Dao (2021) 20:133–148

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-020-09765-6

Revisiting the Exchange between Zhuangzi

and Huizi on Qing

Lin MA 1 & Jaap van Brakel 2

Accepted: 8 December 2020/ Published online: 15 January 2021

# The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. part of Springer Nature 2021

Abstract
In this article we focus on the famous dialogue between Zhuangzi 莊子 and Huizi 惠子
concerning the question whether or not ren 人 (in particular the shengren 聖人) have
qing 情. Most scholars have understood qing in this exchange as referring to “feelings”
or “emotions.” We take issue with such readings. First, we demonstrate that, while
Huizi probably understands qing as something like feelings or emotions, Zhuangzi’s
view is that having qing is connected with making shifei 是非 judgments whereas
having no qing means that shifei has no grip on those ren, especially the shengren.
What follows is that the expression wuqing 無情 should not be identified as a “doctrine
of nonemotion.” Instead, wuqing implies that Zhuangzi advises us to lead a life of
tranquility, calmness, and stillness. We show that these peaceful attitudes are associated
with the idea of wuwei 無為 in the Zhuangzi.

Keywords the Zhuangzi 莊子 . Qing 情 . Shifei 是非 . Wuwei 無為 . Wuqing 無情

1 Introduction

In this article, we focus on the famous dialogue between Zhuangzi 莊子 and Huizi 惠子
concerning the question whether or not ren 人 (in particular the shengren and including
other “sages”) have qing 情. In the first place, we argue that qing in this context should
not be translated either as “emotions” or “feelings,” or as such modern Chinese
expressions as ganqing 感情. For reasons that will become clear, we occasionally leave

* Lin MA
malin2008@ruc.edu.cn

Jaap van Brakel

Jaap.vanBrakel@kuleuven.be

1
School of Philosophy, Renmin University of China (Zhe-xue-yuan), Av. Zhongguancun 59,
Haidian District, Beijing 100872, China
2
Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte, KU Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, 3000 Leuven, Belgium
134 Lin MA, Jaap van Brakel

such words/characters as qing, ren, shifei 是非, and haowu 好惡 untranslated (even in
cited passages).
Below is the translation by James Legge of the relevant passages from the end of
chapter 5 of the Zhuangzi. Although this translation is rather old, it has some features
that suit our explanations better than other more recent renditions.1

聖人不謀, 惡用知? …… 既受食於天, 又惡用人?有人之形, 無人之情。有人之形, 故群

於人; 無人之情, 故是非不得於身。
The sagely ren lays no plans; of what use would wisdom be to him? … Since he
receives this food from Heaven, what need has he for anything of ren’s (devis-
ing)? He has the bodily form of ren, but not the qing of (other) ren. He has the
form of ren, and therefore he is a ren. Being without qing of ren, shifei are not to
be found in him. (Legge 1891: 234)

惠子謂莊子曰 :「 人故無情乎 ?」 莊子曰 :「 然 。」 惠子曰 :「 人而無情 , 何以謂之

人?」莊子曰:「道與之貌, 天與之形, 惡得不謂之人?」惠子曰:「既謂之人, 惡得無
情?」莊子曰:「是非吾所謂情也。吾所謂無情者, 言人之不以好惡內傷其身, 常因自
然而不益生也。」
Huizi said to Zhuangzi, “Can a ren indeed be without qing?” The reply was, “He
can.” “But on what grounds do you call him a ren, who is thus without qing?”
Zhuangzi said, “The Dao gives him his personal appearance (and powers);
Heaven gives him his bodily form; how should we not call him a ren?” Huizi
rejoined, “Since you call him a ren, how can he be without qing?” The reply was,
“You are misunderstanding what I mean by qing. What I mean when I say that he
is without these is, that this ren does not by his haowu do any inward harm to his
body—he always pursues his course without effort, and does not (try to) increase
his (store of) life.” (Legge 1891: 234–235)

In subsequent sections, we first point out that Huizi and Zhuangzi understand the meaning of
qing in different ways. It could be the case that Huizi understands qing as something like
feelings or emotions. In contrast, Zhuangzi explains that making shifei 是非 judgments is
what he calls qing 情. This is a highly significant utterance by Zhuangzi. In this exchange,
Zhuangzi is less concerned about qing than about shifei, and it supports what is said about
shifei in chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi.
The translation cited above from Legge consists of two parts/blocks. The first block
contains a few comments concerning the features of the sagely person (shengren); the
second block consists of the conversation between Zhuangzi and Huizi. Commentators have
tended to assume that the ren in that conversation concerns only ordinary humans. However,
this is not self-evident. The characters ren and qing are used, but not the binome renqing
(human qing).2

1
We have considered a number of translations of the Zhuangzi in English as well as in a number of other
modern languages (including modern Chinese), but we have rendered all the citations from these non-English
language translations into English.
2
Only Richard Wilhelm, A. C. Graham, and Brook Ziporyn add the modifier “human” in their translation of
qing in the first line of the second block (Wilhelm 1920, Graham 1981/2001, Ziporyn 2009). Other translators
may have assumed that the use of ren restricts the discussion to humans. This is ambiguous because ren
includes sages.
Revisiting the Exchange between Zhuangzi and Huizi on Qing 135

In the first block, Zhuangzi claims that shifei cannot get at the shengren; in the
second block, he claims that haowu should not harm ren by entering her/his body.
We suggest that there is not that much difference between shifei 是非 and haowu
好惡 as is generally assumed, because they should be understood in light of the
feature of phrasal interdependence (huwen xianyi 互文見義) in classical Chinese
language.3
We stress that although wuqing 無情 (or 无情) occurs in the exchange between
Zhuangzi and Huizi, it should not be rendered as a “doctrine of nonemotion” in the
English language. What one can claim is that Zhuangzi (following Laozi 老子) advises
us to lead a life that is characterized by tranquility, calmness, and stillness. These
characteristics describe the way of life of the shengren, who is a role model for ordinary
ren.4 What the “peaceful” characteristics are associated with is wuwei 无為/無為.

2 Varying Translations of Qing

Mair translates the first line of the dialogue as follows:

惠子謂莊子曰:「人故無情乎?」 莊子曰: 然!
“Are there really men without emotions?” Master Hui asked Master Chuang.
“Yes,” said Master Chuang. (Mair 1994: 49)

In the secondary literature in modern languages, qing is most often rendered as

“emotions” or “feelings” when this passage occurs in relative isolation. However,
translators present a variety of alternative translations of qing 情 in the question
Huizi asked Zhuangzi. For example: “affections” (Feng 1928/1989), “characteristic
human inclinations” (Ziporyn 2009), “desires” (Qin and Sun 20035), “desires and
passions” (Legge 1891), “essence” (Kjellberg 2001), “emotions” (Wang 2003,
Wilhelm 19206), “essentials” (Graham 1981/2001), “feelings” (Watson 1968,
Schipper 20077), “passions” (Giles 1889, Lin 1957), and “sentiments” (Levi
20108). Although David Chai points out that there is no consensus on the meaning
of the word typically taken to mean emotion (qing 情), he seems to have ignored
such other renditions as “essence” or “characteristic human inclinations” in his
discussion of the “doctrine of no-emotion” that is ascribed to Zhuangzi (Chai
Forthcoming).9

3
Huwen xianyi 互文見義 or “phrasal interdependence” refers to the case where a couple of homologous
phrases (that is, phrases having the same grammatical environment) mutually support and supplement one
another, which thus creates a hybrid meaning to which both phrases contribute.
4
For the sage as a “role model” see Ma and van Brakel 2019: 193–198.
5
QIN Xuqing and SUN Yongchang’s translation into modern Chinese is: 人本來沒有情欲嗎? (Qin and Sun 2003:
86).
6
Huizi wandte sich an Zhuangzi und sprach: “Gibt es wirklich Menschen ohne menschliche Leidenschaften?”
(Wilhelm 1920: 131).
7
“Kan een mens zonder gevoelens zijn?” (Schipper 2007: 104).
8
“Est-il vrai que l’homme est privé de sentiments?” (Levi 2010: 51).
9
In translations of other Warring States texts, one finds other different renditions of qing, for example: “real/
basic fact,” “[essential/true/real] (human/inner) nature,” “state of perfect genuineness,” “situation” (Ma and
van Brakel 2019, ch. 3).
136 Lin MA, Jaap van Brakel

For the second block, various translations of the Zhuangzi in modern Chinese tend to
leave qing as it is, suggesting that one has to read qing in its classical meaning (Huizi or
Zhuangzi are not speaking modern Chinese).10 As to the first block, they usually render
qing as a binome. For example, pianqing 偏情 (inclinations; Chen 2007: 193);11
zhenqing 眞情 (real/true situation, the facts/truth, true feelings/sentiments; G. Zhang
1993: 97); xingqing 性情 (disposition, temperament, temper; Si 2013: 60); qinggan 情感
(emotion, feeling, friendship, liking each other; M. Zhang 1993: 187). It is plausible
that classical qing includes the meanings of all these binomes, which are also used in
modern Chinese.12
Shifei has been translated into English as: judging/distinguishing between matters of
right and wrong (or approval and disapproval); and alternatively as: judging “that’s it,
that’s not” or “what is and what is not,” and a few more variations (Ma and van Brakel
2019, ch. 3).13 Note that Legge translates shengren as “sagely human,” whereas most
translators render shengren simply as “sage.” Also note that Legge adds “other” in
brackets in the phrase saying that the sagely ren does not have “the qing of other ren.”14
Qing is restricted to renqing (the qing of humans) only in the translations by Graham,
Wilhelm, and Ziporyn. Other translators assume that it is self-evident that the text
concerns ordinary humans.
It seems that Huizi is asking the same question three times; the translation
by Burton Watson runs (cf. translation by Legge cited above):

Hui Tzu said to Chuang Tzu, “Can a man really be without feelings?” (Watson
1968: 75)

Hui Tzu, “But a man who has no feelings—how can you call him a man?”
(Watson 1968: 75)

Hui Tzu, “But if you’ve already called him a man, how can he be without
feelings?” (Watson 1968: 75)

By repeating his question three times, it may seem that Huizi is pointing out a
contradiction in Zhuangzi’s stance, but Zhuangzi clearly denies it. This could be
interpreted as: either Huizi is too stupid to understand Zhuangzi, or Zhuangzi is

10
There are exceptions. For example, ZHANG Mosheng translates it as qinggan 情感 (he does so also in the first
block) (M. Zhang 1993: 187).
11
CHEN Guying writes: “[The sage] has humans’ appearance and body and hence is immersed among humans;
nevertheless s/he lacks humans’ inclinations [偏情], hence the shifei of ordinary people cannot affect him. How
small [the sage] is! Because s/he is of the same species as humans. How great s/he is! Because s/he shares the
same body as nature” (Chen 2007: 193).
12
Other binomes are: ganqing 感情, shiqing 實情, and xinqing 心情. See for discussion, among an extensive
literature in modern Chinese, Xu 2005 and Chen 2014, 2016.
13
We shall not address other details of translation, including the alternative translations of a man, this man,
him, one who, one’s, a human being, people, you, person; similarly, s/he, him/her, they, their, you, them, a
man, a person. Further, we will not make a distinction between not having, have/has not, lack, without, not
sharing, free of; and similarly, no distinction between cannot gain any grip (on her/his personality), cannot get
at (them), do not get to, doesn’t have room, have no effect upon (her/him), find (in them) no place, cannot be
found (in your person), does not touch (her/him), has no hold on; and finally, we make no distinction between
harm, wound, and disturb.
14
Adding “other” is also found in Eno 2010, but in no other translations.
Revisiting the Exchange between Zhuangzi and Huizi on Qing 137

defending a contradiction. We do not think such an interpretation is plausible. The

repetition makes some sense, because there is misunderstanding. The meaning of qing
is not the same for Huizi and Zhuangzi. Huizi does not explain what he means by qing.
David Machek suggests that Huizi represents the position of the Confucians (Machek
2015: 531 n. 19). Zhuangzi himself says explicitly that Huizi’s and his understandings
of qing are different: “You are misunderstanding what I mean by qing” (Legge 1891:
235); “‘shifei’ is what I mean by ‘qing’” (Graham 1981/2001: 82).

3 Qing as Entailing Making Shifei Judgments

The occurrence of shifei in the second block is ambiguous, which can be easily
discovered by comparing a number of translations. The translations of 是非吾所
謂情也 fall into two groups depending on whether shifei is read as a single
notion or a comma is to be added between shi and fei so that it reads: “this [is]
not ….” The most common translations are:

shifei is what I call “qing.” (Ziporyn 2009: 38; Levi 2010: 52;15 Graham and
Kjellberg offer similar renditions)

qing is what I mean by shifei. (Lin 1957)

In recent years these have become the most popular translations, also in the secondary
literature.16 The second group favors translations such as:

That’s not what I mean by qing. (Feng 1928/1989: 39; Mair 1994: 49; similarly:
Giles 1889: 66; Watson 1968: 75; Wang 2003: 87, Wilhelm 1920: 13117)

You are misunderstanding what I mean by qing. (Legge 1891: 235)

That which you mention here is not what I understand as “qing.” (Schipper 2007:
104)18

As time moves on, the first option becomes the “received view,” but it is difficult to say
whether this is the result of thorough investigation or of a general tendency to
standardization. Anyway, the second option is still chosen in some more recent
translations. For example, those by Mair, Schipper, and Wang.
Each group of translations is supported by modern Chinese renderings of the classic
text:

是, 此。指惠子所說的人情 (Cao 2000: 69)

Shi [是], means ci [此]
15
“J’appelle «sentiments» la faculté de juger.”
16
See, for example, A. Cheng 2004: 52; Machek 2015: 531; Puett 2003: 258; and especially “Juger ‘c’est
ainsi’ ou ‘ce n’est pas ainsi’, voilà ce que j’appelle ‘être essentiellement homme’” (Reding 1985: 283–284).
17
“Diese Leidenschaften ist es nicht, die ich meine.”
18
“Wat jij hier noemt is niet wat ik onder ‘gevoelens’ versta.”
138 Lin MA, Jaap van Brakel

CAO Chuji says explicitly that shi means ci (i.e., “this”), pointing to what Huizi
speaks of as human qing. SI Lü places a comma after shifei in the original (是非, 吾所謂
情也) and thus gives it the meaning: shifei, that is what I mean by qing. Nevertheless,
Si’s translation into modern Chinese is: “Zhe bushi wo suo shuo de qing 這不是我所說的
情 (This is not therefore what I say qing is)” (Si 2013: 61).
We do not think that the ambiguity is resolvable, nor need be resolved, because we
should not exclude the possibility that the original (in classic Chinese) be understood as
entailing both options. Even if the first option (shifei = qing) is incorrect, there is
indirect support for the close connection of qing and shifei, between “having” qing and
“making” shifei judgments.
Even if we cannot declare absolute knowledge about what shifei means and/or what
qing means, we can be rather certain that “無人之情, 故是非不得於身 (being without qing
of ren, shifei are not to be found in him)” (Legge 1891: 234). This is confirmed by
virtually all the translators (Giles, Graham, Kjellberg, Legge, Lin, Mair, Watson, Wang,
Ziporyn; M. Zhang 2003: 187). FENG Youlan adds the words “ordinary distinction” before
shifei, leaving open the possibility that sages may employ nonordinary kinds of shifei.
Translations into other modern languages do not differ much;19 this is the same case with
the secondary sources (e.g., A. Cheng 2004, Chong 2010). CHONG Kim-chong provides an
interesting connection with chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi: “Having no qing means that they
are free of the worries and concerns that would be brought about by considerations of
shifei” (Chong 2010: 31). There can be no doubt that in the passage under review the
subject is the shengren. If we read the Chinese characters as a continuous sequence, then it
is not implausible to presume that the question Huizi asks Zhuangzi is a reaction to what
was said about the shengren just before. If that is so, Huizi’s question does not concern
“ordinary” ren or ren in general, but the shengren specifically.
Shifei distinctions are what Zhuangzi calls qing (evaluative judgments concerning
being right/wrong, as Middendorf 2008: 139f. puts it). Modern commentators do not
agree on the question as to whether shifei should be associated with emotional qualities.
Eifring disputes that shifei has emotion-like associations. He argues that shifei is an
attitude and not an emotion (against GUO Xiang 郭象 and Graham) (Eifring 2004: 14–
15). Referring to Mengzi’s 孟子 four sprouts, CHEN Guying says that shifei (in the sense
of approving or disapproving something) is a moral emotion (Chen 2015). Chris Fraser
argues that shifei could be taken as cognitive-evaluative (approval/rejection) and haowu
as preferences and aversions (like/dislike), but it is disputable whether such a distinc-
tion can be made on behalf of Zhuangzi (Fraser 2011: 103). Even for ZHU Xi 朱熹,
compassion, shame, respect, and sense of right and wrong are all just emotions.20
Elsewhere we have discussed various aspects of the use of shifei at length (Ma and
van Brakel 2019). As Graham remarks: “Man should spontaneously follow heaven like
other beings, but in stead [sic] make the mistake of distinguishing between right and
wrong alternatives” (Graham 1967: 261). Dividing the world in terms of right and

19
“Mais il n’en pas les sentiments, c’est ce qui explique qu’il n’y a pas place chez lui pour les jugements de
valeur” (Levi 2010: 51); “Il [est] absolument indifférent à leur approbation et à leur désapprobation, parce qu’il
n’a plus leurs qing” (Wieger 1913/1983: 249); “Omdat hij niet de gevoelens van mensen deelt, daarom hebben
‘welles’ en ‘nietes’ geen greep op zijn persoonlijkheid” (Schipper 2007: 104); “da er aber nicht menschliche
Leidenschaften kennt, so haben ihre Wertungen keinen Einfluß auf sein Leben” (Wilhelm 1920: 131).
20
See ZHU Xi’s commentary on the Mengzi in ZHU Xi’s Four Books: ceyin, xiuwu, cirang, shifei, qing ye 惻
隱、羞惡、辭讓、是非, 情也。
Revisiting the Exchange between Zhuangzi and Huizi on Qing 139

wrong obscures the underlying patterns for harmonious action provided by Heaven.
Having qing entails making shifei judgments. Having no qing means that shifei has no
grip. As Scott Bradley puts it succinctly in a paraphrase: “What I mean by qing … is
the constant need to make shifei judgments” (Bradley 2015: 100).

4 Do the Sages Have Qing or Not?

It is well-known that a Daoist sage diverges significantly from a Confucian sage.

Consider:

是謂素樸; 素樸而民性得矣。及至聖人, 蹩躠為仁, 踶跂為義, 而天下始疑矣; 澶漫為樂,

摘僻為禮, 而天下始分矣。 (ch. 9)
Dull and unwitting, they have no desire; this is called uncarved simplicity. In
uncarved simplicity the people attain their true nature. Then along comes the
sage, huffing and puffing after benevolence, reaching on tiptoe for righteousness,
and the world for the first time has doubts; mooning and mouthing over his
music, snipping and stitching away at his rites, and the world for the first time is
divided. (Watson 1968: 105)

In the cited text, what is first presented is Laozi’s idea of a Daoist sage, which is
followed by his criticism of the Confucian sage.21
When Sinologists discuss the exchange between Zhuangzi and Huizi, it is rare that
they include in their discussion the sentences preceding this passage. About the sage,
Zhuangzi says in the first block of text we cited:22

They have human form but not human qing. Since they have human form, they flock
with ren. Since they lack human qing, shifei do not get to them. (Kjellberg 2001: 228)

If we overlook the imposed paragraph/section separation between the first and the
second block, it may well be the case that the subsequent exchange is about ren that
include the shengren or even only about the shengren.
In the exchange between Zhuangzi and Huizi, all the translators render ren as human
or human beings (or earlier: man). In this way, the possibility that their exchange is
(also) about the shengren is suppressed. The exchange is “literally” about ren, which
includes the shengren as well as all kinds of other ren;23 insofar as the exchange is

21
Early Confucians shared a recognition of human emotions and desires as one of the defining aspects of the
human character, as well as an attempt to conceptualize morality as something developed out of these
emotions (Virág 2014: 21).
22
Lacking shifei judgments is what is special about a sage, while being occupied with shifei judgments is
characteristic of ordinary humans.
23
In the Chinese language many characters can be used to modify ren. Wenzi 文子 gives a list of five times
five binomes (Levi 2012: 115–116): shenren 神人, zhenren 真人, daoren 道人, zhiren 至人, shengren 聖人;
deren 德人, xianren 賢人, zhiren 智人, shanren 善人, bianren 辯人; gongren 公人, zhongren 忠人, xinren 信人,
yiren 義人, liren 禮人; shiren 士人, gongren工人, yuren 虞人, nongren 農人, shangren 商人; zhongren 眾人,
nuren 奴人, yuren 愚人, rouren 肉人, xiaoren 小人. There are still other binomes of ren that are not mentioned
by Wenzi. For example, shiren 世人, zhongren 中人, fanren 凡人, zairen 宰人, xiren 細人, biren 鄙人, suren 俗人,
wenren 文人, xianren 仙人, zhuren 主人.
140 Lin MA, Jaap van Brakel

about human beings,24 the sage figures as role model. By choosing to separate the two
blocks by means of imposing paragraphs or a section break, the continuity between the
first and second block is “blocked.”25 Although all the translators render ren as “men”
or “humans,” the possibility should not be excluded that after the passage concerning
the shengren, the exchange between Zhuangzi and Huizi can be rephrased in modern
language as: Huizi: “A sagely human is also a human. How can you say that the
shengren has no qing?”
If a sage has no human qing, s/he may still have sagely qing. On various occasions,
Chinese literati raised the question whether the sages have qing and disagreed with one
another. This debate has already gained a high profile in the time of WANG Bi 王弼 (cf.
Lynn 2015: 376–377). CHEN Guying attempts to distinguish between “sagely and
standard human emotions” (Chen 2015: 343).26
As there are many different interpretations of qing 情, there are many possible reasons
why considering a sage or a human being as having no qing remains underdetermined.
There is no consensus as to whether Zhuangzi is committed to the position that a sage
lacks qing. Perhaps he is only thinking of certain kinds of qing being lacking, or perhaps
he thinks that a sage may have many sublime qing that cannot be identified with the qing
of ordinary human beings. As long as one’s qing accords with nature/heaven and does
not arise from one’s own preferences (that is, from one’s shifei judgments), that is all
right; xinuaile 喜怒哀樂 (joy and anger, sadness and happiness) are natural, provided that
one remains unperturbed by them. This finds expression in a passage from chapter 23:

出怒不怒, 則怒出於不怒矣; 出為无為, 則為出於无為矣。

If he who bursts out in anger is not really angry, then his anger is an outburst of
non-anger. If he who launches into action is not really acting, then his action is a
launching into inaction. (Watson 1968: 260)

5 The Fusion between Shifei and Haowu

A further point we would like to make is that Zhuangzi does not establish a
strict distinction between shifei 是非 and haowu 好惡. Compare the first block:
無人之情, 故是非不得於身。

with the second block:

吾所謂無情者, 言人之不以好惡內傷其身。

Below we present a number of translations of the relevant passages where shifei and
haowu occur. It can be seen that there are a number of differences and similarities.
However, the translations into English all confirm that there is a slight difference

24
The following scholars translate shengren as “sage”: Eno, FENG Youlan, Graham, Kjellberg, Levi, LIN
Yutang, Mair, Watson, and Ziporyn. More appropriate translations might be: “the truly wise” (Giles 1889),
“sagely human” (Legge 1891), “holy human” (Schipper 2007), and Berufene (the one that has a calling, like a
priest) (Wilhelm 1920).
25
An exception is CHONG Kim-chong: “the dialogue is prompted by the preceding passage” (Chong 2010: 38).
26
See also Puett 2004: 124; Graham 1967: 240; and Tang 2003: 278. “HE Yan 何晏 believed that sages do not
have emotions. …WANG Bi 王弼 disagreed” (Lynn 2015: 376).
Revisiting the Exchange between Zhuangzi and Huizi on Qing 141

between the first block (no qing, and hence no room for shifei) and the second block
(no qing means: don’t allow likes and dislikes to enter your body).

Since he doesn’t have the feelings of a man, right and wrong [是非] cannot get at
him.… When I talk about having no feelings, I mean that a man doesn’t allow
likes or dislikes [好惡] to get in and do him harm. (Watson 1968: 75–76)

Since they lack human essence, right and wrong cannot get to them.… By “no
essence” I mean people not letting in good and bad to hurt them. (Kjellberg 2001:
228–229)

Since he has no human affection, he is above the ordinary distinction of right and
wrong.… When I say a man is without affection, I mean one who does not inflict
internal injuries upon himself with desires and aversions. (Feng 1928/1989: 39)

Because he is without human emotions, “right” and “wrong” have no effect upon
him.… What I mean by having no emotions is to say that a man should not
inwardly harm his person with “good” and “bad.” (Mair 1994: 49)

As he does not have human emotions, he is not troubled with what is right and
wrong.… What I mean by having no emotions is to say that he does no harm to his
natural qualities by dwelling on what he likes and dislikes. (Wang 2003: 85, 87)

Because he has not human passions the questions of right and wrong do not touch
him.… By a man without passions I mean one who does not permit likes and
dislikes to disturb his internal economy. (Lin 1957)

Most translators opt for “likes/dislikes” to translate 好惡 (Graham 1981/2001: 82; Levi
2010: 51; Lin 1957; Watson 1968: 76; Ziporyn 2009: 38; and many secondary
sources). Yet there are alternative translations (by reading 好惡 as hao’e) including
“good/bad” (Giles 1889: 68; Kjellberg 2001: 229;27 Mair 1994: 49), “love/hate” (Eno
2010: 41; Schipper 2007: 10428), “desires/aversions” (Feng 1928/1989: 39),
“(dis)inclinations” (Wilhelm 1920: 13229). CHEN Guying explains the possible harm
as the harm done to “life and soul” (Chen 2016: 55).
The idea that one should not harm the body with particular qing repeatedly occurs in
the Zhuangzi: three times in the inner chapters, and once in the outer chapters.30

安時而處順, 哀樂不能入也。(ch. 3, 6)
31

27
Kjellberg translates one occurrence of 好惡 as “good/bad”; the second occurrence (in an identical sentence)
as “(dis)like.”
28
“Wat ik ‘wuqing’ noem, is dat je niet door liefde en haat het binnenste van je persoonlijkheid verwondt.”
29
“Wenn ich sage, dass einer ohne Leidenschaften ist, so meine ich damit, dass ein solcher Mensch nicht
durch seine Zuneigungen und Abneigungen sein inneres Wesen schädigt.”
30
There is one example in the outer chapters: “[Be like them] and joy, anger, grief, and happiness can never
enter your breast. In this world, the ten thousand things come together in One” (Watson 1968: 226) [喜怒哀樂不
入於胸次。夫天下也者, 萬物之所一也。] .
31
This Chinese text occurs in both chapters 3 and 6, but translations often diverge in these two cases.
142 Lin MA, Jaap van Brakel

Content in the time and finding one’s place in the process of following along, joy
and sorrow are unable to seep in. (Ziporyn 2009: 24)

哀樂不易施乎。(ch. 4)
You likewise cannot change the joy and sorrow [fate] sets before you.
(Ziporyn 2009: 28)

We assume that “joy and sorrow” represent many qing (interdependence). Instead of
“likes/dislikes,” the translator has other options including “good/bad.” The latter option
is the nearest equivalent to shifei in the first block. We could formulate the similarity as
follows: If a (sheng)ren has no qing, then this ren is not burdened with shifei judgments
or (dis)like judgments. Thus, not allowing good/bad to enter means that without qing
there would be no shifei judgments.
We suggest that shifei and haowu share a relation of phrasal interdependence. What
is said of the one can well be said of the other. There is ample circumstantial evidence
for such a case of phrasal interdependence and especially when it comes to the issue
that shifei and haowu should not be allowed to enter one’s body. For example, in a
comment on Hansen 1995, Middendorf remarks, “not letting likes and dislikes—that is,
pro-con, right-wrong responses—to harm his body” (Middendorf 2008: 118).
Middendorf explicitly endorses the equivalence of like/dislike and right/wrong.32 On
one occasion Zhuangzi writes the two binomes consecutively:33

而好惡是非, 直服人之口而已矣。(ch. 27)

With benefits and duties spread out before you, to like and dislike and judge
“That’s it” and “That’s not,” this serves only to make men submit from the
mouth. (Graham 1981/2001: 102)

Writing shifei and haowu in a series occurs more often. GUO Xiang writes:

以是非為情則無是無非無好無惡者。(Guo and Cheng 2011: 122)

If one regards shifei as qing, then there is neither shi nor fei, neither hao nor wu.

Finally, consider CHENG Xuanying’s 成玄英 comment on the passage concerning the
quarrels between Mohists and Ruists. Cheng uses the expression biwo shifei 彼我是非.
This suggests that biwo (that and I, that and this) and shifei are closely related in this
case. Perhaps biwo sometimes means “that and this,” and wo 我 does not function as a
personal pronoun. In his subcommentary on the passages from the end of chapter 5,
following GUO Xiang just cited, CHENG Xuanying extends this blurring of distinctions
even further:34

32
According to Middendorf, because shifei is also qing, the latter refers not only to emotions and passions, but
also to beliefs, preferences, evaluations, and shi/fei judgments (Middendorf 2008: 114).
33
Other renditions are: “your ‘likes and ‘dislikes,’ your ‘rights’ and ‘wrongs’” (Watson 1968: 305); “his
distinctions of likes, dislikes, approvals and disapprovals” (Wang 2003: 477). According to Graham, this is a
passage “related to the Inner chapters” (Graham 1981/2001: 102).
34
Shifei, biwo, and haowu are pairs of contrasts or “opposites”; zeng 憎 and xian 嫌 are near-synonyms. Each
of the eight mentioned characters/notions arises from qing.
Revisiting the Exchange between Zhuangzi and Huizi on Qing 143

吾所言情者, 是非彼我好惡憎嫌等也。(Guo and Cheng 2011: 122)

What I speak of as qing, is shifei, that and this [that and I], like and dislike,
hate/detest and loathe/dislike, and so on.

We conclude that in the context of classical Chinese the relation of shifei and haowu in
the last section of chapter 5 of the Zhuangzi is one of phrasal interdependence.

6 Wuqing as Peaceful State of Mind and Its Connection with Wuwei

The first sentence of the abstract of Lenehan’s article on “non-emotion” reads:

“Zhuangzi purports to follow a particular method of viewing human emotion and
suggests freeing oneself from worldly emotions—this is called ‘doctrine of non-
emotion’ (wuqing shuo 無情說)” (Lenehan 2013: 340). We are sympathetic to
Lenehan’s suggestion that we should distinguish between transcendence and limitation:
“S/he has the form of a person” is a fact and indicates a person’s limitation, whereas
s/he has “not the emotions of a person” points to a transcendent realm. However, we do
not think that we can ascribe to Zhuangzi a doctrine of non-emotion. Instead, “emo-
tional detachment” (Chen 2015: 341) is a more nuanced characterization. It may be
more relevant to reflect on a “doctrine of non-shifei” in the Zhuangzi.
In recent Anglophone literature, there have been quite a number of authors who
claim that Zhuangzi “advocates a life unperturbed by emotions” (Fraser 2011: 97).35
“Zhuangists advocate a kind of emotional equanimity characterized by unperturbed
ease and joy” (Ren 2018: 55).36 Roth wrote at length about “emotionless, desireless
experience of mental tranquility associated with the vital essence and with the Way and
its Power” (Roth 1991: 620). Perhaps the most detailed recent account on this matter in
English is Fraser. He ascribes to Zhuangzi an idea of virtuoso, which is to “accept the
inevitable without experiencing intense emotions.” These virtuosos “nurture a state of
inner calm and ease.” The virtuosos “are not utterly emotionless: they experience a
general sense of ease and joy” (Fraser 2011: 100). There is still agency, but in a
detached way.37
Given such an understanding of equanimity, we need a nonstandard understanding
of such qing as le 樂. According to Kwong-loi SHUN, le is not to be understood as
“emotional exhilaration or excitement,” but as “a state of moving along at ease with the
flow of things, calmly and …” (Shun 2015: 317).38
Words in English such as “calmness,” “equanimity,” and “peaceful” point to a state
of mind, stance, or attitude that contrasts with (what sometimes can be extreme) forms
35
Note the use of the word “emotion(al)” in the list that follows.
36
See also: “feel at ease in the feelings of inborn nature” (Q. Liu 2011: 121); “the ideal is one of calm
emotions” (Morgan 2018: 32).
37
Machek compares Zhuangzi with the Stoics and refers to the passages on “perfect happiness” in the
Zhuangzi (Machek 2015: 540). See also LIU Xiaogan: “People should accept fate [ming 命] peacefully without
pain or complaint, as one faces the annual cycle of seasons” (X. Liu 2010: 52). The notion of calmness (when
confronted with setbacks) as a cultural norm has been reported in relation to other traditions as well (Ma and
van Brakel 2016: 116).
38
Zhuangzi distinguishes between three types of joy or happiness: renle 人樂 (harmony among men), tianle 天
樂 (harmony with heaven), and zhile 至樂 (serene quietude, supreme impassiveness, also translated as
“complete/true/perfect happiness”) (Despeux 2004: 86–88).
144 Lin MA, Jaap van Brakel

of joy and anger, agitation, and all the other ordinary emotions. Equanimity, as well as
other descriptions, is related to wuwei 無為, carefree wandering, accepting the inevita-
ble, “transcending uncultivated worldly feelings” (Lenehan 2013: 344).
There is not a single character that stands out as the label of this peaceful state of
mind or stance, and translators often use the same English words as translations of
different Chinese characters. Nevertheless, we suggest that in connection with wuwei
(and also with zhile 至樂), the following cluster of classical Chinese notions outline the
relevant discourse, which we connect to a cluster of English concepts:39

{an 安, dan 澹, dan 淡, ding 定, ji 寂, jing 靜, mo 漠, ning 寧, ping 平, pu 樸, tian

恬, xu 虛, …} ⇔ {calmness, detachment, emptiness, limpidity, peaceful ease,
quietude, repose, serenity, silence, simplicity, stillness, tranquility, undisturbed
peace and quiet, …}

In English, perhaps the word “peaceful” can be highlighted. There are many characters
that could be translated as “peaceful” in some context. We can take Zhuangzi to
advocate a cosmological attitude in terms of concepts such as “calmness,” “equanim-
ity,” and “peaceful.”
We find that these characters are most often used in combination and this displays
interdependence of their meaning in chapters 13 and 15:

夫虛靜恬淡寂漠无為者, 天地之平而道德之至, 故帝王聖人休焉。休則虛, 虛則實, 實者

倫矣。(ch. 13)
40

Emptiness, stillness, limpidity, silence, inaction—these are the level of Heaven

and earth, the substance of the Way and its Virtue. Therefore, the emperor, the
king, the sage rest in them. Resting, they may be empty; empty, they may be full;
and fullness is completion. (Watson 1968: 142)41

故曰, 夫恬惔寂漠虛无无為, 此天地之平而道德之質也。故曰, 聖人休休焉則平易矣, 平

易則恬惔矣。平易恬惔, 則憂患不能入, 邪氣不能襲, 故其德全而神不虧。(ch. 15)
So it is said, limpidity, silence, emptiness, inaction—these are the level of Heaven
and earth, the substance of the Way and its Virtue. So it is said, The sage rests;
with rest comes peaceful ease, with peaceful ease comes limpidity, and where
there is ease and limpidity, care and worry cannot get at him, noxious airs cannot
assault him. Therefore, his Virtue is complete and his spirit unimpaired. (Watson
1968: 168)42

39
The symbol ⇔ means “similar as judged from a given perspective.”
40
This is similar to: “Emptiness, stillness, limpidity, silence, inaction are the root of the ten thousand things”
[夫虛靜恬淡寂漠無為者, 萬物之本也] (Zhuangzi ch. 13; Watson 1968: 143). Compare: “Emptiness, peacefulness,
quietude, and non-action are the root source of everything in the world” (Wang 2003: 203).
41
Compare Watson’s “emptiness, stillness, limpidity, silence, inaction” with: “emptiness, peacefulness,
quietude and non-action” (Wang 2003: 201); “emptiness and stillness, calm and indifference, quiescence”
(Graham 1981/2001: 259).
42
Compare Watson’s “limpidity, silence, emptiness, inaction” with: “indifference, solitude, emptiness and
non-action” (Wang 2003: 249); “indifference, quiescence, emptiness and nothingness” (Graham 1981/2001:
265); “be quiet, be still, be open, do nothing” ([“rustig zijn en stil, open zijn en niets doen”]) (Schipper 2007:
213).
Revisiting the Exchange between Zhuangzi and Huizi on Qing 145

These chapters have been ascribed to the so-called syncretists.43 It is possible that in
these passages the syncretists are elaborating the idea of wuwei. If we focus on chapters
ascribed to Zhuangzi or to his followers, we can also find textual support, although the
text is not as neat as those in chapters 13 and 15.
There is one place in the inner chapters where two characters from the cluster we
provide appear, that is, dan 淡 and mo 漠:

无名人曰: 汝遊心於淡, 合氣於漠, 順物自然而无容私焉, 而天下治矣。 (ch. 7)

The Nameless Man said, “Let your mind wander in simplicity [dan 淡], blend
your spirit with the vastness [mo 漠], follow along with things the way they are,
and make no room for personal views then the world will be governed.” (Watson
1968: 94)

Graham translates it differently:

Said the man without a name:

“Let your heart roam in the flavourless, blend your energies with the featureless,
in the spontaneity of your accord with other things leave no room for selfishness
and the Empire will be [in] order.” (Graham 1981/2001: 95)

Above all, what can indeed be established is that all the relevant characters occur in the
context of the idea of wuwei.44 Consider, for example, the reference to the “peaceful
and calm” in connection with wuwei in chapter 10:45

自三代以下者是已, ….. 釋夫恬淡无為而悅夫啍啍之意。

Things have been like this since the three dynasties.… One neglects the peaceful
and calm non-interference in nature, but values ideas that are put forward in a
verbose and fussy way. (Schipper 2007: 152)46

In chapter 18, both zhile (perfect happiness) and ning 寧 (peacefulness) are mentioned
in connection with wuwei:

天下是非果未可定也 。雖然 , 无為可以定是非。 至樂活身, 唯无為幾存。請嘗試言

之。天无為以之清, 地无為以之寧, 故兩无為相合, 萬物皆化。 (18.1.9)
47

43
Although there are disagreements concerning the respective chapters, we believe that grosso modo chapters
12–16, 30, and 33 are composed by the most typical post-Zhuangzi syncretists, who may diverge from
Zhuangzi’s own thinking. Therefore, we have been careful when citing passages from these chapters.
44
In the outer chapters, wuwei is also used in the same context as, for example, pu 樸 simplicity (ch. 12); dan
惔 limpid (ch. 15), and jing 靜 stillness (ch. 23).
45
There have been (weak) speculations that much of chapter 10 predates the inner chapters (Klein 2010: 318–
321).
46
“Sinds de drie dynastieën gaat dit al zo. … Men verwaarloost het vredig en kalm niet-ingrijpen in de natuur,
maar waardeert ideeën die met veel omhaal te berde worden gebracht.”
47
The combination of heaven (nature) and earth should not be understood as the basis of a decision, but only
as the generation of wanwu 萬物. This is an example of wuwei and wubuwei 無不為: no action but everything is
achieved. See comments by GUO Xiang and CHENG Xuanying: “If I remain wuwei and leave the shifei under
the heaven to itself, then each shifei goes its own way and determines [itself]” (Guo and Cheng 2011: 333).
146 Lin MA, Jaap van Brakel

In this world of ours, it is impossible to decide what is right and what is wrong.
Nevertheless, refrainment from action can help to solve this puzzle. In refrain-
ment of action we are closest to perfect happiness and enjoyment of life. I shall
try to put it this way. The heaven is clear because it does nothing; the earth is
quiet because it does nothing. As neither the heaven nor the earth does anything,
everything in the world is born out of them. (Wang 2003: 287)

Our last example from chapter 22 complements the citations from chapters 13 and 15:

嘗相與游乎无何有之宮, 同合而論, 无所終窮乎! 嘗相與无為乎! 澹而靜乎! 漠而清乎!

調而閒乎! 寥已吾志, 无往焉而不知其所至, 去而來而不知其所止。
Let’s travel together to the Land of Nothingness, where we can have a discussion
on the basis of identity and concordance, as Tao is beyond limit! Let’s comply
with nature and take no action! Let’s keep a peaceful and tranquil mind! Let’s
keep quiet and pure! Let’s keep harmonious and carefree! Our minds are already
vacant and empty. We shall not want to go anywhere and we don’t know where
we shall be. We shall come and go and don’t know where we shall stay. (Wang
2003: 375)

We agree that an important aspect of Zhuangzi’s stance can be presented in such

English terms as “limpidity,” “simplicity,” “quietude,” “stillness,” and such like.
However, we strongly dispute the common practice in Sinology where these attitudes
are associated with the received meanings of emotions or “the emotional.” Zhuangzi
often stresses the importance of these attitudes for a peaceful life, taking the sage as a
role model, but nothing like emotion is ever involved in those contexts. Instead, these
notions have to be understood in light of wuwei.

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