How Poland Promotes Democracy

Tsveta Petrova

Journal of Democracy, Volume 23, Number 2, April 2012, pp. 133-147

(Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: 10.1353/jod.2012.0026

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http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jod/summary/v023/23.2.petrova.html

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 how poland
promotes democracy
Tsveta Petrova

Tsveta Petrova is a fellow at Columbia University’s Harriman Insti-

tute. She will be a Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at the National
Endowment for Democracy beginning in May 2012. She is the author,
most recently, of “Citizen Participation in Local Governance in the
Post-Communist Space,” which appeared in the June 2011 issue of the
journal Europe-Asia Studies.

S ince the end of the Cold War, supporting the diffusion of democratic
norms and practices around the world has become a priority for many
Western governments and nongovernmental organizations. In the wake
of the “third wave” of democratization, some of the new democracies
of Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia have also begun
to engage in such work. The international democracy support provided
by these new players remains understudied and poorly understood. Yet
these countries—once recipients themselves of democracy support and
now suppliers of it—represent a new generation of international democ-
racy promoters. They have firsthand experience with democratization
through their own political transitions, giving them credibility with re-
cipients and expertise that other donors lack. They work mostly in their
own neighborhoods, where they have extensive knowledge of the local
sociopolitical realities and where their own experiences are highly rel-
evant.
These new democracy promoters have been most active at the re-
gional level, creating formal and informal democracy-promotion initia-
tives through a variety of forums, including the African Union (AU), the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the European Union (EU) and
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and
the Organization of American States (OAS). The AU, for example, has
suspended the memberships of governments that gained power uncon-
stitutionally and has pressed them to return to constitutional order. In 41
of the 44 democracy crises in Latin America since 1990, other states in

Journal of Democracy Volume 23, Number 2 April 2012

© 2012 National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press
134 Journal of Democracy

the region have made some effort to help protect democracy, frequently
through multilateral forums,1 and sometimes they have succeeded in de-
terring or reversing the deterioration of democracy.2
Besides leveraging their mem-
berships in regional organizations
Despite the limitations to initiate and support multilateral
of the democracy-pro- democracy-promotion efforts, some
new democracies have used “quiet
motion efforts of the new
diplomacy” to prevent democratic
democracies, their mod-
backsliding or breakdowns in neigh-
est activism has already boring states and to provide political
made an impact and will and moral support to prodemocratic
increasingly influence the forces. Beginning in the mid-1990s,
diffusion of democracy Brazil, for instance, played an im-
around the globe. portant role—both multilaterally and
bilaterally—in efforts to stabilize
democracy in Paraguay, Venezuela,
Haiti, and Bolivia. In Asia, Indonesia, for example, has been putting
pressure on Burma to move toward democratic governance and urging
Laos and North Korea toward political liberalization.3
Some new democracies have also begun to provide democracy aid.
Consider that South Africa established the African Renaissance and In-
ternational Cooperation Fund in 2001, tasking it with “the promotion
of democracy [and] good governance,” among other development ob-
jectives.4 Similarly, South Korea provides good-governance assistance
through the Korean International Cooperation Agency. In addition,
many new democracies have provided technical assistance through vari-
ous governmental and quasi-governmental institutions. Since its found-
ing in 1990, the Mexican Federal Electoral Institute, for example, has
taken part in 87 electoral observation missions in 24 countries across
the globe and in 61 technical-assistance missions in 31 countries in the
Americas, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.5
Several Central and East European (CEE) countries have been among
the most active of the emerging international democracy promoters.
They began investing in the democratization of their neighborhood al-
most immediately after their own democratic breakthroughs, and nearly
all did so within the next decade. They have been using bilateral dip-
lomatic channels to encourage democracy’s laggards in the region—in
particular, Belarus, Croatia, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia, and Ukraine—to
observe democratic norms and principles, and they have leveraged their
memberships in various Euro-Atlantic organizations to keep democra-
cy promotion in the European neighborhood on the agenda. Most have
transformed their development-aid systems into platforms for democ-
racy assistance while focusing on a few of the six countries above.
At this point, only the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia have be-
Tsveta Petrova 135

come noteworthy democracy promoters. Among all CEE donors, these

three provide some of the highest rates of democracy assistance relative
to overall official development assistance—rates that are comparable to
those of many Western donors. Within a year of their respective demo-
cratic breakthroughs, Poland and Slovakia began actively promoting de-
mocracy via both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Poland has taken
a leadership role in the EU’s relations with its eastern neighbors, while
Slovakia has helped to shape European policy toward the western Bal-
kans and, more recently, Belarus. Poland was the driving force behind
EU support for Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution. Slovakia also played
a pivotal role in supporting the “color revolutions” of the early 2000s.
The Czech Republic began supporting democracy abroad diplomatically
within the first five years of its independence and has since emerged as
a defender of beleaguered oppositions around the globe—notably, in
Belarus, Cuba, and, to a lesser degree, Burma.
Hungary, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia are moderately active de-
mocracy promoters. Budapest and Vilnius began promoting democracy
in their neighborhood diplomatically (both bilaterally and multilater-
ally) early on. Beyond the protection of minority rights and cross-border
cooperation, however, Hungary’s investment in regional democratiza-
tion has remained low. Estonia and Latvia began supporting democracy
promotion via diplomacy mostly after their EU accession. Democracy-
aid distribution in all these countries is only weakly institutionalized,
and the democracy assistance provided by all but Estonia has been either
belated or small.
Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Romania have shown little interest in assist-
ing democratization outside their borders. Of the three, Bulgaria is the
least active. Although little of Slovenia’s development aid goes to sup-
porting democratization abroad, it has indirectly supported the develop-
ment of democracy in its neighborhood by advocating stronger regional
cooperation within European democracy-promotion forums. Romania
has also been slow to assist democracy abroad. It has put forward bilat-
eral and multilateral diplomatic initiatives in support of democracy but
made only minimal investments in them.
The capacity of new democracies all over the world to provide de-
mocracy assistance remains underdeveloped and somewhat underfund-
ed. Their democracy-promotion commitments have often been inconsis-
tent, ad hoc, and low-priority efforts that are limited to concern about a
handful of their neighbors and expressed most often when there is strong
domestic pressure for such activism. Moreover, these new democra-
cies are for the most part hesitant to confront antidemocratic practices
publicly and are reluctant to embrace openly a democracy and human-
rights agenda.6 Despite Western hopes and expectations, they have not
actively, predictably, or unambiguously advocated democracy and hu-
man rights within global institutions such as the UN or the Community
136 Journal of Democracy

of Democracies.7 Not only are these new democracies wary of violating

the principle of nonintervention and undermining important bilateral re-
lationships, they are also skeptical of the effectiveness of “naming and
shaming” and isolating authoritarian regimes. They prefer instead re-
gional multilateral involvement and behind-the-scenes bilateral engage-
ment on political reform.8
Despite the limitations of the democracy-promotion efforts of the
new democracies, their modest activism has already made an impact and
will increasingly influence the diffusion of democracy around the globe.
Examining their initiatives allows us to gain a better understanding of
the effectiveness of different actors and strategies and to foster better
cooperation between established and newer democracies in supporting
democratization abroad.
As noted above, among new democracies the CEE members of the
EU have been some of the most active democracy promoters. Of these,
Poland in particular stands out for its early and active support of democ-
ratization in neighboring states beginning almost immediately after its
own democratic breakthrough in 1989.9 Poland has also sought, with a
degree of success, to guide the EU’s relations with its eastern neighbors,
including support for their democratization.

The Origins of Polish Democracy Promotion

Polish democracy promotion began with the international activity of
the Solidarity opposition movement. Solidarity activists wanted to sup-
port and make allies of their counterparts in other countries who were
fighting against the Soviet system.10 A number of Polish intellectuals
involved in the movement also came to believe that supporting free-
dom for Belarus, Lithuania, and Ukraine would help to ensure lasting
independence for Poland and peace and stability in Europe. Accord-
ingly, beginning with its first congress in 1981, Solidarity encouraged
other dissident groups in the Soviet bloc to “follow the Polish example”
and fight for freedom and representation.11 Solidarity reached out to a
number of other opposition movements in the region, especially those
in Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine. Solidarity offered
moral support, political literature, equipment, and lessons from its expe-
rience in organizing anticommunist resistance.
As Solidarity grew into a mass movement of ten-million members—a
third of whom also belonged to the Communist Party—it became a plat-
form for sharing “freedom-promotion” ideas with Polish society as part
of its program of democratization and national liberation. By the time
that communism fell in Poland, Solidarity’s ideas had “gained universal
acceptance and entered the canon of national common sense.”12 These
ideas were incorporated into Poland’s foreign policy by the Solidarity
elites who came to power after 1989.
Tsveta Petrova 137

Since then, many former Solidarity activists—some of whom entered

electoral politics, while others remained in civil society—have turned
their attention to the problems of democratization abroad. They believe
strongly that supporting the freedom of their neighbors—both internally
(democracy) and externally (sovereignty)—brings stability and security
to their region. Moreover, they appreciate the difficulties of living un-
der a repressive regime and maintain a deep personal commitment to
democracy. Most of them also believe that, having themselves received
Western support in the years before the collapse of communism and in
the early transitional years of building a market democracy, they have a
duty to repay this “debt” by assisting others on the road to democracy.
Some of these activists laid the ideological and organizational foun-
dations of civil society in postcommunist Poland, and a number of Pol-
ish nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with ties to prodemocracy
actors abroad have developed ambitious international-assistance efforts.
In some cases, outside groups have consulted Polish NGOs such as the
Foundation in Support of Local Democracy and the Stefan Batory Foun-
dation about specific types of problems that Poland had contended with
and resolved in the past. In other cases, Polish organizations, includ-
ing the East European Democratic Center, the Education for Democ-
racy Foundation, and the Civil Society Development Foundation, have
reached out to groups in other countries in transition that might be able
to apply the lessons learned during Poland’s transition. As Western do-
nors began pulling out of Poland in the late 1990s but continued to pro-
vide democracy assistance elsewhere in the region, some Polish groups
began pursuing such funding and participating in these international
projects as subcontractors.
Polish activists have worked to share Poland’s democratization ex-
perience with political and especially civic actors abroad. A few dozen
Polish NGOs regularly organize trainings and conferences and publish
manuals and research on the lessons learned from the country’s political,
economic, and societal transformations. These organizations also invite
politicians and civic organizers from abroad on study visits to Poland in
order to see how democratic institutions work in a postcommunist coun-
try. Polish civic groups have worked principally with recipients from
their immediate neighbors, Ukraine and Belarus, as well as from more
distant neighbors such as Russia, Moldova, and Georgia. Some Polish
organizations have also provided assistance elsewhere in the former So-
viet Union and former Yugoslavia, and a few NGOs, such as the Lech
Wa³êsa Foundation or the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, have
even reached out to civic actors in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the
Middle East.
Polish activists have worked to support democratization abroad and
have ardently urged their government to do the same. They have done
so in individual and group meetings, both formal and informal, with Pol-
138 Journal of Democracy

ish diplomats and through the Zagranica Group, an association of Pol-

ish NGOs established in 2001 as a forum for collaboration among these
NGOs and for advising and monitoring
the Polish state on foreign policy and
Whereas Polish civic development assistance. The Polish
groups’ support for state has, in fact, acted in support of
democracy has been democracy outside its borders and ex-
motivated primarily by pressed solidarity with prodemocratic
movements. The Polish foreign min-
principle, Polish official
istry has routinely issued statements
democracy promotion condemning coups and grave human-
has for the most part rights violations around the world and
concentrated on creating has supported EU and UN sanctions
a favorable international against the offending governments.13
environment for the newly Poland has also reacted to the manipu-
democratic Polish state. lation of electoral processes abroad by
supporting the resolutions and collec-
tive actions of the Council of Europe,
the OSCE, and the UN. In addition,
Warsaw has opposed lifting EU sanctions against Cuba and the EU arms
embargo on China.
Whereas Polish civic groups’ support for democracy has been motivat-
ed primarily by principle, Polish official democracy promotion has for the
most part concentrated on creating a favorable international environment
for the newly democratic Polish state. For Poland, the struggle against
communism was also a struggle against Russian imperialism, which had
for centuries threatened Poland’s independence. After 1989, containing
the threat of Russian expansionism continued to be a top security and
foreign-policy objective, as was reintegration into the community of Eu-
ro-Atlantic democracies. Solidarity’s freedom-promotion agenda, which
addressed both the moral and the geostrategic foreign-policy concerns of
Polish elites, became central to the country’s security strategy of creating
reliable partners in its eastern neighborhood to bring it closer to Europe
and to counterbalance Russian power. Thus Warsaw has resolutely, if not
always consistently, supported democracy abroad, particularly where it
extends the zone of freedom around Poland.
Poland has persistently worked to support the independence and democ-
ratization of its mutual neighbors with Russia—Ukraine and Belarus. A
secondary priority has been the two other countries in the Polish-Russian
neighborhood—Moldova and Georgia. By contrast, Poland has paid scant
attention to the rest of the former Soviet Union and the western Balkans.
The geostrategic rationale behind Polish democracy promotion has
made Warsaw’s efforts both more resolute in priority countries and
generally inconsistent, especially in nonpriority countries. At times,
Polish democracy promotion has been overshadowed by other foreign-
Tsveta Petrova 139

policy objectives such as maintaining positive relations (particularly

economic ties) with nondemocratic countries. For instance, because
Kazakhstan is an important energy partner, Poland has tended to ig-
nore human-rights violations there and even to endorse as free and fair
some Kazakh elections that OSCE monitors had denounced. Even in
the cases of Ukraine and Belarus, support for national independence
has been a higher priority than support for democracy because the in-
dependence of these countries is understood to be a more powerful
deterrent to Russian expansionism.
At the same time, a number of factors have reinforced Poland’s commit-
ment to supporting democracy and human rights abroad. In postcommunist
Poland, democracy has come to be associated with the peace and prosper-
ity enjoyed in the Euro-Atlantic community. Democracy is also believed
to have been crucial in creating a secure and thriving state.14 Moreover, for
Poland, as for some of the other eastern EU countries, democracy promo-
tion represents to a certain extent a continuation of Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion. Democracy promotion allows Poland to reaffirm and enhance its new
democratic identity. Finally, democracy promotion has become a niche for
Poland within the realm of EU foreign policy: Poland has recent experi-
ence with democratization, as well as unique regional expertise and rela-
tively good relations with the EU’s new eastern neighbors.15
Polish citizens have generally approved of supporting democratiza-
tion abroad. In fact, the share of the population that supports Warsaw’s
democracy-promotion efforts has grown. In 2004, 63 percent of Poles
thought that their country should provide development aid, explicitly
defined to include “support [for] democratic reforms, the rule of law and
self-governance.” In 2009, 83 percent of Poles expressed this opinion.16
Perhaps because of Poland’s leading role in bringing down communism
in Central and Eastern Europe, the Polish citizenry feels a special re-
sponsibility to support democratization abroad.
At the same time, Polish democracy promotion has faced a number of
domestic and international constraints. The alignment of Polish foreign
policy and democracy promotion with U.S. policy has provoked nega-
tive reactions in both Western Europe and Russia. Russia’s attempts to
reassert its power in the non-Baltic republics of the former USSR have
also presented a number of challenges for Poland and led to inconsisten-
cies in its support for democratization abroad. Although it has at times
advocated a more critical EU stance toward Russia, Poland has rarely
expressed direct disapproval of notorious breaches of democracy and
human rights in Russia. Rather, Warsaw has tended to place its eco-
nomic or energy needs vis-`a-vis Russia above its concerns about rights
and liberties there. Warsaw has also been reluctant to criticize publicly
the checkered democratization records of neighboring states with pro-
Western governments, such as Ukraine under Viktor Yushchenko and
Georgia under Mikheil Saakashvili. Similarly, Warsaw has often ac-
140 Journal of Democracy

tively lobbied against criticizing and sanctioning Ukraine and Belarus,

fearing that “if we do not talk to them, Moscow will.”17

Polish Democracy-Promotion Initiatives

Poland has used three main channels to support democracy abroad:
bilateral diplomacy; bilateral development aid; and multilateral diplo-
macy via the Euro-Atlantic clubs to which Warsaw belongs.
Bilateral Diplomacy. Since the fall of communism, Poland has used
its bilateral ties to support the democratization of neighboring states.
Poland has been trying to persuade and pressure Ukraine’s political
leadership to embrace democracy since Ukraine gained independence in
1991.18 Polish elites at all levels—presidential, parliamentary, local, and
civic—have discussed with their Ukrainian counterparts the political,
social, and economic benefits of democracy and EU integration; they
have also shared their transition experiences and advised their Ukrai-
nian colleagues on how to overcome the types of transition and EU-
integration problems that Poland itself had faced in the past. Although
Warsaw has consistently kept pressure on Ukraine to move forward with
democratization and EU-integration reforms, it has done so mainly be-
hind closed doors. In fact, Warsaw has actively lobbied the international
community not to criticize or sanction Ukraine during periods of demo-
cratic backsliding (the early 2000s and the early 2010s, for example).
Poland played a pivotal role in Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, in
which the country’s united opposition protested electoral fraud and mo-
bilized the citizenry to defend democracy. Polish president Aleksander
Kwaœniewski, a veteran of the 1989 Polish Roundtable and former com-
munist, was invited by the Ukrainian government and opposition to me-
diate their postelection standoff. Kwaœniewski developed a roundtable
plan for Ukraine and convinced Lithuanian president Valdas Adamkus
and the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security
Policy, Javier Solana, to join him as mediators. Kwaœniewski’s efforts
helped to end the electoral crisis and push Ukraine in a more democratic
direction.
Poland has also prioritized promoting democracy in Belarus. In the
early 1990s, Poland focused on improving bilateral relations with Be-
larus so that Polish pressures to democratize would have greater sway.
But Poland’s policies changed after 1994, when Alyaksandr Lukash-
enka was elected president of Belarus and soon began transforming the
country into “Europe’s last dictatorship.” Warsaw followed the West’s
lead in downgrading diplomatic ties with Belarus and joined successive
rounds of Western sanctions against Minsk in 1999, 2002, 2004, 2006,
and 2010.
Throughout the 2000s, Warsaw shifted its diplomatic dealings with
Belarus in the direction of “critical dialogue” and encouraged the in-
Tsveta Petrova 141

ternational community to do the same. Poland has supported Belarus’s

prodemocracy activists and expressed concern over violations of po-
litical and human rights by Minsk while also engaging the Lukashenka
regime in limited, unofficial, and often nonpolitical ways. Warsaw has
on occasion spoken out against repression and electoral manipulation in
Belarus, but has preferred that such criticism come from the EU.19 In ad-
dition, Poland has provided political and moral support to the embattled
Belarusian opposition, especially during the presidential elections of
2001, 2006, and 2010 and the constitutional referendums of 1996 and
2004. At the same time, Polish elites have worked to convince their
Belarusian counterparts that “democracy is well worthwhile”20 and that
there are “areas of co-operation [with the EU, such as economy and cul-
ture] that can be developed in the present political reality in Belarus.”21
Accordingly, Poland has sought to prevent the international isolation of
Belarus and to maintain some dialogue with the regime.
More generally, Warsaw has been supportive of the diffusion of de-
mocracy in the rest of Central and Eastern Europe and has offered dip-
lomatic support at critical junctures in the transition of several postcom-
munist countries (especially Slovakia, Georgia, and Moldova). More
recently, Poland has become active outside its region as well. During
the Arab uprisings of 2011, Poland’s Rados³aw Sikorski became the
first European foreign minister to visit the rebel-controlled Libyan city
of Benghazi, and former Solidarity activists (with the support of their
government) have offered to advise various prodemocracy forces in the
Middle East. It remains to be seen whether Poland will build on its com-
munist-era ties to then-friendly regimes in the Middle East and remain
interested in democracy in the region or whether these 2011 initiatives
were meant primarily to establish Poland as a major diplomatic player.

Democracy Assistance. Once a beneficiary of democracy assistance,

Poland is now a donor. In the late 1990s, when it was still receiving as-
sistance itself, Warsaw was already providing some democracy aid to
other postcommunist countries. One example of such assistance is Po-
land’s contribution to multilateral programs such as the Visegrád Fund,
the Polish-American Freedom Fund, and the Poland-America-Ukraine
Cooperation Initiative, all of which Poland has used to share the lessons
of its transition with other CEE countries. Another example is the “twin-
ning” consultancy and training programs that Polish state agencies have
run for the central institutions responsible for the structural transforma-
tion and European integration of other postcommunist countries, espe-
cially Ukraine. When the Polish foreign ministry set up its development-
assistance program, Polish Aid, in the late 1990s, it also began to fund
the democracy-related projects of Polish NGOs and state institutions.
In 2004, Poland defined the priority recipients of Polish development
aid as Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Afghanistan, the Palestin-
142 Journal of Democracy

ian Authority, and Angola. So far, only the first four countries have
received democracy assistance from Poland. Although Warsaw is in-
volved in the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Polish
contribution there is limited to socioeconomic-development assistance.
In its first five years of operation, Polish Aid sponsored 428 devel-
opment-assistance projects, of which 191 supported democratization
abroad. Most of these—61 projects,
or 32 percent of all democracy-as-
sistance projects—were in Ukraine.
Upon assuming the rotat-
The main recipients of this assistance
ing presidency of the EU were civil society, local governments,
in the second half of 2011, and youth groups. Poland has spon-
Poland made democracy sored 49 democratization projects in
promotion in the Eastern Belarus, or a total of 26 percent of all
Partnership countries and Polish democracy-assistance projects.
the Middle East one of its Not only has the number of projects
priorities. targeting Belarus been steadily in-
creasing, but at important junctures
in the country’s political development
Poland has approved additional special appropriations—funding, for ex-
ample, the ten-project Competitive Media and Internet Initiative before
the 2006 presidential election, the launch of BelSat TV and Radio Racja
as alternatives to state-run media, and the establishment of a few stu-
dent programs such as the Kalinowski Scholarship program. The main
recipients of Polish Aid have been the Belarusian civil society, the inde-
pendent media, and youth.
The bulk of the remaining democracy-assistance projects were aimed
at Georgia (17 projects) and Moldova (16 projects). On occasion, Po-
land has also provided democracy assistance to nonpriority countries
in southeastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia,
Montenegro, and Serbia), the South Caucasus (Armenia and Azerbai-
jan), and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmeni-
stan, and Uzbekistan).
Overall, the democracy assistance provided by Poland has been lim-
ited in terms of both its objectives and its scale. At the end of its first
five years of operation, Polish Aid’s budget was roughly US$48 mil-
lion, of which only slightly more than a third went to democracy-re-
lated projects.22 Nonetheless, the democracy support that Warsaw pro-
vides its eastern neighbors is still greater than the aid provided by the
other CEE countries and by the Western non-Scandinavian countries.
This Polish funding, however, is granted mainly to Polish NGOs rather
than to local implementers in the target countries. In part to maintain
political control over the distribution of development aid, Poland has
provided democracy assistance through the foreign ministry’s develop-
ment-cooperation department, which is understaffed and suffers from
Tsveta Petrova 143

high turnover. Polish Aid still supports mainly small projects and has
few multiannual or multilateral programs. Additionally, although some
Polish embassies provide small democracy-assistance grants, they have
provided less funding since 2008 due to a “lack of administrative ca-
pacity.”23 As a result, there has been an ongoing debate in Poland over
whether the country should set up an independent democracy-assis-
tance agency.

Multilateral Efforts. Poland has been particularly active in sup-

porting democracy abroad through various international organizations.
Together with the United States, Poland cofounded the Community of
Democracies in 2000, and Warsaw is home to its permanent secretariat.
Poland’s UN voting record on human rights and democracy issues has
also been strong.
Poland’s most active multilateral efforts to support democracy abroad
have been through the EU. Warsaw has advocated further EU enlarge-
ment to the east and southeast and closer cooperation between the EU
and countries in these regions.24 Warsaw has actively argued for a spe-
cial policy for the EU’s immediate eastern neighbors that reinforces
its support for their democratization and European integration. Poland
devised a proposal for such a policy even prior to its own EU acces-
sion. In 2009, this proposal, now known as the Eastern Partnership, was
introduced in the EU as a joint Polish-Swedish initiative.25 Yet it offers
too few strong and timely democratization incentives, too little democ-
ratization assistance, and too few benefits to the transition frontrunners
(such as Ukraine and Georgia), while offering too many benefits to the
transition laggards (such as Belarus and Azerbaijan).26
Poland has also supported the integration ambitions of Ukraine,
Georgia, and Moldova, and has lobbied with some success for trade and
visa liberalization for these countries, both to incentivize further reform
and to advance the diffusion of democratic norms and practices in the
long run. The EU has been reluctant, however, to offer its eastern neigh-
bors a membership perspective—a credible prospect of membership
once the relevant conditions have been met. Ukraine received such an
offer but only after the 2010 presidential elections, which marked a step
back in the country’s democratization. At the same time, both Poland
and the EU have expressed concerns over the democratic backsliding
in Ukraine and especially the abuse-of-power trial and imprisonment of
former Ukrainian prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko. These issues have
set back Ukraine’s relations with Poland and the EU.
Warsaw has also actively worked to strengthen the EU’s response to
violations of human rights and democratic practices in Belarus. Poland
sought the chairmanship of the European Parliament’s committee on Be-
larus, and it is partly thanks to Polish efforts that the European Parliament
has passed more resolutions condemning democracy and human-rights
144 Journal of Democracy

violations in Belarus than in any other country and has twice awarded
the prestigious Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to Belarusian na-
tionals. In addition, in line with its policy of “critical dialogue,” Warsaw
sought to convince the EU to include Belarus in the Eastern Partnership.
The brutal postelection repression in Belarus in 2010 revealed the policy’s
shortcomings, and Warsaw subsequently spearheaded new EU pressures
on Minsk—in the form of ramped up criticism, a new round of more tar-
geted sanctions, more support for civil society, and a promise of more aid
to the regime in exchange for democratic reform.
Upon assuming the rotating presidency of the EU in the second half
of 2011, Poland made democracy promotion in the Eastern Partnership
countries and the Middle East one of its priorities. Poland was suc-
cessful in steering the EU to move forward with Croatia’s accession,
Montenegro’s candidate status, and Moldova’s visa facilitation and
free-trade agreement. One of the highlights of the Polish EU presidency
was supposed to be the Eastern Partnership Summit, held in Warsaw
in 2011. Yet despite Polish hopes that the Partnership would become
a step toward future enlargement, the summit produced few concrete
results and was yet another sign that the EU sees the Eastern Partner-
ship as a substitute for enlargement. Poland also worked to unite the EU
behind a plan for a European Endowment for Democracy. Like the U.S.
National Endowment for Democracy, the European version is intended
to serve as an independent democracy-assistance agency working with
nonstate actors in recipient countries and thus as a complement to exist-
ing EU democracy-assistance mechanisms, most of which target recipi-
ent states.
Warsaw has also been moderately active in the Council of Europe,
the OSCE, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, and in less in-
stitutionalized forums such as the Visegrád Group, the Council of the
Baltic Sea States, and the Central European Initiative. In addition, the
OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR),
one of the main vehicles through which Poland helps to improve elector-
al processes abroad, is headquartered in Warsaw. In addition to contrib-
uting funding and personnel, Warsaw has leveraged its membership in
such organizations to ensure that democracy promotion in the countries
relevant to its foreign policy remains high on their respective agendas.
Furthermore, Poland has worked to involve democratization laggards in
the neighborhood in various Euro-Atlantic initiatives as a way to anchor
them in the democratic community.

Making a Difference?
Compared to other new (and even some established) democracies,
Poland’s commitment to promoting democracy outside its borders
ranks high. Its efforts have so far been greatest in its own neighbor-
Tsveta Petrova 145

hood. Despite competition and resistance from a number of EU states,

Warsaw has played an important role in defining EU policy toward
Poland’s eastern neighbors. Because of Poland’s efforts, Ukraine and
Belarus have remained high on the EU’s agenda. Warsaw has also
made its voice heard in debates about the EU’s democracy-promotion
approach to these countries. Moreover, Poland has already made a
difference there by helping to secure some democratization gains in
Ukraine, even if a number of them have been reversed in just five
years; on the other hand, Poland’s efforts in Belarus have so far proved
fruitless.
What lessons can Poland impart to new democracies about promoting
democracy abroad? First, the Polish example demonstrates the value of
nurturing the international solidarity of civil society in new democra-
cies—not just through funding such initiatives and involving interested
activists in serving as consultants or subcontractors for Western-funded
projects in neighboring countries, but also by creating more regional de-
mocracy-aid programs and strengthening existing prodemocracy trans-
national networks. Equally important, civic activists and groups inter-
ested in supporting democracy abroad should be part of the bilateral and
multilateral conversations about democracy among new democracies
and between new democracies and the West. Supporting activists who
act in solidarity with their counterparts abroad legitimizes democracy
promotion and could potentially create an opening in new democracies
for state-society conversations about the moral and strategic importance
of democracy promotion. Efforts based on such domestically negotiated
commitments are much stronger and more sustainable than those that
take their cues from the West.
Second, it is important to recognize that new democracies are trans-
lating what democracy promotion means within their own regional po-
litical contexts. Like other new democracies, Poland has preferred to
support democracy via regional multilateral mechanisms rather than to
engage in bilateral confrontation. While it has sometimes condemned
grave violations of human rights and democratic principles, Warsaw has
preferred to do so through multilateral organizations. It has also relied
much more on cautious and quiet diplomacy, which favors engagement
with autocracies (Belarus) and hybrid regimes (Ukraine), together with
behind-closed-doors persuasion, criticism, and pressure.
In this sense, Poland strongly resembles other newly emerging demo-
cratic regional powers, which generally eschew public criticism of other
governments and share a belief that inclusion is more likely than exclu-
sion to foster political liberalization. Therefore, another critical lesson
that the Polish case may have to offer is the importance of strengthening
formal and informal regional democracy-promotion channels and of en-
couraging and building on the quiet diplomatic support that new democ-
racies provide for human rights and democracy. It is thus important to
146 Journal of Democracy

recognize that such efforts, while often interpreted by the West as a sign
of unprincipled pragmatism, actually represent a distinctive approach to
democracy promotion.

NOTES

The research for this essay was supported by grants from the Eurasia Program of the So-
cial Sciences Research Council and the East European Studies Program at the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, with funds provided by the U.S. Department of
State under the Program for Research and Training on Eastern Europe and the Independent
States of the Former Soviet Union (Title VIII); the World Politics Program at the Smith
Richardson Foundation; the Pre-dissertation Fellowships Program at the Council for Eu-
ropean Studies; and Cornell University’s Peace Studies Program, Institute for European
Studies, and Government Department.

1. Jennifer L. McCoy, “International Response to Democratic Crisis in the Americas,

1990–2005,” Democratization 13 (December 2006): 756–75.

2. Craig Arceneaux and David Pion-Berlin, “Issues, Threats, and Institutions: Ex-
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Politics and Society 49 (Summer 2007): 1–31; and Dexter S. Boniface, “The OAS’s
Mixed Record,” in Thomas Legler, Sharon F. Lean, and Dexter S. Boniface, eds., Pro-
moting Democracy in the Americas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007):
40–62.

3. Brookings Institution, “The Foreign Policies of Emerging-Market Democracies:

What Role for Human Rights and Democracy?” Report of Proceedings, 14–15 April 2011;
and Rizal Sukma, “Do New Democracies Support Democracy? Indonesia Finds a New
Voice,” Journal of Democracy 22 (October 2011): 110–23.

4. Wolfe Braude et al., “Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance:

The South Africa Case,” Partnership and Business Development Division Report, IDRC,
South African Institute of International Affairs, January 2008.

5. See www.ife.org.mx.

6. Thomas Carothers and Richard Youngs, “Looking for Help: Will Rising Democra-
cies Become International Democracy Supporters?” Carnegie Paper, July 2011.

7. There are, of course, exceptions: South Korea, for example, has been an active par-
ticipant in the Community of Democracies since that organization’s founding, and has had
a generally strong voting record on these issues at the UN during the past two decades.
For a discussion of how new democracies cast their vote on human rights and democracy
issues in the UN, see Ted Piccone, “Do New Democracies Support Democracy? The Mul-
tilateral Dimension,” Journal of Democracy 22 (October 2011): 139–52.

8. Alicia Frohmann, “Regional Initiatives for Peace and Democracy: The Collective
Diplomacy of the Rio Group,” in Carl Kaysen, Robert A. Pastor, and Laura W. Reed, eds.,
Collective Responses to Regional Problems: The Case of Latin America and the Carib-
bean (Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1994), 129–41.

9. Laurynas Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern

European States,” Working Paper, FRIDE, Madrid, 18 March 2008.

10. Padraic Kenney, A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989 (Princeton: Princ-
eton University Press, 2002).
Tsveta Petrova 147

11. Solidarity Labor Union, “Message to the Working People of Eastern Europe,” cited
in Kenney, Carnival of Revolution, 167.

12. Jerzy Pomianowski, “Jerzy Giedroyc (1906–2000): Chleb z Mejszago³y,” Tygod-

nik Powszechny 39 (September 2000): 11–12.

13. Democracy Coalition Project, “Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign

Policy Trends, 1992–2002—Poland,” available at www.demcoalition.org/pdf/Poland.pdf.

14. Rados³aw Sikorski, Address to the Polish Parliament on Poland’s foreign policy for
2008, Warsaw, 17 February 2008.

15. European Policies Initiative (EPI) and Open Society Institute (OSI), “Not Your
Grandfather’s Eastern Bloc: The EU New Member States as Agenda Setters in the En-
larged European Union,” Comparative Policy Report, April 2009.

16. See www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Public,Opinion,Polls,197.html.

17. Balazs Jarabik and Vitali Silitski, “Belarus,” in Richard Youngs, ed., Is the Eu-
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18. Ryszard Ziêba, “The ‘Strategic Partnership’ Between Poland and Ukraine,” Polish
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19. Author’s interview with M.M., 13 October 2008.

20. W³odzimierz Cimoszewicz, “The Eastern Policy of the European Union,” speech
given at the Institute of Political Science, Paris, 22 April 2004.

21. Polish foreign minister W³odzimierz Cimoszewicz and Belarusian foreign minister
Mikhail Khvostov, declaration after unofficial meeting in Bia³ystok, 10 March 2002; and
Aleksander Kwaœniewski to Valdas Adamkus, statement at a press meeting, Warsaw, 3
January 2003.

22. See www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Assistance,in,figures,184.html.

23. Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions: European De-
mocracy Assistance After EU Enlargement (Prague: PASOS, 2008).

24. EPI and OSI, “Not Your Grandfather’s Eastern Bloc.”

25. The former Soviet republics participating in the Eastern Partnership are Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

26. Natalia Shapovalova, “The EU’s Eastern Partnership: Still-Born?” Policy Brief
No. 11, FRIDE, 20 May 2009.