Poverty: absolute or relative?

Author(s): BEVERLEY SHAW

Source: Journal of Applied Philosophy , 1988, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1988), pp. 27-36
Published by: Wiley

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24353360

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Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1988 27

Poverty: absolute or relative?

BEVERLEY SHAW

abstract In recent decades poverty has been defined as a rela

absolute notion. Those in poverty have been seen as poor relative to a le
social condition, accepted as average or normal for a society. Poverty
as 'relative deprivation'. This paper argues, first, that the redefinition
relative to social norms is a radical departure from the traditional no
Secondly, it considers whether such a redefinition gives support to th
claims of those in poverty (relative) may be considered as morally
claims of those in poverty (absolute). The paper concludes by arguing
relative poverty is advanced to give support to social and econom
primary aim is equality rather than the relief of poverty.

In the last three years TV screens have presented to us pictures of st

in Ethiopia, and in other African societies. Such societies have un
people living in poverty. Their peoples lack food, fuel and shelter.
enough for the maintenance of life. Their plight gives rise to com
consequence that many in Western, richer societies try to help to rel
however difficult this is in practice.
What here is being relieved is poverty conceived as an existence all b
keeping alive. The poor live on a narrow edge, one side of which slips
by starvation and exposure.
This view of the poor and of poverty has, however, been chall
decades. For example, Professor Peter Townsend, in the opening
monumental work, Poverty in the United Kingdom: a survey of househ
standards of living, declares that: "Poverty can be defined object
consistently only in terms of the concept of relative deprivatio
provides a gloss on the concept of relative deprivation, for he i
"Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in
they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the a
the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or at least w
or approved, in the societies to which they belong" [2],

Relative Deprivation: a radical redescription of poverty?

Townsend's redefinition of poverty had been anticipated by the Amer
John Kenneth Galbraith, who in his best selling book, The Affluent S
constrasted private affluence with public squalor. From the perspectiv
is of interest to note that he thought poverty to be a matter o
importance in affluent western societies. For this reason the poor
ten—a forgetfulness Galbraith regretted from the moral point of vie

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28 B. Shaw

Galbraith saw no need for a precise definition of poverty, cl

a physical matter, those afflicted have such limited and insu
clothing, such crowded, cold, and dirty shelter that life is pa
tively brief" [3]. Yet Galbraith could sufficiently depart f
notion of poverty to add in the very same paragraph: "Pe
when their income, even if adequate for survival, falls mark
community" [4].
What we have here, in this latter definition, is a radical rede
the one hand poverty is a matter of starvation rations, clothin
wearer from the elements, inadequate heating and shelter. O
is, as with Townsend, marked by a failure to enjoy that
society, or encouraged or approved of in that society. Those
may, as Galbraith remarks, have an income adequate for surv
that enables them 'to keep up with the Joneses', to use a phr
once was, and one that both pithily described and satirised t
life is to live up to the expectations created by the largel
bearers of the affluent society.
Townsend had good reason to believe that his more recently
poverty was not one widely accepted, for he had conducted a
very issue. On the crucial point that poverty is a matter of
failure to match up to a commonly accepted standard of livi
respondents unwilling to agree. As Townsend notes: "Only
sample saw poverty as a condition relative to standards whic
widespread in contemporary society" [5]. Indeed Townse
generalising from his sample: "... a substantial percentage
conception of poverty as being a standard below subsistence"
Townsend thus found himself differing radically from his
meant by poverty. To many of his respondents, poverty was
level of subsistence. Thus the subjects of his survey were in
Seebohm Rowntree who, in his seminal book, Poverty: a stud
families whose "total earnings are insufficient to obtain the
the maintainence of merely physical efficiency as being in p
Townsend rightly notes: "Previous operational definitions
expressed in thoroughgoing relativist terms, not founded co
concepts of resources and standards of living" [8].
Given the propensity of his respondents to cling to pr
subjective and unscientific operational definitions of poverty
those defined as poor by Townsend, by reference to the key
standards of living, have in his words "come to conclude tha
[9]. This non-existence of poverty, it is important to note, is
rather than in the world generally. The consequence is that
Townsend reject this categorisation and deny also that th
Townsend described as a 'genuine problem' [11].
It may be remarked at this point that I have unduly sh
between poverty (to be described from now on as absolute o
poverty, as defined by Townsend. For in contrast consid
collective authorship of the Report of the Archbishop of Ca
Urban Priority Areas, Faith in the City: a call for action by
report it is written:

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 Poverty 29

Poor people in Britain are not of course as poor as those in the Third Wor
But their poverty is real enough nevertheless. For poverty is a relativ
well as an absolute concept. It exists, even in a relatively rich wester
society, if people are denied access to what is generally regarded as
reasonable standard and quality of life in that society [12].
What we might question in this passage is whether there is therein one
poverty or two. For judged by the notion of absolute poverty there are n
people in poverty in Britain. If poverty is relative the number can turn upon
is conceived to be a reasonable standard and quality of life in that society: a m
say the least, of some contention.
Judged by the "standards and quality of life" set out by Townsend, of cour
people in Britain must be seen as relatively poor. By his 'deprivation index' [1
are in poverty if, amongst other deprivations, they have "not had a cooked b
most days of the week"; or they live in a "Household [that] does not usua
Sunday joint (three in four times)"; and also is one that: "Does not have f
(including meals out) as many as four days a week" [14]. In a less schematic wa
Harrison, in his study [15] of the London borough of Hackney, attempts a des
of relative poverty which requires a statement of what is required for
acceptable life. Harrison found in 1980-81 that what his informants saw as ne
for such a life included "a three piece suite, wall units, carpets, a fridge
machine and colour television, an annual holiday away from home plus s
trips a year; and at least one night out a week for teenagers" [16].
No doubt precisely delimiting the notion of absolute poverty is not wi
difficulties—yet the facts of starvation in Ethiopia are straightforward enoug
cases are paradigmatic; and there is much poverty not dissimilar in many par
world, though not perhaps so well publicised as that in Ethiopia and the Sudan
enough poverty remains endemic in the world; and this despite the fact
industrialised countries have managed to pull most, if not quite all, of their c
a standard of living above that of bare subsistence, as that is understoo
nationally. As already noted, such absolute poverty is seen as including a nutr
inadequate diet, and not one inadequate in terms of some socially approved
that may be influenced by fashion and culture. Rather a poverty-stricken die
inadequate to sustain life, or sustains life only, leaving little in reserve for w
mind the positive enjoyment of life. Clothing and shelter are also necessities
maintenance of life, as we in the affluent west are reminded of when we ventu
on mountains, deserts, and oceans. Our biological nature requires warmth; the
fuel supplies are an additional necessity for life.
It may be remarked that these aspects of poverty are a matter of deg
example, it may be said that the diet required to sustain life cannot be determi
precision and may vary between individuals, as what is needed for people of d
physique, age and sex will vary; and also, more food, better shelter and clothi
far more fuel may be necessary in cold climates than in hot. Many distin
make, however, are matters of degree. Such distinctions are not thereby unim
or cannot be made, despite there being disputes on the border.
A major distinction between absolute and relative poverty is not that b
matters of degree, but that with the former the judgement as to poverty is m
reference to man as such. In contrast relative poverty is seen with refer
specific society or culture: as in Townsend's definition of relative povert
above, by which people are poor "when they lack the resources to obtain the t

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30 B. Shaw

diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions

customary, or at least widely encouraged and approved, in the s
belong" [17].
Townsend is eager to pursue the notion that poverty is relative to living conditions
and amenities which are customary, encouraged and approved in any given society.
This logically enough leads him to argue that "a different definition of poverty is
required for every society, or indeed every relatively autonomous community" [18]. It
is commonly argued today, following Disraeli, that Britain is made up of two nations.
It is said that we are divided into the affluent South and the socially deprived North. If
this is true, do we require two definitions of poverty so that those living in (say)
Surrey are in poverty if they fail to possess a Volvo and are denied access to at least a
week's ski-holiday a year in Liechtenstein? In contrast, are those living in (say)
Durham in poverty only if they are denied access to an inside lavatory, and lack a three
piece suite and colour TV?
Townsend knows well where the logic of the notion of relative poverty leads. He
points out that "research studies might find more poverty, according to this definition
[relative], in certain wealthy than in less wealthy societies..." [19]. This is true
enough and scarcely requires research studies. Society A is poorer than Society B. In A
subsistence may be taken for granted as the poverty line, yet many people or perhaps
the majority may be for most of their lives just somewhat above it. In contrast in
society B there is more wealth and no one is living below the subsistence line or even
on it, at least judged by international standards. Yet in society B many people may
come to believe they are poor if they cannot match up to a socially approved standard
of living. Thus we arrive at the paradox that wealthy societies are more poverty
stricken than poor societies, for as Townsend has remarked there is more relative
poverty in wealthy than in less wealthy societies.
The notion of relative poverty also rules out the possibility that increasing wealth
will eliminate poverty. As Townsend points out: "despite continued economic growth
over a period of years the proportion found to be in poverty might rise" [20]. So that
just as a wealthy society is likely to be more poverty-stricken than a poorer society, so
in the same way an increase in wealth, that leads to an improvement in general living
standards, will lead to an increase in relative poverty. An example of increasing
wealth's increasing poverty (relative) is afforded by the USA. For in that country: "the
assumption that the prevalence of poverty has been steadily reduced since 1959 may
have to be abandoned, principally because the definition upon which prevalence is
measured is rooted in the conceptions of a particular movement in time and not
sufficiently related to the needs and demands of a changing society" [21].

The Morality of Poverty

There are no grounds in reason to condemn those who wish to change—even radically
change—the meaning of words. To believe otherwise would be to commit the fallacy
of essentialism, to employ a term popularised by Karl Popper. That is, we would have
to believe that for every word or term we use there is a corresponding unchanging
essence. From the essentialist point of view language is not so much a human invention
devised for the multifarious purposes of human life but rather a source of knowledge
of the unchanging essences which language embodies.
In contrast we can view language as serving our human purposes. We can agree to
change the meaning of words and to accept those changes of meaning that arise from

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 Poverty 31

changes in the character of human life. Sometimes changes in meaning are q

dramatic and arise from the activities of a small community of language users. Thu
the term 'atom' until recent times meant 'body too small to be divided' (as defined
the Concise Oxford Dictionary, 4th edn, 1951). Modern physicists use the term
quite other purposes without any qualms or difficulties.
If, therefore, I am correct in arguing that Townsend, and other social scientists a
policy makers, are offering a radical re-definition of poverty, then that in itself can
be condemned. There is no harm in anyone making the attempt to persuade u
change our understanding of whatever term or word is in common or uncom
usage. Nevertheless we can ask why the change is required or necessary, and w
benefits will follow from a change in some standard or traditional usage.
One consequence of a radical change in usage is that what was formerly named by
the radically revised term is no longer so described. Thus if poverty is now redefin
as relative deprivation, a deprivation relative to whatever may be said to be the nor
living conditions in a society, then the word 'poverty', as such, no longer means th
condition endured only by those living at or below subsistence level. For this condit
we have coined the expression 'absolute poverty', when once 'poverty' was enough.
Perhaps we can hold the two quite dissimilar notions of absolute poverty a
relative poverty separate. Yet is there not a danger that important distinctions will
overlooked, and the moral appeal that is invoked by absolute poverty be transferred
association to the radically different notion of relative poverty? Or indeed that rel
poverty ceases to be spoken of as such, but as poverty per se, thus gathering to tho
said to be relatively deprived in wealthy western societies, the degree of sympathy
compassion felt, along with the urge to charity and to help and assist, for t
multitudes in poverty (absolute) in the Third World?
Consider, again, the point of view found in Faith in the City [22]. This work is, a
its subtitle proclaims, A Call for Action by Church and Nation. We are called to act
behalf of the relative poor to be found in our inner-cities. No doubt there is much
be done to improve our inner-cities. Yet as the Report points out, and as I have alre
quoted: "Poor people in Britain are not of course as poor as those in the Third Worl
[23]. In the Third World the poor are starving and dying for lack of the most
shelter, clothing and medical care. In Britain, as in other western societies, the rela
poor are those people "denied access to what is generally regarded as a reason
standard and quality of life in that society" [24], Denied access, that is: to three pie
suites, Sunday joints of meat for three out of four weeks, a week's annual holiday a
colour TV [25],
How can we justify a greater concern for those in relative poverty on our doorst
than for those in absolute poverty overseas? From the secular viewpoint this does s
difficult whether one adopts a utilitarian or a rights-based stance to moral justificatio
From a Christian point of view, surely things are even simpler. From the perspecti
of a universalistic Christian ethic, that proclaims that brotherhood of mank
geographical distance and cultural difference are immaterial. The moral claim of the
absolute poor must take precedence over that of the relative poor.
To say that some people are poor, or that they are in poverty, is to describe their
condition, but it is also to make a moral claim on their behalf. Traditionally, the po
have been thought deserving of succour. In the words of the old carol: "Good K
Wenceslas look'd out/On the Feast of Stephen;/ When a poor man came
sight,/Gath'ring winter fuel". We all know the consequences of that sighting.
good king there and then set out in search of the poor man, followed by his faithf

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32 B. Shaw

page. Would we be too far wrong in believing that what

suffering human being: a poor man gathering his firewood wh
Therefore the king and saint calls out to his page: "Bring
wine/Bring me pine-logs hither;/Thou and I will see him
thither".

This moral claim on behalf of the poor is made of those tha

already quoted, "have such limited and insufficient food,
crowded, cold and dirty shelter that life is painful as well as
Can such a claim be made of those people whose income is bel
Britain, yet cannot be said to be in poverty as defined by Ga
A response to this may be that the absolute poor are in far-o
cannot be certain that our aid is genuinely effective. In cont
members of our society. They may not be anywhere near as
elsewhere: but they are our poor and therefore demand a mor
of average wealth and income in our society. Surely this sort o
Faith in the City [27] whose capitalised and singular City is n
mundane inner-cities of Britain's London, Birmingham, Brad
Yet this response begs a number of questions. For exam
poor in affluent western societies any more effective tha
absolutely poor in poverty-stricken, badly organised countri
governments? The evidence from the USA, with its 196
initiated by President Johnson, does not support the thesis t
in relative poverty to some higher level of income and
fundamentally, the question remains: Can the claims of th
wealthy, western countries be as great to the more affluent
those in absolute poverty in the Third World?
Faith in the City argues that poverty is more than shor
"about rights and relationships, about how people are tre
themselves; about powerlessness, exclusion, and loss of
certainly important matters: but surely their relationship to
traditionally conceived, is questionable? And Faith in th
sentence quoted above, and concludes the paragraph, by rema
adequate income is at its heart" [29], the heart, that is, of po
Consider here the issue of unemployment. Faith in the
William Temple in the 1930s as saying: "Unemployment i
social evils" [30]. There may be an element of rhetorical exag
report points out, unemployment destroys dignity and erod
less unemployment in Britain, as in other wealthy countr
income adequate enough to raise the unemployed out of pove
it [31]. Indeed, it is more than possible, that were the u
income considered adequate by the authors of the report, th
lack dignity, and have less self-respect than those in employm
of unemployment is being in receipt of an income not
however false this view may be in some actuarial way.
Thus the goal of an adequate income for all, an income a
to what is generally regarded as a reasonable standard a
society" [32], even if achieved cannot guarantee that w
Canterbury's report rightly believed to be commendable: dign

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 Poverty 33

and relationships. The goal that might be achieved is income equality. Is this intende
as the major consequence of the doctrine of relative poverty?

Poverty and Equality

The ideal of eliminating or reducing poverty (absolute) for mankind is widely held.
presumably underpins all those agencies and voluntary bodies to be found in wealthy
western societies whose aim is to aid and assist Third World countries to better
themselves. Whether the total elimination of such poverty is practically possibl
matter of conjecture. Nevertheless it is a goal that, in principle, is possib
achievement.

On the other hand, the abolition of relative poverty seems, in principle, incapable of
achievement. For as Townsend has argued, even if societies become wealthier and
living standards rise accordingly, the relative poor will always be with us. Rising living
standards will increase the proportion of the relative poor whose income does not
permit access to all the goodies an affluent society can provide for its citizenry.
To be absolutely poor is a condition too many endure but most would never wish to
endure. Responses to relative poverty can presumably vary: recall that many of
Townsend's respondents failed to recognise their condition of relative poverty and fell
undiminished by it. This Townsend describes as a problem, perhaps one—to borrow a
Marxist phrase—of 'false consciousness', to be remedied by a more general acceptance
of his persuasive definition of poverty. The relatively deprived will thus be encouraged
to see their condition as an injustice requiring a remedy. How unlike the Cynic
philosopher Diogenes, of whom by legend it is said that when asked, by the world
conquering Alexander, what most he wanted, replied from the interior of his famous
tub, "For you to get out of my light''.
It is worthy of note that the proponents of relative poverty are uneasy or ambivalent
about those acceptable living standards in wealthy societies by which relative poverty
is measured. For example, in Faith in the City it is claimed that there "is a profound
unease w hich a Christian is bound to feel about the moral and spiritual effects of the
modern consumer economy, depending as it does on the continual stimulation of all
attainable desire" [33]. Secular versions of this unease are expressed by Galbraith [34];
and by Townsend [35], who writes of the extent and severity of poverty (relative) as
being in part a function "of style or styles of living which are constantly being defined
and redefined and which the population feels compelled, or is compelled, to emulate"
[36].
There are, of course, strong philosophical and religious traditions that have, over the
ages, rejected whatever modest degree of affluence or consumerism their societies have
generated. Such affluence has been seen as a snare and a delusion—holding out the
illusion of genuine happiness in this life, and acting as an obstacle to salvation in the
after-life. But if one sincerely holds these views, ought one to be arguing, first, that the
absence of the trappings and symbols of the consumer society is to be considered a
genuine deprivation? For example: that to be without a colour TV is an indicator of
poverty, either material or spiritual. And second, that without question collective
action should ensure that all so deprived be brought up to the standard of the rest—as
argued in Faith in the City? The goodies of the affluent society are either good for all
or they are not. If they are not, why should they be seen as that which to lack is to be
poor and deprived?
The notion of relative poverty leads with a certain inevitability to the notion of

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34 B. Shaw

equality, for it is only when we are equal at whatever given

relative poor are eliminated. (Indeed, in a society so miserably
absolutely poor there might be some pride that at least
problem.) The relationship is well observed in Faith in the Ci
assumption of the work itself that inequality is always synon
that poverty and inequality are both sides of the same
authorship's insistence "that there is collective responsib
poverty and inequality that we have described" [37]. Note
any qualification to the term 'poverty' so we do not know wh
or poverty (relative) is that for which we are collectively
the assumption that poverty and inequality are problems tha
and buggy.
Yet this assumption can be questioned. The abolition of p
abolition of inequality are two separate enterprises and there
tion. There is no incompatibility in a world where the scourg
been greatly reduced, and yet there remains a considerab
(say) income and wealth between those who are now raised
who are indisputably wealthy. Indeed that is what we find in
societies where there is little absolute poverty, and yet such
ians often remark, profoundly unequal, and this is by th
deplored. Thus whilst absolute poverty is not a marked featu
unequal societies, a society may be profoundly equal, but t
poverty with many people living at a subsistence level and b
Nothing distinguishes relative from absolute poverty more
to equality. Whilst there is clearly no necessary relationship
and equality: their abolition remains separable policy goal
justifications, this cannot be said of the relationship betw
equality. Only in conditions of equality of income and w
eliminated. To be committed wholeheartedly to the abolition
be committed also to income egalitarianism, and possibly oth
as well, for those who are committed to raising up all tho
certain acceptable standard of living cannot stop short b
enough'. And what of those whose style of life is even m
than some acceptable social norm? Will not this style of
opulence and scale for fear that it would provide a standa
below it?—once, that is, relative poverty appeared to be a
opinion of the authors of Faith in the City that the lack of an
heart of poverty, and again that this adequacy is not to
sufficient to mankind as such, but to whatever is, in any gi
reasonable standard and quality of life in that society" [38],
Given his notion of poverty, it is not surprising that Town
what he calls an "effective assault on poverty" [39], such me
excessive incomes. This would lead to a scheme whereby
free income "according to a publicly agreed and controlle
category and skill, but also by need or dependency—whic
narrow span of variability" [40]. There are many econo
objections to this proposal that there is here no space t
consider how this "publicly agreed and controlled schedule"
whom. And what if there was little public agreement on

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 Poverty 35

should be paid as opposed to another: how would such disputes be decided and
whose interests? Perhaps we may take heart from Townsend's comment on his ow
of proposals to abolish relative poverty: "it would be wrong to suggest that any of
is easy or even likely" [42].
Can poverty be both relative and absolute as Faith in the City suggests? Only, I
argued, if we accept that poverty has two meanings. The first is the traditional an
widely accepted definition of poverty as living at and below the level of subsisten
the second definition, poverty is relative to some acceptable social norm. Thu
redefined poverty is relative to the living-standards prevailing in a society. Parad
cally, as we have seen, there is then more poverty in wealthy societies than in
ones; and, also, it seems to follow, more poverty in the better-off regions in weal
societies than in their poorer, inner-city areas.
I suggest that the persuasive definition of poverty as relative poverty serve
major purposes and policies. One is that of egalitarianism, as in Professor Townsen
[43] proposal that we should all be paid a tax-free income "which would cov
relatively narrow span of variability". By this Townsend presumably means
despite individual differences in effort and merit, never mind 'need or dependenc
such incomes would as nearly approach equality as makes no difference. The s
policy consequence is that concern for the relatively poor in our inner and outer c
will seem to transcend concern for the absolutely poor elsewhere. Both these polic
are eminently questionable. The danger is that we may be the more ready to a
these doubtful and debatable policies if we fail to distinguish between the two not
of poverty now current and come to believe, falsely in my view, that there i
poverty as such, and that this can be both absolute and relative.

Beverley Shaw, School of Education, University of Durham, Leazes Road, Dur

DH1 IT A, United Kingdom.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] Peter Townsend (1979) Poverty in the United Kingdom: a survey of household resou
of living, p. 31 (London, Penguin).
[2] Ibid., p. 31.
[3] J. K. Galbraith (1962) The Affluent Society, p. 261 (London, Penguin).
[4] Ibid., p. 261. Galbraith, writing in The Affluent Society, first published in 1958, saw p
rather than a general case in modern society. Increased output in the USA had "redu
the problem of a majority to that of a minority" (p. 260). Indeed Galbraith suggest
poverty. One, he described as 'case poverty': "related to some characteristic of t
afflicted" (p. 262); on his list were such characteristics as: mental deficiency, alc
education, bad health, excessive procreation (cf. p. 262). And second: insular pov
reluctance to move from a poverty-stricken environment or economically unproduct
in the USA, the Appalachian plateau.
[5] Peter Townsend (1979) op. cit., p. 27.
[6] Ibid., p. 241. Elsewhere in his book Townsend notes, presumably with regret, that
people in the UK] take the view that poverty is a condition under which people are
subsistence, or the basic necessities of life or is a condition which applies to particu
minorities, such as pensioners or the unemployed" (p. 914).
[7] Seebohm Rowntree (1901) Poverty: a study of town life, quoted in Peter Towns
P- 33.
[8] Peter Townsend (1979) op. cit., p. 33.
[9] Ibid., p. 429. Townsend quotes (p. 38) an international review (OECD) as an illustration of just such a
suspect operational definition of poverty. The OECD review defined poverty "in terms of some

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36 B. Shaw

absolute level of minimum needs, below which people are regarded as be

and government concern, and which does not change through time".
[10] Peter Townsend (1979) op. cit., p. 426.
[11] Ibid., p. 426.
[12] The Report of the Archbishop of Canterbury's Commission on Urban
the City: a call for action by church and nation, p. 195 (London, Churc
[13] The deprivation index has 12 items or characteristics, and this is mere
index contains 60 items, including: "Works mainly or entirely outdoor
milk per person per week", "At least one day without cooked meal in la
fair", "No meals paid or subsidized by employer", "Moved house at l
(Townsend, op. cit., pp. 1173-6).
[14] Peter Townsend (1979) op. cit., Table 6.3, p. 250.
[15] Paul Harrison (1983) Inside the Inner City (London, Penguin).
[16] Ibid., p. 425.
[17] Peter Townsend (1979) op. cit., p. 31.
[18] Ibid., p. 53.
[19] Ibid., p. 31.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] The Report of the Archbishop of Canterbury's Commission on Urban Priority Areas (1985), op. cit.
[23] Ibid., p. 195.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Townsend takes a strongly functionalist view of society, and sees those in relative poverty as not in the
same sense full citizens because their level of consumption is not as high as others' (see p. 922).
[26] J. K. Galbraith (1962) op. cit., p. 261.
[27] The Report of the Archbishop of Canterbury's Commission on Urban Priority Areas (1985), op. cit.
[28] Ibid., p. 195.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid., p. 207.
[31] See Note [9],
[32] The Report of the Archbishop of Canterbury's Commission on Urban Priority Areas (1985), op. cit.,
p. 195.
[33] Ibid., p. 55.
[34] J. K. Galbraith (1962) op. cit.
[35] Peter Townsend (1979) op. cit.
[36] Ibid., p. 922.
[37] The Report of the Archbishop of Canterbury's Commission on Urban Priority Areas (1985), op. cit.,
p. 24.
[38] Ibid., p. 195.
[39] Peter Townsend (1979) op. cit., p. 926.
[40] Ibid.
[41] See for challenges to this viewpoint: William Letwin (Ed.) (1983) Against Equality: readings on
economic and social policy (Basingstoke, Macmillan); and Antony Flew (1981) The Politics of
Procrustes (London, Temple Smith).
[42] Peter Townsend (1979) op. cit., p. 926. Reality does occasionally break through; as in Townsend's
comment that: "There is bound to be some kind of limit which they [taxpayers] will seek to set on the
amount that they will allow governments to extract in taxes, whether directly or indirectly, so that the
needs of the poor may be met' (p. 924).
[43] Ibid., p. 926. Faith in the City (1985) similarly argues that "there is merit in further thought being
given to a 'basic income' scheme" (p. 224). Its authors advocate the establishment of a 'major
independent review' to examine this option, along with other radical alternatives to current modes of
income distribution.

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