Field Fortifications Part 1

FIELD
FORTIFICATIONS
THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS
:>&&
FIELD FORTIFICATIONS
Course in Field Engineering
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
1926
THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS PRESS
FORT LEAVENWOETH, KANSAS
666—3-10-26—6M
1926
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
1 9 2 6
Introduction
1. This text treats of the selection and occupation of
ground for defense, and of the methods employed in plan
ning, laying out, and constructing field fortifications. It
deals primarily with the defensive in mobile situations, but
refers to stabilized situations to the extent deemed necessary
to show the trend of field fortification development when
a mobile situation is followed by stabilization. In a stabi
lized situation of long duration such as existed on the West
ern Front during the World War, works of field fortifica
tion are developed to a degree precluded by the conditions
of mobile warfare. Such works, like those used in the
attack and defense of fortified places, require separate
treatment.
2. The first operations of opposing land forces after
declaration of war, in general, will be conducted under
mobile warfare conditions, and the correct application of
field fortifications under such conditions may have a pro
found influence on the outcome of the campaign. One of
the contending forces, if compelled to adopt the defensive
by reason of a stronger, better prepared, or more aggres
sive opponent, may, by the proper use of field fortifications,
avoid an adverse decision and bring about a stabilized situa
tion from which it may eventually emerge, victorious.
Therefore, a correct understanding of the employment of
field fortifications in mobile situations is of first impor
tance to officers of all grades.
3. This text is not a field fortification manual, and,
except as considered necessary for a clear understanding of
the subject matter involved, details of works and methods
INTRODUCTION
of construction have been omitted. Such details may be

found in War Department publications.
H. J. BREES,
Colonel, Cavalry (D.O.L.),
Assistant Commandant.
APPROVED:
EDW. L. KING,
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,
Commandant.
IV
Glossary of 'Terms
Approach trench.—A trench providing protected communi
cation between the front and rear elements of a defen
sive position.
Area, outpost.—That part of a defensive system in front of
the battle position, in which a part of the force on the
defensive is disposed for observation and security and,
in some cases, for delaying or disorganizing general
attacks. It may consist of mutually supporting organ
ized tactical localities, a more or less fully organized
position, or a combination of both. A line of resistance
is always prescribed.
Battalion reserve line.—One of the lines of a battle position.
Its trace is defined by the combat locations of the re
serves of battalions holding the main line of resistance.
Center of resistance.—An organized tactical locality con
sisting of two or more strong points, so disposed as
to provide for all around defense of the locality. It
is under command of a single officer and is usually
garrisoned by a battalion of infantry with one or more
platoons of the howitzer company attached.
Class of defense.—The method of conduct of defensive com
bat as determined by the mission of the defending force
and the enemy situation. The classes of defense are:
(a) The active defense—to gain a tactical victory
by temporarily developing and containing the enemy
and then striking a decisive blow.
(b) The passive defense—to hold a specified area,
position, or front against hostile attacks.
Combat group.—The smallest organized tactical locality in
a defensive system. Its garrison varies from a squad
to a platoon. It always is prepared for defense to the
front and flanks and, when practicable, to the rear.
Communication trenches.—A term occasionally used to des
ignate those trenches of a defensive position intended
for communication, both perpendicular and parallel to
the front. The former are approach trenches; the lat
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
ter connect the organized tactical localities along the

several lines of the position, and are sometimes desig
nated as "parallels."
Communications.—The routes by which troops or supplies
are moved. They include roads, trails, railroads, and
navigable waterways.
Defensive system.—A series of organized areas or positions
arranged in depth for coordinated use in the defense
of a given front.
Defensive zone.—A defensive zone consists of a battle posi
tion, covered by an organized outpost area. It may in
clude reserve battle and switch positions.
Fire trench.—A trench designed and constructed so as to
facilitate the delivery of fire.
Form of defense.—The tactical dispositions and defensive
measures taken for defensive combat. The several
forms of defense are:
(a) The deployed defense—deployment on the ter
rain without its thorough preparation for defense. .
(b) The position defense—a defense in a single well
organized position.
(c) The zone defense—a defense in which an organ
ized outpost position or area is utilized to assist in
the defense of the battle position by delaying and dis
organizing the enemy attack before it reaches the lat
ter.
Front line. The line connecting the most advanced organ
ized elements of a unit, exclusive of patrols.
Limiting point.—The point where one of the lines of a de
fensive position intersects a sector boundary, and where
defensive works constructed on that line are coordi
nated by adjacent units.
Line of resistance.—The line on which the principal defense
of a position or area is made. The base line of a defen
sive position; i.e., the line which controls the location
of the elements of the defense.
Main line of resistance.—The line of resistance of the bat
tle position.
VI
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Mutual support.—Reciprocal protection of the front, rear,

or flanks of adjacent organized tactical localities, by
the fire of their garrisons.
Observation post.—A place from which the fire of a unit
of artillery, machine guns, or trench mortars is ob
served, corrected, or controlled; or from which enemy
movements and activities are observed.
Organization of the ground.—The preparation of terrain for
defense by the construction of works for the purpose of
interfering with and delaying hostile attacks, providing
protection from hostile fire, and facilitating fire con
trol, command, movement, supply, and evacuation.
Position.—A belt of terrain occupied or organized for de
fense.
Position, battle.—A position on which it is intended to fight
a decisive action.
Position, outpost.—A position intended for defensive action
by the outpost.
Position, reserve battle.—A position selected for use as a
battle position in case of unsuccessful defense of the
initial battle position. It may be selected only, or or
ganized wholly or in part. It is located at such dis
tance to the rear as to be beyond effective range of
enemy light artillery emplaced for the attack against
the initial battle position.
Position, switch.—A position oblique to the front connecting
positions of a defensive system with each other. It
is intended to prevent exploitation to the flank by at
tacks which penetrate into the defensive system, and
to serve as a base of departure for counterattacks.
Regimental reserve line.—One of the lines of a battle posi
tion. Its trace is defined by the combat locations of
the reserves of regiments holding sectors of the battle
position.
Sector.—A subdivision of a defensive system or of a posi
tion, defined by lines approximately perpendicular to
the front, and assigned to a unit for defense.
Vll
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Sector boundary.—A line, defined in general by designating

successive points from rear to front, which separates
adjacent sectors and areas of responsibility for distant
defense by fire. Unless otherwise stated it is assumed
to be straight between successive points.
Strong point.—An organized tactical locality consisting of
two or more combat groups so disposed as to provide for
defense to the front and flanks, and whenever prac
ticable, to the rear. It is under command of a single
officer, and usually garrisoned by a company of infantry.
Support line.—The line of a position defined by the combat
locations of the supports of companies holding the line
of resistance.
Tactical locality.—A terrain feature, possessing natural de
fensive strength and so located that it can form part
of a defensive organization. Combat groups, strong
points, and centers of resistance are referred to as
"organized tactical localities."
Trace.—The projection on the ground of one of the lines
of a position, or of the firing crest of a trench.
VU1
Contents
Page
INTRODUCTION iii
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
CHAPTER I
PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION FOR DEFENSE
Page
SECTION I.—Organization of the Ground—General- 1
Situations affecting organization of the ground—Influ
ence of class and form of defense—General principles of or
ganization of the ground and its defense—Sectors—Sectors
of fire.
SECTION II.—Employment of Weapons in Defense 9
General considerations—Infantry weapons—Supporting
weapons—Gas.
CHAPTER II
ORGANIZATION OF A DEFENSIVE SYSTEM
SECTION I.—The Battle Position 21
Relative importance and general organization—Line of
resistance—Supports—Battalion reserve line—Regimental
reserve line—Development of the position—Limiting points—
Machine gun plan—Centers of resistance—Strong points—
Combat groups—Defense of intervals—Extent of command—
Defensive works—Representation of defensive organization.
SECTION II.—The Outpost Area 44
The outpost—Development in zone defense.
SECTION III.—Procedure in Organization of the Ground 49
Preparatory steps—Reconnaissance*—Duties of successive
commanders—Procedure under different situations—Relative
importance of works.
CHAPTER III
CONSTRUCTION OF DEFENSIVE WORKS
SECTION I.—Types and Methods 58
General discussion—Use of troops in construction—Tools
and materials—Machine gun emplacements—Trenches—Clear
ings—Obstacles—Emplacements for artillery, etc.—Com
mand and observation posts—Shelters.
ix
CONTENTS
CHAPTER IV
PRINCIPLES AND EXECUTION OP THE WORK OF
CAMOUFLAGE
SECTION I.—Camouflage 88
Definition and purpose—Airplane photographs—Influ

ence of location—Camouflage discipline—Application.
SECTION II.—Execution of Work of Camouflage 93
Camouflage work in A.E.F.—Present organization—
Camouflage work by troops—Screening.
CHAPTER V
ILLUSTRATIVE PROBLEM
SECTION I.—Organization of a Division Sector 97
SECTION II.—Organization of a Brigade Sector 105
SECTION III.—Organization of a Regimental Sector 108
SECTION IV.—Organization of a Battalion Sector 117
SECTION V.—Organization of an Outpost Area 123
1—1-2
CHAPTER I
Principles of Organization
for Defense
Paragraphs
SECTION I.—Organization of the Ground—General 1-5
II.—Employment of Weapons in Defense 6-9
SECTION I
Organization of the Ground—General
Paragraph
Situations affecting organization of the ground 1
Influence of class and form of defense 2
General principles of organization of the ground and its defense 3
Sectors 4
Sectors of fire 5
1. SITUATION AFFECTING ORGANIZATION OF THE

GROUND.—Defensive combat is employed in either offen
sive or defensive operations to offer resistance to hostile
advance or attack. Organization of the ground for defen
sive combat may be undertaken, therefore, under one of the
following situations:
a. In contact with the enemy on an active front;
b. When contact with the enemy has not been obtained
but is expected in a limited time;
c. Out of presence of the enemy, or where work can be
carried on with very little, if any, enemy interference.
2. INFLUENCE OF CLASS AND FORM OF DEFENSE.—a.
The class of defensive combat to be employed (active or
passive) is determined primarily by strategical and tactical
considerations.
b. The form of defense to be used (deployed, position,
or zone) is determined by the class of defense adopted, the
1—2-3
2 FIELD FORTIFICATIONS
time available for defensive dispositions, and the size of the

force involved.
c. A force undertaking the passive defense may,
through lack of time, first use the deployed defense, later
developing into the position defense and eventually into
the zone defense.
d. In general, the maximum organization of the ground
is required by the passive defense, less being required by
the active defense.
e. In the passive defense, divisions and smaller units
when acting alone usually will employ the position defense.
The detached corps may employ either the position or the
zone defense, depending on the situation, while the army
will usually make use of the zone defense, though frequently
compelled by the situation to use the position defense ini
tially.
/. In general, after the work has been planned and
staked out, the position occupied, and the troops equipped
and supplied for the task at hand, a period of six hours is
considered the minimum time required for organization of
the ground for a position defense.
3. GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING ORGANIZATION OF
THE GROUND AND ITS DEFENSE.—a. In selecting ground
for defense, the general line to be followed depends, as a
rule, upon broad considerations, such as the defense of a
frontier, an important seaport, or railway center; a vital
line of communications; or a territory containing important
natural resources such as mines, manufacturing establish
ments, etc. These constitute the objective to be covered.
b. Any plan of defense on a front of any importance
will provide for a defensive system consisting of a battle
position, covered by an outpost area. (See Figure 1.) The
outpost area will have its front line from 1500 to 4000
yards in advance of the main line of resistance. The lesser
distance is determined by the consideration that the out
post always should prevent the emplacement of hostile ma
chine guns and trench mortars within effective range of
the main line of resistance; and the greater distance, by the
consideration that artillery located in rear of the battle
1—3
PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION FOR DEFENSE 3
position should be able to place effective fire from 1500 to

2000 yards beyond the front line. The troops in the out
post area provide security for the battle position by screen
rganize
6arfl&
Posihon
Division
Figura 1
A DEFENSIVE ZONE.
ing it from enemy ground observation, by repulsing minor

attacks or raids, and by giving warning of impending
enemy attacks. By observation of the enemy and by raids.
1—3
they secure information of impending general attacks, and,

in case of a surprise attack, they offer the initial resistance
to the enemy advance and thereby enable the troops in the
battle position to be in readiness to receive the attack.
Whether the outpost troops fall back on the battle position
in case of attack or whether they resist in place, depends
on the entire situation and is made known to them when
they occupy the outpost area. A change in procedure may
become necessary during the battle. When the outpost
troops fight in place, serving as a buffer to absorb the shock
of the attack, deprive it of momentum, and break up the
enemy organization, a battle ensues over a zone of con
siderable depth, which is characteristic of the form of de
fense known as "zone defense."
c. In some situations in zone defense, the importance
of the front held, and the quantity and power of enemy
artillery, require that the main line of resistance be placed
far enough in rear of the front line to be beyond effective
range of the bulk of the hostile guns—6000 to 8000 yards.
This depth of outpost area is too great to permit adequate
support of the outpost from the battle position and some
troops, infantry and artillery, must then be located between
the front line and the battle position to support the forward
outpost elements and supplement their action in delaying
and disorganizing hostile attacks. (See Figure l a . )
d. When the troops in the outpost area fall back on
the battle position without any serious effort to delay the
enemy or to break up his attack organization, or when the
enemy situation has prevented the organization of an out
post beyond effective small arms range of the main line of
resistance, the defensive battle to all intents and purposes
is fought on one position, which is characteristic of the
"position defense."
e. The battle position is the vital part of any defensive
system. Its location is determined by the consideration
that observation points for the control of artillery fire must
be protected and kept available to the defenders. The bulk
of the defender's troops are assigned to the defense of the
battle position. If the defense is to be regarded as reason
1—3
PRINCIPLES OP ORGANIZATION FOR DEFENSE
front Une
lineofOtoma
hot) of Outpost)
Organized
TacticQl
Localities
Organized
Tactical
Localities
Organized
Rattle
Position
Artillery
and
Local "Res
+•'Bngade Sector -If—Brg
Division Sector
Figure 1-a
A DEFENSIVE ZONE WITH DEEP OUTPOST AREA.
1—3
ably successful, the enemy's attack must be stopped in front

of the battle position, or else he must be ejected from it and
the battle position must be in the defender's possession at the
conclusion of the battle. In the zone defense, from the view
point of an army commander, a successful defense is not
achieved until the enemy, stopped in front of the battle
position, has been ejected from the zone by a general counter
attack, and the original front of the zone restored. Corps
and division commanders charged with maintaining the in
tegrity of the battle position may, however, consider their
defense successful, if, when the enemy's advance is stopped,
the battle position in their sectors remains intact.
/. On an extended defensive front, both the position
and the zone defense may be in use at the same time in
contiguous sectors of large units, and organization of the
ground for zone defense may vary from the minimum depth
to the maximum. Variations in the form of defense or in
the depth of a defensive zone on the same front are due to
the configuration of the terrain, to the relative importance
of the several sectors, as well as to the amount and power
of the artillery of the enemy and his facilities for observa
tion over the area behind the front lines. The tactical im
portance of terrain on or close to the front line may demand
that it be held at all costs. In such a case, if the enemy's
situation prevents the establishment of an adequate outpost
area for zone defense, the position defense must be used.
The depth of a defensive zone will ordinarily be reduced
where the terrain has unusual defensive strength or does
not lend itself readily to a deep organization. On the other
hand, increases in depth of a defensive zone will be made
where the sectors are more important and heavy hostile
attacks more probable, or where the enemy possesses good
observation over extended areas in rear of the defender's
front line. As the expenditure of labor and material for
a defensive zone increases directly with its depth, all factors
must be carefully considered in order to secure an adequate
defense without subjecting the troops to unnecessary labor,
or causing an undue expenditure of materials. Therefore,
1—3
no fixed, unvarying depth for a defensive zone can be pre

scribed.
g. In any defensive situation, the commander must al
ways have in mind the possibility of defeat on the selected
battle position and the necessity for a continuation of the
defense farther to the rear. Depending on the time avail
able and the importance of the front held, an additional
battle position may be provided for as follows:
(1) The position may be selected from the map without
reconnaissance.
(2) The position may be reconnoitered and a plan of organi
zation prepared.
(3) The position may be staked out and partly or wholly
organized.
Such a position is designated as the "reserve battle

position." On highly important fronts, additional positions
in rear of the reserve battle position may be selected, recon
noitered, or staked out. The selection of the reserve battle
position and other positions in rear is based on placing each
position at such a distance in rear of the battle position
next in front, that the enemy, after having successfully
attacked a forward position, will have to advance the bulk
of his artillery before undertaking the attack of the next
battle position. However, the configuration of the terrain
may require some modification in the application of this
rule.
h. In addition to the several positions of a defensive
zone paralleling the front, additional positions oblique to
the front and connecting a forward position with those in
rear are provided. These oblique positions, designated
"Switch Positions" are established on the flanks of locali
ties in the defensive system where, due to lack of natural
defensive strength or other reasons, there is a probability
of an enemy penetration. Attacks against a defensive zone
must be exploited to the flanks as the advance progresses,
in order to break through the defensive organization on a
front broad enough to insure success, and to counteract the
narrowing of the initial front of attack by the resistance of
the defense. Switch positions are planned to resist exploi
tation by the enemy to the flanks of a penetration, to insure
1—3-4
continuity of the front when forward defenses have been

broken through, and finally to provide a line from which
general counterattack against the flank of a penetration may
be started. Depending on their importance, switch posi
tions will be organized to a greater or less extent, but usu
ally, due to lack of time and materials, only the most im
portant tactical localities along the position will be fully
organized.
4. SECTORS.—a. The commander of a force on the de
fensive divides his front into sectors and assigns them to
the several units for occupation, organization, and defense.
In subdividing his front into sectors, each commander is
guided by the following:
(1) Important tactical localities should as far as practicable
be included within the sector of a single unit. Therefore, sector
boundaries should follow generally the natural lines which sub
divide the terrain.
(2) The width of sectors should vary according to the nature
of the terrain. In a terrain which lends itself to easy defense,
the sectors are wide and lightly held. On the other hand, in
terrain where by reason of covered means of approach the enemy
is able to advance close to a position without serious exposure,
sectors are made narrow and occupied more strongly.
b. Sectors are designated by the size of the unit occupy
ing them, and a sector may be specifically designated by
the name of the unit assigned to its defense as: "1st Divi
sion Sector." In terrain organized for defense and occu
pied for long periods, sectors, particularly those of larger
units, may be designated by the name of some prominent
geographical feature included therein as: "Gettysburg Sec
tor."
c. Sector boundaries indicate the lateral limits of the
portion of the defensive front for the defense of which the
unit occupying the sector is responsible. Sector boundaries
extend forward of the front line sufficiently to include
ground within effective range of the weapons of the unit
concerned, and thus they define the area for which the unit
occupying the sector is responsible for covering by fire in
distant defense. Within brigade and regimental sectors,
smaller units (battalions, companies, and platoons) organize
and hold tactical localities, but their responsibilities for
1—4-6
defense are fixed by sector boundaries which extend suffi

ciently to the front to define responsibility for distant de
fense by fire, and to the rear to include the location of their
rearmost combat elements.
5. SECTORS OF FIRE.—It must be borne in mind that
while the extension of sector boundaries to the front defines
the responsibilities of the several units for distant defense,
the fire of units for close defense cannot be restricted to
lanes leading straight to the front. Each unit on the de
fensive must be given the definite mission of covering the
front of adjacent units by fire in close defense, especially at
those points where the terrain within the adjacent sector
cannot be reached by the fire of the unit occupying that
sector. Sectors of fire of units are therefore not restricted
by sector boundaries; but by application of the principle
of mutual support, dead spaces are eliminated and no part
of the terrain immediately in front of the line of resistance
of a position is left untouched by the fire of the defense.
SECTION II
Employment of Weapons in Defense

Paragraph
General considerations 6
Infantry weapons 7
Supporting weapons 8
Gas 9
6. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.—a. A successful defense

depends primarily on an effective combination of the fires
of the various weapons at the disposal of the defender.
Therefore, the following brief discussion of the characteris
tics of the several weapons and their use in defense is intro
duced before taking up the organization of the ground in
detail. Weapons may be broadly classified as infantry
weapons and supporting weapons; the former being used
by, and the latter in support of, the infantry.
1—6-7
b. The infantry weapons are the rifle (with bayonet

for individual combat), automatic rifle, rifle grenade, hand
grenade, machine gun, 37-mm. gun, 3-inch trench mortar,
and tanks. The first four form the armament of the squad
of the rifle company. In each squad there are seven rifles
(one equipped with a grenade discharger) and one auto
matic rifle. Squads are trained in the combined employ
ment of all four weapons for offense and defense.
c. The infantry is supported by the weapons of the
artillery.
7. INFANTRY WEAPONS.—a. The rifle.— (1) The rifle,
in the hands of a well trained rifleman, and at short ranges,
has a rate of ten to fifteen well aimed shots per minute.
Depending on the size of the visible target and the skill of
the riflemen, its fire is effective against individual targets at
maximum ranges of 600 to 1000 yards. Kifle fire is seldom
used to advantage against materiel.
(2) Other things being equal, the rifle is more effective
in the defense than in the attack. This is due to the pro
tection afforded by field fortifications, greater stability in
aiming, and better knowledge of the range.
(3) The rifle is primarily the infantry weapon for
frontal fire and for use against distributed targets.
b. The automatic rifle.— (1) The automatic rifle is
habitually fired semiautomatically. When fired at the same
rate as the rifle, its effectiveness is the same; however, due
to the fact that it can be effectively fired at from 40 to 60
shots per minute and to its superior fire control, the auto
matic rifle is equal to several rifles. Its mobility is practi
cally the same as that of the rifle. Its capacity for produc
ing rapidly a large volume of concentrated fire from a nar
row front makes it extremely valuable for flanking fire; but
in the absence of a fixed mount, it cannot be laid on a definite
line like a machine gun and for such a mission the latter is
superior, especially when darkness, fog, or smoke makes
observation of fire effect impracticable. The automatic
rifle also lacks the capacity of the machine gun for sus
tained fire over long periods.
1—7
(2) In the defense it is used for covering dead spaces

in the bands of flanking fire laid down by machine guns,
covering intervals between organized tactical localities, de
livering flanking fire in front of its own or adjacent combat
groups, and for frontal fire against an enemy advancing
toward it. Generally it will not be restricted to definite
lines of fire, but will execute those missions which provide
the best coordination with the fires of other weapons.
c. Grenades.—Grenades are high angle fire weapons
especially adapted for use in close combat against an enemy
that cannot be reached directly with other weapons. In
addition to being employed as high explosive projectiles,
grenades may be used, in favorable situations, as vehicles
for smoke, gases, or other chemicals. They include both
rifle and hand grenades, the special characteristic of each
being as follows:
(1) The rifle grenade has a range of from 30 to 200 yards
and can be fired from a fixed rest, which permits accurate regis
tration.
(2) The hand grenade has an average effective range of
30 to 40 yards*and is especially useful in trench fighting and
in close combat in woods or villages. Its use in mobile situa
tions will be unusual.
d. Machine guns.— (1) Each infantry battalion has in

addition to three rifle companies, a machine gun company
equipped with eight machine guns, organized in two pla
toons of two sections with two guns each. Therefore, the
number of machine guns assigned to the defense of a given
sector of a defensive front will depend on the disposition
of the infantry responsible for its defense. In planning his
defensive organization, if a commander deems the normal
quota of machine guns insufficient for the defense of the
organized tactical localities garrisoned by his battalions, he
should utilize part of the machine guns of his reserve bat
talions for this purpose.
(2) For defense of a battle position sufficient machine
guns should be available for the following:
(a) To develop a continuous band of flanking fire in front
of the main line of resistance and such of the other lines of the
position as may be necessary.
1—7
(b) For distribution in depth to coyer the rear and flanks of,
and the intervals between, the organized tactical localities on
the successive lines of the position.
(c) For delivering fire on the terrain in front of the battle
position for its defense, or to support elements of the defense
in advance of the battle position.
(3) (a) Machine guns employed in the defense of a
battle position are assigned missions which may be one or
a combination of the following:
(i) To cover a given sector of fire by employing direct lay
ing on any suitable target which may appear in it.
(ii) To protect by flanking fire a given tactical locality
against assault.
(iii) To support counterattacks.
(iv) To deliver fire by indirect laying on designated areas.
(v) To deliver antiaircraft fire.
(b) A machine gun is located with a view to the effec
tive execution of its most important mission which is usu
ally the covering of a given sector by direct laying. The
gun is sited so that it also may deliver a fixed band of graz
ing fire across the front or flanks of the tactical locality to
be protected. This band of fire is known as the final pro
tective line. In front of a line of resistance, it is linked
up with those of other guns so as to form a continuous belt
of flanking fire. Dead spaces in this belt are covered by
automatic rifles, 3-inch trench mortars, and artillery. In
case assault is imminent, guns are switched from firing upon
targets within their sectors to their final protective lines.
(c) Machine guns which, because of intervening ob
jects, are unable to fire by direct laying at the beginning of
an attack, are given missions of delivering fire by indirect
laying on approaches or important areas on call. This
mission is first in order of occurrence but second in order
of importance to that of delivering fire by direct laying.
If forward guns are given indirect fire missions on enemy
approaches, such missions usually will be executed from al
ternate emplacements, in order not to disclose prematurely,
the emplacements for direct fire missions. The area covered
by a single gun using indirect laying varies with the range.
An average area may be taken as 25 yards wide by 100
yards deep.
1—7
(4) A plan for the location and employment of machine

guns in defense of a given sector is governed by the follow
ing considerations:
(a) Guns located near the main line of resistance must
be sited, if possible, so as to link their final protective lines
into a continuous band of flanking fire in front of the line
of resistance. Guns located in the vicinity of the battalion
and regimental reserve lines are sited to cover the flanks of,
and intervals between, the organized tactical localities in
their front and to place bands of fire in front of the lines
on which located.
(b) When a machine gun is firing over level or uni
formly sloping ground at a range of 700 yards, the lowest
part of the cone of fire is not above the head of a man stand
ing.
(c) Machine guns can deliver effective fire at much
longer ranges than the automatic rifle and should have
missions at ranges in excess of 300 yards. For ranges of
300 yards or less the automatic rifle will suffice.
(d) For firing over friendly troops, the Browning ma
chine gun must be located within about 1800 yards of such
troops. This limiting distance will, in general, permit guns
located on or in the vicinity of the regimental reserve line
to participate in barrages in front of the main line of resis
tance.
(e) Where practicable, in order to insure tactical con
trol of a machine gun section, the guns should be located in
pairs with from 20 to 50 yards between guns. This does
not require that they have the same missions, though such
an assignment of missions is preferable. The terrain being
organized for defense frequently is such as to prohibit the
location of two guns so close together without impairment of
the missions of one or both.
(f) Machine guns must be carefully concealed and
every possible means taken to avoid disclosing their loca
tion, thus preventing their destruction by hostile fire.
With the same end in view, machine guns required for
flanking the main line of resistance should be located as far
to the rear of that line as is consistent with the efficient
1—7
execution of this mission. Locations near trenches ex

posed to hostile aerial or ground observation should be
avoided, if practicable, in order to escape the effect of hos
tile artillery fire directed on the latter.
(g) The most effective use of machine guns is for
flanking or enfilade fire. Flanking fire combined with sur
prise action enables a machine gun to cause tremendous
losses in a very short time. In general, direct fire is more
effective than indirect fire.
e. 37-mm. guns and 3-inch trench mortars.—The how
itzer company of the infantry regiment is organized into
three platoons, each armed with one 37-mm. gun and one
3-inch trench mortar. This organization favors the at
tachment of one platoon to each battalion for combat, but
the tactical situation may require the assignment of two
platoons or even the entire company to a single battalion.
The platoon is the fire unit except where terrain conditions
prevent the location of the weapons close enough together
to permit control of both by the platoon commander. These
weapons are preferably sited to cover the entire battalion
front and such terrain features outside of the battalion front
from which the enemy could bring machine gun fire on the
battalion. When it is impossible to cover the entire bat
talion front from a single position, supplementary positions
are selected. These weapons are not usually assigned to a
definite zone of action unless more than one weapon of either
kind is operating on the battalion front. Their employment
on the defensive is governed by the following:
(1) 37-mm. guns.— (a) This gun has a flat trajectory
and a maximum effective range of 1800 yards.
(b) Its maximum rate of fire is 20 rounds per minute.
(c) The radius of action of the bursting shell is about
5 yards.
(d) The 37-mm. gun fires over friendly troops, and
hence must be located either on commanding ground, or a
sufficient distance in rear of friendly troops to permit of
overhead fire. Otherwise it must be located in gaps in the
line of riflemen.
1—7
(e) The 37-mm. gun usually fires on targets of oppor

tunity. Its target will generally be a tank or a definitely
located machine gun.
(f) The location of the gun is disclosed by its flash,
sound of discharge, or the dust raised by the blast. Con
cealment is therefore of utmost importance; alternative posi
tions should be selected, and locations near important de
fensive installations avoided.
(2) 3-inch trench mortars.— (a) This is a high angle
fire weapon having a range with the projectile assumed to
be in use (the French seven pound projectile) of 300 yards
minimum and 1800 yards maximum.
(b) The normal rate of fire is 6 rounds per minute,
but a rate of 20 to 30 rounds per minute can be maintained
for three or four minutes.
(c) The radius of action of the bomb is large and the
mortar is therefore well adapted for fire against a target
which is not definitely located. Casualties may be expected
when the bomb strikes within 30 yards of the target. For
safety reasons, targets should be at least 300 yards from
friendly troops.
(d) The mortar can be traversed to fire over an arc of
18 degrees. To cover a greater arc supplementary posi
tions must be prepared.
(e) The ammunition is heavy and to maintain the nor
mal rate of fire, the mortar must be located within easy
carrying distance of a suitable route of communication.
(f) As the mortar can fire from well defiladed posi
tions, locations in ravines, on the reverse slopes of steep
hills, in sunken roads, in woods, or behind buildings are
sought. Dark backgrounds are desirable to prevent the
enemy locating the piece by observation of the projectile
immediately after firing. Discovery of a mortar in action
will promptly draw hostile fire, and locations near occupied
trenches or important defensive installations are therefore
to be avoided. Alternative positions should be provided*
(g) The targets for mortars on the defensive will be
machine guns, accompanying artillery, trench mortars, and
similar weapons whose general location is known but which
1—7-8
are not definitely located. They will also cover areas that
are dead to the fire of other weapons of the defense, and
participate in barrages in front of the line of resistance.
Their fire in the latter missions must be carefully coordi
nated with that of the machine guns and supporting artil
lery.
(h) The minimum range of these weapons requires
that they be emplaced more than 300 yards from any areas
on which their fire will probably be required.
/. Tanks.—The tank is primarily for offensive opera
tions, and to make use of it in a defensive situation merely
as a weapon of fire without utilizing its mobility would
mean unjustified exposure to loss or damage. For fire ac
tion alone, better results can be secured on the defensive by
the use of the other infantry weapons and the artillery from
concealed or protected positions. The best use of a tank on
the defensive is in counterattacking any enemy that may
have secured a lodgement in the defensive system. Tanks
are generally held in reserve for this purpose.
8. SUPPORTING WEAPONS.—a. Artillery.— (1) An
army on the defensive makes use of division, corps, and
army artillery. The organic division artillery consists of
two regiments of 75-mm. guns; a total of twelve batteries of
four guns each. It may be reinforced by the attachment
of 155-mm. howitzers, additional 75-mm. guns, or guns of
other calibers.
Corps artillery includes three regiments of 155-mm.
howitzers; a total of eighteen batteries of four pieces each;
and one regiment of 155-mm. guns—six batteries of four
guns each.
Army artillery consists of such types as are allotted to
the army from General Headquarters Reserve in accor
dance with the needs of the situation It may include
155-mm. guns, 240-mm. howitzers, and heavier types.
(2) The extreme range and rates of fire of these types
of artillery are as follows:
Caliber and Type Extreme Range Rounds per piece per minute
i . Yards Prolonged Short bursts
75-mm. gun 8,800 (H.E. shell) 2 6
155^mm. howitzer 12,270 £ 2
155-mm. gun 17,780 I 1
240-mm. howitzer 16,400 \ I
b. Close support of the infantry in defense is furnished

by the division artillery, while the fires of corps and army
artillery are usually placed beyond those of the division artil
lery on objectives such as hostile artillery, troop concentra
tions, establishments, and routes of communication.
c. Prearranged or organized defensive fires.— (1) The
prearranged or organized artillery fires peculiar to the de
fensive are primarily of two kinds: counterpreparation, and
standing barrage. In addition to the two kinds of defen
sive fires just mentioned, fires for defensive concentrations
within friendly lines are prepared when conditions permit.
(2) (a) Counterpreparation is designed to break up
the enemy's attack before it can be fairly launched. It con
sists of prepared fire on previously selected localities de
livered for a specified length of time, when it is evident or
known that the enemy is about to launch an attack.
(b) The points on which fire is put down are sensitive
parts of the enemy's front line trenches or probable line of
departure, woods and ravines which afford cover for as
sembled troops and are likely to be occupied by supports and
reserves, important observation points, and other points or
areas probably occupied by his formations. Command posts
and signal communication centers are also suitable targets.
(3) (a) The object of a standing barrage is to place
a barrier of bursting projectiles between our troops and the
enemy for the purpose of stopping his advance. It is a
stationary barrage delivered for defensive purposes in front
of an occupied line or position.
(b) Normal barrage.—If, in spite of the counterprep
aration, the hostile attack is launched and progresses to
wards the line to be defended, a defensive barrage should
be put down close in front of that line for the purpose of
stopping the attack. This barrage, known as the normal
barrage, consists of a rapid fire of the 75-mm. guns directed
on a single line from 200 to 400 yards in front of the line of
resistance. The line may be continuous, if the defender's
strength in artillery warrants it, but it is usually broken,
covering only those parts of the front where it is believed
that the enemy is most likely to attempt to advance. The
1—8
normal barrage is a standing barrage. All batteries con

cerned are kept constantly laid to deliver their part of the
barrage when not otherwise engaged. It is fired on any part
of the front required, on rocket signal from the infantry,
and is the barrage fired in case of a general attack. The
front usually assigned to a 75-mm. gun battery in a normal
barrage is about 200 yards. A frontage much in excess of
this makes the barrage so thin as to be ineffective, while a
frontage much less in extent causes some of the power of
the artillery to be lost.
(c) Emergency barrage.—In addition to the normal
barrage, each battery usually has one or more emergency
barrages for the purpose of reinforcing the normal barrage
of another part of the line in case of a local attack. Such
a barrage may be so placed as to fill gaps in the barrage
line where the latter is not continuous, or, in the case of a
continuous barrage line, it may be used to increase the den
sity of fire. Emergency barrage missions are assigned by
the division artillery commander. They are not fired on
rocket signal, but on order of a local artillery commander
or on the order of the division artillery commander only,
as the latter may prescribe. The missions assigned are simi
lar to normal barrage missions.
(4) Defensive concentrations are designed to stop and
break up the enemy's attack in case it succeeds in making
progress within the defender's lines. These fires are pre
pared for and delivered on points or areas that are of tac
tical importance to the enemy, such as likely avenues of
approach, ridges, hills, observation points, and wooded or
defiladed areas that furnish cover to hostile formations.
Defensive concentrations consist of concentrations of fire
in depth placed on the hostile advancing infantry. The fire
is directed on the leading elements of the hostile assault
waves and by successive range changes is made sufficiently
deep surely to include the hostile local reserves.
d. (1) The commander having designated the line or
lines to be defended, all artillery is posted in positions best
adapted to assist in this defense. The desire to bring the
full power of all the artillery to bear in the defense of the
1—8-9
main line of resistance, and to continue this defense without

interruption after the enemy may have broken through this
line, leads toward a selection of artillery positions in rear
of the main line of resistance. On the other hand, outposts
must be covered by artillery fire, the defensive barrage and
counterpreparation missions must be carried out, and some
batteries must be able to reach well into the enemy's lines
to break up his formations, counter his batteries, and inter
dict his routes of supply and communication.
(2) These conflicting considerations lead to a distribu
tion in depth of the artillery—division, corps, and army.
Such disposition also permits the advanced elements of the
artillery to be withdrawn, should the necessity arise, under
cover of the fire of the units farther to the rear. The most
advanced elements are those which have the greatest mobil
ity, so far as the proper assignment of missions permits.
9. GAS.—a. Use of poisonous gases in military opera
tions of the future is subject to the limitations imposed by
international agreements, but on the assumption that they
will be used, gases become an important adjunct to the de
fense when the weather conditions and the supply of am
munition permit.
b. In the use of gases, due consideration must be given
to the character of the defense, whether passive or active,
and to the plans for local and general counterattacks, taken
in connection with te.rrain conditions, present and prospec
tive weather conditions, and the persistencies of the various
gases. In the distant defense, greater latitude is permissible
in the use of persistent gases, such as mustard gas, and the
limitations as to wind direction become negligible or less im
portant, depending on the distance from friendly troops and
the class of defense. In the close defense, the use of gases
is more dependent on weather conditions, and persistent
gases should be used only in exceptional cases.
c. The minimum safe distances from friendly troops
at which gas bombardments may be placed are as follows:
(1) For wind blowing toward the enemy:
Nonpersistent gases; 300 yards
Persistent gases; 500 yards for small shoots
2200 yards for large shoots.
_ 6F U. S. ARM'.
1—9
(2) For wind blowing toward friendly troops or in a

calm, the minimum safe distance for all gases is in general
taken as 3000 yards.
d. In the defense, the principal methods of using gases
are as follows:
(1) Weak or harassing gas barrages along all or a portion
of the front in order to force masking.
(2) Heavy concentrations of deadly gases on limited areas
for the purpose of securing large casualties locally, and demoraliz
ing the attacking troops.
(3) To block or delay the enemy's advance at important
defiles.
(4) To deny the use by the enemy of sheltered forming
up places, such as woods, ravines, and villages.
(5) To harass or neutralize important hostile observation
posts.
II—1-2
CHAPTER II
Organization of a Defensive
System
Paragraphs
SECTION I.—The Battle Position 1-15
II.—The Outpost Area 16-17
III.—Procedure in Organization of the Ground 18-22
SECTION I
The Battle Position

Paragraph
Relative importance and general organization 1
Line of resistance 2
Supports 3
Battalion reserve line 4
Regimental reserve line 5
Development of the position 6
Limiting points 7
Machine gun plan 8
Centers of resistance 9
Strong points 10
Combat groups 11
Defense of intervals 12
Extent of command 13
Defensive works 14
Representation of defensive organization 15
1. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE AND GENERAL ORGANIZATION.

—The battle position is the most important part of a defen
sive system and in the general case is the most highly or-
ganized. It consists of a belt of ground, from one-half to
one mile in depth, parallel to the front and organized over
its whole depth with more or less fully developed works
arranged roughly in three lines, designated respectively
from front to rear as line of resistance, battalion reserve
line, and regimental reserve line. (See Figure 2.)
2. LINE OF RESISTANCE.—a. General.—The front boun
dary of the battle position is its line of resistance and this
21
II—2
Figure 2
DIAGRAM OF A REGIMENTAL SECTOR OF A BATTLE POSITION.
Showing organized tactical localities, frontages, depths, and pos
sible disposition of machine guns. Distances are in yards.
II—2
ORGANIZATION OF A DEFENSIVE SYSTEM 23
line is the main line of resistance of the defensive system.

It is sometimes referred to as the firing line. The line of
resistance of the battle position, as main line of resistance
of the whole defensive system, becomes the base or reference
line which governs the location of the other defensive ele
ments.
b. Location.— (1) The general location of the front to
be held defensively having been determined, the location
of the main line of resistance is prescribed by designating
geographical points, such as villages, woods, hills, road
crossings, or road junctions, through which it extends. Its
position on the ground is prescribed in more and more detail
as the orders for organization of the ground are issued suc
cessively by the several headquarters from the higher to
the lower. Its location is determined by the following con
siderations :
(a) Providing in its front the most effective combination of
fire and obstacles for stopping the enemy's attacks.
(b) Insuring the retention by the defender of terrain features
that afford him observation over the foreground and the interior
of the position. The line of resistance must be so located that
the fight will take place in front of, and not on, terrain features
that are vital to the defense.
(2) A location which secures the best field of fire,
takes advantage of existing natural obstacles, and affords
the best protection for important observation will generally
be found on the forward slope of commanding ground, in
the vicinity of the military crest. In certain cases, a loca
tion on the reverse slope may prove advantageous, provided
the terrain in rear aifords adequate observation to insure
covering the terrain in front of the main line of resistance
with effective artillery fire. When the line of resistance is
located on the reverse slope, the restricted field of fire is
compensated for by concealment from hostile ground ob
servation, and by the resulting protection from effective hos
tile artillery fire. (See Figure 3.) Terrain that is favor
able to a location on the reverse slope will be the exception,
and, on a defensive front, such a location, in general, will
be practicable in only a few isolated localities. Forward
slope locations will be the general practice.
II—2
c. Trace.— (1) The trace of the line of resistance, while

avoiding pronounced salients, will follow in a general way
the contour of the ground, forming alternate salients and
reentrants, running forward on the spurs and back in the
valleys. This irregular trace affords excellent opportunities
for enfilade fire in front of the line of resistance by ad
jacent units, and these should be fully utilized. Enfilade fire
is demoralizing to the attacker and heartening to the de
fender, as the attacker comes under a fire with which he
is unable to close.
Protected
Observation
GOOD REVERSE SLOPE POSITION

OBSERVATION PROTECTED
FORWARD SLOPE OCCUPIED

REVERSE SLOPE WOULD NOT PROTECT
OdSERVATION
Figure 3
(2) The trace of the line of resistance is affected to
a certain extent by the ability of the supporting artillery
to place defensive fires close in its front. A trace that may
be satisfactory from the standpoint of infantry defense
alone, might not be suitable for close artillery support, and
consequently should be modified to insure the best combina
tion of infantry defense and close artillery support.
(3) The final trace of the main line of resistance and of
all the principal lines of a defensive system should be ac
curately plotted on available maps, since a knowledge of their
II—2-3
location is important to all elements of the defense and

particularly to the artillery for the adjustment of its defen
sive fires.
d. Close defense of the line of resistance.—The close de
fense of the line of resistance is effected by the fire of
machine guns located to place bands of flanking fire along
its front, by riflemen located in trenches on or immediately
in rear of the line, and by defensive fires laid down a short
distance in front of the line by artillery, trench mortars, and
machine guns from positions in rear. All these fires are
carefully coordinated with each other; and, except where
impassable obstacles provide the necessary protection, are
designed as far as practicable, to cover the whole front with
a screen of fire.
e. Infantry dispositions for defense.—Disposition of
the infantry for defense of the line of resistance is based,
as a rule, on the assignment of sectors to battalions, each
battalion occupying a tactical locality which it organizes as
a center of resistance for the defense of the sector. In
organizing the center of resistance, the battalion disposes
its rifle companies, usually by whole companies, part for
the close defense of the line of resistance and part in bat
talion reserve. The machine gun company is disposed in
depth over the center of resistance. The rifle companies,
assigned to the close defense of the line of resistance, oc
cupy tactical localities and organize them as strong points
which are made up of combat groups. These combat groups
are located, part on the line of resistance for its immediate
defense and part in support.
3. SUPPORTS.—a. The combat groups held by the sup
ports of the front line companies are located usually not
less than 100 nor more than 300 yards in rear of the line
of resistance. The minimum distance is fixed by the con
sideration that supports should not be within the zone of
dispersion of artillery fire directed on the line of resistance,
and the maximum distance is fixed by the necessity of keep
ing them within effective supporting distance, by fire and
movement, of the front combat groups.
II—3-4
b. In situations where the fire of the supports is not

needed for immediate defense of the line of resistance, and
where the terrain permits it, the supporting combat groups
should be located on the reverse slope. In localities on a
defensive front where the line of resistance occupies the
military crest of a narrow ridge, the supports will often be
in rear of the topographical crest.
c. Long occupation of a battle position will generally
lead to the construction of trenches connecting up the com
bat groups in support of the line of resistance. This line
of trenches, practically continuous, and from 100 to 300
yards in rear of the line of resistance, is known as the sup
port line of battle position.
4. BATTALION RESERVE LINE.—a. One or more of the
rifle companies of a battalion organizing a center of resis
tance is placed in battalion reserve. The company or com
panies thus placed in reserve are assigned locations by the
battalion commander, from about 400 to 900 yards in rear
of the line of resistance (300 to 600 yards in rear of the
supports). These distances are determined from the con
siderations that within these limits suitable locations for
battalion reserves can generally be found, which will be
sufficiently distant from the supports to provide space for
counterattack, and still keep the foreground within effective
rifle range. The function of the battalion reserve is to
expel the enemy, by fire and movement, from any portion
of the sector held by its battalion, which may have been
occupied by the enemy. Should the tactical situation pre
vent counterattack, the reserves must stop or delay further
advance by the enemy, and must accordingly be prepared
for defense to the front, flanks, and rear. The reserves ac
cordingly organize strong points for defense, and the line
defined by the front elements of these strong points is termed
the battalion reserve line.
b. In order that the battalion reserves may cover the
foreground by fire at least as far to the front as the sup
ports, and also be located for mutual support of the reserve
units of adjacent battalions, these battalion reserve strong
points should have some of their combat groups on the for
II—4-5
ward slope of commanding ground. Between the strong

points, the battalion reserve line may be located on the re
verse slope and such a location may be advantageous for
forming up under cover when a counterattack is to be under
taken. .
c. The trace of the battalion reserve line will therefore
generally be partly on the forward and partly on the reverse
slope when the terrain conditions are favorable. The trace
of the battalion reserve line as a whole is regulated by the
regimental commander only sufficiently to secure coordina
tion between adjacent units, the battalion commanders being
given as wide discretion as possible in the location of their
reserve strong points.
5. REGIMENTAL RESERVE LINE.—a. Mission.—When a
regiment is assigned the defense of a sector of the battle
position, it deploys with one or two battalions as combat
or first line battalions, and with two or one of its battalions
in reserve. The combat locations of the reserves of a regi
ment on the defensive determines the regimental reserve
line. The primary mission of the regimental reserves is to
maintain the integrity of the sector held by the regiment,
and its principal method of action is by counterattack. As
in the case of the battalion reserves, when the tactical situa
tion does not permit the counterattack, the regimental re
serves must stop or delay the enemy's advance to permit a
counterattack being prepared and delivered by brigade and
division reserves located farther in rear. Tactical localities
along the regimental reserve line must accordingly be or
ganized for stubborn defense and, in case the centers of
resistance in front are overrun by the enemy, they must be
occupied and held by the regimental reserves. From the
viewpoint of regimental and higher commanders, the regi
mental reserve line is next in importance to the line of re
sistance, in that it furnishes a second line of defense, covers
the artillery, and enables the brigade and division reserves
to be assembled for a coordinated counterattack.
b. Location.— (1) When time permits the necessary re
connaissance by members of the corps staff, the location of
the regimental reserve line may be prescribed in the corps
II—5-6
order for the defense, in a manner similar to the line of

resistance. When not prescribed by the corps, it will be
prescribed by divisions and coordinated by mutual agree
ment between adacent divisions.
(2) It will usually be located from 400 to 900 yards
in rear of the battalion reserve line (800 to 1800 yards in
rear of the line of resistance), since within these limits a
suitable location can be found which covers the foreground
by effective fire at least as far as the battalion reserve line,
which provides sufficient space in rear of the battalion re
serve line for counterattacks, and which permits machine
guns located on the regimental reserve line to place defen
sive fires in front of the main line of resistance. The regi
mental reserve line is organized in mutually supporting
strong points, prepared if practicable for all around defense.
c. Trace.—The trace of the regimental reserve line is
determined primarily by the front elements of the strong
points organized for its defense. Due to the necessity of
covering the foreground by fire, at least as far as the bat
talion reserve line, and rendering mutual support between
adjacent strong points, some of the combat groups of these
strong points will be on the forward slope of commanding
ground. In the intervals between strong points, the line,
for the same reasons as in the case of the battalion reserve
line, may seek the reverse slope should the terrain be favor
able. The trace of the regimental reserve line may, there
fore, be partly on the forward and partly on the reverse slope.
6. DEVELOPMENT OF THE POSITION.—The battle posi
tion thus develops from a series of organized strong points
arranged on three approximately parallel lines with a depth
from the line of resistance to the regimental reserve line,
of approximately 800 yards as a minimum and 1800 yards
as a maximum. Organization of the ground will first appear
as groups of isolated fire trenches covered by obstacles, par
ticularly in the strong points along the line of resistance.
Continued occupancy of the battle position will result in
continuous lines of trenches following the trace of the several
lines, each line being protected by a continuous obstacle in
its front and all lines of trenches being connected with each
II—6-8
other by numerous approach trenches. Numerous obstacles

approximately at right angles to the front will be constructed
to protect the flanks of the organized tactical localities.
7. LIMITING POINTS.—Coordination of work of adja
cent units, particularly in connecting the isolated trenches
along the several lines, is insured by the designation of
points, called limiting points, where the trace of the several
lines intersect the sector boundaries. Limiting points may
be designated separately as such, or they may be indicated
by naming the limiting point as one of the location points
not only for a defensive line but also for a sector boundary.
When limiting points are not designated by higher com
manders, their location is determined by adjacent units,
through mutual agreement.
8. MACHINE GUN PLAN.—a. The location of machine
guns is the principal factor in the organization of a battle
position. When time is available, the plan for the employ
ment of the machine guns of a division in a defensive situa
tion may be prepared by the division commander assisted
by the division machine gun and howitzer officer. Lack of
time for the preparation of such a divisional plan may re
quire that the regimental commanders, assisted by the regi
mental machine gun officers, prepare the plans for the use
of the machine guns of their respective regiments; or the
situation may be such that the plan of employment of ma
chine guns may devolve on battalion commanders assisted
by commanders of their machine gun companies. In any
event, the location of machine guns which have the mission
of placing flanking bands of fire in front of the line of resis
tance is of first importance and these guns have precedence
in choice of site over other, elements of the defense. The
flanking bands of fire should be laid down along the obstacles
in front of the line of resistance so as to secure the maximum
effect through an effective combination of fire and obstacles.
This requires a very careful coordination of obstacles in
front of the line of resistance with the flanking fire of ma
chine guns, and makes it desirable that the" officer charged
with the location of the flanking machine guns also should
II—8
plan the location of the obstacles to be constructed in front

of the line of resistance.
b. Limitation on flanking fires.—The maximum front
which a machine gun can effectively cover by flanking fire,
is, by reason of the trajectory, limited to 700 yards, when
the gun is located on the line of resistance and the terrain
over which it fires is level. Inasmuch as the gun for pur
poses of concealment and safety should as a rule be located
some distance in rear of the line of resistance, and as the
terrain over which it fires will never be ideal for the execu
tion of its flanking mission, the actual amount of front to be
covered ordinarily should not exceed 300 to 400 yards.
Moreover, the range from the gun to the far end of the
flanking band should not greatly exceed 700 yards. The fore
going limitations indicate that for flanking 1200 yards of
front (the maximum front usually assigned to a battalion),
at least four machine guns are required.
c. Reciprocal fires.—Effective flanking fire in front of
those parts of a defensive line adjacent to sector boundaries
can, as a rule, be delivered best by guns located in the ad
joining sectors. Such locations are undesirable from the
standpoint of control and command; hence, by mutual
agreement between adjacent units, or by suitable orders,
some of the machine guns of a unit are given the mission
of placing flanking fires in front of adjacent units. These
reciprocal fires must be carefully provided for in the plans
for the employment of machine guns on the defensive.
d. Disposition in depth.—Machine guns of a battalion
holding a sector on the line of resistance, which are not
required for flanking the line of resistance are disposed in
depth within the center of resistance. At least two guns
should be located on the battalion reserve line. The ma
chine guns of the battalion in regimental reserve are lo
cated on the regimental reserve line if not detached be
cause of more urgent needs elsewhere. The machine guns
located on the battalion and regimental reserve lines are
given the missions of covering the intervals between the
organized tactical localities in their front and of placing
flanking fire in front of the lines on which located. They
II—8-9
also have the missions of participating by indirect laying

in the defensive barrages placed in front of the main line
of resistance by the artillery and trench mortars.
e. Protection of machine guns.—Machine guns in a de
fensive organization must be protected, and should as far
as practicable, be located within the obstacles protecting the
strong points. Elements of combat groups must be so
disposed as to cover the machine guns by their fire in case
of necessity. Machine guns that cannot be located within
the obstacle protecting a strong point without affecting too
disadvantageously the execution of their missions must be
protected independently by a suitable obstacle.
9. CENTERS OF RESISTANCE.—a. A battalion assigned
to organize and defend a center of resistance disposes its
rifle companies with two or one of them on the line of
resistance, one or two in reserve. The disposition decided
on is determined by considerations of properly covering the
front assigned and taking full advantage of the tactical
localities presented by the terrain so that the purpose of
the defense may be accomplished. In passive defense, unless
exceptional terrain conditions prevent, two companies will
be located on the line of resistance and one on the battalion
reserve line. The rifle companies are assigned to tactical
localities capable of mutual support, which they organize
as strong points. These strong points, when properly or
ganized, should permit a close defense of the center of re
sistance against attacks from any direction.
b. The area organized by a battalion for close defense
should not as a rule be less than 500 yards front by 400
yards depth in order to avoid undue losses from overcrowd
ing, nor should it in general, exceed 1000 yards front by
900 yards depth in order to avoid too great dispersion of
the garrison. As the sector assigned to a battalion defend
ing the main line of resistance will vary, depending on the
tactical situation and the adaptability of the terrain for
defense, from about 600 to 1200 yards, it will appear that
the organized center of resistance will not occupy the full
width of the battalion sector. Defense of the unoccupied in
tervals between adjacent centers of resistance must be
II—9-10
effected by fire from the organized localities; and the bet

ter the terrain is adapted to being covered by such fire, the
greater the intervals and the more compact the organized
localities. On the other hand, terrain that is broken and
affords avenues facilitating the advance of attacking troops
requires greater extension of organized localities in order
that all avenues of approach may be properly covered by
fire, and the intervals must be correspondingly reduced.
Intervals between front line strong points of a center of
resistance should not exceed 400 yards and intervals be
tween centers of resistance should not be in excess of 800
yards. These distances are practicable only under very
favorable -conditions.
c. The commander of a battalion occupying a tactical
locality disposes his rifle companies' and machine gun com
pany as heretofore discribed, assigns locations and mis
sions to any attached elements of the howitzer company,
and directs the organization and defense of the center of
resistance. He establishes his command post ordinarily
near the battalion reserve line, convenient for communica
tion with all strong points and with regimental headquar
ters. He is assisted in the organization of the defense of
the center of resistance by the trained personnel making
up his headquarters.
10. STRONG POINTS.—a. A strong point is composed
of several combat groups, disposed laterally and in depth,
and commanded by a single officer, generally a company
commander. The garrison of a strong point is usually a
company, but it may be held by a force varying from two
platoons to two companies, depending on the terrain and
other conditions. The combat groups of a strong point are
located with a view to resistance to the front and flanks
and if necessary to the rear, so that when fully organized
the strong point should, if necessary, be capable of a pro
tracted all around defense. (See Figure 4.)
b. A company of 200 men can defend, by its fire, a
front of from 300 to 600 yards, depending on the defensi
bility of the terrain. The portion of this front which is
actually organized as a strong point generally will not be
11—10
less than 200 by 200 yards in order to minimize losses from

the enemy's fire, nor be greater than 400 yards front by
300 yards depth in order to avoid undue dispersion of the
garrison.
c. Strong points are ordinarily organized with combat
and support echelons. A strong point on the line of resis-
Mortar
Figure 4
ORGANIZATION OF COMBAT GROUPS IN A STRONG POINT.
(Less than one day available for organization of ground.)
tance, garrisoned by one company, will usually have two pla

toons as combat echelon, and one platoon in support. Ter
rain conditions may require one platoon in the combat eche
lon and two platoons in support. Combat groups in the
support are located with a view to protecting the flanks
of the front combat groups by fire, guarding the strong
11—10
point from envelopment, and reinforcing the front combat

groups. They may be advantageously located on the reverse
slope concealed from hostile ground observation, where the
terrain favors such a location and the extent of front de
fended by the strong point does not require the fire power
of the troops in support. The front and flanks of strong
points should be fully protected by obstacles so located as
to be swept by the fire of the garrison. Strong points, in
addition to the garrison of riflemen, will generally have lo
cated within them, machine guns or weapons of the howitzer
company which will not be under the direct command of the
strong point commander, but which he must protect by the
fire of his garrison. Each strong point has a sector assigned
to it for defense, and in addition to covering this sector by
fire, it will have other sectors of fire assigned to it for the
purpose of supporting adjacent strong points should a suc
cessful advance by the enemy render such support neces
sary. In certain cases where a strong point is on an ex
posed flank, or where the terrain favors a penetration on
the flank of a center of resistance, or where a long narrow
ridge favors such an organization; a strong point on the
line of resistance may be extended to the rear to include
the battalion reserve line. Such an organization is well
adapted for defense to the flank.
d. Strong points organized on the battalion reserve line
are located with a view to covering by fire the intervals be
tween and the flanks of the front strong points of the center
of resistance, stopping any penetration through or between
them, and ejecting by fire and movement any minor pene
trations into the battalion sector. Due to the necessity of
covering both the outer and inner flanks of the front strong
points by fire, a strong point organized by a single com
pany on the battalion reserve line will require considerable
frontage and this will generally necessitate the deployment
of all three platoons abreast. In this case, a certain amount
of depth should be given it by the use of supports, particu
larly on the flanks. This may be done by echeloning the
flank platoons to the rear.
11—10-11
e. Strong points on the regimental reserve line are lo

cated with a view to arresting by fire an attack which has
overrun the centers of resistance, and, for covering by fire
the intervals between and the flanks of the centers of resis
tance. They must also be capable of mutual support. These
strong points are organized in depth similar to strong points
on the line of resistance and are capable, whenever practi
cable, of an all around defense.
/. Each strong point will have a command post lo
cated so as to facilitate communication between the com
mander and his several combat groups. For strong points
on the line of resistance, the command post will usually
be located in the vicinity of the line of supports; while for
strong points on the battalion and regimental reserve lines,
it will usually be located from 100 to 200 yards in rear of
the line and on an approach trench when the latter exists.
11. COMBAT GROUPS.—a. The combat group is the basic
element of ground organization. It is occupied by a force
varying from a squad to a platoon, disposed to cover by fire
a definite portion of the terrain and is ultimately organized
for all around defense. Unity of control and command
indicates the platoon as the normal garrison for a combat
group, but, in broken terrain the necessity for covering by
fire the sector assigned to a platoon for defense will fre
quently require it to garrison more than one combat group.
Depending on the frontage assigned to it and the extent
of the field of fire to the front, the platoon deploys for de
fense in one or two lines. While deployment in one line
will be the general rule, deployment in two lines may be
advisable when the field of fire to the front is short and an
attack can reach assaulting distance under cover. The fund
amental principle governing the defensive tactics of the
combat groups of an organized strong point is that each
combat group in the front line shall be able to cover its
own front, and to flank the fronts of adjacent combat
groups and intervals; and that each combat group in the
rear line shall be able to cover the flanks of the combat
groups in front and the intervals between them. The squads
of a combat group are therefore located in such a manner as
11—11-12
to favor the development of frontal and flanking fire and

to cover areas which are dead to the fire of machine guns.
b. A platoon of 57 men with 6 automatic rifles should,
in open country, effectively defend with its fire a front of
300 to 400 yards, when participating as part of a larger
force in defensive combat. In close country the front cov
ered will be considerably less. The area actually occupied by
a combat group should not as a rule be greater than 150
yards front by 75 yards depth for a platoon, nor greater than
75 by 75 yards for a half platoon. When a platoon must
be disposed over a distance much greater than 150 yards
for proper defense of the terrain, it is preferable to have it
organize two combat groups; but in this case it should not
extend over an area greater than 250 yards front by 75
yards depth.
c. Combat groups are enclosed by obstacles so located
as to be effectively covered by the fire of the group. After
terrain has been extensively fortified, the garrison of a com
bat group occupies such portions of the available network of
trenches as will enable it to best fulfill its mission. The
entire personnel may be distributed along a single trench
either parallel or perpendicular to the front or it may be
located so as to include portions of trenches running both
parallel and perpendicular to the front. Its location may
also be changed from time to time to prevent disclosure
of its detailed disposition to the enemy.
12. DEFENSE OF INTERVALS.—In the preparation of a
battle position for defense, the organization and occupancy
of tactical localities of limited area instead of continuous
lines leaves unoccupied intervals of greater or less extent
between the organized localities. These intervals, though
unoccupied, are defended by fire from adjacent tactical lo
calities, including those in rear; and where of sufficient
width to permit, may be defended in part by the fire of artil
lery. To assist in the defense, obstacles in front of the line
of resistance, and eventually in front of the other lines in
rear, are made continuous along the entire front. To pre
vent infiltration by the enemy through the intervals be
tween organized localities under cover of fog, darkness,
II—12-14
or smoke, small detachments from the garrisons of adja

cent tactical localities are located in the intervals to offer
resistance to any hostile movement through them and to
give timely warning thereof to the adjacent garrisons.
13. EXTENT OF COMMAND.—The organized tactical lo
calities occupied by the several units on the defensive must
not be confused with the sectors assigned to these units for
defense. A sector is the area of ground for the defense of
which the unit is responsible. The troops assigned to de
fend the sector are not spread out over the whole sector, but
are located in organized tactical localities from which they
can cover the sector by fire and by counterattacks when
necessary. These organized tactical localities occupy only a
part of the sector that they defend. (See Figure 2.)
14. DEFENSIVE WORKS.—The troops having been as
signed their respective missions for defense of the battle
position, having occupied their respective sectors, and hav
ing organized their defensive fires; the construction of the
works necessary to protect them from hostile fire, to delay
the progress of an attack, and to facilitate fire control,
command, movement, supply, and evacuation, is under
taken. In a situation where only a limited time is available
for organization of the ground, these works will necessarily
be of a hasty character at first, but will be developed and
improved according to the length of time the position is
occupied. The initial efforts of the defense in organization
of a battle position will be directed to securing, as quickly
as possible, cover for the units disposed for immediate de
fense of the line of resistance, and a continuous obstacle
along the front. The works constructed consist of machine
gun emplacements, trenches, obstacles, observation posts,
command posts, aid stations, and communications. (See Fig
ure 5.)
a. Machine gun emplacements.—In a hasty organiza
tion, machine gun emplacements are simple pits, capable of
holding the gun and three men, and carefully concealed
from hostile ground and aerial observation.
b. Trenches.— (1) Fire trenches.—Fire trenches are
constructed to fit the deployment, but as the front of a de
11—14
Location of Machine Guns in favorable -Sites for

flanking frres. Small dead Spaces ignored.
Location o f Automatic Rifles to cover dead Spaces
Location oF Obstacles fo conform to the flanking

Tires of MachineGuny
Location of Trench to conform to above Dispositions

Showing possible Combat Groups.
Figure 5
PROGRESSIVE ORGANIZATION OF MAIN L I N E OF RESISTANCE
FOR CLOSE DEFENSE.
(Diagrammatic—not drawn to scale.)
11—14
ployed squad is about 40 yards, the construction of this

length of trench in the initial stages of organization of the
ground would be impracticable in a limited time. The first
shelter constructed by each squad will therefore be either a
single trench, 20 to 25 feet long, capable of sheltering the
squad, or a number of detached pits or "fox holes" each
capable of holding one or two men. The actual arrangement
depends on the requirement for delivery of fire to cover
properly the squad sector and for proper control of the
squad. Squad trenches are faced in the direction the prin
cipal fire is to be delivered, and may be parallel or oblique
to the general direction of the front. Those on the flanks of
a combat group will generally be refused to protect the
flanks and to cover the front of the adjacent combat group
and interval. Squad trenches of a combat group are con
structed with intervals of greater or less extent between
squads. The average interval may be taken as 20 yards.
When the interval exceeds 50 yards, it will generally be
preferable to separate the garrison into two combat groups
in order to facilitate control. Fire trenches, when first con
structed, will not be continuous, but as time permits, the
squad trenches or "fox holes" will be connected up; first,
in combat groups and later in strong points, so as to form
a continuous traversed line to facilitate control and provide
protected communication parallel to the front. The fact
that fire trenches are not continuous at first, and the diffi
culty of completely concealing defensive works from aerial
observation enables the enemy to determine the localities
that are occupied defensively, and the location of combat
groups and strong points. Woods, hedges, and other natural
objects, therefore, should be used as much as practicable to
conceal the trenches. Use should also be made of dummy
trenches to deceive the hostile observation. By excavating
to a depth of from ^ to 1 foot for the proper width along
the trace decided on for the final continuous line of trenches,
it will be practicable to prevent the enemy from determin
ing accurately from airplane photographs what part of the
terrain is actually occupied.
11—14
(2) Approach trenches.—Approach trenches are con

structed approximately perpendicular to the front to provide
covered communication between the front and rear elements
of a defensive position. They are also of value as part of
the combat organization, particularly to the flanks, when
prepared for use as fire trenches. They are generally pro
vided as follows in a battle position:
(a) Between the line of resistance and the supports—at
least one for each platoon on the front line.
(b) Between the supports and the battalion reserve line—
at least one per company on the line of resistance.
(c) Between the battalion and the regimental reserve lines
—at least one for each battalion on the line of resistance.
The approach trenches necessary for combat purposes
are constructed first. These are located along the flanks of
strong points and centers of resistance, and are sited for
field of fire to the flank. They usually have an obstacle on
the exposed side.
(3) Switch trenches.—The trenches paralleling the
front of a battle position, combined with the approach
trenches, generally will be adequate for all around defense,
and will prevent easy exploitation to the flanks after hostile
penetration into the position. Certain cases will arise how
ever, particularly between the battalion and the regimental
reserve lines, where the construction of a switch trench may
be necessary to resist lateral exploitation. Such a trench
usually runs obliquely between these two lines, and differs
from an approach trench in that it is located primarily for
combat, though it can also serve as an approach trench.
c. Obstacles.— (1) Kinds.—Two kinds of obstacles
are used, natural and artificial.
(a) Natural obstacles.—Streams, ponds, and lakes are
the most common forms of natural obstacles which can be
utilized to advantage in defense, though precipitous banks
or cliffs may sometimes serve as effective obstacles. The
fact that the location of the line of resistance of a battle
position is generally along high ground overlooking water
courses, frequently permits the use of the latter as part of
the line of obstacles covering the front. While a stream
, 11—14
may be in itself of no special value as an obstacle, the possi

bility of increasing its depth and width by the use of dams
at favorable points should be carefully studied, and made
use of where practicable. Marshy ground, or a stream
with a depth of four feet or more is a particularly effec
tive obstacle against tanks, and no opportunity for provid
ing an adequate obstacle to a tank attack should be over
looked.
(b) Artificial obstacles.—The bulk of the obstacles
used in the organization of a battle position will be arti
ficial, and of these, the wire entanglement furnishes the
best obstacle for the least expenditure of time and labor.
There are two kinds of wire entanglements, the high and
the low; the former being about waist high and the latter
knee high. The high wire entanglement is by far the more
effective of the two and should always be built when time
and available materials permit. The only advantage of the
low entanglement is its comparative invisibility, and the fact
that less labor and materials are required.
(2) Purpose.—Obstacles are used for two purposes—
tactical and protective.
(a) Tactical obstacles are intended to hold the attacker
as long as possible under the fire of the weapons of the de
fense. The continuous obstacle along the front of the line
of resistance, which is enfiladed by the flanking fire of ma
chine guns and the location of which is determined largely
by the direction of the flanking bands of fire, is an example
of a tactical obstacle.
(b) Protective obstacles are intended to prevent the
sudden entrance of hostile forces into the works of the de
fense. The obstacle surrounding a combat group is an ex
ample of a protective obstacle.
(3) Location.—The following principles govern the
location of obstacles:
(a) They must be covered throughout by the fire of the
defense; otherwise, they are of no value.
(b) Protective obstacles must not be so far from the
trenches that they cannot be kept under observation and
control at all times, especially at night, and they must not
II—14 m
42 , FIELD FORTIFICATIONS
be so close as to permit an enemy to approach within hand

grenade range of the trenches. A distance from 30 to 100
yards from the trenches will generally be suitable.
(c) All obstacles should be concealed as much as pos
sible from hostile observation, particularly ground observa
tion, by taking advantage of depressions in the ground,
minor reverse slopes, tall grass, woods, etc.
(d) Centers of resistance and strong points should be
protected by obstacles on their front and flanks, while com
bat groups should be completely surrounded by an obstacle.
While the obstacle in front of the line of resistance is lo
cated primarily for tactical purposes and sited in broad
zigzags, on many parts of the front it will be located favor
ably to serve as a protective obstacle also; where not so
located, additional obstacles for protective purposes must
be provided. Protective obstacles should, as far as prac
ticable, avoid exactly paralleling a fire trench, and in locat
ing them, special effort should be taken to avoid indicating
the manner in which the ground is occupied.
d. Observation posts.—Observation posts should be so
located that the entire foreground, and all the terrain with
in the position itself are under constant observation. Where
this is not possible, they should be so located as to give a
good view of the most important front occupied by a unit.
It is often necessary to have several observation posts for
the same unit.
e. Command posts.—A command post should be cen
trally located and near the rear of the area of the unit to
which it belongs. Its location should facilitate communica
tion with all parts of the area, under all conditions, as well
as with the command post of the next higher unit. Shelter
is necessary at a command post to enable the commander
and his staff to function in as nearly a normal manner as
possible at all times; but in the initial stages of organiza
tion, any construction required by observation and command
posts will be of a more or less temporary character.
/. Aid stations.—Aid stations are located on the lines
which would naturally be followed by casualties on their
way to the rear, and near a road, if practicable, in order
H—14-15
to provide for evacuation by ambulances. Local aid posts,

at the rate of one per company on the front line, are pro
vided when conditions render them necessary. They are
located centrally in the rear part of the area occupied by
the company.
g. Communications.—In a defensive system where
roads and trails do not exist or are inadequate, a sufficient
number must be constructed, or existing ones improved,
in order to provide adequate means for the prompt move
ment of reserves, for the bringing forward of supplies and
ammunition, and for the evacuation of the wounded and of
salvaged materials. When a stream lies within or closely
in rear of a battle position, numerous crossings supplement
ing those at the established roads should be provided, in
order to facilitate the movement of troops across country
and to provide alternative stream crossings in case those on
established routes of traffic are shelled.
15. REPRESENTATION OF DEFENSIVE ORGANIZATIONS.—
Organized tactical localities (centers of resistance, strong
points, and combat groups) are shown in plans of a defen
sive organization by means of oval figures which include
the tactical locality. The line forming the figures is so
drawn as to include within it the combat locations of all
the elements occupying the tactical locality. The designa
tion or size of the unit constituting the garrison is written
inside the oval figure. The location of machine guns and
the main direction of fire for their most important missions
are indicated by suitable conventional signs, and the loca
tion and fire missions of weapons of the howitzer company
are similarly indicated. The location of the defensive fires
of supporting artillery are similarly indicated and suitably
numbered in order to insure prompt and accurate designa
tion by the infantry when called for.
11—16
SECTION II
The Outpost Area

Paragraph
The outpost 16
Development in zone defense 17
16. THE OUTPOST.—a. General—(l) The general func

tions of an outpost are to protect troops in rear against sur
prise, to prevent an attack upon them before they can be
prepared to resist, and to prevent or restrict hostile recon
naissance and ground observation. Outpost troops are ac
cordingly disposed for observation and resistance. The
functions and dispositions of an outpost in a defensive situa
tion differ from those given above, only in the amount of
resistance which the outpost may be expected to make to a
hostile advance, and in the manner in which the outpost
is disposed. When the defensive is undertaken in contact
with the enemy on an active front, the battle position may
be in such close proximity to the enemy's front line that the
only outpost practicable is a line of small detachments
thrown out in advance by front line units. In general,
these combat outposts would be within effective small arms
range of the main line of resistance, and in case of a general
attack would withdraw to the battle position. Such an
arrangement is characteristic of the outpost in the deployed
and the position defense, in situations where the distance
from the enemy's front line to the battle position does not
afford sufficient depth for the organization of an outpost
area. The enemy permitting, an outpost should always be
established a sufficient distance in front of the battle posi
tion to prevent the emplacement of enemy machine guns
and trench mortars within 1,500 to 2,000 yards of the main
line of resistance. A location of the outpost farther to the
front is desirable, however, inasmuch as the farther away
the enemy is kept from the battle position, the less effective
will be his reconnaissance and observation of the disposi
tions for defense, and the greater his uncertainty as to the
11—16
exact location of the main line of resistance. His artillery-

fire directed on the battle position will be correspondingly
less effective, and should the defender be able to occupy
the terrain for 6,000 to 8,000 yards in advance of the main
line of resistance, the bulk of the hostile artillery will be
kept beyond effective range of the battle position. A loca
tion of the front line (line of observation of the outpost)
1,500 to 2,000 yards in advance of the main line of resis
tance, in the general case, will provide sufficient depth to
organize an outpost area, and permit the employment of a
zone defense; and from this distance (the practical mini
mum) up to 6,000 or 8,000 yards (the usual maximum) the
distance between the front line and main line of resistance
is fixed by practical considerations, viz.: the enemy's situa
tion, configuration of the terrain, and the time and materials
available for organization of the ground. Ordinarily in the
initial organization of a defensive zone, the depth from the
front line to the main line of resistance will be limited by
practical considerations to 4,000 yards or less.
(2) When the front line is less than 1,500 yards in front
of the main line of resistance, and hence in general within
effective range of machine guns in the battle position, the
outpost forces generally consist of squads, sections, pla
toons, or companies, depending on the actual distance in
volved, sent forward by battalions holding the line of re
sistance of the battle position. When the distance exceeds
1,500 to 2,000 yards and the mission of the outpost forces
is to disorganize an attack, these forces consist of battalions
or companies with attached machine guns sent forward by
regiments or brigades holding sectors of the defensive zone.
The assignment of elements of the same unit to the outpost
and battle position, when resistance in depth is contemplated,
avoids mixing units, and assures better cooperation between
the outpost and the battle position. Situations may occur,
however, where it would be desirable to employ a force
under a single commander, such as a complete regiment, for
the outpost of a division sector.
b. Organization of the ground.—(1) Position defense.
—When the enemy's situation prevents the establishment
11—16
of an outpost at a distance greater than 1,000 to 1,500 yards

in front of the main line of resistance, little effective resis
tance to a general attack by the outpost troops is expected.
These troops are located in small detachments along a desig
nated line, and as time permits they organize such small
tactical localities as will assist in protecting the battle posi
tion from minor attacks and raids. The intervals are cov
ered by patrols. On the other hand, when the situation per
mits the location of the outpost of a force on the defensive
at such a distance in front of the battle position that an
outpost area could be organized for defense; lack of time
for organization of the ground and the preparation of sup
porting fires, the character of the terrain, and other con
siderations may preclude any serious resistance on the part
of the outpost to hostile attacks. In this case, the outpost re
tires on the battle position without making any serious effort
to delay or disorganize the hostile attack. While troops on
outpost, in such a situation, provide themselves with such
cover and protection by means of defensive works as the
means available permit, no systematic ground organization,
coordinated with defensive fires of supporting artillery is
undertaken, as in the case of a regularly organized outpost
area. A line of resistance is prescribed, however, in order
to coordinate the action of the outpost.
(2) Zone defense.—Organization of an outpost area for
use in zone defense will be coordinated by means of a line
of resistance, prescribed by the high command. Initially,
the complete organization of a position will not be attempted,
but the troops will organize mutually supporting tactical
localities, so selected as to cover the front and resist local
attacks. A line of observation is established in front of
the line of resistance. Troops assigned to the outpost will
be required to cover much greater fronts than in the battle
position; a company may be required to cover 800 to 1,500
yards and a battalion 1,500 to 3,000 yards; and special
situations may require extensions of these limits. Under
these circumstances, the organized tactical localities have
greater intervals between them than in the battle position,
and detached combat groups and strong points are used ex
11—16
tensively. Detached combat groups would be quickly over

run in case of a heavy hostile attack; whereas, the same
garrison, if located in a larger organized tactical locality,
would be able to hold out for a much longer period. There
fore, provision is made, in case of attack, for the withdrawal,
in part at least, of the garrisons of the smaller organized
tactical localities into the larger and more important ones,
with a view to making a protracted defense of the latter.
The imporant tactical localities in an outpost area are
those which furnish the best observation into the enemy's
territory, and over probable routes of his advance into the
defensive system. These important tactical localities nor
mally are organized as strong points or, if their importance
justify it, as centers of resistance, and prepared and sup
plied for a protracted all-around defense. If these tactical
localities be held, general attacks would not only be devel
oped and delayed, but also disorganized through the con
trolled fire of artillery directed on hostile units in their
advance into the defensive system, and the way prepared
for expelling them by counterattack. These important tac
tical localities organized for protracted defense should not
be more than 3,000 yards apart to secure efficient action
against general attacks; and their close defense should be
insured by a system of suitably placed defensive fires, de
livered by artillery in rear. Means of signal communica
tion to the battle position from important tactical localities
in the outpost area are of prime importance, and all prac
tical arrangements should be made to guard against their
interruption. The value to the defense of uninterrupted
signal communication from important observation posts in
the outpost area cannot be overestimated. Continued oc
cupancy of a defensive zone results in the development of
the organized tactical localities of the outpost area into a
more or less well organized position consisting of the fol
lowing (see Figure 6 ) :
(a) A line of observation (the front line) in front of the
line of resistance, occupied by outguards to provide observation
and defense of the foreground.
11—16-17
(b) A line of resistance occupied by companies in strong

points, to cover the front by fire and to hold important tactical
localities.
(c) A reserve line, occupied by companies in strong points,
to assist the units on the line of resistance.
17. DEVELOPMENT IN ZONE DEFENSE.—a. The amount

of labor and materials involved in the organization of a de
fensive zone varies with the depth of the zone; and, it may-
Figure 6
ELEMENTS OF AN OUTPOST POSITION FOR A DEFENSIVE ZONE.
be expected that the initial ground organization will be

limited to a depth from the front line to the main line of
resistance, not exceeding 4,000 yards. Should the front be
come stabilized, the improvement of the enemy's observa
tion facilities, and the increasing amount and effectiveness
of his artillery fire will eventually require a deepening of the
defensive zone, at least on some parts of the front. There
11—17-18
fore, a new battle position will be selected and organized

at such a distance behind the front line as to be beyond
effective range of the bulk of the enemy's artillery, and the
old battle position may, at the will of the higher commander,
become part of the outpost area of the deepened zone. Simi
larly, when the zone defense develops from the position de
fense, and a new battle position is organized in rear, the
original battle position may become part of the outpost
area of the defensive zone.
b. The positions in the outpost area into which the
ground organization gradually develops, will be further sup
plemented by the organization of tactical localities in rear.
Some of these tactical localities will be organized to provide
for delay between the several positions, while others may
be organized as part of switch positions connecting the bat
tle position with the outpost position. Long continued sta
bilization will result in a defensive organization of the
ground extending over the whole depth of the defensive zone.
SECTION III
Procedure in Organisation of the Ground

Paragraph
Preparatory steps 18
Reconnaissance 19
Duties of successive commanders 20
Procedure under different situations 21
Relative importance of works 22
18. PREPARATORY STEPS.—a. Having decided to employ

the defensive, the superior commander initiates the organi
zation of the ground by prescribing the following:
(1) The form of defense.
(2) The locations of the lines of resistance of the battle posi
tion, outpost area, and reserve battle position; also of switch
positions, if contemplated.
(3) The sector boundaries and the assignment of subordinate
units to sectors.
(4) The relative order of importance in organization of
elements of the defensive system.
11—18-19
b. In an army, except in a situation where the defen

sive is undertaken out of presence of the enemy, time will
not permit any extensive reconnaissance by the army staff,
and the army plan for defense will be made principally from
the map. Any ground reconnaissance made will usually be
to determine the boundaries of sectors assigned to corps or
for the preparation of plans for the defense of specially im
portant tactical localities on the army front. The army
normally assigns sectors to corps for occupation, organiza
tion, and defense; and the corps, after the necessary map
studies supplemented by reconnaissance, assigns sectors to
its divisions. The assignment of sectors to units for de
fense is continued down through the hierarchy of command,
and is based more and more, as the lower units are reached,
on an actual reconnaissance of the terrain.
19. RECONNAISSANCE.—Reconnaissance of ground to be
organized for defense in the higher commands (army and
corps) usually is limited to that required for purposes of
coordination, or to tactical localities which require special
treatment because of particular importance to the defense.
In the division, however, reconnaissance must be in suffi
cient detail to permit a working plan of the organization
of the ground in the division sector being prepared. Recon
naissance in the division should be made by the commander
or his general staff, assisted by representatives of the artil
lery, machine guns, and engineers—all working together and
coordinated by the commander or the general staff officer
present. They determine the trace of the* line of resistance
of the battle position within the division sector in sufficient
detail to insure the best defensive arrangements through a
combination of artillery and machine gun fires and obstacles;
decide on the location of the regimental reserve line, if it
has not been prescribed by higher authority; and plan the
disposition of troops for the defense of the sector. They also
investigate the need of improved or additional communica
tions, and the local availability of supplies and materials for
defensive works; and decide on an assignment of the divi
sion engineers and any available division reserves that can
assist in the prompt organization of the sector for defense.
11—19-20
In lower units of the division, reconnaissance of the sectors

assigned for defense is carried out in more and more detail;
so that the smaller the unit, the more its plan of defense is
based on direct ground reconnaissance rather than a map
study. The importance and higher degree of organization of
the battle position require a more detailed reconnaissance
of this position than the other elements of the defensive
system. The trace of the main line of resistance having
been approximately decided on, the subdivision into sectors
is determined by selecting those tactical localities which are
suitable in size for occupation by battalions, and for organi
zation as centers of resistance. Sector boundaries are then
located so as to assign to the several units the number of
these tactical localities which each can effectively defend.
20. DUTIES OF SUCCESSIVE COMMANDERS.—a. General
duties.—Formal orders for organization of the ground for
defense originate with, the highest unit concerned, each
subordinate unit going into more detail until the platoon
is reached. In the preparation of orders for the organiza
tion of the ground, the several headquarters should be guided
by the following: first, the preparation of comprehensive
plans; next, the definition of tasks of the next lower units,
and provision for their coordination with each other; then
decentralization in the execution of the plans. Centralized
control and decentralized operation should be the guiding
principle. In the absence of instructions from the higher
command relative to cooperation between adjacent units,
each commander on his own initiative arranges with the
commanders of adjacent units for coordinating their plans
of ground organization so as to secure the best cooperation
in defense.
b. Procedure in successive units.—The steps taken and
instructions issued by the commanders of successive units,
from the army to the platoon, may be summarized as fol
lows:
(1) The army.—The commander, having decided to
undertake the defensive:
(a) Makes a map study to determine the front to be held
and the best dispositions for defense;
(b) Prescribes the form of defense and the missions of the
troops assigned to each position or area;
11—20
(c) Prescribes the general location of the lines of resis

tance ;
(d) Designates the corps sectors and assigns corps thereto;
(e) Prescribes the relative order of importance in organiza
tion of the positions or areas of the defensive system;
(f) Prescribes the employment or assignment of army troops.
(2) The corps.—The corps commander on receiving
from the army the plan of defense, the general location of
the lines of resistance, and the sector to which assigned:
(a) Makes a map study and supplements it by reconnais
sance, if necessary and practicable, in order to determine the best
disposition for defense of the sector;
(b) Designates in greater detail the location of the lines of
resistance within his sector, and when desirable locates the regi
mental reserve line of the battle position;
(c) Designates the division sectors and assigns divisions
thereto;
(d) Based on the army plan of defense, prescribes the gen
eral method of occupation of division sectors (strength of out
post, etc.);
(e) Prescribes the order in which the several elements of
the defensive system shall be organized, if not prescribd by the
army commander;
(f) Prescribes the employment or assignment of corps
troops.
(3) The division.—The division commander on receipt
of the corps orders for organization of the ground for de
fense :
(a) Makes a map study of his sector and supplements it by
a reconnaissance of the ground, if practicable;
(b) Designates in greater detail the location of the lines
of resistance, and the regimental reserve line within his sector;
(c) Designates the brigade sectors and assigns brigades
thereto;
(d) Prescribes the general distribution of troops in the sector
in accordance with the plan of defense;
(e) Prescribes the order in which the works in each posi
tion or area shall be executed;
(f) Prescribes the employment or assignment of division
troops and reserves, to assist in work of organization.
(4) The brigade.—On receipt of the division order, the
brigade commander:
(a) Makes a study of the terrain in his sector by recon
naissance of the ground and from the map;
(b) Designates, in additional detail, the location of the lines
of resistance and the regimental reserve line within his sector;
(c) Decides on the regimental sectors and assigns regi
ments thereto;
11—20
(d) Decides on the general distribution of troops for defense

of his sector;
(e) Prescribes the employment of brigade reserves, and the
assignment of any attached troops to assist in work of organiza
tion.
(5) Theregiment.—On receipt of the brigade order, the

regimental commander:
(a) Familiarizes himself with the sector assigned his regi
ment, by means of reconnaissance of the ground and study of
the map;
(b) Decides on the trace of the lines of resistance and the
regimental reserve line within his sector;
(c) From a consideration of the tactical localities in his sec
tor suitable for organization as centers of resistance, decides on
front line sectors and assigns battalions for their defense. He
assigns troops to regimental reserve, and attaches elements of
the howitzer company to battalions;
(d) Selects the limiting points on the battalion reserve line
at the boundary between his front line battalions, in order to
coordinate work on this line; and, by agreement with the com
manders of adjacent units, determines similar points on the regi
mental boundaries;
(e) Recommends to the commander of supporting artillery
the location of defensive fires in front of the main line of resis
tance ;
(f) Prescribes the employment of elements of the head
quarters company or any attached troops, for assistance in the
work of organization.
(6) The battalion.—(a) The commander of a battalion
assigned to a center of resistance, on receipt of the regi
mental order:
(i) Reconnoiters the ground;
(ii) Decides on the exact trace of the line of resistance and
the battalion reserve line within his sector, and on the location
of the supports of front line companies sufficiently to insure co
ordination between them;
(iii) From a consideration of the tactical localities in his
sector suitable for organization as strong points, decides on
front line sectors and assigns companies thereto, and to battalion
reserves. Supervises the disposition of the machine gun company;
(iv) Decides on the general location of attached elements
of the howitzer company and assigns them fire missions.
(b) The commander of a battalion in regimental re

serve follows the same general procedure in organizing the
regimental reserve line for defense.
(7) The rifle company.—A company commander,
whether in command of a front line, or of a reserve eompany,
carries out practically the same procedure. On receipt of
the battalion commander's order he:
II—20-21
(a) Makes a close study of the ground assigned him for

organization and defense;
(b) Decides on the location of combat groups, their sectors
of fire and the assignment of platoons thereto.
(8) The machine gun company.—The company com
mander receives instructions for the disposition of his ma
chine guns from the battalion commander. These instruc
tions may be either to carry out a machine gun plan issued
by the division commander, or by the regimental command
er, if such plan be issued. If no such plan be issued, he
assists the battalion commander in making a careful exam
ination of the terrain, selecting locations for his guns and
assigning them appropriate missions, including mutual sup
port of adjacent units. He directs the execution of an ap
proved plan for the employment of his machine guns, and
may supervise the location of the tactical obstacles in front
of the line of resistance.
(9) The platoon.— (a) The commander of a rifle pla
toon, on receipt of orders from his company commander,
studies the terrain to be covered by the fire of his platoon;
locates each squad and assigns it, particularly its automatic
rifle, a sector of fire; and supervises the tracing and con
struction of the trenches to be occupied by his platoon, or
assigned to it for construction. He supervises any clear
ing necessary to secure an adequate field of fire for his pla
toon, and the location and construction of the necessary
protective obstacles.
(b) The commander of a machine gun platoon, under
the instructions of his company commander, locates his
guns in accordance with the plan for the employment of
the machine guns and supervises their emplacement.
(c) The commander of a platoon of the howitzer com
pany attached to a battalion, on receipt of the battalion
commander's instructions, selects the exact location for his
weapons, including alternative locations, and causes the
emplacements to be prepared.
21. PROCEDURE UNDER DIFFERENT SITUATIONS.—a. The
procedure outlined in the foregoing paragraphs is that
which might be followed in a situation where contact with
11—21
the enemy has not been obtained but is expected in a limited

time. This form of procedure would necessarily be modi
fied under the other two situations in which organization
of the ground for defense is undertaken, viz.:
(1) In contact with the enemy on an active front.
(2) Out of presence of the enemy, or where work can be
carried on with very little, if any, interference.
5. (1) When in contact with an enemy on an active
front, the defensive may be taken up under one of the fol
lowing conditions:
(a) At the conclusion of an offensive with a limited ob
jective.
(b) When offensive operations are stopped.
(2) When the defensive is to be undertaken on the
conclusion of a limited objective attack, the plans for de
fensive organization of the captured ground are prepared
in advance from studies of maps and airplane photographs,
and from information gained from aerial and ground ob
servation. When the troops reach their designated objec
tives, they organize the ground for defense in accordance
with the previously prepared plans, which are usually issued
as an Organization of the Ground Annex to the orders for
the offensive. These plans will generally provide for an
outpost in contact with the enemy, and a battle position
some distance in rear. The assault or first line battalions,
on reaching the objective, organize the ground for defense
and serve as an outpost to cover the organization of the
battle position. During the day, little or no changes in the
disposition of the leading companies of the assault bat
talions can be made, and these companies dig in wherever
they find themselves, but after dark the commanders of
the first line battalions make such changes in dispositions
as will insure a better organization for defense. The sec
ond line battalions halt on the line selected for the main
line of resistance and proceed to organize the battle position.
(3) When offensive operations are stopped, due to the
enemy's resistance or other causes, the leading troops dig in
where they find themselves; and each regimental command
er, in the absence of instructions from higher authority,
will, on his own initiative, undertake the defensive in his
11—21
zone of action, disposing his troops, part as outpost and

part as holding forces on lines of resistance which he se
lects and coordinates with adjacent units as well as cir
cumstances permit. A main line of resistance will, how
ever, ordinarily be prescribed by the high command on
which to base the defensive organization. Its location will
usually be such that it will be necessary to withdraw some
of the leading elements that are too far in advance, and in
some cases it may be so located that a local attack will have
to be made to secure possession of parts that are still held
by the enemy. In the organization of the ground in immedi
ate contact with the enemy, reconnaissance will necessarily
be limited to the smaller units, and work will have to be
carried on by them under conditions where coordination and
control by the higher command is often at a minimum.
c. Organization of the ground for defense out of pres
ence of the enemy can as a rule be carried on more methodi
cally and deliberately than in the other situations. The
ground is thoroughly reconnoitered, and a plan for its or
ganization prepared and approved before work is begun.
The works may be constructed by troops other than those
who will occupy them for defense, and in some cases civilian
labor may be employed. The commander of a force organiz
ing ground for defense under these conditions will fre
quently assign to his engineer officer the duty of preparing
a plan of organization and after its approval may charge
him with carrying out the work. The engineer officer in
this case makes use of the engineer topographical personnel
and equipment at his disposal for the reconnaissance and
other work incident to the preparation of the plan of de
fense; and utilizes, in the construction of the defensive
works, engineer and other troops assigned to him, supple
mented by civilian labor when it can be secured. In a sit
uation where a force is retiring with the expectation of
assuming the defensive in a locality several marches in rear,
the engineer officers of the several units may be directed to
precede their units and prepare plans for organization of
the ground, staking out the several positions as far as prac
ticable, so that they may be occupied and organized by the
11—21-22
troops as soon as possible after their arrival. In such cases

an Organization of the Ground Annex would probably be
prepared and issued for the guidance of the troops in the
work of organization.
22. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF WORKS.—a. In the or
ganization of the ground for defense, where time does not
permit the construction of all works simultaneously, the
order of relative importance must be prescribed for the guid
ance of subordinate units in the allotment of tools and ma
terials, and in the assignment of reserves or other troops
for assistance in the work. The order of importance of the
several positions or areas usually would be prescribed by
the army commander, and the order of importance of works
in any one position or area by division commanders.
b. The positions or areas of a defensive system gener
ally would be organized in the following order:
(1) The battle position.
(2) The outpost area.
(3) Reserve battle position.
(4) Switch positions.
The foregoing order of importance may be changed by
the situation; as, for example, in taking up the defensive
following an offensive, in which case the organization of
the battle position and the outpost area are practically of
equal importance.
c. The relative importance of the elements of organi
zation of a battle position may be taken as follows:
(1) Machine gun emplacements.
(2) Reasonable field of fire.
(3) Fire trenches on line of resistance and support line.
(4) Continuous obstacle in front of line of resistance.
(5) Obstacles protecting combat groups of front line strong
points.
(3) Temporary command posts, observation posts and aid
stations; routes of communication.
(7) Completion of trenches and obstacles in front line strong
points. Shelters.
(8) Fire trenches and obstacles on battalion and regimental
reserve lines.
(9) Completion of trenches and obstacles in centers of re
sistance. •
(10) Permanent command posts, observation posts, aid sta
tions, and shelters.
(11) Completion and improvement of trenches and obstacles
in the position.
Ill—1
CHAPTER III
Construction of Defensive Works
SECTION I
Types and Methods

Paragraph
General discussion 1
Use of troops in construction 2
Tools and materials 3
Machine gun emplacements 4
Trenches 5
Clearings 6
Obstacles 7
Emplacements for artillery, etc. 8
Command and observation posts 9
Shelters 10
1. GENERAL DISCUSSION.—The works constructed when

ground is first organized for defense, consist of those which
facilitate the exercise of command and control during com
bat, provide physical protection from the fire of the enemy,
and increase the natural defensive strength of the ground
occupied, by impeding hostile attacks and improving the
fire action of the defense. These works consist of machine
gun emplacements, trenches, clearings, obstacles, emplace
ments for artillery, trench mortars and 37-mm. guns, com
mand and observation posts, and shelters. Numerous types
of defensive works exist which are intended to fulfill a par
ticular function, and the tactical situation or the physical
characteristics of the ground occupied may in some cases
require the use of a particular type. In the general case,
however, simple standard types of works can fulfill all re
quirements, and their use will not only facilitate organiza
tion of the ground, but will also simplify greatly the sup
ply of the materials and tools required for their construc
58
Ill—1-3
CONSTRUCTION OF DEFENSIVE WORKS 59
tion. All officers should, therefore, be reasonably familiar

with the dimensions and method of construction of standard
types of defensive works, and should have a general knowl
edge of the time, labor, and materials required in their con
struction.
2. USE OF TROOPS IN CONSTRUCTION.—Except in the
case of rear positions that are deliberately sited and pre
pared for defense, troops construct the works they occupy
or utilize in defensive combat. They may be assisted by
reserves and by troops of higher units. .The construction
of trenches and obstacles requires the greatest amount of
time and labor, and will therefore be the principal factor
in determining the total time required in the preparation
of ground for defense. In a division, troops will be used,
in general, as follows:
a. Infantry.— (1) Rifle companies construct trenches
and obstacles and clear the field of fire.
(2) Machine gun companies construct machine gun
emplacements, clear the field of fire, and may site obstacles
in front of the line of resistance.
(3) Howitzer companies emplace their weapons and
provide means for their control.
(4) Headquarters companies construct command and
observation posts.
(5) Attached medical troops construct aid stations.
b. Artillery.—Artillery emplaces its guns and does the
necessary work for installing its means of command and
fire control.
c. Engineers.— (1) Engineers supply tools and ma
terials for the construction of works.
(2) They construct communications and any special
works desired by division headquarters.
(3) They may be attached to brigades (infantry or
artillery).
3. TOOLS AND MATERIALS.—Infantry troops use the
tools forming part of their equipment, and those carried
in the twelve tool wagons with the engineer regiment.
Engineer distributing points for these tools and for ma
Ill—3-4
terials, when the construction of defensive works is first

undertaken, are established well to the front. While tool
wagons at the rate of one per infantry battalion are avail
able in a division, tools should be assigned according to the
relative order of importance of construction of works. A
battalion organizing a center of resistance in a battle posi
tion should ordinarily be allotted more than one tool wagon.
In mobile situations, materials for obstacles (barbed wire,
posts, and pickets) will generally not be available initially
through the usual channels of supply, and will have to be
secured locally, although if practicable they will be brought
up from the rear. The procurement of these materials and
the stocking of the engineer distributing points with them
is the function of the division engineer, who utilizes part
of the engineer regiment and its transportation for this
purpose. In stabilized situations, tools and materials are
furnished through the regular established channels of sup
ply, and dumps of these articles are established, to include
regimental and even battalion sectors. The kind and num
ber of the most important articles carried in each of the
twelve intrenching tool wagons with the division engineer
regiment are as follows:
Article Number
Axes 36
Bars, pinch 4
Mattocks, pick, large 125
Saws, assorted 26
Shovels 250
Sand Bags 500
Tape, tracing, white, feet . 3000
The division engineer regiment also carries, in addition to
the contents of the intrenching tool wagons, 3000 sand
bags and materials for about 400 yards of wire entangle
ment.
4. MACHINE GUN EMPLACEMENTS.—Machine gun em
placements are among the first works constructed when or
ganization of the ground is undertaken. The governing
dimensions for machine gun emplacements are as follows:
Ill—4-5
a. Firing platform—4 feet wide in front and 41/2 feet

from front to rear. The rear part of the platform may be
narrowed to li/2 feet.
b. Height of parapet above firing platform—not more
than 214 feet.
c. If emplacement has overhead cover, loop hole should
be from 8 to 12 inches high, and wide enough to allow fir
ing through an arc of 60 degrees. Head room of at least
6 inches, and preferably 8 inches, from top of loop hole
to underside of roof, should be provided. A simple type
of emplacement simulating a shell hole is shown in Figure
7. This type requires 12 man-hours of labor and about
200 pounds of materials. Simpler types with rectangular
pits also may be used. The prime consideration for hasty
machine gun emplacements is concealment from hostile
ground and aerial observation. When the terrain does not
provide adequate concealment, the emplacements must be
concealed by the use of camouflage nets. Continued occu
pation of a defensive position will bring about the improve
ment of hasty machine gun emplacements to the extent of
providing overhead cover, at least splinter proof, for the
gun and its crew; and stabilization will bring into use ma
chine gun emplacements of concrete, providing protection
for gun and crew against artillery of heavy calibers.
5. TRENCHES.—a. Profiles.— (1) Fire trenches.—Fig
ure 8 shows the nomenclature of the various parts of a
trench. A fire trench for use by men standing requires a
height from step to firing crest of 4i/2 feet, and a width of
fire step not less than l1/^ feet. The profile, with area and
dimensions of a simple standing trench is shown in Figure
9. This trench would generally be constructed when only
a limited time is available for organization of the ground.
If constructed under fire, it would probably first be dug
with a uniform width of 2 feet and later widened at the top
to 4 feet. Figure 9 also shows the development of the
simple standing trench to the standard profiles, known as
Type A and Type B.
Ill—5
62 F I E L D FORTIFICATIONS
-zJl€
Pton
MACHINE GUN I
EMPLACEMENT. " A3
(Shell Hole Type) Platform
Figure 7
III—5
i
bo fc
s I
o
Ill—5
(a) Type A.—Figure 10 shows the profile, with area

and dimensions of this trench. It is the first profile to be
worked for in the development and improvement of
trenches. It is the standard profile for hard ground, where
the slopes will stand permanently without revetment.
(b) Type B.—Figure 11 shows the profile, with area
and dimensions, of this trench. Type A will develop to
this profile in soft ground, for which Type B is intended.
The lower half of the trench is revetted throughout, while
the upper half has a wide berm to prevent shell fire from
blocking the trench.
(2) Approach trenches.—With limited time available
for organization of the ground, approach trenches will prob
ably be first constructed with a profile approximating that
of the simple standing trench shown in Figure 9. This
profile would then be developed to Type A, Figure 12, in
hard ground and to Type B, Figure 13, in soft ground. It
will be noted that the profile of excavation of Type A ap
proach trench is the same as Type A fire trench, except
for the additional excavation required for the lx/2 foot fire
step. The profile of excavation for Type B approach trench
is the same as Type B fire trench.
(3) Modifications.—Standard profiles will frequently
be modified as follows:
(a) Berms in Type B profiles omitted and the ground above
sloped as shown by the dotted lines.
(b) Width decreased in very hard soil, or for temporary or
hasty works, thereby reducing excavation, and increasing pro
tection.
(c) Command of parapet increased to secure better fire over
foreground, or where rock or underground water prevents ex
cavation to the full depth.
(d) Excavated material removed to a distance from the
trench, where concealment is particularly important.
(e) Overhead cover used on parts of approach trenches.
(f) Existing cover (cuts, fills, ditches, and slopes) utilized.
(g) Important approach trenches increased in width, and
less important ones decreased in width and depth.
(h) Parts of approach trenches adapted for use as fire
trenches.
(i) Fire trenches arranged for fire to the rear as well as
to the front.
III—5
Ort fom C <tpoa*d*</ C

• • A • A
' ' B " ~ • 3'
Figure 9
SIMPLE STANDING TRENCH.
(Showing development into Standard Fire Trench, Types A and B.)
Figure 10
TYPE A.
(For use without A frames.)
TYPEB
(/ for use wm A fr^mesj
Figure 11
Figure 12
TYPE A.
(For Use without A frames.)
Ill—5
b. Trace.— (1) The trace of a trench must fulfill the

following requirements:
(a) Provide protection against enfilade fire, and limit the
effect of bursting shell, by traverses or frequent changes in
direction. A straight section of untraversed trench usually
should not exceed 40 feet in length.
(b) Lend itself, if a fire trench, to the development of
flank, or cross, fire.
(c) Provide, if an approach trench, for easy movement of
men and supplies, and excavation of casualties.
(d) Be simple to mark out on the ground, and construct.
(e) Provide for protection against general as well as local
enfilade fire by making a general change of direction at least
every 100 yards, in addition to local irregularities.
(2) Prevailing types of trench traces are the follow
ing:
(a) Traversed.—Figure 14. Dimensions shown may
be varied to adapt trace to ground, but traverses should
never be less than 12 feet thick nor fire bays more than 40
feet long. Its advantages are that it affords good protec
tion against enfilade fire, and limits the effect of bursting
shell to a single fire bay; it is easy to lay out, and by the
occasional use of a forward traverse, lends itself to the
development of cross fire. Its disadvantages are that a
greater amount of excavation is required than in the other
types, and the movement of men and supplies is difficult, due
to the right angle turns. For the latter reason it should
never be used for an approach trench.
(b) Octagonal.—Figure 15. The advantages of this
trace are that it gives a 30 per cent reduction in the labor
required to construct an equal length of traversed trace;
movement of men and supplies is easier than in the trav
ersed trench; and it facilitates the development of flank
or cross fire. Its disadvantages are that less complete pro
tection is provided from enfilade fire and the effect of burst
ing shell than in the traversed trace, and it is not quite so
simple to mark out on the ground as tlfie traversed trace.
(c) Echelon.—Figure 16. This trace is used for fire
trenches which run toward the enemy's-, lines, particularly
down a' slope; It provides protection of fire bays from en
filade fire, and good faeifrfcieS'/ox!.flflnXflre along its front.
III—5
Figure 13
TYPE B.
(For use with A frames.)
•28
Figure 14
TRAVERSED TRACE.
Full lines indicate trace for Type B trench.
Dotted lines indicate trace for Type A trench.
t - -SO'- • -\&6 • - 25—\&6%

12 Paces JOPsces
ifz
30' -
itcfe
Figure 15
OCTAGONAL TRACE.
(Method of tracing indicated.)
T
V r
V
SCHOOLS
Ill—5
(d) Zigzag.—Figure 17. This trace may be used either

for fire or approach trenches. Its advantages are: good
facilities for flank fire; ease of movement for men and sup
plies if widened at the bends; simple to mark out and con
struct; and well suited for approach trenches prepared for
fire to a flank. Its disadvantage is that it does not limit
the effect of bursting shell as well as the traversed type.
(e) Wavy.—Figures 18, 19, and 20. This is the most
suitable trace for approach trenches, due to the ease with
which it permits movement of men and supplies. It also
may be used for fire trenches. It has nearly the same quali
ties as the zigzag trace except that it is more difficult to
mark out and revet, and it facilitates movement due to the
easier bends.
c. Construction.—Trench construction is executed un
der widely different conditions. For example; when the
defensive is assumed in a meeting engagement, or after
an offensive on a stabilized front, the front trenches of the
opposing sides are the places where the foremost combat
ants actually dig themselves in. Such conditions give very
little opportunity for the construction of trenches. Indi
vidual pits, convenient shell holes, and accidents of the
ground affording shelter, are gradually connected up until
there is a semblance of a continuous line. On the other
hand, in a rear system out of the presence of the enemy
and beyond interference from his fire, trenches may be
carefully sited, traced, and excavated. The larger part of
trench construction will be carried on under conditions in
termediate between these two extremes, and, in general,
the more time that can be devoted to a careful laying out
of the work, the better will be the results both in quality
and quantity. Trench construction may be considered under
the heads of siting, tracing, and execution.
(1) Siting.—The general locations of defensive lines
having been fixed by higher headquarters, the actual siting
of the trenches is done by the lower units. Limiting points,
on lines of trenches at the boundaries between adjacent
units, must be fixed and marked by the next higher head
III—5
quarters, or by mutual agreement between the units con

cerned, in time to insure coordination of work at those
points. The considerations governing the location of the
several lines of a battle position, namely: protection of ob
servation, field of fire, enfilade fire across the front, mutual
support, and close artillery support, as well as the use of
rs'
Figure 17
ZIGZAG TRACE.
Figure 18
WAVY TRACE.
Figure 19
WAVY TRACE, RIGHT.
With both local and general irregularities.
Figure 20
WAVY TRACE, WRONG.
No general irregularities.
approach trenches for flank defense, and the utilization of

natural cover for concealment, have already been discussed
(see Chapter II), and govern the siting of trenches. In
addition to the above, drainage must also be considered.
Drainage is particularly important where trenches are in
tended for long continued occupancy, and if not properly
provided for, may cause as many casualties through result
Ill—5
ing sickness as occur from the fire of the enemy. In siting

trenches, drainage should be considered as follows:
(a) Trenches should not be located in marshy or boggy
ground, unless absolutely necessary.
(b) Approach trenches should not be located in the bottoms
of gullies or valleys, but along the side slope above the bottom.
(c) Trenches should be located so that they drain toward
natural low points in the line, avoiding any artificial low spots.
(See Figure 21.)
(2) Tracing.—Trenches, when sited, are marked at
certain selected points by stakes, small flags, stones, or
other improvised means; or the excavation of short sections
may at once be started. Using the markers as guides, the
trench trace decided on is then marked out on the ground
by means of tracing tape, or by digging a small furrow.
The tape, or mark on the ground, indicates the edge near
est the enemy, in case of a fire trench, or the right hand
edge of an approach trench. Tracing should always be
supervised by an officer, and if possible should be completed
before the men who are to do the excavating arrive. Some
training is necessary to enable a tracing party to do its
work properly and quickly, especially at night. The best
time for tracing, if liable to interference from hostile fire,
is generally just at dusk, when, for 30 or 40 minutes, there
is light enough to see what is being done, but sufficient
darkness to interfere with the enemy's observation.
(3) Execution.— (a) As previously indicated, troops
in contact with the enemy and under fire will secure cover
in the most expeditious manner possible, by utilizing exist
ing cover and excavating individual pits, or "fox holes,"
with the tools carried by them. Trenches connecting these
individual shelters will have to be sited, traced, and exca
vated under cover of darkness. Under more favorable con
ditions, tools may be issued and the troops deployed on the
ground they are to occupy, but the situation may prevent
the tracing of the trenches before work is begun. In this
case, each platoon commander places each of his squads,
which then excavate a short section of trench, usually a
fire bay, sufficient to shelter the squad. While this work
is being done the platoon commander traces the trench

connecting the squad trenches, to insure the proper develop
ment of the trenches to be occupied by his platoon. When
the situation permits an orderly execution of the work, each
working unit, usually the platoon, secures tools at the dis
tributing point (ordinarily one pick mattock and one shovel
per man if the supply permit) marches to its task, where
the men are assigned individual tasks and work is begun.
Individual tasks in trench work should not be less than
5 feet in length, as this is the minimum length in which one
man can work without interference from others. Depending
on the allotment of tools, tasks may be assigned to two men,
Figure 21
one of whom picks and the other shovels, or to three men,

one of whom picks while the other two shovel. As soon
as tasks are assigned to individuals or small groups, the
right hand corner is marked, and rifles and equipment placed
6 to 8 paces in rear. A small furrow is then dug along the
tape, which is then removed and preserved. The sod, if
any exists, is removed and placed to form a revetment to
the parapet, and the trench is dug to the required depth.
Observance of the following rules will increase the effi
ciency of the work:
(i) The tactical organization of small units should be main
tained. In general, the platoon is the best working unit.
(ii) Each unit should work under the immediate supervision
of its own officers and noncommissioned officers. The officers are
responsible for the enforcement of discipline and the quantity
of work done.
Ill—5
(b) Rate.—The rate of execution of trench work de

pends on the character of the soil, tools assigned, and meth
od of working the men. The rate of excavation of indi
vidual men decreases with continuous work, as the men be
come fatigued. The greatest results per man can be ob
tained by working each man continuously at the same task
for not exceeding 8 hours, with a 10 minutes rest each hour.
With sufficient men available to use two reliefs, a greater
total output is obtained but with a smaller output per man.
The following table shows what may be expected per man,
under favorable weather conditions, by working parties
not accustomed to such work:
Proportion oftools Cubic feet excavated per man

Totals
Nature of
Soil Picks Shovels 1st hour 3d hour 3d and First U Second 8 hours
Uth hours hours U hours
Hard* .... 2 1 15 10 15 40 27 67
Average . 1 1 23 15 22 60 40 100
Easyf 1 2 30 20 30 80 53 133
*A11 must be loosened with pick.
tRequires little or no picking.
Based on the above table, a platoon, working 48 men

(corporals are assumed as working with the squads), in
average soil, can complete in 8 hours, a simple standing
trench with traversed trace on a front of about 110 yards,
or with the octagonal trace, on a front of about 160 yards.
An approach trench of equal profile of excavation, could be
completed over a distance of about 160 yards.
(c) Revetment.—The means used in field works to re
tain earth at a steeper slope than it would naturally as
sume, is termed revetment. It is employed in the construc
tion of parapets and trenches, but its use should be avoided
wherever practicable, due to the great amount of time, labor,
and materials involved in its construction. By the use of
trench profiles, in which the sides are sloped at safe angles,
and berms provided at various levels, the use of revetment
may be minimized. The standard trench profiles, types A
and B, were designed with this in view. In these profiles,
Ill—5
only the lower 2 or 3 feet are revetted and this is restricted

to the profiles for soft ground, Type B, and the Type A fire
trench, as fire steps always require revetment. By revet
ting only the lower part of trenches, the revetment is sel
dom injured by shell fire, and if the upper part of the
trench is blown in, it can be more easily cleared than if
the revetment has been carried farther up. The use of
high revetment is then restricted to the repair of trenches,
and to those cases where the character of the soil requires
it. The revetment contemplated for the Type B profiles
consists of wooden "A" frames, supporting the revetting
material, which may consist of brush, poles, planks, or cor
rugated iron. Extensive revetment work will usually be
necessary in stabilized situations and the engineer dumps
will eventually be stocked with materials for this work,
though local materials should be utilized to the fullest ex
tent. Many methods of revetment have been devised, but
all may be placed in two general classes, viz.: the retain
ing wall type and the superficial type. The retaining wall
type is self supporting, as for example: the sand bag, sod,
and gabion revetments, and is best suited for fills. The
superficial type requires independent supports, such as the
A-frame revetment in the Type B profiles, and is best suited
to cuts, as practically no additional excavation for the revet
ment itself, is required.
(d) Provision for drainage.—In the execution of trench
work, the following precautions relative to drainage should
be observed:
(i) The excavating should be so regulated, that the bottom
will allow water entering the trench to flow along it, and not
accumulate at points in the trench.
(ii) Intercepting ditches on the uphill side of trenches should
be provided as soon as possible to catch surface water, and pre
vent its flowing into the trenches.
(iii) A drainage ditch or sump always should be constructed
at the same time as, or in advance of, the trenches draining
into it.
d. Trench accessories.—Trench accessories find their
greatest use in highly stabilized situations and consist of
camouflaged sentinel posts, snipers or sharpshooters posts,
Ill—5-7
ammunition and grenade boxes, sign boards, trench boards,

ladders, steps, and similar devices. These accessories or
materials for their construction, are provided through engi
neer supply establishments.
6. CLEARINGS.—A field of fire of 100 yards in front of
each fire trench is considered necessary and, in the general
case, some clearing of the foreground must be done to ob
tain it. On terrain organized for close defense, it is gen
erally advisable to commence at the trench and work for
ward as time permits; but in delaying actions where fire
effect at long ranges is desired, clearing to that end would
be preferable. In clearing terrain, it should be done in such
a way as to give no assistance to the enemy in his advance
or in the use of his weapons, and the retention of existing
cover for the defense should also be borne in mind. Large
scattered trees, if left standing, give less cover to an at
tacker than if cut down, and are sometimes useful as range
marks. Unless they can be entirely removed, only the lower
braches should be cut off. Buildings and walls should be
demolished if the debris will not afford as good cover for the
enemy as the structure would, if left standing. It is rarely
possible or desirable to undertake the wholesale clearing
of woods, and the work is usually restricted to clearing the
undergrowth and removing the lower branches of the larger
trees. Narrow lanes, running obliquely in front of a line
to be defended, may be cut through woods and swept by
machine gun fire. Under average conditions, an area of
100 square yards (10 x 10 yards) requires two man-hours
of labor to clear it of brushwood and small trees (less than
12 inches in diameter).
7. OBSTACLES.—a. Wire entanglements.—Troops hold
ing a position are responsible for the construction of the
necessary obstacles, and should be thoroughly trained in
the construction of wire entanglements. Numerous types
of wire entanglements have been devised, but from the view
point of effectiveness, the amount of preparation and ma
terials required, and the rapidity and simplicity of erection,
the double apron fence is one of the best types (Figure 22).
Ill—7
For very rapid work over long lengths, the back apron may
be omitted temporarily, but the front apron should never
be omitted. A length of one hundred yards of double apron
fence requires 34 posts, 5 feet long and 31/2 to 4 inches in
diameter; 68 pickets, 2 to 2i/2 feet long and 2V2 to 3 inches
in diameter; and 1400 yards of barbed wire. The construc
tion of this length requires 25 man-hours of labor under
average conditions. The principles governing the location
of obstacles are given in Chapter II. The following prin
ciples govern the design and erection of • wire entangle
ments :
(1) For rapid work the location of the entanglement should
be marked out on the ground.
(2) In general, a broad thin entanglement is better than a
narrow, thick one. The former, while equally effective, is less
5t>tt3
Inclined Wire,
Section -Order of strinqinq Wires
5 0 YDS. STANDARD DOUBLE APRON FENCE
Figure 22
liable to destruction by artillery fire and is less visible. Two

belts of entanglement separated by a space of 10 to 50 yards
are better than the same amount of entanglement in one belt.
(3) An entanglement must be well supported and anchored,
so that it is difficult to flatten it out or drag it aside.
(4) Loose tangled barbed wire in the entanglement, or be
tween the several belts, increases its effectiveness.
(5) The first entanglement erected should be at the outer
limits of the obstacle, so that if deepened, this work can be
carried on under protection of the entanglement already com
pleted.
In stabilized situations, extensive use is made of wire
entanglements, and stocks of materials for their construction
will be available in engineer dumps. These materials will
be prepared with a view to the rapid erection of the en
tanglements. In mobile situations, much of the material
will have to be secured locally, barbed wire frequently being
Ill—7-8
secured from existing fences, and posts and pickets cut in

the vicinity. Improvised entanglements will therefore often
be constructed, but as a few wires strung on posts will cause
some interference with hostile attacks, even this should be
made use of initially in organization for defense. A com
plete system of wire entanglements for a battle position re
quires a length of obstacles about nine times that of the
front held. A thousand yards of a battle position would
thus require 9000 yards of wire entanglements, which, if
only a single belt of double apron fence, would mean 126,000
yards of barbed wire—about 13 tons.
b. Gaps.—The only gaps required in front line wire
are a few small concealed exits for patrols. On rear lines,
however, it is important to have plenty of well marked gaps
in obstacles for the advance of counterattacking troops or
the withdrawal of troops compelled to retire. All such gaps
must be provided with means for quickly closing them in
case of hostile advance. Such means usually consist of
cheveaux de frise, or similar portable obstacles, that can
be quickly moved into position to close the gap, and secured
in place.
c. Miscellaneous obstacles.—Obstacles may be con
structed of felled trees, which may or may not be entangled
with barbed wire. These obstacles require much more work
than entanglements and would rarely be used except in
connection with clearings. Obstacles against tanks are ex
tremely difficult to provide and, where an inundation of
sufficient depth cannot be secured, defense against tanks
will generally have to be made by means of mines and anti
tank guns.
8. EMPLACEMENTS FOR ARTILLERY, ETC.—a. The prep
aration of an artillery position in defense should be carried
out in the following order of importance:
(1) Concealment.
(2) Cover for command post and telephone.
(3) Cover for personnel, guns, and ammunition.
Before any work is begun, the site must be camouflaged
sufficiently to conceal every indication of work. Cover
Ill—8-9
should be provided progressively, depending on the time,

labor, and materials available, from shelter against the
weather to shelter against hostile fire. A command post for
a battery, including telephone, can be accommodated in a
space 9 feet by 9 feet by 6 feet high, but a separate chamber
for the telephone is desirable. There are no fixed sizes for
ammuntion shelters and any available shelter may be used,
provided the shells are stored in relatively small lots sepa
rated by traverses not less than 4 feet thick. Except with
fixed ammunition, powder charges should be separate from
the shells. Shells and powder charges should be kept off
the ground, and the latter screened from the sun's rays. Gun
emplacements may be only camouflaged or, in addition, may
be furnished varying degrees of protection against hostile
fire. The extent to which a gun may be sunk below ground
level depends on the nature of the ground and the minimum
range at which the gun must fire. All emplacements must
be so constructed that the gun can be run in and out with
out difficulty and also provide for drainage. Antitank guns
will require protection against heavy hostile fire.
b. Trench mortars and 37-mm. guns.—These are first
emplaced in the open in defensive situations, concealment
and alternative emplacements being relied on for protec
tion. In a stabilized situation, physical protection from
hostile fire becomes necessary and protected emplacements
are then provided.
9. COMMAND AND OBSERVATION POSTS.—When ground
is first organized for defense, temporary command and ob
servation posts are established and provided with such
protection as their location requires. If stabilization ensues,
provision must be made for more permanent posts, with in
creased protection against hostile fire. This, for command
posts, will ordinarily be in the nature of heavy shelter.
Observation posts, being in localities fully exposed to hostile
observation, will depend largely on concealment with such
physical protection against hostile fire as can be secured
without disclosing their locations. The size of the observa
tion post is usually as small as possible in order to facili
Ill—9-10
tate concealment. Thirty-six square feet is the minimum

area in which work can be done properly. The observation
post may be connected directly with a heavy shelter be
neath it, for use by the observers. Figures 23 and 24 show
some types of observation posts.
10. SHELTERS.—a. Shelters are works intended to pro
tect personnel from the weather and from the fire of the
enemy. They are essential when terrain is held defensively
for long periods, and in any defensive situation where it is
apparent that the defensive will continue for some time,
steps must be taken to provide adequate shelter. Ordi
narily, shelter construction will be undertaken before any
extensive deepening and widening of trenches is begun.
Depending on the protection afforded, shelters are classi
fied as follows:
(1) Light shelters.—Light shelters afford protection
against rifle and machine gun fire, shrapnel, and shell
splinters, and in some cases against continuous bombard
ment by artillery of 3-inch caliber. When not proof against
direct hits by 3-inch shells, they are known as splinter
proof shelters. Light shelters are the type first constructed
in mobile warfare, and they are also extensively used in
the front lines in stabilized situations, where promptness
of exit precludes the use of shelters deep under ground.
Figure 25 shows the simplest form of light or splinter proof
shelter, while Figures 26 and 27 show forms, proof against
3-inch shells, for use in defensive situations of long dura
tion.
(2) Medium shelters.—Medium shelters afford protec
tion against continuous bombardment by artillery up to
6-inch caliber. (See Figures 28 and 29.)
(3) Heavy shelters.—Heavy shelters afford protec
tion against continuous bombardment by artillery up to
8-inch caliber, and occasional hits by higher calibers.
b. Shelters, depending on the method of construction,
are also known as cut and cover shelters and cave shelters.
(1) Cut and cover shelters.—Cut and cover shelters
are constructed by open excavation and provided with a
Ill—10
SPUNTER AND BULLET-PROOF
OBSERVATION POST.
>SS filled
with broken atoha.
ndbagt fillmd
with broken fton»
TiroS'S Girder* Staal plotm*
AUTERNATfVS KEAO PiCCE

Figure 23
Ill—10
SPUNTER-PROQFOBSERVATIQKPOST
PLAN AT A A SECTION OF HOOD.

Shewing ObstrveOoA Slit
Trench
yMmtd totrsnct
PLAN
OOQ spikes t»*c<

M steps
Figure 24
Ill—10
i'-e>'parapet
Section fltevation
Figure 25
HASTY SPLINTER PROOF.
Seclion LlevaUon
Figure 26
TIMBERED SHELTER.
Using 3" x 9" frames.
Proof against 3" shells.
Clevatlon
Figure 27
CORRUGATED IRON SHELTER.
Using 2-man Shelter Section.
Proof against 3" Shells.
Ill—10
Ill—10
protective roof. (See Figures 28 and 29.) They will be

used under the following conditions:
(a) Where underground water, or the hardness of under
lying rock, make construction of cave shelters impracticable;
(b) Where rapidity of exit prohibits the use of deep cave
shelters;
(c) In wooded areas, or buildings, where concealment is
easy and ample materials available.
Cut and cover methods will generally be used for light

and medium shelters, since protection against calibers as
great as 6 inches, presents no great difficulties. To secure
protection against calibers greater than 6 inches by cut
and cover methods is generally impracticable, unless con
crete is used for the shelter.
(2) Cave shelters.—Cave shelters afford the best pro
tection against all calibers of artillery and trench mortars,
and should be constructed whenever time, tactical considera
tions, and the physical condition of the terrain permit. They
should be designed to be proof against the 8-inch shell at
least. This requires overhead cover of 30 feet of ordinary
soil or 15 feet of rock. Cave shelters are constructed by
mining or tunneling operations. Figure 30 shows a type
of entrance to cave shelters. Two entrances should always
be provided for each deep shelter and should be at least 40
feet apart. In large shelters, entrances should be provided
at the rate of one for each 25 men. Figures 31 and 32 show
cave shelters suitable for a platoon of infantry. Difficulty
of exit, due to the long steep entrances, makes the use of
cave shelters inadvisable in or near front lines, and there
numerous small cut and cover shelters must be used. The
entrances of deep shelters must be provided with adequate
protection against gas. A cave shelter for a platoon of in
fantry, in soil requiring timbering as the work progresses,
could, if work is carried on continuously, be completed in
about 10 days.
N
Ill—10
c. (1) Shelters are constructed on the following al

lowances of floor space:
Troops shelter, per man occupying 9.5 sq. ft.
Aid station, per litter 28 sq. ft.
Command post, platoon 100 sq. ft.
Command post, company 200 sq. ft.
Command post, battalion 400 sq. ft.
Command post, regiment 600 sq. ft.
Command post, brigade 800 sq. ft.
Command post, division 1600 sq. ft.
>—30-<r—-4tf*+
Figure 31
STANDAKD INFANTRY CAVE SHELTER.
Using Standard Chamber Sets.
Figure 32
STANDARD INFANTRY CAVE SHELTER.
Using French Major Gallery Sets.
(2) Shelters in a defensive position should be con

structed in the following order, where conditions do not per
mit their construction simultaneously:
(a) Machine gun personnel.
(b) Command and observation posts.
(c) Infantry rifle companies.
(d) Aid stations.
(e) Kitchens.
Ill—10
Artillery shelter construction is undertaken at the same

time as the infantry shelters, if conditions warrant.
(3) When extensive construction of shelters must be
undertaken, it is advisable before starting the work to have
an investigation of the underground conditions made by a
geologist. Such an investigation will result in designs and
methods of construction best suited to the terrain, and avoid
to a large extent difficulty from underground water, due to
improper location or methods of construction. Materials
for standard types of shelters are prepared and furnished
by engineer supply establishments.
IV—1
CHAPTER IV
The Principles, and the Execution

of the Work of Camouflage
Paragraphs
SECTION I.—Camouflage—General 1-5
II.—Execution of Work of Camouflage 6-9
SECTION I
Camouflage—General
Paragraph
Definition and purpose 1
Airplane photographs 2
Influence of location 3
Camouflage discipline 4
Application 5
1. DEFINITION AND PURPOSE.—a. Military camouflage

is a term that was first applied to the painting and screen
ing of guns to render them less conspicuous. Later de
velopments proved this to be only a minor part of camou
flage; and it now includes all work done for the purpose of
deceiving the enemy as to the existence, nature, or location
of material, troops, or military works. It is simply counter
intelligence work designed primarily to defeat or neutralize
the means of intelligence available to the enemy through
airplane photographs, air observation (airplane and bal
loon), and ground observation. Its importance depends, in
general, on the activity and effectiveness of the hostile air
service.
b. The prime object of camouflage is deception of the
enemy. By means of a covering or disguise, objects are
IV—1-2
PRINCIPLES—EXECUTION—CAMOUFLAGE 89
rendered indistinguishable or unrecognizable. Concealment

from view is not essential, provided the object appears as a
natural part of its surroundings. Concealment in the lim
ited sense of hiding from view, is screening, not camouflage.
2. AIRPLANE PHOTOGRAPHS.—a. The airplane photo
graph will generally fix definitely on the map the position
of objects included therein; hence, camouflage must be used
primarily to deceive the expert examiner of such photo
graphs. In general, to achieve success in camouflage, the
one directing the work of camouflage must have skill in
reading airplane photographs, so that having made an ex
amination of a photograph of an area in which it is pro
posed to construct a work or install weapons, he is able
to execute the camouflage work so that there is no apparent
interference with the normal aspect of the locality with
which the enemy has become familiar.
b. In airplane photographs the effect of color is not so
marked or important as the effect of light and shade. Earth
appears light and grass or vegetation dark, not so much be
cause of their respective colors but on account of the amount
of contained shadow produced by texture. A billiard table
or a silk hat illustrates this quality. Brush them against
the nap and the tone is lowered to dark green in the one
and a dead black in the other; brushed in the right way,
they appear noticeably lighter in tone. The reason is that
they gain contained shadow when brushed the wrong way
and lose it when brushed the right way. Nap consists of a
multitude of slender hairs or fibers, each one throwing a
shadow when erect, but casting none when "laid."
c. Grass or vegetation possess the same property in
a marked degree. The longer it is, the darker it appears
in the photograph; but when it has been pressed down, the
amount of shadow thrown is lessened and consequently it
appears lighter. For this reason a slightly worn path in
grass which may be quite inconspicuous from the ground,
shows up vividly in an airplane photograph. Earth, on
the contrary, contains little contained shadow and the longer
it has been turned up and exposed to the weather, the less
IV—2-3
it has. A beaten track is however noticeable as it contains

no contained shadow at all and will therefore reflect more
light.
d. The airplane photograph records colors, variations
of the ground, vegetation, etc., in terms of light and shade,
and shows a patch work pattern of black and white meet
ing in varying intensities of gray. The pattern may be
large and simple, or intricate and complex. A highly de
veloped agricultural district presents a regular pattern
with cultivated fields and grass lands showing large rec
tangular expanses of monotones, broken occasionally by
clumps of trees, hedges, groups of buildings and their at
tendant shadows, but presenting on the whole a simple pat
tern. On the other hand, ground with alternating cleared
spaces and clumps of trees and broken by ravines gives a
complex and intricate pattern of mingled light and shade.
It will be apparent that the interpretation of a photograph
with a complex pattern will be much more difficult than
with a simple pattern, and it is further complicated by the
variations due to changing light conditions.
3. INFLUENCE OF LOCATION.—a. When the location of
works or weapons is being considered, the influence of the
location on the successful use of camouflage should be an
important factor in coming to a decision, and, as indicated
above, terrain which presents a complex pattern in the air
plane photograph is much more favorable for successful
camouflage than terrain with a simple pattern.
b. In the American Expeditionary Force, by far the
greatest amount of camouflage work was done in connection
with the artillery, and based on the experience in this special
line, the conclusions reached were that the values of the
factors entering into the successful camouflage of artillery
positions were about as follows:
Reconnaissance and choice of position 40 per cent
Camouflage discipline 25 per cent
Correct installation of camouflage material 20 per cent
Camouflage material used 15 per cent
c. Positions for artillery must necessarily be selected
within an area from which the guns can perform the mis
IV—3-4
sion assigned to them, but almost any sacrifice should be

made to avoid placing guns in an open field, if the posi
tion is to be occupied for any length of time. Such a loca
tion, due to the fact that the terrain in the vicinity of the
location presents a simple pattern on the photograph, en
ables any slight change in the apparent shade or texture of
a wide expanse of the same tone to be readily detected and
the difficulty of exactly matching the shade or texture of
the field by camouflage material will be apparent. On the
other hand, positions under trees, among bushes, in hedges,
and in localities where natural shadows exist, and which
show as an irregular and complex pattern on the photograph
are the positions to be selected. Then by tying in the
overhead cover with the irregularities which appear in the
photograph, even if nothing more than a clump of trees, the
natural shadows are sufficient to prevent the sharp contrast
which overhead camouflage would otherwise cause in an
unbroken expanse of monotone.
4. CAMOUFLAGE DISCIPLINE.—a. In successful camou
flage work for artillery, camouflage discipline is probably
next in importance to choice of positions. Perfect camou
flage discipline is extremely difficult if not impossible of
attainment, and this fact makes the selection of positions
even more important, in that with proper choice of posi
tions the bad effect of a lack of camouflage discipline can be
minimized.
b. Positions along established roads are therefore to be
sought, as the bringing up of guns, ammunition, and rations
can then be accomplished, and access to the battery secured
without the necessity of making additional tracks that would
tend to betray the position.
c. When necessary, however, to establish guns off a
road, which will often be the case, traffic must be carefully
laid out and rigidly confined to the authorized tracks. Such
tracks or trails must be under cover, natural or artificial,
or if they are so long that it is impossible to cover them,
they should never stop at a position but continue beyond to
a road, farm, patch of woods, or other logical objective.
IV—4-5
d. A path made by a single man walking through grass

is visible to an unbelievable degree, and, consequently, in
discriminate paths and tracks caused the detection and de
struction of more artillery positions than any other single
cause during the war. The making of indiscriminate paths
and tracks in the vicinity of gun positions must, therefore,
be strictly guarded against; and the necessary traffic con
fined to one path or track, which must be made as narrow as
possible by wiring in on both sides, and run under the shel
ter of natural cover whenever practicable.
e. In this connection, the importance of camouflage dis
cipline may be indicated by the value placed upon tracks by
those interested in the interpretation of airplane photo
graphs. In a War Department document entitled "Notes on
the Interpretation of Aeroplane Photographs," issued during
1918, the following statements appear under the heading,
"Tracks":
"Tracks form one of the most valuable guides to the enemy's
activities, but are sometimes neglected because they are obvious.
"A study of tracks will often reveal the following points:
Dumps
Billets and hutments (especially in woods)
Active battery positions
Headquarters
Observation posts
Under the heading "Batteries," the following appears:

"It is evident that increasing care is being taken to conceal
emplacements and defeat the camera. New battery positions are
often concealed by overhead cover, but they may be detected by
the tracks or tramways leading to them. Although the battery
emplacement itself is concealed, it is difficult to conceal the
activity to it and round it."
5. APPLICATION.—Camouflage naturally finds its great

est application in stabilized situations, where the means of
securing and studying evidences of works are highly de
veloped, requiring correspondingly greater efforts for
"Counter Intelligence." While mobile situations will not re
IV—5-6
quire the refinements in camouflage work resorted to under

stabilized situations, nor will the conditions permit of as
great elaboration, all practical means should be utilized to
nullify the enemy's means of securing information as to dis
positions of troops and works. It may be expected that
means of securing information through the medium of air
plane photographs will be continuously improved and de
veloped, and that in future wars the precautionary measures
required to nullify the enemy's intelligence methods under
open situations may approximate those required in stabi
lized situations during the World War.
SECTION II
Execution of Work of Camouflage

Paragraph
Camouflage work in the A.E.F. 6
Present organization 7
Camouflage work by troops 8
Screening 9
6. CAMOUFLAGE WORK IN THE A.E.F.—Camouflage

work in the American Expeditionary Force was based on
the experiences of the French and the British. The 40th
Engineers was organized for camouflage duty and functioned
as part of the American Expeditionary Force, operating
factories for the manufacture of camouflage material, fur
nishing details for instructional purposes at the various
schools, and for the supervision and inspection of camou
flage work in the divisions, corps, and armies. The fac
tories were operated mainly with French civilian employees,
and produced a large quantity of material, mainly overhead
nets, but a considerable quantity of hangar covers, sniper
suits, observation posts, and other devices were manufac
tured. Detachments of the 40th Engineers with divisions,
corps, and armies were relatively small and were used main
ly for inspection and supervision of the camouflage work in
IV—6-8
the unit to which assigned. These detachments reported to

the engineer officer of the unit to which assigned. .
7. PRESENT ORGANIZATION.—a. Present plans for cam
ouflage operations in our service contemplate the assign
ment of one engineer camouflage battalion to General Head
quarters Reserve and one engineer camouflage company to
each army. All camouflage troops will be omitted when the
effective hostile air forces are negligible.
b. The General Headquarters camouflage battalion will
ordinarily perform the following functions:
(1) Provide for the general supply of camouflage material
including the operation of such camouflage factories as are neces
sary for the manufacture of material.
(2) Furnish details for camouflage instruction as training
centers.
(3) Provide for the inspection of such camouflage work as
is necessary in the communications zone.
c. The army camouflage company will function as fol
lows :
(1) Provide for the supply of camouflage material to the
army.
(2) Execute such special camouflage work as may be directed,
including work at army headquarters.
(3) Provide for the inspection of camouflage in army areas
not included in corps areas, and for army troops when operating
in corps areas.
d. Ordinarily the work required for the camouflage of
troops will be performed by the troops concerned. In each
corps and division, an assistant to the unit engineer is pro
vided as camouflage officer. These assistants are charged
with the supply of camouflage material, general supervision
of special camouflage work, and inspection of camouflage
for the unit to which assigned, with a view to the enforce
ment of camouflage discipline so as to insure the maximum
security of the command.
8. CAMOUFLAGE WORK BY TROOPS. — a. Camouflage
work must be done by the troops concerned and for this rea
son all troops should receive instruction in the elements of
camouflage and camouflage discipline.
b. Artificial camouflage material furnished will con
sist of nets made of fish nets or chicken wire to which are
tied strips of burlap or other material colored to harmonize
with the vegetation, and thinned out towards the edges to

prevent the edges of the net from casting pronounced shad
ows. These nets, supported on posts and wires, are used to
cover artillery, ammunition dumps, entrances to dugouts,
command posts, etc. Smaller nets are similarly used for
machine guns, but in the front lines, where exposed to the
enemy's ground observation, they must be kept close to the
ground and greater care taken in harmonizing the colors
with the vegetation than would be necessary were only the
airplane camera to be contended with.
c. Nets must be erected with care and pulled sufficiently
tight to prevent flapping and sagging. They should, as pre
viously indicated, always be tied in with trees or other ob
jects, casting irregular natural shadows; and should have
the edges cut in an irregular manner so as to prevent, in
the airplane photograph, any tendency to regularity of form
showing up.
d. The sufficiency of camouflage work can best be tested
by having the air service make the necessary photographs
and determine by an examination of the photographs
whether the work is effective.
e. It is not practicable to conceal long lines of trenches
in the open, and recourse usually must be had to dummy
trenches to deceive the enemy as to the actual ground or
ganization. For the same reason, dummy artillery posi
tions may be constructed and numerous artifices resorted to
for the purpose of confusing the enemy in his efforts to
detect the real locations of artillery, machine guns, and
trench mortars.
/. Camouflage work, to remain effective, must be con
stantly maintained, and the colors of the overhead cover
must be kept in general harmony with the surrounding
vegetation.
9. SCREENING.—a. The primary aim of screening is
concealment from view in order to permit free and unob
served circulation of traffic. A screen should be sufficiently
opaque to hide movement from any but very close and con
tinuous scrutiny. The efficiency of any screen, except one
absolutely opaque, is influenced by the back-ground. A com
IV—9
paratively transparent screen may be used successfully in

combination with a back-ground of hedges and trees. In
order to hide movement at ranges of from 2000 to 4000
yards, three-quarters of the surface of the screen should
be opaque.
b. Screens may be either plane or camouflaged, though
the latter, which are usually painted to represent a definite
locality, should only be used when required for a short time
as the paint does not stand the weather long and requires
constant watching and careful maintenance.
c. In screening roads running perpendicularly to the
front, the best results can be obtained by hanging vertical
screens across the road. For roads running parallel to the
front, short lengths, of about thirty yards, placed in echelon
and overlapping each other, are better than long continuous
lengths, as this method permits plenty of passage ways and
limits damage by shell fire. Roads running obliquely to the
front can be concealed by screens facing the front, arranged
in echelon.
V—1-2
CHAPTER V
Illustrative Problem
Paragraphs
SECTION I.—Organization of a Division Sector 1-8
II.—Organization of a Brigade Sector 9-16
III.—Organization of a Regimental Sector 17-30
IV.—Organization of a Battalion Sector 31-44
V.—Organization of an Outpost Area 45-55
. SECTION I
Organization of a Division Sector

Paragraph
General situation 1
Special situation 2
Requirement 3
A solution 4
Mission of 5th Division 5
Location of lines 6
Disposition of troops 7
Sector boundaries 8
1. GENERAL SITUATION.—a. General Map, Gettysburg

(1924), 1 inch = 5 miles. Topographical Map, Gettysburg
Antietam (1924), 1:21,120; Gettysburg, Bonneauville, Ta
neytown, and Kingsdale sheets. Special maps herewith.
b. The United States (Blue) and an overseas power
(Red) have been at war for some time. The Blue First
Army, which has been operating against Reds landing at
Baltimore, has been compelled by superior forces, to retire
from the line of the Patapsco to the northwest.
2. SPECIAL SITUATION (BLUE).—a. (Special Map No.
1 herewith.) The Blue retirement proceeded as planned.
Pursuit by the Reds was interfered with considerably by
negative measures and by cavalry heavily reinforced by ma
chine guns. On 28 July, the First Army commander de
97
V—2-3
cides to organize and hold a defensive zone along the gen

eral line: Emmitsburg—Harney—Hanover, with the III, II,
and I Corps in line from west to east, and the IV Corps in
reserve.
b. At 9:00 AM, 29 July, the Commanding General, 5th
Division, receives the III Corps order for the occupation,
organization, and defense of the corps sector from which
the following is an extract:
"2. a. The III Corps will occupy, organize, and defend a defensive
zone within its sector with the 5th and 6th Divisions in
line, 5th Division on the left.
b. Sector boundaries:
III Corps:
East boundary: Two TAVERNS—CONOVER—hill 524—hill

586 (all excl)—PINEY .CREEK (village)—RJ 607
(both incl).
West boundary: * * *.
Boundary between divisions: PLUM RUN—ROCK CREEK
—MONOCACY RIVER to PINE HILL MILL (all to 6th
Division)—ECKHARDT—RJ 476—hill 463 (all to 5th
Division).
c. The defensive zone will be organized as follows:
(1) Battle position with line of resistance on the line: ST.
JOSEPHS COLLEGE—RJ 375—high ground north of AL
LOWAY (ALLAWAY on some maps) CREEK to hill 524
(south of PALMER).
Regimental reserve line: EMMITSBURG—MYERS MILL,—
CONOVER.
(2) Outpost area with line of resistance along the line: FOUR
POINTS—hill 532—hill 586.
"3. a. The 5th Division will organize and defend the east sector.
x. (1) Not to exceed three battalions per division will hold the
outpost area. In case of attack, they will fight in place
without giving ground and will be withdrawn by divi
sion orders, only on authority of these headquarters.
(2) The battle position will be held at all costs."
3. REQUIREMENT.—a. Give the general location of the

following lines in 5th Division sector—line of resistance
and regimental reserve line of the battle position, and line
of resistance of the outpost area.
b. Give the assignment of troops for the organization
and defense of the sector, including designation of division
reserve and outpost troops, and assignment of division re
serve for work of organization.
V—3-5
ILLUSTRATIVE PROBLEM 99
c. Give boundaries between brigades, if brigades be em

ployed abreast.
4. A SOLUTION.— (See Map No. 1.)—a. Line of resis
tance battle position: road junction 375—high ground north
of Alloway Creek—point on road 700 yards northwest of
road junction 470—hill 524. Regimental reserve line battle
position: point 600 yards southeast of mouth of Marsh
Creek—southwest corner of woods 500 yards southeast of
road junction 548—Conover.
Line of resistance outpost area: hill 532—hill 574—hill
586.
b. 10th Brigade to organize and defend the west bri
gade sector.
9th Brigade, less one battalion, to organize and defend
the east brigade sector.
One battalion, 9th Brigade, and 5th Tank Company in
division reserve. Division reserve (less tank company) at
disposal of 9th Brigade for work in brigade sector during
next 48 hours.
One battajion, 5th Engineers, to construct dams at suit
able points along Alloway Creek to form an obstacle against
tank attacks.
5th Engineers, less one battalion, to supply materials
for organization, and to construct and maintain communica
tions in rear of the regimental reserve line.
Not to exceed two battalions, 9th Brigade, and one bat
talion, 10th Brigade, to constitute the outpost.
c. Boundary between brigades: hill 563—southwest
corner of woods five hundred yards southeast of road junc
tion 548—point on road seven hundred yards northwest of
road junction 470—road junction 525—road junction 526
(all to 9th Brigade)—crossroads 469 (to 10th Brigade).
5. MISSION OF 5TH DIVISION.—In the situation pre
sented, the 5th Division, an interior division of a larger
force, with both flanks protected by adjacent units, is di
rected to occupy, organize, and defend a sector of a defen
sive zone. So far as this division is concerned, its mission,
at least for the present, is one of passive defense, although
V—5-6
the army commander may and probably does contemplate

the resumption of the offensive in the near future.
6. LOCATION OF LINES.—a. In the corps order, the divi
sion receives instructions as to the general location of the
line of resistance and the regimental reserve line of the
battle position and the line of resistance of the outpost area.
On each line the corps locates quite accurately two points
from which the division commander is not authorized to
deviate. These are the limiting points, that is, the points
at which contact with adjacent units is made. Between
these points the locations of the lines, within reasonable
limits, are at the discretion of the division commander.
When time is not available for reconnaissance by the corps,
the location of the regimental reserve line may be left en
tirely to the division commander, in which case the location
at division boundaries must be coordinated by conferences
with commanders of adjacent divisions. The corps also
prescribes the division boundaries.
b. The line of resistance of the battle position is the
line on which the enemy's attack must be stopped. It is
therefore essential that it have an excellent field of fire,
and that it be so located that the artillery can place effective
fire on the immediate foreground. It should be located so
as to protect the best available points of observation, not
only over the foreground, but also over the entire position.
c. An attack by the enemy, penetrating the forward
lines, must be checked along the regimental reserve line prior
to the launching of counterattacks by the brigade and divi
sion reserves. Therefore, it should be located so as to be
capable of coordinated resistance. It should have, so far as
practicable, a field of fire at least as far forward as the bat
talion reserve line. Machine guns located on the regimental
reserve line should, if practicable, be able to place defensive
fires in front of the main line of resistance. If the regi
mental reserve line is located more than 1800 yards in rear
of the main line of resistance, these iire missions cannot be
effectively accomplished. If located less than 800 yards in
rear of the main line of resistance, sufficient space for offen
sive action by the regimental reserve will not be available.
V—6
d. In reaching a decision as to the location of the line

of resistance and regimental reserve lines, the two must be
considered together, in order to secure the best possible
combination on the available terrain. With limiting points
on the main line of resistance as fixed by the corps, it is
evident that the 5th Division should make use of Alloway
Creek as an obstacle wherever practicable. But a location
of the line of resistance too close to Alloway Creek is sub
jected to observation from the high ground south of the
creek. The division commander, therefore, tentatively de
cides to place the line of resistance, in general, 300 or 400
yards north of Alloway Creek. No attempt is made to fol
low the deep salient made by Alloway Creek near the center
of the sector.
e. Except in the western part of the division sector,
north of Alloway Creek the ground gradually rises to include
all possible locations of the regimental reserve line. In the
eastern part of the sector, the regimental reserve line might
include hill 564 or hill 500 yards southeast of crossroads
568. The former location unnecessarily reduces the depth
of the position without any compensating advantages. In
the center of the sector, but one suitable location is avail
able, hill 547 and north of stream line east of Koon. In the
western part of the sector, the choice lies between placing
the regimental reserve line on the reverse slope west of hill
547, or on the forward slope of ridge running southwest
from hill 547. The latter location restricts the depth of the
battle position but gives a better field of fire. The former
location will not permit effective fire support of the area
in rear of the probable location of the battalion reserve line.
/. The division commander, therefore, decides to locate
his main line of resistance, in general, 300 to 400 yards
north of Alloway Creek and his regimental reserve line on
the line: forward slope of ridge southwest of hill 547—
hill 547—hill 500 yards southeast of crossroads 568.
g. The line of resistance of the battle position having
been located, the line of resistance of the outpost area is lo
cated on the most favorable ground to the front which can
V—6-7
be supported by artillery fire from positions in rear of the

feattle position.
7. DISPOSITION OF TROOPS.—a. Before assigning troops
for the organization and defense of the zone, the division
commander must first determine the number of battalions
necessary to hold the battle position. The length of the
main line of resistance, 7,500 yards, immediately indicates
that about six battalions will be required. From a map study
and such reconnaissance as time permits, he notes the tac
tical localities suitable for the organization of battalion cen
ters of resistance.
b. In the situation there are four localities especially
suitable for this purpose, namely; the Harney spur, the
spur just west of the road: Piney Creek Church—Koon, the
spur east of this road, and the area south of Rhorbough.
With centers of resistance in these favorable localities, it
becomes necessary to locate an additional one in the less
favorable locality southwest of road junction 483, in order
to eliminate the excessive interval at this place. In addi
tion, the interval between the Monocacy River and Harney
must be taken care of, possibly by organization of a de
tached strong point. Thus, five battalions and one company
is the minimum force required on the line of resistance of
the battle position.
c. The assignment of division reserves should receive
consideration next. The mission of the division, at least for
the present, is one of passive defense. The function of the
reserve will be to maintain the battle position by counter
attack. No offensive action beyond the battle position to
be organized is contemplated at present. The division is
an interior division with both flanks protected. Under these
circumstances, one battalion should be ample for division
reserve. If practicable, the division reserve should be taken
from the brigade holding that portion of the line on which
it is expected the reserve will be used. In this situation, the
terrain indicates that a penetration by the enemy is more
probable on the eastern portion of the sector than on the
western. Therefore, the division reserve is taken from the
• V—7-8
brigade holding the east sector and its sector is shortened

accordingly.
d. In the defensive, the tank company should be held
in reserve for use in the counterattack.
e. The next point to be considered by the division com
mander is the strength of the outpost forces. From an
examination of the map, it is immediately seen that hill
574 is the predominating terrain feature along the line of
resistance of the outpost area. The division commander con
cludes that it probably will be desirable to hold this with
one battalion. He also concludes that one battalion to the
east of hill 574 and one to the west of that hill, probably
distributed in detached strong points, will be ample for the
outpost. This complies with the corps order that not to ex
ceed three battalions will be placed in the outpost. (For
details of organization of the outpost, see Section V.)
/. In general, troops construct the fortifications they
are to occupy. Engineers, in general, construct and maintain
communications and other works that are of use to the divi
sion as a whole. In the present situation, the position is in
home territory and many good roads are available, thus
reducing this work to the minimum. One battalion of engi
neers should be able to handle all the communication and
supply work. Alloway Creek offers possibilities as an ob
stacle against tanks. The division commander decides to
use one battalion of engineers to construct dams at suitable
points to deepen the creek to form such an obstacle. The
division reserve is utilized on work of organization in such
a way as to insure rapid progress of the work on the most
important part of the division sector.
8. SECTOR BOUNDARIES.—a. The disposition of the di
vision in the outpost and battle position and the reserve
having been decided, the sector boundaries may be pre
scribed. These should be so located as to assign entire tac
tical localities to one organization for defense. In select
ing the sector boundaries, consideration must be given the
number of battalions available in each brigade and their
probable disposition. In the present situation, the division
V—8
reserve of one battalion is taken from the east brigade. In

addition, this brigade must furnish at least one battalion,
possibly two, for the outpost. To give this brigade three
battalion centers of resistance to organize on the battle
position would leave not more than one battalion to furnish
regimental and brigade reserves on that part of the front
where attack is most likely, and where the organization
should be as nearly complete as possible. On the other hand,
with the east brigade organizing two battalion centers of
resistance on the battle position, the best location for the
boundary between brigades would require the west brigade
to organize the outpost from the west division boundary to
include hill 574, requiring two battalions for this purpose.
This with the three battalions plus one company on the line
of resistance, battle position, would leave in the west brigade,
only one battalion, less one company, for regimental and
brigade reserves. The division commander, therefore, de
cides to place the boundary between brigades as shown on
Map No. 1, requiring the east brigade to furnish the outpost
from the east division boundary to include hill 574. This
has the disadvantage, that the brigade boundary is not per
pendicular to the defensive front, but under the circum
stances, seems to be the best solution.
b. In prescribing brigade and division boundaries, the
points where they intersect the line of resistance and regi
mental reserve lines of the battle position and the line of
resistance, outpost area, should be accurately located by the
designation of terrain features, if practicable. Brigade
boundaries should extend sufficiently far to the front of the
outpost area to fix responsibility for distant defense by fire
of the artillery of the division.
V—9-11
SECTION II
Organization of a Brigade Sector

Paragraph
Special situation (Blue), continued 9
Requirement 10
A solution 11
Duties of brigade commander 12
Locations of lines 13
Disposition of troops 14
Boundary between regiments 15
9. SPECIAL SITUATION (BLUE), CONTINUED.—At 11:30

AM, 29 July, the Commanding General, 10th Brigade, re
ceives instructions for the organization and defense of the
west brigade sector in accordance with the decisions of the
division commander embodied in the preceding section.
10. REQUIREMENT.—a. Location of line of resistance
and regimental reserve line of the battle position within the
10th Brigade sector.
b. Disposition of the 10th Brigade for the organization
and defense of the sector.
c. Boundaries of regimental sectors, if regiments be
employed abreast.
11. A SOLUTION.— (See Map No. 2.)—a. Line of re
sistance battle position: road junction 375—point (353.5
735.3)—point on road seven hundred yards northwest of
road junction 470.
Regimental reserve line: point six hundred yards south
east of mouth of Marsh Creek—point (353.3-736.5)—south
west corner of woods five hundred yards southeast of road
junction 548.
b. Disposition of troops:
20th Infantry (less one battalion and one platoon howitzer
company) to organize and defend the west regimental sector.
19th Infantry to organize and defend the east regimental
sector.
One battalion and one platoon howitzer company, 20th In
fantry, constituting the brigade reserve is available to regi
mental commander for work on position during next 48 hours.
One company, 19th Infantry, with attached machine guns,
and one battalion, 20th Infantry (less one company and one
machine gun platoon) to constitute the outpost.
V—11-14
c. Boundary between regiments: Headgegrove—point

at (353.3-736.5)—point at (353.5-735.3)—road junction
510—Longville—road junction 487—Taneytown (all to 19th
Infantry).
12. DUTIES OF BRIGADE COMMANDER.—The duties of the
brigade commander in the organization of the brigade sector
are, in general, similar to those of the division commander
in the organization of the division sector. He makes only
such decisions as are necessary to coordinate the work of
the regiments within the brigade, leaving to the regimental
commanders the details of the organization of their sectors.
These decisions should cover the general location of the line
of resistance and regimental reserve line; distribution of
troops in the sector, including designation of brigade re
serves and outpost troops; designation of sectors assigned
to each regiment; and the assignment of attached troops.
He exercises supervision over the work of the brigade, insur
ing cooperation between regiments of the brigade and with
adjacent brigades.
13. LOCATIONS OF LINES.—The brigade receives, from
the division; the brigade boundaries, and the general loca
tions of the main line of resistance, the regimental reserve
line, and the line of resistance outpost area, with definitely
located limiting points on the brigade boundaries for each.
Between these points, the locations are at the discretion of
the brigade commander, within reasonable limits. In mak
ing his locations of these lines, the brigade commander is
governed by the same considerations which govern the di
vision commander, which were enunciated in Section I.
14. DISPOSITION OF TROOPS.—a. In making the disposi
tion of troops, the brigade commander first considers the
probable dispositions of the regiments within their respec
tive sectors, and makes such dispositions and sub-divisions
in the sector as will give the strongest possible defensive
combination of troops on the various positions and espe
cially on the battle position.
b. In the present situation, the width of the brigade
sector, 4800 yards, indicates at once that the brigade must
be disposed with regiments abreast. The number of bat
V—14
talions necessary to hold the line of resistance must now be

determined. Twelve hundred yards is about the maximum
front a battalion should hold on average terrain. After a
map study and reconnaissance, the brigade commander de
cides to employ three battalions, organizing centers of re
sistance on the Harney spur and the two spurs east and
west of the road: Piney Creek Church—Koon. A detached
strong point covering the interval between the Monocacy
River and Harney, on the line of resistance, should be suffi
cient because of the effect of Alloway Creek and the Mo
nocacy River on any attack on this portion of the front.
(See Map No. 2.)
c. The next consideration is the brigade reserves. The
brigade mission is one of passive defense. No offensive
action beyond the zone to be organized is contemplated at
present. Therefore, one battalion is ample for brigade re
serves. If practicable, this battalion should be taken from
the regiment holding that portion of the front where the
reserve will most likely be used. In the present situation,
the terrain indicates that the main attack will come against
the eastern portion of the brigade front. But to take the
brigade reserve from the east regiment will require the
west regiment to occupy a front of about 3600 yards, which
is somewhat extended for one regiment. The brigade com
mander, therefore, decides to take one battalion from the
west regiment for brigade reserve.
d. The division requires that the brigade outpost con
sist of not to exceed one battalion. An examination of the
map indicates that one battalion distributed in company
strong points will be sufficient. To place one complete bat
talion in the outpost tends to facilitate coordination in the
organization of the outpost area. But it has the disadvan
tage of spreading a battalion over an extended front mak
ing it difficult to control as a unit in action. And in this
situation, a complete battalion for the outpost could be se
cured only from the regiment holding the east regimental
sector, which would leave that regiment without any troops
for regimental reserve. This is undesirable because it is on
this portion of the brigade sector that the main attack is
expected. The brigade commander, therefore, decides to
V—14-15
l>lace in the outpost one company with attached machine

guns of the east regiment, and one battalion (less one
company and one machine gun platoon) of the west regi
ment.
e. This disposition leaves one battalion (less one com
pany and attached machine guns) available for regimental
reserve in the east regimental sector, but none for this pur
pose in the west regimental sector. In the latter sector, the
outpost, when withdrawn, will take up the functions of
regimental reserve, or, in case of an emergency, the brigade
reserves might be returned to the control of the regiment
for this purpose.
15. BOUNDARY BETWEEN REGIMENTS.—With the above
dispositions in mind, the designation of the boundary be
tween regiments is simple. The east regiment must organ
ize and defend two centers of resistance. The boundaries
of regimental sectors should be located so as to include
complete tactical localities within the regimental sectors.
They should extend far enough to the front to fix responsi
bility for distant defense by fire, and to the rear to include
all the area occupied by the combat elements of the regi
ment. In prescribing the boundaries, points where they in
tersect the main line of resistance and regimental reserve
line should be given, if practicable, by designation of prom
inent terrain features.
SECTION III
Organization of a Regimental Sector

Paragraph
Requirement 17
A solution 18
Duties of regimental commander 19
Location of lines • 20
Disposition of troops — 21
Boundary between battalion sectors 22
Location of machine guns 23
Command post 24
Observation posts 25
Aid station 26
Defensive barrage 27
Organization of regimental reserve line 28
Use of reserves 29
V—16.18
16. SPECIAL SITUATION (BLUE) , CONTINUED.—a. Topo

graphical Map, Gettysburg-Antietam (1924), 1:21,120; Get
tysburg and Taneytown sheets. Special Map, 12 inches =
1 mile, attached. (Map No. 3.)
b. The Commanding Officer, 19th Infantry, receives in
structions to organize and defend the east regimental sector
in accordance with the decisions of the brigade commander
given in Section II. He is informed that the 1st Battalion,
10th Field Artillery, will support the 19th Infantry.
17. REQUIREMENT.—a. General location of the line of
resistance, battalion reserve line, and regimental reserve
line of the battle position within the 19th Infantry sector.
b. Disposition of 19th Infantry for organization and
defense of the sector.
c. Boundary between battalion sectors, if battalions be
employed abreast.
d. Location of all machine guns for the defense of the
sector, including those of adjacent sectors firing into 19th
Infantry sector, with the main line of direct fire of each.
e. Location of regimental command post, regimental
observation post, and regimental aid station.
/. Areas recommended to be covered by defensive bar
rage by the 1st Battalion, 10th Field Artillery.
g. Outline of strong points to be organized, on regi
mental reserve line in 19th Infantry sector.
h. Statement of assignment of regimental reserve for
the organization of the battle position.
18. A SOLUTION.—a. For solution to requirements 17
a, c, d, e, f, and g, see Map No. 3.
b. Requirement b, Disposition of 19th Infantry:
1st Battalion with one platoon howitzer company attached, to
organize and defend the east battalion sector.
2d Battalion with one platoon howitzer company attached, to
organize and defend the west battalion sector.
3d Battalion (less one rifle company and one section ma
chine guns) with one platoon of the howitzer company attached,
to constitute the regimental reserve and organize the regimental
reserve line after completion of task given below; one rifle com
pany and one section of machine guns to constitute the outpost.
Pioneer platoon, headquarters company, to construct regi
mental command post, regimental observation posts, and assist
in construction of regimental aid station.
V—18-20
c. One rifle company, 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, to

be attached to 1st Battalion and one rifle company to be
attached to the 2d Battalion to assist in work of organiza
tion. The 3d Battalion to be prepared to organize the regi
mental reserve line on orders from regimental headquarters.
19. DUTIES OF REGIMENTAL COMMANDER.—For detailed
list of duties of regimental commander, see Chapter II. Like
the brigade commander, the regimental commander should,
in general, act on the principle of decentralization of re
sponsibility. He makes and issues only such decisions as are
necessary to insure cooperation between battalions of the
regiment and with adjacent regiments. His decisions should
include general location of the line of resistance, battalion
reserve line, and regimental reserve line within his sector;
assignment of all troops of the regiment; assignment of
sectors to front line battalions; specification of the method
of organizing the regimental reserve line; location of regi
mental command post, observation posts, and aid station;
and the assignment of attached troops for work of organi
zation. He arranges for artillery support for the regiment.
When time is available, in order to coordinate their defen
sive fires, he may locate all the machine guns of the regi
ment, if not prescribed by division headquarters.
20. LOCATION OF LINES.—a. The regiment receives from
the brigade the regimental boundaries, and the general lo
cation of the line of resistance and the regimental reserve
line, with definitely located limiting points on the regimental
boundaries on each. Between these points the locations of
these lines are at the discretion of the regimental com
mander, within reasonable limits. In locating these lines,
he is guided by the same considerations as those enunciated
in Section I for the division commander.
b. The regimental commander is the highest command
er who usually designates the battalion reserve line. This
means that he must locate the limiting points of this line on
the battalion and regimental boundaries, the latter in con
sultation with commanders of adacent regiments. The func
tion of the battalion reserve is to expel the enemy by fire or
counterattack, or by a combination of both. The location of
V—20
the battalion reserve line is such as to facilitate the execu

tion of this mission. Therefore, at least a portion of the
battalion reserve line should be located so as to include
tactical localities capable of organization for defense and
for giving a field of fire at least as far forward as the sup
ports of the front line strong points. If located less than
300 yards behind these supports, room for development of
the counterattack is restricted. If located more than 600
yards behind these supports, the effectiveness of the rifle
fire on the foreground will be diminished.
c. In the present situation, the location of the limiting
points of the line of resistance on the regimental boun
daries indicates that the regimental commander is expected
to make the maximum possible use of Alloway Creek as an
obstacle. However, salients which expose troops to enfilade
fire from machine gun and artillery fire are to be avoided.
This makes it impracticable to follow the sinuosities of Al
loway Creek in the eastern half of the regimental sector.
To avoid, as much as possible, the direct observation from
the high ground south of Alloway Creek, the regimental com
mander decides the line of resistance should run from the
west limiting point to a point northeast of crossroads 435,
keeping 300 or 400 yards north of Alloway Creek, thence
in a northeasterly direction to the east limiting point. He
locates the limiting point on the boundary between bat
talions so as to bring about this general location within
battalions.
d. North of this line of resistance, to include all possible
locations of the battalion reserve line, the ground gradually
rises so that a good field of fire for the battalion reserve line
is easy to obtain. The outstanding tactical localities suitably
located to be included in the battalion reserve line are; the
spur east of road junction 508, spur south of road junction
528, woods northeast of crossroads 750 yards north of cross
roads 435, and the spur northeast of road junction 526.
Within limits, any location on the spur east of road junction
508, spur south of road junction 528, and spur northeast of
road junction 526, would be suitable. Unless cleared, the
woods northeast of the crossroads 750 yards north of cross
V—20-21
roads 435 would seriously interfere with fire from the bat
talion reserve line if it were located north of the south edge
of these woods. To avoid this work of clearing, the battalion
reserve line is located along the south edge of these woods
and the regimental commander locates his limiting points
accordingly.
e. On the general line of the regimental reserve line, as
fixed by the limiting points on the regimental boundaries,
there are four tactical localities of importance, namely; the
ridge southwest of hill 547, hill 547 and woods on its south
west slope, woods on high ground at road junction 528, and
the high ground northeast of crossroads 533. A regimental
reserve line located to include these areas is capable of strong
coordinated defense, covers all probable avenues of penetra
tion by an enemy, gives concealment for the formation of
counterattack troops, and covers by fire the foreground to
battalion reserve line and intervals between front line cen
ters of resistance.
21. DISPOSITION OF TROOPS.—a. With the above general
location of lines in mind, the regimental commander next
considers the disposition of the regiment. He is directed
to place one company with attached machine guns, in the
outpost, leaving three battalions (less one company and at
tached machine guns), headquarters company, and howit
zer company to be disposed of by the regimental commander.
b. The width of the sector, 2500 yards, at once indicates
that two battalions will be needed to hold the main line of
resistance. This leaves one battalion to furnish the outpost
and to organize and defend the regimental reserve line. The
company on outpost, if withdrawn, would join the regimen
tal reserve. The outpost company should have a section of
machine guns attached.
c. The normal assignment of the howitzer company, in
defense, is one platoon to each battalion. The platoon at
tached to the battalion in regimental reserve should be em-
placed to assist in the defense of the regimental reserve line
and to support any countrattack that may be launched by
the regimental reserves.
V—21-22
d. Included in the headquarters company is a pioneer

platoon consisting of four squads which is available to as
sist in the organization of the sector. The normal tasks of
this platoon are the construction of regimental command
post, and assisting in construction of the regimental obser
vation post, aid stations, and telephone stations. It may be
attached to battalions to assist in construction of battalion
command posts and observation stations. In the present
situation, because of the time available to battalions for
work of organization, the regimental pioneer platoon is kept
on regimental tasks, at least for the present. The intelli
gence and communication platoons of the headquarters com
pany, with the assistance of the pioneer platoon, construct
the regimental observation post and telephone centrals. In
emergency, the band section of the service company may be
used to assist in work of organization.
22. BOUNDARY BETWEEN BATTALION SECTORS.—a. With
the general disposition of the regiment decided upon, the
regimental commander next assigns the battalion sectors of
the battle position for organization and defense. By recon
naissance or map study he determines the tactical locali
ties within his sector which are especially suitable for or
ganization of battalion centers of resistance and assigns sec
tors accordingly.
b. The boundary between battalion sectors should be
so located as to include important terrain features in one
battalion sector. They should extend far enough to the front
of the line of resistance to fix responsibility for defense by
fire up to the maximum range of the weapons available to
the battalion. They should extend to the rear beyond the
battalion reserve line. The regimental reserve line usually
is not divided into battalion sectors. In prescribing the
boundary between battalions, points where the boundary
intersects the line of resistance and battalion reserve line
should be given by designation of some prominent terrain
feature, if practicable.
c. In the present situation, two localities especially suit
able for organization of battalion centers of resistance are
separated by the ravine running north from crossroads 435.
V—22-23
In order to equalize the front held by the two battalions in

line, the defense of this ravine is given the west battalion.
23. LOCATION OF MACHINE GUNS.—a. In the defense,
the coordination of machine gun fires is of greatest impor
tance. Where ample time is available, the division com
mander, with the assistance of his division machine gun
and howitzer officer, assigns machine gun missions. Where
organization takes place in contact with the enemy, these
missions and the locations of machine guns necessarily
must be determined by battalion commanders, with the as
sistance of their machine gun company commanders. When
a limited time is available, as in the present case, the divi
sion commander issues instructions for the coordination of
machine gun fires between brigades and between the battle
position and outpost area when necessary. In such a case,
the general locations and assignment of missions is made
by the regimental commander with the assistance of the
regimental machine gun officer and R-3.
b. In the defensive, machine guns are assigned direct
fire missions and indirect fire missions. They are located
primarily to carry out their direct fire missions. It is with
these missions, especially flanking fire missions, that we are
directly concerned in field fortifications. On level ground
one gun can completely cover 700 yards in flanking fire
although the assignment should not exceed 400 yards due to
the usual rolling nature of the terrain. The maximum range
when used for flanking fire should not exceed 700 yards.
Machine guns should be located within strong points when
practicable and as far to the rear of the line of resistance
as the execution of the mission will permit. When located
outside of strong points, local protection must be afforded.
c. With these points in mind, the regimental commander
is able to locate ten machine guns so as to give, with the
assistance of fire from adjacent regiments, a band of ma
chine gun fire across his sector in front of the line of resis
tance and to render the necessary support to adjacent units.
At least two machine guns should be located on the battalion
reserve line in each battalion sector to cover the intervals
V—23-27
between organized tactical localities on the front line and

flanking fire in front of the battalion reserve line.
d. Machine guns on the regimental reserve line are
located within organized strong points so as to cover the
intervals between front line centers of resistance and ave
nues of possible penetration and to provide flanking fire in
front of the regimental reserve line.
24. COMMAND POST.—The command post should be cen
trally located and near the rear of the area assigned the
unit. I should be located so as to facilitate communication
with all parts of the area under all conditions. Shelter
should be provided. Three locations are considered—road
junction 548, houses 500 yards west of road junction 548,
and southeast of road junction 485. The first is rejected
because it is an important road junction and will probably
be subjected to more or less continuous artillery fire. The
second is rejected because of the lack of cover.
25. OBSERVATION POSTS.—a. Observation posts should
be located so as to give, if possible, an unobstructed view
of the entire ground in front of the sector occupied by the
unit and of the interior and flanks of the position. Where
this is not possible, they should be located so as to give a
good view of the areas of probable counterattack.
b. In this situation, due to the absence of any promi
nent hill, and due to the obstruction to view by trees in the
center of the sector, it seems desirable to provide for two
regimental observation posts.
26. AID STATION.—The regimental aid station should
be located near a road, near water, and in a protected posi
tion. It should be located near the lines which would be
followed by casualties in working their way to the rear.
The location selected seems to fulfill these conditions.
27. DEFENSIVE BARRAGE.—The defensive barrage should
be placed on those parts of the front where it is believed
the enemy will attempt to advance. One battery can effec
tively cover 200 yards of front with a defensive barrage.
The ravine west of crossroads 436 appears to be the most
likely line of penetration in the regimental sector. The
woods furnish cover for an advance by the enemy. There
V—27-29
fore, the defensive barrage is placed north of Alloway Creek

west of crosroads 435.
28. ORGANIZATION OF REGIMENTAL RESERVE LINE.—a.
As the regimental reserve, under the immediate command
of the regimental commander, organizes, occupies, and de
fends the regimental reserve line, the regimental com
mander is more concerned with details of the organization
of this line than with front line centers of resistance. He
specifies the location of the regimental reserve line in con
siderable detail and may specify the tactical localities to be
organized. The regimental reserve line supports the line
of resistance by fire and must itself have the characteristics
of a line of resistance. A penetration of the front lines must
be checked on the regimental reserve line. Companies on
the regimental reserve line are located in strong points so
disposed as to cover with fire the flanks and rear of the
battalions in line and the avenues of most likely penetra
tions.
b. In the present situation, the most likely lines of pene
tration are the two stream lines north of crossroads 435
and the stream line just east of the regimental sector. These
are effectively covered by fire from the tactical localities
specified for organization. At present one rifle company
and one machine gun section are detailed on outpost, never
theless, all three strong points on the regimental reserve
line should be organized as soon as practicable.
29. USE OF RESERVES.—All labor available for work on
the organization of the battle area should be concentrated
on the front line centers of resistance. Work on the or
ganization of the regimental reserve line should be post
poned until front line work is at least well under way. When
practicable, reserve units should be given complete and in
dependent tasks. In this situation the construction of the
band of wire across the front of the regimental sector is
a complete task suitable in extent to be performed by the
regimental reserves. This work is so intimately connected
with the organization of centers of resistance that it should
be under the direction of front line battalion commanders.
V—29-31
These units will organize the regimental reserve line as

soon as the organization of centers of resistance is suffi
ciently completed to warrant their relief from this work.
SECTION IV
Organization of a Battalion Sector

Paragraph
Requirement „ 31
A solution 32
Duties of battalion commander 33
Location of lines 34
Location of strong points ; 35
Boundary between front line companies 36
Approach trenches 37
Wire entanglements 38
Howitzer platoon 39
Command post 40
Observation post 41
Aid station 42
Assignment of attached troops 43
30. SPECIAL SITUATION (BLUE), CONTINUED.—The

Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, receives
instructions to organize the east battalion sector in accor
dance with the decisions of the regimental commander given
in preceding section. (See Map No. 4.)
31. REQUIREMENT.—Give the following:
a. Detailed location of line of resistance, support line,
and battalion reserve line.
b. Outline of strong points on the line of resistance
and support line, and strong points or detached combat
groups on battalion reserve line, and garrison of each.
c. Boundary between front line strong points.
d. Location of approach trenches that will be constructed
first between battalion reserve line and line of supports
of front line companies, and between line of supports of front
line companies and line of resistance.
e. Location of wire entanglements that will be con
structed during the first 48 hours.
V—ai-34
/. Locations of weapons of howitzer platoon and area

covered by the defensive barrage fire of the trench mortar.
g. Location of battalion command post and observation
posts and aid stations.
32. A SOLUTION.—For solution see Map No. 4.
33. DUTIES OF BATTALION COMMANDER.—The battalion
is the unit under the immediate direction of which all the
infantry weapons fight. The battalion commander in co
ordinating these weapons is required to plan the organiza
tion of the ground in considerably more detail than do high
er commanders. When machine gun locations and missions
are not prescribed by the regimental commander he, with
the assistance of the commanding officer of the machine gun
company, locates the machine guns of the battalion and de
termines the final protective lines in front of the line of
resistance. He locates, with considerable accuracy, the line
of resistance to conform with the final protective lines. In
addition he issues such instructions as are necessary to co
ordinate the work of companies within the battalion and
with adjacent battalions. These instructions should cover
the dispositions of all troops of the battalion, assignment of
companies to sectors, assignment of general positions and
missions to attached units of the howitzer company, location
of battalion command and oservation posts, aid station, ap
proach trenches between the battalion reserve line and line
of supports of front line companies, wire entanglements
in front of the line of resistance and battalion reserve line
and on the flanks of his center of resistance.
34. LOCATION OF LINES.—a. The battalion receives
from the regiment the battalion boundaries, and the general
location of the line of resistance and the battalion reserve
line, with definitely located limiting points on the battalion
boundaries on each. Between these points the location of
these lines is at the discretion of the battalion commander,
within reasonable limits. When time is available, as in the
situation under discussion, the battalion may also receive
from the regiment the general location of machine guns
and their direct fire missions. The exact locations of ma
chine guns are fixed by the battalion commander, assisted by
V—34-35
the machine gun company commander. With the flanking

fire of machine guns in front of the line of resistance fixed,
in this case by the regimental commander, and remember
ing that obstacles will be placed along these lines and that
the firing line where practicable, should be from 30 to 100
yards from these obstacles, the battalion commander is able
to trace accurately the line of resistance of the position.
b. The battalion commander locates the battalion re
serve line with considerable accuracy so as to include there
in tactical localities suitable for organization. These or
ganized localities should cover the probable avenues of pene
tration by the enemy and should be so located as to permit
fire to the front at least as far as the support line. In the
situation presented, with the limiting points on the battalion
reserve line as given, the battalion commander has little
choice as to the location of the battalion reserve line. It
must include the two tactical localities in the vicinity of the
farm and woods west of road junction 526 and the spur
northeast of road junction 526.
35. LOCATION OF STRONG POINTS.—a. The battalion
commander, in planning his organization, must decide on the
tactical localities, within his sector, suitable for organization
as strong points. Front line strong points always include
combat groups on the line of resistance and combat groups
in support. Combat groups in support should be located from
100 to 300 yards in rear of the line of resistance. With terrain
sloping continuously to the rear and with little cover avail
able, as in this situation, the front line strong points should
be given a depth approaching the maximum. When the
terrain and the situation warrant, they may extend to the
rear to include the battalion reserve line.
b. On average terrain a company may effectively de
fend with its fire a front of from 300 to 600 yards, although
the portion of the front actually organized by the-company
should not be more than 400 yards, nor less than 200 yards.
With these points in mind, an examination of the map dis
closes two locations in the vicinity of the front line suitable
for organization of strong points, namely, spur 500 yards
east of crossroads 435 and spur northeast of crossroads 364.
V—35-37
c. The width of the battalion sector, 1200 yards, re

quires two complete companies for defense of the line of
resistance. It, therefore, becomes necessary to divide the
company on the battalion reserve line: one company, less one
platoon, organizing the farm and woods southwest of road
junction 526; and one platoon organizing the spur northeast
of road junction 526. Strong points or detached combat
groups organized on the battalion reserve lines are given
depth by organization of approach trenches or special in
termediate trenches constructed for the purpose.
36. BOUNDARY BETWEEN FRONT LINE COMPANIES.—
The battalion commander is now able to designate sectors
for the front line companies. The boundary between sec
tors should be so located as to give complete tactical locali
ties to one company for organization. They should extend
sufficiently far to the front to fix responsibility for defense
by fire up to the maximum effective rifle range. They should
extend to the rear of the support line to include all the area
occupied by the company. In prescribing boundaries be
tween companies, the intersection with the line of resistance
should be given, by designation of prominent terrain features
if practicable.
37. APPROACH TRENCHES.—a. Approach trenches be
tween the battalion reserve line and the line of supports are
used to furnish covered communication, but may be used as
part of the defensive organization, especially when strong
points are organized to include the battalion reserve line.
At least one and preferably two per company on the line of
resistance are constructed. Their location is a function of
the battalion commander.
b. The location of approach trenches between the line
of resistance and the line of supports is a function of the
company commander. At least one approach trench and
preferably two per platoon on the line of resistance are con
structed. They are more frequently used as part of the de
fensive organization, especially those along the flanks of the
strong points.
c. Because of drainage difficulties, approach trenches
are never placed at the bottom of a valley but are placed
V—37-39
a little way up the slope. In constructing approach

trenches, those to be used as part of the defensive organiza
tion are constructed first and those to be used exclusively
for communication are then constructed at proper intervals
and as far as possible in concealed locations.
38. WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS.—a. Wire entanglements
must be covered at every point by rifle, automatic rifle, or
machine gun fire. They should be located, concealed if pos
sible, from 30 to 100 yards in front of the trench they pro
tect. They should not run exactly parallel to fire trenches.
b. The battalion commander is especially concerned with
the location of a band of wire in front of the line of resis
tance, covered by machine gun fire, and with wire flanking
his organized center of resistance. With the belts of ma
chine gun fire in front of the line of resistance, and machine
guns on the battalion reserve line covering intervals between
front line strong points located, the location of the wire is
simple. A band of wire in front of the battalion reserve
line is constructed according to the priority given in Chap
ter II.
c. Wire entanglements in front of the supports of front
line companies should be constructed promptly, and a band
of wire is constructed in front of the support line in accor
dance with priority given in Chapter II. Strong points are
protected on the flanks and combat groups are completely
enclosed by obstacles. Locations of these are functions of
the respective commanders of strong points and combat
groups.
39. HOWITZER PLATOON.—a. The howitzer platoon con
sists of one 37-mm. gun and one 3-inch trench mortar. The
battalion commander designates the general location and
fire missions of these weapons. For convenience in supply
and command these weapons should be placed close together.
The 37-mm. gun should be placed on elevated, but concealed,
positions where it can have a good field of fire and can fire
over troops in front. Trench mortars are generally located
in protected positions and fire on areas which cannot be
covered by other than high angle fire.
V—39-43
b. In the present situation, there is a dead space in the

band of machine gun fire 600 yards northeast of road junc
tion 364 which is a suitable target for the trench mortar.
The only available cover in the sector suitable for mortar
position is the woods southwest of road junction 526.
40. COMMAND POST.—Cover and facility of communica
tion with all parts of the center of resistance and with regi
mental headquarters are prime considerations in the loca
tion of the battalion command post. The location shown
seems to be the most favorable available in this situation.
41. OBSERVATION POST.—The battalion observation post
is located to give a good view of the immediate foreground
and areas of probable counterattack. It should be located
so as to facilitate communication with battalion headquar
ters.
42. AID STATION.—The battalion aid station is located
near the rear of the battalion area and on or near the routes
which will be followed by casualties in working their way
to the rear. It should be near a road to facilitate evacua
tion by ambulance when this is practicable..
43. ASSIGNMENT OF ATTACHED TROOPS.—a. For pri
ority list of work in the organization of a position, see Chap
ter II. When attached troops are available, they should be
utilized so as to complete simultaneously as much of the
work listed as is possible. Where possible they should be
assigned complete tasks which are more or less independent
of the work being done by troops that are to occupy the posi
tion, such as making extensive clearings, etc. Where they
must be employed on tasks that must be closely coordinated
with the work being done by troops that are to occupy the
position, it is better for the attached troops, to work under
the direction of commanders of companies that are to occupy
the position.
b. While it is desirable to utilize battalion reserves to
assist on the organization of front line strong points, leaving
the organization of the battalion reserve line until later, in
the present situation the regimental commander has attached
one company of the reserve battalion to the 1st Battalion to
V—43-47
assist in the organization. With this help and the time avail
able for work, it is possible, in this situation, to carry on the
organization of the line of resistance and battalion reserve
line simultaneously.
SECTION V
Organization of an Outpost Area

Paragraph
Requirement 45
A solution 46
Mission of the outpost 47
Location of lines 48
Organization of the line of resistance, outpost area 49
Organization of line of observation 50
Organization of tactical localities 51
Artillery fires 52
Boundaries between battalions 53
44. SPECIAL SITUATION (BLUE) , CONTINUED.—In accor

dance with the decisions of the division and brigade com
manders (see Sections I and II), one battalion (less one
company and one machine gun platoon), 20th Infantry;
one company, 19th Infantry, with one section machine guns
attached; and one battalion, 9th Brigade, were detailed to
organize and occupy the outpost. The regimental and bri
gade boundaries and limiting points on the line of resis
tance outpost area are as shown on Map No. 5. The out
post was directed to hold at all costs.
45. REQUIREMENT.—Give the following:
a. Location of line of resistance and line of observation of
the outpost area within the 5th Division sector.
b. Location of areas to be organized and held by the outpost
with the garrison of each.
c. Location and principal line of fire of all machine guns of
the outpost in the 5th Division sector.
d. Normal targets assigned to the division artillery for the
support of the organized areas to be held by the outpost.
46. A SOLUTION.—For solution, see Map No. 5.
47. MISSION OF THE OUTPOST.—a. The mission as
signed to the outpost in zone defense consists of two parts:
V—47-48
1st, observation and security; 2d, resistance to disorganize

the enemy's attack formations in case of a general attack, and
to delay his advance. The second part of the mission may
be accomplished in two ways. The outpost may fight a de
laying action in the outpost area, falling back towards the
battle position; or it may hold, at all costs, important tactical
areas. The amount and character of the organization of
the outpost area is dependent on the methods chosen. When
the mission is merely one of delay, the required organiza
tion of the ground on any one position is less than when the
mission is that of holding the outpost position, which re
quires the maximum organization of tactical localities along
the line to be held.
b. The decision as to the mission of the outpost is one
for the army or corps commander to make.
c. In the situation under discussion, the outpost is or
dered to hold the outpost position at all costs which calls
for the maximum organization along that line.
48. LOCATION OF LINES.—a. The organization of the
outpost is coordinated by the designation of the line of re
sistance of the outpost area, the general location of which
is selected by the high command and passed down to lower
units by the successive designation of limiting points on
their boundaries. As its name implies, it is the line of the
outpost area along whch an advance by the enemy is to be
resisted, and is located so as to give a good field of fire and
to permit effective artillery support. It is located so that
hostile reconnaissance and ground observation will be pre
vented or restricted. The inclusion of good points of ob
servation from which artillery fire on the foreground and
the entire outpost area may be controlled is important.
b. The Longville ridge furnishes a good location for
an outpost covering a battle position with line of resistance
north of Alloway Creek as in this situation. At every point
it is within effective range of light artillery located behind
the battle position; it masks, on a considerable portion of
the front, the battle position from ground observation by the
enemy; it furnishes good observation over the outpost area
V—48-49
itself and for several thousand yards to the south; and it is

in itself an excellent defensive position.
c. Coordinated observation and defense of the immedi
ate foreground is secured by prescribing a line of observa
tion of the outpost area. It is located by the commanders of
the various sectors of the outpost area in consultation with
commanders of adjacent sectors. It should be located within
effective range of machine guns and rifles on the line of re
sistance of the outpost area. In a stabilized situation, the
line of observation of the outpost area is the line of contact
with the enemy.
49. ORGANIZATION OF THE LINE OF RESISTANCE, OUT
POST AREA.—a. In a situation such as that under discussion,
complete initial organization of the outpost position is not
contemplated. The initial organization consists of a line
of mutually supporting tactical localities, organized for all
around defense, which are expected to hold long enough to
accomplish the mission of the outpost. These organized lo
calities are located to include important points of observa
tion over the terrain to the front and within the outpost
area. The smaller the unit occupying the locality, the smaller
the intervals must be to insure mutual support. These locali
ties should be located not more than 3000 yards apart. The
strength of the garrison of each organized locality depends
on its importance, the time it is to be held, and its size.
In general, each unit occupies localities in the outpost which
are somewhat greater in size than those held by the same
unit in the battle position.
b. Examining the line of resistance, outpost area, in the
case under discussion, hill 574 stands out as the most im
portant tactical locality in the sector. Its possession fur
nishes observation to the south of Piney Creek and over
practically the entire outpost area. From here artillery
fire can be directed on an advancing enemy from the time
he comes within range of the guns. It is suitable in size
for the organization of a center of resistance. But it is more
than 3000 yards from hill 586 (359.6-735.9), the probable
western organized area of the adjacent division. Since only
one battalion is available for outpost duty in the 9th Bri
V—49-51
gade sector, it is decided to organize hill 574 as a center of

resistance with a garrison of one battalion, less one com
pany, and one machine gun section and to use this detached
company to organize two areas on hill 567 (357.7-735.0)
and hill 572.
c. Considering next the 10th Brigade sector. Due to
the bend in the Monocacy River north of Bridgeport, a
strong attack between the Monocacy River and the 10th
Brigade is not likely. It is not probable that the 6th Division
will strongly organize this portion of the outpost. Hill 532,
in the 10th Brigade sector, furnishes observation to the
south and southwest and over all the area included in the
bend of the Monocacy River. From it, effective machine
gun fire can be brought over most of this territory. It should
be organized. It is suitable in size for the organization of
a strong point. Hill 531 and Longville are both suitable for
organization as strong points. Detached companies on out
post should have some machine guns attached.
d. With hills 567, 574, 531, and 532, and the village
of Longville organized and supplied and to be held to the
last, a general attack will be disorganized and, throughout
its advance to the battle position, will be brought under
artillery fire directed from the observation points included
in these organized tactical localities or from in rear of the
battle position. The interval between hill 567 (357.7-735.0)
and hill 586 (359.6-735.9) is too great to prevent penetra
tion by local attacks and raids against the outpost; hence,
the organization of hill 572 with a garrison of one rifle pla
toon. In case of a general attack, this platoon might with
draw into the strong point organized on hill 567.
50. ORGANIZATION OF LINE OF OBSERVATION.—The line
of observation is held by sentinels, squads, sections, or pla
toons sent out from the organized localities. In case of at
tacks, these outguards retire to the organized locality from
which sent out. In this situation, only works for local pro
tection and shelter are contemplated on the line of observa
tion.
51. ORGANIZATION OF TACTICAL LOCALITIES.—a. In the
organization of tactical localities, the same principles apply
V—51-53
as in the organization of strong points and centers of re

sistance on the battle position except that greater intervals
between combat groups in strong points and between strong
points in centers of resistance are permissible. Within
strong points and centers of resistance, locations of sup
ports are designated by company commanders. Within cen
ters of resistance, a battalion reserve line is designated by
the battalion commander in order to coordinate the work
of organization. As the situation stabilizes, these lines will
be developed until a complete position is organized.
b. Machine guns are located within organized areas so
as to give, by flanking fire, a band of fire across the entire
sector, as far as practicable. In these fires, because of the
greater intervals in the outpost, machine guns are given
more extensive missions than is the case in the organiza
tion of the battle position. The same necessity for coordina
tion and mutual assistance between adjacent units in the
siting of machine guns exists in the outpost as in the battle
position. Tactical localities are prepared for all around
defense and are completely surrounded by obstacles.
c. As in the organization of strong points and centers
of resistance on the battle position, mortars^ are used to cover-
dead spaces in the machine gun fire. The 37-mm. gun is
used as a weapon of opportunity.*r • ; *. £Ll|41, i *
52. ARTILLERY FIRES.—Whvn*-%r)rmxa3l" is** imminent,
the artillery places the usua,l «®tflil^|!|^j|a^Ptto\r fires on
places which the enemy will probably use to form for his
attack. These are followed by fires placed for close defense
of the organized tactical localities. These defensive fires
by artillery and the machine gun fire supplement each other.
Together they insure the greatest possible fire support to the
organized localities. To provide for defense at night or
when observed fires are impracticable, prearranged fires by
the artillery are provided. These are placed on areas where
an enemy may arrive quickly and unobserved.
53. BOUNDARIES BETWEEN BATTALIONS.—It is prefer
able that troops holding a sector of the outpost be of the
same regiment holding the corresponding sector of the bat
tle position. The Commanding General, 10th Brigade, has
V—53
designated a boundary between regiments extending through

the outpost position and sufficiently far to the front to co
ordinate the artillery support of the regiments by long range
fire. Should the necessity for changing this boundary arise,
the outpost commanders should request the change from
the brigade commander, otherwise confusion in artillery
support may result.

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FIELD

THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS

Course in Field Engineering

THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS PRESS

FORT LEAVENWOETH, KANSAS

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

of construction have been omitted. Such details may be

ter connect the organized tactical localities along the

Mutual support.—Reciprocal protection of the front, rear,

Sector boundary.—A line, defined in general by designating

PRINCIPLES AND EXECUTION OP THE WORK OF

Definition and purpose—Airplane photographs—Influ­

SECTION II.—Execution of Work of Camouflage 93

Camouflage work in A.E.F.—Present organization—

Camouflage work by troops—Screening.

SECTION I.—Organization of a Division Sector 97

SECTION II.—Organization of a Brigade Sector 105

SECTION III.—Organization of a Regimental Sector 108

SECTION IV.—Organization of a Battalion Sector 117

SECTION V.—Organization of an Outpost Area 123

1. SITUATION AFFECTING ORGANIZATION OF THE

time available for defensive dispositions, and the size of the

PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION FOR DEFENSE 3

position should be able to place effective fire from 1500 to

ing it from enemy ground observation, by repulsing minor

they secure information of impending general attacks, and,

PRINCIPLES OP ORGANIZATION FOR DEFENSE

+•'Bngade Sector -If—Brg

ably successful, the enemy's attack must be stopped in front

PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION FOR DEFENSE 7

no fixed, unvarying depth for a defensive zone can be pre­

Such a position is designated as the "reserve battle

continuity of the front when forward defenses have been

PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION FOR DEFENSE 9

defense are fixed by sector boundaries which extend suffi­

Employment of Weapons in Defense

6. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.—a. A successful defense

b. The infantry weapons are the rifle (with bayonet

PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION FOR DEFENSE 11

(2) In the defense it is used for covering dead spaces

d. Machine guns.— (1) Each infantry battalion has in

PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION FOR DEFENSE 13

(4) A plan for the location and employment of machine

execution of this mission. Locations near trenches ex­

(e) The 37-mm. gun usually fires on targets of oppor­

b. Close support of the infantry in defense is furnished

normal barrage is a standing barrage. All batteries con­

PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION FOR DEFENSE 19

main line of resistance, and to continue this defense without

(2) For wind blowing toward friendly troops or in a

SECTION I.—The Battle Position 1-15

II.—The Outpost Area 16-17

III.—Procedure in Organization of the Ground 18-22

The Battle Position

Relative importance and general organization 1

Battalion reserve line 4

Regimental reserve line 5

Development of the position 6

Machine gun plan 8

Representation of defensive organization 15

1. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE AND GENERAL ORGANIZATION.

Definition and purpose—Airplane photographs—Influ

no fixed, unvarying depth for a defensive zone can be pre

defense are fixed by sector boundaries which extend suffi

execution of this mission. Locations near trenches ex

(e) The 37-mm. gun usually fires on targets of oppor

normal barrage is a standing barrage. All batteries con

effected by fire from the organized localities; and the bet

tance, garrisoned by one company, will usually have two pla

e. Strong points on the regimental reserve line are lo

or smoke, small detachments from the garrisons of adja

(2) Approach trenches.—Approach trenches are con

may be in itself of no special value as an obstacle, the possi

16. THE OUTPOST.—a. General—(l) The general func

tensively. Detached combat groups would be quickly over

b. In an army, except in a situation where the defen

(c) Prescribes the general location of the lines of resis

(b) The commander of a battalion in regimental re