Indo-Pacific Perspectives: Australia, ASEAN and India

Indo-Pacific Perspectives:
Australia, ASEAN and India
Edited by:
Vijay Sakhuja & Anu Maria Francis
Centre for Public Policy Research and Monash University
i
Indo-Pacific
India and Australia
Perspectives: Australia, ASEAN and India
Strengthening
Edited by VijayInternational
Sakhuja & Anu
Cooperation
Maria Francis
through the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative
Edited by Vijay Sakhuja & Anu Maria Francis
ISBN 978-81-955180-5-0 (e-book)
ISBN 978-81-955180-2-9
978-81-955180-6-7 (print)
First published in 2022
2023
Copyright © Centre for Public Policy Research and Monash University, 2023
2022
Published by the Centre for Public Policy Research (CPPR) Elamkulam, Kochi,
Kerala - 682020, India (www.cppr.in) and Monash University, Wellington Road,
Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia (www.monash.edu)
Copy-edited by Swapna
Haseena Jambhekar
Hamsa
Design and Typeset by Aargee Communications, Ernakulam, Kerala, India.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission of the
publisher.
The views expressed in the book are the individual opinion(s) of the author(s), who
take individual and joint responsibility for its content. The book does not reflect the
official views of the Centre for Public Policy Research, Monash University or of any
government department, institution or agency. The publishers do not accept any
responsibility for the same in any manner whatsoever.
ii
Contents
Abbreviations
Contributors
Foreword
Introduction 1
Chapter 1 ASEAN's Perspectives on the Indo-Pacific 3

Sinderpal Singh
Chapter 2 India's Perspective on the Indo-Pacific 7

Amruta Karambelkar
Chapter 3 Understanding Strategic Contours of India's 17

Perspective on the Indo-Pacific
Mukund V Narvenkar
Chapter 4 ASEAN's Role in Maintaining a Secure and 21

Prosperous Indo-Pacific
Sumathy Permal and Alif Imran Hidayat
Chapter 5 Promoting Peace and Prosperity in the Indo-Pacific: 29

The Positive Roles of ASEAN, Australia and India
Him Raksmey
Chapter 6 ASEAN + 2 Cooperation in Marine Plastic Waste: 33

Pragmatic Suggestions to Kick-off ASEAN-
Australia-India's Indo-Pacific Cooperation
Vu Hai Dang
Chapter 7 Maritime Connectivity - A Strong Pillar for the 39

Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative
Lucio Blanco Pitlo III
iii
Chapter 8 Indonesia's Quest for Smart Port: Challenge 45
and Opportunity
Siswanto Rusdi
Chapter 9 India, Australia, ASEAN... and, beyond, the 51

Global South: A Sense of 'Buddy
Diplomacy', away from the Narrow Great
Powers' Dilemma?
Eric Frecon
Chapter 10 Indo-Pacific and the Dream of a Rules-based Order 55

Harisankar K Sathyapalan
iv
Abbreviations & Acronyms
AUKUS : Australia-United Kingdom-United States

ADMM-Plus : ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus
AI : Artificial Intelligence
AIIPOIP : Australia-India Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership
AANZFTA : ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area
AMS : ASEAN Member States
AOIP : ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
ARF : ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN : Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BIMSTEC : Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical
and Economic Cooperation
BoB : Bay of Bengal
BRI : Belt and Road Initiative
BCIM : Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic
Corridor
CPPR : Centre for Public Policy Research
CPTPP : Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership
CECA : Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement.
CTI-CFF : Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and
Food Security
CSIS : Center for Strategic and International Studies
DFAT : Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
EAS : East Asia Summit
EU : European Union
EEZ : Exclusive Economic Zone
EXIM : Export-Import Bank of India
FIPIC : Forum for India-Pacific Island Corporation
FTA : Free Trade Agreement
GDP : Gross Domestic Product
GOI : Government of India
v
IoT : Internet of Things
IFC-IOR : Indian Navy's Information Fusion Centre for Indian
Ocean Region
IMO : International Maritime Organisation
IO : Indian Ocean
IORA : Indian Ocean Rim Association
IOR : Indian Ocean Rim
IONS : Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
INSW : Indonesian National Single Window
IRASEC : Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia.
IPOI : Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership
IOSEA : Indian Ocean and South-East Asia
ISIS-Malaysia : Institute Of Strategic & International Studies-Malaysia
IAID : Indonesian Africa Infrastructure Dialogue
MGEC : Mekong Ganga Economic Corridor
MOU : Memorandum of Understanding
NLE : National Logistics Ecosystem
NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PRC : People's Republic of China
QUAD : Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
RCEP : Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RBO : Rule-Based Order
RUSI : Royal United Service Institute
SAGAR : Security and Growth for All in the Region
SOEs : State-Owned Enterprise
SIDS : Small Island States or the Small Island Developing
States
UK : United Kingdom
UN : United Nations
UNCLOS : United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea
UNEA : United Nations Environment Assembly
USA : United States of America
vi
Contributors
Alif Imran Hidayat is a Maritime Security and Diplomacy Researcher at

the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) and Sumathy Permal is a Senior
Researcher with the Centre for the Straits of Malacca at the Maritime
Institute of Malaysia (MIMA), Kaula Lumpur.
Amruta Karambelkar was a Research Associate with the Indo-Pacific cluster
at the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), New Delhi. Currently,
she is pursuing her PhD from the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, JNU,
India.
Eric Frécon is an Adjunct Fellow at the Research Institute on Contemporary
Southeast Asian Studies in Bangkok and a visiting academic at the Universiti
Brunei Darussalam, Brunei.
Harishankar K Sathyapalan is an Assistant Professor at School of Legal
Studies, CUSAT, Kochi and a Research Fellow (International Law & Dispute
Settlement) with the Centre for Public Policy Research (CPPR), India.
Him Raksmey is a Research Fellow at the Cambodian Institute for
Cooperation and Peace and a Lecturer at the Department of International
Studies, Institute of Foreign Languages, Royal University of Phnom Penh,
Cambodia.
Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is a Research Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways
to Progress Foundation and a member of the Board of Directors of the
Philippine Association for Chinese Studies, Quezon City CPO, Bicol,
Philippines.
Mukund V Narvenkar is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and
International relations at Goa University, India.
Sinderpal Singh is a Senior Fellow and Assistant Director of Institute of
Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) and Coordinator of South Asia
Programme, IDSS at S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS),
Singapore.
Siswanto Rusdi is the Founder and Director of the National Maritime Institute
(NAMARIN), an independent maritime think tank in Jakarta, Indonesia.
Vu Hai Dang is a Senior Research Fellow at Centre for International Law,
National University of Singapore.
vii
Foreword
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Australian Government

in 2020-2021 instituted the Australia India Indo Pacific Ocean Initiative
Partnership (AIIPOIP) grant to deliberate on the AIIPOI framework in the
region consisting of Australia, India and ASEAN. The grant was awarded
to Centre for Public Policy Research (CPPR), India, and Monash University,
Australia, in 2021 to organise an international conference on topics related
to security, trade, environment and spirit of cooperation as envisioned in
AIIPOI. As we prepared for the international conference, we were intrigued
by the voices of emerging scholars from the region. So, we hosted a round
table discussion in a hybrid format exclusively for these young scholars
titled 'IPOI Scholar Connect' to give them an opportunity to present and
deliberate on their views, outlook and concerns.
This publication compiles the papers written by the scholars after the
roundtable. The papers deal with security concerns, the region's
environmental challenges, soft power and cultural diplomacy. They document
the prospects and challenges in the region through the prism of youth
scholarship. It presents a bird's eye view of how the emerging leadership in
the region might look at the global theatre from the settings of AIIPOI.
This is a volume of scholarly research papers worth reading to understand

the future of AIIPOI from the perspectives of scholars of different
nationalities. They appreciate the aim, focus and efforts of AIIPOI and also
share their concerns for the present and future of the initiative.
I thank all the scholars for contributing to this publication. I also thank Dr
Vijay Sakhuja and Ms Anu Maria Francis for their efforts in editing and
compiling the papers and congratulate them on the publication.
D Dhanuraj PhD
April 23, 2023
viii
Introduction
India announced its Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) in November

2019 at the East Asia Summit. In the same year, ASEAN came up with the
ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). Similar Indo-Pacific strategies
were promoted by Japan, Australia and US during the period. These strategies
underlined the importance of partnerships for establishing a rule-based order
in the Indo-Pacific region. In the context of rising China, the geopolitical
strategies of ASEAN, India and Australia gain significance for fostering
and promoting peace and security in the region.
The Centre for Public Policy Research (CPPR), Kochi, India and Monash
University, Melbourne, Australia decided to come together to pool their
academic and policy research capacities to build a robust research agenda
on the Indo-Pacific. In March 2022, CPPR and Monash University hosted
'Dialogue on Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI): Strengthening
International Cooperation' in a hybrid (physical-digital) format. Scholars from
ASEAN, Australia, India and Japan were invited to discuss the various
pillars of the IPOI and accelerated long-term growth in the Indo-Pacific
region. The Dialogue was supported by the Department of Foreign Trade
(DFAT), Government of Australia.
One of the important sessions in the Dialogue was 'IPOI Scholars Connect'
in which scholars from ASEAN countries and India shared their perspectives
on the IPOI in the context of ASEAN, India and Australia. This digital
volume is a compilation of papers presented by these scholars that discuss
the existing geopolitical strategies of India and ASEAN and evaluate them
from different perspectives. Contemporary issues like marine plastic pollution,
maritime connectivity and smart ports are also discussed. It is hoped that
the volume will add to exciting scholarship on the subject and trigger policies
that contribute to peace, stability and development in the Indo-Pacific region.
Vijay Sakhuja
Anu Maria Francis
1
Indo-Pacific Perspectives : Australia, ASEAN and India
2
Chapter 1
ASEAN’S PERSPECTIVES ON THE

INDO-PACIFIC
Sinderpal Singh1
This paper makes three main points. The first will discuss the ASEAN
Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) as ASEAN’s official articulation of
the Indo-Pacific. The second point relates to the differences between various
Southeast Asian states in their individual approaches to the notion of the
Indo-Pacific. The last point speaks to how Southeast Asia will possibly
negotiate the Indo-Pacific in the near to medium future.
The AOIP, officially announced in 2019, is not a specific ASEAN vision or

strategy for the Indo-Pacific, nor is it, as some have suggested, an
endorsement of the notion of the Indo-Pacific by ASEAN. The AOIP has
three interrelated objectives.
The first is to be part of the conversation on the Indo-Pacific, given the

differing geographical scope and aims of various Indo-Pacific articulations,
even amongst countries that have embraced the term.
1
Sinderpal Singh is a Senior Fellow and Assistant Director of Institute of Defence and
Strategic Studies (IDSS) and Coordinator of South Asia Programme, IDSS at S
Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore
3
The second, related to the first, is to re-assert ASEAN centrality, specifically

in Southeast Asia, and, to a lesser extent, the broader East Asian region.
The aim is to re-state the centrality of ASEAN-led multilateralism in the
region via ASEAN-led institutions such as the East Asian Summit, the ASEAN
Regional Forum, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM
Plus) process.
Finally, the AOIP aims to relate various articulations of the Indo-Pacific by

different states to certain key ASEAN norms, principles and founding ideas.
A key part of this relates to ‘viewing the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean
regions, not as contiguous territorial spaces but as a closely integrated and
interconnected region, with ASEAN playing a central and strategic role’.2
The Asia-Pacific, a term accepted by all ASEAN states and major external
partners, remains ASEAN’s strategic region, not the Indo-Pacific, understood
as a single contiguous strategic space. The AOIP thus advocates against
the replacement of the older ‘Asia-Pacific’ with the newer, yet nebulous,
‘Indo-Pacific’.
The AOIP, being an ASEAN product, is borne out of consensus between

the various ASEAN member states. Consensus, in this case, does not mean
unanimity or complete agreement amongst the member states but rather an
agreement on a document arising from discussion amongst the member
states. Indonesia was one of the first countries to articulate the notion of
the Indo-Pacific as a distinct strategic space. In 2013, Indonesia’s then
foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, outlined an ‘Indonesian Perspective
on the Indo-Pacific’, arguing that the political and economic destinies of the
Indian and Pacific Oceans, long viewed as separate, were now intertwined
into a single Indo-Pacific region.
In that same speech in Washington DC, he proposed an Indo-Pacific treaty

on friendship and cooperation, modelled on ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation, first agreed in 1976. This Indonesian vision seemed to
2
Associaton of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-
Pacific (https://asean.org/asean2020/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ASEAN-Outlook-
on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf)
4
ASEAN’s Perspectives on the Indo-Pacific
complement Indonesia’s self-conception as a major maritime nation lying at

the intersection of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In 2014, Indonesia outlined
its own domestic ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’ vision, reflecting these self-
conceptions of Indonesia as an Indo-Pacific nation.
Indonesia’s enthusiasm for and advocacy of the Indo-Pacific idea has not
been matched by other ASEAN member states. This is unsurprising given
the differences in location and size between Indonesia and the other ASEAN
states. Indonesia’s foreign policy has a long-standing tension between its
global maritime aspirations, with the largest Muslim population in the world
and its role as a leading state within ASEAN. Its articulation of the Indo-
Pacific idea as an extension of its own domestic policy as well as its advocacy
within ASEAN reflect this tension. The remaining Southeast Asian states
view East Asia as their primary strategic region and have relatively less
interest in claiming any leading role outside this regional space. This applies
to the other two ASEAN members who are Indian Ocean littorals as well,
namely Malaysia and Singapore. In addition to stretching the region beyond
East Asia, ASEAN states also have two other trepidations about the Indo-
Pacific idea.
The first point is that ASEAN was not the first mover on the idea of Indo-
Pacific as a means to make sense of the regional security architecture, and
as a result, it became an idea-taker, and not an idea-leader.
Secondly, and related to the first point, China has viewed the Indo-Pacific
‘project’ as a means of limiting China’s influence in East Asia specifically.
This is not surprising given that the earliest and strongest advocates of the
Indo-Pacific idea, such as the United States, Japan, India and Australia, are
also members of the Quadrilateral Security Initiative (QUAD). For ASEAN,
therefore, the Indo-Pacific was already burdened with notions of great power
soft balancing strategies against China and thus went against a central tenet
of all, if not most, ASEAN members- to not have to choose a side when it
comes to China-US strategic competition.
ASEAN’s present agnostic stance towards the Indo-Pacific, however, is

probably likely to change in the medium to long term. There is a huge incentive
for Southeast Asian states to manoeuvre and leverage the multiple visions
5
and articulations of the Indo-Pacific to their advantage. Southeast Asia has

always thrived when no single external power or idea was hegemonic in
East Asia and ASEAN became the arbiter or manager of this multipolarity
within the region. In a similar manner, the Indo-Pacific visions of the QUAD
countries have important differences, especially amongst the US and Indian
visions of the Indo-Pacific, the latter mindful of the relative absence of the
Indian Ocean in the US’s Indo-Pacific strategies and visions. This disparity
allows ASEAN the opportunity to arbitrate and define the Indo-Pacific in a
manner that reinforces its centrality.
Two conditions are probably required for this to happen. The first is a
moderation of the strategic tensions between the US and China, and the
second is a re-definition of the ideational content and professed intent of an
Indo-Pacific regional security architecture. If strategic tensions between
the US and China continue to rise, Southeast Asian states will be less likely
to negotiate differing visions of the Indo-Pacific.
The Indian government’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) is a case in

point. The IPOI was meant to have various pillars and agendas driven by
countries that chose to lead in different areas, and was meant to seek out
the participation of ASEAN member states. Vietnam was viewed as a likely
participant, but to date, it has not officially joined the IPOI. More interestingly,
neither has Indonesia.
The reasons for these can be found in the AOIP. Southeast Asia, at this
point, does not seem comfortable crossing the Indo-Pacific Rubicon, but
this is unlikely to remain the case. The timing and manner of its crossing
will be dictated by one of the most significant puzzles within international
politics – how to deal with China?
6
Chapter 2
INDIA’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE
INDO-PACIFIC
Amruta Karambelkar1
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June

2018 is considered to be the articulation of India’s views on the Indo-Pacific.
Even earlier, India’s policy and projects in its maritime neighbourhood were
evident in the attention paid to the Indian Ocean small-island states. India’s
policy towards the Indo-Pacific is based on the principles of openness and
security, connectivity among countries, rule of law, regional stability, and
prosperity, wherein all countries are free to exercise their choice. It is an
extension of its ancient cultural and civilizational ties with the East, its
longstanding relations with Southeast Asia, its rising trade and strategic
footprint, and its willingness to act in a contemporary geopolitical setting.
India’s policy of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), its
ties with ASEAN states, its participation in multilateral fora like the
BIMSTEC, MGC, etc., with Japan, Korea, and the Pacific Island States, its
ties with Russia and China, and strategic partnerships with several countries
in the region – all reflect India’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-
Pacific for India, is a zone of regional cooperation and inclusivity. India has
FTAs with several nations in the Indo-Pacific, and the Indian Navy has
1
Amruta Karambelkar was a Research Associate with the Indo-Pacific cluster at the
Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), New Delhi. Currently she is pursuing
her PhD from Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, JNU
7
been conducting various bilateral and multilateral exercises in the Indo-
Pacific region. As the Indian economy grows, and the world begins to
integrate further, India’s priority is to build a region based on peace. The
Indo-Pacific is a natural region and presents great opportunities to cooperate
and collaborate.
The Indo-Pacific is a free, open and inclusive region consisting of resident
countries and those with stakes in the region. New Delhi envisions a peaceful
and prosperous Indo-Pacific. ASEAN is central to India’s Indo-Pacific policy.
India believes in equal access to the region’s resources, open, rules-based
trade regimes in tune with international law, and a balance between trade
and services. Connectivity is crucial for physical and human interactions.
However, the connectivity projects should be transparent, viable and
sustainable, based on trust. Further, the connectivity or infrastructure projects
should lead to national empowerment and not push countries into a debt
trap. India will support democracy and a rules-based international order.
India’s commitment to multilateralism is reflected in its foreign policy, as
follows:
India believes in the vision of an open, free, rules-based Indo-Pacific
region supported by inclusive global and regional institutions that
promote prosperous, stable and sovereign states on the basis of shared
interests.2
India is part of many bilateral and multilateral initiatives that promote common
weal in consonance with India’s Indo-Pacific policy. These are Security
and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative
(IPOI), the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), and the Indian Ocean
Naval Symposium (IONS). Initiatives in blue economy and maritime security
in the Indian Ocean Region, the Sagarmala Project, and policies towards
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands aim to strengthen the domestic maritime
sector. India’s Indo-Pacific approach is elaborated through the vision of
SAGAR; in other words, SAGAR guides New Delhi’s approach towards
both the Indian Ocean and the Indo-Pacific region.
India’s Views on the Changing Global Order
The world is now more globalised and interconnected than ever before, and
regional problems cannot be viewed as geographically disconnected, they
2
External Affairs Minister (EAM), India 2021
8
India’s Perspective on the Indo-Pacific
are a shared enterprise. The QUAD indicates a changing world, one that is
complex and where complex problems cannot be resolved by a single set of
relationships; therefore, a larger cooperative effort is necessary.3
The world balance is shifting; the top 20 economies of today are different
from those of 50 years ago. As the 5th4 largest economy, India has bigger
interests. India is preparing for greater responsibilities in tune with its growing
capacities and influence, shedding its erstwhile aversion to partnerships (due
to its colonial past). In a reverse trend of the past 25 years, the bulk of
India’s trade now takes place more in its east than in its west. India’s Act
East Policy and thereby its relations with ASEAN and Australia thus assume
greater significance.5
The Indo-Pacific will drive global growth in the future. It is witness to strategic
manoeuvres. Actions of a revisionist power are leading to the dominance of
sea lanes. There are a few destabilising factors in the Indo-Pacific:
information operations, debt traps, military assertions, and legal ambiguities.
In this context, working with all stakeholders becomes an important part of
India’s Indo-Pacific vision.
Developing nations require assistance, lack domestic capacity, and hence
turn to foreign support. There is a need to establish a credible alternative
and explore multiple financial assistance options. The other serious problem
in the Indo-Pacific is the unilateral action of territory-grabbing and
incrementally changing facts on the ground through dubious interpretations
of international law.6 Developments in Europe raise questions about the
stability of international order7 and hence India’s focus on its neighbourhood
and regional organisations will become even more prominent.
Perception of Maritime Security
Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) countries had to do more for themselves in the
last decade because of fewer resources and capabilities. Hence, intra-
3
EAM remarks at Australia-India Institute, Melbourne, February 2022 https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=irizUW4s_vU
4
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/09/india-uk-fifth-largest-economy-world
5
Ibid.
6
CNS speech, Indo-Pacific Regional Dialogue (IPRD) 2019.
7
Prime Minister’s remarks at the BIMSTECS ummit, 2022.
9
regional capabilities need to come into play. India envisages a democratised
response to maritime challenges, which means it wants IOR nations to
develop capabilities of their own and that ‘help’ should not come just from
one (American) source.8
The Indian Navy plays an important role in the Indo-Pacific in terms of
enhancing regional efforts through individual and collective actions, optimising
response, and sharing best practices. The Indian Navy’s cooperative security
strategy is aligned with SAGAR. India’s plan of action9 could be: (a)
establishing partnerships with maritime neighbours; (b) enhancing
transparency and maritime domain awareness for all regional stakeholders;
(c) establishing maritime zones; (d) continuing engagement with like-minded
countries to share information through logistical agreements; (e) maintaining
a sustained, effective, and capable Indian presence wherever required in
the region; and (f) training regional navies for inter-operability across regions.
Security and management of the maritime domain require collective efforts.
The maritime domain provides opportunities for regional connectivity; people-
to-people connectivity; and maritime connectivity (Indo-Pacific maritime
continuity). From a commercial point of view, or to address the problem of
rationalising connectivity projects, the best return on investment in
connectivity projects would be achieved by aligning sub-regional, regional,
and national efforts and maximising the value accrued from each level. It is
important to take regional aspirations into account, but business practices
should not impinge on national sovereignty.
Opportunities in Blue Economy
As a maritime geographical space, there is immense potential for the
development of a Blue Economy in the Indo-Pacific, but very few in the
region have the necessary capabilities. Therefore, it is necessary to develop
skills and capacities across the region that allow nations to expand their
maritime footprint in a sustainable manner. Maritime powers can form valuable
partnerships to meet the needs of regional countries and yield profitable
outcomes. (e.g., generate employment in the age of Automation.) India is
committed to cooperation in the blue economy.10
8
Op.Cit. Melbourne
9
Op.Cit. IPRD, 2019.
10
Prime Minister’s remarks with the incoming delegation from Seychelles in 2018.
10
Annexe
India’s Policy Initiatives in the Indo-Pacific
India’s
Initiatives Blue
in the Indo- SAGAR IPOI IONS Sagarmala
Pacific Economy
Policy
Attributes Security and Complement Voluntary and India’s blue Development

Growth for ASEAN-led inclusive economy of ports as
All in the mechanisms initiative to comprises well as port-
Region but not bring together entire ocean led
(SAGAR) is remain navies of IOR resources and development.
India’s vision restricted by littorals. manmade Ambitious
for the Indian them.Cohesive Cooperative economic programme
Ocean Indian forum to infrastructure to bring
Region. approach to discuss in marine, about a step
‘SAGAR’ is existing common maritime and change in
in consonance partnerships maritime offshore India’s
with India’s (Association issues.Aims coastal logistics
‘Act East of Southeast to achieve a activities sector.
Policy’ and Asian greater flow within the Unlock the
the nation’s Nations, of country’s full potential
diplomatic, Indian Ocean information legal of India’s
economic and Rim amongst jurisdiction. waterways
military Association, naval India has a and
outreach in Ayeyawady- professionals coastline of coastline.The
the region. Chao to arrive at a 7500 km. 2/ aim is to
(GOI, Phraya- uniform 29 states are reduce the
2018)Indian Mekong understanding coastal states. cost of
Navy’s anti- Economic and common 1382 domestic and
piracy Cooperation regional islands199 EXIM cargo.
operations, Strategy, response to ports; 12 Estimated
its force Mekong- maritime major ports cost savings
deployment Ganga issues. handle are ¹ 35,000 -
in key Cooperation, Facilitate the approx. 1400 40,000
regions, East Asia generation of million crores/year, a
mission Summit, mutually- tonnes of contribution
readiness in Asia-Europe beneficial cargo/ to GDP
the event of Meeting. maritime year.India’s growth by
wide-ranging security EEZ is 2 2%.The
contingencies, outcomes. 36 million sq. outlay for
complex navies of the km. 802 projects
military IOR are part - ¹ 5.53 lakh
exercises, and of IONS. crores. 29/
the 802 projects
11
India’s
Initiatives Blue
Pacific Economy
Policy
establishment completed so
of IFC-IOR far.Increase
are part of in cargo
the initiative. handling
capacity by
80 million
tonnes. (42%
since 2014)
Revamped
communi-
cation
system to
eliminate
delays and
duplication
of
documents.
Focus Safeguard Go beyond Working Policy draft Reducing the

Areas India’s non- groups on: on Blue cost of
mainland and traditional Maritime Economy in transporting
islands.Ensure maritime Security February domestic
a safe, stable issues to the Humanitarian 2021.The cargo by
and secure larger Assistance policy optimising
Indian Ocean maritime and identifies the the modal
for regional domain. Disaster blue economy mix∙Lowering
prosperity. Maritime Relief as a multiplier logistics cost
Deepen security Information of economic of bulk
economic and principal sharing and growth.Centred commodities
security theme. Create interoperabi- around by locating
partnerships a sustainable lity sustainability future
with IOR and peaceful and the socio- industrial
littorals.C environment. economic capacities
ontribute to Multilateral well-being of near the
the capacity focus on its people. coast.
building and maritime Focus areas ∙Improving
economic security, and are:National export
growth of safety; marine account competitive-
IOR littorals. focus is a key framework ness by
Respond to pillar. India for the blue developing
Humanitarian has pledged economy and port-
12
India’s
Initiatives Blue
Pacific Economy
Policy
Assistance to end the ocean proximate

and Disaster use of single- governance. discrete
Relief use plastic. Coastal manufacturing
situations marine spatial clusters.∙
and utilise its planning and Optimizing
assets. tourism.Marine time/cost of
fisheries, EXIM
aquaculture container
and fish movement.
processing. Components
Manufactu- of Sagarmala
ring, emerging are as
technologies, follows: Port
trade, skill Modernization
development, & New Port
etc.Logistics, Development
shipping and Port-linked
infrastructure Industrialization
development. Coastal
Coastal and Community
deep-sea Development
mining and Coastal
offshore Shipping &
energy. Inland
Security, Waterways
strategic Transport
dimensions
and
international
engagement.
Nodal Whole of Launched by Indian Navy Ministry of Ministry of

Agency govern-ment India, but an Earth Shipping
approach. open global Sciences
initiative.
Year of 2015 4 November 2008 February 2014
Establish- 2019 2021
ment/
Promulga-
tion
13
References:
IONS
Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India., 12 November

2018. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1552527 [Accessed 9 April 2022]
About IONS, Indian Navy, 2012. https://www.ions.global [Accessed 9 April 2022]
36 Member Nations, 1 Shared Vision: What is the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium?, India
Today, 14 November 2018. https://www.indiatoday.in/education-today/gk-current-affairs/
story/ions-indian-ocean-naval-symposium-1387711-2018-11-14 [Accessed 9 April 2022]
IONS 10th Anniversary Celebrations to Commence Today, The Indian Navy, 12 November
2018. https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/ions-10th-anniversary-celebrations-
commence-today [Accessed 10 April 2022]
SAGAR and IPOI
Prime Minister's Speech at Seychelles, 7 February 2016. https://www.narendramodi. in /

pm-modi-at-the-international-fleet-review-2016-in-visakhapatnam-andhra-pradesh-413019
[Accessed 8 April 2022]
Address by External Affairs Minister at the 2nd Indian Ocean Conference, August 31,
2017. https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/28907/address+by+external
+affairs+minister+at+the+2nd+indian+ocean+conference+ august+31+2017 [Accessed 8
April 2022]
Address by Secretary (East) at the Virtual Seminar on Connectivity Cooperation for a Free,
Open and Inclusive Indo-Pacific, 18 March 2021. https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-
Statements.htm?dtl/33680/Address+by+Secretary+East+at+the+ Virtual+Seminar+on+
Connectivity+Cooperation+for+a+Free+Open+and+ Inclusive+IndoPacific [ Accessed 9
April 2022]
Mishra Rahul,2021 Indo-Pacific Oceans' Initiative: Providing Institutional Framework to

the Indo-Pacific Region, RIS https://aei.um.edu.my/img/files/AIC%20commentary%
20No%2020%20August%202021%20final.pdf
G. Padmaja, 2018 Revisiting 'SAGAR' - India's Template for Cooperation in the Indian
Ocean Region, National Maritime Foundation. https://maritimeindia.org/revisiting-sagar-
indias-template-for-cooperation-in-the-indian-ocean-region/ [Accessed 9 April 2022]
14
Sagarmala
Devanjana Nag, 2021 'Smart Ports, Digitization & More! Sagarmala Programme to Boost
India's Coastal Economy', Financial Express
Sagarmala: Cargo Handling up by 42 Per Cent, Smart Ports, Revamp of Communications

System Amongst Major Achievements, Swarajya, 31 December 2021. https://
swarajyamag.com/insta/sagarmala-cargo-handling-up-by-42-per-cent-smart-ports-revamp-
of-communications-system-amongst-major-achievements
Blue Economy
P.Manoj, 2022, All about India's Blue Economy, The Hindu Business Line. https://
www.thehindubusinessline.com/blexplainer/bl-explainer-all-about-indias-blue-economy/
article65076459.ece
Press Information Bureau, 17 February 2021. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm. aspx?

PRID=1698608
Lok Sabha unstarred question no 4113, Government of India. https://moes.gov.in/sites/

default/files/LS-USQ-No-4113-Eng_0.pdf
INCOIS, Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government of India. https://moes.gov.in/node/3069
PIB, 3 February 2021. https://moes.gov.in/sites/default/files/PIB1795031_1.pdf
INCOIS, Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government of India. https://moes.gov.in/node/3069
15
16
Chapter 3
UNDERSTANDING STRATEGIC CONTOURS OF

INDIA’S PERSPECTIVE ON INDO-PACIFIC
Dr Mukund V Narvenkar1
Indo-Pacific has emerged as a strategic game-changer in the international

structure in contemporary international relations. This international structure
is dominated by an existing superpower, the US, and at the same time, there
is a rise of a belligerent new contender, China. The advent of China, along
with its military might and economic rise, has sent a static tremor in the
world. The Chinese have shown a total disregard for the rule of law and the
early signs have been felt in the South China Sea region. The change in
Beijing’s behaviour was anticipated and there is a possibility of a rise of a
new world order dominated by China. China has certainly become a power
centre and is determined to play a dominating role in 21st-century international
relations.
Aspiring regional powers like India have been caught up in the structural
transformation in the region. It has been observed that the micro-regional
level of Southeast Asia and the macro-level of the Indo-Pacific are influenced
by the USA. For India, China’s rise is a manifestation and has implications
1
Assistant Professor of Political Science and International relations at Goa University,
Goa
17
for its national interest. Recent border skirmishes in the Himalayan region
are one example. Furthermore, the rise of Chinese maritime forces and
their growing presence in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the proximity of
India’s exclusive economic zone in the Andaman Sea has raised serious
security concerns for India. This also means that India is caught up
strategically at its two geographical extremes, making it imperative for India
to act now.
Meanwhile, India’s strategic shift from its Look East Policy to Act East
Policy has enabled it to engage with the prolific region in its east in promoting
economic cooperation, and cultural ties, and developing a strategic
relationship with countries of the Indo-Pacific region. This is based on a
steady foundation of two decades of its earlier version of the Look East
Policy which laid the foundation of India’s political, economic, and strategic
engagement with Southeast Asia.
The major turning point in this engagement was India’s Free Trade
Agreement with ASEAN. This agreement has empowered India to engage
with ASEAN and paved the way for the creation of one of the world’s
largest free trade areas. Since 2010 the value of trade between India and
the ASEAN has amounted to over USD 78 billion in the fiscal year 2021
(Statista Research Department, 2022).
Furthermore, the confluence of the two seas and its strategic significance
in economic and maritime matters has bolstered India’s bilateral relations
with Japan, the US, and Australia. In addition, the Quadrilateral Cooperation
[QUAD] between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – all
democracies and vibrant economies is working on a far broader programme,
which includes tackling maritime security, economic development, and the
strategic need for a free and open Indo-Pacific.
For India, the Indo-Pacific is of strategic importance for its economic

development and maritime connectivity. It is one of the largest geographic
spaces that stretches from the east coast of Africa to the west coast of the
United States of America. Between these lie 10 members of the ASEAN
regional group that connects the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. India’s
conception of the Indo-Pacific lies in its most valued perception of
18
Understanding Strategic Contours of India’s Perspective on Indo-Pacific
inclusiveness, openness, and the unity and centrality of ASEAN. Besides

this, India’s active participation in various forums such as the Indian Ocean
Rim Association (IORA), the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Defence
Ministers Meeting Plus, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Bay of Bengal
Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
(BIMSTEC), the Mekong Ganga Economic Corridor (MGEC), and the
Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC) shows India’s
commitment to the core values of inclusivity and openness in the Indo-
Pacific.
At the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore on June 1, 2018, Prime Minister

Narendra Modi outlined India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific region. India
called for a free, open, and inclusive order in the Indo-Pacific, based on
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, peaceful
resolutions of disputes through the process of dialogue, and obedience to
international rules and laws. This perspective and vision are based on the
principle of ASEAN centrality.
On November 4, 2019, at the East Asia Summit, Prime Minister Narendra

Modi launched the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) in Bangkok,
Thailand. It was an open global initiative focused on seven central pillars of
maritime security, maritime ecology, maritime resources, capacity building
and resource sharing, disaster risk reduction and management, science,
technology and academic cooperation, trade connectivity and maritime
transport.
Certainly, the emergence of the concept of the Indo-Pacific and its strategic
significance has enabled nation-states to redefine their perspective. The
US pivot to Asia and the rise of China have put the entire Indo-Pacific in
the strategic limelight. In this evolving and changing international scenario,
India, along with Australia, enjoys a geostrategic position that gives them a
vantage point. From this standpoint, it is pertinent to witness the importance
of India and Australia as middle-level powers and more so in balancing and
maintaining the multilateral balance of power in Southeast Asia.
Further, India and Australia have raised concerns about the Chinese
assertiveness in the region. Their concerns are valid given the evolving
19
dynamics and their possible impact on the Indo-Pacific. Therefore,

cooperation with the regional powers of Southeast Asia at the bilateral and
multilateral fora is a necessity. This would also help to ensure that no one
power exercises a hegemonic influence in the region.
In this context, India and Australia have a common strategic understanding

of the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, the Australia-India Indo-Pacific Oceans
Initiative Partnership (AIIPOIP) will help shape maritime cooperation in
the Indo-Pacific to support an open, inclusive, resilient, prosperous, and
rules-based maritime order. Alongside this, India’s and Australia’s
commitment to supporting ASEAN certainly brings multilateral balance to
the strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.
Amidst the ongoing geopolitical and geostrategic contest in the Indo-Pacific,

AIIPOIP is a ray of hope for bringing much-needed stability and promoting
strategic multilateral balance, economic development, and a constructive
alternative for peace and prosperity in the region. Moreover, the 2+2
Ministerial Dialogue between the two countries and the recent Free Trade
Agreement are truly watershed moments between the two partners.
India and Australia stand at the crossroads of structural change and evolving
power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. The ongoing competition and change
in US-China relations have forced the two nations to evaluate the utility of
the current political and security framework in the region. Therefore, it has
created space for the reassessment of the contemporary regional security
apparatus. In this context, ASEAN centrality has a significant role to play.
China, on the other hand, will continue to rush to influence the region.
Moreover, the rapid rise of China, its aspirations, and its dominant role will
shape the course of events. Therefore, AIIPOIP must have a holistic dialogue
and strengthen international cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.
20
Chapter 4
ASEAN’S ROLE IN
MAINTAINING A SECURE AND
PROSPEROUS INDO-PACIFIC
Sumathy Permal and Alif Imran Hidayat1
Southeast Asia is embracing rapid change in terms of its economy and

influence in balancing the rise of great powers. For Southeast Asia, prosperity
and security are the key determiners of peace and stability in the Indo-
Pacific’s maritime domain. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) emphasises its unity and centrality, openness and inclusiveness,
and respect for international law.
ASEAN is also a key influencer in the evolving geopolitics of Asia and the
wider Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific concept has been dealt with delicately
by the different ASEAN member states; however, some states have shifted
their attention to focusing on bilateral ties rather than investing in multilateral
efforts. As such, the mood toward pursuing Indo-Pacific cooperation is
losing momentum in Southeast Asia. A key challenge ahead is the lack of
1
Alif Imran Hidayat is a Maritime Security and Diplomacy Researcher at the Maritime
Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) and Sumathy Permal is a Senior Researcher with the
Centre for the Straits of Malacca(MIMA), Kaula Lumpur.
21
push on how the region could cooperate between the different Indo-Pacific
partners.
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, it explores the underlying factors
behind the Indo-Pacific’s lack of momentum from Southeast Asian states.
Next, the analysis looks at the shift of the global economy towards the East
and the challenges ahead for an Indo-Pacific-focused economy. Finally, the
article focuses on the lack of a functional approach in the Indo-Pacific
region.
There is a lack of momentum from the Southeast Asian states in the Indo-
Pacific, both conceptually and in terms of practicality. The Indo-Pacific is
characterised by a general sense of insecurity coming from the great power
rivalry; thus, Southeast Asian countries are trying to prevent the region
from falling into an insecurity trap. This sense of insecurity is further
exacerbated by the rise of non-traditional security threats, which in turn
have taken a toll on global affairs. Both the insecurity of the region and
non-traditional security threats have had a significant impact on how
countries have realigned their national, regional, and global priorities.
The Biden administration has promoted the Indo-Pacific as a key component

of its foreign policy, with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) being
used as an important vessel for its strategy. President Joe Biden, together
with other members of the Quad, holds a firm view that the distribution of
power in the world is changing and thus creating new threats. To the United
States (US), the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the only competitor
capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological
strengths to mount a sustained challenge to the stable and open international
order. While it could be a valid concern for the United States, it may not
necessarily impose similar security threats on others, including those from
Southeast Asia. While there have been some prominent security issues in
the South China Sea, many Southeast Asian countries have benefited from
the rise of Asia’s power in terms of their economies, politics, and values.
During the CSIS International Security Program – Transition 46 (2021)
series, a view was shared that a single-minded country threat will only
create insecurity and lead to an unsustainable regional order. The notion of
22
ASEAN’s Role in Maintaining a Secure and Prosperous Indo-Pacific
viewing the PRC as a hegemonic competitor destabilises the region and

creates divisions, which leads to greater bipolarization. The European Union
(EU) member states have promoted their inclusive Indo-Pacific strategies,
where they don’t necessarily have similar threat perceptions as the US.
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK) have communicated the
importance of the Indo-Pacific to promote open maritime passage. However,
these countries are also increasingly positioning a strategic approach based
on the PRC as either a ‘strategic threat’ or a ‘systematic competitor’. This
could be detrimental to building momentum among smaller states, including
Malaysia. Dr Kuik (2008) had established that smaller states are not
bandwagoning but rather adopting a ‘middle’ position that is best described
as ‘hedging’. Hedging strategies become more prevalent in times of
uncertainty, like during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The power contest between the US and the PRC has been ongoing for
more than a decade. The US has had a consistent approach to the rising
power as the PRC declares a peaceful rise in terms of its status and
aspirations. Nevertheless, the rivalry intensified under US President Donald
Trump. The rivalry peaked as the COVID-19 pandemic spread across the
world, with the Trump administration labelling it a ‘Chinese virus’ and
ushering in a new level of anti-Chinese sentiment. However, the power
rivalry between the dominant US and a rising China will continue. Kishore
Mahbubani, an expert on Asian and international affairs, believes that it is
important to understand that the dispute between the US and China is a
multidimensional contest covering economic, political, military, and cultural
aspects (Kwek 2020). In the post-COVID-19 era, this rivalry will continue
in many other areas. The dilemma faced by Southeast Asian states is that
while they may want to develop influence in the Indo-Pacific, ASEAN and
Southeast Asian countries want to maintain constructive engagement with
China.
The global economy has been shifting from the West to the East, with Asia
becoming the new centre of gravity. According to a study by the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, China’s share of global output was
14% during the 1950s and rose to 34% in 1998 (Pettis, 2021). China’s global
output is expected to rise to 44% in 2030. Furthermore, in the aftermath of
23
COVID-19, the US and countries in Europe have been facing a downward

trend in economic growth when compared to countries in the East. In the
second quarter of 2020, US Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell to 9.1%
and Europe fell to approximately 11.8%. However, in the fourth quarter of
2021, US GDP grew by 6.9%, and in the third quarter of 2021, the EA-19
grew by 3.9% (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2022; Eurostat, 2022). The
change is also coupled with the severe impact on the world economy that is
happening at a different pace.
Emerging markets and developing economies have been severely affected;
however, the PRC and Vietnam have enjoyed strong growth in 2021. In
2020 and 2021, Vietnam was able to maintain growth in each quarter, with
the country experiencing 5.64% GDP growth in the second quarter of 2021
(2022). The PRC dipped 6.8% in the first quarter of 2020 before enjoying
relative GDP growth before the lockdowns in Shanghai and many parts of
the country in 2022. The PRC enjoyed 18.3% GDP growth in the first
quarter of 2021 (2022).
A report by the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) (2021) suggested
that the future largest economies of the world are concentrated in Asia:
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. In addition, trade
within Asia is also greater than trade between Asia and the rest of the
world. The PRC holds a large economic advantage over many countries in
Southeast Asia. In this respect, US-China economic competition only forces
states to take individual stances to avoid the economic trap.
The signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)

on November 15, 2020, amid the global fight against the COVID-19
pandemic, is a demonstration of Asia’s economic growth. The PRC is
promoting regional integration through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
and forming strong partnerships with Southeast Asia. The RCEP is expected
to increase cooperation among its partners in the economy, public safety,
and health. However, although RCEP is a multilateral agreement, the
withdrawal of India and rejection by the US indicate a trend towards de-
globalisation. A highly globalised world economy is slipping into the grips of
protectionism. The post-pandemic world economy seems to be less globalised,
24
as the politics of nations do not show any bent towards openness. In this
scenario, economic integration among and within the Indo-Pacific is faced
with obstacles.
Finally, the Indo-Pacific region has been concentrated on the great-power
narrative and has lacked a functional approach. Although the Indo-Pacific
region has become the main policy guidance for Indo-Pacific states, it has
yet to provide responsive measures in the case of conflict escalation. There
has been no formal engagement except for the QUAD, which is focused
on strategic competition.
Malaysia and Australia’s bilateral relations can demonstrate the strength of
middle powers in cooperating to maintain a stable Indo-Pacific. Malaysia
and Australia are Comprehensive Strategic Partners; furthermore, they are
both members of the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA). The armed
forces of both states, including the navies and air forces, participate in military
exercises together under the Malaysia-Australia Joint Defence Programme,
and hopefully, in the future, this cooperation can delve into intelligence sharing
and cyber-defence capabilities. Moreover, both countries are members of
the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP).
Malaysia and India have a close relationship; the two established diplomatic
relations in 1957. The two states have regularly engaged in summit-level
exchanges and meetings; furthermore, Malaysia established close relations
with India through ASEAN-India summits. Both countries are comprehensive
economic partners, and with the signing of the Malaysia-India
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA), Malaysia is
also a large investor in Indian companies. Malaysia and India signed the
Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation in 1993, leading
to both states holding defence cooperation meetings regularly. Service talks
and regular exchange visits from the Chiefs of the Army and Navies of
both countries demonstrate this strong relationship. India also participates
in the cooperative mechanism on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and
in International Maritime Organisation (IMO) projects in the straits for
navigational safety and environmental protection. Lastly, the Indian and
Malaysian Navies participate in the Milan Exercises, which are held every
two years. Malaysia and India’s bilateral relations have recently hit a dark
25
patch but have been overcome and are developing into a more cooperative
arrangement. In recent years, there has been growth in cooperation in the
manufacturing of defence products.
Both India and Australia have endorsed ASEAN’s centrality and ASEAN-
led mechanisms like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia
Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting Plus
(ADMM+). These mechanisms provide the best platform to tackle issues
in the region and reinvigorate multilateral cooperation. Maritime cooperation
should expand beyond traditional security and defence fields and look towards
issues of connectivity, economy, and environment. Unfortunately, the
strategies of some Indo-Pacific states doubt the competence of the PRC as
a cooperative partner and instead focus on containing the state. China has
been accused of harassing the hydrocarbon operations of other claimants in
the contested South China Sea to halt unilateral hydrocarbon activities and
push these states into entering joint exploration with the PRC (Pitlo III
2020). ASEAN-led mechanisms, especially the ARF and the EAS, include
all the major powers in the Indo-Pacific. It strengthens ASEAN’s centrality,
and ASEAN-led initiatives are effective in engaging and building trust
between major powers to de-escalate tensions centred on ASEAN norms
and principles.
The Way Forward
The ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) has emphasised that ASEAN
should be central in the Indo-Pacific. ASEAN is optimistic that the Indo-
Pacific could increase efforts to promote cooperation among various
countries. This narrative received support and endorsement from Indo-Pacific
proponents, and it was reiterated again at the QUAD Ministers meeting.
Despite the lack of advancements on the three issues raised in regard to the
Indo-Pacific region, there is optimism that the Indo-Pacific can keep countries
open, reject disorderly unilateral policies, and promote collaborations in terms
of capacities to respond to health emergencies, infrastructure, connectivity,
and keeping the rules-based order. Many multilateral arrangements have
the potential to build positive momentum in the region, particularly in the
distribution of vaccines, keeping the supply chain going, investment and
26
infrastructure development, advancing strategic partnerships, and preserving

the rules-based order.
Malaysia has built strong relations with the middle powers in the Indo-Pacific.
Japan and Malaysia are great partners in terms of promoting a cohesive
and rules-based Indo-Pacific, especially in areas of soft connectivity, and
infrastructure in the maritime domain, and cooperating in a joint capacity to
strengthen the rule of law. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
between Malaysia and Australia, signed in January 2021, increased
consultation and cooperation in terms of strategic issues, paid greater attention
to the importance of multilateral cooperation, and ensured that multilateral
institutions were effective and accountable. Moving together in a spirit of
cooperation ensures that Malaysia, as a maritime nation, continues to play
its role as an important economic, environmental, and social hub serving the
local, regional, and international communities.
Although India and Malaysia have hit a slight bump in recent times, both
countries continue to enjoy strong economic and military cooperation. The
maritime domain is a strong component of both countries’ foreign strategic
aims. The two countries enjoy favourable collaboration in their respective
navies and coast guards; however, further cooperation when facing non-
traditional security threats is an area that can continue to build trust and
information sharing.
The Indo-Pacific region should go beyond the United States and China’s
great-power rivalry narrative; in addition, the formulation of an Indo-Pacific
framework should not rest entirely on the major powers. The smaller and
middle powers in the Indo-Pacific should step up to sustain the international
rules-based order. Policymakers from these countries should explore ways
to cooperate on responsive measures if an escalation of conflict were to
ever happen. Furthermore, the Indo-Pacific concept should divert away
from the issue of strategic competition and focus on more pressing issues
such as reviving both economic and human security in the region. Pursuing
these non-traditional security issues will help the Indo-Pacific gain
momentum among Southeast Asian and Indo-Pacific states.
27
References:
“China GDP Annual Growth Rate”. 2022. Trading Economics. https://tradingeconomics.com/

china/gdp-growth-annual
“Defense 360 Transition 46”. 2021. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https:/
/www.csis.org/programs/international-security-program/transition46.
“Gross Domestic Product”. 2022. Bureau of Economic Analysis. https://www.bea.gov/

data/gdp/gross-domestic-product.
“Quarterly National Accounts - GDP And Employment”. 2022. Eurostat. https://

ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title= Quarterly_national_ accounts_
-_GDP_and_employment#Quarterly_GDP_growth.
“Vietnam Economic Growth, Percent Change in Quarterly Real GDP, December, 2021”.
2022. The Global Economy. https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Vietnam/gdp_growth/.
Cainey, Andrew. 2021. “The UK And The CPTTP: Creating an Asian Option for The
Future”. Royal United Service Institute. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/
commentary/uk-and-cpttp-creating-asian-option-future.
Cheng-Chwee, Kuik. 2008. “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response
to A Rising China”. Contemporary Southeast Asia 30 (2): 159-185. doi:10.1355/cs30-2a.
Kwek, Rachel. 2022. “Why ASEAN Should Be on The Fence and On Our Toes”. IS
Chartered Accountant Journal, 2022. https://journal.isca.org.sg/2020/01/17/why-asean-
should-be-on-the-fence-and-on-our-toes/pugpig_index.html.
Pettis, Michael. 2021. “China Financial Markets”. Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancialmarkets/.
28
Chapter 5
PROMOTING PEACE AND

PROSPERITY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC:
THE POSITIVE ROLES OF ASEAN,
AUSTRALIA AND INDIA
Him Raksmey1
In recent years, there has been an increasing focus on the Indo-Pacific.

Many prominent players have come up with their own frameworks and
strategies concerning the region. Three of them are ASEAN, Australia and
India.
While different in details and strategic standpoints, the three share, among
other things, the common desire for peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific,
which is well emphasised in their respective strategic documents. All of
them share concerns about some regional challenges that have broader
strategic implications not only for themselves but for the region as a whole.
In these challenging times, it is important that the trio step up their collective
efforts to play positive roles in managing key regional issues to further
promote peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.
1
Him Raksmey is a Research Fellow at the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and
Peace; and Researcher at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, and Lecturer at the
Department of International Relations, Institute for International Studies and Public
Policy, Royal University of Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
29
Among the common challenges faced by the trio, the major cause for concern
is the US-China rivalry. The competition between the two superpowers has
intensified and become more and more confrontational, spanning almost all
major spheres, including political security, diplomacy, trade, defence and
technology. Washington DC and Beijing have become more hostile, and the
two have regularly traded insults.
The US-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific is dangerous as the two tend to

have fixed views on how the region should be run in general and how issues
such as the Mekong, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Cross-
Strait, and the Korean Peninsula should be addressed in particular. With
their massive military and economic might, any staunch differences on these
regional issues can lead to strategic miscalculations that might result in all-
out armed conflicts if not managed properly.
The second cause for concern is the decline of multilateralism in recent

years. Regional and international bodies such as ASEAN and the UN have
found it difficult to find effective solutions to address ongoing issues such
as the Myanmar Crisis, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and other armed conflicts
and humanitarian crises in many parts of the world. It should be noted that
in many of these cases, considerable commitment to address these issues
on the basis of relevant international laws and norms has been shown by a
number of responsible members of the international community, but to no
avail. It raises questions as to the reasons and what can be done to reform
multilateral bodies and restore confidence in multilateralism. But ASEAN,
Australia and India should, in terms of words and actions, aspire to be strong
proponents of multilateralism. Multilateralism, imperfect as it may be, is by
far a more viable option for the trio in helping maintain peace and prosperity
in the region than other options, especially the one where “might is right”.
The third cause for concern is finding ways to prepare for the post-Covid-
19 scenario. For the past two years, Covid-19 has negatively impacted the
world, taking millions of lives, infecting hundreds of millions, changing ways
of living, and putting a strain on the political, economic, and social fabric of
many countries. Indo-Pacific ASEAN, Australia and India are no exceptions
to this. Recovery from such a large-scale pandemic will not be an easy task
30
The Positive Roles of ASEAN, Australia and India
and will require well-coordinated national, regional and international efforts.

Priority should be given to boosting the vaccination rate, discovering safe,
possible ways for countries in the region to reopen their economies, and
strengthening the infrastructure to prepare for future pandemics. More
attention should be given to areas to establish protocols for intra-regional
cooperation in the healthcare sector, including establishing a regional
pandemic data and information exchange centre, supporting healthcare
investments, and strengthening the implementation of a more comprehensive
social security system, especially in less developed countries in the region.
To further promote the common desire for peace and prosperity in the Indo-
Pacific, it is important that ASEAN, Australia and India make combined
efforts to address these regional challenges and beyond. Each one of the
trios should have more comprehensive strategic views on their regional
interests. Their views should take into account their long-term interests. In
the short term, they should concretely operationalize their written strategies
and put them into practise to bring real deliverables to the ground that are
helpful to managing peaceful relations in the Indo-Pacific. In the medium
and long term, the three should actively seek consultations with each other
to come up with strategies that are more coordinated and synergized
between their respective national and regional interests.
Amidst the ongoing rivalry between the US and China, ASEAN, Australia
and India should continue to constructively engage with the two superpowers.
The trio should not attempt to pit one superpower against another. Given
ASEAN’s position, the regional bloc can serve as a mediator to bridge gaps
of trust between the US and China in order to encourage the two superpowers
to identify and establish some ground rules for engagements and de-
escalations in issues of mutual concern in the region. This can only be done
if Washington DC and Beijing agree to ask ASEAN to do so, and ASEAN
itself agrees to take up this challenging task. Australia and India should
support and encourage ASEAN to undertake this positive mediating role.
ASEAN, Australia and India should enhance their activities to support and
strengthen multilateralism. The three should try to find a common voice
among themselves on various issues in the international forum and work
31
jointly to gather support and resources in order to address those issues. The
trio should boldly take up challenges to lead efforts in reforming various
international institutions to make them more responsive to issues of mutual
concern. While this is a long process and requires a lot of resources and
patience, it is important that the three start the process.
The trio should advocate establishing a more resilient regional protection

system for future pandemics post-Covid-19. Protocols should be put in place
for intra-regional cooperation in the healthcare sector, including establishing
a regional pandemic data and information centre, supporting healthcare
investments, and strengthening the comprehensive social security system,
especially in less developed countries in the region.
32
Chapter 6
ASEAN + 2 COOPERATION IN MARINE

PLASTIC WASTE:
PRAGMATIC SUGGESTIONS TO KICK OFF
ASEAN-AUSTRALIA-INDIA’S INDO-PACIFIC
COOPERATION
Vu Hai Dang1
Introduction
ASEAN’s Outlook for the Indo-Pacific, Australia’s strategies for the Indo-
Pacific (namely Australia’s Defence White Paper, 2016, Foreign Policy
White Paper, 2017, and Defence Update, 2018), and India’s Indo-Pacific
Oceans Initiative have many commonalities. These strategies aim to build a
peaceful, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. They also put emphasis
on regional cooperation with other countries for their implementation.
In terms of areas for cooperation, both ASEAN’s Outlook for the Indo-
Pacific and India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative put a focus on maritime
security, marine resources and environment, science and technology, trade,
1
Senior Research Fellow, Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore.
33
and connectivity. Meanwhile, Australia’s Foreign Policy White Paper, 2017,

seems to emphasise security and trade as the main cooperation areas in the
Indo-Pacific that Australia will pursue.
This paper provides pragmatic suggestions for ASEAN, Australia, and India
to start their trilateral Indo-Pacific cooperation in three aspects: (a)
Institutional Arrangements; (b) Issues of Trilateral Convergence; and (c)
Cooperative Measures. It also argues for the implementation of a cooperative
activity relating to marine plastic waste in the Bay of Bengal as a concrete
and practical first step to kick off the initiative.
Institutional Arrangement
ASEAN should take the lead in facilitating trilateral meetings. This is

consistent with the principle of strengthening ASEAN centrality as stated in
its Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Under its Dialogue Partnership mechanism,
ASEAN has been able to develop a system of periodic bilateral meetings
with both Australia and India, many of which are relevant to maritime issues.
These range from Heads of Government or Chiefs of State-level meetings
to Ministers of Foreign Affairs-level meetings, sectoral Minister-level
meetings, and senior officials-level meetings. From this perspective, ASEAN
can take the initiative to organise an ASEAN+2 meeting between the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of ASEAN Member States, Australia, and India
(AMM+2) to explore the possibility of Indo-Pacific trilateral cooperation.
Since ASEAN has already been hosting annually at least one ASEAN +
Australia and one ASEAN + India Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting to
discuss the respective bilateral relations, the hosting of such an AMM+2
meeting should not pose any problem for the Association. The organisation
of the AMM+2 meeting could be a flexible initiative without long-term
commitment: after the first meeting, relevant parties could either decide to
hold additional meetings to further the discussion, to make it a permanent
mechanism, or if there is not enough momentum to continue, simply stop.
After discussing at the Ministers of Foreign Affairs level, if all sides agree
that there is a potential to develop Indo-Pacific cooperation between ASEAN,
Australia, and India in a specific area or issue, they could suggest organising
34
ASEAN + 2 Cooperation in Marine Plastic Waste
additional ASEAN+2 meetings between relevant Ministers such as Defence,
Trade, Environment, and Transport. This approach has been followed by
ASEAN in developing ASEAN+3 relations with China, Japan, and South
Korea. In terms of Track II cooperation, there is currently an annual
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Dialogue gathering academics, economists,
security analysts, businesses, and diplomats to discuss regional issues,
including maritime security, which is led by Asialink, ISIS-Malaysia, and the
Asia-New Zealand Foundation. Leading Indian research institutions and
experts could be invited to join this Dialogue.
Issues of Trilateral Convergence
Based on the commonalities in the cooperation areas in Indo-Pacific

strategies of the three sides shown in the introduction, the following issues
could be subjects of discussion between ASEAN, India, and Australia at
their trilateral meetings:
Respect of international law and freedom of navigation in the South

China Sea: The peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute based
on international law is key to ensuring maritime security in the Indo-Pacific.
Though the South China Sea dispute is more of a concern for ASEAN,
Australia and India have publicly stated that they also have an interest in
the South China Sea. Most importantly, all three sides share the position of
supporting respect for international law and freedom of navigation. Thus,
this would be the most visible issue for discussion at their trilateral meeting.
Improving connectivity between ASEAN, Australia, and India by

submarine cables: Currently, there are a lot of submarine cables between
ASEAN and India and ASEAN and Australia, but there is only one that
connects all three regions, which is the SeaMeWe-3 system (see Figure 1
below). This is also the only system that connects Australia and India, going
through Malaysia. Having more submarine cables connecting Australia and
India would increase communication and the transfer of data between the
two countries, improving bilateral business linkages. Southeast Asia could
serve as the transit area between the two for such a submarine cable
connection, contributing to its economic and logistic effectiveness.
35
Figure 1. SeaMeWe 3 Submarine Cable System

(Telegeography)
Source :https://www.submarinecablemap.com/
Establishing protection sites for marine turtles: All ASEAN Member

States, Australia and India are signatories to the Memorandum on the
Conservation and Management of Marine Turtles and Their Habitats of the
Indian Ocean and South-East Asia (IOSEA Marine Turtles), 2001 (see
Figure 2). Pursuant to the MOU, signatory states will take action to protect,
conserve, and rehabilitate marine turtle habitats.
To implement the MOU, a Network of Sites of Importance for Marine

Turtles in the Indian Ocean—South-East Asia Region is being developed.
To date, 11 sites have been accepted into the Network, including three from
ASEAN Member States: Turtle Island Wildlife Sanctuary (Philippines),
Thameehla Island (Myanmar), and Con Dao Island (Viet Nam). No site
from Australia or India has been accepted into the Network yet.
36
ASEAN + 2 Cooperation in Marine Plastic Waste
Figure 2. IOSEA Marine Turtles Range States (Blue Navy)
Source: https://www.cms.int/en/legalinstrument/iosea-marine-turtles
(IOSEA Marine Turtles)
ASEAN, Australia, and India could cooperate in designating Sites of

Importance for Marine Turtles in India (such as the Nichobar Islands) and
Australia (such as the Great Barrier Reef), as well as in creating linkages
and partnerships between their national sites. This will not only help three
parties fulfil their commitments under the IOSEA Marine Turtles but also
contribute to the conservation of marine turtles in the region.
Improving the Management of Marine Plastic Waste : At the recent
United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) 5.2 in March 2022,
Resolution no.5/14 was adopted, requesting the convening of an
intergovernmental negotiating committee to develop an international legally
binding instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment,
by 2024. Marine plastic pollution is a grave issue for Maritime Southeast
Asia, the Bay of Bengal, and the seas surrounding Australia. At UNEA,
many ASEAN Member States, Australia and India expressed support for
such an instrument, which calls for, inter alia, sustainable production and
37
consumption of plastic, promotion of international cooperation to reduce
plastic pollution in the marine environment, and arrangements for capacity-
building, technology transfer, and technical and financial assistance. The
ASEAN+2 cooperation could serve as a framework for ASEAN, Australia,
and India to discuss cooperation in the management of marine plastic and
coordinate their positions relating to the legally binding international
instrument.
Project on Improving Marine Plastic Waste Management for
ASEAN+2 Cooperation
A cooperative project on marine plastic waste management can not only
help kick off the ASEAN+2 cooperation but also support the efforts by all
parties to prepare for the negotiations of the above-mentioned international
legal binding treaty. Consequently, ASEAN, Australia and India could develop
and implement a cooperative project to improve plastic waste management
in Indonesia. The reason for choosing Indonesia is because the country is
the second biggest discharger of plastic waste into the sea in the world
after China. Furthermore, because of its central geographical location, plastic
litter discharged from Indonesian shores could affect all three regions in the
Indo-Pacific: maritime Southeast Asia, the Bay of Bengal, and the seas
north of Australia. Finally, Indonesia has produced a lot of research relating
to plastic waste.
This ASEAN + 2 project on marine plastic waste management in Indonesia
could include the following activities:
(a) Tracking the plastic litter discharged from Indonesian shores;
(b) Organising beach cleaning activities for coastal communities;
(c) Promoting a circular economy for the treatment of plastic waste;
(d) Supporting the implementation of suggestions from plastic waste
research.
Conclusion
This paper provides practical suggestions for the development of concrete
cooperation in the Indo-Pacific between ASEAN, Australia, and India. Because of
the many shared interests between relevant parties, such cooperation has the
potential to thrive.
38
Chapter 7
MARITIME CONNECTIVITY –
A STRONG PILLAR FOR THE
INDO-PACIFIC OCEANS INITIATIVE
Lucio Blanco Pitlo III1
Maritime connectivity through the construction of relevant maritime

infrastructure like ports and terminals, and investments in shipping and
logistics is a promising dimension of the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative
(IPOI). This domain will surely receive much support from countries washed
by the waters of the two oceans, including the coastal states of Southeast
Asia. These investments will go a long way in spurring international and
domestic, including inter-island, linkages for insular countries in the region.
It can dock connectivity and the broader strategic visions of host/recipient
and investor states. For instance, Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor,
the Philippines’ “Build, Build, Build,” and Indonesia’s Global Maritime
Fulcrum can dovetail with India’s Security and Growth for All in the Region
(SAGAR) and Act East Policy. IPOI can also jibe with the India-Japan
Asia-Africa Growth Corridor and the evolving Indo-Pacific visions of other
middle powers like Australia and Japan.
1
Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is a Research Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress
Foundation and member of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association for
Chinese Studies, Quezon City CPO, Bicol, Philippines
39
Due to their geographic proximity to Southeast Asia, both India and Australia
are well placed to link with the region. India shares a long 1,643 kilometres
of contiguous land border with Myanmar, while the Andaman Sea links it
with southern Myanmar, southern Thailand, and western Indonesia. On the
other hand, Australia sits just to the immediate south of the sprawling
Indonesian archipelago. India, Australia, and the Southeast Asian countries
of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand are all members of the
Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). India, Myanmar, and Thailand are
also fellow members of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral
Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). Connectivity and
transportation are among the areas for cooperation in both IORA and
BIMSTEC. Furthermore, India and Australia are also members of the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), which seeks to grow through
QUAD+ formats. Functional cooperation in the area of maritime connectivity
is one area that will certainly elicit regional buy-in. Involvement in building
regional infrastructure was mentioned in the joint statement by QUAD leaders
post their in-person meeting in Washington in September 2021.
Cooperation in the connectivity space deepens an economic dimension often

underappreciated and overshadowed by security in Indo-Pacific discourses.
India, Australia, and other partner countries can capitalise on the burgeoning
infrastructure demand in the region. These maritime projects have economic,
military, and strategic underpinnings due to Southeast Asia’s strategic location
and prevailing geopolitics. For instance, the projects can provide
counterweights or alternatives to China’s massive multi-year Belt and Road
Initiative, which is already in its eighth year and continues to get traction,
criticisms, and suspicions aside. More choices give regional countries more
legroom to negotiate better deals with their active infrastructure partners.
Most maritime connectivity investments are driven by commercial impetus,

but investor government support can help anchor such disparate transactions
to an overarching framework for diplomatic and strategic gains. Companies
can thus provide the economic flesh for their home governments’ strategic
policy towards the larger region. Indian and Australian firms can leverage
their experience and existing portfolio in Southeast Asia to play larger roles
40
Maritime Connectivity – A Strong Pillar for the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative
in this space. For example, the private Indian company Adani Ports and
Special Economic Zone Limited has set up a special purpose vehicle in
Singapore to cater to investments in Southeast Asia, notably in Indonesia,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam, as well as in
neighbouring Bangladesh. Another Indian company, GMR, in partnership
with local Filipino company Megawide, completed airport projects in Cebu
and Clark and is raring to resubmit a proposal to rehabilitate and upgrade
the Manila airport in the Philippines when the new administration assumes
office after the country’s May 9, 2022 elections. The GMR-Megawide
consortium is the private operator of the Mactan-Cebu international airport,
the Southeast Asian country’s second busiest airport. Australian construction
companies like Leighton Asia of CIMIC Group and Aurecon have diverse
pipelines of projects in the region. Leighton, for instance, designed and
constructed a jetty to unload petroleum and liquefied natural gas in Bataan
province on the Philippines’ main island of Luzon2. Aurecon, on the other
hand, has been involved in jetty and port projects in Malaysia, Singapore,
Thailand, and Indonesia. Shipbuilding and defence contractor Austal,
headquartered in Henderson, Western Australia, has a presence in Cebu, in
the central Philippines, where it produces commercial vessels like ferries
and wind farm support ships3.
Southeast Asian countries continue to grow their economic partners to avoid

overexposure to a limited set of investors or creditors. This creates plenty
of space for other entrants to step in. There is no need to outcompete other
players in terms of scale. India, Australia, and other partners can ride on
the region’s desire to diversify infrastructure partners and concerns about
certain Chinese investments. Issues associated with Chinese projects include
opaque terms, claims of onerous contractual provisions and corruption, debt
sustainability, and proximity to military facilities or strategic locations. This
makes regional countries receptive to new connectivity pitches from other
2
Leighton, Total Mariveles Jetty, https://www.leightonasia.com/en/projects/completed/
total-mariveles-jetty
3
Austal Philippines, Our Customers, https://philippines.austal.com/our-customers
41
partners. Hence, there is a lot of scope for bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral
cooperation arrangements to foster maritime transport linkages.
Myanmar can serve as India’s direct gateway to the rest of mainland

Southeast Asia. The country’s importance was evidenced in Delhi’s funding
for the construction of the Sittwe port in Myanmar’s Rakhine state off the
Bay of Bengal as part of the larger Kaladan multi-modal transit transport
project that provides access to the sea for landlocked northeast India.
Indonesia is another Southeast Asian country that has welcomed Indian

port investments. Both sides are jointly developing a deep-sea port in Sabang,
in western Sumatra’s Aceh province. This project will enhance connectivity
between India’s offshore Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Indonesia’s
third-largest island, which are just 90 nautical miles apart. The two countries
set up a joint task force to undertake port-related infrastructure and to promote
trade, tourism (including sail, cruise, and marine ecotourism), and people-
to-people contacts in these two areas. Sabang can link with Port Blair and
Havelock Island. The security and strategic profile of this undertaking cannot
be downplayed due to its close proximity to the Malacca Strait chokepoint.
The new port may host bilateral maritime exercises and naval and coast
guard ship visits between the two countries. During the 2018 visit of Prime
Minister Narendra Modi to Jakarta, the port was cited as one of the priorities
in their “Shared Vision of Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.”
However, such maritime investments have also faced some hurdles of late.
For instance, in October 2021, Adani Ports announced it would divest from
the Ahlone international port project in Yangon, Myanmar, following the
military takeover of the government. Sanctions against the ruling regime led
to the exit of foreign capital, and pressure on those that continued to do
business increased. The port sits on land leased from a military-linked
conglomerate, the Myanmar Economic Corporation. It remains to be seen
when the political crisis in the strife-torn country will be resolved to make it
attractive again to foreign investment. The company initially planned to build
a greenfield container terminal in the country’s commercial centre but had
to write it off due to the present circumstances. Trouble in its neighbouring
country represents a major setback to India’s drive to link with the rest of
peninsular Southeast Asia via Myanmar. From this vantage point, port projects
42
Maritime Connectivity – A Strong Pillar for the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative
elsewhere in the region are seen as alternative ventures to pursue while

sanctions against Naypyidaw are in force.
As China steps up port investments in India’s backyard in maritime South

Asia and the Indian Ocean, India is likely to reciprocate by doubling down
on port investments in its neighbourhood and venturing into Southeast Asia.
This would give Beijing a dose of its own medicine. Working with other
partners like Australia, Japan, and the United States through IPOI, the Asia-
Africa Growth Corridor, the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure,
QUAD, and other arrangements can add heft to Delhi’s forays. India has
become wary of China’s massive investment and rising influence in
Myanmar. Beijing is funding the construction of the Kyaukhpyu port and
special economic zone, which is just 105 kilometres from Sittwe. These
projects form part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which can
deepen connectivity between the two countries and enhance Beijing’s
leverage over Naypyidaw, especially given the latter’s increasing diplomatic
isolation. Compared to India, China shares contiguous terrestrial boundaries
not only with Myanmar but also with Laos and Vietnam. It is linked via the
contested waters of the South China Sea with its maritime neighbours, the
Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei.
To counter China’s so-called String of Pearls of potentially dual-use Indian

Ocean ports where Chinese naval ships were sighted visiting and
replenishing, Delhi upped its investments in the region. It made the largest
investment in Sri Lanka’s port industry through the $700 million deal to build
a new container terminal in Colombo. This game-changing development
put it in a good position to compete with its rival in the island’s port sector
and offer a neighbour an opportunity to mitigate its growing reliance on
Chinese capital. India also built the Chabahar port in Iran to rival Pakistan’s
Gwadar port in providing sea access to Afghan and Central Asian trade.
Indian port investments enable coastal states from Sri Lanka, Iran and
Myanmar to play off one partner against another, enhance their autonomy
and bargaining position, and avoid dependence on one major infrastructure
lender. India, Australia, and Southeast Asia, through IPOI and other regional
configurations, can thus contribute to shaping a robust, inclusive, and
sustainable maritime connectivity order for the Indo-Pacific.
43
References:
Adani. 2021. Review of Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Limited Integrated Annual
Report 2020-21.
https://www.adaniports.com/-/media/Project/Ports/Investor/Investor-Downloads/Annual-
Report/Adani-Port-Special-Economic-Zone-IR21.pdf
Chanayuth. 2021. “Indian Company Drops Plan to Develop Myanmar Military-Owned

Port.” The Irrawaddy. October 28, 2021. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/indian-
company-drops-plan-to-develop-myanmar-military-owned-port.html.
Chulanee Attanayake, 2021 India’s answer to China’s ports in Sri Lanka, The Interpreter,
November 9, 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/india-s-answer-china-
s-ports-srilanka#:~:text=The%20Colombo%20Port% 20grew%20multi,handled%20
over%2040%20per%20cent.
Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy. 2019. “Eyeing Southeast Asia, India Builds Port in Indonesia.”
The Economic Times, March 20, 2019. https://economi-ctimes.indiatimes.com/news/
defence/eyeing-southeast-asia-india-builds-port-in%20indonesia/articleshow/
68490478.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_ medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.
Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy. n.d. “Myanmar Junta Expedites Work on China Funded
Kyaukphyu Port.” The Economic Times. Accessed July 27, 2022. https://economictimes.
indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/myanmar-junta-expedites-work-on-china-
funded-kyaukphyu-port/articleshow/85167272.cms? utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_
medium=text& utm_campaign=cppst.
“Joint Statement from Quad Leaders.” 2021. The White House. September 25, 2021.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/joint-
statement-from-quad-leaders/.
Mihir Mishra, 2021 GMR builds new terminal at Clark International Airport in Philippines
in record time, The Economic Times
Richmond Mercurio, 2022 Megawide wants another shot at NAIA upgrade project,
Philippine Star
“Shared Vision of India-Indonesia Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.” n.d. Pib.gov.in.

Accessed April 28, 2023. https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx? relid=179630&
msclkid=43ad2756c76411eca 90958a93253f96c.
The Times of India. 2018. “India, Indonesia to Set up Task Force to Enhance Connectivity
between Andaman and Sabang,” May 30, 2018. https://timesofindia. indiatimes.com/india/
india-indonesia-to-set-up-task-force-to-enhance-connectivity-between-andaman-and-
sabang/articleshow/64385330.cms
44
Chapter 8
INDONESIA’S QUEST FOR SMART PORT:

CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY
Siswanto Rusdi1
Smart port is a new mantra in our era and interchangeable with other phrases
like smart ocean and digitalization of the sea, among others. However, there
is no common definition of the concept except that it embraces Artificial
Intelligence (AI) and the Internet of Things (IoT) to operate. Many countries
in the world have been tuning into the rhythm, including Indonesia. But of
course, the level of applicability amongst them varies.
In Indonesia, the implementation of the smart port concept is still in its

infancy. In terms of geographic features, the country provides the best
cultivating ground for the venture. It has a huge span of water territory,
accounting for 2/3rd of its area, with massive potential yet fully unexploited
and unexplored. Some challenges hinder the implementation of smart ports
in Indonesia, which the government has been trying to address. This piece
tries to explore challenges and opportunities in smart port implementation in
the country.
1
Siswanto Rusdi is the Founder and Director of the National Maritime Institute
(NAMARIN), an independent maritime think tank in Jakarta, Indonesia
45
Challenges
Multiple regulators
By law, Indonesia’s port governance falls under the remit of the Ministry of
Transport and is handled by the Directorate General of Sea Transport in
charge of port management. Its authority covers the entire spectrum of
ports, from ministry-owned facilities to SOEs (State Owned Enterprises)
and those operated by private entities. However, ferry ports are exempted
and separately managed by the Directorate General of Land Transport.
Other leading agencies for smart port implementation are the Coordinating
Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investment and the Ministry of Finance.
This leads to multiple agencies responsible for the same output, but a lack
of communication among them necessitates additional efforts to complete
the work. Currently, two big platforms are Indonesia National Single Window
(INSW) and Indonesia Portnet (Inaportnet).
The former is under the aegis of the Directorate General of Customs and
Excise, Ministry of Finance, and is dedicated to export-import documentation,
while the latter is supported by the Ministry of Transport to handle ship
information (port of origin-destination, cargo manifest, etc.). In 2020, the
Coordinating Ministry, in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance, launched
the National Logistics Ecosystem (NLE). Officials involved in the project
stated that it was neither a platform nor an integrator.2
Asymmetrical local capacity
Smart port implementation in Indonesia is also marked by asymmetrical
capacity among domestic port operators. Indonesia’s port architecture sees
several different players operating in the business. This article clusters them
into a couple of groups. Group 1 is home to state-owned port operator
Pelabuhan Indonesia (Pelindo for short). They manage less than 100 ports
across the archipelago, but these are relatively advanced in terms of capital,
knowledge, and human resources compared to the others. If we are talking
about smart ports in Indonesia, it is Pelindo’s terminals that are mostly
referred by many parties.
2
Interview with officials in charge of the National Logistics Ecosystem (NLE)
46
Indonesia’s Quest for Smart Port: Challenge and Opportunity
Group 2 consists of port operators under the aegis of the Ministry of

Transport, amounting to more than 2,000 units nationwide. They are actually
managing rudimentary facilities for supporting the movement of people and
cargo in the area where they were constructed. Of course, some of them
have transformed into bustling harbours with quite significant revenue for
their operators. Anggrek port in Gorontalo province, for instance, has
attracted attention from a local investor willing to invest Rp1.3 trillion for its
expansion. But these ports lack human and monetary resources for the
implementation of the smart port concept and, consequently, need support
from a third party, mainly Pelindo, if they want to do that.3
Group 3 is made up of private port operators permitted by the Ministry of

Transport. They can be a subsidiary of a big company requiring a dedicated
port or terminal service to support their main business. Or, they are
independent port operators without any linkage to business conglomerates.
Since they manage the very basic general-purpose terminal/port the level
of smart port implementation is correspondingly low. Even their loading and
unloading equipment is relatively obsolete.
Internationally unconnected
Last but not least, the implementation of smart ports in Indonesia is also
hindered by the disconnect between local platforms and overseas partners.
On an international level, there is a common platform, Tradelens, on which
shipping companies, port operators, trucking firms, and scores of other entities
can share what they are doing. This makes the handling of cargo across the
globe smoother and more traceable. So far, there are no Indonesian logistics
players on board. Pelindo is in touch with Tradelens management in order
to join.
The aforementioned challenges surely indicate worrisome prospects for

Indonesia in its quest for smart ports. It might be thought almost impossible
for the country to achieve this given that it has no sufficient budget to establish
basic infrastructure (internet connection, electricity) to support the
programme. On-state players, like Pelindo, are also facing similar problems.
3
Interview with the executives of Pelindo
47
Local or foreign investors are an option if the programme is expected to

continue with significant results in the future.
Opportunity
Port sector reforms
Indonesia has seen massive reforms in its port sector since its four state-
owned port companies, locally known as Pelindo, that have run for more
than four decades merged into a single entity last year. With the integration,
the existing businesses (container, non-container, and marine services) that
are now under one holding will be managed by four newly created sub-
holdings.
Consequently, the holding actually has massive business lines like a labyrinth,
not only the abovementioned but also others, ranging from property, hospitals,
IT solutions, shipbuilding, and port investment, to mention some. All of these
reforms require many applications of smart ports.
Improved investment climate
The enactment of an omnibus law on job creation two years ago is also
considered to have provided chances to boost smart port implementation in
Indonesia. This law eases red tape in the country’s investment sector and
automatically opens bigger opportunities for the investor to come in. It should
be noted that it does not specifically address the issue of smart ports.
An improved investment climate is significant in pushing further the ventures

of Indonesia’s port automation, digitalization of the ocean, and so on that
are currently in the research or trial phases. These need huge investments
before opening to the market.
Conclusion
To accelerate smart port implementation in Indonesia, the government is

expected to give more leeway to the private sector, including its state-owned
enterprises, in port business. Within this context, Pelindo, as an SOE, can be
the appropriate entity and may become the leader of the initiative. This is
because of the company’s massive resources to push the programme to a
48
Indonesia’s Quest for Smart Port: Challenge and Opportunity
higher level. Full involvement of the company in the country’s quest for
smart ports will bring it closer to the best practices adopted by many port
operators around the world.
References:
‘
Gobel Group Siapkan Rp1,4 TriliunBangun Pelabuhan Anggrek’, Bisnis Indonesia, 28
September 2021, https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20210928/98/1447857/gobel-group-
siapkan-rp14-triliun-bangun-pelabuhan-anggrek (accessed April 12, 2022)
Siswanto Rusdi, ‘Merger Pelindo, Mungkinkah Jadi Sokoguru Ekosistem Logistik Nasional?’
Kompas, 10 August 2021, https://money.kompas.com/reD/2021/08/10/131400926/merger-
pelindo-mungkinkah-jadi-sokoguru-ekosistem-logistik-nasional?page=all (accessed April 12,
2022)
49
50
Chapter 9
INDIA, INDONESIA, ASEAN AND BEYOND: A

SENSE OF ‘ABANG DIPLOMACY’ BEYOND THE
GREAT POWERS’ DILEMMA?
Eric Frecon1
Focusing on Australia, India and Indonesia as the three pillars of the Indo-
Pacific is a very stimulating idea. The French cannot afford to be indifferent
to this. It is true that it reminds us of Macron’s first idea in 2018 to build a
strong axis Paris-New Delhi-Canberra and the subsequent trilateral meeting
in 2021, while Paris was moving in parallel closer to ASEAN as a new
development partner. That said, above all, it also echoes the French
diplomatic doctrine, namely ‘gaullo-mitterrandism’ (named after two previous
presidents in the 1960s and 1980s). These consistent guidelines through the
last decades have pushed actors to behave autonomously, or without any
heed to consequences, and mirror the Indian ‘non-alignment’ and the
Indonesian ‘bebasaktif’ traditions in a certain way.
At first glance, this focus raises two main comments. Firstly, interestingly, it
comes together with other current initiatives (seminars, meetings, exercises)
1
Eric Frécon is a visiting academic at the Universiti Brunei Darussalam; he is also an
adjunct fellow at IRASEC (Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asian
Studies, Bangkok), at IRSEM (Institute for Strategic Research at the Military School,
Paris), and at the French Naval Academy. Opinions are my own and not the views of
my employers.
51
that shed light on the “regional” and not only the “great” powers. I refer to
the next seminar by IRASEC in 2022, with academics from ASEAN, India
and Japan, as well as to the Indo-Pacific Forum in Paris in 2022, at a more
official level. Neither Washington nor Beijing attended the event, while the
Australian Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the
Indian External Affairs Minister, and the Indonesian Minister for Foreign
Affairs travelled to Paris.
In the wake of Professor Bertrand Badie’s work in France, this recent

trend shows that the regional powers can help other (small) countries of the
Global South to take the lead, to be more autonomous, and to move ahead,
away from the only Chinese-US dilemma, which may sometimes confine
initiatives.
In this process, regional powers like Australia and India (and maybe Japan
or South Korea as well) should play big brothers rather than tutors, guardians,
or possible (sub) hegemons, benevolent or not. This could be seen as a kind
of empathic ‘abang diplomacy’ (big brother diplomacy).
Secondly – and for this reason, to precisely create a strong and deeply
anchored Indo-Pacific – this axis New Delhi-Jakarta-Canberra should be a
springboard, a starting point and a backbone to go further. This strong frame
should be connected to other sub-regions, like the Indian Ocean and the
Southern Pacific.
In order to achieve this aim, it is necessary to reinforce the existing web of

relationships to sustain a dense network across the straits and oceans along
the equator.
There are already plenty of connections between countries in these sub-

regions through pragmatic, neo-functionalist and trans-regional initiatives:
Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic

Cooperation (BIMSTEC): Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal,
Sri Lanka, and Thailand;
Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security

(CTI-CFF): Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Papua New Guinea,
Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste; and
52
India, Indonesia, ASEAN and Beyond
Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM):

India, China, Myanmar and Bangladesh.
At the commercial level, the old ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade

Area (AANZFTA), which entered into force in 2010, may be referred. As
a follow-up, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, New Zealand,
Singapore and Vietnam are also signatories to the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which
entered into force for Australia, New Zealand and Singapore on December
30, 2018; for Vietnam on January 14, 2019. Australia, Brunei Darussalam,
Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam
have also ratified the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP) Agreement, an ASEAN-led FTA, which entered into force on
January 1, 2022.
Besides, most of these countries are already members of existing groups,

like the Alliance of Small Island States or the Small Island Developing States
(SIDS) within the United Nations.
Furthermore, some countries can take promising trans-regional initiatives.

For instance:
The Indonesia Africa Infrastructure Dialogue (IAID) in 2019 after the

Indonesia-Africa Forum in 2018,
The Pacific Expositions by the Indonesian Embassy in New Zealand

(in 2019 and 2021),
And, in January, Singapore signed a free trade agreement with the Pacific
Alliance, a bloc made up of Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.
Last but not least, two ASEAN members led vast organisations in 2022
involving many Indo-Pacific countries: Thailand as Chair of APEC and
Indonesia as Chair of the G20.
At the end of the day, if we zoom out, how can such a vivid network interact
with the Great Powers, especially with the USA because of its two (quasi)
alliances, namely QUAD and AUKUS, besides all its bilateral agreements
53
across the regions (Japan, South Korea, Philippines, etc.)? Better and clearer
than any QUAD or AUKUS “+”, on the model of ADMM”+”, is it absurd
to compare this situation with the one in Europe, where Brussels promotes
its so-called “strategic autonomy”, with the support of Washington, while
most of its members, in parallel, are parts of the 1949 Washington Treaty?
This win-win process, in which a stronger and more coordinated European
Union automatically reinforces NATO, could be seen in the Indo-Pacific
and could possibly maintain ASEAN centrality: a similar mix of bilateral and
mini-lateral agreements or partnerships, away from the exclusive US
umbrella, like the Information Fusion Centres in Singapore, Madagascar,
New Delhi, and Peru, could actively contribute to the maritime or
environmental securities in general and to the freedom of navigation or the
rules-based international order in general – our common values and shared
principles.
54
Chapter 10
INDO-PACIFIC AND THE DREAM OF A

RULES-BASED ORDER
Dr Harisankar K Sathyapalan1
The imagination of the Indo-Pacific has been at the centre of political and
academic discourse over the past decade. The need for securing a rules-
based order (RBO) in the region is one of the key narratives in such
discourses. Drawing on the regional architecture of the Indo-Pacific, the
IPOI endeavours to ensure safety and security in the regional maritime
domain by increasing cooperation among like-minded countries. Achieving
a rules-based maritime order is again a dominant narrative on the table.
Against this backdrop, it is important to look at whether and how this dream
of RBO can be made possible in the region. In so doing, Section I of this
paper inquires into the meaning of the RBO and further reiterates the
essentiality of international law in securing the order. Section II examines
the diverging approaches taken by the two regional powers to respecting
(or disrespecting) international law. In conclusion, the paper suggests the
positive use of lawfare by the two democratic powers in the region.
1
Assistant Professor, School of Legal Studies, CUSAT; Research Fellow (International
Law & Dispute Settlement) CPPR, <harisankar@cusat.ac.in>
55
Rules-based order, international law and the UNCLOS
Despite its centrality in global politics, the meaning and scope of the term
RBO remain largely ambivalent. In the context of the Indo-Pacific, this
ambivalence is mainly due to the differing emphasis given by the states to
the geo-economic, geopolitical, and security aspects of the term. A country’s
commitment to promoting RBO may very well depend on its national interests.
However, the origin of the RBO, which goes back to the end of World War
II and the establishment of the UN-based governance system, gives us an
idea that the norms and institutions formed under the auspices of the UN
remain the central pillars of the current global order. This means that countries
are required to obey its charter and comply with the international treaty
obligations created under its umbrella. Thus, international law is at the core
of the rules-based global order. The intrinsic value that international law
offers as a normative framework is crucial in setting the ‘rules’ and
maintaining ‘order’. International law essentially has a dual role to play as
far as the conduct of a state in the international or regional community is
concerned. On the one hand, it empowers the sovereignty of a state to
manage its internal affairs. On the other hand, it prevents the states from
exercising absolute authority (or sovereignty) in their dealings with other
members of the community.
In the maritime domain, the rules of conduct are set by the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). A treaty requires its member
countries to comply with the provisions and respect the procedures and
institutions set forth therein. Though the overall compliance history of the
UNCLOS since its inception in 1982 is satisfactory, there are some
controversial exceptions. Maritime boundary disputes between the
neighbouring coastal states in the region have attracted the role of the dispute
settlement mechanism under the treaty. Although the treaty sets out the
rules relating to maritime zones, overlapping entitlements over the maritime
zones based on sovereign and historic rights have given rise to complicated
disputes in the region. Settling these disputes peacefully is a sine qua non
for maintaining the RBO.
56
Indo-Pacific and the Dream of a Rules-based Order
Regional powers’ diverging attitude to international law and dispute

settlement
Both India and China, because of their historical experiences as well as

their present aspirations in the geopolitical and economic realms, are
undoubtedly capable of maintaining or destabilising the RBO in the Indo-
Pacific. The recent expansion of economic and diplomatic footprints by
both countries in the Indian Ocean demonstrates the importance of the
maritime domain in their path to global power status. Apart from the growing
rivalry between India and China, their individual behaviour with respect to
the interpretation and application of international law is highly significant in
testing the waters of the RBO.
To evaluate the varying approaches to international law in maritime affairs,

one needs to look at how these states have given the norms and institutions
of UNCLOS due regard. Interestingly, both India and China actively
participated in the decade-long negotiation of the treaty and ratified it around
the same time after careful consideration. Recent examples, however, show
divergence at three different levels – internalisation, interpretation and
implementation – of the treaty. While India, to a greater extent, has
maintained its intent to play by the rules, China’s approaches are in the
opposite direction. First, the Chinese domestic law relating to maritime zones
(enacted after the ratification of UNCLOS) is at odds with the treaty and
shows its intent to protect illegitimate maritime entitlements. Secondly, China
has rejected the dispute settlement procedures of the UNCLOS in a
declaration made much later, while India has made only marginal reservations
in this regard. Third, the national preferences for implementing international
law are visibly found in managing actual maritime disputes.
Comparing two recent cases decided by arbitral tribunals formed under

UNCLOS Annex VII will help us reflect more on the varying attitudes of
the two major powers. In 2014, India lost the arbitration award in the Bay
of Bengal maritime delimitation case against Bangladesh. In 2016, in the
South China Sea arbitration instituted by the Philippines, the award went
against China. While India participated and respectfully agreed to comply
with the awards, China refused to participate in the proceedings and outright
rejected the decision. In both cases, there was a clear imbalance of power
57
between the disputing parties, as the claimants were comparatively weaker

than the respondent states. Apart from the power politics, the cases also
demonstrate that the commitment to stand by the international rule of law
irrespective of individual national interests is what holds the idea of RBO in
good stead. More recently, the settlement of a jurisdictional contest between
two equally placed states (India and Italy, in terms of economic and military
capability) in the Enrica Lexie case is another example of the relevance of
international law and institutions in maintaining order in the maritime and
diplomatic space. These approaches arguably indicate the future paths that
the states wish to pursue either as a normative power or as a hegemonic
power.
Conclusion: Lawfare and role of India-Australia IPOI partnership
Even though international law is central to securing maritime security and

order in the region, the weak enforcement mechanism allows states to deviate
from the rules-based system. The international community is thus often left
with political and economic sanctions against divergent states. The West’s
imposition of economic sanctions against Russia is the most recent illustration
of this. China’s military expansion and hegemonic ambitions in the Indo-
Pacific are not that far from what Russia had been doing prior to the Ukraine
invasion. However, when it comes to the question of countering China,
countries, in general, have been naive about the geopolitical power of
economics, partly due to China’s unique position in the global supply chain.
In this context, the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) partnership between

India and Australia, the two democratic countries trying to establish a peaceful
regional order, becomes significant. It is high time that this partnership
disprofesses the age-old maxim interarmaenim silent lçgçs (for among
arms, the laws are silent). In order to counter the Chinese use of domestic
characteristics against international law and their unreasonable justifications,
India-Australia must jointly engage in a positive lawfare—not by hijacking
the international rule of law or to the detriment of the RBO, but by assertively
speaking against the international law violations in the region.
58
About the Publishers
Centre for Public Policy Research
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profit public policy think tank dedicated to in-depth research and scientific
analysis with the objective of delivering actionable ideas that could transform
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Studies, Economy, Ease of Doing Business, Governance & Law, and
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various projects and themes. We have also worked with Embassies and
High Commissions of different nations in India, international foundations,
and multi-lateral organisations. Please find more details about the people,
work, and impact of CPPR at www.cppr.in.
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Indo-Pacific Perspectives:

Australia, ASEAN and India

Vijay Sakhuja & Anu Maria Francis

Centre for Public Policy Research and Monash University

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

Chapter 1 ASEAN's Perspectives on the Indo-Pacific 3

Chapter 2 India's Perspective on the Indo-Pacific 7

Chapter 3 Understanding Strategic Contours of India's 17

Chapter 4 ASEAN's Role in Maintaining a Secure and 21

Chapter 5 Promoting Peace and Prosperity in the Indo-Pacific: 29

Chapter 6 ASEAN + 2 Cooperation in Marine Plastic Waste: 33

Chapter 7 Maritime Connectivity - A Strong Pillar for the 39

Chapter 9 India, Australia, ASEAN... and, beyond, the 51

Chapter 10 Indo-Pacific and the Dream of a Rules-based Order 55

AUKUS : Australia-United Kingdom-United States

Alif Imran Hidayat is a Maritime Security and Diplomacy Researcher at

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Australian Government

This is a volume of scholarly research papers worth reading to understand

India announced its Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) in November

ASEAN’S PERSPECTIVES ON THE

The AOIP, officially announced in 2019, is not a specific ASEAN vision or

The first is to be part of the conversation on the Indo-Pacific, given the

The second, related to the first, is to re-assert ASEAN centrality, specifically

Finally, the AOIP aims to relate various articulations of the Indo-Pacific by

The AOIP, being an ASEAN product, is borne out of consensus between

In that same speech in Washington DC, he proposed an Indo-Pacific treaty

complement Indonesia’s self-conception as a major maritime nation lying at

ASEAN’s present agnostic stance towards the Indo-Pacific, however, is

and articulations of the Indo-Pacific to their advantage. Southeast Asia has

The Indian government’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) is a case in

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June

Attributes Security and Complement Voluntary and India’s blue Development

Focus Safeguard Go beyond Working Policy draft Reducing the

Assistance to end the ocean proximate

Nodal Whole of Launched by Indian Navy Ministry of Ministry of

Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India., 12 November

About IONS, Indian Navy, 2012. https://www.ions.global [Accessed 9 April 2022]

SAGAR and IPOI

Prime Minister's Speech at Seychelles, 7 February 2016. https://www.narendramodi. in /

Mishra Rahul,2021 Indo-Pacific Oceans' Initiative: Providing Institutional Framework to

Sagarmala: Cargo Handling up by 42 Per Cent, Smart Ports, Revamp of Communications

Press Information Bureau, 17 February 2021. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm. aspx?

Lok Sabha unstarred question no 4113, Government of India. https://moes.gov.in/sites/

INCOIS, Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government of India. https://moes.gov.in/node/3069

PIB, 3 February 2021. https://moes.gov.in/sites/default/files/PIB1795031_1.pdf

INCOIS, Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government of India. https://moes.gov.in/node/3069

UNDERSTANDING STRATEGIC CONTOURS OF

Indo-Pacific has emerged as a strategic game-changer in the international

For India, the Indo-Pacific is of strategic importance for its economic

inclusiveness, openness, and the unity and centrality of ASEAN. Besides

At the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore on June 1, 2018, Prime Minister

On November 4, 2019, at the East Asia Summit, Prime Minister Narendra

dynamics and their possible impact on the Indo-Pacific. Therefore,

In this context, India and Australia have a common strategic understanding

Amidst the ongoing geopolitical and geostrategic contest in the Indo-Pacific,

Southeast Asia is embracing rapid change in terms of its economy and

The Biden administration has promoted the Indo-Pacific as a key component

viewing the PRC as a hegemonic competitor destabilises the region and

COVID-19, the US and countries in Europe have been facing a downward

The signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)

infrastructure development, advancing strategic partnerships, and preserving

“China GDP Annual Growth Rate”. 2022. Trading Economics. https://tradingeconomics.com/

“Gross Domestic Product”. 2022. Bureau of Economic Analysis. https://www.bea.gov/

“Quarterly National Accounts - GDP And Employment”. 2022. Eurostat. https://