Vietnam's Prudent Pivot

Vietnam’s prudent pivot to the rules-based
international order
THUY T. DO *
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/99/4/1557/7216728 by guest on 03 September 2023

Vietnam presents an interesting case of the changing world-view of a state that
was once war-torn and isolated during the Cold War but that now sees itself as a
proactive and responsible member of the international community. The fact that
a socialist-oriented and once anti-colonial Vietnam1 is increasingly open to the
western-crafted international order makes it worth examining, and promises to
enrich the conceptualization of international order from the vantage point of a
post-colonial socialist lesser state. This article attempts to answer three research
questions. First, how does Vietnam conceptualize the existing international order?
Second, what is Vietnam’s perspective vis-à-vis the western-crafted liberal inter-
national order and alternative visions of world order, such as that held by China?
Third, what kind of changes, if any, does Vietnam envisage for the evolving global
and regional orders?
The article argues that Vietnam’s conceptualization of the existing interna-
tional order has changed over the past decades: shifting from an outsider, if not
a challenger of the western-crafted liberal international order (LIO) during the
Cold War, to a cautious advocate of a rules-based international order (RBO) in
recent years.2 While the LIO is often associated with those rules, norms and insti-
tutions established by the US and its western allies since the end of the Second
World War, the RBO, from the Vietnamese perspective, is broader than the LIO
in that it is constituted by universally or regionally accepted rules, norms and
institutions such as those promoted by international law and international regimes,
centring on the UN and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
* This article is part of a special section in the July 2023 issue of International Affairs on ‘Asian conceptions of
international order: what Asia wants’, guest-edited by Kanti Bajpai and Evan A. Laksmana. The author would
like to express sincere thanks to Kanti Bajpai, Huiyun Feng, Evan A. Laksmana and the journal’s editors and
three anonymous reviewers for their insightful and constructive comments on the earlier drafts of this article.
This research is financially supported by the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of
Singapore (project title: ‘Asian conceptions of international order’) and the state-level science and technology
programme managed by Vietnam’s Central Theoretical Council (project number: KX.04.35).
1
The term ‘Vietnam’ in this article refers to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which was established on
2 September 1945 and later, after national unification in 1976, changed its name to the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam. The South Vietnamese state—the Republic of Vietnam—which was under US patronage and was
therefore regarded as a member of the US-led order between 1955 and 1975, is not discussed in this article.
2
In this article, ‘rules-based international order’ is used interchangeably with ‘rules-based order’. In Vietnam,
the term ‘rules-based international order’ is more widely used, but ‘rules-based order’ is more frequently used
in the literature. For consistency, both terms are abbreviated here as ‘RBO’.
International Affairs 99: 4 (2023) 1557–1573; doi: 10.1093/ia/iiad144

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Thuy T. Do
Thus, Vietnam supports the construction of a rules-based multipolar and multi-
centre international order in which the voices and interests of lesser powers (like
Vietnam) should not be subsumed by great power politics.3
Vietnam’s pivot to the RBO has been precipitated by three main causes:
domestic reform and modernization; deepened integration into the regional
and international political economy; and growing strategic concerns over great
power coercion stemming from China’s rise. Therefore, Vietnam’s conception of
order and its engagement with the RBO are also influenced by China’s vision of
world order and the course of Sino-Vietnamese relations. However, its pivot to

the RBO is also cautious, given Hanoi’s reluctance to accept liberal norms and
values, lingering suspicion about western intentions to undermine the regime
security of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), and the path dependence
of Vietnam’s relationships with its traditional non-western partners and global
South countries, as well as the occasional clashes between the old, conservative
Marxist-driven world-view and the new, more open-minded thinking that now
shapes its foreign policy.
Thus far, Vietnam’s vision of international order remains predominantly
shaped by the elite—in particular, leaders of the CPV and influential think
tanks.4 The research, therefore, mainly uses government sources and statements
from semi-official thinkers and influential commentators. Vietnam’s conception
of order is also inferred from actual policies and practices, through the lens of
Hanoi’s national security concerns and its policy of integration into the inter-
national political economy. However, the growing openness of the country due
to reforms, the integration process and the rise of both social media and public
opinion has increasingly affected the leadership’s conceptualization of interna-
tional order; hence, the research also examines surveys of public opinion and the
news media. Although the article is committed to using local sources to reflect
national perceptions of order, it also consults foreign sources to present diverse
perspectives.
The article proceeds as follows. First, it begins by unpacking the historical back-
ground and Vietnam’s contemporary conceptualization of international order. It
then clarifies Vietnam’s perception of the liberal international order and the logic
behind Vietnam’s turn towards supporting the RBO. Next, the article explains
Hanoi’s perception of the Chinese vision of world order and the Vietnamese
regime’s preferences in terms of changes in the emerging international order. Lastly,
the article concludes by analysing the policy relevance and added value of study-
3
Thuy T. Do, ‘Vietnam’s growing agency in the twenty-first century’, The Pacific Review 35: 2, 2022, pp. 319–41,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2021.1998206; Dang Cam Tu, ‘Trat tu quoc te dua tren luat le va vai tro cua
cac nuoc vua va nho’ [Rules-based international order and the role of small and medium-sized countries],
Tap chi Cong san [Communist Review], 29 Sept. 2021, https://tapchicongsan.org.vn/quoc-phong-an-ninh-oi-
ngoai1/-/2018/824123/%E2%80%9Ctrat-tu-quoc-te-dua-tren-luat-le%E2%80%9D-va-vai-tro-cua-cac-nuoc-
vua-va-nho.aspx. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible
on 09 June 2023.)
4
See, for example, Pham Binh Minh, Cuc dien the gioi den 2020 [The world situation towards 2020] (Hanoi: Nxb.
Chinh tri quoc gia Su that, 2010); Cam Tu Dang and Vu Tung Nguyen, ‘Decoding Vietnam’s foreign policy
after the thirteenth national party congress: process, continuity, and adjustment’, TRaNS: Trans-Regional and
-National Studies of Southeast Asia 11: 1, 2022, pp. 89–101, https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2022.9.
1558
International Affairs 99: 4, 2023

Vietnam’s prudent pivot to the rules-based international order
ing the perpectives of Vietnam—an example of a weaker state in the international
system—to aid our understanding of the literature on international order.
Vietnam’s world-view and conceptualization of the evolving internation-

al and regional orders
The historical background of Vietnam’s conceptualization of interna-
tional order
There are many factors that have contributed to shaping Vietnam’s world-view

and conceptualization of international order, including, among others, culture,
geography, ideology, the history of enculturation and co-existence with China
over thousands of years, and the interaction with western civilizations through a
hundred years of anti-colonialism and modernization.
China has exerted a great influence on Vietnam’s world-view, including the
former’s vision of Tianxia, or the Chinese world order. Throughout history, China
constantly sought influence over Vietnam through various attempts to conquer
and assimilate the latter. Since Vietnam gained de facto independence from China
in 938 ad, China imposed its order on Vietnam through ‘rituals and ceremo-
nies’ of the tributary systems. In order to affirm its position in the China-centric
order, Vietnam implemented a two-pronged policy of ‘self-proclaimed Emperor
internally and self-proclaimed King externally’ (trong xung de, ngoai xung vuong)
to retain a degree of harmony with Chinese feudal dynasties whilst preserving
its own independence and sphere of influence. On the one hand, Vietnamese
rulers paid tribute regularly and bowed down to China’s emperors—even after
defeating multiple Chinese invasions—in return for Chinese acceptance of their
kingly entitlements. On the other hand, self-proclaimed Vietnamese emperors
tried to establish their own tributary system, or ‘a mini-Tianxia’, over various
states in southern Vietnam.5
At the end of the nineteenth century, the influence of China on Vietnam’s
world-view had waned to make way for anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, as
well as the spread of Marxist ideology and Westphalian norms following French
colonial rule. Many notable Vietnamese intellectuals, such as Nguyen Truong To,
Luong Van Can, Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chu Trinh, had tried to find ways to
emancipate the country from feudalism and colonialism. They had studied the
experience of the West, China (Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People), and
Japan’s post-Meiji modernization, but finally Ho Chi Minh settled on the Marxist
doctrine of socialism. The guiding principle of Vietnam in much of the twentieth
century has been influenced by Ho Chi Minh’s idea of ‘national independence
in tandem with socialism’.6 After gaining national independence in 1945, North
Vietnam joined the socialist order led by the Soviet Union (USSR).
5
Vu Hong Lam, ‘Lich su quan he Viet–Trung nhin tu goc do dai chien luoc’ [The history of Vietnam–
China relations from a grand strategy perspective], Thoi dai moi [New era], no. 2, July 2004, http://www.
tapchithoidai.org/200402_VHLam.htm.
6
Ho Chi Minh, Toan tap [Full episode], vol. 15 (Hanoi: Nxb Chinh tri quoc gia, 2011), p. 392.
1559

Thuy T. Do
After the Second World War, most of the world adopted the Westphalian
norms of national self-determination and national sovereignty, and lived under
US/Soviet bipolarity. Vietnam’s conceptualization of international order during
the Cold War was characterized by the ‘two camps, four contradictions’ tenet.
Until the mid-1980s, the world-view held by the CPV leadership ‘was based on
orthodox Marxist-Leninist beliefs that world politics was a class struggle between
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie’ and ‘a mortal struggle between imperialist and
revolutionary camps’.7 In addition, the Cold War era was driven by four contra-
dictions, namely those between socialism and capitalism; between the bourgeoisie

and the working class; between colonial, dependent and underdeveloped peoples
and imperialist countries; and between capitalist countries themselves.
With regard to the regional order, Vietnam was heavily affected by great
power politics. After defeating the US and achieving national unification in
1975, Hanoi started to engage with those of its south-east Asian neighbours that
shared an anti-colonial history. However, due to the structural impacts of the
bipolar order, Vietnam and most of its south-east Asian neighbours held negative
views of each other. On the one hand, Vietnam saw the groupings of south-east
Asian countries, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and
ASEAN, as pro-American blocs with different political ideologies and an anti-
communist tendency. On the other hand, ASEAN member states were concerned
about Vietnam’s intention to export revolution to the region and its desire for
hegemony in Indochina. This was considered the main reason behind Vietnam’s
missed opportunity to improve relations with ASEAN in the mid-1970s. Relations
were also affected by ASEAN member states’ tilt towards China and the US and
the economic embargo on Vietnam after Hanoi sent its troops into Cambodia in
1979.8
Suffering international isolation for a decade (1979–89) and sensing the threat
of further ‘lagging behind’ its south-east Asian neighbours, Vietnam adopted a
policy of Doi Moi (renovation) in 1986 which established domestic reform, devel-
opment and modernization as fundamental long-term goals. However, the disso-
lution of the socialist system in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe in 1991
caused a serious churn in Vietnam’s world-view and revived the ‘two camps, four
contradictions’ tenet among the Vietnamese leadership. Seeing the world through
the lens of regime security, many Vietnamese leaders feared that if Vietnam
pursued reform, modernization and integration, it would follow the missteps of
the central and eastern European states.9 The greatest threat was thought to come
from the US and the West’s attempts to provoke ‘peaceful evolution’ (dien bien
hoa binh)—a concept borrowed from China—to undermine communist rule and
export liberal democracy to the remaining socialist states.10 However, at the same
7
Gareth Porter, ‘The transformation of Vietnam’s world-view: from two camps to interdependence’, Contem-
porary Southeast Asia 12: 1, 1990, pp. 1–19 at p. 1.
8
Vu Tung Nguyen, ‘Vietnam’s membership of ASEAN: a constructivist interpretation’, Contemporary Southeast
Asia 29: 3, 2007, pp. 483–505.
9
Vu, ‘The history of Vietnam–China relations from a grand strategy perspective’.
10
Jörn Dosch and Alexander L. Vuving, The impact of China on governance structures in Vietnam (Bonn: Deutsches
Institut für Entwicklungspolitik GmbH, 2008), p. 20.
1560

time Hanoi understood that, in order to develop and modernize, Vietnam would
have to cooperate with the economic and financial-technological centres led by
western capitalist countries (the US, Japan and western Europe).11 Elements of
the old world-view continued to coexist with the new, producing continuing
debates in foreign policy thinking between the pro-China and pro-Russia ‘conser-
vatives’ and pro-western ‘modernizers’ and/or ‘integrationists’ who wanted to
shift the country’s foreign policy emphasis from the struggle against imperialism
to economic interdependence.12 With the initial success of the Doi Moi policy,
Vietnam’s subsequent accession to ASEAN in 1995 and its rapprochement with the

US and western countries from the early 1990s, the modernization and integra-
tionist perspective has trumped isolationism.
Vietnam’s conceptualization of the contemporary international order

Since the turn of the new millennium, Vietnam has envisioned that the world is
in transition to a multipolar and multicentre order.13 Accordingly, the US remains
a superpower; other poles include China, Russia, the EU, Japan and India. World
politics also witnesses a diffusion of power, with the rise of multiple centres in
global governance, such as the UN, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa) and, to a lesser extent, the G20 and ASEAN14 or more loosely struc-
tured ‘interdependent networks’ such as the Asia-Pacific’s Principled Security
Network and the German–Franco-led Alliance for Multilateralism.15 However,
these emerging groupings and powers have yet to directly challenge the US-led
order, given their own internal problems and given that they still benefit from the
operating principles of the LIO, such as free trade and multilateral institutions.16
Recently, leaders of several emerging powers have talked about the emergence
of a ‘new world order’ with more centres of powers than the five great powers
(China, France, the UK, the US and the USSR, now Russia) that had been victo-
rious allies in the Second World War.17 Colonel Le The Mau—a former political
and security analyst from Vietnam’s influential Institute for Defence Strategy—
11
12
Alexander L. Vuving, ‘Strategy and evolution of Vietnam’s China policy: a changing mixture of pathways’,
Asian Survey 46: 6, 2006, pp. 805–24, https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2006.46.6.805.
13
Pham Binh Minh, Cuc dien the gioi den 2020 [The world situation towards 2020]; Dang Cong san Viet Nam
[Communist Party of Vietnam], Political report of the tenth session of the Party Central Committee at the eleventh
Congress of the CPV (Hanoi: National political publishing house, 2011), p. 42; Communist Party of Vietnam,
Documents of the twelfth Congress of the CPV (Hanoi: Office of the Party Central Committee, 2011), p. 71.
14
Nguyen Viet Thao, ‘Boi canh hinh thanh va dac diem noi bat cua cuc dien the gioi hien nay’ [The emerging
context and salient features of the existing world configuration], Ly luan chinh tri [Political Theory], 23 May
2023, http://lyluanchinhtri.vn/home/index.php/quoc-te/item/5013-boi-canh-hinh-thanh-va-dac-diem-noi-
bat-cua-cuc-dien-the-gioi-hien-nay.html
15
Vu Le Thai Hoang and Pham Duy Thuc, ‘Su dich chuyen tu tu duy “cuc” sang “mang luoi” trong trat tu
quoc te da cuc hien nay’ [The transition from ‘pole’ to ‘network’ thinking in the current multipolar interna-
tional order], Nghien cuu quoc te [International Studies Review] 129: 2, June 2022, https://nghiencuuquocte.
org/2022/08/24/chuyen-dich-tu-tu-duy-cuc-sang-mang-luoi-trong-trat-tu-quoc-te-da-cuc/.
16
Steve Chan, ‘Challenging the liberal order: the US hegemon as a revisionist power’, International Affairs 97: 5,
2021, pp. 1335–52, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab074; John M. Owen, ‘Two emerging international orders?
China and the United States’, International Affairs 97: 5, 2021, pp. 1415–31, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab111.
17
Berdal Aral, ‘“The world is bigger than five”: a salutary manifesto of Turkey’s new international outlook’,
Insight Turkey 21: 4, 2019, pp. 71–95, https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2019214.05.
1561

Thuy T. Do
also perceives the emergence of a Yalta 2.0 international order. If the postwar
Yalta 1.0 Order was based on two poles—the US and the USSR—then the Yalta
2.0 Order is also based on two poles. One is the US and its democratic allies, and
the other is the China–Russia coalition. In the words of US President Joe Biden,
cited by Le, the twenty-first century will be an era of competition between a
coalition of ‘democratic’ nations led by the US and a coalition led by ‘autocratic’
states such as China and Russia.18
In the evolving international order, Vietnam strongly promotes the role of the
UN as a new pole, with the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and the
UN itself being the ‘centre for harmonizing the actions of nations’.19 Along the

same lines, CPV leader Nguyen Phu Trong calls for ‘a United Nations that is truly
cohesive and inclusive, where every member, large or small, rich or poor, can have
a voice in deciding matters of common concern’ and that the UN ‘must serve as
the “incubator” for multilateral cooperation initiatives for peace, development
and prosperity’.20
Vietnam’s 2019 white paper posited that the evolving international order is
shaped by various driving forces such as globalization and international integra-
tion, cooperation, and mutual development and Industrial Revolution 4.0, as well
as strategic competition among major powers, small-scale conflicts, rising nation-
alism and power politics.21 The thirteenth national congress of the CPV predicted
further setbacks for international law and multilateral institutions, prolonged
crisis and recession in the global economy due to the impact of the COVID–19
pandemic, and heightened competition for markets, resources and technologies
among economic powerhouses.22
The ongoing war in Ukraine also marks the turn of the new international
order. Although it is still premature to predict how the Ukraine war will end,
Vietnam’s former deputy prime minister and distinguished diplomat Vu Khoan
believes that the war will affect the evolving international order significantly
and across three dimensions. First, the conflict has taken strategic competition
between major powers and the polarization of international politics to unprec-
edented levels, even if the danger of a destructive world war is averted. Second,
globalization has witnessed significant adjustments, with production and supply
chains as well as the commercial, financial and monetary systems at risk of being
split into different systems. However, the US–China–Russia strategic triangle is
18
Le The Mau, ‘Forecasting the world order in the post-Covid-19 Era’, Journal of National Defence, 15 Feb. 2022,
http://tapchiqptd.vn/en/events-and-comments/forecasting-the-world-order-in-the-postcovid19-era/18330.
html.
19
‘Remarks by PM Nguyen Xuan Phuc at UN General Assembly high-level meeting to commemorate UN’s
75th anniversary’, VietnamPlus, 22 Sept. 2020, https://en.vietnamplus.vn/remarks-by-pm-nguyen-xuan-
phuc-at-unga-highlevel-meeting-to-commemorate-uns-75th-anniversary/187379.vnp.
20
‘Remarks by Party General Secretary, State President Nguyen Phu Trong at high-level general debate of 75th
session of UNGA’, National Defence Journal, 26 Sept. 2020, http://tapchiqptd.vn/en/news/remarks-by-party-
general-secretary-state-president-nguyen-phu-trong-at-highlevel-general-d/16060.html.
21
Bo Quoc Phong [Ministry of Defence], Quoc phong Viet Nam 2019 [Viet Nam’s national defence 2019] (Hanoi:
National Political Publishing House), 2019, pp. 11–12.
22
Dang Cong san Viet Nam [Vietnam’s Communist Party], Van kien Dai hoi dai bieu lan thu XIII [Documents
of the thirteenth Congress of Vietnam’s Communist Party] (Hanoi: Nxb Chinh tri quoc gia Su that, 2021),
pp. 110–11.
1562

unlikely to become a crucial feature of international relations as it did during
the Cold War. Instead, a multipolar and multicentre world may be realized in
the near future. Third, many existing international organizations, including the
UN, will lose their vitality or need to be restructured with a new set of rules and
procedures.23 In this view, the Ukraine war ushers in the end of US and western
hegemony in international politics and the rise of a new post-western multipolar
order, with the US and its western allies on one side of the fault-line and a global
alliance of non-western powers consisting of China, Russia, and those countries
dissatisfied with the LIO on the other side.

When it comes to regional order, Vietnam emphasizes the strategic significance
of the Asia-Pacific as the key driver for global development and the centre of the
evolving strategic competition among the major powers. As Pham Binh Minh—
then permanent deputy prime minister and a recent minister of foreign affairs—
stated at the 27th International Conference on the Future of Asia in May 2022,
‘the present balance of power is rapidly shifting towards a multicentre model, in
which Asia will continue to be an integral economic, political and technological
hub in the world’. 24
Vietnam has benefited greatly from its ASEAN membership in terms of both
fostering its economic integration and development and increasing its strategic
leverage vis-à-vis the great powers. It therefore consistently promotes ASEAN
centrality in regional affairs. Hanoi has tried to forge ASEAN’s united position on
the South China Sea conflict at the same time as balancing the bloc’s relationship
with the major powers. Together with Indonesia and other ASEAN members, it
has contributed to developing ASEAN’s common position on the issuance of the
ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) as well as the bloc’s response to China’s
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
It is important to note that Vietnam accepts a growing regional bipolariza-
tion even as it supports global multipolarization. The Sino-US bipolar structure is
more evident in the Asia-Pacific, with heightened strategic competition and force
alignments between these two superpowers. As Nguyen Viet Thao, vice-president
of the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics, observed in 2019:
The Asia-Pacific regional order has the common features with the multi-polar and multi-
centre international order, but also possesses its own distinctions and characteristics. With
strong development after more than four decades of reform and opening up, China today
has become a global great power and a superpower in the Asia-Pacific, competing strategi-
cally with the US superpower … These two powers will seek to strengthen their [balance
of power] alignments, first of all with major actors (ASEAN, Russia, Japan, India, Korea,
Australia …) in order to gain advantages in shaping the power structures in the region and
Vietnam.25
23
Vu Khoan, ‘Mot thoi dai moi dang dan hinh thanh?’ [A new era taking shape?], Tap chi Cong san [Commu-
nist Review], 20 Nov. 2022, https://www.tapchicongsan.org.vn/web/guest/tin-binh-luan/-/asset_publisher/
DLIYi5AJyFzY/content/mot-thoi-dai-moi-dang-dan-hinh-thanh-.
24
‘Full remarks by Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh at the 27th Int’l Conference on Future of Asia’,
Socialist Republic of Vietnam Government News, 26 May 2022, https://en.baochinhphu.vn/full-remarks-by-
deputy-pm-pham-binh-minh-at-27th-intl-conference-on-future-of-asia-111220526184129729.htm.
25
Nguyen Viet Thao, ‘Nhan dien mot so xu the trong the gioi tac dong den tu duy chien luoc va doi ngoai
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Thuy T. Do
This bipolar regional structure has created intertwining opportunities and
challenges for lesser states in the region, and Vietnam is no exception. Vietnam’s
geopolitical location places it at the centre of great power rivalry, thus it needs to
navigate the complex dynamics. In particular, the competition for influence and
the creation of different types of balance-of-power alignments will force small
and medium-sized countries to ‘choose sides’ and poses many challenges for their
foreign affairs and ASEAN solidarity.26
Vietnam’s shifting perspectives vis-à-vis the liberal international order:

from an outsider to a stakeholder
Vietnam’s engagement with the US- or western-led liberal order: cata-
lysts and constraints
The drivers for Vietnam’s gradual engagement with the US-led LIO are princi-
pally threefold. First, the course of domestic reform and modernization, starting
with Doi Moi in 1986, created the room for rapprochement with the US and
capitalist countries, as the latter were seen as a hub of trade, investment, finance
and technology that Vietnam wanted to attract in order to construct an aspira-
tional ‘strong nation, wealthy people, and civilized, democratic and just society’—
a political slogan introduced since the Tenth Congress of the CPV in 2006.27
Vietnam’s normalization of diplomatic relations with the US, its signing of a
cooperation framework with the EU and its decision to join ASEAN all took
place in 1995, marking a milestone in its ‘open-door’ policy, under which it set
out to befriend all nations in the world for the purposes of joint development. To
date, Vietnam is the only ASEAN member state that has strategic or comprehen-
sive partnerships with all the members of the G7 and with as many as 16 members
of the G20 grouping. These countries are also the largest trade and investment
partners of Vietnam.
Second, Vietnam’s proactive international and regional integration also contrib-
utes to Hanoi’s shifting perspective vis-à-vis the LIO. The inclusion of Vietnam
in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) in 1998, and its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007,
have been conducive towards this end. As Vu Hong Lam points out, in the Doi Moi
period Hanoi ‘considered the world as a unified, interdependent market, moving in
the direction of globalization and regionalization. Countries that want to survive
quoc gia hien nay’ [Recognizing some international trends affecting national strategic thinking and foreign
policy at the moment], Tap chi Cong san [Communist Review], 2 Dec. 2019, https://www.tapchicongsan.org.
vn/web/guest/quoc-phong-an-ninh-oi-ngoai1/-/2018/815612/nhan-dien-mot-so-xu-the-trong-the-gioi-tac-
dong-den-tu-duy-chien-luoc-va-doi-ngoai-quoc-gia-hien-nay.aspx.
26
Le Hai Binh, ed., Tap hop luc luong trong the ky XXI: Xu huong, tac dong va doi sach cua Viet Nam [Force alignment
in the twenty-first century: trends, implications and Vietnam’s policy] (Hanoi: Nxb. Chinh tri quoc gia su
that, 2020).
27
Tran Huu Tien, ‘Dan giau, nuoc manh, xa hoi cong bang, dan chu, van minh’ [Strong nation, wealthy people,
and civilized, democratic and just society], Tap chi Cong san [Communist Review], 06 July 2007, https://
tapchicongsan.org.vn/tin-tieu-diem-10-06/-/2018/450/%E2%80%9Cdan-giau%2C-nuoc-manh%2C-xa-hoi-
cong-bang%2C-dan-chu%2C-van-minh%E2%80%9D.aspx
1564

have no choice but to participate in the “new international division of labor”, to
integrate into the world economy and to integrate into the region’.28 In fact, Viet-
nam now increasingly identifies itself as a beneficiary, if not a stakeholder, of the
LIO. Thus far, Vietnam has participated in more than 500 bilateral and multilateral
agreements in many fields. It is recognized by 71 countries as a market economy,
and has signed 15 free-trade agreements (FTAs), including the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). As a result, by 2023 Vietnam has
become one of the 20 largest exporting countries in the world, and its economy is
among those with the highest level of openness globally.29

Third, growing security concerns, particularly involving China’s geopolitical
rise and its assertiveness in the South China Sea, have brought Hanoi closer to
Washington and the LIO. Vietnam’s changing view of the US—formerly seen as
an ‘arch-enemy’, it is now considered a ‘comprehensive partner’—is remarkable.
Hanoi and Washington have increasingly seen eye to eye on a wide range of bilat-
eral and multilateral issues, such as mutual respect for each other’s polity, indepen-
dence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutually beneficial cooperation, and
respect for the UN Charter and international law, as well as on substantive issues
such as nuclear non-proliferation, counterterrorism, climate change, the safety
of navigation, and the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific.30
Economically, the US is now Vietnam’s second largest trading partner after China,
while Vietnam is the US’s eighth largest trading partner and the ASEAN member
country that exports the most to the US.31
Hanoi has also been courted to join regional security and economic arrange-
ments led by the US and/or its allies, such as the CPTPP (and the original Trans-
Pacific Partnership—TPP), the concept of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP),
the ‘Quad Plus’ initiative, building on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—
Quad—between Australia, India, Japan and the US, and the Indo-Pacific
Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF).32 According to the 2022 and 2023
survey reports conducted by the Institute of Southeast Asian studies (now ISEAS-
Yusof Ishak Institute), Vietnamese respondents are among those most supportive
of US influence in the region and Washington’s leadership in maintaining RBO
28
29
Nguyen Minh Phong, ‘Dau an tich cuc tren hanh trinh doi moi va hoi nhap quoc te cua Viet Nam’ [Positive
imprints in the course of renovation and international integration of Vietnam], Socialist Republic of Vietnam
Government News, 10 Jan. 2022, https://baochinhphu.vn/dau-an-tich-cuc-tren-hanh-trinh-doi-moi-va-hoi-
nhap-quoc-te-cua-viet-nam-102220110083625022.htm.
30
Hoang Anh Tuan and Do Thi Thuy, ‘U.S.–Vietnam security cooperation: catalysts and constraints’, Asian
Politics & Policy 8: 1, 2016, pp. 179–92, https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12229.
31
‘Chu tich USABC danh gia cao trien vong hop tac song phuong Viet-My’ [President of USABC highly
appreciates the prospect of US-Vietnam bilateral cooperation], Vietnam Plus, 31 May 2023, https://www.
vietnamplus.vn/chu-tich-usabc-danh-gia-cao-trien-vong-hop-tac-song-phuong-vietmy/865459.vnp
32
Kent Hughes and Anh Nguyen, Vietnam takes on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Washington DC: The Wilson
Center, 2015), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/vietnam_
takes_on_trans-pacific_partnership.pdf; Le Thu Huong, Southeast Asian perceptions of the quadrilateral security
dialogue, ASPI Special Report, 2018; VietnamNews, ‘Viêt Nam joins Indo-Pacific Economic Framework
for Prosperity’, 23 May 2022, https://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/1204361/viet-nam-joins-indo-pacific-
economic-framework-for-prosperity.html.
1565

Thuy T. Do
and upholding international law (39.7 per cent), as well as its initiatives such as the
Quad (65.9 per cent) and IPEF (55.9 per cent).33 At the UN, however, Vietnam’s
voting behaviour does not always align with the positions of the US and western
countries, particularly on those issues related to its traditional partners such as
Cuba (over the US embargo), Palestine (over the Israel–Palestine conflict), and
Russia (over the conflict in Ukraine).
In sum, Vietnam adopts a dual perception of the US as the hegemon in the
LIO. On the one hand, Hanoi sees Washington as an important economic partner
and an indispensable security patron to hedge against China’s intentions in the

South China Sea dispute. On the other hand, differences in political systems,
democratic values and strategic calculations about China’s reactions still matter in
obstructing Hanoi and Washington from elevating their bilateral relations from
a comprehensive partnership to a strategic partnership framework. As Le Dang
Doanh—a notable reform economist—observes:
We live in a world that is rapidly and fluidly changing … Mr. United States [sic], he is
far away, and has never grabbed anyone’s land. [On the other hand] the United States has
a very different civilization from us, our economies are different, our way of thinking is
different, so understanding each other is not easy.34
It is important to note that Hanoi’s lingering concerns about the LIO are largely
driven by regime security and democracy-related reasons. Although the concep-
tualization of international order in Vietnam is less ideologically driven at the
present time, regime security—understood as maintaining the country’s socialist
orientation and the CPV’s political power—still looms large in Hanoi’s world-
view. Recently, in making the case for the relevance of Marxism-Leninism in
today’s world and the country’s continued transition towards socialism, Vietnam’s
most influential leader, CPV general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, highlighted
many weaknesses of capitalism as a model for development:
We concur that capitalism has never been more global as it is today, and has achieved
immense accomplishments, especially in liberating and developing the productive capacity
and advancing science and technology … Yet capitalism still cannot address its innate and
fundamental contradictions. Crises continue to break out … Reality has shown us that the
‘free market’ of capitalism itself cannot help solve these problems, and in many cases even
causes serious harm to poor countries and deepens the conflict between global labour and
global capital. This reality also rips apart economic theories or development models that
have long been considered as ‘in vogue’.35
33
Sharon Seah et al., The state of southeast Asia: 2023 survey report (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2023),
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/state-of-southeast-asia-survey/the-state-of-southeast-asia-
2023-survey-report-2/; Sharon Seah et al., The state of southeast Asia: 2022 survey report (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof
Ishak Institute, 2022), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/The-State-of-SEA-2022_FA_
Digital_FINAL.pdf.
34
Quoted in David W. P. Elliott, Changing worlds: Vietnam’s transition from Cold War to globalization (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 291.
35
Nguyen Phu Trong, ‘Some theoretical and practical issues on socialism and the path towards socialism in Viet
Nam’, Socialist Republic of Vietnam Government News, 20 July 2021, https://en.baochinhphu.vn/some-
theoretical-and-practical-issues-on-socialism-and-the-path-towards-socialism-in-viet-nam-11141771.htm.
1566

In addition, Vietnam still has some reservations about an important element of
the LIO, namely the promotion of western-style democracy and human rights.
Concerns over the recession of democracies36 and even the end of the LIO37
have been growing, particularly in the wake of Donald Trump’s ascendancy to
power. Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, observes
that the three components of LIO—liberalism, universalism and the preservation
of internal order—are being challenged as never before in its 70-year history.38
The relative decline of the West since the 2008 global financial crisis further casts
doubt on its ability to write the rules for the evolving order. Along similar lines,

Nguyen Phan Quynh Giao and Do Thi Thuy posit that the ‘over-expansion’ of
the western liberal order—in the sense of spreading democracies across the globe
through military interventions and colour revolutions, as well as the ongoing
global and regional power shifts—has significantly undermined the American
order. This, in turn, gives rise to a non-western coalition endorsing new values
and a new balance of power in the international system.39
Some Vietnamese International Relations (IR) commentators posit that the
current COVID–19 crisis is a litmus test for the resilience of the LIO. They note
that the US and European states were heavily struck by the pandemic, at least
partly due to their ineffective handling of it, making their claim to global leader-
ship and governance questionable.40 Thus, Colonel Le The Mau argues that the
COVID–19 pandemic ‘revealed the very basic limitations of post-Cold War global-
ized capitalism and would accelerate the collapse of the unipolar world order
and the Washington consensus’, as capitalist countries could not serve as ‘a good
model’ for governance. The world was therefore in need of ‘The Great Reset’
of the global capitalist system.41 COVID–19 would accelerate the global power
shift and the recession of the US-led order and Washington consensus. Emerging
powers such as India, South Africa and various developing countries had led global
efforts to respond to the pandemic—for instance, in urgently calling for western
countries and the big pharmaceutical companies to temporarily waive the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS agree-
ment) for the production of COVID–19 vaccines.
Vietnam’s burgeoning interests in the rules-based international order

Given the historical and ideological issues, Vietnamese policy-makers and scholars
appear to be more comfortable using the term RBO rather than LIO. In fact,
36
Le, ‘Forecasting the world order in the post-COVID–19 era’.
37
Amitav Acharya, The end of American world order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014); Christopher Layne, ‘The
US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana’, International Affairs 94: 1, 2018, pp. 89–111, https://
doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix249.
38
Richard N. Haass, ‘Liberal world order, R.I.P. ’, Project Syndicate, 21 March 2018, https://www.cfr.org/article/
liberal-world-order-rip.
39
Nguyen and Do, ‘Arising issues in the American order under the Donald Trump administration’, International
Studies 119: 4, 2019, pp. 147–74 at p. 174.
40
Nguyen and Do, ‘Arising issues in the American order under the Donald Trump administration’.
41
Le, ‘Forecasting the world order in the post-COVID–19 era’.
1567

Thuy T. Do
RBO is increasingly used by Vietnamese foreign policy-makers in official policy
statements and during meetings with foreign leaders (particularly with the
Quad member countries, the EU, and ASEAN members) as well as in scholarly
exchanges.42 In a first comprehensive volume on the RBO in Vietnam, IR special-
ists Le Hai Binh and Chu Minh Thao define it as ‘a kind of order established
through the rules and laws so as to manage the behaviour of actors, a joint commit-
ment among countries implementing structural actions that include agreed rules
such as international laws, regional security agreements and trade agreements’.43
Vietnam increasingly adopts key elements of the RBO, which include respect

for national sovereignty, international law, universal rules and norms; support
for multilateral global governance mechanisms, particularly the UN and ASEAN;
and promotion of globalization and a rules-based trading system. The reasons
for Vietnam’s gradual pivot to an RBO are essentially fourfold. First, Vietnam
benefits from the RBO because, as a weaker state in the international system,
it needs to rely on international rules and institutions to help constrain power
politics. Second, Vietnam supports multilateralism to forge collective actions
against global challenges that affect the country significantly, such as climate
change, pandemics, sustainable development, and so on. Third, Vietnam also
benefits from a rules-based trading system, centred on the WTO, regional FTAs
and bilateral trade agreements, that strongly advances its prosperity. Finally, the
shared perception of the China threat, especially in the South China Sea, among
Vietnam, the US, and the latter’s allies ( Japan, the EU, the UK and Australia,
above all), and Hanoi’s reliance on multilateral rules and norms in circumstances
such as managing maritime disputes, have shaped Vietnam’s supportive view of
the US-led regional and global orders.
Although the extent of Hanoi’s support for the US-led RBO remains steady,
it is not without limitations. As Le Hong Hiep observes, it ‘will vary depending
on the shifting dynamics in Vietnam’s relations with China as well as Sino-US
strategic competition’.44 Unprecedented events such as the Russia–NATO
confrontation in Ukraine also pose great challenges for sustaining the RBO. On
the one hand, Hanoi understands that Russia’s launch of the ‘special military
operation’ in Ukraine from February 2022 is a clear violation of international law
and the principles of the RBO. This view is shared by a recent survey report:
32.4 per cent of Vietnamese respondents in the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s 2023
42
For example, RBO has been a key topic of discussion at recent important policy and scholarly events in
Vietnam such as the annual South China Sea Conference (since 2014); the 7th Maritime Dialogue, with the
theme ‘Assessment of emerging maritime issues from the perspective of international law’, organized by the
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV) in collaboration with the British embassy in Vietnam and the German
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) foundation in August 2021; and the international symposium entitled
‘Sustaining peace in time of uncertainties: toward greater regional resilience and responsiveness’, organized
by DAV and KAS in December 2019 within the framework of the 12th Congress of the Council for Security
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).
43
Le Hai Binh and Chu Minh Thao, eds, Trat tu quoc te dua tren luat le: ly luan, thuc tien va ham y cho Viet Nam
[International rules-based order: theory, practice, and implications for Vietnam] (Hanoi: Nxb. Chinh tri quoc
gia Su that, 2021), pp. 27–8.
44
Le Hong Hiep, The Vietnam-US security partnership and the rules-based international order in the age of Trump (Singa-
pore: ISEAS Publishing, 2020), p. 27.
1568

survey consider that the most serious impact of ‘Russia’s invasion of Ukraine’
is that it ‘erodes trust in a rules-based order and [is a] violation of national
sovereignty’.45 On the other hand, Hanoi’s close political and defence relations
with Moscow prevent it from publicly joining the West in criticizing Russia.
Instead, its position on the Ukraine issue is more convergent with that of China,
India, and other neutral states in abstaining in most votes at international organi-
zations within the UN system. In addition, Vietnamese public opinion is divided
on the Ukraine issue, with one side calling for Russia to respect international
law and withdraw its troops, and the other side blaming the West for failing to

take into consideration Russia’s legitimate security concerns and adopting double
standards in their sanctions (for example, confiscating Russian assets in the West
or imposing a price cap on Russian oil).46
Against such a background, Vietnam’s own official position is to remain
neutral and call for the observance of international law. Speaking at an event at
the Washington DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
in May 2022, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh reiterated Vietnam’s position:
… to respect the UN Charter and principles of international law, respect the independ-
ence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, and to address all disputes through
peaceful means without use or threat of force … In a world full of turbulence, strategic
competition and a great many choices, Vietnam picks no side. Instead, it chooses justice,
fairness and goodness, based on the principles of international law and the UN Charter. It
chooses equality, shared benefits for all, and win-win for all.47
Vietnam’s perception of the Chinese world order and the emerging in-
ternational order
Strategic ambivalence vis-à-vis the Chinese vision of world order
Vietnam’s conception of international order and its engagement with the LIO/
RBO are closely attached to the Chinese vision of world order. As John Owen
has noted, the emerging international order is characterized by two contrasting
components: the LIO, led by the US and Europe, and the China-led order which
‘might be termed an authoritarian–capitalist international order (ACIO), empha-
sizing authoritarian government, state-led development (but also trade and invest-
ment) and state sovereignty’.48 The soul of ACIO lies in China’s vision of a united
and harmonious world (Datong) or a ‘community with shared destiny’, based on
Confucian ideas and the ancient Chinese philosophy of Tianxia. The ACIO is put
45
Seah et al., The state of southeast Asia: 2023 survey report, p. 19.
46
There have as yet been no official surveys of public opinion in Vietnam regarding the war in Ukraine.
However, Vietnamese internet users often express their opinions by commenting on various posts concerning
the Russia–Ukraine military conflict through online media platforms, most notably VnExpress and Vietnam-
Net.
47
‘Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh’s full speech at CSIS’, Socialist Republic of Vietnam Government
News, 16 May 2022, https://en.baochinhphu.vn/prime-minister-pham-minh-chinhs-full-speech-at-
csis-111220516063545637.htm.
48
Owen, ‘Two emerging international orders?’, p. 1416.
1569

Thuy T. Do
into practice through China-led frameworks for global governance such as the
Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative (GSI), the BRI and
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Among these, the BRI serves as the
backbone of ACIO with an aim to construct ‘the global network of partnerships,
officially based on “dialogue, non-confrontation, and non-alliance”’.49
For Vietnam, China’s vision of world order offers an appealing alterna-
tive model of global leadership and development, stimulated by the successful
economic reforms which have transformed China into a global power as well as
the two countries’ similarities in ideology, culture and concerns about regime

security and the ‘peaceful evolution’ of democratic values. In addition, over
the last decade China has become Vietnam’s most important economic partner.
However, for historical and security reasons and on account of a strong anti-
China sentiment among the Vietnamese public, Hanoi has not actively partici-
pated in China-led initiatives. The ISEAS’s aforementioned surveys reveal that
Vietnamese respondents have modest confidence in China’s contribution to global
peace, security, prosperity and governance, and in its specific initiatives such as
GSI and the BRI.
Despite scepticism about China’s attempt to revive a Sino-centric regional
order, for historical reasons, and Vietnam’s leaning towards the US-led RBO in
recent years, Hanoi tries to strike a balance in its relations with China and the US
(and the West in general) and to maintain stable relations with Beijing. While it is
being courted by new alignments such as the Quad and the AUKUS security pact,
with proposals to include it in the Quad Plus initiative and boost strategic cooper-
ation, Hanoi has maintained a prudent approach towards these US-led security
arrangements (for instance, by not publicly supporting them, and preserving its
‘four nos’ non-alignment policy instead).50 This strategy reflects Hanoi’s concerns
over Beijing’s possible reactions to Hanoi’s strategic turn towards ‘an overtly anti-
China coalition of democracies’51 and the prospect of eroding ASEAN centrality
in the regional architecture.
Vietnam’s preferences for change in the emerging international order

Given Vietnam’s complex conception and perspectives vis-à-vis the LIO and
ACIO, and its emerging status as a middle power in Asia, the country envisions
an emerging international order whereby lesser states would have a greater voice
in rule-making. In Hanoi’s view, small and medium-sized countries must play
an increasingly important role in the development of rules in new issue areas,
such as cybersecurity, climate change and green growth. This is especially true
in cases when rule-making in these new areas has much to do with the interests
49
Nadège Rolland, China’s vision for a new world order, NBR special report no. 83 (Washington DC: National
Bureau of Asian Research, 2020), p. 41.
50
The ‘four nos’ are no military alliances, no alignment with one country against another, no foreign military
bases on Vietnamese territory and no use of force or threats in international relations. The last ‘no’ is to reas-
sure Beijing that Hanoi has no intention of engaging in armed conflict for reasons other than self-defence.
51
Rahul Mishra, ‘Vietnam’s regional security perceptions and priorities: role of India’, India Quarterly 77: 2,
2021, pp. 200–218 at p. 200, https://doi.org/10.1177/09749284211004983.
1570

of weaker states and does not necessarily follow the usual logic of big power
competition. Instead, lesser states should have a strong stake in strengthening the
rules-based international order, as well as playing an active role in creating and
maintaining such an order through a strong commitment to multilateralism.52
Le Hai Binh and Chu Minh Thao observe that countries across the globe ‘share
the same desire to promote the building of an international order operating on the
basis of common principles, standards and rules as a way of ensuring a peaceful,
secure, and favourable environment’.53 An RBO also converges with the interests
of Vietnam in promoting ASEAN centrality and leadership in regional order and

peaceful settlement of international disputes such as the South China Sea issue.
In short, Vietnam’s notion of an RBO overlaps but is not fully congruent
with that of the West. From Hanoi’s vantage point, the RBO should serve the
interests of the majority of states for the purpose of collective action but should
not be an instrument in the hands of a few great powers. In addition, ‘a sustain-
able and effective international order’ needs to ‘ensure the principle of fairness
and equality, be open and balanced between different ideologies, aiming to serve
the interests of all peoples and nations; and that rules and regulations should be
applied consistently and extensively’.54
It is Hanoi’s hope that, as an emerging middle power, it will contribute to
shaping the current RBO as a rule-maker rather than a pure rule-taker.55 Accord-
ingly, Vietnam projects itself as a country that continues to uphold the rule of
law at both the national and international levels, strengthens pluralism in inter-
national affairs, and complies with the basic principles of international law, the
UN Charter, and international treaties to which Vietnam is a signatory. During
its chairmanship of the UN Security Council (2020–2021), it helped to formulate
an open discussion and a Chairman’s statement to reiterate respect for the UN
Charter.56 As a newly elected member of the UN Human Rights Council for the
term 2023–2025, Vietnam made great efforts at the 52nd Session to build a core
group with representatives of all regions of the world, in successfully negotiating
for a resolution on the 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the 30th anniversary of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action.57 In addition, Vietnam played a leading role in the formation of the ‘Group
of Friends of UNCLOS’ forum, established to commemorate the 40th anniversary
of the signing of this landmark convention in 1982. After the maritime incident
52
Dang Cam Tu, ‘Rules-based international order and the role of small and medium-sized countries’.
53
Le and Chu, International rules-based order, p. 317.
54
‘Phat bieu cua PTT Pham Binh Minh tai Hoi nghi Tuong lai chau A’ [Speech by Deputy Prime Minister
Pham Binh Minh at the Asia Future Conference], VietnamPlus, 30 May 2019, https://www.vietnamplus.vn/
phat-bieu-cua-ptt-pham-binh-minh-tai-hoi-nghi-tuong-lai-chau-a/572189.vnp.
55
Le Dinh Tinh, ‘A multi-level approach to Vietnam foreign policy: from security preoccupation to middle
power role’, Strategic Analysis 45: 4, 2021, pp. 321–35, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2021.1938942; Thuy T.
Do, ‘Vietnam’s emergence as a middle power in Asia: unfolding the power–knowledge nexus’, Journal of
Current Southeast Asian Affairs 41: 2, 2022, pp. 279–302, https://doi.org/10.1177/18681034221081146.
56
‘10 dau an cua Viet Nam tai Hoi dong Bao an Lien hop quoc nhiem ky 2020–2021’ [10 imprints of Vietnam at
the UNSC during the 2021–2022 term], VietnamPlus, 18 Jan. 2022, https://vov.vn/chinh-tri/10-dau-an-cua-
viet-nam-tai-hoi-dong-bao-an-lien-hop-quoc-nhiem-ky-2020-2021-post918924.vov.
57
‘Vietnam active at UN Human Rights Council’s 52nd session’, VietnamPlus, 5 April 2023, https://
en.vietnamplus.vn/vietnam-active-at-un-human-rights-councils-52nd-session/251034.vnp.
1571

Thuy T. Do
involving the deployment of China’s giant HD-981 oil rig in Vietnam’s claimed
waters in the South China Sea in 2014, Vietnamese legal experts have studied the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)’s 2016 ruling on the South China Sea case
brought by the Philippines against China, in consideration of bringing a similar
case against China in future.58 The fact that the PCA recently opened a new repre-
sentative office in Vietnam is evidence of international recognition of Vietnam’s
strong commitment to the peaceful settlement of international disputes by means
of international law.
In addition, Vietnam strongly promotes ASEAN centrality in shaping the evolv-

ing rules-based regional order. In Hanoi’s view, ASEAN’s capacity and reputation
for establishing the ‘rules of the game’ in the Indo-Pacific region—such as open
regionalism, soft institutionalism and ASEAN centrality—is a testament to how
small and medium-sized countries can, in combination, make a significant impact.59
The appeal of ASEAN’s norms and rules derives from the flexibility and inclusive-
ness of ASEAN-led mechanisms—in contrast to the competitive and exclusive
nature of the BRI and FOIP strategies led by China and the US, respectively.
Conclusions
This article has analysed Vietnam’s changing attitude towards the LIO over the
past two decades. It argues that due to concerns over regime security Vietnam
has shifted from a stance of opposition to and scepticism of the LIO to a gradual
pivot to the RBO, both at the international and regional levels. Vietnam’s concep-
tualization of an RBO overlaps but is not fully congruent with that of the LIO.
Basically, Vietnam conforms to the Westphalian minimalist conception, or a hard
sovereignty view of international order. Yet it has also cautiously adopted positive
elements of the western-crafted liberal order such as respect for international laws
and norms, support for multilateralism and collective actions to deal with global
challenges, and the promotion of a rules-based trading system. However, Hanoi
emphasizes universally negotiated rules and institutions, rather than western-
dominated ones, with the focus on the rules and norms promoted by the UN
and ASEAN. It also supports a strengthening of the respective roles of the UN
and ASEAN in the international and regional orders. As China’s power increases,
Vietnam has been careful to adjust to its rise and its intention to construct an
alternative vision of international order. Vietnam’s gradual pivot to the RBO
and its strategic ambivalence vis-à-vis the China-led order will be maintained for
the immediate future, but could sharpen subject to the dynamics of the Sino-US
power shift and the South China Sea disputes. This, in turn, would have profound
implications for Vietnam’s bilateral relations with the US and China, as well as
for Hanoi’s desire to enhance its leverage and ASEAN centrality in the regional
architecture in the coming years.
58
Thuy T. Do, ‘Vietnam’s strategic outlook after Haiyang 981’, East Asia Forum, 4 June 2014, https://www.
eastasiaforum.org/2014/06/04/vietnams-strategic-outlook-after-haiyang-981/.
59
Tran Viet Thai, ‘The evolving regional order in east Asia: a view from Vietnam’, Asia Policy 13: 2, 2018,
pp. 64–8.
1572

Hanoi believes that the unfolding international order will feature a multipolar
structure in which the US and other major powers will cooperate and compro-
mise; however, they will also struggle and constrain each other more fiercely. In
view of the complexity, fluidity and uncertainty of world politics, the interna-
tional order is still in the process of transformation. In this light, Vietnam supports
the rise of a more universal rules-based international order with a greater diffusion
of power in which small and medium states like Vietnam have a bigger voice and
greater agency. This, in turn, would help consolidate Vietnam’s foreign policy
options, strengthening its commitment to multilateralism, international integra-

tion and the rule of law.
1573

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