Introduction Why Professional Ethics? (One of the fist questions you ae likely to have is why the topic of profesional ethic is imporeant. You may have the idea that there must be something tit since hele course (and a bok of tis size) can be devoted tt, but you are probs ane oF we ‘he ig isis eal ll about ‘The starting point inthe efore to understand the importance of proicsonal ethics tight begin with the concept of roles. A single indus! norway plas a varcty of ferent role, alla the same time. You may be a sedent, but you also may be 2 fend, & brother or aster, «son or daughter, a zoommate, 4 membre of elu, 2 eisen of ‘ation, oF any numberof cigs. With each tole come certain ethial obligations, Av student, sou have an obligation not to hese, and asa fend, you have an bligation to help vous fiend in his oF her time of need. Ifyou are a roommate, you might ewe your Foommate the courtesy of Keeping the common areas clean, Av 2 citizen of 4 nation, you sre obigated to fliow the lav isued by the government. Some etieal cbign tions, such as te very base duty to reais fom farming othe people, peobaby exes stem from your fundimental role a¢ a member of the human comeyunity. The iden st that whenever there is talk about ethics snd your ethical obligations, ther ks connecs tion thats being suggested (even if nly implicitly) between those Obligations ane the soles fren which they stem ‘The topic of professional this concers the obligations held by individuals in thet particular roles as professionals. A distinction fere may be helpful Ax + fumehede _eson may possess obligations stemming feom her position is mother end conmre ity member, and other roles noe eelited to her jo asa lawyer Thus 8. honsehldes, she may possess obligations owed to her children, spouse, frends and flow memboes ‘of the community in which she lives. The term homschlder cas be thought of lose the Tins of private ciinen, and as designating the various rics (sul as thene mentees) ‘a a person may have in hee capacity as citizen, As a privonal, onthe other nao, Person takes on ethical responsibilices Uist go beyond the normal range of sepone bilities se possesses She may be a mother and thus owe certain things te her chen, bu in er role as lawyer she posteses 2 st of ethical duties she would not otherwise have. She may, inher role at lawyer, have a duty to her cleat to maintain conden igs she may have a ducy wo her boss to submit'& deposition by = certain ending, she may have a duty to her seerecary to provide reasonable payor time off she may cotshave certain obligations owed to sociery generally, sch asthe dy to uphold the di. nicy of the legal profession oto refrain fom acting in ways thac Would be detrimental to the legal restem as 2 Whole ‘Many of these examples of professional obligations may’ seem straightforward, bur there are also many examples that are aot at all clear. A layers obligation ro be honest nd forthright nay conflict with er obligation to provide her client weh the best posi ble defenre (Hf misleading the jry or othersise “bending” the truth sould help her lien, there will be disagreement oter whecher doing so is ethically aceptable.) A jour pals’ obligation to provide importa information to the public may confice with his ‘Obligation to respect the peivacy of public officials. An engineer's obligation to meer cer fain specification requirements within a budget, such as designing 2 more efficient yet {bexpensive automobile transoisaon, may comic with his duty to kook out For de safer ‘of the public. (The wansmission may come with ceran safety rsks iF money-saving short {us are taken.) These torts of questions give ste to additional, more general inquiries that are oF crucial importance. Whar, exactly are the obligations of lawyers, and to whom ie they owed? What is ethically required of teachers? Doctor? Journalist? Even if the answers to these are established, situations wil arse in which a penon wil fe coir ing obligations io his role 38 profesional and will have to make decsions about which ‘ones to Follow and whieh to neglect. ‘Because the circumstances surrounding any given isaue will often be varied and com: ples, professionals must be able to cca and logically analyze those circumstances if they ae co make ethically sound decisions. However, engaging in ania depeh analysis of ‘very stuaion that arses would be time-consuming and tedious, and ultimately inei- ‘lent and ineFective, One way to make the process more efficient isto rely on ethical rules that provide guidance in different contexts, even if they are oaly rules of thumbs (meaning they can have exceptions ot be overridden by more pressing rues), Indeed, professions already have certain formal cules in place that ust be folowed. Fist, professionals are obligated to obey laws that govern their socicbs. In the United stares, the Sherman Anti Trust Act prohibits business from getting togesher and fixing prices, Its thought to be an ethicily sound rule, since allowing businesses co do this ‘would inkibir competition and have the effecr of exploiting consumers in various ways ‘This parscular law therefore fimetions 10 protect the interests of vousumers, who, because they need certain products and posses less knowledge ofthe products than the professionals selling them, are vulnerable o exploitation. Other laws serve to promore {thial behavior and outcomes i various way. : ‘Second, specific professions and industnes ofen specify their own rules, beyond the general requirements of the las and ditec the individuals in those professions and ‘industries co act accordingly. Sometimes these are writen ipa formal way, a6 the case ‘vith codes of ethics. For example, the Code for Nurses requires nurses to demonstrate Fespect for the patients dignity cepardies of socal or economic status, The Code of [Ethics for Engincers specifies obligations to avoid deceptive conduct and co serve the public interest at al des. The ethical roles of specific professions may also be unwrit fen, exissing at an smplict standard of practice. An example in journalism is not report ing the mame of an alleged rape viet, even though there is no explicit law that prohibits e Indusiry-level rales mast be consistent with (n0c in conic with) the more fencrl laws they serve to highlight behaviors specifi co the industry that may or be not be desirable “Third, individual organizations have their own policies, guldelines, and even codes of ‘this designed to be even mote attentive £0 the particular vorts of issues encountered byIniroducsion those organizations, At ths level, the aim i to Focus on rules that are even more directly felevan for the specific organization; again, those rues must be consistent withthe more (general lows and indstey-lvel rules ‘With these sorts of fora) rules already in place, you may ask why itis necessary for professionals to have the ability to critically analyze ethical situations. Afterall ifthe rules te thece then it jst seems a matter of following them, Its extremely important to real ize, however, that acting ethically inthe professions i not so simple, Adopting a simpli: tic approach will not be helpful and is likely to be damaging. Even with certain rules in place, the ability to rationally analyze sitwations i crucial “There ae two min reasons for making this claim. Firs, rules must be interpreted if they are to be followed, and in any particular case, the same rule can be interpreted by fifecent people in very different ways, To demoastrate this, consider the role of the Supreme Court in the United States. Its purpose i 0 interpret the laws contained in the Constitution—the general rules conceming individual protections against gover~ tent regulation. The First Amendment to the Constitution is a rule providing for free- dom of speech, but the rele self docs rot make it clear whether flag burning, for ‘cxample, is allowable, The issue is debatable and requires interpretation of that rule ‘This is why rules themselves are never enough; the precise meaning of any given rule and the way it applies to any particular ect of circumstances can be discovered only rough csitial analysis. An example fiom the professions is the Hippocratic Oath, taken by medical doctors upon entering the profession. The oath-taker promises, among, Other things, not to give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it and not to provide women with abortive remedies, What, exactly, this implies for the controversial practices ‘of physcian-sssted suicide end abortion, though, is n0¢ as clear as it may seem. Thos, professionals need more than just formal lists of rules; chey need to be able to interpret the cules and apply them to specific isues that arise, This, in tura, requires the abty 1 think clay and logically. "The second reason this ability is important pertains ro whether the rules themselves are ethical in the firs place, Upon reflection, it should be clear that rules can be unethi- al Jost because a particular cule is coded as 2 company policy or even as an industry ‘Standard does not mean itis right. Some companies, for example, have polities forbid ding their employees from dating cach other. Is such a rule ethically acceptable, or docs fe violate the privacy rights of the employees? What about policies zequining monitored rug testing? When asked about the ethics. 0 company or industry rules or practices, su {dents are sometimes tempted to look to the law The temptation isto think that if the law allows it then it must be ethical and ifthe law forbids it then it must be unethical However, cebying solely on the law as the standard for determining what is ethical would be misguided. While it would be wrong to directly violate the aw, numerous practices allowed by the law may aot be ethically scceprable. For example, the law used to allow ‘companies to pay employees appallingly meager wages and to hire children as workers. ‘Been before minimum wage and child labor laws were enacted, ethically educated com panies could perhaps have seen the wrongfulness ofthese practices and acted accordingly. ‘Cases involving employee privacy, such as the dating stuatioa mentioned earlier, present more contemporary isues: even ifthe av does not prohibit various sors of privacy inva- sions, companies proceeding, with those invasions may stl be acting unethically. The Dvertiding concern i not only thatthe [aw could be ethically miyguided but also tha i isso genetal that may not be precise enough for specific professions or companies; hav: ing more precise rules, appropriate for the narrower circumstances of individual profes: sions of companies, i therefore thoughs to be a good idea‘The imporsance of professionals having the ability to identify ethical and unethical cules (which, again, cequires the ability to think clesnly and critlly) stems fom a cur ‘enc tend. Profesional organizations are becoming more democrat. In the develop, ‘ment of individual polides and codes of conduct, for example, it i becoming more ‘common for eruployees a al levels to make coarebutons, A similar phenomenon applies t adjustments made in polices, codes, and practices; opportunities to provide input regarding a questionable policy and ideas for tevisng it are increasing. This strategy 36 ‘more inclusive chan a “top-down” approach that i less democratic, with the company rules (including its code of ethics) being dictated from above by managers, aw partners, newspaper editors, or other leaders in the professional organization. This trend against the top-down approach may well be desirable, but its sucees relies heavy om he assump: tion that employees at all levels have the ably to think about what makes some poten tial rules ethical and’ what makes others unethical. An ethically educated workforce i therefore of great importance. Even in organizations dh remain less democratic, the policies and codes of conduct that are “handed dawn” by the professionals in charge (the managers, editors, and $0 oa) wil be more ethically sound if all the professional are eth ically educated The Nature of Ethical Inquiry Professional ethics is thus largely about the abey to think, and this ability derives fom the usefulness of cule, such as company policies, codes of conduct, and professional codes of ethics. Fist, because rules are necessarily general, thle correct application to any speak instance that might aise in the professions requires careful thought. Second, ‘cause thee i substantial room within the bounds ofthe hw to develop codes and pol ies, developing rules chat are ethically justified aio requires cartel thought Sima, ‘shen esting rules are thought t0 be Unjussfied, professionals must be able co adjust hem accordingly But according to what? The suggestion chat they be adjusted “accondingly” assumes thar there must be some standard againse which rales can be teste for ethical accept abliry. Tht standara, agai, cannot simply be the law. Some might think the standard Js prudence, especialy im the context of professonal cthice, Doing something that is prudent is understood as doing something ovt of sel interest, For instance, it would be Brudent for you to do wel in schoo!; doing well sn your best interest, since a strong {zacemic recont wil help you when applying for jobs or for graduate school. Goofing ‘off and not doing well academically is not prudent. It seems strange, however, ro say that goofing off is unethical, since our intuition is that the term anechical designates something more significant. Ths is one clue tha prudence is not the standard against ‘which actions and rules should be judged ethically. Another clue comes ftom the con {ext of professional ethics itself. An engineeving Bem might whitk i prudent {in its best Ineress vo continue sling somewhat dangerous produce eather than recall of take it ff che market, This would pethaps be the conchusion if a cost bene analysis ind cated shat the cost ofa few lawsuits would be less than the cos of iniitng the recall and losing te sales. While the prudent rategy would thus be to continue selling the provlt, thereby endangering even more people, our intition is probably thae tis is ‘not an etical thing to do. ‘Thus, ie seems that what is ethieal cannot be assested in ‘ere of what it prtdent. ‘Others might think thatthe stndard for determining ethical rightness is something like common opiaion or the prevailing view in society After ll if most people believethar something is wrong then it seems t must be wrong, However it also seems possible ‘that some actions deemed “wrong” by most people may ner be unethical. Most people ‘would think that public belching and aose-picking are wrong and should noc be pre ticed. Instead of being in the realm of ethics, chough, this seems to bein the realm af et ‘quette, the difference being that matters of etiquette pertain merely to what is considered Polite or impolite. Etiquette is concerned with politeness and acting in ways that soxiety ‘eons proper, wheress martes of ethics go beyond the politeness of an action and con ‘com the nature of che action isl. One problem, then, with the “common opinion” view stat it sisks blurring the distinction bercen ethics and etiquette. Another problem is that even when 2 widely held opinion does seem to fall within the realm of ethics, the ‘opinion cnuld sil be misguided-—that most people might just be mistaken about the point in question. Uf, for example, avast majority of people in a society believe thar physi= ‘an assisted suicide is unethical, does chat necessarily mean that i really is unethicaP If ‘vast majority of people in society believe that there is nothing wrong with denying ‘wonten equal opportunities inthe workplace, does chat necessarily mean there realy is nothing wrong with doing sa? Upon rection, we wil probably be inclined to conclude that what relly i ethics! need no correspond with what the common opinion happens tobe. Se neither prudence nor common opinion cas be referred to confidently when assess: ‘whether sn action, rule, or practice is ethical. One reason students sometimes think fotherwise concerns the language that is used in these contexte-apecificaly the language ‘of “ought” (or should) and “ought not” (or should not). A high school graduate con- ‘dering whether to continue his education atthe college level sometimes advised by parents and otiers that he ought to do 50. Jo this example, “ought” serves as a way of conveying the idea that according to his parents it would be prudent of him to attend College-—that it would be in his own bess interests to do so. Parents also tll their chil ‘ren that they oughc nat to chew with the mouths open, The confusion arises because the same language is used in the realm of ethics; we oughe to refrain from lying, cheat ing, stealing, torturing others, and so on. Thus, some things we ought to do (such as retraining from fying or scaling) are ethical in ator, while other things we ought to do (Guch ar staying in school and chewing food with closed mouths) are not matters of ethics but of something else, such as prudence or erquerte. It is understandable that some con fusion would arse over these matters Perhaps all that can be said about adjusting rues and policies “accordingly” is chat they be secseed against the standard of ethical truth, This rounde extremely vague, bat ighen the problems encountered with other potential standards, ethical eth may be the Best we eat do, Like sciatic truths, ethical euths in ths sense wovld ( chey exist) be objects, meaning they would be true regardless of what any individual or group of indi viduals happens to believe. In science, itt widely held that the truth or Flty of claims is independent of any belief, feelings, or choughts that people might have. The idea is that there realy isa fact of the mater in scientific inquiry and, furthermore, that we ca (all of us) be mistaken about scienifc claims. It would follow that a statement such as “The earth is Mar” would be false even if everyone believed it was tee; in such 40 instance, everyone would just be mistaken Tn contrast to objective truths, zubyecrine ruths do depend on the beliefs or feelings of parscwlar individuals, Whether your daim that “Broccoli tarts delicious” is true or false depends on how you feel abour the taste of broceoli, and for this reason its truth Of falsity would be subjective, The observation that itis subjective is based on three related observations. Firs, fe would be very strange for someone to claim that you weremistaken about your asesament ofthe tte of broccoli. We can imagine a cide argu ing the point, axempring to persuade you that you really da nor like broctoll heen though you think you do, but such a ercizm seems rather misplaced, Seconds the woah ‘of your clim chat “Broccoli tastes delicious” comes dicey, from your belch moa feclings; your believing that it tastes delicious is what makes it te dat it tastes del igus, Third, it follows that further specification must be_made to the clainn that “Broccoli tates deicious”—we lave co say that this is true for jou. Ie may be touc for some people and false for others, and this is why itis necesary to add for whom the claim i true (or fas), Subjective claims, then, have the following characteristics: they ean be tr for some People and filse for others; their tuth or falsity comes directly ftom individual belie or feelings; and accusing someone of being. mistaken about her aubjecuve cain wold be oda Objective claims do mot share these charactertch, which is why seeouie inquiry seems objective. Believing the earth is fat docs ot make it 40; you cannot ey ‘ha tis tue for you cha the earth i fiat even if iis fake for ethers and {ahercione) i would not be strange at all to suggest that you might be mistaken about the each being fas we are going to say tha ethical assessonents of actions, rules, and practices are wo be ‘made against the standard of ethical tath, i is important £0 be clear Sbeut whethes og appropriate. Some reflection would perhaps srengthen this hypothesis, and an extiome czample would make the point mo direcds. Adolf Miler believed that creating + noe ter race through te extermination of “ess desirable” seyents of sociey wae pron 4, The clear intuition is that Hitler's policies of mass genocide were horribly uneonea! IF this chim about the ethics of Hider's policies were subjective, however then foloe. ing the standards for subjective claims) we would have to say that genocide mas erhal for Hitler, and furthermore that his belief thatthe genocide was ethical made 8 chic for hie This seems extremely implausible, Te would follow that any individ for Sroup's) beliefi—no matter how racist, seis, of otherwise imolerant would be aie hog tha individual simply because he believes it. The more reasonable poston is that cecal claims are objectively ve or fe, Jo philosophical terms ie seems better to edopt a theory of ebicalobjeciviom than esh= seal relasivion, Ethical objecivisn is he thesis that ethical truths are independent of vidual! belies or feelings, If ethical claims ae indeed ebjecively true oF fs. then the thesis of ethical objectivism follows. Ethical relativism, on the other hend, is the these {hat ethical uth are not independent but arein some way dependent, Those the men, a5 we bave sid, depend on (or be relative to} the belief or feelings of individuals, tac ‘ne ersion of relativism. Another version of rlativin is that ethical trate depend on (or are relative to) the moral “cade” of a soci, For example, fa society belies thar slavery fs wrong, then itis indeed wrong-—ior tha society Ifa ‘diferent suciey beng thar davery is molly acceprble, then it indeed morally aceptate ior tat eosiey ‘The “code” may be captured in various ways—in the sociey's lau, clatonsn, Of sea ‘ions, For cxampio~and the base relativist idea is that there is no petspectne hom whch ing to relates, i canoe be said that the society accepting the pratice of dary “aly is" wrong. Again, because i seems that there ean bea dference between what stocky (or an individual) believes to be truc and what really is tc, ethical objecivim appexe to be the preferable approach,Intraduction Moral Vision ‘This distinction between what is believed to be ethically tae and wha really is ethically frac can bo used! to help us further understand che importance of scudying profesional ethics To see this, consider the flea of “moral vision.” a concept described by the Philosopher David MeNaughton. Everyone, including people we rake ro be morally bad a4 well as morally good, has a moral vision. Te is a way of secing the world in cerns of ‘what an individual thinks, feels, or believes to be morllycight, wrong, ot permissible Mother Teresa had a moral vision shar was about assisting the poor and disadvantazed, and she acted on it by voting her life 1 assting others. Adolf Hitler had a moral ison ‘that was about ereating a master race, and he acred od i by careying out the inass rr ser of groups he considered inferior. Again, a moral vision is subjective concept, and 30 every individual (every subject) has one. ‘The analogy with eyesight is iting. One's oprical vision is about the way one happens to see the world, but itis not necessarily the way the world relly i, Tools for asessing the accuracy of person’s vision and for adjusting her vision accordingly (vith eveghases ‘or contact lenses) may be appropriate. Similarly, obe's moral vision i about the way one Inappens to “see” the world ir terms of right and wrong and similarly, one's moral vision {is nor nevessanly securate, Ie may be hased on what a person was taught asa child, ideas he sequited wile growing up, the culture of bis society his eligion, the standards of et 4quette in his community, or Gwhat is most likely) on any combination of these and other factors. The important point is that what he was taught as a child and what his cure Ihappens to find acceptable could be ethically wrong, Of course, they could also be eth, cally conrect, but whether this is so must be investigated, Put this way, ethics ean be described as matter of corrective ision—as 2 way of investigating whether one’s moral vision requires some focusing or adjusting. This raises the question of how such an investigation is to take place, Afterall, the ‘implication het i tht ethical inquiy slike scientific inquiry, and is not like simple nat ters of taste; the idea is tha ethical truths, ike scientific truths, are "out there” waiting tw be discovered. On this view, learning those facts and bringing our behavior in ine with them (that, correcting our moral vision} is what ethic is really ll about. The question Is how we are to go abour discovering those ethical wuths. Without the means o discover Those truths, we are hack where we started, with no standard against which to assess our ‘mora vision, [n seience things ae more oleae, A given scientific hyporhess can be tested against observation, and an assessment of ve abilgy to predict and explain natural phe omen can be made in an effort to decide whether the hypothesis ie true. In ethics, 0 such means of testing ate available, and this has led some people to reject ethical objec. ‘vam and adopt instead the relatvist view that ethics (unlike science) f relative t0 he individual or the society and chat it all imply comes dowa to different views of Opinions about night and wrong. Different moral visions, in other words, ae just that-—different— {and there is no perspective from which one moral vision ean be objectively judged to be beter or worse that any otber, Drawing sis conclusion, however, would be too hasty. First, an inability co know whether a certain daim is objectively true 0 false does not logy imply that itis wot objectively true or false. We currently do nor know whether intelligent life exists eke where in the universe, bur this does not mean there is no abjecive truth about whether there is such life. Indeed, the very opparite scems tobe the cae: itis either true oF fle, objectively, tha inteligent life exists elsewhere in the universe, and he fact of ts truth fr flscy fs “out there” waiting co be discovered, Similars, we do not know whetherphysician asited suicide is objectively unethical, bu it daes toe fallow that there is ne objective rrath about 3t. Second, even if objective ethical truths were forever hidden ‘from us, such that we could never know them with absolute certainty, it does nok fol low that we should cease all ethical inguiry and adopt an “anything goes" aniudey very good approximations can perhaps sil be made, as long asthe appropriate tools ae ‘wlized. Moral Theories ‘The tools for accomplishing these tasks are commonly referred to as moral theories oF ethical theories. A moral theory is a mechanism for assessing svhether a particular action ‘or rue s ethically justified. More precisely, a moral theory helps us to sharpen our moa! vision; it helps us to determine whether an action or rule is ethically right (meaning tis required and mart be performed or folowed), wrong (meaning it must ete performed or followed), oF permissible (meaning it may be, but need not be, performed oF fl: lowed). Students sometimes confuse the conceprs of “ethically ight” and “ethically per missible,” bur the distinction is important. Something that = ethialy permissible provides much more leeway—it allows fora choice, whereas something that is ethtally Fight leaves no room for choice, Ie is permissible for you to collect stamps: doing 60 is ncither required nor prohibited, and so you have a choice, ethically, about whether this ‘isan activity ro pursue. It is (usually) sight chat you Keep your promises; doing $0 is required, and s0 there ino choice, ethically, about this ‘The purpose of an ethical theory, then, is to provide ultimate ethical justification in a ‘way that conventions, customs, etiquette, and the like cannot do. An ethieal theory serves {0 provide decisive reasons forthe rightness, vrongfulness, or permisiblity of za action ‘or rule. Exhica theories, therefore, are of some importance. and some ofthe eading the cries wll be discussed in detail in Chapter 1. Thete are postive aspects of and potential drawbacks to each theory, but certain characteristics are thought fo be intrinsic toa) acceptable ethical theory First, an ethical theory should be preseriptivg, meaning it should be action-guiding. We look to ethical theories in order to determine what sorts of behavioes or rules are accept able, and those theories should therefore advise us regarding what ought to be done (ovhac is righ), what may be done (what is permissible) and what ought nar to be done (what is wrong). A theary that occasionally fas to provide prescriptions of this sort will be somewhat problematic. Even when there seems to be conflict hetwecn rules that se Benerally sound, the theory should provide guidance. The general obligation to heey ‘one's promises may at times conflict with the general obligation not to lie, and an e*5 ‘al theory should be sccesfal in helping one to decide which obligation is stronger and should be kept in a particular set ofcicumstaics, Second, an ethical theory should be wniveral (or impartial), meaning ic should apply to all who are in the same morally relevant citcumstances, For example, if a theory ind) ‘cates thar Susan fas a moral obligation to perform a certain action in a certain situation, then the cheory should indicate that Michael has the samme moral obligation when he i in that same situation, If the theory stipulates that one employee has right to safety it ‘the workplace, them it must stipulate that a second employee has the same right unless there exists some morally relevant diference between the two employecs oF thet ci. ‘cumstances, That which counts as morally relevant will in part be a finetion ofthe moeal theory that is used; che important point is that a moral theory cannot allow any such dif: ferences to be wholly arbitrary. Ar the heart ofthis requirement of universality (or impar-Intraduction tility) i the core iden that all persons are moral equals, and differences in treatment can be justified only when there are morally relevant differences in circumstances. Itis essen tally a matter of logic: FX possesses certain rights or obligations and Y is similar o Xin all the morally relevant ways, then it follows that ¥ should possess the same rights or obli= ations as X. “Thurd, an ethieal theory should be practical. When working through different theos ries, ccan sometimes be forgotten thatthe ultimate aim isto apply he theory to the real ‘World in an effort o resolve ethical difficulties. [tis important not o ger so bogged down in dicussions of theory that we do not even talize that the implications ofa particular ‘theory have become tinmanageable. The important poine here is that we are limited by ‘our circumstances and by our owa conditions. An ethical theory ehat instructs us to do ‘whats physically impossible or even peychologically impossible is nota very practical eth- ical theory and s0 is not very good. The rules and guidelines that follow from it must be feasible, ‘As will become clear in Chapter 1, different moral theories focus on different things. Consider the various ways of assesing whether 2 certain action or rue is ethically right, wrong, or permisible. You may think thatthe important factor is che consequence that follows from enacting the ation or rule, and indeed theresa theory that focuses on con- sequences; you may think that the important factor isthe motivation behind the action fr rule, and indeed there isa theory that focuses on motivation; you may think that che important factor is the character of the indwvidval(s) initiating the action or rule, and indced there is a theory that focuses on character, Tn all, five different moral theories will be discussed in Chapter 1, the aim being, to acquaint you with different ways of reason ing in echical contexte-with tools that can be used when deliberating about the ethics of an action, rule, or policy Professionals, Ethics, and Moral Theory In sum, theee points should be emphasized, First, iti important ro recognize that what ‘you “feel” is right may not infact be the ight thing to do. Wht you were taught, what Your conscience tells you, the principles of your religion, even the principles oflaw—these fan tur out to be mistaken, all of them. Moral theones, when used correcty, provide ‘ways of dealing with issues that necessitate setting aside these sors of things tht can skew ‘one’s moral vision. They provide ways of getting outside our own perspectives, atleast as much as is posible, and they enable us to assess perspectives and viewpoints with which swe initially disagree in order to assess whether that initial disagreement is justified. ‘Regardless of what your reasoned conclusions about specif issues turn out to be, moral theory helps co provide more complete reasons for them, ‘Second, it will become clear while reading Chapter 1 thatthe theories ean be complex and tedious to se, perhaps too tedious for professionals who, afterall, have a great many things to remember and worry aboot. The important point here is that every detail of every theory need not, ultimately, be remembered. If che theories are learned well now, land ifthe articles in this book are read and analyced through the lenses of moral theory, then realli cases will be seen in a new light and the process of ethical analysis will be ‘much less cedious in che future than iis in the beginning. “Thied, it must be recognized that acting ethically in the profesions is important, I is sometimes believed that professionals have a eetain choice when faced with a dificult sit ‘ation: one ean either do what is bert for one's career or one's company, or one can do ‘what is ethical This apparent dilemmayhowever, does not really exist. Over the long run,acting ethically pays off, shough this is no aways clear Decloping the habit of doing the right thing benefis you personaly x bemets you prfesusnally and ic beneite Yous company or organization. Professionals who Snernaliae ethical ways of thinking became, (over the Jong rn, recognized by their bosses, employee, sustoer, and COWES $s people who cau be trusted, and developing 2 sense of ere with these group evil ‘or profesional success (OF couse, the fst that acing ethically “pays of” in these ways does aot emean that {hiss ohe reson a thal, share phlosophealh, acang ethically important hot esse it happens to bring about personal or profesional beat, bt other forts ow sake, Indeed, acing “etheal”" ia order to bene yourself or your company robes ‘oe acting ehicaly Nonetheless, sting ethically sod sting inthe best teens of one self and one's company, ar fxn being exclusive, are complementary. Ther i therefore, ery reason to act ethically, and ds book i devoted to he search or ethical rth nthe professions cheough the us of etal and logical cals. Chapter 6 Engineering Ethics, Ethos, and the Professions: Some Lessons from Engineering Whistleblowing: Professionalism and Personal Life Can Engineers Hold Public Interests Paramount? ‘Trade Secrets and Patents in Engineering: Ethical Issues Concerning Professional Information Optimization, Option Disclosure, and Problem Redefinition: Derivative Moral ‘Obligations of Engincers and the Case of the Composite-Material BicycleExginccring “The protesion of engineering presents variety of etic sues, come of which are related co readings from the previous chapter Afr al, engineering i a Business, oF {Gepending on one's defiion} ia leas tke a busines sce engiteeting fem sve to atact customers and generate profit, Because many ofthe ethical problems in engl necting pertain to safer sues, the obligations may petiaps be more sungmi his content tha in more sandaed busines context. Desighng ear, smlanes, bdges, ‘weapons, and oter items ena risk onthe part of wer, namely a ask of physical injry ‘or even death, When the stakes ae tha high seems that the engineers desing, com Strctng, and seling the prot take on obligations that are correspondingly mor ig. ‘ros. However, expaining presse what thore obligations ate and determining Row they compare to ater diss 305. The Feld oFenpinerng eis prondes ways ‘of addressing thet matters “Manager of engineering fms (sho themselves ypicly have engineering experience) Ive ataricty of ferent responsblines Making sare product are safe i cea one sch fesponsblity, but so makings reatonable prot. Thu, there are ses when cons ers about reveme and pub reltons may be more important than sey Should 2 ompany spend an extra $8,000 per cart make ies An extra $102 What he act, increas in set is extreme sal? Companies could make cas so safe tht they ate ‘eset Te tanks out thereon the roa, but then cach one right cost $200,000, ‘What counts a “tafe enough”? How does one determine where to draw the ine? The arcs in this chapter are intended to prove ways of addresning these and other que tions, whether one i 2 manager line” engnecr (one wth no managesial duties) et ‘uy way aflated withthe prfesion. "nthe fist selection, Gene Moriarty pots out that many engineer do ot, a3 at ter of ft uUlze eal theory when making dechions with eh rumieations. Tosca, they tend vo approach snes inte which meats dat sound eel deo vwil be made when de engines haves atasg ethos, oc good moral character. Sie Character crphaized by vite etic, makes sense to point out some vires that are importact ia this profesion sf eapineers can have an understanding of the mai engi neering virtss, then sound ec desions are more likely to be made, een ifthe deus of rte ethics a such are not grasped. Because che various conserations that Stein engineering (uch a8 those mendoned inthe previous paragraph) can make this ‘UG, Mowiacy argues tha the core ites of ebjestity and eae shouldbe practice by engines, Cag and being objecive on a consistent basis he sus, wl enable gine to mate the ght deutons in ment drcunstances, ‘Mike W. Maru discusses the sue of whisicblowing, which can arse in any profes sion bu is pardculsely reliant in engineenng Where safety concems are common, ‘Whistcblowing is generally understoou to occur when an employee gors ouside the company (to the pres, for example) in order 10 shed light on misconduct within the compan}: The lbel “blowing the while” comes fom the cffor ro get the publ’s stteon, and when this occurs in engineering ies rp in order to alee the pubic to potentially unsafe product. An engineer would take this step when his box (or tose) allowed a producto sll despite the engineers conecrs; he manager, having ee responsbiliy to make reasonable prof, might not make safety the priory. The eng nett must then decide whether to blow the whist, which could prevent harm (and even feats) but might wel un hs eaeer, sine “worlag” on one's company i sen a he ‘worst form of diya. Martin reviews tome common ethical approaches 20 while bowing, which tend 1 emphasize the confic:Berween the dry of snferyomed tothe publicon one hand and the duty oF eyalty owed to one's company onthe otier He then Brgucs that thete's another important considerson-—an engineer's righte aa pers and 201202 bis responsibilities re family and others ouside the workplace. This is certainly elvan, Martin clams, since whisblowing seriously jeopardizes the whistleblowers income aed livelihood. Martin concudes by recommending 2 virtue-based approach ta this mage ‘an eth sve “The question of engineers obligations ro the public then taken up by ‘Taft Broome, J While engincers indeed have certain duties of loyaley and even certain fates teaver ‘ain the busines, ic a commonly held view that engineers, as prolesionate, owe how Poimary obligations co the public. However, competing interests and personal comsideee, ‘ons of the sot aleady discussed can make falling public obligations diffccls Whee & i pombe for engineers to hold public interests paramount depends, im pst on yee ‘shat s meant by the “publi” and thus “public paramount” Ie ako depends On whee is meant by “engineering,” which has waditionally been considered + eld of applied ac ence. Broome offs is Views about these meanings and points cut that mak €0 the pol lc s a inherent part of engineering. The health and welfare of the public eanace ke Buatantced, and so 2 qualified view of public partmountey wil be that engineers met hold acceptable rsk—not assurance of talesy (whichis niposnble andl eaen commrea tory)—to be paramount, ovalty, meanwhile, is discussed by Eugene Schlossberger in the contest of trade sscrets and patents, When an engineer changes companies, she brings tothe seme con ny information she acquired while atthe fst, a this raises certain cna quesony, Engincering firms compete with each other on the bess of information, Resech eet development is necessary to generate the information, which in tuth leeds to the devel foment of new oF improved products, Thus, we can imagine One company spending money o do research and learning information, and another compaty “sealng” thee information, enabling it to make the products without having to do any reaarch Such scaling secns wrong, of couse, but when an enginecesoiply gives her New company information learned at Ber old company, the effet isthe same. In analing this ous, Schlosberger describes diferent eypes of information, and he cplcins why some tee 25 Hihtly te property of the previous company wile ether pes are eth the props ‘ty ofthe engineer herele ‘Many of the ethical questions raised inthe engineering profesion are covered in the final article, Robert E. McGinn describes a ease invoiveng diferent stages of developmen in the engineering of composite bicyies, While the ease might inal seem suengce, acd, it encompasses several ethical issues, and MeGinn tevies each i tone Piece inclu sues pertaining to conflicts of interest, efBiency, safe, ans information dle see, The decals covered ty McGinn demonstrate how cal ethical problems cag eke in engineering, even when the situation sms uncomplicatedMorava: Bees, bos, and she Prfesims: Some Lesons fms Enver 203 Ethics, Ethos, and the Professions: Some Lessons from Engineering GENE MORTARTY Introduction Ethical tues atise our of professional practice Ethical theory can he brought to bear on these issucs and can help the prefessonal make ethical decisions by providing 4 conceptual framework Svthia which the wares can be clariied, However, jt is also true thet ethiesl decisions are offen arrived st without reference t@ ethical theory, ot evento profesional codes of ethics wach wpcally embod varies of ethical theories. The profes Sional person (awyer, physician, enginest, ete.) often decides what t0 do intuitively simply om the basis of his oF Rer character or ethos. I that per son is. for example, caring and objective physt stan, then he oe she would no dosbr excrete his locker medical knowledge and sls a caring and ‘objective manner, "The word ethas “orginally meant customs (of & group) and later was stsocated with character Jin addition to a group ethos, an individual ethos land a global ethos en be distinguished, E will net take up the quetion of global ethos, bur wil gue that a group ethos or character ofa particular king emerges ost of the practice of particular nds of ‘irues (or vices) And, of course, groups are com posed of individuals. A practicing professional i tlwvays both an individual a6 well asa member of 2 profession, But Twill be less concerned with iad Niuals as individuals, and rmore eoncerned with individuals a8 group’ members Certainly, most engineering practice these days entals a group tffoct, For product development, for nstance, a8 fngineening group or team might need a diversity fof expertise nthe areas of circuit design, model 'shornin Wl, “tone Vieue Theory and suaness hn” Banos and Pfeil Eterna V8. ing, siolion, esting, layout, meprated iret FBbicaton and packaging Ts there a character or ethov of engineering? “The ethos of engineering i the ethos oF character of te engineers as engineers, individually and col Tccovely engaged inthe enterprise of engineering Orcouse ffs posible that ap engiect may lead {vo of moce diferent lve, Belg an ethical pe former on the job real De Jey, whe being 2 Ms Hyde at home, or vie vrs. However in get rai the practice of tues uch a cre and obj: tisky By any professional profesional should help to shape his or her whole charter and, in partes, shoul hep to shape forthe engineer. tng profession collectively caring and objective froup eos ln turn, athe ethos OF the engineer {hg profxion becomes more extng and objective, insibidual eninge it draving Rom sts ethos fn! ving up toi, wil become themes more Caring and object. ‘Engineering is 2 practic inherent ed 10 4 sity of values, ome of which may bein con fact Effiency, for example, high valued nginering practice. But defining effxency ar Tory (ay fOr example, the maaimums of tae ext put por nit np) massa seriou damage the eniroameny, se prowccon of which i bo ‘alued in engnesing pracice Ia the face of the sles of values important co engineering, 1 vil fngue that the expe pracace of the mares of Core and obsess portened in he works OF Hisworth, Gillgan, Mayer? and” Nodding Lawrence Howarth, Deedee ana bjt (Teco: Ur of Tovonto Py 1977); Cao Gilg, # Dine Tour (Cambridge, MA: Ded UP 1982), Aton ‘Moyo, On Caring (New Yorks Haye a Rot, 1970), Na Nodiings, Carga Feminine Approach» Eis ad ‘Mera Edenton Bercy, CA U. oF Caria P1984) ‘Gwe Meviare i Profesor of Ensincring, Sa Joe Sone University "Bi Eh, ad he fein Sma esos ro Engin." Teokesona Fas # (29992, pp TS Rept i tina ormunon ose chrconstitutes 2 postive engineering ethos, Such an cecos, in tues, can provide a focus forthe eng neering profestion, ‘The Problem 1 wil illustrate the problem at fsue by a nasative from my personal histor: Twas brought up to feel that war Was goad for nothing, generally speaking, ‘except making the eich people richer. But there T was fresh out of graduate school, interviewing for an engineering job at large aerospace compan. ‘The engineers in my prospective group were excit= edly telling me about a system they were develop- fing. It sensed the terrain with an ingenious radar ‘mechanism, employed an elaborate feedback con- trol structure, and made determinations on the bass of stactial decision rules. The job offered fascinating prospects for sophisticated engincering, designs. But then 1 took a wide look atthe pro fect and realized thatthe system I" be working on, Was to form part ofthe signal processing unst oF What came t0 be the Crise Missle A dilemma indeed. Could t contribute to such a project and. thereby tothe militarization of the plane? This not an uncommon problem in engineering: here i 2 technically sweet project whose intended use is, however, at best unsettling. What to de? My instinct told me to back down. Ui (and was fr tunate to gee a better job later anyway) Reflecting on this situation, 1 reaived that I had not explicitly employed any euhieal yetem of thought to guide my decsion abou a situation that had obvious ethical import. T didn’, for example, make the decision by seckiog out the {greatest good tor the greatest number. Fcame 3 Aecision based on my character—my internalized values or ethos. The problem is that this scenario ‘pherein personal values eather than ethical asters guide ethical decisions appears fo be quite com mon. Whar tales, then, trould be most postive for engineers and engincering? The valuet of a ‘engineer are revealed in the character or ethos oF that engineer, The values of engineering. are ‘revealed inthe character or ethos of the engineer. ing profession Engineering ethics came into its fown a a separate discipline in the late 1970s, focusing, ts concerns on codes of ethic. In con trate Twill emphasize viwwe ethics, which links directly to character ethos, not a8 a counter to traditional engineering ethics, But a8 3 comple Ethos and Character While ethics i normative and associated wih the “ougir,” eros is primasly desergtive ang associated withthe ts." Hemever, my contention is chat engincering oughe tobe a caring and objec tive practice: ere and objectivity sol character ize che ethos of engineering, Tn other words, there is a normative clement within the notion of ethos ‘which implies that itis possible 10. chwre one’s thes, In fat, postmodern philoweshers sch as Niewiche tell us itis ne Tonger possible to be purely descriptive: all description s really interpre {ation shich incorporates an advocacy oF same Jind. Tadocate chen, a specif ethical practice in aceoed withthe vitucy of care and objective for the sake of creating and insling a specific Kind of engineering ethos. “Ethos or character, exhibited in che practice af virtue and vee, is more than mere habit. Habit Jangely unconscious, while character, though ‘may Be exhibited in a seemingly uneonscions act, Fequires conscious and often strenvous effort £0 develop. Character is 2 vigor an energy 4 tenor, temper, 2 spine, 2 fervor. Ralph Waldo Emerson said ie best) “ehis is what we all Character=-a reierved forge tha ace tty by presence, with Tin addition, characteris often related to destiny Destiny, bur nor fare. Though these words are often used synonymously, Fill tke "Ete" 6 the ‘sven in one's life and “destin” as what one does in the fice of fte. My fite it given to me by my eat of character sac ing daposton to react mat way. Every peton hibits the cipostion in some degree, but no ‘one exhibisevomsseny 0 totally My propos i that engineers embrace this kind of circumspect objectivcy as 2 contribution to 2 Positive professional engineering ethos. Thoogh mast enginecrs are so inlined to some degrees [ want to: designate this sense of objectviey ay ah expliet ingredene in the proposed virese etic This kind of objectivity, practiced 34 3 virtue, seems to provide the conditions that make pos ble an open-minded consideravon of rule-based itmorth op assed. Eventually a representative of the company Ipproached Brown withowt Smith's knowledge tne confided that Zephyr washed to “begin = Sirect relationship” with Brown's company and “bypase” Smith altogether. Brown's reaction a8 ‘9 “simply stare” chat he would “continue to pro= ‘ide our Services Smith] a5 we had agreed 30 Cong. 3+ that relMship existed with the client “Zephes and that ever that elaconship should ‘erminare equitably and the consultant [Smith be fompensated for bringing our company to the >roblem, we would thea|,} wih [Smith’s} know sdge and coasent{,] negotiate 2 direct contact ‘5th the bieyele company forthe services sough Eventually, Zephyr terminated is relationship with Smith, When Smith informed Brown that he st ow fice to begin 2 direct relationship with the sioysle company, Brown negotiated a new agree ‘nent vith Zephyr. The reat was “a $720,000 iraited contract that included royalties on each, composite biycle sold. This was a very good {eal for us, and a8 it turned out forthe chent a wel.” ‘oma is owact sod CEO of he ova small consing rgiecing frm ch provides “egncering dean ed nuftring serie to people who ae potenti Us of Steracntorent cerpoates "(C95 After developing “a workable ansnufscruring plan for composite bicvses," bu prior a deciding fon 3 composite fame declan, Brown fet it Wat Jmporeant to se ifthe strength and sites of the ‘ecsring 4.5 Ib. production frame eould be dupl ‘ented ata lightee weight. He ssked Tones if he ‘wovld agre to some fnite-clemene computer rans Gimed at optimiring the sctare oF the existing metal frame, Jones told Brown "in no uncertain terms, ‘Do nor do that! Since, however, Brown, believed that doing so was "2 vitally important step.” he decided #0 optimize the stcrure a his ‘ow company's expense, What he determined was that the Weight of the existing sluminuca frame could be reduced with no los of stiffness oF strength from 4.5 to 3.1 pounds, within 2 ounces Of the taget weight of the profécted composite ‘terial frame, With over $200,000 of the contract's {$720,000 stil unspent, Brown called Edwards, the president of Zephy7, and inforined im that the ‘ost to reduce the weight of his existing luaninum Frame to 3.1 pounds was going to be about $6.35, per bicvele with no additional investment in faci ties or personnel] compared to building & new Faeibty, hiring and training @ second production staf¥ a an initial cost of $2.6 malin] and a anit ‘ost oF $97.00." Ecards decide that his mar- keting sf? insistence on having 2 carbon: fiber bieycle flame had more to do with incorporsting the ‘buzzeword technology dis jou? than [with] relying on Rindamental applied engineering. to achieve the desired weight redaction deemed nec fesary to maintain marker share.” He there asked Brown 10 complete any task in progress and bring the composite buycle program toa close.” ‘xe sniproved alarm frame biel was a sue> ‘ess patt of Zephyr's product line From 1992 through 1996, Edward’ decison to terminate tke composite bigjcle program "meant the loss of the remaining $300,000 on the contract” and that Brown's com” pany’s “was going [to] have a lot of unbillable time for a fow months.” I also saved Zephyr "a reat deal of money!" To Brown, i aso demon rated that while “ethics have a price, integrity has a reward.” For, he revealed, “ithe refercal business from this experience has rerurned the lost revenue several times over.” However, according to Brows, “money ise not the best reward230 (MAPTER SIU: ENGINEERING That comes from within and if you understand that, you probably have good ethics anyway I'you don't understand that, you probably dida’t under Stand [the] choices made in his case history ccther!” IIL. Analysis of Ethical Issues [Ethical sues are rated by the actions of various partes in dis case, including Jones and pechaps Smith In shat follows, however, we shall focus ‘ur discussion on ethical issues raised by actions of Brown, or by actions of others that targeted: Brown, Noteworthy ethical sues reared their Ineads ar fv juncrares inthis case: (1) when Smith asked Brown 10 endorse his method and approach i the meeting with Zephyrs techoical staff, (2) ‘when Joutes asked Brown at the meeting whetber he thoughs Smith's design and manufacturing. concept was workable; (3) when Zephyr sought to bypass Smith and proposed to begin a direct rela tionship with Brown and his company; (4) when Brown was instructed by Jones nor to optimize the structure of the existing metal frame; and, fall, (5) when Brown determined that an alu rminn-trame bike could be designed that Was as strong and almost a5 light asthe desired compos ite-materal bieycle. Let us took sndividually at cach of these episodes EPISODE 1. SMITH ASKS BROWN TO ENDORSE HIS PLAN When, at the meeting with Zephyrs technical staff, Smith asked Brown £0 “validate his [Smits] ‘methodology and technical approach,” Brown felt himself embroiled in what he termed a “mult faceted ... ethical quandary." On the one hand, since he had been introduced ro Zephyr as an ini tee of Smith, Brown felt “ethically bound not co tundermine [Smith's] business wath this client.” (On the other hand, since he alo fel: “bound 10 contribute both experience and technical expertise ‘vith integrity to ey company and its reputation,” Brown felt he “could not endorse the technically flawed program which was the subject ofthe meet- ing” without harming his own company and its” ‘employees. As noted earlier, his reponse was “tO ssiggest thar 1 apparently did not have the same insight and awareness of the problem as the con- sultant and that his understanding of the dynamics own. under and intricacies of hit concept surpassed offered to refrain from commenting unt “ood the process as well ast author” Brown's conduct was for the most part laud. able, even, as we shall sce below, exemplary However, two aspects of his behavior in this fst episode merit examination. Fist, 25 the above uote indicates, in his response to Smith's endorsement request at the meeting Brown dis sembled and prevariated. One reason he did so twas because he adhered t0 2 “simple business cthic.” Under it, he believed himself “ethically bound” not to de anything that would undermine ‘Smuth’s reputation with fas client, Zephye. Brown seems to have reparded. that obligation as ‘nooluel eather than prima facie binding, He real ied that acceptance of Smith's approach “could core the bieyle company many hundreds of thou: sands of dollars before they understood is weak nesses." That he feigned ignorance and was evasive even under that realization suggests that be fee the obligation not to undermine his clients was categorical ‘Bur however he construed his “simple business thie,” Brown was not obliged to refrain from ent ical comments on Smith’s method and approach by the “Code of Ethics for Engineers” of the National Society for Professional Engineers (NSPE).* While this code does state that engincers “shall not attempt to injure, maliciously or falsely, recy or indirectly, the professional repuration, roe, pace, laymen of sheen jr untruthfuly eritize other engineers? Monk? (Section TILA) ic dove not Hold that eng neers ate obliged not to criticize ther proessional colleagues, only that such cnicism as is made of their Work by fellow engineers be truthful, non- malicious, and not intended to injure. The ethic embodied in the NSPE code of ethics appears, in this instance at leas, to be more nuanced and con ditional than Brown's seemingly categoria “sim ple busines ethic."S “NSPE Pablnion Number 1102, anna 190, Sie crn ont that Brown regards the piscple oF not doing anything to endermine + chen’ eepusston Wilh 2 ‘hid parsy m ronglypressmpvly ther than catego {lly abd. Questions in 1997 abou hs semiogly ee fon poston he wes trong prefecence or Spy ‘fading fom ay project he deemed secu andMcGinn: Opsimication, Option Diclsure, nd Probleme Redeiiton aa 6 Zephyc had ot evenly come to recognize the daw in Smith's plan and had proceeded o® the bass ofthat propos, che company mig not only pave wasted mach money but have reached a point A ohich it was onthe verge of manoficturing and isting struccurally fawed bicycles. Whether Brown's aberence to hin simple business ethic” ‘would have impelles him to contiaue v0 dssemble fr be evave f Zephyr was poised ro make a deci ‘Son thar could have resuted in the delivery of a product that might jeopardize its users? physical Eri is in. principle unknowable. Fortunately, Brown's inital lack oF candor wes sufiienty tpsrcam in the produce developmen proces that ied not contribute cteating an unceasonable tisk of unjostiale harm t© merbers of the pub Tic However, hie choice to remain publicly non- Commit, even though Zephyr stood to lose aot ff money investigating idem of Smith that Brown, Know to be structurally Eawed, is trovbling from ‘the point of view of respecting Zephyrs pro fectable financial interests and fevealing about the strength of Brown's perceived obligation not ( {undermine his cents professional reputation, “This fst episode had a second ethically grob- lematie aspect, one which contributed tothe frst. Iiytis own admision,dasing Smith's presentation a the meeting with Zephyr it “became obviows” fo Brown that Smith's “proposed solution created ‘nedconaly daved. Only when pes die eltant ‘Sowtnig tha these could be earns a whi Soul arly compa wo “tborge the cao” Sotvacben io flow othe ters own core the Tew er ying tooo someting ow the ute Shar we knew at bad (red mse) (C97) ‘he ater of cour, someting enginees ae mor Olpted nor to dn asconung to he Are fantom hoon of many coger af engineering chic: hal pare oune the ele, an wee f he pub the rfocrance other ptesina ues” ("Cate of Eis (be bape Nana Sosy of Profesional Engneet® INSP, NSPE Pablesion Number 1103 ane 199, ‘Shem is) Ne crepe oth obligato is mace when {Be evince in senso nthe employ of notes COO Sart ned, the NSPE Code of Bes wats expci’y “ovens shal atl nes” cope thatthe“ tmoy gn’ so opotece the say eal, oper hd wet tthe publ (hd, Seon TLL)» potion hats cue ent cme to dec cont with Brower’ imple Bouse eke” fac more new problems than it attempted ro solve.” Nevertheless, Browa’s decision to become {consultant for Sith aad apparent willingness 0 fiend the meeting with Zephyr in the role of ndorsee of Smith's mechos and approach before Checking om ter validity ana riabity invites €8- sm. Brown seems blameworthy for not invest tating the workabily of Smith's plan before arceing to put himself jn 3 station where he ‘Yould be subject ro strong pressure to dissemble De prevaricte, or, ie may be argued, he knevs or Should have known that he would be expected (0 Support his client's proposal at the meeting. Moreover given his “simple business ethic,” he should have realized that iependent ofits meri, he would be extremely feluctant if not unwiling to say anything thar would invalidate or cast doube lupon his clients program and thereby his repata ‘hoa. In effec, Brown seems to have inadvertently pt himself ia'a postion in which he was foresee bly confronted by a classical confit of interest. For respecting the legitimate financial intrest of his indirect client, Zepiye, and the sfery interest Of the biel siding poblic could easily come into Conflict with protecting the professional repucs: tional inzezeat of his izect lent, Smith, Tt turns out, however, that the above depiction fof events in and arovnd this fist episode, an Secount based upon Brown's inal writen case Seady and on the 1995 class session, isto thin and tidy, I does not do justice co the complextis and ynapice ofthe sociotechnical engineering situa {Gon Brown actualy faced, While consistent with Brown's original writzen cas sady and intial class GGseussion, the above account and analysis rest fopon several important explicit and implicit sumptions. For example, they assume that Brown was unaware of drawoacks of Smiths €on- Cepe peor to the mectog with Zephyz and that [Brown knew or should have known that be would be expected to endorse or validate Smith's plan at the meeting, Upon farther inguiry, both assump: tions prove to have been invalid, Let us beietly consider each inten "Fist, Brown bad had several mcetings with ‘Smith about his proposed solution dea well before the mecting with Zephye's stall, At chem Brows had “expressed his concern [to Smith] that for findamental reasons hsslution di not appear £0 bbe workable” (CS97) Indeed, prior to thet232 CHuSPTER SIK: ENGINFERIG. meeting with Zephyr, Brown had already pre ented Smith "with several optional approaches to (Gobving} Zephye's problem which did address the unworkable aspects of his initial concepts.” [C597) What Brown realized ar the mecting with Zepiye was not what he already knew—that ‘Smith's approach was structurally flawed—bur that Smith's concept “ereated far mote new prob- lems than it attempeed to solve.” But since Brown hhad conveyed his concerns to Smith before the meeting with Zephr, Brown’s obligation not to indermine his clent’s reputation and credibility was significantly diluted if not completely dis Solved by Smith's public request for validation from the very person who had previously told im in private that his proposed solution idea was structurally flawed ‘Second, far from understanding that he was antending the mecting with Zephyr to endorse oF Validate Smith's ideas, Brow was in fact “sur prised” (C397) that Smith called upon him during this mecting to validate what Brown regarded as “a very creative, clever, but highly unworkable solution.” (C97) Given its ealy stage of devetop- trent, he regarded Smith's solution idea as dis- actly “premature” for endorsement or adoption. (C897) Brown was taken aback by Smith's request to validate because he saw his role entering che Imecting as that of 2 consulting engineer with ceapertise in -composite-material structures who hhad been engaged by 2 client and invited by him to participate in a three-way meeting the purpose fof which, he astumed, was to yointly “explore problems” with Smith's embryonic ideas. That he Jas taken aback by Smith's endorsement request is ear from Brown’s statement that “What I don’t know to this day is whether (Smith) felt that he wens under pressure to perform on this contract tnd needed to produce a positive response in the ‘manufacturer a8 to his performance. Those are things T don’t know, but they could easily have been motivational factors that would have influ enced why he put ms on the spot.” (C97) (emphasis added) Ti light of this less tidy situation, review of moral judgments about Brown’s conduct based on the simpler account inislly offered is in order First, was Brown's intial dssembling and evasive: ress morally Blameworthy? While he did dssemble and prevaricate, Brown “respected, and had confi dence in, Zephyrs ability t© discover the poten tials and pitialls of Smith's concept.” (WC97) He fale it woukd “serve no purpose to deny Smith an “opportunity to presen and defend his recommen Cations to Zephyt.” especially. since Brown's “assessment of the situation and personal dnam- ies [ae the meeting] was that Zepehr's funding commitments would only be toward engineering [and} technology validation at this time and that production funding would be based on demon: Steated merit.” (WC97) Whether this more com plex scate of affairs sulfices to absolve Brown of ny moral blame fr his feigned ignorance depends On whether his confidence was well yeounded that Zephye would in fact discover by ise the pietlls fof Smith's concept. On the one hand, if Brown hhad good reason to think chat Zephyr would probs ably discover these pitallson its own before losing Significant money, then his evasive behavior would fecm to be ethically defensible. On the other hhand, to the extent that he lacked good reason to think chat Zephyr would discover the flaws before Spending 2 significant amount of money on ‘Sth’s unsvorkable ideas, then his lack of eandor ould be ethically problematic, especially if, as Rrgued above, Smith's knowing endorsement request of Brown at the meeting with Zephyr feleased Brown from any moral obligation he had to avoid doing, anything that might damage bis Client's professional reputation ‘Second, what of Beown’s "apparent willingness ro attend the meeting with Zephyr in the de facto tole of endorser of Smith's method and approach Deforececking on their validity amd viabaity™? how appears that, op the contrary, Brown clearly Fecognired and explicitly cold Smith prior to their necting with Zephyr of seious flaws in Smith's tmethor} and approach and did not accept before the meeting the role of blithe endorser oF rubber Hamp validator of Smith's flawed solution idea ‘This revised depiction of the reality of Brown's state of Knowledge and sole understanding atbsolves him of any charge thar he was negligent 5n being willing to attend the Zephyr mecting as endorser without frst checking out the validity of Smith's ideas. As Brown pat it, his notion of the purpose of the mecting was that it was to be Gevoted to jointly “exploring. problems” with Smith's ideas, not to “fossting [flawed] solutions” fom a skeptical manufacturer by allowing his expert=