Diplomacy & Statecraft

ISSN: 0959-2296 (Print) 1557-301X (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdps20

Russo–Iranian Relations in the Post-Soviet Era

Adam Tarock

To cite this article: Adam Tarock (2017) Russo–Iranian Relations in the Post-Soviet Era,
Diplomacy & Statecraft, 28:3, 518-537, DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2017.1347449

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2017.1347449

Published online: 14 Sep 2017.

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DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
2017, VOL. 28, NO. 3, 518–537
https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2017.1347449

Russo–Iranian Relations in the Post-Soviet Era

Adam Tarock
Mont Albert North, Victoria Australia

ABSTRACT
The West has shunned the Islamic Republic of Iran for most of the
past 38 years. To neutralise the very negative impact that this
situation has had on the country’s economy and political isola-
tion, Iran has turned to the East, in particular to China and Russia,
a change in orientation despite Iran’s traditional preference for
the West. Since the Soviet Union’s demise, Iran and Russia have
steadily been expanding co-operation in trade, regional security,
nuclear technology, military issues, and oil and natural gas
exploration and marketing. Yet both Powers have cautiously
approached one other. The degree of expansion or contraction
in co-operation has depended considerably on whether relations
between the West and Russia have been amicable or hostile.
Historically speaking, Great Power rivalry over Iran has worked
better for Tehran than when these Powers have taken a unified
policy, as in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

This analysis examines Russo–Iranian relations since the disintegration of the

Soviet Union in 1991. The two Powers have experienced many difficulties in
their relations since then, yet their new relationship can be marked as the best in
more than 150 years. Russo–Persian/Iranian relations go back several centuries,
but to set the background for this exegesis, a crucial beginning is the early
nineteenth century when the two Powers went to war three times. These wars
ended in total disaster for Persia, which signed the Turkmenchay and Golastan
peace treaties whereby the Russian Empire annexed large territories from
Greater Persia: the present-day Republic of Azerbaijan, Daghestan, Armenia,
Eastern Georgia, Igdir, the Erevan Khanate, and Nakhchivan. To this day,
Iranians feel betrayed, bitter, and nostalgic for the loss of their old territories.
In 1907, unknown to the Iranians, Russia and Britain divided the
country into “spheres of influence” via the Anglo–Russian Convention.
Contemporaneously, from 1906 to 1911, the Russians supported pro-
royalist forces against the Persian/Iranian Constitutional Movement. In
1941, the Soviet Union and Britain occupied Iran that, despite having a
fascist pro-German shah, had declared its neutrality in the Second World
War. Then in late 1945, Moscow caused an international crisis by sup-
porting a group of communist insurgents, the Firqeh, in the Iranian

CONTACT Adam Tarock itarock@bigpond.net.au 24 Francesca Street, Mont Albert North, Victoria 3129, Australia.
© 2017 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 519

province of Azerbaijan. The Firqeh leader, Jafar Pisheveri, sought auton-

omy from the central government in Teheran, and Russian support for the
group apparently aimed to annex Iranian Azerbaijan to the Soviet Union’s
Republic of Azerbaijan. When the alarmed Iranian government ordered
army units to put down the insurgency, Soviet Red Army forces still
occupying Azerbaijan prevented those units from entering the province.
In the end, backed by the United States, Iran took the issue to the United
Nations [UN] asking Moscow to stop interfering in internal Iranian
affairs. After diplomatic tension between Tehran and Moscow, Soviet
troops departed. The historiography of the Cold War often portrays
East–West relations and the Azerbaijan crisis as part of the genesis of
the Cold War.1
Then from the early 1950s when the American Central Intelligence Agency
helped overthrow the democratically elected nationalist government of
Mohammad Mossadeq in a coup until the 1979 Iranian revolution, Iran joined
the Western-sponsored anti-Soviet bloc. Iranians found themselves caught up in
the Cold War. In response, through their proxy, the Tudeh [communist] Party
of Iran, the Soviets often agitated against the Tehran government. The Tudeh
organised huge anti-government street demonstrations, factory and other indus-
trial strikes, and tried to undermine government legitimacy through propa-
ganda. In addition, Radio Moscow often implicitly and/or explicitly threatened
Russian military action against Iran if Tehran failed to follow a balanced stance
between West and East. All these bitter and humiliating events taught Iranians a
hard political lesson: however predatory Great Powers are, they are more
dangerous when they put aside their rivalry.2 It constituted a lesson applied to
current Russo–American relations regarding post-Cold War Iran.
Encounters with major world Powers have left Iranians with an indelible
distrust of what they disparagingly refer to as “predatory foreigners.” This
historical distrust of outside Powers continues to this day to colour Iran’s
relations with them. Yet, international politics rarely find conduct on trust
and friendship, even amongst Powers of equal weight, similar historical,
cultural, and racial backgrounds, or common heritage. Iran is no exception.
A cursory examination shows the current Russo–Iranian relationship
founded on realpolitik not trust. In this context, realpolitik is multi-layered:
states establish political ties amongst themselves to serve best their national
interests; the international political system is anarchic; international actors
act rationally to maximise their self-interest; and all states desire strength to
ensure self-preservation. In the words of Ludwig von Rochau, the nineteenth-
century German political theorist, “Ultimately, the realpolitik is the enemy of
all kinds of self-delusion.”3 What perhaps needs adding is that Great Powers
usually arrogate particular privileges to themselves when dealing with lesser
ones. Hence, as in the past, it is unsurprising that the Russo–Iranian relation-
ship in recent decades skews in Russia’s favour.
520 A. TAROCK

After the fall of Shah Reza Pahlavi in 1979, the United States feared that
Iran would tilt towards the Soviet Union or, worse, become its satellite.
Moscow hoped that the strong anti-American sentiments prevalent in Iran
at the time would help form a strong economic and political, and perhaps
even military, alliance between the two states. However, the superpowers
proved wrong in both their assessment of the Islamic revolution and under-
standing of post-Pahlavi Iran. The revolutionary leader at the time, Ayatollah
Khomeini, had dismissed both superpowers: America the “Great Satan”;
Soviet Russia, the “Lesser Satan”; these slogans have since lost their currency
and impact in Iran’s political discourse.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to think that the Iranians received news of the
disintegration of the Soviet Union with much satisfaction and approbation.
After all, Soviet demise removed a superpower neighbour that was ideologically
and geographically intimidating and threatening. But if Iran was under Soviet
threat from the 1946 Azerbaijan crisis to the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Tehran was in no position to claim to be an innocent party. During much of
the Cold War, Iran’s policy towards Moscow was far from neighbourly or free
from antagonistic posturing. For instance, Moscow had reason to be irritated at
Tehran for allowing the Americans to establish military bases near the Soviet–
Iranian border and, by way of electronic surveillance, spy on the Soviet Union.
In response, Moscow sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly fomented
political agitation in Iran through the Tudeh or by radio broadcasts or other
propaganda to undermine the Shah’s position. However, although Soviet demise
was welcome to the new Iran, it nevertheless remained in a precarious and
vulnerable position vis-à-vis the sole superpower that viewed it as a “rogue” and
“outlaw” state. Moreover, Washington made it known publicly that it wanted
and was trying to change the Iranian regime. Faced with the real prospect of this
threat, it is safe to assume that the Iranian leadership would have wanted the
Soviet Union to remain in place, shedding its communism and serving as a
protective shield against American interventions in the non-Western world
particularly the Middle East.
One can argue that economic considerations primarily drive Russia’s
interest in Iran: selling it things that it wants.4 That may be true.
Nevertheless, such an argument ignores other crucial factors that influence
Russo–Iranian relations. Geostrategic considerations in Central Asia, the
Caucasus, and Middle East have had a great bearing on the nature of their
co-operation. In fact, Iran has had much to offer Russia in terms of helping
it, directly and indirectly, to maintain security and stability in Central Asia.
For instance, Iran refused either to assist materially or politically the Chechen
Moslems in their struggle for national independence. Iran also mediated a
ceasefire between Azerbaijan and Armenia in their war over Nagorno
Karabakh in the 1990s. A particular area of close Russo–Iranian co-
operation in recent times is combating Al Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 521

and the Levant [ISIS] terrorism in Central Asia. Iran has also indirectly
helped Moscow’s standing in the Moslem world by simply refraining from
criticising certain aspects of Moscow’s foreign policy towards the Islamic
world, for instance, remaining silent about Israeli refusal to negotiate with
the Palestinians.
However, recent tensions in the international landscape between the European
Union [EU], the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO], and the United
States, on one side, and Russia, on the other, over Ukraine and Syria have
prompted the expansion of geopolitical and strategic ties between Teheran and
Moscow. Increased tensions in Europe have also pushed the two Powers’ colla-
boration in fields like oil, gas, nuclear technologies, and regional and international
security. Closer Russian ties are important for Iran as its relations with the West in
general, and America in particular, remain distant if not hostile notwithstanding
the signing of the July 2015 nuclear agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action [JCPOA] between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN
Security Council—America, Britain, China, France, and Russia—plus Germany.
If the strong anti-Iran sentiments existing in the American establishment and
mainstream media are anything to judge, antagonism between the two Powers will
continue for some time. Thus, Russia and Iran are both in geopolitical and
economic conflict with the EU and United States and have good reasons to
work closely and productively with each other. What has made the Russo–
Iranian relationship amicable, to the extent that it appears to be so, is that
Moscow recognised and accepted—although not necessarily liked—the new
Iranian political system from its inception in 1979. In fact, since that moment,
one of Russia’s primary objectives in the Middle East has been the long-term
survival of the Islamic Republic. Moscow views Iran as a force for stability in the
Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf, regions caught in a cycle of perpetual
instability where Tehran’s strategic geopolitical interests align much more closely
with Russia’s than those of the Western Powers.5 Moscow also believes that Iran
can act as a facilitator of the new re-invigorated Russian role in the Middle East.
For more than two decades after the Soviet demise, Moscow approached the
region cautiously even as Iran encouraged Russia to take a more active role. The
crisis in Syria after 2011 presented an opportunity for Russia to assume that role by
supporting the Bashir al-Assad regime in Damascus. With Moscow not indifferent
to Syria’s fate, revolutionary Iran has long invested much political and geostrategic
capital in supporting the Assad government.
Although the Islamic Republic has an image problem in the West, its
standing and reputation in many Moslem and Third World countries is
generally more benign. In other words, to many non-Western countries,
Iran is not the outlaw state portrayed for decades in the West, an asset that
Russia recognises and employs to its advantage. Ideologically and strategi-
cally, reasons exist for both Powers to form a tacit alliance. Both strongly
reject the American claim to unilateralism and exceptionalism in the conduct
522 A. TAROCK

of international politics. A guiding principle on which they seemingly agree is

rejecting America’s Manifest Destiny and claim of being a benevolent global
Power—or, in the words of the former American secretary of state,
Madeleine Albright, “If we have to use force, it is because we are
Americans. We are an indispensable nation. We stand tall and see further
into the future.”6 Or as President Woodrow Wilson said almost a century
ago, “our interest must march forward, altruists though we are; other nations
must see that they stand off. And do not seek to stay us.”7 In one form or
another, Iran and Russia have snubbed these claims, instead arguing for
multilateralism in international relations. Russia issued a foreign policy
statement in July 2008 that noted:

… the need for the international community to develop a common vision of our
era is becoming ever more urgent… . Russia will continue to seek the strengthen-
ing of principles of multilateralism in international affairs, development of inter-
national relations that would be based on the recognition by the international
community of the principles of security indivisibility in the modern world and
would reflect its diversity.8

At a meeting with the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, in Tehran on

23 November 2015, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said
America’s claim to unilateralism threatened both Iran and Russia. He praised
Russia for pursuing an independent foreign policy—that is, from the EU and
America. It could be that the ayatollah was referring to Russia’s decision to
support Iran at the UN Security Council in 2008. At the time, there was
much talk in the media and official Washington that the United States would
seek UN authorisation for America taking military action against Iran for its
alleged non-compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons. To Iran’s great approbation and appreciation, and having learnt
from American unilateralism in invading Iraq in 2003, Russia frustrated
Washington’s attempts to use the UN to “punish” Iran for the continuation
of its uranium enrichment programme. The West’s argument was that that
programme intended to produce nuclear weapons.
At this juncture, Russia had a dual policy towards Teheran and
Washington, betting both ways depending on which approach and what
particular time better served Russia’s national interests. It is often the case
that in playing such political games, the interests of the lesser Power often
find sacrifice on the altar of the major one. A Great Power, in this case
Russia, reserved this privilege for itself. In other words, when choosing
between American or Iranian interests, Russia has sometimes considered
the interests of Washington first. Two examples present themselves. First,
in 1995, the American vice president, Al Gore, and Russian Prime Minister
Viktor Chernomyrdin signed an agreement by which Russia agreed to limit
the amount of weaponry and nuclear technical knowledge that it provided to
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 523

Teheran. The reason for Russia accommodating America’s request was that
at the time the two Powers were trying to “‘reset’ … U.S.–Russian relations.”9
Second, in 2011, Russia voted against Iran in the UN Security Council on
American-led sanctions resolutions over Tehran’s nuclear enrichment pro-
gramme. On an issue of paramount importance to the Iranians, Moscow
sided with Washington. Russia’s decision, therefore, was undoubtedly a
serious setback for Iran’s ability to resist both Western economic pressure
and the dismantling of, or rendering inoperative, nuclear facilities on which
Tehran had then spent $100 billion.10 The irony of Russia’s stance was that
Moscow was directly involved in the Iranian nuclear programme at the
Bushehr reactor since the early 1990s and would have known that Tehran
was not engaged in making nuclear bombs. Russia—and China—sided with
the West at the UN, opening the way for the imposition of crippling sanc-
tions on Iran, in the words of President Barak Obama, the “toughest sanc-
tions in history.”11 The Russians, if asked to explain their tilt to the West, will
probably justify their stance at the Security Council by holding up Niccolo
Machiavelli’s The Prince, where he recommends to politicians and princes
the values of realpolitik: states must always pursue their own national inter-
ests first.
Tehran and Moscow’s observance of realpolitik in their relationship also
reflected in frequent visits by their heads of state, as well as by regular contact
between high-ranking officials: military, trade, economic, and energy
amongst others. For instance, in 2012, an unprecedented record of 170 visits
of diplomatic delegations occurred.12 Perhaps the most publicised example of
Russo–Iranian geopolitical co-operation lay in the military and political
support each accorded the Assad government, enabling it to push back
armed opposition groups sustained primarily by America, France, and
some of the Arab Persian Gulf states, in particular Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
In the Syrian case, Moscow has been especially concerned about the security
of the Mediterranean port, Tarus, the only anchorage to which Russia has
had access in the Middle East for decades. Since this geostrategic port has
been so important to Russia, maintaining the Assad regime has always been a
major part of its policy in the region. Tarus, however, is only one aspect,
albeit a very significant one, of Russia’s Middle Eastern interests. For
Moscow, of particular importance is re-establishing and reasserting its rele-
vance in relations with the West, in general, and the United States and
NATO, in particular. Intervening in the Syrian crisis has already offered
the opportunity to achieve those objectives. Iran, too, has had geostrategic
interests in helping Assad keep his position. For Tehran, keeping the Assad
regime in power is also a matter of national security. Reports exist that
Ayatollah Khamenei has followed every detail of the Syrian war, that he
believes that this war is in fact against Iran as much as Syria.13 Still, another
factor for the Iranians wanting to bolster the Assad government derives from
524 A. TAROCK

Tehran feeling obligated to repay its old “moral debt” to Damascus.

Historically, this debt devolves from Syria, perhaps of all the Arab states,
being a staunch and persistent supporter of the Islamic Republic, particularly
during the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq war.
The fall of Assad’s government at the instigation of the Arab states, Sunni
fundamentalist groups, and the United States would be a major loss for both
Russia and Iran. Assad’s collapse would also further strengthen American
influence and position in the region, a development about which neither
Power would be happy. Accordingly, Russia’s decision to involve itself
militarily in support of the Syrian government must have been a great relief
and blessing for Tehran—from a strategic point of view, the fall of Assad
would have a greater negative impact in the region for Iran rather than
Russia. For Iran, supporting Assad is also essential to protect the Hezbollah
in Lebanon, contiguous with Syria: it keeps Israel engaged on its borders
rather than scheme against Tehran. It further serves to support the anti-Israel
“resistance front”—Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas—something reflected in
Russia being allowed to use Iranian bases to launch airstrikes against opposi-
tion groups in Syria in August 2016. It is worth noting that the Islamic
Republic had always maintained that it would never allow a foreign Power to
use Iran as a military launching pad.
For Tehran and Moscow, Obama’s mantra that “Assad must go” had the
ring of “imperial unilateralism” that both have rejected. For them, Assad’s
departure would have been yet another case of Western Powers imposing
their standards of political legitimacy on sovereign states to endorse regime
change.14 For Iran’s leaders in particular, the phrase “regime change,” cur-
rency in official Washington with regard to Iran for decades, has a threaten-
ing ring. As they see it, a change of regime in Damascus would serve as
precursor to a second in Teheran. The immediate concern for Iran and
Russia is that the departure of the Assad government would embolden ISIS
and other Sunni fundamentalists in the Middle East, Caucasus, and Moslem
republics of Central Asia. According to official statistics, about 2,700 Russian
Federation citizens have joined ISIS. Some Russian experts warn of much
higher numbers, alleging that perhaps one million Russian Moslems are
ready to support ISIS or its affiliates. Therefore, Russia seems to prefer to
fight Moslem extremists in Syria and the Middle East rather than closer to
home.15 From the viewpoint of security, human lives, and financial cost, it is
much better to fight enemies as far away as possible from one’s own borders.
One of Russia’s interests in maintaining close ties with Shia Iran is that the
latter could act as a counter-weight to Sunni jihadists in both Central Asia
and the Middle East. Russia’s assessment of Iran’s ability and willingness to
do so does not seem entirely misplaced if the records of pro-Iranian Shia
militia groups in Iraq are anything to go by. For example, after American
troops withdrew from Iraq earlier in 2014, ISIS seized nearly one-third of
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 525

that country in the summer. Defending towns and villages under their
control, the Iraqi Army collapsed without much resistance. Even Baghdad
was on the verge of falling to ISIS when the leader of the Iraqi Shi’ites,
Iranian-born Ayatollah Ali Shahristani, issued a fatwa calling on his followers
to stand up to the ISIS fighters. In the end, the Shia militias, supported by
Kurdish fighters—although divided between Sunnis and Shi’ites—re-
captured much of the territories, including the city of Fallujah, lost to
ISIS.16 A more recent example is the somewhat successful attempt by
Kurdish fighters and Shia militias to take back Mosul from ISIS in
October 2016.
ISIS and other Sunni extremist groups like Al Qaeda and Jebheh al-Nusra
have adopted Saudi Arabia’s strict and literal version of Islam—Wahhabism. A
strong core of Sunni fundamentalism is the sectarian hatred for Shi’ites and
other supposedly apostate branches of Islam, where the Saudi state and Sunni
extremists converge ideologically. The latter can hardly pose an existential
threat to Iran. But considering that they are known to have received direct and/
or indirect financial and moral support from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and that
the ruling Saudi family has viewed the Islamic Republic as a political and
ideological rival, Tehran can hardly be happy to see ISIS flourish in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Central Asia. In this context, Russo–Iranian
concerns about Sunni fundamentalism converge. Their co-operation has
been more a matter of necessity than choice. What has, amongst other things,
brought about this necessity has been re-invigorated Russian involvement in
the Middle East in more recent years. Russia had been somewhat disengaged in
the region during the decade and one-half after 1991. Moscow appeared to
have left the arena of Middle Eastern politics and military affairs almost
entirely to its former rival, the United States. Parallel with Russia’s withdrawal
from the region, America increased its political and military profile. Plainly
put, Washington aggressively extended and expanded Western military inter-
vention in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and, later, Syria. It is more than conjecture
to argue that America’s unrivalled position in the Middle East has had direct
bearing in both heightening conflict and allowing the unprecedented growth of
terrorism in the Greater Middle East, Central Asia, and beyond.
But there were other reasons for the Islamic Republic seeking strategic
partnership and political co-operation with Russia in the early 1990s. First,
Iran had just exited the devastating eight-year war with Iraq. It produced
many badly damaged Iranian villages, towns, and cities, some destroyed; the
economy was unhealthy, with many parts of it hardly functioning; and the
country’s military capability was at its lowest ebb. Second, and perhaps more
fundamental, Iran was isolated internationally, mostly by the United States
and European Great Powers. Some Europeans refused to recognise the
legitimacy of the Republic, others considered it an “outlaw” state. There are
plausible explanations for these Powers doing so. At the time, Iran faced
526 A. TAROCK

accusations, rightly or wrongly, of engaging in or instigating terrorism in

Europe—it acquired the label “outlaw” state largely because of the American
hostage crisis in 1981. In addition, to secular and modern Europe, the
concept of a “theocratic” state was anathema. Moreover, talk of regime
change in Teheran had become the daily news diet of America’s mainstream
media.
With ever-rising political and economic walls around it, and the urgent need
for revitalising the economy, Teheran’s best options were to mend its relations
with the outside world, more specifically with the EU, Russia, and more
developed Third World countries like India, Brazil, and especially China.
Repairing connexions with the United States had become a distant reality.
Even since JCPOA, normalising relations between Tehran and Washington is
unthinkable, as the Donald Trump Administration has adopted a more hawk-
ish policy towards Iran than did its predecessor. In short, economic impera-
tives demanded that Iran earnestly seek foreign investment and technical
assistance from abroad in fields like industry, agriculture, exploration of oil
and gas, and the resuscitation of its nuclear energy programme. After the Iran–
Iraq war ended in 1988, the EU responded positively, albeit slowly, to
Teheran’s approach to re-invigorate the old relations with Europe. Germany,
however, refused to finish the construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactor,
apparently because Teheran–Washington relations remained estranged. This
rebuff occurred in the context of the post-revolution crisis in Iran, including
the American Embassy hostage taking. Importantly, the Iranians did not
intend the reactor for military purposes: Teheran had already declared nuclear
weapons unacceptable and un-Islamic. Furthermore, it is reasonable to argue
that had Germany accepted Tehran’s invitation to reconstruct the reactor—it
built the Bushehr nuclear reactor in the late 1960s and early 1970s—the
countries with concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme would have had
full knowledge of its operational aspects. In turn, it would have prevented
the decades-long politicisation and, therefore, the conflict between Iran and
the West over Tehran’s nuclear programme.
In the modern history of Russo–Iranian relations, Russian involvement in
Iran’s nuclear programme has played a pivotal role. This participation can be
characterised as having gone through both a high and a low point in the
relationship. To explain this seemingly contradictory statement, it is neces-
sary to give a brief background to the programme—brief as it has received
extensive discussion elsewhere.17 For nearly two decades, the programme had
become a highly controversial issue between Iran and the West, more
specifically between Iran and America. By the early 1980s, the implementa-
tion and mastery of nuclear technologies had become for the Iranians not
just a scientific and economic objective but had also gained a nationalist
dimension as a source of aspiration and pride. For the Iranians, the issue was
if other states could master nuclear technologies, so could they. Other
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 527

countries that earlier helped the Iranians in their technological pursuit were
France, Britain, and the United States, particularly under the Gerald Ford
Administration (1974–1979).18 The West offered the Shah the most favours
that it could afford to lavish on a Third World country aligned with it.
Besides, to the Americans, the sale of technologies and construction of
nuclear facilities would bring in billions of dollars to the United States
Treasury Department. And with the sudden hike of petroleum prices because
of the Arab oil embargo put on the West for supporting Israel in the early
1970s, Iran could easily pay the huge capital outlay needed for nuclear energy
facilities.19 For nearly four decades, Iran’s nuclear programme became a
lucrative business—hundreds of billions of dollars—for nuclear industries
in the West.
Iran’s offer to Russia to undertake the Bushehr completion was a proposition
that Moscow could hardly refuse, particularly as Russia’s economy was strug-
gling after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The signing of the Bushehr agree-
ment in 1995 was particularly important for the Iranians as it coincided with the
Bill Clinton Administration’s ever-harsher economic and political pressure on
Iran. In May 1995, the Americans asked the Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, not
to honour the agreement. Yeltsin declined. It is reasonable to argue that the
Russian refusal to acquiesce in the American request was because Moscow
thought that Washington wanted to deprive Russia of a big market for nuclear
technology. Understandably, the Iranians were jubilant about Yeltsin’s decision.
His decision in favour of Iran, and by extension bolstering the Russian nuclear
industry, was politically courageous considering that Washington considered
Iran an “outlaw” state. The significance of the Bushehr deal becomes more
obvious when compared with a previous one between Iran and Russia. The
two states had signed an agreement in 1992 whereby Russia would deliver
submarines to Iran; this agreement died when Russia acceded to Washington’s
request not to honour it. The importance of the Bushehr deal also needs viewing
in the context of the American Senate, which earlier introduced a bill linking aid
to Russia that limited its military co-operation with Iran. In view of American
hostility towards Iran, Tehran must have been happy to see that by the mid-
1990s, Russia was demonstrating a greater foreign policy independence than it
had shown previously. In the words of Yeltsin, Moscow now belonged to neither
the West nor the East. It had become “a dual-headed eagle.”20
The land-locked saltwater Caspian Sea is unique, with its extremely rich
hydrocarbon and fish resources, geopolitical significance, transport routes,
strategic location, and, finally, special place for the littoral states that share its
riches. The Caspian is also the world’s largest lake and its third richest area,
after the Persian Gulf and Siberia, in terms of hydrocarbon resources.21 The
history of Persian–Tsarist Russian–Russian relations concerning the Caspian
Sea goes back to the early nineteenth century and the conclusion of the
Treaty of Turkmenchay, which marked the end of the 1826–1828 Russo–
528 A. TAROCK

Persian wars. With the signing of that accord, Russia strengthened its posi-
tion in the Caspian. After Bolshevik consolidation of power in the Russian
Civil War, Teheran and Moscow signed the 1921 Friendship Treaty that
recognised the borders of the two countries in the Caspian Sea. Sometime
later, in 1935, the two signed another treaty, the Treaty of Establishment,
Commerce, and Navigation that gave each the right to fish in their coastal
waters to a distance of ten nautical miles. In the mid-1980s, when the Soviet
Union and Iran jointly managed the Caspian, Teheran proposed to Moscow
that they explore the waters for oil and natural gas. By then, Iran was no
longer an American “satellite” or “imperialist lackey” of the West—as the
Soviets viewed Iran under the Pahlavi monarchy.22 Yet, the Soviet response
to Iran’s suggestion was hardly enthusiastic. In any case, the 1921 and 1935
treaties remained the legal status of the Caspian Sea until 1991. Since then,
the old Soviet–Iranian ownership of the waters has increased, entangled in a
contentious legal battle with three other littoral states: Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan.
How much and exactly what any of the five littoral states should share and
how they should manage the Caspian is the legal issue that has after a quarter
century remained elusive. Naturally, each Power maintains a particular view
on how to divide Caspian riches and enjoy more of its wealth—fishing,
shipping, and oil and gas. The littoral states have been unable to find a
legal solution, a hurdle preventing them from exploring its vast natural
resources.23 Initially, Russia argued, and Iran concurred, that the provisions
of the old Soviet–Iranian treaties bound the littoral states. In other words, the
resources of the Caspian still belonged to Iran and Russia even after the
disintegration of the former Soviet Union. If the littoral states were to share
the resources, it should be on equal basis regardless of the length of the
seashore that each state possesses. In 1994, however, Russia changed its
previous position and accepted that the littoral states should share Caspian
resources under a new agreement. Yet, the legal status and many aspects of
the commercial use of the Sea have so far proved difficult in reaching a
common agreement. At one point, Turkmenistan supported the Russo–
Iranian proposition. It called for a condominium principle that would govern
the management of the Caspian until the littoral states agreed on its legal
status. However, they faced an impasse. According to the official position of
the Russians, who discovered them, the existing oil and gas fields should
constitute Russian assets.24 In 1996, Russia almost reached an agreement with
Azerbaijan that called for supporting a sectoral division; the two Powers
agreed to divide the seabed according to a median line principle but could
not agree on the point from which to measure the median line.
These cases illustrate the many difficult legal and conflicting questions that
have confronted the littoral states. A particular problem in settling their
dispute is the legal definition of “sea” and “lake.” Either term can define
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 529

the Caspian. According to international legal experts, under typical practice

in international law, lakes and internal seas are not normally subject to joint
sovereignty unless specified by a treaty. Thus, if the Caspian is a lake, two
different perspectives pertain to the current dispute amongst the five Powers:
the condominium and median line principles.25 Billions of dollars in revenue
from oil and gas are at stake. What is of particular relevance is that both
Russia and Iran have endeavoured, and have so far somewhat succeeded, to
exclude the international oil companies from oil and gas exploration in the
Caspian. The exploitation of the Sea’s hydrocarbon riches is very much
within the financial, technical, and marketing capabilities of at least Russia,
Azerbaijan, and Iran, all in the oil business for decades. A big hurdle for these
three Powers, which are regionally landlocked, is how to export their oil and
natural gas to the international market. They can do so only by constructing
pipelines to service six routes: Turkey and Georgia; the Black Sea—preferred
by Russia; China—obviously supported by Beijing; Afghanistan to Pakistani
ports; Iranian territory to the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman; or from Iran
north to Turkey, the Mediterranean, and Europe.26 Iran’s route is shorter and
more economical. However, for economic, political, and ideological reasons,
the Americans have so far managed to prevent the international oil compa-
nies from choosing the Iran route.
According to United States Energy Department reports, the region’s
resources comprise 200 billion barrels of oil, about one-sixteenth of world
reserves.27 Moreover, in International Energy Agency estimates, the Caspian’s
energy reserve amounts to 48 billion barrels of crude oil and 292 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas.28 Even if a bit exaggerated, these estimates are all the same
substantial. With low international oil prices at present, it is reasonable to
argue that petroleum-producing countries, particularly in the Middle East,
would be unhappy if Caspian Sea oil and natural gas arrived—unlikely for the
time being—on the international market. In this context, there are four points
that concern Caspian Sea ownership and hamper the conclusion of an agree-
ment amongst the littoral states. First, the competing political and economic
interests of the five Powers have proved problematic in reaching a mutually
acceptable solution for managing the Sea. Second, different legal interpreta-
tions of the Soviet–Iranian treaties have led to the problems concerning the
rules of international law. Third, in legal terms, the Caspian does not seem to
be a sea, lake, or condominium; its final legal status, therefore, needs determi-
nation by agreement amongst all the littoral states.29 Finally, choosing the
route/s for exporting and marketing oil and natural gas to the world market
remains entangled politically and geostrategically.
In politics, forming friendships counts for little; but forming alliances
between and amongst states is common practice. Never occurring in a
vacuum, alliances emerge when nations need allies for security, political, or
other reasons. It is also axiomatic that relationships between or amongst
530 A. TAROCK

nations are governed by national interests and political expediency. The post-
Soviet Russo–Iranian relationship testifies to the validity of these assertions.
It means the two countries are not friends but partners—the terms “friend-
ship” and “friend” used frequently in diplomatic circles occur mostly for their
rhetorical utility. This axiom is particularly true when it comes to describing
Russo–Iranian co-operation in trade, nuclear technology, military assistance,
regional and international affairs, and more. Still, the extent of co-operation
and/or delays in the implementation of the agreements between Teheran and
Moscow has largely depended on the extent of amity or enmity between
Moscow and Washington.
The state of Russo–American relations have affected relations between Teheran
and Moscow. For instance, the frequent suspensions in construction of the
Bushehr nuclear reactor have had nothing to do with either technical or construc-
tion problems. Rather, delays in completing the reactor relate to Russia’s acceding
to American pressure to waive its commitment to Teheran. Unsurprisingly,
Russian delaying tactics brought strong reaction from the Iranians, who accused
Moscow of “bad faith.”30 The nuclear reactor agreement, signed by the two
countries in 1995, saw project completion several years later after the Iranians
agreed to compensate Russia for rising costs and inflation, which the latter claimed
was the reason for the delays. For the Iranians, the Bushehr saga was another
example that agreements signed between Great Powers and lesser ones provide no
solid guarantee of them being honoured fully or even partly. Another example is
the financial and banking difficulties thrown in by the United States and EU in
implementing the JCPOA at the expense of Iran.
Despite many setbacks, Russia and Iran seem to have adopted realpolitik as
the guiding political compass for conducting their relationship. The concept
argues that relationships with other Powers continue as long as they serve the
parties’ national interests. In the Bushehr case, Iran had little choice but to
persist in co-operating with Russia—even expanding co-operation. For exam-
ple, the two Powers signed an agreement in November 2014 that called for
Russia to build two new reactors with scope for a further six. One could excuse
the Iranians if they wondered how long the construction of six nuclear reactors
would take the Russians when it took them 20 years to complete Bushehr.
What is interesting in Russo–Iranian relations is that on oil and natural
gas, the two Powers can be both rivals and partners. According to British
Petroleum, Iran has the world’s largest reserves of natural gas and fourth
largest oil reserves. The country’s geostrategic position makes it capable of
supplying energy to Europe, its Middle Eastern neighbours, and beyond.31
Since early this century, Russia has shown great interest in and taken steps
towards co-operating with Iran in petrochemical energy, gas exploration and
production, refining, and oil transit from Iran to Russia.32 Iran has said it
wants to increase exports of natural gas to the West; and as relations between
Russia and Europe have deteriorated recently—Russia supplies gas to Europe
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 531

—the EU may see Iran as an alternative supplier. In other words, Iran has the
capacity and opportunity to rival Russia as a supplier of energy to the EU. At
present, however, a more practical view is to consider a memorandum of
understanding signed between the two Powers in August 2014: worth
$20 billion, it calls for exchanging Iranian oil for Russian goods and
services.33 In addition, in 2015, Iranian officials expressed the view that
bilateral Russo–Iranian trade would increase from $5 billion to $70 billion
per year over the next several years.34 Although these forecasts in the
economic and energy fields may sound ambitious and optimistic, they are
nevertheless indicative of the two countries’ projected trade volumes.
The print and electronic media have provided images of high-ranking
Iranian and Russian generals in full military regalia greeting each other in
their respective capitals. Following talks, they often issue a communiqué the
content of which gives the impression that the two governments are in full
accord on military co-operation and defence matters. In general, this is
correct. Co-operation for the most part consists of Russian arms sales to
Iran. For example, the amount of bilateral military co-operation—$7 billion
between 2000 and 2007, with a market share representing 85 percent of Iran’s
arms imports—reflects a strong incentive for Russian diplomacy to keep Iran
happy.35 Still, their military co-operation almost halted when the UN
imposed sanctions on Iran because the West, Russia, and China argued
that Tehran engaged in nuclear weaponisation. In reality, the scope of their
military co-operation has been limited, cautious, and measured on both
sides, perhaps more on the Russian side. Why? Whilst there is no definite
answer/s to that question unless one is privy to the thinking of both sides,
there are some plausible explanations. In one instance, it is common knowl-
edge that the West has refused to sell weapons to Iran for the past 35 years—
and indications exist that the nuclear deal signed by Iran and Russia is
unlikely to lead to the West relaxing its arms embargo on Iran any time
soon. Iran needs $1.3 billion worth of advanced weapons to reduce its tactical
vulnerability to potential invaders.36 Furthermore, with the harsh economic
sanctions imposed on Russia by the West, and with plummeting oil prices on
international markets, Russia badly needs extra cash.
Another plausible dimension to the above question could be that Russia
believes Iran remains, basically, a West-leaning country that traditionally and
historically has felt more comfortable trading and forming political or mili-
tary alliances with the West. If—and a big “if”—Iran and the United States/
EU manage to re-establish “normal” relations, Iran would likely turn a more
favourable eye towards the West but would continue active relations with the
East. As to Iran’s hesitation to get too cosy with Russia, the bitter historical
memories of Russia from the nineteenth century until the demise of the
Soviet Union, as well as the sometimes-lax post-Cold War commitments
shown by Moscow in its agreements with Iran, have had an indelibly negative
532 A. TAROCK

impact on the Iranian psyche. Iranians may also feel that whilst Russia likes
an Iran independent of Western influence, it does not want a strong and
assertive Iran as a neighbour, particularly one that shares borders with the
states once parts of the Soviet Union. Yet, Iran is important to Russia. In one
estimate, Iran’s primary attraction to both the West and East is that it is a
major actor beyond its borders, particularly at the regional level.37 Moscow
wants to take advantage of Iran’s position “as a card in bargaining with the
West” but does not want Iran as a military partner.
As in the construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactor, delayed delivery of
purchased Russian military equipment and S300 missiles occurred several
times at the urging of Israel and the United States. In 1995, for instance, the
Gore-Chernomyrdin “secret” agreement saw Russia curtail arms sales to Iran.
In 2010, Tehran signed an agreement with Moscow to purchase a missile
defence system worth $800 to $900 million but saw delivery postponed
several times. In the end, President Dmitry Medvedev cancelled the agree-
ment reportedly because of outside pressure.38 Finally, Russia started delivery
of the missile system in May 2016 likely because of heightened tensions
between Russia and the West over Eastern Europe. By now, however, it has
become obvious to the Iranians that signing agreements with Russia and
honouring of them are different things. Put differently, Russia places less
value on co-operation with Iran when a stronger and more valued Power
from a geopolitical point of view comes along. Russia will prioritise that
relationship even when that Power might find objectionable a particular
agreement that Russia has made with a lesser state, Iran.
A particular characteristic of politics, however, is its consistency to change,
like a pendulum continuously moving from one side to the other. Thus, the
political landscape in relations between Russia and the West had altered
dramatically by 2015, with the West accusing Moscow of adopting an
aggressive position vis-à-vis its neighbours—Georgia and Ukraine—as well
as involving itself militarily in Syria. To counter Russia’s alleged “aggression,”
NATO established its first major missile defence site and air base in Romania
in May 2016, with plans to build a second installation in Poland in 2018.
NATO and the Pentagon claim that the anti-ballistic missile [AMB] network
in Eastern Europe targets Iran and not Russia. Russia maintains that this
reasoning is disingenuous: Iran has neither the missile capability to hit
Europe nor any reason for doing so. Putin has dismissed the NATO claim
saying, “this [installation of AMB] is part of American missiles with nuclear
warhead strategic potential brought [to] Eastern Europe … . We are forced to
think how to neutralise emerging threats to the Russian Federation.”39 The
relevance of this assessment to this analysis is that Iran can only be happy
and benefit when there are conflicts of interest between the major Powers.
The changes in America and Europe’s policy towards Russia have paved the
road for further expansion of co-operation between Moscow and Tehran.
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 533

More prosaically, there is a direct nexus between the deterioration of rela-

tions between the West and Russia and the amelioration and consolidation of
those between Iran and Russia, something evidenced in the signing of a new
military agreement between the two countries in January 2015.
Sergei Shoigu, the Russian defence minister, has said that his country seeks a
“long-term and multifaceted” military relationship with Iran.40 It is important
to note that only a few months after signing the July 2015 nuclear agreement,
Iranian officials complained that “‘almost nothing’ has been done [by the
West] to make the CJPOA functional.” They were referring to the refusal of
European and American banks to do business with Iran.41 Or as Ayatollah
Khamenei has said, on paper the United States allows foreign banks to do
business with Iran, but these banks could be denied access to American
financial institutions if they did so.42 What the above points suggest is the
likely continuation of tension, if not the old hostility, between America and
Iran and by extension between the EU and Iran and, correspondingly, the
expansion of co-operation between Tehran and Moscow. Given the West’s
humiliating and economically crippling sanctions, the Iranians would possibly
feel more secure in relying on Russia for future arms and trade deals. When
and if sanctions against Iran are fully lifted—unlikely anytime soon—and
Iran’s oil exports reach the level of that before the imposition of the oil
embargo, then Russia, itself under Western sanctions and in dire need of
hard currency, can almost certainly be assured of greater military sales and
much larger volumes of trade with Iran. Iran’s ambassador to Moscow, Mehdi
Sannai, reportedly said that the two countries are planning to increase their
trade to $70 billion a year in the near future.43 Even if optimistic, that
sentiment is indicative of the two sides’ willingness to increase their trade
considerably in the years to come. As both countries have for many years been
under heavy political and economic pressures from the West, it is reasonable to
predict confidently that Moscow and Teheran are likely to increase their
economic, trade, and military co-operation in the foreseeable future, albeit
cautiously. The latest policy document released in 2016 by Russia after the fall
of the Soviet Union shows that Moscow considers Iran enjoying great potential
and, therefore, Moscow should try to expand its relations with the Islamic
Republic. According to Hussein Kebriaezadeh, a keen observer of Iran–Russia
relations, the document has come to light at an auspicious time when Tehran
and Moscow are trying, after a long period of turbulent relations, to restructure
and rejuvenate their old ties.44
Whilst experiencing several highs and lows since the demise of the
Soviet Union, the Russo–Iranian relationship can justifiably be charac-
terised in 2017 as being the best since the nineteenth century. The
Powers’ present ties rest not on some kind of altruism but rather on
each government pursuing its own national interests, geostrategic impera-
tives, and economic needs. In conducting their relationship, they have
534 A. TAROCK

adopted, consciously or not, realpolitik. The ideological underpinning of

the relationship has been a rejection of the unipolar system in interna-
tional relations so enthusiastically embraced and promoted by America
since the end of the Cold War. That supposed global order has tried to
disallow regional Powers like China, Russia, and Iran from playing a role
on the world stage or even in their own neighbourhoods. Regionally,
however, Moscow–Teheran co-operation has been in combating terrorism
in Central Asia, exploring for oil and gas in the Caspian Sea region,
nuclear technology, military assistance, and, generally, trade. In the rela-
tionship in most cases, the stronger party—Russia—understandably
receives the greater benefits. Certainly, this course runs counter to Iran’s
old revolutionary slogan, “Neither East nor West.” That refrain was—and
remains—political rhetoric; and in practice, it has very little value in
statecraft. The power relations between Iran and Russia skew in favour
of Moscow and expectations are they will remain so. It is important to
note, however, that Russia no longer poses a threat militarily or otherwise
to Iran. On the contrary, when it suits Russian national interests, Moscow
acts as a pillar of support for Tehran, for instance in the UN when it faces
pressure from the United States or EU. Iran, too, has been a useful partner
to Russia in Central Asia as when Tehran avoided supporting Chechnya’s
Moslems seeking independence. Iran has attempted to pursue a foreign
policy independent of Washington and that in a way makes Tehran closer
to Moscow when it comes to Russia’s overall policy in the region. What
has usually helped Iran to pursue better an independent foreign policy vis-
à-vis the Great Powers is that for geopolitical and strategic reasons, the
United States and Russia have sometimes taken the path of international
rivalry, a rivalry that has historically served Iran well.
Of course, it is naïve to predict what course Russo–Iranian relations
will hence take. But based on the record of the relationship since the
Soviet Union’s demise and the probability of increasing tensions between
Russia and the United States/NATO, it is very likely that their co-
operation will continue to expand, a point to which their high officials
have already alluded.

Notes
1. K. Blake, The U.S.–Soviet Confrontation in Iran, 1945–1962: A Case in the Annals of the
Cold War (Lanham, MD, 2009); L.L. Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan
Crisis of 1946 (Cambridge, 1992); Jamil Hasanli, “New Evidence on the Iran Crisis
1945–46. From the Baku Archives,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin,
12/13 (2001), 308–14; Z.A. Rahman, A.S. Ghazali, R. Fauzi, and N.H. Yaacob, “Britain,
the United Nations and the Iranian Crisis of 1946,” Middle-East Journal of Scientific
Research, 18/119 (2013), 1544–56.
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 535

2. Ervand Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran (Cambridge, 2008), 49–50.

3. John Bew, Realpolitik: A History (Oxford, 2016), Part One, 15.
4. Omid Shokri Kalehsar, “Iran–Russia Relations under Ahmadinejad Era,” International
Affairs and Global Strategy, 7 (2013), 18.
5. Paul A. Schwartz, “What the Iran Deal Means for Russia,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies (June 2015): https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/ publication/150603_Schwartz_IranDealRussian_Web.pdf.
6. Patrick J. Buchanan, Suicide of a Superpower: Will America Survive to 2025? (NY, 2011), 308.
7. Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance (NY,
2004), 42.
8. Buchanan, Suicide, 20.
9. Elizabeth Alexander, “Building on the ‘Reset’—The Vice President’s Visit to Moscow,”
White House (10 March 2011): https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/03/
10/building-reset-vice-president-s-visit-moscow.
10. Simon Waxman, “Where Does the U.S.–Iran Deal Leave Israel,” Boston Review
(2 December 2013): http://bostonreview.net/blog/waxxman-iran-israel-cold-war-
foreign-policy.
11. Bejan Khajehpour, Reza Marachi, and Tira Parsi, “Never Give in, Never Give Up: The
Impact of Sanctions on Teheran’s Nuclear Calculations,” National Iranian American
Council (March 2013), 7: http://www.niacouncil.org/site/DocServer/Never_give_in__
never_give_up.pdf?docID= 1941.
12. Mehdi Sanaei, “Iran–Russia Relations in Preceding Year,” Iran Review
(23 March 2013): http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Iran-Russia-
Relations-in-Preceding-Year.htm.
13. Ali Hashem, “Teheran Drags Moscow Deeper into Syria,” Almonitor (20 June 2016):
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/06/iran-russia-syria-greater-
involvement.html.
14. Hanna Notte, “Russia in Chechnya and Syria: Pursuit of Strategic Goals,” Middle East
Policy, XXIII/1 (Spring 2016), 59–74.
15. Ibid.
16. Charles Glass, “Disunited Front: The Chaotic, Underfunded Battle Against the Islamic
State,” Harper’s (February 2016), 39.
17. Cf. Gareth Porter, Manufactured Crisis: The Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare
(Charlottesville, VA, 2014); Daniel H. Joyner and Christopher A. Ford, “Iran and the
Bomb: The Legal Standards of the IAEA,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
(November 2013); www.thebulletin.org; Adam Tarock, “The Iran Nuclear Deal:
Winning a Little, Losing a Lot,” Third World Quarterly, 37/8 (2016), 1408–24.
18. Gholam Reza Afkhami, The Life and Times of the Shah (Berkeley, CA, 2009),
Chapter 15.
19. An extensive literature exists on the Iranian nuclear programme and the controversy it
created between Iran and the West—the West argued that Iran intended to use it facilities
to make nuclear weapons. JCPOA drastically curtailed the programme for 20 years. Cf.
Mehdi Khalaji, “Great Expectations: Iran after the Deal, Washington Quarterly, 38/3
(2015), 70; International Crisis Group, “President Trump and the Art of the Iran Deal”
(24 November 2016): https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-
arabian-peninsula/iran/ president-trump-and-art-iran-nuclear-deal; Mechele Kelemen,
“What Has Changed,” NPR (18 July 2016: http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/
07/18/486151700/a-year-after-iran-nuclear-deal-what-has-changed.
536 A. TAROCK

20. Richard K. Herrmann, “Russian Policy in the Middle East: Strategic Change and
Tactical Contradictions,” Middle East Journal, 48/3 (1994), 456.
21. Shamkhal Abilov, “Legal Status of the Caspian Sea,” Institute of Strategic Studies,
Islamabad (2011): http://www.isis.org/pk/old-site/ss_Detail.php?datad=1921.
22. Adam Tarock, “Iran and Russia in ‘Strategic Alliance,’” Third World Quarterly, 18/2
(1997), 215.
23. Abilov, “Caspian Sea.”
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 129.
26. Hamidreza Azizi, “Post Sanctions and Prospect of Energy Cooperation in the Caspian
Sea,” Iran Review (5 April 2016): http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/-Post-
Sanctions-Iran-and-Prospect-of-Energy-Cooperation-in-the-Caspian-Region.htm.
27. Fand Raul Oglu Shafiyev, “The Legal Regime of the Caspian Sea: Views of the Littoral
States,” Prism, 7/6 (2016): https://jamestown.org/program/the-legal-regime-of-the-
caspian-sea-views-of-the-littoral-states/.
28. Azizi, “Post-Sanctions Iran.”
29. Barbara Janusz, Stiftung Wissensschaft und Politik, “The Caspian Sea: Legal Status and
Regime Problems,” Briefing Paper, Royal Institute of International Affairs
(August 2005).
30. “Russia III. “Russo–Iranian Relations in the Post-Soviet Era (1991–present),”
Encyclopedia Iranica: http://www.iranicaonline.org/articals/russia-iii-iranian-relation-
post-soviet.
31. Lukas Tichy and Nikkita Dintsov, “Can Iran Reduce EU Dependence on Russian Gas,”
Journal of Middle East Policy, 23/1 (2016), 110-24.
32. Kalehsar, “Iran–Russia Relations,” 21–22.
33. Schwartz, “Iran Deal.”
34. Alex Vatanka, “Shrimp, SAMs, and the Limits of Russian–Iranian Romance,” National
Interest (23 January 2015): http://nationalinterest.org/feature/shrimp-sams-the-limits-
russian-iranian-romance-12101.
35. “Russia III.”
36. Hussein Kebriaeizadeh, “Future Outlook of Military Cooperation between Iran and
Russia” (5 March 2016): http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Future-
Outlook-of-Military-Cooperation-between-Iran-and-Russia.htm.
37. Ibid.
38. “Russia, Iran Sign Military Cooperation Deal,” Associated Press (20 January 2015).
39. Jonathan Marshal, “Escalations in a New Cold War,” Consortium News (14 May 2016):
https://consortiumnews.com/2016/05/14/escalations-in-a-new-cold-war/.
40. Schwartz, “Iran Deal.”
41. Nick Gass, “Top Iranian Official Says U.S. and EU have not fulfilled Nuclear Deal,”
Politico (16 April 2016): www.POLITICO.com/story/2016/04/iran-nuclear-deal-us
-222029.
42. “Iran’s Supreme Leader Says U.S. Lifted Sanctions only on Paper,” Reuters
(27 April 2016): http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN0XO0SK.
43. Vatanka, “Shrimp, SAMs.”
44. Kebriaeizadeh, “Future Outlook.”
 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 537

Notes on contributor
Adam Tarock specialises in modern Middle East politics and the West, particularly American
policies towards the region. He has contributed numerous refereed articles to journals
published in Australia, Britain, and the United States. He has also published two books;
The Superpowers Involvement in the Iran–Iraq War (1998) and Iran’s Foreign Policy Since
1990; Pragmatism Supersedes Islamic Ideology (1999). He has taught at the University of
Melbourne in political developments in the Middle East and the impact of American political
and military activities on the region. He has also given papers at conferences discussing the
contemporary social and political issues there.