CRIME, FORECLOSURE, AND CONCENTRATED ADVANTAGE

IN PORTLAND, OREGON

By

ALANA ROSE INLOW

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SOCIOLOGY

WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY

Department of Sociology

MAY 2016

© Copyright by ALANA ROSE INLOW, 2016

All Rights Reserved
© Copyright by ALANA ROSE INLOW, 2016
All Rights Reserved
To the Faculty of Washington State University:

The members of the Committee appointed to examine the thesis of ALANA ROSE

INLOW find it satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted.

______________________________________
Raoul S. Liévanos, Ph.D., Chair

______________________________________
Thomas Rotolo, Ph.D.

______________________________________
Jennifer Schwartz, Ph.D.

ii
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Thank you to all who provided support throughout the development and completion of

my thesis. I would especially like to thank my committee members, Drs. Liévanos, Rotolo, and

Schwartz, for their willingness to guide me through this process. I am also grateful to my friends

and family for their patience and seemingly genuine interest in my research. Last but not least,

thank you, to many of my fellow graduate students, for your insight and help along the way.

iii
 CRIME, FORECLOSURE, AND CONCENTRATED ADVANTAGE

IN PORTLAND, OREGON

Abstract

by Alana Rose Inlow, M.A.

Washington State University
May 2016

Chair: Raoul S. Liévanos

This study focuses on criminological theory while also drawing on ecological and spatial

perspectives to examine the relationship between home foreclosures, socioeconomic factors, and

property crime, net of other contextual census tract characteristics, in the city of Portland,

Oregon. It assesses the effect of foreclosure on crime with data on home foreclosures from the

time period of the U.S. foreclosure crisis (2007-2010), and burglary and motor vehicle theft

(MVT) rates from the period directly after the crisis (2011-2014). It also tests the effect of

vacancy rates, residential stability, and concentrated advantage—a factor variable comprised of

tract-levels of white racial composition, college education, and median household income—on

crime levels. Spatial error regression models show that foreclosures only significantly predict

crime levels when using the foreclosure density measure rather than the household foreclosure

rate to predict MVT rates. Unexpectedly, foreclosure density has a negative association with

MVT rates. Residential stability has a consistently significant and negative effect on burglary

rates. Concentrated advantage and vacancy rates, respectively, have significant negative and

iv
positive effects on MVT rates. Findings have implications for future research and policy relating

to the foreclosure-crime nexus, particularly in the wake of the Great Recession.

v
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ......................................................................................................... iii

ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................. iv

LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................. viii

LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................. ix

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................1

A CASE STUDY OF PORTLAND, OREGON ...........................................................................7

Population Characteristics ......................................................................................................7

Foreclosure Laws and Processes .............................................................................................8

Foreclosure and Crime Trends in the Portland Area ...............................................................9

LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................................................... 11

Prior Research on the Foreclosure-Crime Relationship ......................................................... 11

Criminological Theory and Concentrated Advantage............................................................. 17

Hypotheses ............................................................................................................................ 20

DATA AND METHODS .......................................................................................................... 21

Units of Analysis.................................................................................................................... 21

Dependent Variables: Burglaries and Motor Vehicle Thefts .................................................. 22

Independent Variables ........................................................................................................... 26

vi
 Spatial Regression Techniques .............................................................................................. 32

RESULTS ................................................................................................................................. 35

Bivariate Analysis.................................................................................................................. 35

Multivariate Analysis ............................................................................................................. 37

LIMITATIONS ......................................................................................................................... 45

Theory ................................................................................................................................... 45

Portland as a Study Area ....................................................................................................... 46

Data ...................................................................................................................................... 47

Analysis ................................................................................................................................. 50

A DISCUSSION OF RESULTS, PREVIOUS RESEARCH, AND CONCENTRATED

ADVANTAGE ......................................................................................................................... 52

Unique Findings in Relation to Previous Research ................................................................ 52

Concentrated Advantage versus Disadvantage ...................................................................... 54

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 56

REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 61

APPENDIX .............................................................................................................................. 69

vii
 LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Foreclosure geocoding match scores………………………………………………….. 29

Table 2. Descriptive statistics…………………………………………………………...……… 30

Table 3. Principal component factor analysis of concentrated advantage……………………… 32

Table 4. Bivariate correlations between all variables…………………………………………... 36

Table 5. Spatial Error Regression results for the natural log of burglary, 2011-2014, and natural
log of MVT, 2011-2014………………………………………………………………………… 39

viii
 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Reference map of Portland, Oregon…………………………………………………… 8

Figure 2. Graph of foreclosure (2007-2010) and crime (2004-2014) trends over time……….... 10

Figure 3. Comparison maps of the raw burglary rate and the natural log of the burglary rate.… 24

Figure 4. Comparison maps of the raw MVT rate and the natural log of the MVT rate……….. 25

Figure 5. Comparison maps of foreclosure density and foreclosure rate….…………………… 28

ix
 INTRODUCTION

The Great Recession that began in 2007 and ended roughly with the 2010 Dodd-Frank

Act in the United States was rooted in the housing market and foreclosure crises of the mid-

2000s (Goodwin 2013; Rich 2013; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD]

2010). As homeowners began defaulting on their loans at an increasing pace, neighborhoods and

communities began to feel the very negative effects (Immergluck and Smith 2006a). One of the

major causes of abnormally high foreclosure rates was not the irresponsibility of the

homeowners or borrowers, instead it was largely due to the growth of predatory lenders signing

unknowing borrowers to high-risk subprime loans, along with other weakening economic

conditions (Aalbers 2012; HUD 2010). Most major cities in the United States, and globally, felt

at least some form of the repercussions from the recession and housing market crises (Aalbers

2012). The current study focuses on the case of Portland, Oregon, which, as part of the Portland-

Vancouver metropolitan statistical area (MSA) was recently ranked as having the 61st highest

foreclosure rate in the country, out of 206 MSAs (Sprague et al. 2010).

The City of Portland did not suffer extremely high foreclosure rates compared to many

other MSAs and particularly compared to urban areas in the sun-belt region of the U.S.1

Nevertheless, Portland was affected by the economically destabilizing repercussions of the

foreclosure crisis including declining housing prices (Immergluck and Smith 2006a; Sprague et

al. 2010). As the existence of vacant and low-priced homes increase, overall property values tend

to decrease (Sprague 2010). One negative outcome caused by Portland’s spatially concentrated

home foreclosures, as Sprague et al. (2010) suggest, is that the later stabilization of housing

1
Includes cities in California, Nevada, Arizona, and Florida.

1
prices will most likely also be unevenly distributed throughout the city. This could severely and

unevenly impact local economies. The area of Portland hardest hit by the foreclosure crisis was

East Portland, a historically low-income minority area (Sprague et al. 2010). Portland did not

rate among U.S. cities with the highest or most extreme foreclosure rates. However, the uneven

distribution of foreclosures and decrease in property values still negatively affects certain

populations and areas within the city.

Previous scholars have noted that destabilizing social and physical contexts of

neighborhoods have led to higher crime rates (Cohen and Felson 1979; Hipp 2007; Shaw and

McKay 1942; Wilson and Kelling 1982). These destabilizing contexts can include what has been

termed as concentrated disadvantage (Sampson 2012; Sampson et al. 1997; Wilson 1987), which

is comprised of negative socioeconomic conditions within a neighborhood or particular area.

Several studies have continued this line of research in consideration of the foreclosure crisis that

began in 2007. Much of this research has examined whether home foreclosures are associated

with changing crime rates, thus contributing to further neighborhood destabilization and

disadvantage (Cahill et al. 2014). While previous literature has presented valuable findings, the

results between different studies are conflicting, which in itself merits further research. Results

range from a significant positive association between foreclosure and crime (Arnio and Baumer

2012; Arnio et al. 2012; Baumer et al. 2012; Cui and Walsh 2015; Ellen et al. 2012; Goodstein

and Lee 2012; Immergluck and Smith 2006b; Pandit 2011; Stucky et al. 2012; Teasdale et al.

2012), to area specific (Arnio et al. 2012) or weak but positive relationships (Cahill et al. 2014),

to spurious correlations (Kirk and Hyra 2012), to no significant relationship at all (Arnio and

Baumer 2012; Goodstein and Lee 2012; Jones and Pridemore 2012; Madensen et al. 2011; Wolff

2
et al. 2014). Some research also finds only a short-term or distance limited positive effect of

foreclosure on crime (Katz et al. 2013; Wallace et al. 2012; Payton et al. 2015).2 The disparities

between studies thus still leave us without a clear picture as to the extent that foreclosures might

affect crime.

The variation between results within this body of literature has obvious foundations in the

wide array of study areas, units of analysis, and methods used. Study areas throughout the

foreclosure-crime literature range from case studies of single cities to nationwide analyses. Units

of analysis range from a 250 ft. “treatment area” (Cui and Walsh 2015), to census blocks and

tracts, to counties and MSAs. 3 Six of the eighteen studies on the foreclosure-crime nexus,

mentioned above, used census tracts as their unit of analysis as does the present study (Arnio and

Baumer 2012; Baumer et al. 2012; Cahill et al. 2014; Immergluck and Smith 2006b; Katz et al.

2013; Teasdale et al 2012). Census tracts are considered one of the more appropriate levels of

aggregation at which to study the relationship between foreclosure and crime (Baumer et al.

2012; Hipp 2007). Aggregating crime to larger units of analysis (e.g. counties) can ignore

localized effects on crime and disorder within and across neighborhoods (Baumer et al. 2012;

Hipp 2007). Generally, census tracts are the most commonly used unit of analysis in single-city

case studies within the foreclosure-crime literature (Arnio and Baumer 2012; Immergluck and

Smith 2006b; Katz et al. 2013; Teasdale et al. 2012). Single-city case studies help to inform how

variables affect one another at a more localized level in areas with particular demographics and

2
Katz et al. (2013) found that foreclosure has a positive effect on crime for only a three to four month period
(depending on the type of crime) after a foreclosure takes place. Wallace et al. (2012) found that foreclosure’s
positive effect on crime lasts for a four month period, and only directly after the housing crisis. Payton et al. (2015)
found that foreclosure has a positive effect on crime up to a distance of 2,250 feet.
3
A more detailed illustration of these differences along with the specific methods employed by each study can be
found in the table titled, “Summary of previous empirical research on the foreclosure-crime relationship” in the
Appendix.

3
characteristics (Gerring 2007). However, analyzing a single study area can also bring about

issues of external validity (Gerring 2007). Thus, results from this analysis can only truly be

attributed to the city of Portland. In light of this, the practices and findings presented here may

help to inform research on and the understanding of the foreclosure-crime relationship, as well as

concentrated advantage, in cities of similar size, demographics, and neighborhood

characteristics.

The present study seeks to address the limitations in previous research by analyzing the

effect of two different foreclosure measures on property crime within and across census tracts in

the City of Portland. The analysis presented here finds that there are particular areas of the city

that suffered from higher rates of foreclosure than other areas. In other words, foreclosure is

spatially dependent and clusters non-randomly. Because there is a non-random distribution of

foreclosure across Portland, as well as an inequitable distribution of other neighborhood context

variables, it is worth further studying whether home foreclosures have any effect on crime levels

through a spatial analysis. It is also important to understand how other neighborhood

characteristics are associated with crime and whether foreclosure is related to crime while

controlling for neighborhood context variables. The specific research questions this study aims to

answer are as follows: (1) How do tract-level household foreclosure rates and foreclosure

density, separately, affect spatial concentrations of later burglary and motor vehicle theft (MVT)

within and across neighborhoods, net of other neighborhood characteristics? (2) How do the

social and physical contexts of a neighborhood affect burglary and MVT rates after the

foreclosure crisis, net of home foreclosures?

4
 These questions are addressed in this study by focusing on criminological theory, but also

by drawing upon ecological and spatial perspectives, to examine the relationship between home

foreclosures, socioeconomic factors, and property crime. Analyses are conducted using data on

foreclosures from RealtyTrac (2015), crime data from CivicApps (2016) in conjunction with the

Portland Police Bureau (PPB) (2015), and neighborhood context and control variables from the

National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS) (Minnesota Population Center

2011).4 Spatial error regression models are used to test the effect of home foreclosures that

occurred during the U.S. foreclosure crisis (2007-2010) on burglary and MVT rates that occurred

after the crisis (2011-2014). These two crime indicators were chosen based on the availability

and validity of the data, alignment with the theories discussed in this study, and the nature of

these two crimes in general. Further, MVT is considered to have one of the highest reporting

rates while burglary is considered one of the most common property crimes (United States

Department of Justice 2014). These two crime indicators logically flow from the three main

criminological theories focused on in this study. When neighborhoods lack an outwardly stable

appearance because of factors like an increase in foreclosures, they may become more attractive

target areas for property crime (Cohen and Felson 1979; Hipp 2007; Shaw and McKay 1942;

Wilson and Kelling 1982). The study also assesses the effect of vacancy rates, residential

stability, and concentrated advantage—a factor variable comprised of tract-levels of white racial

composition, college education, and median household income—on crime rates. Results show

that home foreclosures significantly predict MVT rates when using the foreclosure density

4
CivicApps.org and the Portland Police Bureau, “cannot vouch for the data or analyses derived from these data after
the data have been retrieved from CivicApps.org." (CivicApps 2016). The author is solely responsible for all
analyses and results derived from any and all data used here.

5
measure rather than the household foreclosure rate. This association is however, unexpectedly

negative. Residential stability shows a consistent significant and negative effect on burglary

rates. Concentrated advantage and vacancy rates are both significantly associated with MVT

rates in the expected directions: concentrated advantage has a negative effect on MVT rates

while vacancy rates have a positive effect.

The remainder of this master’s thesis is organized as follows. First, it provides an

overview of the city of Portland, Oregon and some basic details and definitions of home

foreclosure laws and processes in Oregon. Recent foreclosure and crime trends will also be

outlined. Next, a section discussing recent literature on the foreclosure-crime relationship,

theoretical perspectives, and hypotheses will be presented. The section on data and methods will

discuss, in detail, the variables and measurements used. It will also explain principal component

factor analysis and spatial error regression along with why these methods are used. Results from

the spatial error regression models are then summarized. A separate section discussing

limitations is presented after the results section. The discussion section highlights the most

interesting and important findings in light of the theoretical perspectives and previous research

guiding the analysis. Lastly, the conclusion will summarize the findings, strengths, and

implications of the current study, as well as offer possible routes for future research.

6
 A CASE STUDY OF PORTLAND, OREGON

Population Characteristics

In 2010 the city of Portland, Oregon (Figure 1) had an estimated population of 583,789,

72.2 percent of whom were estimated to be non-Hispanic white. As both current and previous

years’ estimates denote, Portland’s yearly median household income has stayed at a relatively

consistent level, approximately $53,000, from 2006 through 2016 (U.S. Census Bureau 2016).

Compared to other west coast cities, 5 Portland has a very high percentage of non-Hispanic white

residents as well as middle-range median household income and education levels. Compared to

the United States as a whole, Portland has relatively the same median household income

(approximately $53,000), a much higher percent of residents who have a Bachelor’s degree (BA)

or higher,6 and a higher percentage of white residents (U.S. Census Bureau 2016). With its high

numbers of white, educated, and fairly well-off residents, Portland seems to be a city

overflowing with structural advantage, at least for a large portion of its residents. Of course, like

most social variables, residents with these structural advantages are not dispersed evenly

throughout the city. Instead, they are concentrated in certain areas and neighborhoods, as will be

discussed more later. Overall, Portland provides an interesting setting for studying crime,

foreclosure, and other neighborhood characteristics because of its sociospatial dimensions,

demographics, urban environment, and its foreclosure and crime trends over time.

5
i.e. Seattle, Sacramento, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego
6
Bachelor’s degree (BA) or higher, percent of persons age 25 years+, 2010-2014: 44.4% in Portland, OR; 29.3% in
the U.S.

7
Figure 1. Reference map of Portland, Oregon

Foreclosure Laws and Processes

Foreclosure is a process by which a lender can take over ownership of a property when

the owner or borrower fails to make mortgage payments on the loan contracted to them by the

lender (Oregon Homeowner Support 2016; Sprague et al. 2010). Once a lender repossesses the

property through a foreclosure, they have the ability to sell it to the public in an effort to retrieve

the monetary amount that the borrower owed (Sprague et al. 2010). Foreclosure laws differ by

state, so it is important to understand the basics of foreclosure laws and types of foreclosures in

Oregon. Oregon is a state in which foreclosures can go through either a judicial or non-judicial

8
process. Judicial foreclosures are court regulated, meaning that a lender must file a lawsuit in

order for the court to mandate that the homeowner answer to a “Summons and Complaint” in

court (Oregon Homeowner Support 2016). If the homeowner fails to come to court, or after the

court makes a decision, the home is then publically auctioned off by the sheriff. A non-judicial

foreclosure does not require any court oversight. After the property’s trustee 7 posts a Notice of

Default (NOD) and then gives a Notice of Sale (NOS) to the homeowner, the trustee may sell the

property without a court order (Oregon Homeowner Support 2016). Once the trustee records the

NOD there is no maximum or minimum time limit before they are able to post the NOS. So, in

reality, a trustee could present the NOS to the homeowner immediately after the NOD is

recorded. There is a waiting period of 120 days before the trustee can sell the home, and the

homeowner has 5 days before the sale date to pay what is due (Oregon Homeowner Support

2016). These laws remained consistent throughout the foreclosure crisis period, and thus the

period of time analyzed in this study.

Foreclosure and Crime Trends in the Portland Area

The Portland-Vancouver MSA was ranked as the 61st highest, out of 206 MSAs in the

United States with populations greater than 200,000, in terms of foreclosure rates (Sprague et al.

2010). While foreclosure rates in the Portland area may seem to pale in comparison to many of

the sun-belt cities, Portland has faced relatively high foreclosure rates in particular areas of the

city, compared to its surrounding cities and counties (Sprague et al. 2010). For the time period

analyzed in this study the number of foreclosures in Portland fell between 2007 and 2008, but

then rose drastically from 2008 through 2010. Foreclosure trends are depicted in Figure 2 along

7
A trustee is a third party entity, separate from the homeowner and lender, who holds the title of a property during
the foreclosure process.

9
with burglary and MVT incident counts. Both crime counts declined slowly and steadily from

2006 through 2014. Burglary counts decreased by about 10% in 2006, the year before the

foreclosure crisis hit, while MVT counts increased by about 7%. During the foreclosure crisis,

2007 to 2010, burglary counts decreased by 16% and MVT counts decreased by about 32%. The

years after the foreclosure crisis, 2011 to 2014, saw about a 21% decrease in burglary counts and

about a 9% decrease in MVT counts. Whether foreclosure has any relationship with crime is not

evident in these graphs alone. The short periods of rising crime levels and the overall steady

decrease after the foreclosure crisis presents an interesting case for further study. This puzzle

merits a closer look, especially in the context of previous research on the foreclosure-crime

relationship in urban areas, of which a number of studies have come up with differing results, as

noted earlier.

Figure 2. Graph of foreclosure (2007-2010) and crime (2006-2014) trends over time

Crime and Foreclosure Trends in Portland, OR

Foreclosure Count Burglary Count MVT Count

6,000
Number of Foreclosures and Crimes

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Year

10
 LITERATURE REVIEW

This section starts with an overview of the empirical findings from the most recent

literature on the foreclosure-crime relationship in the United States. Some of the most commonly

cited criminological theories within the literature on the relationship between foreclosure and

crime are also summarized below in relation to the mechanisms by which foreclosures might

affect the crime levels within a neighborhood. An explanation and summary of concentrated

advantage in relation to previous research on concentrated disadvantage and affluence is also

provided to help clarify the theoretical justification for the hypotheses presented further below. A

comprehensive summary table of prior empirical research on the foreclosure-crime relationship

can be found in the Appendix. This table helps to show the breadth of measurements and

methods used as well as the differing findings produced by previous studies.

Prior Research on the Foreclosure-Crime Relationship

The foreclosure crisis stems partially from an overabundance of high-risk subprime

lending activity and has caused a number of adverse outcomes for many local economies and

communities across the U.S., especially those containing elevated numbers of low-income

minority residents (Aalbers 2012; Immergluck and Smith 2006a). Some recent studies have also

found that foreclosure is associated with damaging physical and social consequences for

neighborhoods, including an uptick in criminal activity (Arnio and Baumer 2012; Arnio et al.

2012; Baumer et al. 2012; Cui and Walsh 2015; Ellen et al. 2013; Immergluck and Smith 2006b;

Pandit 2011; Stucky et al. 2012; Teasdale et al. 2012). However, not all studies concerning the

relationship between foreclosure and crime have found a positive effect of foreclosure on crime.

Results ranging from those positive associations between foreclosure and crime cited above, to

11
weak or spurious relationships, to no relationship at all (Cahill et al. 2014; Jones and Pridemore

2012; Katz et al. 2011; Kirk and Hyra 2012; Madensen et al. 2011; Wallace et al. 2012; Wolff et

al. 2014) have proven the complexity of the foreclosure-crime relationship. Whether it is the

particular context of a city, the methods used in a particular study, or any number of other

factors, the drastic differences in results stem from somewhere and merit further research on the

subject. There is not much argument surrounding which theories most logically support this type

of analysis. Most prior research on the foreclosure-crime relationship develop their research

questions and/or hypotheses using the main criminological theories discussed here (Cahill et al.

2014). The three main criminological theories cited in the literature are social disorganization,

routine activities, and broken windows theory (Cohen and Felson 1979; Shaw and McKay 1942;

Wilson and Kelling 1982). It is pertinent that these theories are included in this analysis so that

this study can continue to remain in discussion with prior research.

This particular body of literature contains a wide range of studies that use different study

areas, units of analysis, and analytical methods in trying to understand a similar relationship. As

more research is conducted, it becomes more apparent as to what types of analyses are better

suited to test the foreclosure-crime relationship. The most recently published studies on

foreclosure and crime use some version of a distance and/or density based foreclosure

measurement and integrate some type of spatial analysis into their study (Cahill et al. 2014; Cui

and Walsh 2015; Payton et al. 2015). Each of these studies also expresses the importance of a

spatial approach to analyzing the relationship between foreclosure and crime. The fact that these

most recent studies all advocate for spatial analysis is an important justification for the methods

used here.

12
 The six studies that use census tracts as their unit of analysis (briefly summarized in the

Introduction) should be revisited before delving into the other facets of this body of literature

since the current study is also relying on census tracts. Of these six studies, two had the same

study area of Chicago (Arnio and Baumer 2012; Immergluck and Smith 2006b). The study areas

used by the other four analyses were Akron, Ohio (Teasdale et al. 2012), Glendale, Arizona

(Katz et al. 2013), Washington DC and Miami-Dade County, Florida (Cahill et al. 2014) and a

sample of 50 U.S. cities (Baumer et al. 2012). Four of the studies used crime counts for their

dependent variables (Baumer et al. 2012; Cahill et al. 2014; Immergluck and Smith 2006b;

Teasdale et al. 2012) while the other two used crime rates per n number of residents (Arnio and

Baumer 2012; Katz et al. 2013). All of these studies found a significant positive relationship

between foreclosure and a majority, if not all, of their crime indicators. Only two findings among

this group of literature was something other than significant and positive. First, Arnio and

Baumer (2012) reported no significant relationship between foreclosure and homicide in

Chicago. Second, Katz et al. (2013) found that foreclosure’s effect on crime, in Glendale, only

lasted for about three months after a foreclosure took place, otherwise the relationship was

insignificant. Since the current study is also using census tracts as the unit of analysis it is

important to keep these other studies in mind as a source of comparison in terms of methods and

measurements used.

Six of the prior foreclosure-crime studies reviewed here have presented nationwide

analyses, as opposed to analyzing a single-city or area (Arnio et al. 2012; Baumer et al. 2012;

Goodstein and Lee 2012; Jones and Pridmore 2012; Pandit 2011; Wolff et al. 2014). Three of the

nationwide studies found a positive relationship between foreclosure and crime (Arnio et al.

13
2012; Baumer et al. 2012; Pandit 2011), while one found a significant positive relationship for

two crime indicators but insignificance for their remaining four indicators (Goodstein and Lee

2012). 8 Two studies did not find any significant relationship (Jones and Pridemore 2012; Wolff

et al. 2014). Most of the nationwide studies do not attend to spatial clustering, which has been

one limitation highlighted by the most recently published literature. The only two nationwide

studies to take space into account were Arnio et al. (2012), who implemented a spatial regression

analysis, and Baumer et al. (2012), who employed a Poisson regression models with spatial lag

terms. Three of the nationwide studies used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Goodstein

and Lee 2012; Pandit 2011; Wolff et al. 2014), while Jones and Pridemore (2012) used a

weighted least squares regression. One of the most widely implemented approaches taken to

analyze the foreclosure-crime relationship, even beyond the nationwide studies, has been OLS

and other types of regression that assume that crime rates, as well as foreclosure, are spatially

independent (Arnio et al. 2012). These types of analyses do not account for the spatial clustering

that has been shown to occur with foreclosure and crime (Arnio and Baumer 2012; Arnio et al.

2012; Cahill et al 2014).

Beyond the nationwide studies, a majority of the previous literature focused on a single

city or MSA, much like the analysis presented here. Three recent articles have all dedicated their

analyses to Chicago alone (Arnio and Baumer 2012; Immergluck and Smith 2006b; Kirk and

Hyra 2012). Two of the Chicago studies used census tracts as their unit of analysis (Arnio and

Baumer 2012; Immergluck and Smith 2006b) and the third used “Chicago community areas”

8
Aggravated assault and larceny were two of six crime indicators used the Goodstein and Lee (2012) analysis and
the only ones to show a significant positive association with foreclosure; the four other crime measures were not
significant.

14
originally created by sociologists at the University of Chicago (Kirk and Hyra 2012). All three

Chicago studies looked at both violent and property crime, but used three different analytical

methods. Immergluck and Smith (2006b) found a positive relationship between foreclosure and

both violent and property crime. Arnio and Baumer (2012) found that foreclosure had a positive

effect on both robbery and burglary, but results for homicide were insignificant. Lastly, Kirk and

Hyra (2012) found no significant relationship between foreclosure and any crime indicators,

which they ultimately deemed spurious.

Other single-city case studies focused on the following cities: Las Vegas (Madensen et al.

2011), Akron, Ohio (Teasdale et al. 2012), Indianapolis (Payton et al. 2015; Stucky et al. 2012),

Glendale, Arizona (Katz et al. 2013; Wallace et al. 2012), New York (Ellen et al. 2012), and

Pittsburgh (Cui and Walsh 2015). However, these studies vary so drastically in their units of

analysis, variable measurements, methods, and results, that it is almost impossible to compare

them. The summary table of literature included in the Appendix is designed to be much more

helpful in understanding this body of literature than a wordy comparison could offer. However,

something worth mentioning here is that many of these studies did not account for spatial

dependence in their analyses. In the case of this particular body of literature, assuming that crime

and foreclosure are independent of space can limit and skew results. Some studies partially

account for spatial processes by including foreclosure measures using spatial buffers or densities

(Cui and Walsh 2015; Payton et al. 2014). However, whether distance/density based measures of

foreclosure lead to different results than other measures of foreclosure is not apparent in prior

literature.

15
 There is no consensus in the literature on which type of foreclosure measurement is most

appropriate and the types of measurements used in prior research differ greatly. This could be

part of the reason that results between studies are so diverse. Different measurements obviously

take into account slightly different aspects of foreclosure. A majority of previous research has

used some version of a foreclosure rate, whether it be foreclosures per n number of mortgages

(Arnio et al. 2012; Goodstein and Lee 2010; Kirk and Hyra 2012 Wolff et al. 2014), or

foreclosures per n number of households (Arnio and Baumer 2012; Baumer et al. 2012;

Immergluck and Smith 2006b; Pandit 2011), or any other rate based on population, other

foreclosures, time etc. (Cahill et al. 2014; Katz et al. 2013; Madensen et al. 2011; Wallace et al.

2012). The other most accepted and utilized measurement of foreclosure, and one that has

recently gained more attention, is some type of distance or density based measure (Cui and

Walsh 2015; Payton et al. 2015; Stucky et al. 2012). However, no study has yet to incorporate

both measurements of a foreclosure rate and a foreclosure density in their analyses as is

accomplished in the present study. Because there are such conflicting results between previous

studies, it is important to try to begin to understand how different types of measurements might

be influencing results.

As noted earlier, most prior research involves a single-city case study, or in the case of

Cahill et al. (2014), two single-city study areas with separate analyses. However, one study

looked at several U.S. cities at the census tract level to analyze the effect of foreclosure on crime

across census tracts and whether that relationship varies across cities (Baumer et al. 2012). The

Baumer et al. (2012) study is particularly important to the current study because it is the only one

to include Portland, Oregon in its analysis. Portland was included in a 50-city sample that

16
Baumer et al. (2012) compiled from an original 91-city sample in the National Neighborhood

Crime Study (NNCS) (Peterson and Krivo 2000). The 50 cities in Baumer et al.’s (2012) study

all have a population above 100,000 and have fairly similar population characteristics. Portland’s

inclusion in the NNCS population and Baumer et al.’s (2012) study give it some credible value

in being comparable to other large and/or mid-sized cities. While Portland is unique in some of

its characteristics it is also fairly representative of many medium-sized U.S. cities. Thus, the

results of this analysis may help to reflect similar processes and conditions that have taken place

in other similar cities not yet analyzed. Portland, specifically, was included in only one of

Baumer et al.’s (2012) statistical models, but only robbery, a violent crime, was analyzed in that

particular model. The current study analyzes property crime and in doing so is able to report on a

relationship that has not yet been analyzed for the city of Portland.

Criminological Theory and Concentrated Advantage

Social disorganization theory asserts that crime happens when residents are not able to

maintain or support the social order within their neighborhood (Shaw and McKay 1942). In the

case of a neighborhood plagued by high foreclosure activity, residents may not be able to come

together collectively because of vacant homes, fewer residents, and a lack of access to

appropriate resources to create a secure and safe neighborhood. This may set the stage for

criminal activity (Cahill et al. 2014; Immergluck and Smith 2006b). Routine activities theory

(Cohen and Felson 1979) argues that “a motivated offender” will commit a crime when there is

no “capable guardian” present and when an opportunity with an “unguarded target” presents

itself (Cahill et al. 2014:11; Hipp 2007). In this case, an example of an “unguarded target” would

be a foreclosed, possibly vacant home, or any other property that seems “unguarded” because of

17
fewer residents (e.g. vehicles). This theory also posits that the physical condition of a

neighborhood determines whether or not an offender will sense a suitable target (Cohen and

Felson 1979). Broken windows theory (Wilson and Kelling 1982) states that visible signs of

physical deterioration and social disorder emanate a sense of how a particular neighborhood

functions and whether or not it might be a suitable place for criminal activity (Cahill et al. 2014).

Visible, physical disorder could be marked by vacant homes, fewer residents, uncared for

property, etc. (Cahill et al. 2014; Cohen and Felson 1979; Wilson and Kelling 1982). These

theories may help inform how or why changes in crime rates might occur during and/or after the

foreclosure crisis.

To summarize, each of these theories presents social and/or physical contexts by which

neighborhoods might see an increase in crime. The social aspects can be marked by poverty and

a general lack of resources, a lack of neighborhood cohesion, and the presence of residential

instability and racial/ethnic heterogeneity (this can differ based on neighborhood) (Hipp 2007).

Social disorganization theory and routine activities theory overlap in respect to integrating the

social contexts of a neighborhood into their perspectives (Cohen and Felson 1979; Shaw and

McKay 1942). Broken windows theory and routine activities theory overlap in their focus on the

role of physical context in shaping crime outcomes (Cohen and Felson 1979; Wilson and Kelling

1982). These physical aspects can be marked by characteristics such as vacant homes and other

visible signs of “deterioration and litter” (Hipp 2007:661). Together the social and physical

context of a neighborhood can create a more or less appealing setting for crime to take place.

Following from this, if a particular neighborhood has suffered from high rates of foreclosure and

vacancy, it may be more likely to take on some of these social and physical aspects and therefore

18
become a place where property crime may flourish (Cahill et al. 2014; Immergluck and Smith

2006b).

While the theories outlined above speak mainly in terms of destabilizing social conditions

creating a setting for criminal activity, this study utilizes variables that represent advantageous

social contexts and how they may act as a buffer against crime. Specifically, the two social

context variables used in this study are residential stability and concentrated advantage.9 A

positive association between crime and concentrated disadvantage, residential instability, and

overall economic deprivation has been widely supported by prior research (Morenoff et al. 2001;

Morenoff and Sampson 1997; Mosher 2001; Sampson et al. 1997; Wilson 1987). However,

preliminary exploratory analyses found that residential instability and concentrated disadvantage

were not influential predictors of the property crime rates analyzed in the present study. Thus,

stemming from research on concentrated affluence (Massey 1996; Sampson et al. 1999), the

present study utilizes variables representing spatially concentrated social advantage to attempt to

better understand crime concentrations in Portland. Higher levels of education and greater

amounts of yearly income are both associated with more advantage and overall better life

chances for an individual (Massey et al. 1991). At the neighborhood, or census tract level,

concentrations of both higher levels of education and income as well as a higher percentage of

white residents, exude structural advantage (Massey 1996; Sampson et al. 1999; Sampson et al.

1997). This advantage can possibly act as a buffer from destabilizing social factors such as

crime. Understanding how crime is affected by concentrated advantage, rather than disadvantage,

paints a more interesting and possibly more insightful picture for the case of Portland.

9
The measurement and creation of which is discussed in more detail in the section on data and methods.

19
Hypotheses

Four hypotheses were created in consideration of the theoretical perspectives outlined

above. Integrating both the criminological perspectives and research surrounding concentrated

advantage, the hypotheses aim to test not only foreclosure’s relationship with crime, but also the

effects of the physical and social neighborhood contexts on crime. The hypotheses tested in the

analysis are as follows:

H1: The deteriorated physical context of a neighborhood marked by the home vacancy

rate during the housing crisis will be positively associated with crime concentration after

the housing crisis.

H2: The advantageous social contexts of a neighborhood marked by levels of residential

stability and concentrated advantage during the housing crisis will be negatively

associated with crime concentration after the housing crisis.

H3: The concentration of foreclosures during the housing crisis will contribute to

neighborhood destabilization and therefore will be positively associated with crime

concentration after the housing crisis.

20
 DATA AND METHODS

Units of Analysis

The census tract is the unit of analysis in this study. Census tracts have been used as

proxies for neighborhoods since they were first developed in the early 1900s and are the most

common unit of analysis in the recent foreclosure-crime literature (Arnio and Baumer 2012;

Baumer et al. 2012; Darmofal 2015; Cahill et al. 2014; Immergluck and Smith 2006b; Katz et al.

2013; Teasdale et al. 2012). Usually, census tract boundaries are drawn by local community

members who know their area’s neighborhoods well and therefore help to approximate the actual

neighborhoods that exist (Darmofal 2015). 10 However, simply substituting census tracts for

actual neighborhoods comes with unaccounted for spatial limitations. Census tracts do not map

on to actual neighborhood boundaries perfectly. Neighboring tracts are also likely to share

similar characteristics and affect each other irrespective of census boundaries (Darmofal 2015).

Thus, the use of tract boundaries falsely assumes spatial independence. The spatial regression

utilized in this study helps attend to that limitation.

Shapefiles of Multnomah County census tracts and the City of Portland, Oregon, based

on 2010 census tract boundaries, were gathered from the NHGIS (Minnesota Population Center

2011). Each variable used in this analysis was georeferenced to the Portland city and census tract

shapefiles either based on latitude and longitude values or unique geographic identifiers created

by NHGIS. Point shapefiles for crime and foreclosure were spatially joined to the Portland

10
The U.S Census Bureau’s official definition for census tracts is as follows, “small, relatively permanent statistical
subdivisions of a county or equivalent entity that are updated by local participants prior to each decennial census as
part of the Census Bureau's Participant Statistical Areas Program. The Census Bureau delineates census tracts in
situations where no local participant existed or where state, local, or tribal governments declined to participate. The
primary purpose of census tracts is to provide a stable set of geographic units for the presentation of statistical data.”
(U.S. Census Bureau 2010).

21
shapefile, while the NHGIS census data were joined based on the NHGIS unique identifiers in

the provided attribute table (Minnesota Population Center 2011), all using ArcMap (ESRI 2011).

Three of the original 148 census tracts were eliminated due to missing crime data. The final

sample size for all analyses conducted in this study is 145 census tracts which all fall within the

boundaries of the City of Portland, Oregon.

Dependent Variables: Burglaries and Motor Vehicle Thefts

This study’s main dependent variables are two logged property crime rates, specifically

burglary and MVT that occurred after the Great Recession from 2011 to 2014. Both crime rates

were aggregated to the census tract level for the analysis. The two crime indicators fall under the

definition of property crime according to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR) (United States

Department of Justice 2010). Crime data were obtained through the City of Portland Police

Bureau’s (PPB) (2015) public datasets made available on CivicApps.org (CivicApps 2016).

These particular crimes were partially chosen based on the availability and validity of the data.

More importantly, burglary and MVT, as property crimes, are logically linked to spatial

concentrations of foreclosure as described earlier in the discussion on criminological theory. The

two crime variables being analyzed here were the most comprehensive, out of all other crimes

recorded by the PPB, in terms of the availability of locational data and their ability to be

georeferenced and therefore, spatially analyzed. A number of crime incidents were missing

latitude and longitude specifications in the original PPB dataset. Thus, 296 of the burglary

incidents and 323 of the MVT incidents were geocoded using Texas A&M University’s

Geocoding Services (Goldberg 2015). All crime incidents were geocoded with a 100% match

score. Texas A&M’s Geocoding Services’ official definition of a match score is the, “match

22
percentage between input data and reference feature” (Goldberg 2015). In other words, a match

score reflects how closely the input address is matched to specific coordinates on a map. A 100%

match score reflects a true match between an address and its latitude and longitude coordinates.

The vast majority of the burglary and MVT incidents had available latitude and longitude

coordinates recorded in PPB’s original dataset, so they did not have to be geocoded. After all

crime incidents were spatially joined to the Portland census tract shapefile and after the three

census tracts with missing crime data were removed from the dataset, there was a total of 15,406

burglary incidents and 12,993 MVT incidents used to create the dependent variables in the

analysis.

23
Figure 3. Comparison maps of raw burglary rate and the natural log of the burglary rate

24
Figure 4. Comparison maps of MVT rate and the natural log of the MVT rate

25
 Once the crime data were collected and georeferenced, a preliminary analysis revealed

that the abnormal distribution of the variables required that the original crime rates, per 1,000

residents, be converted to their natural log forms. Thus, the dependent variables analyzed are the

natural log of the burglary rate, per 1,000 residents, 2011-2014 and the natural log of the MVT

rate, per 1,000 residents, 2011-2014. Figures 3 and 4 depict a comparison between the spatial

distribution of the raw and logged crime rates for burglary and MVT, respectively. Crime rates

were calculated by first spatially joining crime points to the Portland city and census tract

shapefiles, as explained. Then tract-level crime counts were divided by the total population

residing within a tract and multiplying by 1,000, after which the raw crime rate variables were

transformed into their logged versions.

Independent Variables

There are five main explanatory variables used in this study. Two of them are different

measurements of foreclosure. Both variables are comprised of homes that reached the point of

Notice of Sale (NOS) in the foreclosure process and that occurred from 2007 through 2010. Once

a home is given an NOS it is technically considered to be past the pre-foreclosure process and

fully in foreclosure (RealtyTrac 2016). Thus, homes with a recorded NOS count as a foreclosed

home in this analysis. One foreclosure variable measures home foreclosure density, per square

kilometer. This variable was created by dividing the number of foreclosures in a census tract by

the tract’s area in kilometers. The second measure is the foreclosure rate, per 1,000 households.

This variable was created by dividing the number of foreclosures that occurred in each tract by

the number of households11 in the tract then multiplying by 1,000.

11
Data on households was downloaded from the NHGIS (Minnesota Population Center 2011) compiled and
georeferenced 2010 U.S. Decennial Census data.

26
 Figure 5 depicts a comparison map of the spatial distribution of the two foreclosure

variables. Similar to the crime variables, all of the foreclosure data were geocoded using Texas

A&M University’s Geocoding Services (Goldberg 2015). A total of 15,402 home foreclosures

were geocoded based on the addresses provided in the dataset. After spatially joining the

geocoded data to the City of Portland boundaries and eliminating the 3 census tracts with

missing crime data, there was a total of 11,831 home foreclosures used in this analysis. A

breakdown of the number of foreclosures georeferenced with match scores ranging from 88% to

100% is provided in Table 1.

27
Figure 5. Comparison map of foreclosure density and foreclosure rate

28
 Table 1. Foreclosure geocoding match scores
Number of home foreclosures Geocode match score
1 88%
1 91%
29 92%
17 94%
2 95%
9 96%
4 97%
3451 98%
7296 99%
1021 100%
Note: N = 145 census tracts.

Three other explanatory variables include data on population and neighborhood

characteristics in order to operationalize the physical and social contexts of neighborhoods. A

variable representing the percent of vacant homes in each tract is used to operationalize the

physical context of a neighborhood12. This variable was created by dividing the number of

vacant homes in each tract by the number of a tract’s total households and multiplying by 100.

The social context of residential stability is operationalized by the percent of the population who

live in the same house as one year prior.13 The data on residents who lived in the same house as

one year prior were divided by the total population and multiplied by 100 to create the final

version of the variable.

12
All control and predictor variables that do not represent crime or foreclosure, along with country, county, and
census tract shapefiles were gathered from the Minnesota Population Center’s (2011) National Historical
Geographic Information System (NHGIS) publically available, georeferenced U.S. Census data. Vacancy data were
downloaded from the NHGIS (Minnesota Population Center 2011) compiled and georeferenced data from the U.S.
Census Bureau’s 2010 Decennial Census.
13
Residential stability, population with a BA or higher, and median household income were downloaded from the
NHGIS compiled and georeferenced data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2006-2010 American Community Survey
5-year estimates (Minnesota Population Center 2011). Percent non-Hispanic white was downloaded from the
NHGIS data from the 2010 Decennial Census (Minnesota Population Center 2011).

29
 The neighborhood social context variable representing concentrated advantage was

created using principal component factor analysis. This approach follows the established practice

of using principal component factor analysis to account for multicollinearity within the overall

regression models, collinearity between the separate variables, and to produce analysis that falls

in line with the theories discussed (Morenoff et al. 2001; Morenoff and Sampson 1997; Sampson

et al. 1999; Sampson et al. 1997). In this case, the three variables pooled into the concentrated

advantage factor are the percent of the population with a BA or higher, percent of the population

that is non-Hispanic white, and median household income per $1,000. These three variables were

all constructed to measure more advantage in a positive direction, and less advantage in a

negative direction.

Table 2. Principal component factor analysis of concentrated advantage

Variables Factor loadings
Concentrated
advantage
Percent of the population with a bachelor's degree or higher, 2006-2010 0.924
Percent of the population that is non-Hispanic white, 2010 0.870
Median household income per $1,000, 2006-2010 0.811

Alpha 0.802
Eigenvalue 2.269
% of total variance explained 75.644
N 145

Table 2 reports the factor loadings for each variable that is included within concentrated

advantage. The overall alpha, eigenvalue, and percent of total variance explained is also shown.

According to these values and the high factor loading values, the three variables discussed

combine to create a reliable and valid measure of concentrated advantage. The results from the

principal component factor analysis show a Cronbach’s alpha score of .802, an eigenvalue of

30
2.269, and 75.6% of the overall variance explained. The concentrated advantage variable serves

as a helpful guide in assessing if and how advantage might act as a buffer against crime, and its

possible negative effects, for certain areas in Portland.

Three control variables were used in this study. The first is population density, persons

per tract square kilometer. Population density is commonly used as a control variable in the

foreclosure-crime literature (e.g. Baumer et al. 2012). Controlling for concentrations of

population allows for the interpretation of the effects of explanatory variables on crime sans the

obvious influence of areas with a high population density. The other two control variables are

raw burglary and MVT rates from the period before the foreclosure crisis, 2006 through 2010.14

Previous crime rates are highly correlated with later crime rates (as will be discussed in the

section on bivariate correlations) and should be controlled for so as not to skew results.

Population density and previous crime rates must be controlled for so that the possible effects of

the explanatory variables on later crime rates can be isolated from those possible intervening

factors.

14
Created and georeferenced using the same methods and measures as described for the dependent crime variables
but for the time period of 2006-2010. Note: the crime control variables are raw rates, not logged.

31
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Moran's I

Natural log of burglary rate, 2011-2014 3.190 0.663 0.903 7.467 0.317***
Natural log of MVT rate, 2011-2014 2.854 0.922 -0.022 7.393 0.479***
Burglary rate, 2006-2010 52.037 164.378 6.239 2000.000 0.012*
MVT rate, 2006-2010 53.810 237.851 1.526 2875.000 0.004
Population Density (per sq. km), 2010 2853.208 2508.644 1.410 26875.790 0.163***
Vacancy, 2010 6.078 2.965 0.000 21.746 0.359***
Residential Stability, 2006-2010 79.083 12.475 0.000 93.935 0.215***
Concentrated Advantage 0.000 1.000 -1.930 2.310 0.641***
Percent of population with a bachelor's degree or higher, 2006-2010 41.929 20.058 0.000 79.133 0.740***
Percent of the population that is non-Hispanic white, 2010 73.786 12.223 43.055 90.222 0.630***
Median household income per $1,000, 2006-2010 54.193 23.047 0.000 141.543 0.354***
Foreclosure Denisty (per sq. km), 2007-2010 48.565 32.706 0.000 138.613 0.509***
Foreclosure Rate (per 1,000 households), 2007-2010 46.793 32.397 0.000 153.959 0.585***

Note: N = 145 census tracts. A 1st order Queen contiguity spatial weights matrix was used to determine the Moran's I of each variable. Moran's I
s ignificance levels based on 9999 permutations. * Pseudo p< .05; *** Pseudo p< .001.

Descriptive statistics for all variables are shown in Table 3. The mean, standard

deviation, and minimum and maximum values for each variable are reported. The last column in

Table 3 lists Moran’s I values for each variable. This number corresponds to a variable’s spatial

autocorrelation. The Moran’s I value ranges from 1 to -1, with 1 signifying perfect spatial

clustering and -1 signifying complete spatial dispersion (Anselin 2005; Anselin 1995). All of the

variables used in this study, with the exception of the MVT rate, 2006-2010, show significant

spatial autocorrelation as separate variables. These spatial patterns show that each variable’s

distribution within and across tracts is not independent of space. The spatial patterns of several

variables depicted in Figures 3-5, and the Moran’s I values calculated for each variable (Table

3), indicate the need to address spatial dependence in the regression analyses.

Spatial Regression Techniques

It is well known that certain crimes and various social factors cluster in space and that in

order to produce unbiased results it is important to test for spatial autocorrelation and not assume

that certain variables are completely independent of space (Arnio and Baumer 2012; Arnio et al.

2012; Cahill et al. 2014; Cui and Walsh 2015; Ellen et al. 2012; Payton et al. 2015). Before

32
running the final spatial regression models presented here, univariate Moran’s I statistics for each

variable were derived using GeoDa software (Anselin et al. 2006). As mentioned earlier, the

Moran’s I value for every variable used in this analysis, with the exception of the previous MVT

rate (2006-2010), suggests significant spatial clustering. Models identical to those presented

below were first run using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Moran’s I analysis was

conducted on the OLS residuals to test whether spatial regression analysis was necessary to

account for spatial dependence in the models. The OLS results and accompanying Moran’s I

values suggested significant spatial autocorrelation for each model. After assessing the Lagrange

Multiplier (LM) diagnostics computed with the OLS results in GeoDa (Anselin et al. 2006), the

spatial error model LM showed a higher and/or more significant value than the spatial lag model

LM. These values suggest that the spatial error model, which uses the maximum likelihood

method, was the most suitable option for this analysis (Anselin 2005). The spatial error model is

expressed as:

𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑘 𝛽𝑘 + λ𝑊ε + 𝓊

where 𝑦 refers to the natural log of the burglary or MVT rate, respective of each model; 𝛼 is the

constant; 𝑋 represents the k number of explanatory and control variables associated with the

regression coefficients 𝛽; λ is the parameter representing the spatial autoregressive coefficient;

𝑊 represents the spatial weights matrix; ε is a vector of OLS random error terms; and 𝓊

represents a vector of spatially independent error terms (Anselin 2005).

A row standardized, first-order queen adjacency spatial weights matrix was used to

specify the spatial relationships between census tracts in the regression models because it

correctly accounted for spatial autocorrelation throughout the analysis. A contiguity-based

33
spatial weights matrix that uses the queen criterion specifies census tracts as neighbors if they

share common boundaries and/or points (Anselin 2005). The spatial connectivity between census

tracts in Portland approximates a normal distribution. The total sample size in this analysis is 145

census tracts. There is a minimum of two other neighboring or bordering tracts for each tract, a

mean of 6.11, and maximum of eleven. The standard deviation for neighboring tracts is 1.60.

34
 RESULTS

Bivariate Analysis

Bivariate correlations between all variables are reported in Table 4. All of the dependent

and control crime variables are significantly and positively correlated with each other, as

expected. This helps to ensure that the crime measures are indeed valid. The strong correlations

between crime variables from different time periods help to show that they are measuring what

they were created to measure. Population density is significantly correlated with only the logged

burglary rate. Vacancy shows positive significance in its correlation to the logged MVT rate, and

is significantly related to residential stability in a negative direction, as expected. The negative

correlation between vacancy and residential stability suggests that a tract with low residential

stability could be lending to higher percentages of home vacancy, or vice versa. If residents of a

particular tract are consistently moving out, the neighborhood could begin to deteriorate due to

fewer residents. This in turn could cause possible new residents to find the particular

neighborhood unsatisfactory, therefore empty homes remain empty. Residential stability is

moderately and negatively correlated to all of the crime variables, as expected. This result

suggests that either a neighborhood with residents frequently moving in and out causes less

overall neighborhood stability and therefore contributes to crime, or that high crime rates are

causing people to relocate. Concentrated advantage shows a significant, but weak correlation to

the logged burglary rate and a significantly moderate correlation to the logged MVT rate. Both

relationships are negative, as anticipated.

35
 Table. 4 Bivariate correlations between all variables
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

1. Natural log of burglary rate, 2011-2014 1.000

2. Natural log of MVT rate, 2011-2014 0.839*** 1.000
3. Burglary rate, 2006-2010 0.617*** 0.492*** 1.000
4. MVT rate, 2006-2010 0.599*** 0.497*** 0.997*** 1.000

36
5. Population Density (per sq. km), 2010 -0.316*** -0.150 -0.122 -0.110 1.000
6. Vacancy, 2010 -0.033 0.165* -0.139 -0.127 0.042 1.000
7. Residential Stability, 2006-2010 -0.400*** -0.451*** -0.557*** -0.572*** -0.120 -0.265*** 1.000
8. Concentrated Advantage, 2006-2010 -0.348*** -0.550*** -0.153 -0.150 -0.138 0.006 0.158 1.000
9. Foreclosure Denisty (per sq. km), 2007-2010 0.021 0.085 -0.126 -0.137 0.317*** 0.008 0.135 -0.566*** 1.000
10. Foreclosure Rate (per 1,000 households), 2007-2010 0.129 0.141 -0.098 -0.112 -0.174* -0.042 0.278*** -0.562*** 0.717*** 1.000
N = 145 census tracts; * p< .05; ** p< .01; *** p< .001.
 Lastly, the correlation results do not show any significant relationship between either of

the foreclosure measures and any of the crime variables. The two foreclosure variables are highly

and positively correlated with each other, but not perfectly correlated, showing that there is a

difference in the way foreclosure is measured and how those measurements will interact with

other variables. Foreclosure density is significantly related to population density and shows a

significant, negative and moderate correlation with concentrated advantage. This result suggests

that foreclosure density might be higher in areas with less concentrated advantage. The variables

representing the foreclosure rate per 1,000 households also has a significant relationship with

population density. One interesting result concerning the household foreclosure rate is its

significant and positive relationship with residential stability. A higher presence of residential

stability being associated with a higher rate of foreclosure raises some questions worthy of

additional research about the relationship between the extent of foreclosed homes and residential

turnover in a neighborhood. The household foreclosure rate, much like foreclosure density, is

negatively correlated with concentrated advantage. Exploring concentrated advantage and its

relationship to foreclosure and other aspects of the housing market could be an interesting area

for future research, but discussion surrounding this topic will be taken up in a subsequent

section.

Multivariate Analysis

Table 5 reports the full regression models. In depth analysis done prior to the completion

of this study showed that the control variables remain constant throughout various models. All

models include both control variables and all neighborhood characteristic and socioeconomic

variables. Models 1 and 2 show results for the dependent logged burglary rate variable, while

37
models 3 and 4 show results for the dependent logged MVT rate variable. Models 1 and 3 use the

foreclosure density measure while models 2 and 4 use the household foreclosure rate variable.

38
 Table. 5 Spatial Error Regression results for the logged burglary rate, 2011-2014, and the logged MVT rate, 2011-2014
Model 1 (burglary) Model 2 (burglary) Model 3 (MVT) Model 4 (MVT)
Independent variables
b S.E. b S.E. b S.E. b S.E.

Burglary rate, 2006-2010 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000

MVT rate, 2006-2010 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000
Population Density (per sq. km), 2010 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000
Vacancy, 2010 0.007 0.013 0.005 0.013 0.066*** 0.016 0.060*** 0.016
Residential Stability, 2006-2010 -0.008* 0.003 -0.009** 0.003 -0.007 0.004 -0.008* 0.004
Concentrated Advantage, 2006-2010 -0.072 0.056 -0.053 0.054 -0.408*** 0.068 -0.374*** 0.068
Foreclosure Denisty (per sq. km), 2007-2010 -0.000 0.001 -0.004** 0.002
Foreclosure Rate (per 1,000 households), 2007-2010 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002

39
Lambda 0.704*** 0.074 0.700*** 0.075 0.786*** 0.060 0.762*** 0.065
Constant 4.002*** 0.332 3.942*** 0.336 3.362*** 0.409 3.390*** 0.421
Pseudo R2 0.694 0.695 0.778 0.767
Multicollineary condition index 28.857 29.973 28.802 28.913
Log likelihood -67.961 -67.572 -95.282 -98.005
Difference between OLS and Spatial Regression Log Liklihood -20.927 -21.468 -34.892 -30.800
Degrees of Freedom 138 138 138 138
Akaike Information Criterion 149.923 149.143 204.564 210.009
Difference between OLS and Spatial Regression Akaike Information Criterion 41.852 42.937 69.783 61.600
Moran’s I -0.046 -0.042 -0.004 -0.011
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients (b) and standard errors (SE) reported. N = 145 census tracts. A 1st order Queen contiguity spatial weights matrix was used in the
regression analyses and Moran's I analysis of regression residuals. Insignificance of Moran’s I is based on 9999 permutations.
* p< .05; ** p< .01; *** p< .001.
 There are several noteworthy multivariate relationships presented in Table 5. The control

variables representing previous crime for 2006 to 2010 are highly significant and positive

predictors of their associated logged crime rates for 2011 to 2014, as expected. Each regression

model includes spatial error diagnostics that help to ensure a sound model. The multicollinearity

index (MCI) for each model is below 30, which is the upper threshold suggested by Anselin

(2005). This suggests that possible collinearity between the independent variables in each model

is not present. Two diagnostic terms, the Lambda and the Moran’s I, represent the presence or

lack of spatial dependence depending on their significance. Each model shows a highly

significant Lambda (the spatial autoregressive coefficient) and an insignificant Moran’s I

statistic, meaning that the spatial autocorrelation that existed previously has been accounted for

by the spatial error models.

Model fit can be derived from the interpretation of the pseudo R², the Akaike information

criterion (AIC), and the log likelihood value. The pseudo R² helps in interpreting the explained

variation in the dependent variables. Each model includes the same independent and control

variables, except for the difference in foreclosure measurements. Model 1, which includes the

foreclosure density measure, has a pseudo R² of 0.694 and thus explains approximately 69% of

the variance in the logged burglary rate. Model 2, which uses the household foreclosure rate

instead of density, accounts for approximately 70% (pseudo R² = 0.695) of the variation in the

logged burglary rate. Model 3, which regresses on the logged MVT rate and incorporates

foreclosure density, accounts for about 78% (pseudo R² = 0.778) of the variance in the logged

MVT rate. In model 4, the pseudo R² is 0.767. Thus, this model, which uses the household

foreclosure rate explains about 77% of the variance in the logged MVT rate. OLS models are not

40
reported here, however a set of OLS regression models were previously analyzed in order to

detect the need for spatial regression. Thus, a comparison between the OLS and spatial

regression AIC and log likelihood values are able to convey whether the spatial regression yields

an improved model. Improved model fit is suggested by smaller AIC values and larger log

likelihood values compared to previous models, which is the case for each spatial error model

reported here (Anselin 2005). Two rows in Table 5 show the difference between the OLS AIC

and spatial regression AIC as well as the difference between log likelihood values for both types

of regression.

Results show that neither of the foreclosure variables are significantly associated with

burglary. Instead, the logged burglary rate is most significantly associated with residential

stability controlling for all other variables in models 1 and 2. An increase in residential stability

predicts a slight decrease in later burglary. The results for models 1 and 2 partially support

Hypothesis 2 given the significant negative effect of residential stability on the logged burglary

rate. But, they do not support Hypothesis 1 and 3, respectively, pertaining to the role of

neighborhood physical context of home vacancy and neighborhood foreclosures on crime.

The only difference between models 1 and 2 is the very small change in the coefficient

related to residential stability. In model 1, for each one unit increase in residential stability, later

burglary rates decrease by 0.8%, net of all other variables. In model 2, a similar relationship

exists except that subsequent burglary rates decrease by 0.9%, for each one unit increase in

residential stability, holding all other variables constant. While the difference between the two

models is slight, it still exists and may have something to do with the different foreclosure

measures included in the models. Model 1 incorporates foreclosure density, while model 2 uses

41
the household foreclosure rate. So, there is a 0.1% difference in the logged burglary rates

between models when accounting for the household foreclosure rate instead of foreclosure

density.

Much different results appear for models 3 and 4. Model 3 indicates the foreclosure

density measure is significantly and negatively associated with logged MVT rates, net of all

other variables in the model. A one unit increase in foreclosure density corresponds to a 0.4%

decrease in the MVT rate. So, an increase in foreclosure density per square kilometer predicts a

slight decrease in the logged MVT rate. This finding is in the complete opposite direction of

Hypothesis 3. This suggests the possibility that areas with a higher density of foreclosures are

simply areas with a fewer number of cars in the vicinity after the foreclosure crisis. This result

must also be considered in light of the positive, but insignificant, correlation between MVT and

foreclosure density in the bivariate analysis. The relationship between these two variables

changed direction and became significant once included in the spatial error regression model.

This suggests that along with spatial dependence, there are also other factors mediating the

relationship between foreclosure density and later MVT rates that were not accounted for in the

bivariate analysis. In model 4, the coefficient for household foreclosure rates is insignificant. The

fact that the way in which foreclosures are measured results in significantly different outcomes

between models with the same dependent variable is an important finding in itself and will be

expanded upon later.

The MVT models have other interesting differences compared to the burglary models. As

stated earlier, the only explanatory variable significantly associated with the dependent burglary

variable is residential stability. Residential stability is a significant predictor of the dependent

42
variable representing MVT only in model 4, which is in partial support of Hypothesis 2. The

logged MVT rate, in model 4, decreases by 0.8% for each one unit increase in the residential

stability coefficient. Vacancy and concentrated advantage are both highly significant in models 3

and 4, in support of Hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively. As the percent of vacant homes increases

so too does the MVT rate. Controlling for all other variables in model 3, a one unit increase in

vacancy predicts a 6.6% increase in the logged MVT rate. In model 4, a one unit increase in

vacancy, corresponds with a 6% increase in the logged MVT rate. This may suggest that visibly

vacant homes convey that there is an absence of neighbors or residents in a neighborhood and

therefore less of a chance that a perpetrator will be caught (Hipp 2007; Wilson and Kelling

1982), which supports Hypothesis 1. However, because the vacancy variable is measuring vacant

homes during the foreclosure crisis, in this analysis vacancy is predicting later, not

contemporaneous MVT. This brings up questions as to whether vacancy’s effect on a

neighborhood may be continually disadvantageous for a long period of time, therefore

contributing to later crime. Concentrated advantage is significantly and negatively associated

with the logged MVT rate in both models 3 and 4. In model 3, for each one unit increase in

concentrated advantage the MVT rate decreases 40.8%, net of all other variables in the model.

For model 4, a one unit increase in concentrated advantage corresponds to a 37.4% decrease in

the MVT rate, controlling for the other variables in the model. Areas of the city with a higher

presence of concentrated advantage are significantly associated with lower rates of MVT. These

results suggest that concentrated advantage during the foreclosure crisis may act as a kind of

buffer against later crime, at least against later MVT rates.

43
 In summary, the multivariate analysis presents varying levels of support for this study’s

guiding hypotheses. Models 1 and 2 do not support Hypothesis 1, which hypothesized that

physical contexts of neighborhoods marked by home vacancy would be positively associated

with subsequent concentrations of burglaries. However, Hypothesis 1 is supported by models 3

and 4, which regressed on the logged MVT rate. Hypothesis 2, which hypothesized that the

advantageous social contexts of a neighborhood, marked by residential stability and concentrated

advantage, would be negatively associated with subsequent crime is partially supported in the

first three models and fully supported in the fourth model. Limitations of the study overall and

implications of the results will be discussed in the following sections.

44
 LIMITATIONS

Like any study, the research and analyses presented here are not without weaknesses.

This section will systematically go through each major section of this study to point out

limitations and some possible ways to overcome them in the future.

Theory

This study aims to combine three different criminological perspectives together to create

the hypotheses hinging upon the social and physical contexts of neighborhoods. It also utilizes

foreclosure as a possible independent contributing factor to neighborhood destabilization and

subsequent crime concentration. While the variables analyzed here logically follow from the

theory and literature presented, only one indicator is used to represent the physical context of

neighborhoods: vacancy. This variable has been used by several other studies on foreclosure and

crime to partially represent a destabilizing physical aspect of neighborhoods (e.g. Baumer et al.

2012; Immergluck and Smith 2006b). However, it would be helpful to include more than one

physical context indicator in future research to understand this particular relationship more

clearly and to more thoroughly test the relevant theories.

Overall, only property crimes were analyzed in this study, so there is no way of knowing

whether these hypotheses would predict violent crime for the Portland case. Immergluck and

Smith (2006b) also separated the physical from the social, for what they term “disorder” (similar

to destabilization here). However, they analyzed both property and violent crime. Whether the

theoretical perspectives presented are the best for analyzing only property crime, and only two

specific property crimes, is not entirely clear. Future research should keep this in consideration

for the Portland case. Having said that, the two property crime indicators used in this analysis do

45
logically flow from the criminological theories discussed. In consideration of those theories, a

change in property crime rates seems an appropriate hypothesized outcome for areas that saw

higher levels of home foreclosures during the housing crisis. According to the theories discussed

earlier, a neighborhood with an outwardly unstable appearance, and with fewer or constantly

moving residents, are more susceptible to higher levels of property crime (Cohen and Felson

1979; Shaw and McKay 1942; Wilson and Kelling 1982). Thus, burglary as one of the most

common property crimes, and MVT as one of the most highly or accurately reported (United

States Department of Justice 2014), appropriately fit the theories and hypotheses presented.

Portland as a Study Area

Another aspect of this study that could possibly be limiting is that only census tracts

within the City of Portland are analyzed. The generalizability of the specific results for Portland

can only go as far as the city itself. However, this does not mean that what has been analyzed is

not a useful and interesting contribution to the literature. Local context is important, and it has

been argued that these types of smaller, local contexts need to be studied more often so as to

understand how the foreclosure-crime relationship unfolds in specific types of communities and

neighborhoods (Cahill et al. 2014; Hipp 2007). Portland is not the largest of cities and does not

boast a very large number of census tracts giving this study a somewhat smaller sample size

compared to most previous research. That is not to say that Portland is not a good case to study.

Portland’s size and population characteristics are more similar to most medium-sized cities

throughout the US than are the size and characteristics of global cities like Chicago or New York

(U.S. Census Bureau 2016). This helps with Portland’s external validity in comparing it to other

average U.S. cities (Gerring 2007). Portland’s high percentage of white residents also makes for

46
an interesting case study in itself. Most previous foreclosure-crime research focuses on how

disadvantaged and/or minority areas might be more harshly affected by the foreclosure crisis and

possible rise in crime levels (e.g. Baumer et al. 2012; Immergluck and Smith 2006b). There is a

lack of consideration for how advantaged and/or majority white areas of cities might be buffered

from the negative effects of foreclosure and crime. Portland’s largely white population make

more apparent the effects of advantageous variables on crime.

Another potential problem with focusing so narrowly on one area is the potential for

spillover and edge effects that the present study did not attempt to measure. Several researchers

who utilize spatial analysis in sociological studies have pointed to the importance of taking

spillover and edge effects into account (Cahill et al. 2014; Immergluck and Smith 2006a;

Liévanos 2015) when analyzing social and spatial phenomena. Spillover takes place when what

is happening inside the study area partially “spills over” into and affects all or part of the

surrounding areas (Cahill et al. 2014). Similarly, edge effects happen when what is outside the

study area affects what is happening inside the study area (Liévanos 2015). Social phenomena is

fluid and cannot be locked into the area or unit of analysis being studied, therefore it is important

to consider how neighboring areas might affect the context of a study area and vice versa. While

it was not in the scope of this study to successfully account for spillover or edge effects, this is a

possibility for future research.

Data

While U.S. census data are the most comprehensive data on population characteristics for

the U.S. and its different spatial units, there is still a chance for error, especially when using the

ACS 5-year estimates. After budget cuts were applied to the U.S. Census Bureau’s operations,

47
the amount of detail provided by past census surveys, particularly the long-form census, was no

longer a possibility (Williams 2013). Hence, the 5-year estimates take information from smaller

percentages of a population and apply it statistically to the rest of the population. This creates

more possibility for the sampling error to skew estimates when studying small units of analysis,

such as census tracts and block groups (Powers et al. 2015). This is obviously a problem,

however no other comprehensive data on population and housing characteristics exist for the

years needed in this study and for the city of Portland. 15 However, there are ways to address this

sampling error problem. First, most of the ACS estimates used in this study fell well within the

thresholds created using the margin of errors (MOE) provided by the U.S. Census. This study

was guided by sources reporting that the MOE should not be greater than the estimate, which

was the case for most estimates used in this analysis (U.S. Census Bureau 2008a; U.S. Census

Bureau 2008b). The only problematic estimates arose in the education data. One way to attend to

these problematic estimates, in which the MOE is larger than some of the estimates, is to

combine categories. The current study combined four categories within the education data to

create a variable representing the percent of the population with a BA or higher. This

combination of categories attends to the problems previously found in the estimates (U.S. Census

Bureau 2008a; U.S. Census Bureau 2008b).

There are a few noteworthy limitations concerning the PPB’s public crime data. Some,

but not all, of the crimes reported to the PPB are recorded, not at the exact location where the

crime occurred, but instead at the block face or nearest intersection (City of Portland Police

15
It is worth noting again that all of the U.S. Census data used in this study were downloaded from the re-formatted
and georeferenced data made available by NHGIS (Minnesota Population Center 2011). The limitations of the
census data extend only to the U.S. Census data, not NHGIS.

48
Bureau 2015). This means that many of the mapped crime points, by default, may fall on an

intersection or a road that also acts as part of a census tract boundary. When this happens,

ArcMap (2011) and the geocoding software (Goldberg 2015) randomly place crime points in one

of the tracts. This process makes the assumption that the effects of crime data points, and home

foreclosure data points, are contained within the tracts they are geocoded to. Spatial regression

helps to mitigate this assumption because it analyzes spatial processes between tracts. Another

limitation of the crime data is that some crimes and some incidents are without locational data

entirely. For instance, many crimes that involve one or more juvenile(s) are not recorded with

locational data (City of Portland Police Bureau 2015). This obviously eliminates a portion of

property crime incidents that did indeed occur but cannot be analyzed for confidentiality reasons,

according to PPB. Beyond these limitations the PPB’s dataset is a very comprehensive and valid

resource. Another limitation concerning the use of official police data is that any unreported

crimes are not reflected in the data and therefore go unaccounted for (Mosher et al. 2011). If

crime is extremely underreported it can obviously skew results. However, there are benefits to

using the two crime indicators in this study, as noted earlier, burglary is one of the most

commonly occurring property crimes, while MVT is one of the most accurately reported (United

States Department of Justice 2014).

Lastly, the third data source, foreclosure data from RealtyTrac (2015) also contains

several limitations, some of which were pointed out by Sprague et al. (2010). Because the data

are transferred to the researcher as is, there may be discrepancies in the data of which the

researcher receiving the data might never be aware. Many auctions of foreclosed homes never

actually end with a public sale, meaning there may be no final auction date attached to some

49
individual home foreclosures even if they were reverted to the bank and sold (Sprague et al.

2010). In light of this, the current study notes that the foreclosure measures used include homes

that reached the point of Notice of Sale. According to Sprague et al. (2010), we can be fairly

certain that the homes in the data, even without an actual public auction taking place, were truly

foreclosed upon and reverted to the bank. However, because the data do not specify this when

received as is, there is no way to be absolutely sure. This is why this study’s section on data does

not specifically state that the home foreclosures analyzed in this study were reverted to the bank.

Analysis

The spatial regression techniques utilized for the analysis correctly accounted for spatial

autocorrelation and resulted in interesting findings. However, there are still some potential

problems with the analysis. For one, variables representing different periods of time are used for

the dependent and explanatory variables. This does partially get at how home foreclosures and

other neighborhood and socioeconomic characteristics might be associated with crime that took

place after the foreclosure crisis. However, analyzing variables that are a combination of data

from large chunks of time might be ignoring other temporal processes. If other types of analyses

were conducted in order to account for these possible temporal effects, there would still be a

need to control for spatial autocorrelation. Since this study found that spatial dependence does

exist, future analyses cannot simply ignore the spatial dependence while trying to account for the

possible temporal effects. Some might argue for the use of fixed effects models that focus on

within-tract associations. However, these models still ignore between-tract associations. Both

within-tract and between-tract associations are important to attend to (Arnio and Baumer 2012;

Arnio et al. 2012; Baumer et al. 2012). Since tracts approximate neighborhoods (Darmofal 2015)

50
it is important to understand the associations that are produced within them. But, one must not

assume that effects of variables are completely contained within a tract having no effect on other

surrounding tracts.

51
 A DISCUSSION OF RESULTS, PREVIOUS RESEARCH, AND CONCENTRATED

ADVANTAGE

Unique Findings in Relation to Previous Research

The results from the analyses presented here show that how foreclosure is measured does

indeed matter. This is an important finding especially considering that most previous studies rely

on only one type of measurement (e.g. Baumer et al. 2012; Immergluck and Smith 2006b).

Measuring foreclosure in terms of space rather than in terms of population or housing takes into

account the area that might be affected by foreclosure rather than considering the number of

homes in a tract or neighborhood. In the current study, there were slightly more foreclosed

homes per square kilometer than there were per 1,000 households (see Table 3). Census tracts

vary widely in area size, yet they might have similar numbers of households. Portland’s outskirts

are partially surrounded by various forests, rivers, farm land, and other rural or undeveloped land

(Oregon Explorer 2014). Communities in large tracts, in which houses are most likely more

dispersed, might not be affected in the same way that communities in the smaller tracts are. In

this case, using a measurement of foreclosure density makes sense in helping to understand how

areas with similar numbers of houses but different area measurements might have different crime

level outcomes associated with foreclosure. Household foreclosure rates can be useful in

determining how crime levels are affected in areas of similar size with similar numbers of

households, but with differing neighborhood and socioeconomic characteristics.

Another interesting result is foreclosure density’s negative relationship with later MVT

rates. This result must be understood in consideration of the positive but insignificant association

between foreclosure density and the logged MVT rate in the bivariate analysis. Once analyzed in

52
the regression model this association becomes significant and negative. This could mean that

some of the variables included in the regression model were mediating the relationship between

foreclosure density and MVT rates before they were controlled for. Controlling for population

density, previous MVT rates, and the other physical and social neighborhood context variables

allowed foreclosure density’s influence on MVT rates to be analyzed independent of those

possible intervening factors. One interpretation of this result is that if a neighborhood was

particularly hard hit by the foreclosure crisis, the residents in that neighborhood are probably

suffering other economic burdens. Therefore, car ownership rates may be low among residents in

that particular neighborhood. MVT rates would obviously slow down if there were actually

fewer cars in the area. Another reason could be that foreclosure causes people to move from

“undesirable” areas suffering from high foreclosure rates; fewer people may mean fewer cars and

therefore a decrease in MVT rates after the foreclosure crisis and after residents have partially

abandoned a neighborhood. The U.S. Census publishes data on commuting patterns and means

of transportation to work which may be useful for future research looking to address these

questions (Minnesota Population Center 2011). These are obviously speculations that the

analysis and results here cannot answer for certain. Whether this result is specific to Portland or

not is unknown. Future research could look at foreclosure’s effect on MVT, in other areas, to

hopefully come to a deeper understanding of this outcome.

The negative relationship between foreclosure and MVT rates is unique to this study.

This result does not exist in any of the prior foreclosure-crime literature discussed. While results

from prior research vary, none show a negative effect of foreclosure on crime. This result might

53
be a function of Portland’s local context. However, future research could focus on understanding

this negative relationship more fully.

Concentrated Advantage versus Disadvantage

Gleaning from previous research on concentrated disadvantage and affluence (Morenoff

et al. 2001; Morenoff and Sampson 1997; Sampson 2012; Sampson et al. 1999; Sampson et al.

1997; Wilson 1987), this study implemented a principal component analysis to create the

concentrated advantage variable. Variables concerning concentrated disadvantage are more

conventional within the foreclosure-crime literature. However, disadvantage is not necessarily

useful in understanding the foreclosure-crime relationship for Portland’s case. Variables

commonly used to represent concentrated disadvantage (Morenoff et al. 2001; Morenoff and

Sampson 1997; Sampson 2012; Sampson et al. 1997; Wilson 1987) were tested in preliminary

analyses and showed either insignificant or weak results with very high multicollinearity. These

preliminary analyses included variables representing percentages of minority residents,

specifically of Hispanics/Latinos/as and non-Hispanic blacks, unemployment, female-headed

households, and residential instability/mobility. Variables measuring advantage were far more

useful and explanatory for the particular analysis presented here. Future research should consider

the usefulness of variables like concentrated advantage for explaining local contexts as well as

for better understanding across city variations of the foreclosure-crime relationship.

Concentrated advantage did not have a significant effect in the first two models for

logged burglary rates, but was significant in the last two models predicting a decrease in logged

MVT rates. Maybe residents in areas of concentrated advantage simply have larger houses with

garage space with which to protect their vehicles from possible theft. Advantaged areas could

54
also have heightened security or developed neighborhood watch units because of their obvious

ability to create more funding for local security and anti-crime programs. Whatever these results

truly mean, the concept is worth further analysis. Stemming from these results, future research

could delve into answering questions such as: Does concentrated advantage act as a buffer

against other types of crimes? How does concentrated advantage affect violent crime rates? How

do foreclosure and concentrated advantage interact with each other?

55
 CONCLUSION

This study integrates criminological perspectives with research on concentrated

disadvantage to analyze the effects of foreclosure and other neighborhood and socioeconomic

characteristics on crime. While much of the previous literature on the topic has come up with

varying results, this study helps to shed light on the foreclosure-crime relationship in the local

context of Portland, Oregon. This study makes a contribution to the literature by pointing out the

important differences in results stemming from the use of different foreclosure measurements.

Beyond the host of limitations discussed earlier, this study does bring interesting findings to the

table, including results that speak to the importance of local contexts, spatial processes, variable

measurement, and the idea of concentrated advantage.

Before summarizing the results, it is worth restating the initial research questions to

examine how or if they have been answered:

(1) How do tract-level household foreclosure rates and foreclosure density, separately,

affect spatial concentrations of later burglary and motor vehicle theft (MVT) within and

across neighborhoods, net of other neighborhood characteristics? (2) How do the social

and physical contexts of a neighborhood affect burglary and MVT rates after the

foreclosure crisis, net of home foreclosures?

To answer the first question, neither foreclosure density nor household foreclosure rates

significantly affect later burglary rates. Household foreclosure rates also do not affect later MVT

rates. However, later MVT rates are negatively associated with foreclosure density. To answer

the second question, the physical contexts of a neighborhood represented by home vacancy are

not associated with burglary in this analysis. The only social context variable significantly

56
associated with burglary was residential stability. For the models predicting later MVT rates

(models 3 and 4), the neighborhood physical context variable, vacancy, is significantly

associated with a later increase in MVT rates. In terms of the social context variables, residential

stability is significantly associated with a decrease in MVT rates, net of household foreclosure

rates and other neighborhood factors included in model 4. Concentrated advantage is associated

with a decrease in MVT rates regardless of how foreclosure is measured.

The results provide varying levels of support for the present study’s guiding hypotheses.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 (H1 and H2) were partially supported by all four models. Residential

stability, one of the advantageous social context variables is negatively associated with later

burglary rates in models 1 and 2 as well as with later MVT rates in model 4. Concentrated

advantage is negatively associated with later MVT rates in models 3 and 4. The third and final

hypothesis (H3) was not supported by any of the models’ results. In fact, in model 3, foreclosure

density as an explanatory variable is negatively associated with later MVT rates. Residential

stability is the only significant explanatory variable predicting a decrease in logged burglary

rates. In other words, a higher percentage of neighbors staying in their homes for at least one

year is associated with lower subsequent burglary rates. Vacancy and concentrated advantage are

the most significant predictors of an increase and decrease in later MVT rates, respectively. That

is to say that a higher percentage of vacant homes predicts an increase in later MVT rates, while

an increase in concentrated advantage predicts a later decrease in MVT rates. The only time

foreclosure is significant is when it is predicting a decrease in the logged MVT rate, using the

foreclosure density measure. As noted earlier, this could simply mean that there are fewer cars in

an area that was particularly hard hit by the foreclosure crisis, and therefore less of a chance for

57
motor vehicle theft to be perpetrated after the foreclosure crisis. One of the more interesting

findings is the difference in results between models using different measurements of foreclosure.

Studying this phenomenon in greater depth could help to inform methods and measurement for

this type of analysis. This result, and the results across all measures in general, prompt further

research on the topic of how foreclosure is associated with particular crimes, and how spatial

processes affect and are affected by foreclosure, crime, and the physical and social contexts of

neighborhoods.

As for the strengths of this study, first, the analysis takes space into account by utilizing a

spatial error regression. A majority of the previous foreclosure-crime studies failed to account for

spatial dependence. When analyses do not attend to spatial clustering the standard error in

regression models becomes biased leading to possible false significance of results due to the

spatial dependence of the variables (Anselin 2005). The most recent foreclosure-crime studies,

with varying study areas, have shown that spatial dependence is consistently significant across

variables and models (Cahill et al. 2014; Cui and Walsh 2015; Payton et al. 2015). The current

study has also shown this to be true. Using spatial error regression models in the current study

allows for the unbiased within and between tract analysis of local context results.

An important contribution made by this study is reflected in the results that show that the

way in which foreclosure variables are measured does matter significantly. This difference in

foreclosure measurements between density and household rate is something that previous

research has not analyzed. The contributions of the results from this study are very useful in

continuing research on the topic. Future research should look into how foreclosure densities

58
versus foreclosure rates might differ in a larger city, or even larger study area, such as a

nationwide study similar to the analysis published by Baumer et al. (2012).

Another strength of this study is the use of the concentrated advantage factor variable.

The current study relies on prior research on concentrated affluence (Massey 1996; Sampson et

al. 1999) to create a variable that measures advantage rather than the more popular concentrated

disadvantage. The justification for using variables that measure advantageous conditions rather

than disadvantageous ones was given above in the Discussion section. This study relied mainly

on two concentrated affluence studies, a nationwide study published by Massey (1996) and a

Chicago study by Sampson et al. (1999). Considering that Chicago has been the focus of

research on the foreclosure-crime nexus multiple times (Arnio and Baumer 2012; Immergluck

and Smith 2006b; Kirk and Hyra 2012), it would be interesting to test whether concentrated

advantage applies to those particular cases. It would also be worthwhile to apply the

concentrated advantage variable to other foreclosure-crime studies for cities beyond Chicago. In

particular, using concentrated advantage in an analysis similar to the nationwide, census tract

level, study produced by Baumer et al. (2012) could help in understanding how concentrated

advantage varies across cities compared to concentrated disadvantage. In terms of qualitative

research, several questions emerge. What is it about concentrated advantage that buffers certain

neighborhoods from crime? In specific consideration of the Portland case presented here along

with concentrated advantage, what is the difference between outlier neighborhoods and those

that fall on the regression line?

Considering the contributions made in this study for future research on foreclosure and

crime could help to advance our understanding of how urban housing policies, concentrated

59
advantage, and crime are associated. The significant difference in results based on foreclosure

measurement, for the Portland case, points toward the need for further research on these

measurement differences using other study areas. Taking spatial dependencies into account has

once again been proven a necessity in this study, and is therefore most likely going to be a

necessity for future analyses of foreclosure and crime. Lastly, in light of the results reported here,

further considering local context associations and interactions between foreclosure, crime, and

concentrated advantage, both qualitatively and quantitatively, could yield more helpful

advancements in our understanding of these sociospatial processes.

60
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 APPENDIX

Summary of previous empirical research on the foreclosure-crime relationship

Author Study Area Unit of Analysis

Immergluck and Smith (2006b) Chicago, IL Census Tract

Pandit (2011) United States Metropolitan Statistical Area

Madensen et al. (2011) Las Vegas, NV Residential subdivision

Arnio and Baumer (2012) Chicago, IL Census Tract

Arnio et al. (2012) United States County

Teasdale et al. (2012) Akron, OH Census Tract

Jones and Pridemore (2012) United States Metropolitan Statistical Area

Baumer et al. (2012) U.S. Cities Census Tract

Kirk and Hyra (2012) Chicago, IL Chicago community area

Stucky et al. (2012) Indianapolis, IN 1,000 x 1,000 feet square grid cell

Wallace et al. (2012) Glendale, AZ Census Block

Ellen et al. (2012) New York, NY Blockface

Goodstein and Lee (2012) United States County

Katz et al. (2013) Glendale, AZ Census Tract

Wolff et al. (2014) United States County

Cahill et al. (2014) Washington, DC and Miami-Dade County, FL Census Tract

Payton et al. (2015) Indianapolis, IN 500 x 500 feet grid cell

Cui and Walsh (2015) Pittsburgh, PA 250 ft. "treatement area" around each foreclosure

69
Summary of previous empirical research on the foreclosure-crime relationship (continued)
Author
Immergluck and Smith (2006b)
Pandit (2011)
Madensen et al. (2011)
Arnio and Baumer (2012)
Arnio et al. (2012)
Teasdale et al. (2012)
Jones and Pridemore (2012)
Baumer et al. (2012)
Kirk and Hyra (2012)
Stucky et al. (2012)
Wallace et al. (2012)
Ellen et al. (2012)
Goodstein and Lee (2012)
Katz et al. (2013)
Wolff et al. (2014)
Cahill et al. (2014)
Payton et al. (2015)
Cui and Walsh (2015)
Crime Measurement Foreclosure Measurement
Violent crime incidents (ln)
Property crime incidents (ln) Rate per owner-occupiable structures
Total crime incidents (ln)
Violent crime rate per 100k persons (change over time)
Rate per housholds, per MSA (change in proportion at different points
Property crime rate per 100k persons (change over time)
in the foreclosure process)
Total crime rate per 100k persons (change over time)
Violent crime rate per parcel (percent change over time)
Property crime rate per parcel (percent change over time) Rate per 1k parcels (percent change for three time periods)
"Disorder event" crime rate per parcel (percent change over time)
Homicide rate (ln) per 100k residents
Rate (ln) per 1k housing units
Robbery rate (ln) per 100k residents
Change in rate (ln) over time, per 1k housing units
Burglary rate (ln) per 100k housing units
Robbery rate per 100k residents
Rate (ln) per 1k mortgages
Burglary rate per 100k residents
Burglary count
Larceny count
Drug violation count Count per census tract, that resulted from subprime loans
Disorderly conduct count
Total crime count
Violent crime rate per 100k residents Housing mortgage stress index: operationalization of the foreclosure
Property crime rate per 100k residents crisis
Robbery count
Rate per 1k housing units
Burglary count
Violent crime rate (ln) per 1k residents, one year lag
Rate (ln) per active mortgages in a given year
Property crime rate (ln) per 1k residents, one year lag
Violent crime count per cell, each year
Property crime count per cell, each year Count (ln) within a 3 x 3 grid cell neighborhood around each grid cell
Total crime count per cell, each year
Social disorder rate per 1k persons, each month
Rate of foreclosures in each block group, each month, per housing units
Physical disorder rate per 1k persons, each month
in the block group for the year x 100
Total disorder rate per 1k persons, each month
Violent crime counts (quarterly)
Property crime counts (quarterly) Quarterly count (lagged) at different points in the foreclosure process
Public order crime counts (quarterly)
Violent crime rate per 100k persons
Rate (lagged) per all active loans
Property crime rate per 100k persons
Violent crime rate per 1k persons
Property crime rate per 1k persons Rate of foreclosures in each block group, each month, per housing units
Drug crime rate per 1k persons in the block group for the year x 100
Total crime rate per 1k persons
Robery rate per 100k residents
Rate (ln) per 1k mortgages
Burglary rate per 100k residents
Violent crime counts (quarterly)
Quarterly count
Property crime counts (quarterly)
Violent crime count per cell, each year
Property crime count per cell, each year Density per mile withn a cell and at different distances
Total crime count per cell, each year
Violent crime counts (quarterly) Count based on distance at different points during the foreclosure
Property crime counts (quarterly) process: 250 buffers around each foreclosure
70
Summary of previous empirical research on the foreclosure-crime relationship (continued)
Author Method Results: Foreclosure-Crime Relationship

Violent crime: +
Immergluck and Smith (2006b) OLS regression
Property crime: +

Pandit (2011) OLS regression All crime: +

Madensen et al. (2011) OLS regression All crime: ns

Homicide: ns
Arnio and Baumer (2012) Geographically weighted regression Robbery: +
Burglary: +

Robbery: + (limited to areas with specific characteristics)

Arnio et al. (2012) Spatial error regression
Burglary: +

Teasdale et al. (2012) Negative binomial regression All crime: +

Jones and Pridemore (2012) Weighted least squares regression All crime variables: ns

Robbery: +
Baumer et al. (2012) Multilevel Poisson regression with spatial lag terms Burglary: +
Note: Significant variablity across cities

Kirk and Hyra (2012) Random effects regression All crime: ns (spurious)

Stucky et al. (2012) Fixed effects negative binomial regression All crime: +

Wallace et al. (2012) Fixed effect within-group regression All crime: + (short-term, limited effect only)

Ellen et al. (2012) Fixed effects negative binomial regression All crime variables: +

Robbery: ns
Rape: ns
Murder: ns
Goodstein and Lee (2012) OLS regression
Aggravated assault: +
MVT: ns
Larceny: +

Katz et al. (2013) Random effects time series regression All crime: + (short-term effect only, otherwise ns)

Wolff et al. (2014) OLS regression and propensity score matching analysis All crime: ns

Violent: +
Cahill et al. (2014) Fixed effects regression Property Crime: +
(For both: very weak, in one model only)

Payton et al. (2015) Fixed effects negative binomial regression All crime: + (up to a distance of 2,250 feet)

Violent crime: ns
Cui and Walsh (2015) Difference-in-differences estimation
Property crime: ns
Note: + = Postiive relationship; ns = Not Significant; Studies listed in chronological order to show the progression of research over time

71