wenyu xie

APPROACHING THE DAO:

FROM LAO ZI TO ZHUANG ZI

In the Daoist tradition, the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi have been
regarded as the classical texts and the main resources for formulating
Daoist thought. Scholars have been trying to establish the chronological
relation between these two texts. Traditionally, the Daodejing is treated
as preceding the Zhuangzi, but this treatment depends heavily upon
legend. Chinese scholarship has proposed many solutions to the issue in
question. One solution proposes that the composition of the Daodejing
is earlier than the Zhuangzi, but it appears later in published-book
form, which can be traced back to about 250 b.c. Linguistically, this
solution is based on the evidence that there are some language similari-
ties between these two texts.1 More reflection on this proposal, however,
reveals that there is a strong insistence in Chinese scholarship that per-
ceives the Zhuangzi as influenced by the Daodejing.2 Philosophically,
this insistence needs further investigation. Unfortunately, there are few
attempts to analyze and trace the conceptual relation between these two
texts. If there is indeed an influence, what kind of influence is it?
The weakness of the above proposal is touched upon by some West-
ern scholars. In his excellent book, Disputers of the Tao, A. C. Graham
places the Daodejing after the Zhuangzi. His reasoning is this: “Since
the ‘Inner Chapters’ show no clear evidence of acquaintance with Lao-
Zi, the book [the Daodejing] is conveniently treated after Chuang-Zi,
although there is no positive proof that it is later.”3 Graham understands
these two texts as sharing the same basic insight but leading to two dif-
ferent traditions in Daoism. It seems to him that there is no influence of
Laozi on Zhuangzi at all.4
I do not propose a detailed historical discussion here; rather, we need
a deeper textual analysis. My reading of the texts reveals that having
insights into the Daodejing is the essential preparation to understand
the Zhuangzi. In the Zhuangzi there are some criticisms directed at the
Daodejing that have been more or less ignored. Indeed, these criticisms
provide a basis for Zhuangzi to formulate his own understanding of the
Dao. A discussion of these criticisms will surely help us get a clearer pic-
ture of the relationship between these two Daoist texts and a deeper

Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27:4 (December 2000) 469–488

© 2000 Journal of Chinese Philosophy
470 wenyu xie

understanding of the meaning of the Dao. In this article, I shall focus on

those criticisms that are collected primarily in “On the Equality of
Things,” and try to trace the philosophical development between these
two texts. The following discussion will assume the Zhuangzi’s indebt-
edness to the Daodejing. It is also assumed that both texts share a basic
insight, that is, the term dao is basically used in a similar way. But in
what way is it shared? I would suggest that we might put aside the issue
of their chronology at this stage. Instead, in order to do justice to both
texts, it will be much more helpful to draw our attention to the shared
insight with respect to the Dao, which, until now, is still far from having
been discussed fully.5

The Dao as the Cyclic Principle and as the Mother

Scholars have shown that the Daodejing offers us two basic meanings of
the Dao: the Dao is the universal necessity underlying all things and
controlling their existence, and the Dao is the very beginning of all
things. My question is this: Are these two meanings compatible in logic?
I would like to begin my discussion by analyzing chapter 25 of the
Daodejing.
There is a thing formed in confusion,
Born before heaven and earth.
Silent! Void!
It stands alone without changing,
And travels round without being exhausted.
It may be deemed the mother of the world.
I do not know its name, style it “Dao,”
And force a name on it, “Great.”
Great is “gone on and on.”
Gone on and on is “far,”
Far is “returning.”6

The importance of this chapter has been noted. Here are offered two
essential aspects of the Dao: “the mother of the world” and “returning.”
In the first six lines, Laozi tells us that there is a thing that exists before
all things and will exist as the same forever, and this thing can be named
the mother of all things (italics mine). When he talks about something
born before all things, Laozi is referring to the mother of the world. In
chapter 1 we can also read: “What has a name is the mother of the myr-
iad things.”7 So far, the Dao as the mother of the world is quite clear.
What follows is confusing, however: Laozi continues to say that he does
not know its name, and if forced to give it a name he may call it the Dao,
which can finally and essentially be characterized as “returning.” The
discontinuity is obvious: about the thing born before heaven and earth,
 the dao: from lao zi to zhuang zi 471

he has named it “the mother of the world.” So why does Laozi still not
know it? I assume that what Laozi does not know about is the one who
causes returning. It seems that in Laozi’s mind there is an important dis-
tinction between the mother of the world and the one who causes
returning, even though the distinction may not be clear. Let us analyze
this further.
In using the word fan (“returning”), Laozi talks about something des-
tined. In chapter 40, he says: “Returning is the working of the Dao,
Weakness is the usefulness of the Dao. The myriad things of the world
are born from something, And something is born from nothing.” 8 The
message of these sentences is clear: It is the Dao that makes a thing
return to its origin. All things are bound to return to their origin(s).
We need more analysis. The first question may go to the origin of a
thing. Laozi talks about the birth of a thing. Concretely, people may ask:
“What is the origin of a horse?”—Such a question occurs when one
needs a horse. Similarly, when a man wants to be rich he may ask what
makes a rich man rich; and if he tries to build a long life, he may ask why
someone can live longer while some others do not. Laozi had deep
insights into these questions and offered his observations to answer
them. The observations we read in the Daodejing are comprehensive
and powerful: The opposite of a thing is also the origin of the thing.
Weak is the opposite and origin of strong; poor is the opposite and ori-
gin of rich; and so on. In other words, when one becomes the strongest,
he begins to return to weak, and becomes weaker and weaker. Weak is
the opposite of strong, yet it is the origin of strong. The identification of
opposite with origin in Laozi’s observations of the sensible world
implies that opposition is also reversal. In this treatment, “reversal”
(fan) combines two meanings: opposite and origin. When it is used as
a noun, it is the opposite of a thing; when used as a verb, it refers to a
movement of returning.
Laozi goes further to conclude that reversal is the universal principle.
That is, all things have their own opposites as reversals and so they must
generate from their opposites and will be bound to return to their oppo-
sites. Reversal is then (as in chapter 40) defined as the Dao’s working,
which is also the necessity of all things. I will use the term “the cyclic
principle” to refer to this universal necessity. In the Daodejing, the con-
clusion seems an inductive one from his observing sensible things:
Everything that comes from its opposite is bound to return to its oppo-
site. I would suggest that what Laozi does not know is the name of this
Dao as the universal necessity.
I want to emphasize Laozi’s distinguished contribution when he com-
bined opposite and origin, and then produced a new concept: reversal
( fan). Comparatively, it is easier to perceive the fact that all things have
472 wenyu xie

their own opposites. Laozi went one more step and demonstrated that
opposite is also origin. This was completely new to Chinese thought at
the time. And Laozi knew precisely his predicament; that is, he had diffi-
culty defining and naming his insight such that it would convey the com-
bination of the two terms. Yet he was very confident about his insight.
Indeed, as this article will show, this insight was shared and sharpened
by Zhuangzi, and thus entered into Chinese thought.
We may come back to chapter 25. With the new concept of reversal,
Laozi presents his understanding of the origin of the world. Epistemo-
logically, our experience allows us to have knowledge of what we have
experienced. The world exists before our experience, and therefore it
began in the past. As the beginning of the world is past and we are no
longer able to experience this beginning, we need a tool to acquire an
understanding of the origin of the world. Laozi found this tool in anal-
ogy. That is, we are able to experience the relation between a mother
and her children. This experience provides an analogy: All things in this
world must come from the same origin, which may be named the
mother of the world.
But in naming the universal necessity whose working is reversal
( fan), we have difficulty finding an analogy. The word dao means “way”
or “road.” The original shape of this character looks like an intersection
of roads. Laozi chose dao to refer to his insight of reversal ( fan) as uni-
versal necessity with a kind of analogous thought in mind. He seems to
say that all things have their own ways of existence from beginning to
end, yet there must be a way that can be applied to all of them. How-
ever, he also thinks that the analogous meaning of the word dao is not
very clear in naming this universal necessity. The concept of reversal
may, of course, get support from observing the orderly movement of
things, such as the change of four seasons, of day and night, of rich and
poor, of strong and weak, and so forth. In Laozi’s observation, these
movements follow a common order in which all things return to their
opposites. Such an observation allows Laozi to infer that there is a dao
of reversal underlying them.
Clearly, in chapter 25 Laozi mentions two essential concepts: the
mother of the world and the universal necessity as the cyclic principle. I
may raise a question here: Does Laozi simply juxtapose these two con-
cepts, or is there a logical relation between them?9
To answer this question one needs to clarify two points: First, Laozi is
saying that there must be a thing as the beginning of all things or as the
mother of the world. Talking about the beginning of all things is an
ancient topic. People can imagine it in an anthropomorphized way, as
seen in various mythologies. But as a concept, it requires a kind of philo-
sophical meditation and argument. That is, we have to answer why such
 the dao: from lao zi to zhuang zi 473

a beginning has to be asserted conceptually. Second, the logic that Laozi

employs in the Daodejing may be different from that which we use
today. Unfortunately, there is a widely accepted assumption that Laozi
(as well as Zhuangzi) does not provide conceptual analysis but rather
emphasizes a kind of intuition in understanding. This, however, is not
always true. It is unwise to ignore Laozi’s conceptual analysis. In reading
the Daodejing, readers may be frustrated in confronting much advice
and warning while feeling puzzled as to their logical connection. But
Laozi’s concept has its own logical development. Reformulating it in
our terms may help our understanding.
An inference begins with premises. In ontology, an inference always
begins with an absolute principle. Laozi’s absolute principle is the Dao.
He says:
Humans follow the earth,
The earth follows heaven,
Heaven follows the Dao,
And the Dao follows itself.10

As we see, however, this Dao has two basic aspects: the cyclic principle
and the mother of the world. Which one is more essential and hence can
be used as a premise? Here I defend the notion that the cyclic principle
is the essential one. There are two reasons for this viewpoint: First,
Laozi’s intention is to find an absolute way through which humans can
secure their lives finally.11 As it is absolute, it must be applicable to all
things. He had been observing all kinds of change in the world in order
to find their similarity. From the Daodejing, it is certain that his observa-
tion of the world was concentrated on the distinctions between oppo-
sites and their movements, such as changes from young to old, from
lower to higher, from rich to poor, from stronger to weaker, and vice
versa. Indeed, the descriptions of opposites in their movements com-
prise the main body of the Daodejing. With these observations in mind,
Laozi comes to the conclusion that it is a necessity that everything gen-
erates from its opposite and returns to its opposite. This is the way of all
things. To support this conclusion, the Daodejing provides these obser-
vations (my own translation):
Heavy is the root of light,
And light controls heavy. (26)

Knowing what is male,

Then keep what is female,
...
Knowing what is white,
Then keep what is black,
...
Knowing what is honor,
474 wenyu xie

Then keep what is dishonor, (28)

There is a beginning of the world,
It is the mother of the world,
With this mother,
What is offspring can be known;
Knowing what is offspring,
Come back to stay with its mother,
Then nothing should be lost.
...
Keeping weak means strong. (52)
Considering these observations, I would say that the principle of cycling
is an inductive conclusion.
Second, there is an inference from the cyclic principle to the notion
of the mother of the world. In other words, the concept of the mother of
the world is a deductive one. I reformulate this inference as follows: If
everything originates from its opposite, considering all things together
as a totality, namely, as a “thing,” it must come from its opposite. That is
to say, the world (that is, all things) must originate from its opposite. The
opposite of all things is called “the mother of all things.” What does it
look like? Since it is the opposite of all things, it must be different from
all things in all aspects. So it is formless, empty, nothing, changeless,
silent, and colorless.
With this clarification, the logical structure in chapter 25 may be for-
mulated in this way:
Premise 1: The Dao as the cyclic principle is the ultimate principle.
(It only follows itself.)
Premise 2: All things in total constitute a “thing”; by following the
Dao, it must come from its opposite.
Conclusion: Therefore, there must be the opposite of all things
(formless, empty, changeless, nothing) as the mother of
the world.
Although we do not offer a detailed study of the Daodejing here,
from the above analysis, we have an outline of its teaching. It under-
stands the Dao as the necessity of all things, which can be formulated as
the cyclic principle, and from which the existence of the mother of
heaven-earth is asserted. That the cyclic principle makes all things
return to their origins or opposites leads to the conclusion that to follow
the Dao is to keep opposite, or to stay with the mother (shou qi mu).
We have analyzed the basis of this understanding in the light of
Laozi’s new concept about combining origin and opposite. The Daode-
jing strictly follows this new thinking when it says, “A thing and not-a-
thing produce each other” (chapter 2). It is noteworthy that this idea is
less emphasized, however. The reason seems simple: If one gets strong
by keeping weak, in regress one has to assert that to get weak is to keep
 the dao: from lao zi to zhuang zi 475

strong, and so on, going in a cycle. The Daodejing seems not to want
such a regressive inference to appear, as it tries to provide people the
best practical advice. This results in sacrificing logic. The power of logic
comes back in the Zhuangzi, however, where the concept of the mother
of the world and the distinction between opposites become the targets
of criticism. I am going to analyze some passages in “On Equality of
Things” in the Zhuangzi and try to show how these criticisms work.

Zhuangzi’s Criticisms of the Daodejing

There is little discussion of Zhuangzi’s criticisms of Laozi either in Chi-

nese or Western scholarship. The reason might be that those who treat
them as leading to two traditions in Daoism may focus on the differ-
ences in their thought,12 while those who insist that they expound the
same doctrine may accentuate the similar elements in their writings.13 It
may also be because the title Daodejing does not appear in the Zhuangzi,
and Zhuangzi never mentions Laozi directly in his criticisms of the
Daodejing. Scholars have noticed Zhuangzi’s denial of the concept of
the mother of the world, but they seem to ignore its significance for the
relationship of these two texts.14 In my analysis of the texts, I aim to
reveal the significance of the criticisms. Let us consider this passage in
the Zhuangzi:
Everything has its “that,” everything has its “this.” From the point of
view of “that” you cannot see it, but through understanding you can know
it. So I say, “that” comes out of “this” and “this” depends on “that”—
which is to say that “this” and “that” give birth to each other. But where
there is birth there must be death; where there is death there must be
birth. Where there is acceptability there must be unacceptability; where
there is unacceptability there must be acceptability. Where there is rec-
ognition of right there must be recognition of wrong; where there is recog-
nition of wrong there must be recognition of right. Therefore the sage does
not proceed in such a way, but illuminates all in the light of Heaven.15
The message implied here is clear: There is no distinction between
opposites. Zhuangzi employs very technical words in the discussion:
“this” and “that.” But how should we understand this message?
Zhuangzi develops an argument for this assertion. He says that a
thing called “this” in itself also has its opposite as “that,” so the distinc-
tion between it and its opposite disappears. But why? In a thing (“this”)
we can see it is always distinguished from other things (“that”), such as
right is not wrong, life is not death, and so on. In their appearances, they
are distinguished from each other. But in reality, Zhuangzi insists, the
distinctions do not exist at all. To realize this requires an understanding.
Any understanding starts with a principle. What kind of principle does
Zhuangzi depend on, then? We read these words: “‘this’ and ‘that’ give
476 wenyu xie

birth to each other.” That is, if “this” produces “that,” at the same time,
“that” produces “this.” You cannot tell which is to produce which in
such a course. A thing is always in change, that is, it is always producing
its opposite. But in producing its opposite, it is also produced by its
opposite. Therefore, no distinction in reality between a thing (“this”)
and its opposite (“that”) can be made.
The principle Zhuangzi employs in the above argument is implied in
Laozi’s new thinking, that is, the opposite and the original are the same
thing in reality. According to Zhuangzi, if we accept the new concept of
reversal, that is, a thing comes from its opposite and returns to its oppo-
site, then, it is not important to distinguish a thing and its opposite. In
the cyclic principle all things are the same. It is interesting to note that
the Daodejing does not make such an inference, even though it says: “A
thing and not-a-thing produce each other” (chapter 2). As we have
pointed out, the Daodejing fails to keep the logic. Its pragmatism under-
stands the cyclic principle in such a way that through it, people may gain
what they want. According to this teaching, for those who wish to lead a
decent life, a long life, a loving life, or a life of power, it is advisable to
keep the source of what they want, which is also the opposite of what
they want. Such a practice is called “to stay with the mother.” This
strong pragmatic bent indeed reveals the author’s understanding of the
purpose of life as compatible with that of ordinary people, namely, to
make a desirable life. The only difference is his superiority in being able
to stay with the source of all things. In other words, he is staying with
the mother of heaven-earth. Laozi’s pragmatism makes him blind to the
logical completion of his new thinking. This is done in Zhuangzi’s argu-
ment: If a thing (P) comes from its opposite (P), and its opposite
(P), too, comes from its own opposite (P), then P and P are both the
mother and the produced at the same time.
Obviously, Zhuangzi and Laozi shared a basic understanding of the
Dao as the cyclic principle. Zhuangzi, however, made an important
inference from the cyclic principle: “A state in which ‘this’ and ‘that’ no
longer find their opposite is called the hinge of the Way.” 16 He aban-
doned Laozi’s pragmatism (that is, try to stay with the mother), and crit-
icized his clumsy distinction between opposites. It seems that Zhuangzi
tried to avoid targeting Laozi directly, yet the object of his criticism is
clear. To some degree, Zhuangzi’s work is a kind of revision, since the
essential meaning of the Dao is the same. Zhuangzi shared the new
thinking that the Daodejing presented. However, he was also building
up a new tradition, as we will find a new vision of life in the Zhuangzi. I
will come back to this issue later.
The second criticism I want to analyze is touched upon by many
scholars. That is, Zhuangzi rejected the concept of the mother of the
 the dao: from lao zi to zhuang zi 477

world, which is one of two essential characters of the Dao in the Daode-
jing. The following analysis does not review previous discussions of the
issue. Rather, I consider the importance of connecting Zhuangzi’s criti-
cism directly with Laozi’s concept of the mother of the world.
Here I quote two passages from “On Equality of Things” that are
aimed at the deconstruction of the concept of the mother of the world:
The understanding of the men of ancient times went a long way. How
far did it go? To the point where some of them believed that things have
never existed—so far, to the end, where nothing can be added. Those at
the next stage thought that things exist but recognized no boundaries
among them. Those at the next stage thought there were boundaries but
recognized no right and wrong. Because right and wrong appeared, the
Way was injured, and because the Way was injured, love became com-
plete. But do such things as completion and injury really exist, or do
they not?17
The first sentences of Watson’s English translation has somehow mis-
lead readers regarding about whom Zhuangzi is talking. The passage
begins with these words: gu zhi ren (“ancient man or people”). I trans-
late them in this way: “There was a man who thought that he knew the
absolute. What is the absolute? He thought he reached where there was
not yet a thing.” It is difficult to differentiate ren in Chinese as a person
or persons. However, it can be certain that Zhuangzi begins the discus-
sion with a person or persons as subject instead of an understanding.
In Zhuangzi’s understanding, this ancient man believed that he
reached the point where “things have never existed” (or “there was not
yet a thing”). Tracing ancient Chinese texts, we can find no one except
Laozi who claims that the very beginning of the world is conceptualized
as “there was not yet a thing.” In Laozi’s terminology, “there was not yet
a thing,” is called “nothing.” He said: “All things come from something,
and this something comes from nothing” (the Daodejing, chapter 40).
As we know, Laozi understands that all things come from their rever-
sals. Is it possible to reach the reversal of all things, which is the final
source of all things, and with which people are capable of having all
things in their root and then will never lose them? Laozi firmly believed
he had reached it, that is, “nothing” (wu). Zhuangzi says, this ancient
man also thought that from “there was not yet a thing,” something with-
out boundaries came into being; and then these things were divided or
ordered, first without right or wrong, but later with right or wrong. At
this stage, the Dao was injured or damaged. These teachings are stated
in chapter 18 and chapter 42 of the Daodejing.
Can we assume that this ancient man is Laozi? Zhuangzi does not
explicitly make such an identification. As the chronological issue
between Laozi and Zhuangzi is not the focus of this article, I want to
avoid a lengthy historical discussion of the issue. Rather, I would like
478 wenyu xie

to penetrate into their intellectual relationship. A brief comparison

between the teaching recited by Zhuangzi and the teaching expressed
by the Daodejing indicates a similarity between them. Having consid-
ered this doctrinal similarity, I would assume that in Zhuangzi’s mind,
this ancient man is the author of the Daodejing.
What is wrong with these teachings, then? According to Zhuangzi,
the problem is that Laozi’s understanding of the Dao depends too much
upon the distinction between “this” and “that.” “Nothing” is the oppo-
site of all things; but it cannot be absolute, since “nothing” comes from
its opposite (all things) as well. It would be ridiculous to say “the Dao
was injured,” for if the Dao (as the mother of the world) generated its
offspring (all things), and these offspring finally return to the Dao as the
mother of the world, then how can the mother of the world be injured in
becoming something else? According to the Dao as the cyclic principle,
any particular thing cannot be complete or injured. Consequently, as
Zhuangzi asserts, Laozi’s distinguishing the mother of the world from all
things is logically improper.
Another passage about the mother of the world:
There is a beginning. There is a not yet beginning to be a beginning.
There is a not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be a beginning.
There is being. There is nonbeing. There is a not yet beginning to be
nonbeing. There is a not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to
be nonbeing. Suddenly there is being and nonbeing. But between this
being and nonbeing, I do not really know which is being and which is
nonbeing.18

Even in Chinese, the language is twisted. Yet the implication is clear: We

are not able to determine the chronological beginning of the world,
whether it is a thing or not a thing. It may be a very old subject to dis-
cuss the beginning of the world. Every mythology has touched upon this
problem. It is obvious that Zhuangzi does not intend to attack all doc-
trines of this kind. What target does he have in mind? He appears to be
destroying the doctrine that asserts the beginning of the world as wu
(“nonbeing,” “nothing”). This doctrine is precisely what Laozi defends. 19
The key point is that there is no distinction between a beginning and
its offspring according to the Dao as the cyclic principle. When one
points out something as a beginning, since it comes from its offspring, it
loses its status as a beginning and becomes an offspring. As to Laozi’s
assertion that “nothing” is the beginning of the world, one may ask what
is the origin of “nothing.” And in regress, there will always be a question
about the origin of the origin of the origin of “nothing.” Such an inquiry
is in fact on the wrong track, according to Zhuangzi, since there was no
such thing at all. Therefore, Zhuangzi says: “I don’t really know which is
being and which is nonbeing.”
 the dao: from lao zi to zhuang zi 479

Zhuangzi confirms that the concept of the mother of the world is a

clumsy inference that logically conflicts with the understanding of the
Dao as the cyclic principle. There are still some other passages express-
ing his criticisms of the Daodejing.20 However, it seems enough for us to
have a clear picture of Zhuangzi’s criticisms of Laozi. We may say this
criticism is a development, since Zhuangzi inherited Laozi’s insights
about the Dao and still maintained the cyclic principle. The difference is
that Zhuangzi abandoned the principle of “staying with the mother.”
This abandoning may be justified through Zhuangzi’s discussions of
“this–that,” and of the concept of “nothing.”
We know that the principle of “staying with the mother” is a practical
principle advised by the Daodejing. Zhuangzi’s abandoning the princi-
ple will force him to face this question: What kind of life should we live
in accordance with his understanding of the Dao? In the following, I will
analyze three major interpretations of the Zhuangzi and penetrate into
his concept of life.

Relativism, Freedom, or Transformation?

Scholars have been seeking to understand Zhuangzi’s concept of life for

over two thousand years. The Zhuangzi is a stimulating book, but it is also
a puzzle. Here I survey three major schools of thought on the Zhuangzi:
(1) relativism,21 (2) freedom,22 and (3) transformation.23 I shall dialogue
with these viewpoints, and attempt to base the following discussions on
Zhuangzi’s criticisms of the Daodejing.
Zhuangzi has been treated as a relativist. Although scholars apply dif-
ferent definitions of relativism in interpreting Zhuangzi,24 they usually
appeal to Zhuangzi’s discussion of “this–that.” Zhuangzi asserts that the
relation between “this” and “that” is like the one between “three in the
morning and four at night” and “four in the morning and three at night.”
He tells a story:
When the monkey trainer was handing out acorns, he said, “you get
three in the morning and four at night.” This made all the monkeys furi-
ous. “Well, then,” he said, “you get four in the morning and three at
night.” The monkeys were all delighted.25

The metaphor indicates that there is the same value in “this” and “that.”
In normal life, people want to live and try to avoid death. But life and
death have the same value. Valuing “this” as higher than “that” is a kind
of absurdity, for doing so in fact makes us like those stupid monkeys.
The metaphor has a powerful influence on our reading of the Zhuangzi.
In this reading, Zhuangzi is a relativist, and so considers that everything
has an equal value relating to others. If there is not a thing that can be
480 wenyu xie

valued as higher than others, then we cannot talk about the superiority
of a thing, and consequently there is no superior idealism, position, or
doctrine. In this perspective, Zhuangzi denies the unique truth among
different doctrines and positions, and advocates a relative truth in each
doctrine or position.
To brand Zhuangzi as a relativist, however, does not help us much in
understanding his thought. Philosophically, it is well explored that rela-
tivism cannot fulfill its relativist claim. When a relativist claims a relative
truth, the claim itself becomes the absolute truth, and then logically
invalidates the relativist claim. That is, a relativist claim itself is an abso-
lute claim over all other dogmatic claims. Having considered this, a rela-
tivist claim itself should be treated as one claim among all other claims
that needs exploring individually. We may agree that Zhuangzi is a rela-
tivist, but such a branding is meaningful only when we have provided an
individual analysis of Zhuangzi’s relativist claim. In a word, we should
go on to penetrate into Zhuangzi’s relativist claim as an absolute claim.
We may look into the issue this way. According to Zhuangzi, it is
advisable not to insist on any particular pursuit. Such advice leads us to
do nothing but accept and follow whatever is coming to us. It is called
“following nature and doing nothing” (zi ran wu wei)—referring to
Lao-Zhuang’s philosophy in ordinary Chinese language. This interpre-
tation needs clarification.
The first task is to determine what the meaning of “nature” is. The
original meaning of nature (zi-ran) is “by itself” or “following itself.”
But what is “itself”? One may regard heaven and earth, which always
move according to themselves, as nature; one may consider pristine
existence, which is free from artificial activities, as nature; and one may
follow the Daodejing, and understand nature as a returning to its oppo-
site. We can read all these interpretations in later commentaries on the
Zhuangzi. These interpretations of the Zhuangzi do use the text as their
reference point, but a more careful analysis reveals that they are mis-
leading. We may notice that there are no great difficulties following
Laozi practically. Laozi asks people to “stay with the mother” or keep
with the opposite. It is a piece of simple advice. In fact, this practical
principle has guided later Daoism as a religious movement. But why do
we have difficulty following Zhuangzi practically? To answer this ques-
tion, I want to emphasize that Zhuangzi’s understanding of nature (zi
ran) is critical. In the following, I will analyze the concepts of chaos
(Hun tun), freedom (xiao yao), transformation, and nothing (wu), and
hope that this analysis will provide some insights into the concept of
nature in Zhuangzi’s scheme.
In the metaphor of Hun tun (the god of chaos), Zhuangzi seems to
deliver a strong message: It is best to do nothing. Why should we do
 the dao: from lao zi to zhuang zi 481

nothing? The metaphor suggests that doing something leads Hun tun to
death. But death and life have the same value—what does it matter
whether he lives or dies? Further, doing nothing and doing something is
another pair of “this” and “that.” Therefore, trying to do nothing is a
violation of Zhuangzi’s teaching. “Doing nothing” is not Zhuangzi’s
advice.
Obviously, a relativist interpretation of the Zhuangzi cannot satisfy
our reading. When we say that “this” and “that” have the same value, at
this stage, we do make a kind of distinction between them. Zhuangzi
tries to show us that “this” and “that” have the same value, and that the
recognition of this fact is a necessary step for readers to realize the real-
ity of the Dao. But it does not mean that this assertion itself is the abso-
lute one. Since the sameness of “this” and “that” comes from the Dao as
the cyclic principle, it is essential to overcome their distinction and
reach the one. He says: “No thing is either complete or impaired, but all
are made into one again.”26
Zhuangzi uses the term “one.” We need to spend some time on this
term. First, we cannot interpret it as the beginning of the world, since
there is no distinction between the one as the mother of the world and
all things as offspring. Second, we should also avoid understanding this
one in terms of contrasting “all” or “many.” Graham is correct when he
says: “Zhuangzi never does say that everything is one.” 27 There is no
division between all things and one.
Emphatically, this “one” is not a concept either. When we understand
a concept, we have to formulate a definition of it, and then designate it
as “this” or “that.” But such a designation proves impossible. Zhuangzi
seems to feel the difficulty of conceptualizing “one.” He insists that we
have to appreciate it in terms of no distinction between “this” and
“that,” which, as the above discussion reveals, refers to the cyclic princi-
ple. Nevertheless, he offers some discussions of epistemology. Accord-
ing to his understanding, when people come to understand something,
they need a kind of standard by which they can evaluate objects. But,
again, Zhuangzi questions this: According to what can we assert our
standard as the final or absolute standard? In the dialogue between
Nieh Ch’ueh and Wang Ni, Zhuangzi expresses this idea:
—“Do you know what all things agree in calling right?”
—“How would I know that?”
—“Do you know that you don’t know it?”
—“How would I know that?”
—“Then do things know nothing?”
—“How would I know that?”28

Knowledge does not help at all in appreciating what is right or true.

Therefore, in appreciating this “one,” we should deconstruct all divi-
482 wenyu xie

sions of things, which can be done through a conceptual analysis based

on the cyclic principle, and then intuit directly this “one,” which is actu-
ally the cyclic principle itself.
Coming back to the original question: How should we lead our lives
according to this teaching? Zhuangzi has a paradox. On the one hand,
he finds that he cannot explicitly offer readers a practical principle.
Actually, to provide an exact practical principle is to advise people to do
“this” rather than “that,” and then to make a division between good and
bad. This division violates the Dao as the cyclic principle. On the other
hand, all his discussions would be meaningless to human life if he could
not offer a practical philosophy. Zhuangzi seems aware of this paradox.
To solve the paradox, instead of offering a concrete practical principle,
Zhuangzi provides metaphors and images in which a lifestyle conform-
ing to his understanding of the Dao can be perceived. Let us read a
description from “The Great and Venerable Teacher”:
The True Man of ancient times knew nothing of loving life, knew noth-
ing of hating death. He emerged without delight; he went back in with-
out a fuss. He came briskly, he went briskly; he didn’t try to find out
where he would end. He received something and took pleasure in it; he
forgot about it and handed it back again.29
This picture may not be very clear. But it seems to Zhuangzi that the
True Man who masters the Dao can do anything he wants; he is also not
bound to anything. He enjoys loving life, but he also enjoys death. Any-
thing that comes to him is good; anything that leaves him is also good.
To him, He can live in a city, but he also loves the countryside. He may
look for something for pleasure, but does not care about losing it, and so
on. What should we say about this kind of life?
Some may say it is a kind of freedom. This is true. Zhuangzi does
intend to provide a way to freedom, which he calls xiao yao. He asks
people to forget any distinction among things so that they may be able
to get rid of any boundaries from these things. I would say that histori-
cally this teaching has provided a Chinese ideal for the pursuit of free-
dom. This is a markedly different kind of freedom from that in the
Western tradition. A brief comparison between the Western concept of
freedom and Zhuangzi’s concept of freedom may be helpful.
According to Zhuangzi, freedom means disconnecting himself from
the boundaries of his surroundings. Underlying this understanding is an
assumption that all things are interacting and interdetermined, which is
understood in the Zhuangzi as the cyclic principle. In this context, to
attain freedom is to disconnect oneself from any certain force, following
the Dao’s movement. In contrast, in the Western tradition, people
believe that there is an arche that generates and then determines all
things, but is itself unaffected by all things. In Greek philosophy, it is
 the dao: from lao zi to zhuang zi 483

arche; in Hebraic culture, it is God. The concept of freedom in these

contexts points to the final authority or the absolute, in which freedom
is gained.30 It is interesting to recall that in the Daodejing, Laozi
inferred the existence of the mother of the world, and he seemed to
regard the mother of the world as unaffected, yet moving all things. Put
in the language of freedom, one can be free from something only if he
stays with its original, that is, the mother. It follows that staying with
the mother of the world would guarantee an absolute freedom. This
insight is similar to that in Western thought. However, Zhuangzi
deconstructed this conception of life by completing the logic of the
Dao as the cyclic principle.
Another way to interpret Zhuangzi’s understanding of life is “trans-
formation.” The Zhuangzi advises people not to be bound to any certain
thing. All things—no matter if they are regarded as good or bad—have
the same value. Because they follow the Dao’s movement as the cyclic
principle, good becomes bad and bad becomes good. If this is the reality
of our life, we then live in a situation in which nothing is distinguished,
and we appeal to no standard in judging, no desire in holding, and no
goal in moving. A brief look at our actual life, however, will reveal this
situation: We have certain desires that aim at getting something; we
have different feelings that are affected by something; we have a set of
ideas that define something. It is these desires, feelings, and ideas that
make divisions among things. Clearly, Zhuangzi’s advice seems unable
to conform to the actual human situation. One may push a bit further in
interpretation: If one follows Zhuangzi’s advice and abandons his exist-
ing desires, feelings, and ideas, he then no longer insists on any certain
thing. As a consequence, he enters a field in which his current ideas, atti-
tudes, and positions will lose control of him. Such a release will enable
him to transform into a stage of life containing new ideas, attitudes, and
positions. This is the theme that Robert E. Allinson’s book explores, as
indicated by its title, Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation.
We need a more careful examination of this interpretation. Linguisti-
cally, the English term “transformation” implies “transcending,” “get-
ting better,” “getting more ordered,” and “entering a higher level.” All
these implications cannot be supported by the texts. Words such as “bet-
ter” or “higher” imply a distinction among things, and the Zhuangzi has
no use for such implications. Logically, applying “transformation” to
explain the tenets of the Zhuangzi requires an additional principle in
understanding, that is, a future vision.31 But following the advice of not
making a distinction among things dictates not striving to make a better
distinction. All distinctions are in the same category in that they will be
erased by the cyclic principle. In Zhuangzi’s mind, there is no vision of
the future where we will have a better life, a deeper feeling, or an
484 wenyu xie

advanced idea. The future and the past, too, are under the control of the
Dao.
The proposition that all distinctions are erased by the cyclic principle
has an implication for deconstruction. Generally speaking, a human
being is constituted of certain desires, feelings, ideas, and habits. It is
quite evident that a human being always has his or her own particular
life pursuits, and that he or she instinctively resists any approaching
force that may damage or destroy his or her life. In other words, human
beings make every effort to keep what they already have. This is the so-
called life instinct of self-preservation. In Zhuangzi’s observations, how-
ever, a man cannot stop losing himself because he is in the movement of
the cyclic principle. He provides an image of the True Man to dem-
onstrate his observations. As we read, the true man who is the master
of the Dao has no intention of keeping anything for himself and so has
no fear of losing anything. To be a true man is to free himself from the
grip of his existing holdings; therefore, a true man does not need self-
preservation. If the true man spends no effort in keeping what he
already has, these existing holdings will then have no power over his
further judgments and actions. At this point, his self is deconstructed.
Insight into this deconstruction allows Zhuangzi to perceive a deep
sphere of human existence. That is, in the deconstruction of one’s self,
the true man is not affected by and stuck to any certain thing and so he
sees all things in equal value. The previously established distinctions of
things in terms of value now disappear. The deconstruction of one’s self
does not allow anything dominant in the true man’s judgment and
actions. Therefore, in this sphere all things are possible. Zhuangzi
describes this sphere in his metaphor of Hun tun. As we may read, the
god of Hun tun does not possess eyes, nose, ears, and mouth. Therefore,
in him no distinction can be discerned. In other words, in him nothing is
distinguished. Something emerges from this sphere, however—his
friends wanted to please him by putting eyes, nose, mouth, and ears on
him. This coming out, indeed, is to lead away from the sphere, as the god
of Hun tun at last dies. The death of Hun tun is a miserable surprise to
his friends who wanted Hun tun to live happily.
Indeed, all human beings act like Hun tun’s friends: Their pursuits
always turn against their original will. The reason is that human beings
actually live in the movement of the cyclic principle, and so their pur-
suits are bound to the opposites. To avoid this miserable destiny, accord-
ing to the metaphor of Hun tun, one should stay in the reality of human
existence. The god of Hun tun is the natural state. Here we have
Zhuangzi’s concept of nature, that is, the sphere where all possibilities
are present. This sphere is the Dao itself.
It becomes clear that what Zhuangzi wants to analyze is not cos-
 the dao: from lao zi to zhuang zi 485

mology, as he clearly rejects the feasibility of investigating the origin

of all things in his criticism of the Daodejing. Rather, he wants to pen-
etrate into human existence. Man distinguishes things in experience,
appreciates things in knowledge, and pursues things in action. As
man’s experience and knowledge are limited in a certain scope, he
can only perceive limited possibilities. When a certain possibility is
chosen, he then seeks to actualize it. In actualizing a chosen possibil-
ity, man’s life is then led by a determined direction. According to the
cyclic principle, there is always an end in a certain direction, which
reversibly returns to its opposite. If one insists that the chosen possi-
bility is the only good to his life, he will then be blind to other
possibilities. Such a life leads to death. To restore his life is to open
him to other possibilities, and Hun tun is the one who lives in the
sphere of possibility.
The language of “possibility” cannot be found in the Zhuangzi.
There is, however, language that conveys notions of “equality.” In stat-
ing that all things are equal, Zhuangzi advises people not to be stuck to
“this” or “that,” for they become one in accordance with the cyclic
principle. The message is indeed touched upon by the language of free-
dom and the language of transformation in the above discussions. In
referring to freedom, we must be cautious about the Western distor-
tion. Defining freedom in terms of possibility better leads to Zhuangzi’s
vision of freedom. When one is open to all possibilities, he is indeed
free from all kinds of bondage. As for “transformation,” we are not sat-
isfied with the applicability of this term because it implies a future
vision. But there is only one step from the word “possibility” to the
word “transformation.” When one gets rid of the control of his current
ideas and positions, and is open to all possibilities, he is ready to trans-
form himself and establish a new self. Of course, the Zhuangzi is not
interested in transformation, for any transformation will lead man
away from his reality, and enter into a cyclic movement. The book only
advises its readers to stay with the reality of their existence, that is, the
sphere of equality or possibility.
In conclusion, from Zhuangzi’s criticism of the Daodejing, we learn
that Zhuangzi shifted the discussion from cosmology to human exis-
tence. The Dao is no longer a principle of the universal; rather, it is the
reality of human existence itself. The Zhuangzi perceives it as a sphere
in which all possibilities are open and man is able to disconnect himself
from all kinds of bondage. Hun tun is the reality, and the True Man is the
one who masters the reality.

THE CLAREMONT GRADUATE UNIVERSITY

Claremont, California
486 wenyu xie

Endnotes
1. There are some passages in the Zhuangzi that have strong relevant connections with the
Daodejing. For instance, “The Real and Venerable Teacher” of the Zhuangzi says: “The
Way has its reality and its signs but is without action and form” (Chuang Tzu, trans. Bur-
ton Watson [New York: Columbia University Press, 1964], p. 77). The words qing (“real-
ity”) and xing (“signs”) used here are the same as those describing the Way in chapter 21
of the Daodejing; wuwei (“without action”) appears in chapter 48; and wuxing (“without
form”) is also a description of the Way in chapter 21. And there are other similarities in
language between them that cannot be easily denied.
2. When Kuang-ming Wu summarizes the so-called nine misunderstandings of Zhuangzi, he
lists this first: “The most common misimpression is that Zhuangzi is a commentator of
Laozi” (Kuang-ming Wu, Chuang Tzu: World Philosopher at Play [New York: Crossroad
Pub. Co.; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1982], pp. 2–3). I understand that Kuang-ming Wu
wants to characterize Zhuangzi as an independent thinker. But I would not agree with
Wu’s assertion that treating Zhuangzi as a commentator of Laozi is erroneous. Wu is cor-
rect in criticizing the perspective that depicts Zhuangzi only as a commentator on Laozi.
I am arguing that Zhuangzi does comment on Laozi —as a critical commentator.
3. A. C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1989), pp. 217–218. Other
scholars seem to hold the same viewpoint, including Watson, who also does not view the
Daodejing as preceding and influencing Zhuangzi (see Watson’s preface in his translation
of Zhuangzi, p. 8), and B. I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 186–187.
4. See Graham, Disputers of the Tao, pp. 170–172. There is no discussion of a heritage rela-
tionship in thought between these two texts. Graham seems to prefer treating them as
two parallel thinkers and tends to lessen the significance of the language similarities be-
tween them. As for those passages in the Zhuangzi that have strong relevant connections
in thought with the Daodejing, I suppose he may regard them as evidencing the same in-
sight in both books. It is interesting to note that he also states that “there is a tantalizing
resemblance between a phrase in a discourse of Old Tan in Cz [that is, the Zhuangzi] 7/15
and another found no less than four times in Lao-Zi (Lz 2, 10, 51, and 77); both share the
words pu/fu shih ‘does not depend on it,’” but he thinks “this is far from being clear evi-
dence of influence by Lao-Zi in the ‘Inner Chapters’” (see ibid., p. 217, footnote).
5. I think this is also what C. Hansen suggests in A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 202.
6. The translation follows Graham’s (p. 226). I find that Graham’s translation of the Daode-
jing is excellent both in language and philosophy; unless otherwise indicated, the transla-
tions used in this article are his. As for chapter 25, in the fifth sentence, dai is translated as
“tiring.” The original meaning is “dying,” “being exhausted,” “energy losing.” “Tiring” is
too weak to convey the original meaning. I prefer to replace it with “being exhausted.” In
the last sentence, “returned” is used for Chinese fan. It seems that Graham understands
the sentence as “once a thing gets far, it has arrived at its beginning or its opposite.” How-
ever, my reading of the sentence is this: Once a thing gets far, it begins to return to its be-
ginning, which is also its opposite. Therefore, I prefer to use “returning” for fan, although
fan, indeed, is both returning and returned, as the discussion below will show.
7. Graham, p. 219.
8. Ibid., p. 225. The English translations of Chinese dong are always misleading. I translate
it as “working” instead of “motion” as in Graham’s translation. There are two kinds of
motion, even in Western philosophy. That is, as Aristotle reveals, a thing itself is in mo-
tion, and a thing of self-motionless moves other things. In Chinese, dong, too, can be used
as itself in motion and as moving something else. To say “the motion of the Way,” as in
Graham’s translation, will lead to an understanding that the Dao itself is in motion.
Needless to say, this understanding conflicts in an obvious way with Laozi’s concept of
the Dao. I understand Laozi as employing dong in the second sense, that is, the self-
motionless Dao’s working on other things.
9. In Chinese scholarship, it is usual to juxtapose these two aspects of the Dao in interpret-
ing the Daodejing, which is also reflected in N. J. Girardot’s book, Myth and Meaning in
 the dao: from lao zi to zhuang zi 487

Early Taoism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983). Girardot treats the
Dao as the beginning and the return separately, and offers no discussion of their relation-
ship (see pp. 49–76).
10. The Daodejing, chapter 25 (my translation).
11. Graham also notices this. He writes that Laozi is not interested in merely cosmological
study. What he wants to do is to offer a practical principle for people to live by: “In pre-
ferring to be submissive the sage does not cease to be oriented towards strength, for he
recognizes that surviving by yielding to a rising power is the road to victory over it when
its climax is past” (Disputers of the Tao, pp. 228–289).
12. See Graham, p. 170, and also Watson, pp. 8–9.
13. Girardot seems to follow the mainstream in Chinese scholarship and treats them as the
same doctrine; see Girardot, pp. 77–80.
14. Girardot, pp. 78–79.
15. Watson, pp. 34–35.
16. Ibid., p. 35.
17. Ibid., pp. 36–37.
18. Ibid., p. 38.
19. See the Daodejing, chapter 40, 42, and 52.
20. Girardot picks up a passage in “On Equality of Things” and displays the differences be-
tween the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi (see pp. 78–79). It seems to Girardot, however,
that the mentioned difference does not indicate Zhuangzi’s criticism of Laozi. He con-
cludes that Zhuangzi’s deconstruction of the concept of the mother of the world is “to
condemn, or even mock, any sort of cosmological theory of origin” (p. 78).
21. Allinson makes this comment: “It is commonplace among commentators to take Zhuangzi
to be some sort of relativist” (see Robert E. Allinson, Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transfor-
mation [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989], p. 111). He classifies the so-
called five models of commentaries that treat Zhuangzi as a sort of relativist. He even ad-
mits that he himself, too, regards Zhuangzi as a relativist in the sense of “either relativism
and non-relativism” (p. 142).
22. Watson, p. 3.
23. Notice the title of Allinson’s book—Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation. Allinson
does offer a good discussion of the issue. As I will reveal later, however, Allinson seems
to ignore the difference between the words “transformation” and “deconstruction.”
24. Extensive discussions of relativism regarding Zhuangzi’s thought may be found in Allin-
son, pp. 111–142.
25. Watson, p. 36.
26. Ibid., p. 36.
27. Graham, p. 181.
28. Watson, pp. 40–41.
29. Ibid., p. 74.
30. There is a long tradition of discussing freedom in the history of Western philosophy and
theology. Ordinary people may use “freedom” in terms of free choice. But in a metaphys-
ical meditation, freedom is always related to the final authority, or arche.
31. There is no future vision in the Zhuangzi. Indeed, such a vision can be found in Chinese
culture only after Buddhism introduced the concept of the immortal soul. Allinson de-
fends the understanding of the Zhuangzi in terms of transformation from a Buddhist point
of view. He writes: “Since Zen has been argued to be the legitimate heir of Taoism, it
would not be surprising to find that certain characteristics of the child were to be found in
the genetic make-up of the parent” (Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation, p. 9). In
doing so, however, he imposes on Zhuangzi something that Zhuangzi never touched upon.
488 wenyu xie

Chinese Glossary

dai
dao
Daodejing
dong
fan
guzhi ren
Hun tun
Lao Tan
Laozi
Neih Ch’ueh
pu/fu shih
qing
shou qi mu
Wang Ni
wu
wuwei
wuxing
xiao yao
xing
Zhuangzi
zi ran wu wei
zi ran