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VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 415

Landingin vs. Republic
*
G.R. No. 164948. June 27, 2006.
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.
Adoption; The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect
the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.—The
general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural
parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
Same; The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of
adoption.—The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of
adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained
before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this
case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Same; Section 9 of R.A. 8552 provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be
obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice.—Petitioner’s contention
must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in
effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained,
the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the
biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written
consent of their legal guardian.
Same; Words and Phrases; Abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support.—
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
416
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is a
conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties. The term means neglect and
refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds presence,
love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the
parent, in effect, abandons the child.
Same; Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such
an abandonment.—Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is
https://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001876f52a971319c1717000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/14
not such an abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be
shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
Same; It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his/her
children.—Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors herein will have the effect
of severing all legal ties between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the same
shall then be vested on the adopter. It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial
consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of
parental authority over his/her children. More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally
abandoned the children, and that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an
adopting parent. Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption.
Same; Under Section 34, Rule 132, the offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the Court
to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties.—
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The offer of
evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only
and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence
for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper
barren of
417
VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 417
probative weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do not
confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered.
Same; Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that the
financial capacity of prospective parents should also be carefully evaluated and considered.—Since the
primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that the financial capacity of
prospective parents should also be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be
in a position to support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the family.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Nardo A. Capulong for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed1 in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is 2the
Decision of the Court of Ap-peals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the
Petition for Adoption of the petitioner herein.
The Antecedents
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America
(USA), of Filipino parentage and
_______________
1 Pennedby Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and
Lucas P. Bersamin, concurring; Rollo, pp. 23-35.
2 CA Rollo, p. 25.
418
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

3
a resident of Guam, USA, filed4 a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos5 who
was born on August 31, 1986; Elma Dizon Ramos, who 6 was born on September 7, 1987; and
Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989. The minors are the natural children of
Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin,
7 as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19,
1990, the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their
biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her
second marriage and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with
her inlaws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being
financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria
passed away on November 823, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have
given their written consent to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that
she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are already married, gainfully
employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA,
where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She came back9 to the
Philippines to spend time with the minors; her children gave their written consent to the
adoption of the minors. Petitioner’s brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income,
signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while in petitioner’s custody.
_______________
3 Records, pp. 1-4. The Rule on Adoption was approved by the Court in A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC and took effect on
August 22, 2002.
4 Id., at p. 6.
5 Id., at p. 7.
6 Id., at p. 8.
7 Id., at p. 5.
8 Id., at p. 9.
9 Id., at p. 24.
419
VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 419

Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in her favor, as follows:
“WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court that after publication and
hearing, judgment be rendered allowing the adoption of the minor children Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma
Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that the minor children’s name
follow the family name of petitioner. 10
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises.”
On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) to conduct a case study as mandated by Article 34 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, and to submit a report 11 thereon not later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the
initial hearing
12 of the petition. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) 13entered its
appearance but deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its behalf. 14 Since her
petition was unopposed, petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex parte.
The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine Ramos, the15 eldest of the
adoptees, to testify on the written consent executed by her and her siblings. The petitioner
marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol,
Dennis and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed
16 Landingin, and notarized by a notary public in
Guam, USA, as proof of said consent.
_______________
10 Id., at p. 3.
11 Id., at p. 21.
12 Id., at p. 40.
13 Id., at p. 41.
14 Id., at p. 22.
15 Supra note 8.
16 Supra note 9.
420

On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD, Field Office III,
Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report, with the following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene all surnamed Ramos, eligible
for adoption because of the following reasons:
1. Minors’ surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily consented to their adoption by the paternal
aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in view of her inability to provide the parental care, guidance and
support they need. An Affidavit of Consent was executed by the mother which is hereto attached.
2. The three minors subject for adoption have also expressed their willingness to be adopted and
joins the petitioners in Guam, USA in the future. A joint Affidavit of consent is hereto attached.
The minors developed close attachment to the petitioners and they regarded her as second
parent.
3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary guardian who has also family to look after.
As young adolescents they really need parental love, care, guidance and support to ensure their
protection and well being.
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D.
Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial custody is
hereby further recommended to be dispensed with considering that they are close
17 relatives and that close
attachments was already developed between the petitioner and the 3 minors.
Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows:

The mother of minors came home together with her son John Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks vacation.
This is to enable her to appear for the personal interview concerning the adoption of her children.
_______________
17 Records, pp. 43-47.
421
VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 421

The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was conceived after the
death of their paternal grandmother and guardian. The paternal relatives including the petitioner who
attended the wake of their mother were very much concerned about the well-being of the three minors.
While preparing for their adoption, they have asked a cousin who has a family to stay with minors and
act as their temporary guardian.
The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of
adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. She realized that her children need parental love,
guidance and support which she could not provide as she already has a second family & residing in Italy.
Knowing also that the petitioners & her children have been supporting her children up to the present
and truly care for them, she believes her children will be in good hands.
18 She also finds petitioners in a
better position to provide a secured and bright future to her children.
However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption.
On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for adoption, rendered a
decision granting said petition. The dispositive portion reads:
‘WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos,
Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all legal obligations obedience and maintenance from their natural
parents and that they be declared for all legal intents and purposes the children of Diwata Ramos
Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with considering that parent-children relationship has long been
established between the children and the adoptive parents. Let the surnames of the children be changed
from “Dizon-Ramos” to “Ramos-Landingin.”
_______________
18 Id., at p. 47.
422

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect the
corresponding changes/
19 amendment in the birth certificates of the above-mentioned minors.
SO ORDERED.’
20 21
The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals on December 2, 2002. In its brief for
the oppositor-appellant, the OSG raised the following arguments:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK
OF CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES’ BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE
LACK OF THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER’S CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE
PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE
PROPOSED ADOPTEES.
22
On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision reversing the ruling of the RTC. It held that
petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the children’s
natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit of consent of the petitioner’s children could not also be
admitted in evidence as the same was executed in Guam, USA and was not authenticated or
acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and although petitioner has a job, she was
not stable
_______________
19 CA Rollo, pp. 27-28.
20 Records, p. 78.
21 CA Rollo, p. 15.
22 Rollo, pp. 23-35.
423
VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 423

enough to support the children. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated November 25, 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch23 63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.”
24
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration

25 on May 21, 2004, which the CA denied in its
Resolution dated August 12, 2004. 26
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari on September 7, 2004,
assigning the following errors:
1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED

SOME FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF WEIGHT AND
IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE
RESULT OF THE CASE.
2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
PETITIONER-APPELLEE
27 IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE
THREE CHILDREN.
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a) whether the petitioner
is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia
Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-
adopter’s children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner is
financially capable of supporting the adoptees.
_______________
23 Id., at p. 35.
24 CA Rollo, p. 55.
25 Rollo, p. 22.
26 Id., at pp. 3-20.
27 Id., at p. 5.
424

The Court’s Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit.

It has28 been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as stated in Malkinson v.
Agrava, that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of
the child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care
and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of
society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples or persons
to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted
for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should 29
thus be sustained to promote and fulfill these

30 noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals, the Court also ruled that the liberality with which
this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes
of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever
mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted
child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective. The Court’s position should
not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of
law and jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be
anchored solely on best interests of 31 the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural
rights of the parents over the child.

Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,
provides:
_______________
28 153 Phil. 339; 54 SCRA 66 (1973).
29 Id., at pp. 346-347; p. 73.
30 G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA 128.
31 Id., at p. 157.
425
VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 425

Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption.—After being properly counseled and informed of
his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to
the adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and
adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if living with said
adopter and the latter’s spouse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect
the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure
the opportunity
32 to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed
adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent
must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established
in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia
Ramos to the adoption.
We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview Amelia Ramos
who arrived in the Philippines with her son, John Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos
was in the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is incredible that the latter
would not require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent to the adoption of
_______________
32 Re Adoption of Cannon, 243 Iowa 828, 53 N.W.2d 877.
426

her minor children. Neither did the petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in
support of the petition.
Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother is no
longer necessary because when Amelia’s husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never
came back. The children were then left to the guidance and care of their paternal
grandmother. It is the paternal relatives, including petitioner, who provided for the children’s
financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively abandoned the children.
Petitioner further contends that it was by twist of fate that after 12 years, when the petition
for adoption was pending with the RTC that Amelia and her child by her second marriage
were on vacation in the Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her,
and during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the social worker that she conformed to the
adoption of her three children by the petitioner.
Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial court,
Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent
of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the
minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had
indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal
guardian.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without 33 his
consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties. The term
means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a
parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection,
34 and neglects
to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child.
_______________
33 Matter of Adoption of Eder, 312 Or. 244, 821 P.2d 400 (1991).
34 In Re: McLean, 179 N.Y.S. 182,183, 109 Misc. 479.
427
VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 427

Merely permitting35 the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such
an abandonment. To dispense with the requirement
36 of consent, the abandonment must be
shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to prove her
claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her children. Petitioner’s testimony on that matter
follows:
Q Where is the mother of these three children now?

A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.
Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was
there an instance where she communicated with
the family?
A None, sir.
Q How about with her children?
A None, sir.
Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?
A I do not know, sir.
Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?
A What I know, sir, was that she was already
married with another man.
Q From whom did you learn that?
A From others who came from Italy, sir.
Q Did you come to know whether she has children
by her second marriage?
37
A Yes, sir, she got two kids.
Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:
Q Where is your mother now?

A In Italy, sir.
_______________
35 Truelovev. Parker, 132, S.G. 251, 191 N.C. 430.
36 Slattery
v. Hartford v. Connecticut Trust Co., 254 Mich. 671, 236 N.W. 902 (1931).
37 TSN, April 4, 2002, pp. 9-10.
428

Q When did your mother left for Italy?

A After my father died, sir.
Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy
in 1990?
A Two years old, sir.
Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did
your mother communicate with you?
38
A No, sir.
However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also stated the following:
IV. Background of the Case:
xxxx
Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under the care and custody of their maternal
grandmother. However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an uncle, cousin of their deceased father now serves
as their guardian. The petitioner, together with her children and other relatives abroad have
been supporting the minor children financially, even during the time that they were still
living with
39 their natural parents. Their mother also sends financial support but very
minimal.
xxxx
V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for Adoption:
xxxx
As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger siblings. She helps them in their
lessons, works and has fun with them. She also encourages openness on their problems and concerns and
provides petty counseling.
40 In serious problems she already consult (sic) her mother and
petitioner-aunt.
xxxx
_______________
38 Id., at p. 21.
39 Records, p. 44.
40 Id., at p. 45.
429
VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 429

In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein minors, Amelia recalled that they had a
happy and comfortable life. After the death of her husband, her in-laws which include the petitioner had
continued providing support for them. However being ashamed of just depending on the support of her
husband’s relatives, she decided to work abroad. Her parents are also in need of financial help as they
are undergoing maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged their farm land which she used in going
to Italy and worked as domestic helper.
When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3 children to the care & custody of her
mother-in-law who returned home for good, however she died on November 2000.
While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from Tarlac. They became live-in partners
since 1995 and have a son John Mario who is now 2 years old. The three of them are considered Italian
residents. Amelia claimed that Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of his marriage and his wife
is amenable to it. He is providing his legitimate family regular support.
Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-P15,000 a month through her
parents who share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The
petitioner and other paternal relatives
41 are continuously providing support for most of the needs &
education of minors up to present.
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or to
permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the
country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish
entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law,
for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious personal
problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to the children, though in
minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent in-laws provide.
_______________
41 Id., at p. 46.
430

Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors herein will have the effect
of severing all legal ties between the biological
42 mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the
same shall then be vested on the adopter. It would thus be against the spirit of the law if
financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive
a person of parental authority over his/her children. More proof has to be adduced that Amelia
has emotionally abandoned the children, and that 43 the latter will not miss her guidance and
counsel if they are given to an adopting parent. Again, it is the best interest of the child that
takes precedence in adoption.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered
must be specified. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest
its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties.
Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such
document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight. Mere
identification of documents and the markings44thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary
weight on documents unless formally offered.
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent
purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity45 of which she, likewise, failed to prove.
The joint written consent of petitioner’s children was notarized on January 16, 2002 in
Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same way as a document
_______________
42 Republic Act No. 8552, Sec. 16.
43 Cang v. Court of Appeals, supra note 30, at p. 153.
44 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 112708-09, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 438.
45 Supra note 9.
431
VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 431

46
notarized in this country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103, which states:
Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign country shall be
considered authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are made in accordance with the
following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador, minister, secretary of
legation, chargé d affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or
officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him, and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be under his official
seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In case the
acknowledgment is made before a notary public or an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the
preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment
shall be authenticated by an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, chargé de affaires,
consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country
or place to which he is accredited. The officer making the authentication shall certify under his
official seal that the person who took the acknowledgment was at the time duly authorized to act
as notary public or that he was duly exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which he
assumed to act, and that as such he had authority under the law to take acknowledgment of
instruments or documents in the place where the acknowledgment was taken, and that his
signature and seal, if any, are genuine.
As the alleged written consent of petitioner’s legitimate children did not comply with the
afore-cited law, the same can
_______________
46 Enacted on January 26, 1912.
432

at best be treated by the Rules as a private document whose authenticity must be proved
either by anyone who saw the document executed 47 or written; or by evidence of the genuineness
of the signature or handwriting of the makers.
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the
written consent of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not stable enough to
support the children and is only 48 relying on the financial backing, support and commitment of
her children and her siblings. Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that she is financially
capable as she has worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a house, and currently earns
$5.15 an hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and siblings have
likewise committed themselves to provide financial backing should the need arise. The OSG,
again in its comment, banks on the statement in the Home Study Report that “petitioner has
limited income.” Accordingly, it appears that she will rely on the financial backing of her
children and siblings in order to support the minor adoptees. The law, however, states that it
is the adopter who should be in a position to provide support in keeping with the means of the
family.
Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that
the financial capacity of prospective parents should also be carefully evaluated and
considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to support the would-be adopted
child or children, in keeping with the means of the family.
49
According to the Adoption Home Study Report forwarded by the Department of Public
Health & Social Services of the Government of Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer
_______________
47 RULES OF COURT, Rule 132-B, Section 20.
48 Rollo,p. 34.
49 Records, pp. 62-73.
433
VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 433

supporting her legitimate children, as the latter are already adults, have individual lives and
families. At the time of the filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a
part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a month.
Petitioner’s main intention in adopting the children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She
has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being amortized.
Petitioner likewise knows that the limited income might be a hindrance to the adoption
proceedings.
Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently
handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only has a parttime
job, and she is rather of age. While petitioner claims that she has the financial support and
backing of her children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support
the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the
former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor support petitioner’s allegation
that her siblings and her children are financially able and that they are willing to support the
minors herein. The Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.
While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for her nieces and
nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA. In any
case, petitioner is not prevented from filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Chico-

Nazario, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
434

Chaves vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Notes.—The written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a
requisite for its validity. (Cang vs. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 128 [1998])
The requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the
child. (Ibid.)
Abandonment of a child by his parents means “neglect or refusal to perform the natural
and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.” (Ibid.)
——o0o——
G.R. Nos. 168992-93. May 21, 2009.*
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM, petitioner.

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM,
petitioner.
Adoption; Husband and Wife; Husband and wife must jointly adopt.—It is undisputed that, at the
time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by
herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial
court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article
III of RA 8552 reads: SEC. 7. Who May Adopt.—The following may adopt: x x x Husband and
wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases: x x x The use of the word “shall” in the above-
quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the
child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to
adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. The law is clear. There is no room for
ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adop-
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
99
VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 99
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim,

Monina P. Lim
tion were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner
herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for
adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in
Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband
Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and
Olario are not legally separated from each other.
Same; Same; Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (Republic Act No. 8552); A foreigner adopting together
with his or her Philippine spouse must meet the qualifications set forth in Republic Act No. 8552, and the
requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot be waived.—The
fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice.
There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic
relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least
three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such
residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and
(5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial. These requirements on residency and certification
of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or
adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario.
Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
Same; Effects; Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a
legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child.—Adoption has, thus, the following
effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the
biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter;
and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent
and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be
known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.
Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a
legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate
100

ANNOTATED

Monina P. Lim
child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their
parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive
parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are
entitled such as support and successional rights.
Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Legislation; While the Court is not unmindful of the main
purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the children, regrettably, the law is
clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation.—We are
mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of
the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and
family, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts.
Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law. But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara (270 SCRA 206 [1997]): We are not
unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the
children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than
defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in
view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children.
Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the case
at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription
against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we
cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption. Petitioner, being married at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot
make our own legislation to suit petitioner.
Same; Husband and Wife; Dissolution of Marriage; The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage
between the spouses is of no moment—it is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage; Since, at
the time the petitions for adoption were filed, the petitioner was married, joint adoption with the husband
is mandatory.—Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint
adoption could no
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VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 101

Monina P. Lim
longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the
Los Angeles Superior Court. We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between
petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until
and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario,
the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required.
We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was
married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos
City, Br. 22.
Teodoro P. Sales for petitioner.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set
aside the Decision1 dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City,
Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without
prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June

1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were
unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have
a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they
were the children’s par-
_______________
1 Penned by Judge Antonio C. Lubao. Records of SPL. PROC. Case No. 1258, pp. 161-162 and SPL. PROC. Case
No. 1259, pp. 163-164.
102

Monina P. Lim
ents. The children2 were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim
(Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She
was born on 15 March 1977.3 Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to
petitioner’s clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.4
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the
children to exclusive schools. They used the surname “Lim” in all their school records and
documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner
married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty5 given under
Republic Act No. 85526 (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child.
Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of
_______________
2 Three children were actually entrusted to petitioner and Lim. The third, who was named Primo Jude P. Lim, was
still a minor at the time the petition for adoption was filed. The case was docketed as SPL. PROC. No. 1260. Petitioner
opted not to appeal the decision insofar as the minor Primo Jude P. Lim was concerned.
3 Records (SPL. Proc. Case No. 1258), pp. 94-96.
5 Section 22 of RA 8552 provides:
SEC. 22. Rectification of Simulated Births.—A person who has, prior to the effectivity of this Act, simulated the
birth of a child shall not be punished for such act: Provided, That the simulation of birth was made for the best
interest of the child and that he/she has been consistently considered and treated by that person as his/her own
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the application for correction of the birth registration and petition for adoption
shall be filed within five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act and completed thereafter: Provided, finally, That
such person complies with the procedure as specified in Article IV of this Act and other requirements as determined
by the Department.
6 An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Domestic Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes, otherwise known as the “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.” Approved on 25 February 1998.
103
VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 103

Monina P. Lim
Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259,
respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old
and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their
Affidavits of Consent.7 Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit
of Consent.8 Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent9 for the
adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents
were unknown.10 The DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The
trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition
jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the
wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family
Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied in
the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did
not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioner’s
argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable because, under the
law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification,
which the husband, who was not even made a party in this case, must comply.
_______________

8 Id., at p. 147.
9 Id., at p. 149.
10 Id., at p. 145.
11 Records (SPL. Proc. Case No. 1259), p. 8.
104

Monina P. Lim
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely
for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only
for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an emancipated child acquires certain
rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not petitioner,
who has remarried, can singly adopt.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of
the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be
adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” is not applicable to adoption
cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time
the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was
already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been
emancipated having attained the age of majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had
already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband
Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions
for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
“SEC. 7. Who May Adopt.—The following may adopt:
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Monina P. Lim
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral
character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and
psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who
is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The
requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived
when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided,
That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been
living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for
adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been
certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has
the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter
his/her country as his/her adopted son/
daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii )one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of
his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That
the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
106

Monina P. Lim
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.” (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word “shall” in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to
the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule
also insures harmony between the spouses.12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time
the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were
filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct
in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section
7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her
husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third,
petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent
does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American
citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must
prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he
must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing
of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree
is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed
to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were
shown and proved during the trial.
_______________
12 Republic v. Toledano, G.R. No. 94147, 8 June 1994, 233 SCRA 9.
107
VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 107

Monina P. Lim
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt

cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the
adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the
children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-
being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of
their common children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the
parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the
guardian of the person or property of the children.15
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation—that is, when he attains the
age of majority or 18 years of age16—emancipation terminates parental authority over the
person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of
civil life.17 However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.
Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
_______________
13 Article 209, Family Code.

16 Republic Act No. 6809, An Act Lowering the Age of Majority from Twenty-One to Eighteen Years, Amending for
the Purpose Executive Order Numbered Two Hundred Nine, and For Other Purposes.
17 Article 236, Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6809.
108

Monina P. Lim
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
“SEC. 16. Parental Authority.—Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same
shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy.—The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s)
for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to
legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is
entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession.—In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have
reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and
his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.”
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2)
deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each
other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still
considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights19 of a legitimate child such as:
(1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents;
and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive
parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to
_______________
18 Section 33, Article VI, Rules and Regulations to Implement the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
109
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Monina P. Lim
which biological parents are entitled20 such as support21 and successional rights.22

We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to
provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and
give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or persons
to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted
for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should
be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.23 But,
as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:24
“We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare
of the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather
than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less
severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less
fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring
adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the
proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is
amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption.” (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have
jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit
petitioner.
_______________
20 Section 34, Article VI, Rules and Regulations to Implement the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
22 Section 18, Article V, RA 8552.
23 Bobanovic v. Montes, 226 Phil. 404; 142 SCRA 485 (1986).
24 336 Phil. 944, 948-949; 270 SCRA 206, 210 (1997).
110

Monina P. Lim
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint
adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his
marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and
unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the
wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September 2004
of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258
and 1259. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Corona, Leonardo-De Castro and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed
and protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted
child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving
supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably considered. (Republic
vs. Hernandez, 253 SCRA 509 [1996])
Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father to use,
as middle name her mother’s surname, the Court finds no reason why she should not be
allowed to do so. (In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, 454 SCRA
541 [2005])
——o0o——
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 541
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia
*
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA,

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
Parents and Children; Adoption; Names; It is both of personal as well as public interest that every
person must have a name.—For all practical and legal purposes, a man’s name is the designation by
which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the
word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the
label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in
speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must
have a name.
Same; Same; Same; The name of an individual has two parts—the given or proper name and the
surname or family name; The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the
surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.—The name of an individual has two parts: (1)
the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is
given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or
family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to
child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Adoption is defined as the process of making a child,
whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child; The
modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.—Adoption is defined as the
process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded
to a legitimate child. It is a
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
542

ANNOTATED

Astorga Garcia
juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that
which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. The modern trend is to consider adoption not
merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the
child with a legitimate status. This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State
Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle
that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared
to favor the adopted child. Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the “Domestic Adoption Act of
1998,” secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.
Same; Same; Same; An adopted child is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
—Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino
custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should
be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.—It is a settled rule that adoption
statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes
of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,
hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 10 of the Civil Code which presumes in the interpretation of
application of law that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail was intended to
strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by
some way of interpreting the law.— Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that: “In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the law-
543
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 543

Astorga Garcia
making body intended right and justice to prevail.” This provision, according to the Code
Commission, “is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is
doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may
apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, the Court finds no reason why she should
not be allowed to do so.—Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Br. 13.

Catindig, Tiongco & Nibungco for petitioner.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed. 1
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his
minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
2 Garcia. He alleged therein, among others,
that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name
Astorga be changed to
_______________
1 Rollo at pp. 34-36.
2 Annex “C”, Id., at p. 33.
544

Astorga Garcia
“Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig,” his
surname. 3
On March 23, 2001, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption,
thus:
“After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of any
opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of
the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to
maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to
the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that
the petitioner’s care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more than
enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to
her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal
heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as
STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned pursuant
to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision
4 be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED.”
5
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying
that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her
middle name.
_______________
3 Annex “F”, Id., at pp. 41-43.
4 Rollo
at pp. 42-43.
5 Annex “G”, Id., at pp. 44-48.
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VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 545

Astorga Garcia
6
On May 28, 2001, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that
there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the
surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural
father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having
a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino
to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of
the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child,
hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use
the middle name “Garcia” (her mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and;
(6) her continued use of “Garcia” as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or
Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother
for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother
because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter.
Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof
of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
_______________
6 Annex “H”, Id., at p. 49.
546

Astorga Garcia
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the
surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code.
In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that “the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname
7 of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before
the surname of the mother.”
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law—
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known
and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as
the label or appellation which he bears for 8 the convenience of the world at large addressing
him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that
every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname
or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or
at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that
which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
given name may be freely selected 9 by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law.
_______________
7 Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, August 10, 1985, p. 8.
8 Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA 189, citing 38 Am.
Jur., Name 594-595.
9 Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al., G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 509, citing Tolentino,
A.M., Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 1993 ed., 672.
547
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Astorga Garcia
Thus, Articles 364

10 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the
use of surname of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be
legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman,
or a widow, thus:
“Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use
the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband’s surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as ‘Mrs.’
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her
maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and
surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband’s surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surname employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband’s surname as though he were still living, in
accordance with Article 370.
_______________
10Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra.
548

Astorga Garcia
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such
additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word
‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname, or

(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
x x x”
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of

Middle Name—
As correctly submitted
11 by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name.
Even Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known
as “An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father,” is silent as to
what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted
above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants,
in which case, the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added.
_______________
11 “Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother,
and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of
their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the
father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during
his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.”
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Astorga Garcia
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may
use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter.” Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:
“(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both
shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
x x x”
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the
surname of the child’s mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial
or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus:
“Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the surname and
that of the child because the father’s surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for
which reason he would insist on the use of the father’s surname by the child but that, if he
wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how will his
name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it should be
mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the
surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the present Article 364, which
reads:
550

Astorga Garcia
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself precisely
because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enrile’s correct
surname is Ponce since the mother’s surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose
Gutierrez David’s family name is Gutierrez and his mother’s surname is David but they all call him
Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it
shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the surname
of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this
for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just
enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate
chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that the
surname of the father should always be last because there are so many traditions like the American
tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed
by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of
Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede
the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the
mother. Prof. 12 Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the
suggestion.” (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of13an adopted child, the law provides that “the adopted shall bear the surname of
the adopters.” Again, it is
_______________
12 Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family law Committees, August 10, 1985, pp. 16-18.
13 Article 365 of the New Civil Code.
551
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 551

Astorga Garcia
silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right
and obligation, is 14
for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the
decree of adoption.
The Underlying Intent of Adoption

Is In Favor of the Adopted Child—
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether 15 related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding
in rem which creates between two 16 persons a relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation. The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an
act to establish a relationship17of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the
child with a legitimate status. This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as
a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations,
accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social 18 and moral responsibility, and that
its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted

19 child. Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise
known as the “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,” secures these rights
_______________
14 Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al., supra; Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra.
15 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol. I, Fifteenth Edition, 2002, p. 685.
16 Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1989 Edition, p. 272-273, citing 4 Valverde, 473.
17 Paras, supra, citing Prasnick vs. Republic, 98 Phil. 665.
18 Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003, 406 SCRA 135, citing United Nation General
Assembly/44/49 (1989).
19 “Sec. 17. Legitimacy.—The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all
intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate
sons/daughters born to them without discrimina
552

Astorga Garcia
20
and privileges for the adopted.

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed21 to be a legitimate child of the
adopter
22 for all intents and
23 purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section
17 Article V of RA 8552.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including
the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is
consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as
earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s
surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain24 her maternal lineage. It is to be noted
that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18 , Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption)
provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence,
Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the
future.
_______________
tion of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance and support in keeping with the means of the
family.”
20Id.
21 “Art. 189. (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both
shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the
right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;”
22Supra.
23 Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
24 “Sec.18. Succession.—In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal
rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological
parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.”
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Astorga Garcia
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built
by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all
their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them
“Mama” and “Papa.” Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to
use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving
relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of Adoption

Statutes In Favor Of Adoption—
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane 25and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The 26interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable
intendment should 27be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
“In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.”
This provision, according to the Code Commission, “is necessary so that it may tip the scales
in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen
_______________
25 Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992, 205 SCRA 356, citing 2
Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, 865.
26 Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., Id., citing 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, 910.
27 Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., Id., citing Bobanovic, et al. vs. Montes, etc., et al., 142
SCRA 485 (1986).
554

Astorga Garcia
the determination of the courts to28avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by
some way of interpreting the law.”
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father,
like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in
the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s surname “GARCIA” as her
middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of
adoption.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Petition granted.
Notes.—A person may be known by several aliases, irrespective of his knowledge or

consent to the use thereof. (People vs. Bergonio, Jr., 340 SCRA 269 [2000])
Since the use of initials, instead of a given name, before a surname, has become a practice,
the necessity that these initials be all given and correctly given in court proceedings has
become of importance in every case, and in many, absolutely essential to a correct designation
of the person intended—a middle name is very important or even decisive in a case in which
the issue is as between two persons who have the same first name and surname, did the act
complained of, or is injured or sued or the like. (United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Ramos, 415
SCRA 596 [2003])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 188801. October 15, 2014.*

ROSARIO MATA CASTRO and JOANNE BENEDICTA
CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, a.k.a. “MARIA SOCORRO M.
CASTRO” and “JAYROSE M. CASTRO,” petitioners, vs.
JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO and ANA
MARIA REGINA GREGORIO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgments;

The remedy of annulment of judgment will only be available if “the
ordinary remedies of new trial, ul judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts. This remedy
will only be available if “the ordinary remedappeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.”—Under Rule 47, Section 1 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an action with the
Court of Appeals to annies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner.”
Same; Same; Same; Because of the exceptional nature of the
remedy, there are only two grounds by which annulment of
judgment may be availed of: extrinsic fraud, which must be
brought four (4) years from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction,
which must be brought before it is barred by estoppel or laches.—
Because of the exceptional
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
416

Castro vs. Gregorio
nature of the remedy, there are only two grounds by which

annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic fraud, which
must be brought four (4) years from discovery, and lack of
jurisdiction, which must be brought before it is barred by estoppel
or laches. Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of
jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter, or lack
of jurisdiction over the parties. Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand,
is “[that which] prevents a party from having a trial or from
presenting his entire case to the court, or [that which] operates
upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the
manner in which it is procured.” The grant of adoption over
respondents should be annulled as the trial court did not validly
acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable
decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
Civil Law; Adoption; The law on adoption requires that the
adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not
only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate
children.—It is settled that “the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.” As Jose filed the petition for
adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 8552 which
applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption requires that
the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain
not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his
legitimate children. Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act
No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the consent of his wife if
he seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock.
Same; Same; As a general rule, the husband and wife must
file a joint petition for adoption; The law provides for several
exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse
seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock.—As a
general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for
adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In Re: Petition for
Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, 588 SCRA 98 (2009): The use of the
word “shall” in the above quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the
child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures
harmony between the spouses. The law provides for several
exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse
seeks
417
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 15, 2014 417

Castro vs. Gregorio
to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this

instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse
seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
Same; Civil Procedure; Adoption; Service of Summons;
Personal Service of Summons; Personal service of summons should
have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to
ensure that their substantive rights are protected.—For the
adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic
Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been
effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that
their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on
constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural
technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory
rights.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgments;
Extrinsic Fraud; Prescription; An action for annulment based on
extrinsic fraud must be brought within four (4) years from
discovery.—In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro Florece, 660
SCRA 323 (2011): Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of
the prevailing party in litigation committed outside of the trial of
the case, whereby the defeated party is prevented from fully
exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him
away from court, by giving him a false promise of a compromise,
or where the defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney
fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat.
(Emphasis supplied) An action for annulment based on extrinsic
fraud must be brought within four years from discovery.
Petitioners alleged that they were made aware of the adoption
only in 2005. The filing of this petition on October 18, 2007 is
within the period allowed by the rules.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When fraud is employed by a party
precisely to prevent the participation of any other interested party,
then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was
committed through the use of forged documents or perjured
testimony during the trial.—When fraud is employed by a party
precisely to prevent the participation of any other interested
party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of
whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged
documents or perjured testi-
418

Castro vs. Gregorio
mony during the trial. Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and

Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to contest the
adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate,
the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose’s petition since
he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the law.
There can be no other conclusion than that because of Jose’s acts,
the trial court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent
circumstances.
Civil Law; Adoption; Domestic Adoption Act of 1993 (R.A. No.
8552); Republic Act (RA) No. 8552 fails to provide any provision
on the status of adoption decrees if the adoption is found to have
been obtained fraudulently.—The law itself provides for penal
sanctions for those who violate its provisions. Under Article VII,
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 8552: ARTICLE VII VIOLATIONS
AND PENALTIES SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties.—(a) The
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day
to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be imposed
on any person who shall commit any of the following acts: (i)
obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue
influence, fraud, improper material inducement, or other similar
acts; (ii) noncompliance with the procedures and safeguards
provided by the law for adoption; or (iii) subjecting or exposing the
child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or exploitation. (b) Any
person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a
child under the name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her biological
parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall be
punished by prisión mayor in its medium period and a fine not
exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (P50.000.00). (Emphasis supplied)
Unfortunately, Jose’s death carried with it the extinguishment of
any of his criminal liabilities. Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to
provide any provision on the status of adoption decrees if the
adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently. Petitioners
also cannot invoke Article VI, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8552
since rescission of adoption can only be availed of by the adoptee.
Petitioners, therefore, are left with no other remedy in law other
than the annulment of the judgment.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
419
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Castro vs. Gregorio

Raro, Trinidad & Cudia for petitioners.
Victor Dayrit Rodriguez for respondents.

LEONEN, J.:

The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain
harmony, there must be a showing of notice and consent.
This cannot be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all
instances where it appears that a spouse attempts to adopt
a child out of wedlock, the other spouse and other
legitimate children must be personally notified through
personal service of summons. It is not enough that they be
deemed notified through constructive service.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the
decision2 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
101021, which denied the petition for annulment of
judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the
appellate court sought to annul the judgment of the trial
court that granted respondents’ decree of adoption.3
The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose
Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina
Gregorio (Regina) by Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose). Jose is the
estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) and
the father of Joanne Benedicta Charissima M. Castro
(Joanne), also known by her baptismal name, “Maria
Socorro M. Castro” and her nickname, “Jayrose.”
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 3-29.

2 Id., at pp. 37-62. The decision was penned by Associate Justice
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando (Chairperson) and concurred in by
Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Rosalinda Asuncion
Vicente of the Special Former Seventh Division.
3 Id., at p. 37.
420

Castro vs. Gregorio
Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on

August 5, 1962 in Laoag City. Their marriage had allegedly
been troubled. They had a child, Rose Marie, who was born
in 1963, but succumbed to congenital heart disease and
only lived for nine days. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a
couple of months because of the incompatibilities between
them.4
Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969.
Rosario gave birth to Joanne a year later. She and Jose
allegedly lived as husband and wife for about a year even if
she lived in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose
would visit her in Manila during weekends. Afterwards,
they separated permanently because Rosario alleged that
Jose had homosexual tendencies.5 She insisted, however,
that they “remained friends for fifteen (15) years despite
their separation(.)”6
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition7 for adoption
before the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In
the petition, he alleged that Jed and Regina were his
illegitimate children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio
(Lilibeth),8 whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile
housekeeper.9 At the time of the filing of the petition, Jose
was 70 years old.10
According to the Home Study Report11 conducted by the
Social Welfare Officer of the trial court, Jose belongs to a
prominent and respected family, being one of the three
children of former Governor Mauricio Castro. He was also a
well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte.12 The report
mentioned
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 38-39 and 48.

5 Id., at pp. 39 and 48.
6 Id., at p. 49.
7 Id., at pp. 109-110.
8 Id., at p. 109.
9 Id., at p. 52.
10 Id., at p. 79.
11 Id., at pp. 79-82.
12 Id., at p. 80.
421
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Castro vs. Gregorio
that he was once married to Rosario, but the marriage

did not produce any children.13 It also stated that he met
and fell in love with Lilibeth in 1985, and Lilibeth was able
to bear him two children, Jed on August 1987, and Regina
on March 1989.14 Under “Motivation for Adoption,” the
social welfare officer noted:
Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata,

he was not able to fulfill his dreams to parent a child. However,
with the presence of his 2 illegitimate children will fulfill his
dreams [sic] and it is his intention to legalize their relationship
and surname. . . .15

At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with
Jed and Regina temporarily in Batac, Ilocos Norte.16 The
children have allegedly been in his custody since Lilibeth’s
death in July 1995.17
On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the
adoption,18 having ruled that “[n]o opposition had been
received by this Court from any person including the
government which was represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General.”19 A certificate of finality20 was issued on
February 9, 2006.
Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her
lawyer, Atty. Rene V. Saguisag, filed a complaint for
disbarment against Jose with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.21 In her complaint, she alleged that Jose had
been remiss in providing support for their daughter,
Joanne, for the past 36
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 79-80.

14 Id., at pp. 80 and 83-84.
15 Id., at p. 80.
16 Id., at p. 81.
17 Id., at p. 80.
18 Id., at pp. 87-90.
19 Id., at p. 87
20 Id., at p. 91.
21 Id., at pp. 168-173.
422

Castro vs. Gregorio
years.22 She alleged that she single-handedly raised and

provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had been
showering gifts to his driver and alleged lover, Larry R.
Rentegrado (Larry), and even went to the extent of
adopting Larry’s two children, Jed and Regina, without her
and Joanne’s knowledge and consent.23 She also alleged
that Jose made blatant lies to the trial court by alleging
that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with
Larry’s wife, Lilibeth, to cover up for his homosexual
relationship with Larry.24
In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Jose denies being remiss in his fatherly duties
to Joanne during her minority. He alleged that he always
offered help, but it was often declined.25 He also alleged
that he adopted Jed and Regina because they are his
illegitimate children. He denied having committed any of
the falsification alluded to by Rosario. He also stated that
he had suffered a stroke in 1998 that left him paralyzed.
He alleged that his income had been diminished because
several properties had to be sold to pay for medical
treatments.26 He then implored the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to weigh on the case with “justice and equity.”27
On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos
Norte.28
On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition
for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul
the October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court approving
Jed and Regina’s adoption.29
_______________
22 Id., at p. 168.
23 Id., at pp. 169-170.
24 Id., at p. 171.
25 Id., at p. 174.
26 Id., at pp. 175-176.
27 Id., at p. 176.
28 Id., at p. 122.
29 Id., at p. 38.
423
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Castro vs. Gregorio
In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they

learned of the adoption sometime in 2005.30 They allege
that Rosario’s affidavit of consent, marked by the trial
court as “Exh. K,”31 was fraudulent.32 They also allege that
Jed and Regina’s birth certificates showed different sets of
information, such as the age of their mother, Lilibeth, at
the time she gave birth. They argue that one set of birth
certificates states the father to be Jose and in another set
of National Statistics Office certificates shows the father to
be Larry, Jose’s driver and alleged lover.33 It was further
alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s
illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth
and Larry who were married at the time of their birth.34
On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the
petition.
While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court
to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, the appellate court
ruled that there is “no explicit provision in the rules that
the spouse and legitimate child of the adopter . . . should be
personally notified of the hearing.”35
The appellate court “abhor[red] the mind baffling
scheme employed by [Jose] in obtaining an adoption decree
in favor of [his illegitimate children] to the prejudice of the
interests of his legitimate heirs”36 but stated that its hands
were bound by the trial court decision that had already
attained “finality and immutability.”37
The appellate court also ruled that the alleged
fraudulent information contained in the different sets of
birth certificates
_______________
30 Id., at p. 9.
31 Id., at p. 14.
32 Id., at p. 40.
33 Id., at pp. 153-158 and 226-227.
34 Id., at pp. 41 and 136.
35 Id., at p. 59.
36 Id., at pp. 59-60.
37 Id., at p. 60.
424

Castro vs. Gregorio
required the determination of the identities of the

persons stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope
of the action for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud
was also perpetrated during the trial and could not be
classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action
for annulment of judgment.38
When Rosario and Joanne’s motion for reconsideration
was denied on July 10, 2009,39 they filed this petition.
The issue before this court is whether the Court of
Appeals erred in denying the petition for annulment for
failure of petitioners to (1) show that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction and (2) show the existence of extrinsic fraud.
In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate
court erred in its application of the law on extrinsic fraud
as ground to annul a judgment.40 They argue that because
of the fabricated consent obtained by Jose and the alleged
false information shown in the birth certificates presented
as evidence before the trial court,41 they were not given the
opportunity to oppose the petition since the entire
proceedings were concealed from them.42
Petitioners also argue that the appellate court
misunderstood and misapplied the law on jurisdiction
despite the denial of due process, notice, and noninclusion
of indispensable parties.43 They argue that the adoption of
illegitimate children requires the consent, not only of the
spouse, but also the legitimate children 10 years or over of
the adopter, and such consent was never secured from
Joanne.44
_______________
38 Id., at pp. 60-61.

39 Id., at pp. 98-99.
40 Id., at p. 13.
41 Id., at pp. 14-15.
42 Id., at p. 18.
43 Id., at p. 22.
44 Id., at pp. 26-27.
425
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Castro vs. Gregorio
Respondents, however, argue in their comment that

petitioners could not have been deprived of their day in
court since their interest was “amply protected by the
participation and representation of the Solicitor General
through the deputized public prosecutor.”45
Respondents also argue that there was constructive
notice through publication for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation, which constitutes not
only notice to them but also notice to the world of the
adoption proceedings.46 They argue that since the alleged
fraud was perpetrated during the trial, it cannot be said to
be extrinsic fraud but intrinsic fraud, which is not a ground
for annulment of judgment.47 They also argue that
petitioners were not indispensable parties because
adoption is an action in rem and, as such, the only
indispensable party is the state.48
The petition is granted.

Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure

Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
a party may file an action with the Court of Appeals to
annul judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil
actions of Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will only be
available if “the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.”49
_______________
45 Id., at p. 306.
46 Id., at p. 307.
47 Id., at pp. 311 and 313.
48 Id., at p. 313.
49 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47, Sec. 1.
426

Castro vs. Gregorio
In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of
Appeals:50
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so

exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other
remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or
final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court
lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy,
being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and
readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders
or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by
limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and
extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of
the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards
any of the safeguards cannot prosper.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a
judgment, final order or final resolution is understandable, for the
remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability and
unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner stone in the
dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability
and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid
delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to
make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an
end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors,
which is precisely why the courts exist. As to the first, a judgment
that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable
and is no longer to be modified in any respect even if the
modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or
of law, and whether the modification is made by the court that
rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land. As to the
latter, controversies cannot
_______________
50 G.R. No. 161122, September 24, 2012, 681 SCRA 580 [Per J.
Bersamin, First Division].
427
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 15, 2014 427

Castro vs. Gregorio
drag on indefinitely because fundamental considerations of public

policy and sound practice demand that the rights and obligations
of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite
period of time.51 (Emphasis supplied)
Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there

are only two grounds by which annulment of judgment may
be availed of: extrinsic fraud, which must be brought four
years from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which must
be brought before it is barred by estoppel or laches.52
Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of
jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter,
or lack of jurisdiction over the parties.53 Extrinsic fraud, on
the other hand, is “[that which] prevents a party from
having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the
court, or [that which] operates upon matters pertaining not
to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured.”54
_______________
51 Id., at pp. 586-587, citing People v. Bitanga, 552 Phil. 686, 693; 525
SCRA 623, 629 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Fraginal
v. Heirs of Toribia Belmonte Parañal, 545 Phil. 425, 432; 516 SCRA 530,
539 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Macalalag v.
Ombudsman, 468 Phil. 918, 923; 424 SCRA 741, 744-745 (2004) [Per J.
Vitug, Third Division]; Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 622
Phil. 215, 231; 607 SCRA 200, 213 (2009) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc];
Peña v. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), 533 Phil. 670, 689-
690; 502 SCRA 383, 404 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division];
Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo, 403 Phil. 498, 511; 350 SCRA 568, 578 (2001)
[Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
52 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47, Secs. 2 and 3.
53 Barco v. Court of Appeals, 465 Phil. 39, 57; 420 SCRA 162, 174
(2004) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
54 Bulawan v. Aquende, G.R. No. 182819, June 22, 2011, 652 SCRA
585, 594 [Per J. Carpio, Second Division], citing Alaban v. Court of
Appeals, 507 Phil. 682, 694; 470 SCRA 697, 708 (2005) [Per J. Tinga,
Second Division].
428

Castro vs. Gregorio
The grant of adoption over respondents should be

annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable
decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.

Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings vis-à-vis the
law on adoption

Petitioners argue that they should have been given
notice by the trial court of the adoption, as adoption laws
require their consent as a requisite in the proceedings.
Petitioners are correct.
It is settled that “the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.”55 As Jose filed the petition
for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 8552
56
which applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption
requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out
of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also
the consent of his legitimate children.
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the
husband must first obtain the consent of his wife if he
seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock:
ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt.—The following may adopt:
_______________
55 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Zenaida Bobiles, G.R. No. 92326,

January 24, 1992, 205 SCRA 356, 363 [Per J. Regalado, Second Division],
citing Ramos, et al. v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 148-B Phil. 1047,
1066; 41 SCRA 565, 583 (1971) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].
56 Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
429
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Castro vs. Gregorio
. . . .
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of
the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/
daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified,
his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . .
(Emphasis supplied)

The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the
husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption.
The rationale for this is stated in In Re: Petition for
Adoption of Michelle P. Lim:57
The use of the word “shall” in the above quoted provision

means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As
the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The
rule also insures harmony between the spouses.58

The law provides for several exceptions to the general
rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or
her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint
adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to
adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
_______________
57 606 Phil. 82; 588 SCRA 98 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
58 Id., at pp. 89-90; p. 106, citing Republic v. Toledano, G.R. No.
94147, June 8, 1994, 233 SCRA 9, 13 [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
430

Castro vs. Gregorio
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or

annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married
despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to
adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her
consent to the adoption. Jose, however, did not validly
obtain Rosario’s consent. His submission of a fraudulent
affidavit of consent in her name cannot be considered
compliance of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been
given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would
have had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of
the affidavit. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was
ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the
adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older. In
Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552:
SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption.—After

being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or
withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of
the following to the adoption is hereby required:
. . . .
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of
age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any. (Emphasis
supplied)

The consent of the adopter’s other children is necessary
as it ensures harmony among the prospective siblings. It
also sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they
will have to share their parent’s love and care, as well as
their future legitimes, with another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario’s
legitimate child and that she was over 10 years old at the
time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent,
therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose
manifested to the trial court that he and Rosario were
childless, thereby
431
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Castro vs. Gregorio
preventing Joanne from being notified of the

proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained,
the adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was
required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of
summons should have been effected on the spouse and all
legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights
are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice
as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural
technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive
statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on
Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly
acquired jurisdiction.

There was extrinsic fraud

The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that
while fraud may have been committed in this case, it was
only intrinsic fraud, rather than extrinsic fraud. This is
erroneous.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro Florece:59
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing

party in litigation committed outside of the trial of the case,
whereby the defeated party is prevented from fully
exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him
away from court, by giving him a false promise of a compromise,
or where the defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney
fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat.60
(Emphasis supplied)
_______________
59 G.R. No. 187409, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 323 [Per J. Reyes,
Second Division].
60 Id., at p. 327, citing Amihan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Romars International
Gases Corporation, G.R. No. 180819, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 406, 411 [Per
J. Nachura, Second Division].
432

Castro vs. Gregorio
An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must

be brought within four years from discovery.61 Petitioners
alleged that they were made aware of the adoption only in
2005. The filing of this petition on October 18, 2007 is
within the period allowed by the rules.
The badges of fraud are present in this case.
First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that
had no relation to any of the parties. Jose was a resident of
Laoag City, llocos Norte.62 Larry and Lilibeth were
residents of Barangay 6, Laoag City.63 Jed and Regina
were born in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.64 Rosario and
Joanne were residents of Parañaque City, Manila.65 The
petition for adoption, however, was filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte.66 The trial court gave
due course to the petition on Jose’s bare allegation in his
petition that he was a resident of Batac,67 even though it is
admitted in the Home Study Report that he was a
practicing lawyer in Laoag City.68
Second, using the process of delayed registration,69 Jose
was able to secure birth certificates for Jed and Regina
showing him to be the father and Larry as merely the
informant.70 Worse still is that two different sets of
fraudulent certificates were procured: one showing that
Jose and Lilibeth were married on December 4, 1986 in
Manila,71 and another wherein the portion for the mother’s
name was not filled in at all.72
_______________
61 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47, Sec. 3.

62 Rollo, p. 139.
63 Id., at p. 138.
64 Id., at p. 88.
65 Id., at pp. 4-5
66 Id., at pp. 87-90.
67 Id., at p. 109
68 Id., at p. 80.
69 Id., at pp. 155 and 158.
70 Id., at pp. 153 and 156.
71 Id., at pp. 154 and 157.
72 Id., at pp. 153 and 156.
433
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Castro vs. Gregorio
The birth certificates of Jed and Regina from the

National Statistics Office, however, show that their father
was Larry R. Rentegrado.73 These certificates are in clear
contradiction to the birth certificates submitted by Jose to
the trial court in support of his petition for adoption.
Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he
declared that his motivation for adoption was because he
and his wife, Rosario, were childless,74 to the prejudice of
their daughter, Joanne. The consent of Rosario to the
adoption was also disputed by Rosario and alleged to be
fraudulent.75
All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to
induce the trial court in approving his petition, but also to
prevent Rosario and Joanne from participating in the
proceedings or opposing the petition.
The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud
employed by Jose as intrinsic on the basis that they were
“forged instruments or perjured testimonies”76 presented
during the trial. It failed to understand, however, that
fraud is considered intrinsic when the other party was
either present at the trial or was a participant in the
proceedings when such instrument or testimony was
presented in court, thus:
[I]ntrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that

prevented a fair and just determination of the case, but the
difference is that the acts or things, like falsification and false
testimony, could have been litigated and determined at the trial
or adjudication of the case. In other words, intrinsic fraud does
not deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can guard
against that kind of fraud through so many means, including a
thorough trial preparation, a skillful, cross-examination,
_______________
73 Id., at pp. 226-227.

74 Id., at p. 80.
75 Id., at p. 14. The allegedly fraudulent affidavit of consent was not
attached in the Rollo.
76 Id., at p. 61.
434

Castro vs. Gregorio
resorting to the modes of discovery, and proper scientific or
forensic applications. Indeed, forgery of documents and evidence
for use at the trial and perjury in court testimony have been
regarded as not preventing the participation of any party in the
proceedings, and are not, therefore, constitutive of extrinsic fraud.
77
(Emphasis supplied)
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent

the participation of any other interested party, as in this
case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the
fraud was committed through the use of forged documents
or perjured testimony during the trial.
Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from
having a reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption.
Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the
trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose’s petition
since he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under
the law. There can be no other conclusion than that
because of Jose’s acts, the trial court granted the decree of
adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who
violate its provisions. Under Article VII, Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 8552:
ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties.—
_______________
77 Pinausukan Seafood House v. Far East Bank and Trust, G.R. No.
159926, January 20, 2014, 714 SCRA 226 <
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014
/january2014/159926.pdf> [Per J. Bersamin, First Division], citing Ybañez
v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 643, 656; 253 SCRA 540, 551 (1996) [Per J.
Francisco, Third Division] and Strait Times, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 356
Phil. 217, 226; 294 SCRA 717, 721-722 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, First
Division].
435
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 15, 2014 435

Castro vs. Gregorio
(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be
imposed on any person who shall commit any of the following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue
influence, fraud, improper material inducement, or other similar
acts;
(ii) noncompliance with the procedures and safeguards
provided by the law for adoption; or
(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger,
abuse, or exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the
birth of a child under the name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her
biological parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall
be punished by prisión mayor in its medium period and a fine not
exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00). (Emphasis supplied)

Unfortunately, Jose’s death carried with it the
extinguishment of any of his criminal liabilities.78 Republic
Act No. 8552 also fails to provide any provision on the
status of adoption decrees if the adoption is found to have
been obtained fraudulently. Petitioners also cannot invoke
Article VI, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 855279 since
rescission of adoption can only
_______________
78 Revised Penal Code, Art. 89.

79 Article VI of Rep. Act. No. 8552 provides:c
SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption.—Upon petition of the
adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over
eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the
adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by
the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the
adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of
the
436

Castro vs. Gregorio
be availed of by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are

left with no other remedy in law other than the annulment
of the judgment.
The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne’s
prejudice. There is reason to believe that Joanne has grown
up having never experienced the love and care of a father,
her parents having separated a year after her birth. She
has never even benefited from any monetary support from
her father. Despite all these adversities, Joanne was able to
obtain a medical degree from the University of the
Philippines College of Medicine80 and is now working as a
doctor in Canada.81 These accomplishments, however, are
poor substitutes if the injustice done upon her is allowed to
continue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision dated October 16, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court
of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17 in S.P. Proc. No. 3445-17
is rendered NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza and

Reyes,** JJ., concur.
Petition granted.
_______________
adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure

to comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to
rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the
adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.
80 Rollo, p. 169.
81 Id., at p. 5.
* * Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1844 dated
October 14, 2014.
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 15, 2014 437

Castro vs. Gregorio
Personal service of summons should and always be the

first option, and it is only when the said summons cannot
be served within a reasonable time can the process server
resort to substituted service. (Planters Development Bank
vs. Chandumal, 680 SCRA 269 [2012])
——o0o——
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4/11/23, 3:58 PM CentralBooks:Reader

VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 415

G.R. No. 164948. June 27, 2006.

DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Landingin vs. Republic

VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 417

Landingin vs. Republic

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 419

420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows:

VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 421

422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 423

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration

1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED

424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

thus be sustained to promote and fulfill these

rights of the parents over the child.

VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 425

(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 427

Q Where is the mother of these three children now?

A Yes, sir, she got two kids.

Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:

Q Where is your mother now?

428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Q When did your mother left for Italy?

V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for Adoption:

VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 429

430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 431

432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 433

Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Chico-

434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM, petitioner.

VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 99

In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim,

100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim,

VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 101

In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim,

The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June

102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 103

The Ruling of the Trial Court

7 Records (SPL. Proc. Case No. 1258), pp. 147-148.

104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Court’s Ruling

Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife

VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 105

106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

12 Republic v. Toledano, G.R. No. 94147, 8 June 1994, 233 SCRA 9.

VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 107

These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt

13 Article 209, Family Code.

108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED