THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REASON AND WILLREASON AND WILL

REASON AND WILL

Introduction

Reason and will can generally be considered as standing in an antithetical relationship.This fact
originates from the different historical developments of the natural law and legalpositivist theories.
Originally, natural law was an idea that explained the nature of morality andnot the nature of law. Man
could (by using reason) understand the revelation of the Gods. Bythis, he could understand how he
should behave in respect of other human beings around him.(Minnevick, 2017).

Legal positivist theories have historically been considered originating from the free will of the
human being. This means that if the law is made by man the law is valid even if totallylacking any kind of
reason or morals. Here we can see two contraposed concepts of law.Natural law (and reason) is the first
concept and legal positivism (and free will) is the secondconcept of law.(Minnevick, 2017).

Learning Objectives:

1.Define Reason and Will;

2.Differentiate knowing and actually executing a good moral decision; and
3.Judge their own moral behavior in terms of planning and execution in important moral experiences.

Discussion

The concept of reason was central in the tradition of classical natural law. Reason wascrucial for
people to understand the natural laws. Plato wrote that reason was crucial in order tounderstand his
concept of Ideas. Cicero developed the concept of reason even further bystating that reason was an
inborn gift from the Gods. Reason was therefore crucial for therelationship between man and God.
Reason (since it had been given to all people) thereforemade natural law available and applicable for all
human beings.
Reason and Will within theTheories Presented by Suárez and Finnis In this chapter, will follow an
explanation of twoopposing ideas on reason and will. The first is presented by one of the most influential
purelypenal law theorists Suárez and the second is presented by Finnis.

One of the most influential purely penal law theorists of all time was Suárez. Hedeveloped a theory
on the concepts of reason and will that Finnis several centuries later wouldoppose to. Suárez explained
free and deliberate human actions as consisting of a chain of interacting components. He explained that
the human mind was intelligent enough to, by usingreason, understand and see a possible outcome in
the end of that chain of actions.Furthermore, Suárez meant that if a person could see that possible
‘good’ outcome of a certainchain of actions, the situation still required for that person to actively desire
that ‘good’ end for himself. Ultimately, that desire was what Suárez considered as the free ‘will’ of the
human mind.The thoughts following that desire (for instance the ability of an intelligent human mind to
consider different outcomes by different choices) were what Suárez considered the ‘reason’. Sofar,
Suárez agreed with the ideas of St Thomas Aquinas.

In contrast to St Thomas Aquinas, Suárez wrote that one’s decision will start one’sactions. This
meant that it was the ‘will’ that lay behind human action and the ‘will’ of a superior that controlled the
political arena. St Thomas Aquinas drew a distinction here. In the process of a persons’ decision-making,
he added a component that he called ‘command’. This ‘command’he meant stemmed from one’s reason.
It would act as a guideline to how one should act. This‘command’ could be explained as the result of
one’s intelligence that steered one’s decisionsand therefore also one’s actions. The purpose of the
‘command’ was to make one choose anaction with the aim at ‘the good of an end’ and the aim at taking
into consideration theappropriateness of the means. These two aims should be attributed to ‘reason’
rather than thefree ‘will’. The ‘command’ however presupposed also the free ‘will’ since one’s desire for
acertain outcome was what steered one’s actions.

To sum up what Suárez has stated about the concepts of reason and will and to alsosee the
difference between the ideas of Suárez and St Thomas Aquinas, following will bementioned. Suárez and
St Thomas Aquinas agreed on the idea that the free ‘will’ of the humanmind was reflected in the desires
that humans felt, when assessing between which choices tomake in situations that offered several
possible outcomes. They also agreed on the ideas thatthoughts following that desire, as for instance the
assessment of advantages and disadvantagesof a certain choice, were attributed to reason. In contrast to
one another, Suárez believed that itwas the ‘will’ that lay behind human action and the ‘will’ of a
superior that controlled the politicalarena. St Thomas Aquinas however, added a component to a
person’s decision-making, that hecalled ‘command’. This ‘command’ he meant stemmed from one’s
reason. The ‘command’ wasa guideline for peoples’ behaviour.

The theory of natural rights developed by Finnis falls well into the category of naturallaw theory.
Finnis focuses greatly on the works of St Thomas Aquinas. The work of Finnis hashad importance to
modern natural law thinking in two specific ways. His ideas have their base inthe Thomistic ideas.
However, they develop from that base in an innovative and distinctive way.Finnis’ discussions on classical
naturalist concerns with focus on the moral and ethical nature of law has influenced the modern
discourse of ‘rights’ in the legal and political world. Also, hisworks take a step away from the formal ideas
of post-positivist traditions. They add a modernperspective of natural law to the jurisprudential debate.

Furthermore, Finnis argues that humans can understand what is ‘good’ (on a basic level)by using
their reason. This reason lies within the human nature. Finnis also points out certaingeneralisations of
what most people (in different human societies despite cultural diversities)find to be the most important
values. He calls these values the ‘basic forms of human good’.When applying these basic goods
mentioned above, Finnis argues that to understand what inpractice is considered right and wrong one
needs to use the tests of ‘practical reasonableness’.The purpose of these tests is to relate moral and
ethical criteria to action and consequences.This ‘practical reasonableness’ combined with the basic
goods represents the structure of whatFinnis defines as the ‘natural law’ analysis. By following these two
factors mentioned, Finnisargues that every society can avoid gross injustice and enjoy a society based
upon basic rightsfor all.(Melissaris, 2012).

Suggested Readings:

John Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory (OUP 1992)Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories:
Their Origin and Development (CUP 1979)

Assessment:

Individual reflection on a most recent personal dilemma.

Briefly answer the question below and present the same in class.
How did I decide and what did I actually do during my most important moral experiencein the past year.

References:

Francisco Suárez, De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore (first published in Coimbra 1612)Book I, ch 9.

John Mitchell Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights
(Clarendon Press 1980)
Minnevik, Natalie, Reason and Will A Historical Review from the Point of View of theTheories of Natural
Law, Legal Positivism and the Analytical Philosophies of Law Presented byDworkin and Raz
St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia-IIae, 5 vols (first published 1485, Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trs, Christian Classics 1948)

MORAL THEORIES AND MENTAL FRAMES

Introduction

Moral theories are not mere theories in the dismissive sense either. They too are basedon repeated
observations, are likely to integrate hypotheses, and attempt to explain and justify arange of moral or
ethical judgements about particular cases.

But neither are moral theories quite like scientific theories. The data that scientific theories try to
explain is provided by observation of the natural world. The data that moraltheories try to explain is our
considered moral judgements; judgements that have, we might say,survived the test of good logical and
critical thinking. There is an obvious difference here. In thecase of moral theories, we use our considered
judgements to supply the data by which we judgethe adequacy of moral theories.

Still, even with this difference acknowledged, we do use moral theories, and often in verysimilar
ways to their scientific counterparts.

For the strategist, a useful theory provides a way of understanding the dynamics of thecomplex
strategic environment, recognizable indicators or warning signals of change, andagreed-upon means of
dealing with change. Simply put, a theory is one's notion of cause andeffect.

Learning Outcomes:

1.Explain the role of mental frames in moral experience; and

2.Classify the dominant mental frames.

Discussion

Moral Theories

Through the ages, there have emerged multiple common moral theories and traditions.We will
cover each one briefly below with explanations and how they differ from other moraltheories.

Mental Frames

In his influential book The Fifth Discipline, Peter Senge refers to hypotheses about causeand effect
as mental models. To Senge, mental models are “deeply ingrained assumptions,generalizations, or even
pictures and images that influence how we understand the world andhow we take action” (Senge 1990:
8). Mental models are useful and, indeed, unavoidable. Bynature, we form beliefs about cause and
effect. One person may form a mental model that sayspeople are best moved toward excellent work by
the promise of monetary rewards. Someoneelse may hold to the mental model that the best
determinant of good and diligent work is theintrinsic satisfaction of the effort itself. Both of these mental
models can be stated in cause andeffect terms. A good mental model is “disconfirmable.” That is, we can
put models andhypotheses to the test through experimentation or simply through continued
observation of events and results.

To put theories or mental models to work, we use an approach referred to as

systemsthinking. While strategic thinking involves consideration of the big picture, systems
thinkingbegins when we consider a real-world phenomenon and seek to understand the cause andeffect
relationships characteristic of a “system.” A systems thinker wonders how anorganization works, looking
at the parts as dynamic aspects of the whole. It is theinterrelationships of the elements of an
organization that interests the systems thinker.

Though a mental model—a hypothesis about cause and effect—provides a useful way of
understanding the dynamics and working of the world around us, blind adherence to entrenchedmodels
can be dangerous. Once we close our eyes to disconfirming evidence, once we fail tosee the weaknesses
of our assumptions about cause and effect, we have failed as systemsthinkers. History, of course, is
replete with examples of people adhering stubbornly to oldparadigms despite overwhelming evidence
that a new way of thinking has become necessary.

Mental models become the frames through which we view the world. We attend to whatis inside
our frame, oblivious sometimes to what occurs outside our frames, which can lead todangerous blind
spots. Frames can be useful insofar as they direct our attention toward theinformation we seek. But they
can also constrict our peripheral vision, keeping us from noticingimportant information and, perhaps,
opportunities. Once liberating, mental models can becomeshackles.

As an illustration of the way in which mental models and frames can get out of hand,consider
Donald Schon’s concept of a generative metaphor. A generative metaphor is an“implicit metaphor that
can cast a kind of spell on a community. All solutions are understood interms of the implicit metaphor.”
Some work cultures, for example, use a sports analogy as their generative metaphor, ubiquitously
describing events in sports language and casting solutions as“game plans.” A generative metaphor like
this can be healthy, but it can also restrict creativityand problem-solving, since the “team” may miss out
on ideas and options not endemic to themetaphorical world at hand.

At times, an over-used generative metaphor can lead to a group dynamic knownas

groupthink. When cultural propensities like this become problematic, leaders can stimulatepositive
organizational change by introducing new and useful generative metaphors as theycommunicate with
others. The new metaphor can provide people with a lens through which tosee things anew and lead to
positive change in the work atmosphere and business result.

Assessment
1. Identify which picture best describes moral theory and mental frame.
2. Submit a Reflection Paper. What is the bigger context in which I make myindividual decisions?

Aristotle and St. Aquinas

Introduction

For Aristotle, prudence or practical wisdom is a virtue of thought that is practical rather than
theoretical and deliberative rather than intuitive. It is the intellectual virtue that perfectsreasoning in
regard to decision making in the realm of human action. To have this virtue is to begood at thinking
about how to live a fulfilled life as a whole, and to be successful in so doing.The prudent person is the
only one who is truly just, courageous and temperate, and the goodperson is truly good only if he is
prudent. According to Aristotle, there is a fundamentalconnection between prudence and moral virtue.
This connection depends on the pre-existenceof certain natural qualities. Although Aristotle stresses the
importance of prudence and theethical life, he holds that the human person - endowed as he is with the
divine element of reason - is capable of an even higher way of life.
Learning Outcomes

1.Articulate what virtue ethics is;

2.Critique virtue ethics; and
3.Make use of virtue ethics.

Discussion

This is the life of contemplation, the life dedicated to the appreciation of truth, the life thatis
closest to the way of life of the gods. For St. Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle is the Philosopher. Intreating of
prudence, Aquinas follows Aristotle very closely especially in his Commentary on Aristotle’s
'Nicomachean Ethics. He teaches that prudence is a virtue of the practical intellectthat is related in a
particularly close way to the moral virtues. In order to be morally good, aperson needs the moral virtues,
and these in turn need the judgment of prudence. Aquinas’sinterpretations of Aristotle’s notion of
prudence are more accurate than, and indeed representimprovements on, those advanced by other
leading authorities of his time, including St. Albertthe Great in his Super Ethica. In ways that are
significant, he changes and develops some of Aristotle’s teachings on prudence in both his Commentary
on Aristotle’s ‘Nicomachean Ethics’and in some of his more theological works, e.g., his Summa
Theologiae. For example, Aquinas holds that Aristotle’s conception of ultimate end or human flourishing
- by Aristotle’s ownstatement - can only be realized in an imperfect way in this life.

For the virtue theorist the primary question is: how can I live a good life? Aristotlethought that the
best life was the life of a fully realized human being: a human being whodemonstrated excellence in all
human capacities, e.g., the capacity for emotion, for practicalrationality, for theoretical rationality. This
was a life of human flourishing. Just as the virtues of atool (e.g., a pen) are those features (e.g., having
flowing ink) that enable the tool to perform itsproper function (e.g., writing), so the virtues of a person
are those features (kindness,generosity, courage…) that enable it to excel as a human being. Virtues are
dispositions to actin certain ways for certain reasons and with certain feelings. Amy has the virtue of
courage if Amy tends to take the appropriate risks for the sake of important things without panicking.
Amyhas the vice of cruelty if she tends to hurt others without concern for their well-being and
takespleasure in it. Unlike utilitarianism and deontology, virtue ethics cannot give us a formula for
deciding how to act. Rather, it can only suggest a model for how we should aim to be, what sortof
character we should strive for: have those character traits that are present in a fullyflourishing human
being.

The term “natural law” is ambiguous. It refers to a type of moral theory, as well as to atype of legal
theory, but the core claims of the two kinds of theory are logically independent. Itdoes not refer to
thelaws of nature, the laws that science aims to describe. According to naturallaw moral theory, the
moral standards that govern human behavior are, in some sense,objectively derived from the nature of
human beings and the nature of the world. While beinglogically independent of natural law legal theory,
the two theories intersect. However, themajority of the article will focus on natural law legal theory.

According to natural law legal theory, the authority of legal standards necessarilyderives, at least in
part, from considerations having to do with the moral merit of thosestandards. There are a number of
different kinds of natural law legal theories, differing fromeach other with respect to the role that
morality plays in determining the authority of legalnorms. The conceptual jurisprudence of John Austin
provides a set of necessary and sufficientconditions for the existence of law that distinguishes law from
non-law in every possible world.Classical natural law theory such as the theory ofThomas Aquinas
focuses on the overlapbetween natural law moral and legal theories. Similarly, the neo-naturalism of
John Finnis is adevelopment of classical natural law theory. In contrast, the procedural naturalism of Lon
L.Fuller is a rejection of the conceptual naturalist idea that there are necessary substantive
moralconstraints on the content of law. Lastly, Ronald Dworkin’s theory is a response and critiqueoflegal
positivism. All of these theories subscribe to one or more basic tenets of natural lawlegal theory and are
important to its development and influence.

Two Kinds of Natural Law Theory

At the outset, it is important to distinguish two kinds of theory that go by the name of natural law.
The first is a theory of morality that is roughly characterized by the following theses.First, moral
propositions have what is sometimes called objective standing in the sense thatsuch propositions are the
bearers of objective truth-value; that is, moral propositions can beobjectively true or false. Though moral
objectivism is sometimes equated with moral realism(see, e.g., Moore 1992, 190: “the truth of any
moral proposition lies in its correspondence with amind- and convention-independent moral reality”),
the relationship between the two theories iscontroversial. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (1988), for example,
views moral objectivism as one species of moral realism, but not the only form; on Sayre-McCord’s view,
moral subjectivismand moral intersubjectivism are also forms of moral realism. Strictly speaking, then,
natural lawmoral theory is committed only to the objectivity of moral norms.

The second thesis constituting the core of natural law moral theory is the claim thatstandards of
morality are in some sense derived from, or entailed by, the nature of the worldand the nature of human
beings. St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, identifies the rational natureof human beings as that which
defines moral law: “the rule and measure of human acts is thereason, which is the first principle of
human acts” (Aquinas, ST I-II, Q.90, A.I). On this commonview, since human beings are by nature rational
beings, it is morally appropriate that theyshould behave in a way that conforms to their rational nature.
Thus, Aquinas derives the morallaw from the nature of human beings (thus, “natural law”).

The strongest construction of the Overlap Thesis forms the foundation for the classicalnaturalism
of Aquinas and Blackstone. Aquinas distinguishes four kinds of law: (1) eternal law;(2) natural law; (3)
human law; and (4) divine law. Eternal law is comprised of those laws thatgovern the nature of an
eternal universe; as Susan Dimock (1999, 22) puts it, one can “think of eternal law as comprising all
those scientific (physical, chemical, biological, psychological, etc.)‘laws’ by which the universe is
ordered.” Divine law is concerned with those standards that mustbe satisfied by a human being to
achieve eternal salvation. One cannot discover divine law bynatural reason alone; the precepts of divine
law are disclosed only through divine revelation.

The natural law is comprised of those precepts of the eternal law that govern thebehavior of
beings possessing reason and free will. The first precept of the natural law,according to Aquinas, is the
somewhat vacuous imperative to do good and avoid evil. Here it isworth noting that Aquinas holds a
natural law theory of morality: what is good and evil,according to Aquinas, is derived from the rational
nature of human beings. Good and evil arethus both objective and universal.
 But Aquinas is also a natural law legal theorist. On his view, a human law (that is, thatwhich is
promulgated by human beings) is valid only insofar as its content conforms to thecontent of the natural
law; as Aquinas puts the point: “[E]very human law has just so much of the nature of law as is derived
from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the lawof nature, it is no longer a law but a
perversion of law” (ST I-II, Q.95, A.II).

Assessment

Group discussion using the Aristotelian (mean between two extremes) and Thomisticperspectives on gay
marriage.

Kant's and Right

Introduction

It is common for Kant's rights-based liberalism to be contrasted with the communitarianauthoritarianism

of the later Fichte and of Hegel, and it is the concept of autonomy that isgenerally regarded as the
theoretical fount of Kant's theory of natural rights, providing theanalytical link between Kant's moral
philosophy and his political and legal theory. The author argues that this view is erroneous: The notion of
autonomy ultimately remains content less andincapable of providing practical political and legal
prescriptions without Kant's substantiveaccount of human nature, an account specifying both the proper
moral ends that humans shouldstrive for and the anthropological limits of human perfectibility. Kant's
theory of rights is informedby both sets of considerations. Contrary to the received view, Kant develops a
socially sensitiveaccount of the self in his later writings, and comes to believe that individual autonomy
dependsin large measure on the realization of certain propitious sociocultural and political
arrangements.For Kant, natural rights, like individual freedom, are not ahistorical, universal standards of
political justice but the historical outcome of the long process of enlightenment. As such, what isright
will depend on what is timely. Here Kant is much closer to Fichte and Hegel than isgenerally
acknowledged.

Learning Outcomes:
1.Understand and articulate the rights theory;
2.Differentiate a legal and a moral right;
3.Critique virtue ethics; and4.Make use of the rights theory.

Discussion

Kant, unlike Mill, believed that certain types of actions (including murder, theft, and lying)were
absolutely prohibited, even in cases where the action would bring about more happinessthan the
alternative. For Kantians, there are two questions that we must ask ourselveswhenever we decide to act:
(i) Can I rationally will that everyone act as I propose to act? If theanswer is no, then we must not
perform the action. (ii) Does my action respect the goals of human beings rather than merely using them
for my own purposes? Again, if the answer is no,then we must not perform the action. (Kant believed
that these questions were equivalent).

Kant’s theory is an example of a deontological moral theory –according to thesetheories, the

rightness or wrongness of actions does not depend on their consequences but onwhether they fulfill our
duty.

Kant believed that there was a supreme principle of morality, and he referred to itas
The Categorical Imperative. The CI determines what our moral duties are.

Morality and imperatives: What does it mean for one's duty to be determined by thecategorical
imperative?
What is an imperative? An imperative is a command. So, "Pay your taxes!" is animperative, as are
"Stop kicking me!" and "Don't kill animals!"

Hypothetical Imperatives: these imperatives command conditionally on your having arelevant desire. E.g.
“If you want to go to medical school, study biology in college.” If you don’t want to go to medical school,
this command doesn’t apply to you. Another example, your father says, "if you are hungry, then go eat
something!" - if you aren'thungry, then you are free to ignore the command.

Categorical Imperatives: These command unconditionally. E.g. “Don’t cheat on your taxes.” Even if you
want to cheat and doing so would serve your interests, you may notcheat.

What is the connection between morality and categorical imperatives?

Moralitymust be based on the categorical imperative because morality is such that you arecommanded
by it, and is such that you cannot opt out of it or claim that it does not applyto you.

How does the categorical imperative work? The categorical imperative has threedifferent formulations.
That is to say, there are three different ways of saying what it is. Kantclaims that all three do in fact say
the same thing, but it is currently disputed whether this istrue. The second formulation is the easiest to
understand, but the first one is most clearly acategorical imperative. Here is the first formulation.

Assessment
1.Quiz: Question/s: What is the difference between the rights and virtues theories?2.Analysis in class of
a case highlighting why the option taken by the agent may belegal but not moral.

Utilitarianism
 Utilitarianism states that actions are morally right if and only if they maximize the good(or,
alternatively, minimizes the bad). Classical utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham and JohnStuart Mill (as well
as many contemporary utilitarians) take ‘the good’ to be pleasure or well-being. Thus, actions are
morally right, on this view, if and only if they maximize pleasure or well-being or minimize suffering.
This approach is sometimes called hedonistic utilitarianism. For hedonistic utilitarians,the
rightness or our actions are determined solely on the basis of consequences of pleasure or pain.
Utilitarian theories may take other goods into consideration.Preference utilitarianism
,for example, takes into account not just pleasures, but the satisfaction of any preference.
Utilitarianism can also be divided along other lines. Act-utilitarianism claims that wemust apply a
utilitarian calculation to each and every individual action. By making thiscalculation, we can thereby
determine the moral rightness or wrongness of each action we planto take.
Rule-utilitarianism eases the burden that act-utilitarianism places on practical reasoningby
establishing moral rules that, when followed, brings about the best consequences. Rule-utilitarianism
can be illustrated by the rule “do not kill.” As a general rule, we would be better off,that is, the best
consequences, or state of affairs, would be brought about, if we all followed therule “do not kill.

Objections to Utilitarianism:

There are a number of objections to utilitarian theories, both in their act- formulations and intheir rule-
formulations.
(1) Act-utilitarianism, for example, seems to be impractical. To stop to calculate the possibleoutcomes of
every act we intend to make, as well as the outcomes of all of the possiblealternatives to that act is
unrealistic. Moreover, it may hinder one’s ability to bring about thebest consequences – for example, in
cases where a quick response is vital (as in responding toa car wreck).
(2) Others have objected to utilitarianism on the grounds that we cannot always predict theoutcomes of
our actions accurately. One course of action may seem like it will lead to the bestoutcome, but we may
be (and often are) mistaken. The best it seems we can do, then, is toguess at the short-term
consequences of our actions.
(3) Objections to utilitarianism have also been made on the grounds that it is excessivelydemanding and
places too large a burden on individuals. Since utilitarianism says that acts aremorally right if and only if
they maximize pleasure or well-being, it seems that leisure activities,such as watching television, may be
morally wrong because they do not maximize well-being. Any person watching television could, after all,
be doing something else – somethingthat would maximize utility, like helping others or volunteering.
(4) Finally, utilitarianism receives criticism because seemingly immoral acts and rules can be justified
using utilitarianism (this criticism is applicable both to act- and rule- utilitarianism).Genocides, torture,
and other evils may be justified on the grounds that they, ultimately, lead to he best outcome. Unjust
rules – for example, laws that legalize slavery or apartheid – mightalso be justified on utilitarian grounds.
 Justice and Fairness

Justice as fairness refers to the conception of justice that John Rawls presents in
ATheory of Justice. This conception of justice concerns society’s basic structure—that is,“society’s main
political, constitutional, social, and economic institutions and how they fittogether to form a unified
scheme of social cooperation over time.”

Rawls constructs justice as fairness in a rather narrow framework and explicitly states,“Justice as
fairness is not a complete contact theory.” Its purpose is to show how we ought toallocate a cooperative
surplus of resources to individuals in society. As a result, justice asfairness relies on two implicit
assumptions about the societies in question: first, socialcooperation is possible and can work to
everyone’s mutual advantage, and second, there existsa moderate surplus of available resources to be
distributed. Justice as fairness cannot be usedto determine the just distribution of sacrifices to be made
by a society’s members whenresources are scarce. More generally, it cannot help us identify just social
policies in societieswhere background conditions (e.g., scarcity of natural resources, cultural barriers,
war) haveeliminated the possibility of mutually advantageous social cooperation.

The process for determining how the basic structure should be arranged is based on athought
experiment in which rational, mutually disinterested individuals choose principles of justice from behind
a veil of ignorance, a condition that specifies they do not know specificdetails about themselves (e.g.,
personal values, race, gender, level of income) or the society inwhich they live (e.g., societal stage of
development, economic circumstances). However, whenchoosing these principles, the parties do
possess general social, psychological, and economicknowledge, and they also know that the
circumstances of justice obtain in the society to whichthey belong.

From this hypothetical initial situation, which Rawls calls the “original position,” theseindividuals
will presumably endorse two principles of justice. The first, known as theequal liberty principle, is that
“each person is to have an equal right to the most extensivescheme of basic liberties compatible with a
similar scheme of liberties for others,” and thesecond is that “social and economic inequalities are to be
arranged so that they are bothreasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and attached to
offices and positions opento all.”

Rawls’ primary argument for the two principles is that they would be chosen over anyvariation of
utilitarianism, which he considers the strongest opposition to justice as fairness.Constrained by the veil
of ignorance, the parties in the original position (as mutuallydisinterested rational agents) try to agree to
the principles which bring about the best state of affairs for whatever citizen they represent within
society. Since the parties are all unaware of precisely what social role they will occupy, they strive to
maximize their individual shares of primary goods. These goods are defined as “things that every rational
man is presumed towant” regardless of this person’s rational plan of life and include (among other
things) rights,liberties, social opportunities, and income. Rawls argues, largely through the appeal to
themaximin rule, that the parties in the original position would favor the equal liberty principle over
variations of utilitarianism. He further argues that the parties would support using the
differenceprinciple to regulate the distribution of wealth and income instead of a principle of average
utility(constrained by a social minimum) because the difference principle provides a stronger basis for
enduring cooperation among citizens.

The full application of justice as fairness can be regarded as a 4-stage sequence. Thedeliberations
concerning the two principles occur at the first stage. With the two principlesestablished, the parties
then progressively thin the veil of ignorance and, as they acquire morespecific knowledge about society
at the subsequent stages, determine more specific principlesof justice. At the second stage, the parties
learn more about society’s political and economiccircumstances and create a constitution that is
consistent with the two principles. At the thirdstage, the parties agree to laws and policies which realize
the two principles within the contextof the agreed-upon constitutional framework. At the fourth stage,
the parties possess allavailable information about their society and apply the established laws and
policies to particular cases.

One of Rawls major tasks in presenting justice as fairness is to show that the society itgenerates
can endure indefinitely over time. To achieve this aim, Rawls deploys the just savingsprinciple, a rule of
intergenerational savings designed to assure that future generations havesufficient capital to maintain
just institutions. Additionally, Rawls argues that the societygenerated by the two principles is congruent
with citizens’ good and that citizens can developthe necessary willingness to abide by these principles.
As a result, the society generated byadherence to justice as fairness is stable and can be expected to
endure indefinitely over time.

Notably, however, the arguments for the stability of justice as fairness that Rawlspresents in A
Theory of Justice do not prove convincing. Rawls does not account for reasonablepluralism, a critical
aspect of any constitutional democracy with the guaranteed liberties thatRawls specifies. Thus, Rawls
recasts his arguments for the stability of justice as fairnessin. Political Liberalism and strives to
demonstrate that citizens, despite reasonable disagreementabout many issues, will agree on a limited,
political conception of justice through an overlappingconsensus of their individual viewpoints.

Globalization and it's ethical challenges

Introduction

The corporate leaders and senior managers working with every global organization are
facing various dilemmas and concerns spamming various disciplines like marketing, finance,
human resource, production etc. Ethics present solutions to overcome these dilemmas and
concerns.
Ethics is an important aspect in life of individuals as well as businesses. It attempts to
distinguish right from wrong and good from bad. It constitutes desirable conduct in a particular set of
social circumstances, prescribes moral codes, norms, beliefs and practices. Business or corporate ethics
is a form of applied ethics or professional ethics that examines ethical principles and moral or ethical
problems that arise in a business environment. It is a
specialized area of moral right and concentrates on application of moral standards to
business institutions and organizations. It applies to all aspects of business conduct and
is relevant to the conduct of individuals and business organizations as a whole.

Aims and Objectives

The aims of the paper are:
 To get the knowledge about emergence of Globalization and its importance.
 To understand the impact of Globalization on different Stakeholders.
 To analyze the ethical issues in different International Functional areas.
 To corroborate the Ethical Initiatives by some Global Corporations.

Discussion
Phenomenon called Globalization
Globalization is a phenomenon that has led to the integration of regional economies,
societies, and cultures through communication, transport and trade. It is closely linked with
economic globalization that stands for the integration of national economies into the
international economy through trade, foreign direct investment, capital flows, migration, the
spread of technology and military presence. However, the phenomenon of globalization is
usually driven by a combination of economic, technological, socio-cultural, political and
biological factors. Globalization includes internationalization, liberalization,
universalization and westernization, which crosses the boundaries of nations.
Globalization has led to internationalization of business processes. Europeans countries
and USA have many migrant workers from India, Africa, the Middle East and Far East.
Cross-border movement of people is becoming easier. So, it becomes important to deal
with ethical issues in cross-cultural settings.
The term business ethics should be understood from all angles. It is argued that it is
unethical to resort profiteering on one hand and it is unethical to incur losses. For the simple,
reason that a company which cannot make profits and incurs losses is a liability on the system
by wasting scarce resources creating the problem of unemployment etc. Thus instead of profits being
contradictory to ethics, business ethics dictates that the first responsibility of the business is to remain
profitable and generate revenue for all the stakeholders viz., shareholders, employees, government,
customers, public etc., of the society.
Business ethics is a form of applied ethics. It aims at inculcating a sense of value orientation within
company's employee as to how to conduct business responsibly. Because the term ‘ethics’ can pose
problems in the international context, i.e., the term does not translate well into action and it is difficult
to find a common understanding. Some organizations choose to recast the concept of business ethics
through other terms like integrity, social responsibility, customer welfare, employee welfare, social value
added, transparency and disclosure in accounting and environmental protection.

Business Ethics and Need of Business Ethics

 Business ethics (also corporate ethics) is a form of applied ethics or professional ethics that
examines ethical principles and moral or ethical problems that arise in a business environment. It applies
to all aspects of business conduct and is relevant to the conduct of individuals and entire organizations.
It aims at inculcating a sense of value orientation within company's employee as to how to conduct
business responsibly. Because the term ‘ethics’ can pose problems in the international context, i.e., the
term does not translate well into action and it is difficult to find a common understanding. Some
organizations choose to recast the concept of business ethics through other terms like integrity, social
responsibility, customer welfare, employee welfare, social value added, transparency and disclosure in
accounting and environmental protection.

Ethics create credibility with the public:

A company perceived by the public to be ethically and socially responsive will be honored and
respected even by those who have no intimate knowledge of its actual working. There will be an
instinctive prejudice in favour of its products, since people believe that the company offers value for
money. Its public issue will attract an immediate response.
Ethics give management credibility with employees: Values are supported to be a common language to
bring leaderships and its people together. Organizational ethics, when perceived by employees as
genuine, create common goals, values and language.

Ethics help better decision making:

Another point of great importance is that an ethical attitude helps the management make better
decisions, i.e., decisions which are in the interest of the public, their employees and the company's own
long term goal even though decision making is slower. This is so because respect for ethics will force the
management to take various aspects like economic, social and ethical into consideration in making
decisions.

Ethics and profits:

Ethics and profits go together. A company which is inspired by ethical conduct is also a
profitable one. Value driven companies are sure to be successful in the long run though in
the short run they may lose money.

Law cannot protect society, ethics can:

Ethics is important because the government, law and lawyers cannot do everything to
protect society. Technology develops faster than the government can regulate. People in an
industry often know the dangers in a particular technology better than the regulatory
agencies. Further, government cannot always regulate all activities which are harmful to
society. Where law fails, ethics can succeed. An ethically-oriented management takes
measures to prevent pollution and protection of workers' health even before being mandated by law.

Natural Law
The term “natural law” is ambiguous. It refers to a type of moral theory, as well as to a type of legal
theory, but the core claims of the two kinds of theory are logically independent. It does not refer to the
laws of nature, the laws that science aims to describe. According to natural law moral theory, the moral
standards that govern human behavior are, in some sense, objectively derived from the nature of human
beings and the nature of the world. While being logically independent of natural law legal theory, the
two theories intersect. However, the majority of the article will focus on natural law legal theory.

According to natural law legal theory, the authority of legal standards necessarily derives, at least in part,
from considerations having to do with the moral merit of those standards. There are a number of
different kinds of natural law legal theories, differing from each other with respect to the role that
morality plays in determining the authority of legal norms. The conceptual jurisprudence of John Austin
provides a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of law that distinguishes law from
non-law in every possible world. Classical natural law theory such as the theory of Thomas Aquinas
focuses on the overlap between natural law moral and legal theories. Similarly, the neo-naturalism of
John Finnis is a development of classical natural law theory. In contrast, the procedural naturalism of Lon
L. Fuller is a rejection of the conceptual naturalist idea that there are necessary substantive moral
constraints on the content of law. Lastly, Ronald Dworkin’s theory is a response and critique of legal
positivism. All of these theories subscribe to one or more basic tenets of natural law legal theory and are
important to its development and influence.

Table of Contents
1.Two Kinds of Natural Law Theory
2.Conceptual Naturalism
a.The Project of Conceptual Jurisprudence
b.Classical Natural Law Theory
3.The Substantive Neo-Naturalism of John Finnis
4.The Procedural Naturalism of Lon L. Fuller
5.Ronald Dworkin’s “Third Theory”
6.References and Further Reading

1. Two Kinds of Natural Law Theory

At the outset, it is important to distinguish two kinds of theory that go by the name of natural law. The
first is a theory of morality that is roughly characterized by the following theses. First, moral propositions
have what is sometimes called objective standing in the sense that such propositions are the bearers of
objective truth-value; that is, moral propositions can be objectively true or false. Though moral
objectivism is sometimes equated with moral realism (see, e.g., Moore 1992, 190: “the truth of any
moral proposition lies in its correspondence with a mind- and convention-independent moral reality”),
the relationship between the two theories is controversial. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (1988), for example,
views moral objectivism as one species of moral realism, but not the only form; on Sayre-McCord’s view,
moral subjectivism and moral intersubjectivism are also forms of moral realism. Strictly speaking, then,
natural law moral theory is committed only to the objectivity of moral norms.
2. Conceptual Naturalism
a. The Project of Conceptual Jurisprudence
The principal objective of conceptual (or analytic) jurisprudence has traditionally been to provide an
account of what distinguishes law as a system of norms from other systems of norms, such as ethical
norms. As John Austin describes the project, conceptual jurisprudence seeks “the essence or nature
which is common to all laws that are properly so called” (Austin 1995, 11). Accordingly, the task of
conceptual jurisprudence is to provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of
law that distinguishes law from non-law in every possible world.

b. Classical Natural Law Theory

All forms of natural law theory subscribe to the Overlap Thesis, which asserts that there is some kind of
non-conventional relation between law and morality. According to this view, then, the notion of law
cannot be fully articulated without some reference to moral notions. Though the Overlap Thesis may
seem unambiguous, there are a number of different ways in which it can be interpreted.

3. The Substantive Neo-Naturalism of John Finnis

John Finnis takes himself to be explicating and developing the views of Aquinas and Blackstone. Like Bix,
Finnis believes that the naturalism of Aquinas and Blackstone should not be construed as a conceptual
account of the existence conditions for law. According to Finnis, the classical naturalists were not
concerned with giving a conceptual account of legal validity; rather they were concerned with explaining
the moral force of law: “the principles of natural law explain the obligatory force (in the fullest sense of
‘obligation’) of positive laws, even when those laws cannot be deduced from those principles” (Finnis
1980, 23-24). On Finnis’s view of the Overlap Thesis, the essential function of law is to provide a
justification for state coercion (a view he shares with Ronald Dworkin). Accordingly, an unjust law can be
legally valid, but it cannot provide an adequate justification for use of the state coercive power and is
hence not obligatory in the fullest sense; thus, an unjust law fails to realize the moral ideals implicit in
the concept of law. An unjust law, on this view, is legally binding, but is not fully law.

4. The Procedural Naturalism of Lon L. Fuller

Like Finnis, Lon Fuller (1964) rejects the conceptual naturalist idea that there are necessary substantive
moral constraints on the content of law. But Fuller, unlike Finnis, believes that law is necessarily subject
to a procedural morality. On Fuller’s view, human activity is necessarily goal-oriented or purposive in the
sense that people engage in a particular activity because it helps them to achieve some end. Insofar as
human activity is essentially purposive, according to Fuller, particular human activities can be
understood only in terms that make reference to their purposes and ends. Thus, since lawmaking is
essentially purposive activity, it can be understood only in terms that explicitly acknowledge its essential
values and purposes:

5. Ronald Dworkin’s “Third Theory”

Ronald Dworkin’s so-called third theory of law is best understood as a response to legal positivism, which
is essentially constituted by three theoretical commitments: the Social Fact Thesis, the Conventionality
Thesis, and the Separability Thesis. The Social Fact Thesis asserts it is a necessary truth that legal validity
is ultimately a function of certain kinds of social facts; the idea here is that what ultimately explains the
validity of a law is the presence of certain social facts, especially formal promulgation by a legislature.

6. References and Further Reading

Thomas Aquinas, On Law, Morality and Politics (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1988)
John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence and the Philosophy of Positive Law (St. Clair Shores, MI: Scholarly
Press, 1977)
John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)
Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)
Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws In General (London: Athlone Press, 1970) Jeremy Bentham, The Principles of
Morals and Legislation (New York: Hafner Press, 1948)
Brian Bix, “On Description and Legal Reasoning,” in Linda Meyer (ed.), Rules and Reasoning (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 1999)
Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) Brian Bix, “Natural
Law Theory,” in Dennis M. Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory
(Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing Co., 1996)
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1979)
Jules L. Coleman, “On the Relationship Between Law and Morality,” Ratio Juris, vol. 2, no. 1 (1989), 66-78
Jules L. Coleman, “Negative and Positive Positivism,” 11 Journal of Legal Studies 139 (1982)
Jules L. Coleman and Jeffrie Murphy, Philosophy of Law (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990)
Ronald M. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986)
Ronald M. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977)
John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980)
John Finnis, “The Truth in Legal Positivism,” in Robert P. George, The Autonomy of Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1996), 195-214
Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, Revised Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964)
Lon L. Fuller, “A Reply to Professors Cohen and Dworkin”, 10 Villanova Law Review 655 (1965), 657. Lon L.
Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law–A Reply to Professor Hart,” 71 Harvard Law Review 630 (1958)
Klaus F¸þer, “Farewell to ‘Legal Positivism’: The Separation Thesis Unravelling,” in George, The Autonomy
of Law, 119-162
Robert P. George, “Natural Law and Positive Law,” in George, The Autonomy of Law, 321-334
Robert P. George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992)
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Second Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994)
H.L.A. Hart, “Book Review of The Morality of Law” 78 Harvard Law Review 1281 (1965) H.L.A. Hart,
Essays on Bentham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) H.L.A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law
and Morals,” 71 Harvard Law Review 593 (1958)
Kenneth Einar Himma, “Positivism, Naturalism, and the Obligation to Obey Law,” Southern Journal of
Philosophy, vol. 36, no. 2 (Summer 1999)
Kenneth Einar Himma, “Functionalism and Legal Theory: The Hart/Fuller Debate Revisited,” De
Philosophia, vol. 14, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 1998)
J.L. Mackie, “The Third Theory of Law,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Fall 1977)
Michael Moore, “Law as a Functional Kind,” in George, Natural Law Theory, 188- 242
Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979)
Joseph Raz, “Authority, Law and Morality,” The Monist, vol. 68, 295-324 Joseph Raz, “Legal Principles and
the Limits of Law,” 81 Yale Law Review 823 (1972)
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, “The Many Moral Realisms,” in Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism
(Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1988)