17 August 2022).

54 Australian Border Force, ‘Integrated Cargo System (ICS)’, https://www.abf.gov.au/help-and-support/ics/

integrated-cargo-system-(ics) (accessed on 17 August 2022).

55 David Widdowson, et al., ‘Single window in the context of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement’, World
Customs Journal, (2019) https://worldcustomsjournal.org/Archives/Volume%2013%2C%20Number%20

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 1%20(Mar%202019)/1877%2001%20WCJ%20v13n1%20Widdowson%20et%20al.pdf?_t=1563333690
(accessed on 17 August 2022).

56 Government of India, ‘Single Window Interface for Facilitating Trade (SWIFT, India)’, https://www.icegate.
gov.in/SWIFT/ (accessed on 17 August 2022).

57 ibid.

58 ibid.

59 ibid.

60 ibid.

61 ibid.

62 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australian Government, ‘Australia-India Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership’ (2020) https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/india/joint-statement-comprehensive-
strategic-partnership-between-republic-india-and-australia (accessed on 17 August 2022).

63 Australian Government, ‘Australia-India Cyber and Critical Technology Partnership Grants’ (2022) https://
www.internationalcybertech.gov.au/AICCTP-grant-round-two (accessed on 17 August 2022).

141