This chapter attempts to define the essence of religion by examining different viewpoints. It compares Tylor's view that religion is based on belief in spiritual beings to Durkheim's view that religion is based on social practices and rituals. The chapter then discusses various scholars' perspectives on what constitutes the core of religion, such as fascination, dependence, power, or concern with the ultimate. Like Socrates' dialogue where he tried to define piety through examples and questions but reached no conclusion, the chapter finds defining religion's essence to be difficult. It suggests focusing instead on religion's function.
This chapter attempts to define the essence of religion by examining different viewpoints. It compares Tylor's view that religion is based on belief in spiritual beings to Durkheim's view that religion is based on social practices and rituals. The chapter then discusses various scholars' perspectives on what constitutes the core of religion, such as fascination, dependence, power, or concern with the ultimate. Like Socrates' dialogue where he tried to define piety through examples and questions but reached no conclusion, the chapter finds defining religion's essence to be difficult. It suggests focusing instead on religion's function.
This chapter attempts to define the essence of religion by examining different viewpoints. It compares Tylor's view that religion is based on belief in spiritual beings to Durkheim's view that religion is based on social practices and rituals. The chapter then discusses various scholars' perspectives on what constitutes the core of religion, such as fascination, dependence, power, or concern with the ultimate. Like Socrates' dialogue where he tried to define piety through examples and questions but reached no conclusion, the chapter finds defining religion's essence to be difficult. It suggests focusing instead on religion's function.
This chapter tries to define what the essence of religion is and therefore to know what makes religion what it is. Firstly, it compares two points of view. The first one is of Tylor who defines religion as the belief in spiritual beings, giving rise to a more individualistic view. On the other hand, Durkheim's definition revolves around practices and rituals, putting the community as a base and defending a collectivist vision. Tylor's definition is based on European philosophical idealism where belief arose from the higher self and not from collective behaviors. Nowadays, a way of life that is practiced individually rather than as a community is considered a spirituality. On the contrary, if you are part of an institution, you are not spiritual, you are religious. Later in the chapter, the author lists different views of what is essential for a religion to be considered as such. He leaves aside the external aspects and the historical background. For Otto it would be fascination; for Schleiermacher, dependence; Vand der Leeuw would say it is power; Tillich defends the ultimate concern; and Mircea Eliade, the sacred. It uses the comparative method to try to find what is common to all these definitions, and thus, to find the essence of religion. To seek a comparison of his difficulty in trying to find the essence of religion, he uses the example of a work by Plato. The Euthypro is a dialogue between Socrates and Euthypro that tries to define what piety is. Socrates uses the method of dialogue through questions to try to get Euthypro to come to an answer. He gives eight definitions and tries to define it through examples but does not reach any conclusion. There is only one question that is key to understand what piety is:” Is something pious because the gods love it or do they love it because it is pious? “That is to say, we return to the question of other chapters of whether the essence is found in the object itself or in the subject. Therefore, since finding the essence of something is an almost impossible task, we should then focus on the function of religion.