CHAPTER 7

History — Historicism

(From: “Men among the Ruins” by Julius Evola)

At the end of chapter 1, when discussing the premises proper to the

revolutionary- conservative idea, I declared my intention to return to the
topic of historicism. I will do so in this chapter, also in order to introduce
the topics that I will analyze later (e.g., choice of traditions; the third
dimension of history; domestic clarifications [concerning Italy]). What I
will say may cause a few difficulties for those who have not renounced
the historicist mindset.
We should begin by noticing that the emphasis given to the notion of
“history” is recent and alien to every normal civilization; much more so is
the personification of history into some kind of mystical entity that is the
object of a superstitious faith, as are many of the other personified
abstractions that have become fashionable in an age that claims to be
“positivist” and “scientific.” Many people are accustomed to writing
History with a capital H, just as in the past the first letter of a name of a
deity was capitalized.
The first and more general meaning of historicism refers to the
collapse or disastrous shift from a civilization of being (characterized by
stability, form, and adherence to super- temporal principles) to a
civilization of becoming (characterized by change, flux, and contingency).
26 This should be our starting point. In a second phase, values have been
inverted, and this caving-in has come to be seen as a positive thing that
not only should not be resisted, but also should be accepted, extolled, and
willed. On this basis, the ideas of History, “progress,” and “evolution” have
been intimately associated with one another; thus, historicism has often
appeared as an integral part of the progressive and enlightened
nineteenth century, constituting the background of rationalist, scientific,
and technological civilization.
Aside from this, historicism in a specific sense is the basic view of the
philosophy, originally inspired by Hegel, that was represented in Italy by
the philosophers Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile. I will now
expound upon the spirit and the “morality” of the latter type of
historicism.
As it is known, Hegel saw a coincidence between the spheres of reality
and of rationality, hence his famous axiom: “Everything that is real is
rational, and everything that is rational is real.” I will not examine this
problem from a meta-physical perspective, or sub specie aeternitatis
[from the perspective of eternity]. However, it is certain that from a
concrete and human point of view this axiom is dubious for two reasons.
The first reason is that, in order for it to be useful, one would first have to
know directly, a priori, and in a determinate way what must be called
“rational” and used as the order or the law that History and every event
are always supposed to reflect. The disagreement among historicists on
this issue is significant: the truth is that each one of them is inspired by
his own subjective speculations, on the level of college philosophy; what
is truly lacking here is even the most modest birdʼs- eye view that is
required to grasp not only what lies beyond the world of phenomena, but
also what is hidden behind the most evident causes of historical
upheavals. The second reason is that (even if we were to believe in what
this or that philosopher postulates as “rational”) in the course of ordinary
experience it is not possible to detect the complete identity of the rational
and the real; thus, we may wonder if one affirming this identity calls
something “real” because it is rational, or vice versa, if he calls something
“rational” only because it is merely real, or because it presents itself as
factual reality.
Even without engaging in an appropriate philosophical critique—as
I have done elsewhere, when I criticized so-called “transcendental
idealism”27—this suffices to expose the ambiguous and ephemeral
character of historicism. It is precisely because we live in the world of
becoming, which is characterized by a rapid change of events,
circumstances, and forces, that on the one hand historicism reduces
itself to a “passive philosophy of the fait accompli” and a theory that
bestows a “rationality” on everything that has successfully asserted
itself;28 on the other hand, historicism may equally promote
“revolutionary” claims when one does not want to acknowledge the real
as “rational.” In this case, in the name of “reason” and “History,”
interpreted to oneʼs advantage, a condemnation is passed on what is. A
third solution is still possible, as a mixture of the previous two—namely,
to label everything as “anti-History” that seeks to assert itself or that tends
to realize or to restore an order other than the existing one, yet without
succeeding except to justify it and to lend a “rationality” to it, in the case
of its victory and assertion, since by then it has become “real.” Thus,
depending on the situation, historicism may be equally on the side of a
second-rate conservatism or that of revolutionary utopias, or, as probably
occurs more often, on the side of those who know how to adapt to
changing circumstances, shifting allegiance according to which way the
wind blows. Thus, “History” and “anti-History” become slogans devoid of
any concrete content that may be used in both senses, according to
personal preferences, in the context of a dice game that representatives
of this view call “dialectics” or “historical dialectics.”
The typical example of this was the development that occurred in
Germany, out of the premises of Hegelian historicism, of both a theory of
authority and of the absolute State on the one hand (a worthless theory
behind a system that, being rooted in traditional values, had no need
whatsoever for a philosophical justification), and of the Marxist
revolutionary and “dialectical” ideology on the other. A more recent
example, in Italy, is the enmity between Gentile and Croce, both of whom
were committed historicists. However, Gentile, by assuming as rational
what asserted itself in the political arena, bestowed the character of
“historicity” upon Fascism, putting his philosophy at its service.
Conversely, Croce, due to his personal and ideological preferences,
thought the “rational” corresponded to liberal anti- Fascism; thus, he
stigmatized the Fascist order, although it was “real,” as being
“antihistorical.” After the wind changed direction, many people who were
yesterdayʼs Fascists awoke a few years later as anti-Fascists; these
turncoats may be regarded as the representatives of the third
possibility—becoming up-to-date about what “History” and its
“rationality” will desire from time to time.29These brief references show
what historicism amounts to. It is essentially a formless, useless, and vain
philosophy, at times even cowardly and opportunistic; it is either
unrealistic or coarsely realistic, depending on the circumstances. But
aside from the lucubrations of historicism as a philosophy and the
corresponding mental deformity of which a sector of Italian academic
culture is guilty, we must expose the myth of History with the capital H,
especially when this myth fosters the narcosis of those who are not aware
of the forces they have surrendered to, and when it helps those who want
the current to become more rapid, any opposition to cease, and the last
dams to be broken; appealing to the “sense of history,” these people
stigmatize every attitude different from their own as “antihistorical” or
“reactionary.”
This type of historicism, when it is not a senseless hallucination of
shipwrecked people, is obviously the smokescreen behind which the
forces of world subversion operate. Surprisingly enough, even among
those who yearn to restore the old order there are some who are not
aware of this; they are unable to reject the historicist myth in all of its
forms, failing to acknowledge that it is men who make or undo history, if
given the opportunity. We must be opposed to any consecration and
“rationalization” of the status quo and must deny any acknowledgment of
the forces or currents that have assumed power. We should recall that the
anathema of being “antihistorical” and “outside of history” is cast against
those who still remember the way things were before and who call
subversion by its name, instead of conforming to the processes that are
precipitating the worldʼs decline.
Having made this clear, man is restored to a fundamental freedom of
movement; at the same time, the groundwork is laid for a possible
investigation aimed at judging the effective influences that have promoted
this or that upheaval in history. In regard to the first point, what I have
said will constitute the introduction to the next topic, the choice of
traditions. Having overcome all historicism, we are rid of both the idea
that the past is something that mechanically determines the present and
the concept of a teleological, evolutionary, and transcendental law that,
for all practical purposes, leads us back to determinism. Then, every
historical factor will appear to have a conditioning role, but never a
determining role. The possibility of an active attitude toward the past will
be safeguarded, especially the possibility to uphold everything that is
inspired by super-temporal values.
After these general references, I wish to examine some historical
problems concerning Italy.