Assess India’s foreign policy with

regards to ASEAN

MUKUL JOSHI
Internal Assessment- India’s Foreign Policy
Teacher in charge- Dr. Vipin Malhotra
Department of Political Science
Sri Arobindo College (M), University of Delhi
 Author’s note
All the data and facts in this article have been collected from various
authenticated sources and references for such have been provided.
Efforts have been made to provide details on this topic in such a way
that readers find it easy to comprehend. This article has been made
under guidance of Professor Vipin Malhotra, Sri Aurobindo College
(Day), University of Delhi.

Abstract
India-ASEAN relations can be traced to historical and cultural
relations. Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam spread from India to the
region and the imprint of this shared cultural heritage is also seen in
art forms and architecture. Despite this after independence India did
not have good relations with ASEAN because, ASEAN was
perceived to be pro-West during the Cold War period (Ideological
differences). After the end of Cold War, India-ASEAN relations have
evolved from just economic ties to new strategic heights owing to
common threats and aspirations.

The complete potential of India-ASEAN relationship still remains

untapped. ASEAN, as a regional bloc, and India as a dominant
South Asian presence, share geographic proximity. Cultural ties
between India and ASEAN go long back in history and member
countries of ASEAN and India share a similar historic experience of
colonialism. Trade between India and ASEAN in 21 st century shows
promising aspects of growth. India's trade with the world in 2003 stood
at $114.13 billion, ASEAN accounting for 8.56 percent of India's global
trade. Geographic proximity has also offered scope in development
of relationships in strategic domain. With growing importance of
Indo-Pacific region, it is imperative that India and ASEAN coordinate
to consolidate themselves against the growing clout of China and
rising interest of USA in the region.
 Introduction
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a political and
economic union of South East Asian Nations comprising of 10
countries- Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar,
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. It was formed on 8
August 1967, when the foreign ministers of five countries: Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore Signed the ASEAN
Declaration. Brunei Darussalam then joined on 7 January 1984, Viet
Nam on 28 July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and
Cambodia on 30 April 1999, making up what is today the ten Member
States of ASEAN.

Credit: https://www.indiaasean.org/

The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia, signed at

the First ASEAN Summit on 24 February 1976, declared that in their
relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties should be
guided by the following fundamental principles:

 Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality,

territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations
 The right of every State to lead its national existence free
from external interference, subversion, or coercion
 Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another
 Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner
 Renunciation of the threat or use of force
  Effective cooperation among themselves

India’s engagement with South-East Asian region has shifted from

cultural and commercial relation in medieval period to political,
economic, and strategic relation in the early post war period. However, it
was only after the Look East policy of 1991 that the relations became
more profound, engaging, and oriented.

Historical Background
India’s earliest contacts with South-East Asia date back to the rule of
Chandragupta Maurya. This was the time when procurement of gold
from Siberia had begun to be interrupted by nomads. This pushed the
ruler to look for alternate sources of procurement, and thus gold trade
with Malay Island began. What followed was Ashoka’s contingent of
Buddhist missionaries. The relation between South East Asia remained
cultural and commercial in nature for a long time. In the medieval period,
Chola invaded Srivijaya- the largest Maritime South East Asian Empire.
This opened doors for merchants of Arabia and Persia to South East
Asia. In modern period, India and South East Asia shared the ill fate of
colonisation.
Struggle against colonisers gave South East Asia and India a common
goal. Jawaharlal Nehru was a prominent champion in cause of
Indonesia’s freedom, for which India provided political and diplomatic
support to Indonesia. Although Nehru was vocal for the cause of
decolonization, he refused material support. This cost him the legitimacy
of being the champion of Asian unity. Amitav Acharya categorised
India’s relation with South East Asia until Look East policy into 4 stages.
First stage was the stage of ‘romancing India’. At the beginning of 20 th
century, India had constructed its own identity, and established its
connection with the rest of Asia. It became an important component of
Indian national movement. India’s role in development of civilisations
across Asia in ancient times gave India a sense of being natural leader
against colonisers in Asia. This enforcement of collective identity had
been critiqued by Rabindranath Tagore and many countries as well.
India saw itself as the natural leader of
Asia, many in China and Japan looked down upon colonial India as a
defeated and pacifist nation. Even as they admired Indian leaders, many
smaller Asian nations were also afraid of India emerging as a dominant
power. These contradictions between India’s self-perception of its role in
Asia and the image of India in other Asian countries would prove to be
enduring in the rest of the twentieth century. The second stage was
called the stage of ‘leading Asia’. Jawaharlal Nehru forged the Asian
identity into an ambitious political agenda and aimed at building a new
Asian century through regional solidarity and unity. Nehru took the lead
in organizing Asian cooperation by hosting two pan-Asian conferences in
New Delhi. But India, despite its early start as an independent Asian
nation and as an international actor, was resented and feared in Asia
because of its diplomatic style and domineering attitude. India shifted its
attention from Asia to global non-alignment after the Bandung
Conference, assuming perhaps too big a role for itself. This led to third
stage in India’s post-war approach to Asia may be called ‘leaving Asia’.
This was a strategic mistake, as it would cost India the possibility of
membership of ASEAN, which was set up in 1967 as Asia’s first regional
organization, with five nations: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
Thailand, and Philippines. ASEAN would subsequently expand its
membership to bring in another five countries: Brunei (1984), Vietnam
(1995), Laos (1997), Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1997), thereby
becoming ASEAN-10. The last stage began After the Cold War and the
collapse of the socialist model, wherein India began the process of
‘returning to Asia’, marking the fourth stage in its evolving relationship
with East Asia. It is during this stage that the ‘Look East’ policy was
articulated. But the forces driving this return were quite different from
those which underpinned India’s diplomacy in East and South-East Asia
in the 1940s and 1950s.

Look East Policy

Look East policy was started in 1991 is an effort to cultivate extensive
economic and strategic relations with the nations of South East Asia to
bolster its standing as a regional power and a counterweight to the
strategic influence of China. Look East policy marked a drastic shift in
foreign policy of India. It was done so in the background of disintegration
of Soviet Union. Main objective of the Look East policy was to reorient
the attention of India’s foreign policy makers to Asia. The collective
Asian identity was re-invoked. India did not assume the role of leader
now, as it had in the past. China grew much stronger, and India only
opened its economy out of necessity and not by chance. India was at a
weaker footing than before, however not weak enough to be ignore.
Prime Minister of Singapore said that for ASEAN to function to properly,
it was necessary to balance both India and China, who were to ASEAN
what wings were to a plane. India’s Look East policy remained
incumbent until 2014, when the similar ambition came to called Act-East
policy. Important dimensions of Look East policy are discussed below:
1) Economic Dimension: The ASEAN-India Trade in Goods
Agreement was signed in 2009 and ones on ASEAN-India Trade-
in-Services and Investments in 2015. With the signing of these
Agreements, the ASEAN-India FTA is complete. ASEAN-India
trade rebounded in 2016-17to reach USD 70 billion after few years
of static growth due to global slowdown. FDI inflow into India from
ASEAN between April 2000 to December 2016 was US$ 54.97
billion, which represents 16.81% of the cumulative inflows received
by India. Cumulative FDI outflows from India to ASEAN countries,
from April 2007 to March 2015, as per data maintained by Ministry
of Finance, was about US$ 38.67 billion.
Clearly ASEAN has come to play an important part in economy of
India. ASEAN and India also cooperate in sectors of space,
energy, agriculture, medium and small enterprise, etc. Economic
cooperation is at heart of ASEAN-India engagement. Economic
dynamicity of ASEAN has been lauded by entire world. In 2009
India-ASEAN Summit, Manmohan Singh announced that greater
integration with South East Asia would be beneficial for Indian
economy.
2) Strategic Dimension: As noted, India’s ‘Look East’ policy was
initially driven by economic calculations mainly on the part of India.
But strategic considerations have become increasingly dominant
and may now be driving the relationship. Strategic relation
between ASEAN and India is based on two imperative geopolitical
realities. First is the growing naval power of China in the region.
Chinese naval interference in South East Asia has been rising, and
Indian presence in the region is seen as an asset by ASEAN.
Another important factor is absence of border and territorial
disputes with member countries of ASEAN. This puts ASEAN in a
 comfortable place against India, which is not to be found in
negotiations with China. It is visible that ASEAN wants for India to
be a balancer in the region against rising might of China. However,
how this role is to be played is not certain. India does not have the
desire or the resources to be a physical challenge against China.
India would not create a polarisation of allegiance in Asia, as it
would go against India’s long held tradition of non-alignment.
However, India has increased its defence contacts with the
ASEAN countries. In the 1990s, the Indian navy began conducting
‘friendship exercises’ with some ASEAN navies, including those of
Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. India has also
increased its defence diplomacy with Asia Pacific countries
through its participation in the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), held
annually in Singapore, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting
Plus (ADMM Plus), which brings together the ASEAN countries
and a number of key Asia Pacific nations including the United
States, China, Japan, and Australia.

Conclusion
India has traditionally focused on insulating itself from the pressures
of the international and regional systems than in shaping them. The
big question is can India lend a new purpose to its newfound regional
power? This is the key challenge facing the future of its ‘Look East’
policy. The question is all the more pertinent when asked keeping in
mind India’s engagement with ASEAN. South East Asia is a region
which has asserted itself with great vigour in contemporary age,
however the question of leadership of the region is a historic one.
China’s growing dominance in the region is a testimony to failure of
India’s foreign policy in ASEAN.
Yusof Ishak Institute, affiliated with the Institute for South East Asian
Studies released third report called State of the South East Asia:
2021 Survey. The survey gives a reality check for India’s foreign
policy establishment which considers South East Asia as a successful
area of its foreign policy. India has gained much in economic and
strategic domains from its engagement with ASEAN, although soft
power of India does not appear to be increasing. India’s main
competitor in the region- China, appears to be doing much better.
South East Asians prefer China over India in tourism, education, etc.
India’s pursuit of ASEAN received new energy and aggression in
2014 when Look Est policy was rebranded as ACT East policy. Age
old cultural ties were re-invoked and India tried to regain its footing
the region by strengthening its naval presence through dialogues and
exercises.
India has emerged as an alternative to China, however India desires
a much stronger and consolidated position in the region. Indonesia
was against offering to India, a member position in the ASEAN, for
Indonesia feared losing its dominance. Since its inception, member of
ASEAN have had differing views towards India, however all agree
that only India can balance China in the region. It is for the time to tell
what India will be to ASEAN in the future, however it is clear that
neither India, nor ASEAN can see peace without one another

References
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