Lecture 5: Limitation on Exercise of Appellate Jurisdiction

What is limitation on a jurisdiction refer to?

There are instances in which express limitations are placed on competence of a

court to adjudicate a claim. The effect of such limitation on jurisdiction is to
render the court incompetent to hear an action otherwise properly brought
before it. The limitations are often grounded in public policy or in fulfillment
of international obligations. The limitations may be in respect of parties to the
action, the cause of action itself, or even the relief sought, and may be a
creature of statute or common law.

Constitutional Restrictions

Limitation Statutory Restrictions

Court Imposed Restrictions

Constitution aims at maintaining a fair balance only between the three organs
of power, the Legislature, the Executive and the judiciary, but it is designed to
secure a similar balance between the powers of the Central Government and
those of State Government.

The Supreme Court is not required to adjudicate upon the dispute in exactly
the same way as the ordinary courts of law are called upon to do upholding the
rights of the parties and enforcement of its orders and decisions. A. 137
(Review) does not prescribe that a suit must be filed in Supreme Court for
complete adjudication of dispute envisaged in therein or passing of a decree
capable to of execution in an ordinary way as decree capable of execution of in
an ordinary way as decree of other courts are. It is open for the aggrieved party
to present a petition to the Supreme Court containing full statement of
relevant facts praying for declaration of rights as against other disputants.

Predominantly, the restrictions are imposed by the articles itself.

Let’s say, Art. 131 deals with original jurisdiction. Under Art. 132, restriction if
that of High Court issuing certificate under 134A. Under 136, the Supreme
Court maintains that the first restriction imposed by them is on concurrent
findings of the facts, the Court can interfere and in exceptional circumstances
the Court can interfere in concurrent findings if there is wrong appreciation of
evidence, or any other legal error has been committed.

Let’s examine all these Articles and its restrictions in depth:

Art. 131: Original Jurisdiction:

With regard to
Parties

Limitation u/a
131

With regard to
Subject Matter

Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited by the conditions of this

Article. It is not a court of ordinary original jurisdiction in all matters and
between all parties. In order to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court the two conditions must be satisfied (a) as to parties and (b) as to
the nature of the dispute. If these two conditions are not satisfied, a suit
cannot be brought before the Supreme Court simply on the ground that there
is no other court in the land which can try the question raised by the suit.

(1) Parties.-There must be an inter-State dispute i.e., the dispute must be

between the units of the Union or between the Union and any one or
more of the States, or between the Union and any State or States on one
side and one or more other States on the other. The idea behind this
condition is that if there is a dispute between two States or between the
 Union and the States, it is not desirable that it should be litigated in the
court of one of the disputing parties.

The Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction cannot entertain suits brought
by private individuals against the Government of India. Where a private
individual has a claim against the Government of India, the case must go in
the first instance to the local courts and from there it can go to the Supreme
Court in appeal provided that the appeal fulfils other requirements of the law.

In State of Bihar v. Union of India, 1970 1 SCC 67, the Court held that a
dispute between the State of Bihar and the Hindustan Steel Ltd., a registered
company under the Indian Companies Act, did not fall within its original
jurisdiction because a body like the Hindustan Steel Ltd. was not 'a State' for
the purposes of Article 131.

In State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, 1984, 4 SCC 238, a question

arose whether 'State' in Article 131(a) also includes within its purview State
Government'. Chandrachud, J. observed that the true construction of
Article 131(a), true in substance and true pragmatically, is that a dispute must
arise between the Union of India and a State.

“Such a dispute cannot be but a dispute which arises out of the differences
between the government in office at the Centre and the government in office
in the State. The purpose of Article 131 is to provide a forum for the
resolution of disputes which must involve a question, whether of law or of
fact, on which the existence or extent of a legal right is based, not a mere
political issue. The issuance of a directive from the Government of India to
State Governments that the Chief Ministers should tender a certain advice to
their Governors and the dissolution of State Assemblies on the grounds
mentioned in the Home Minister's letter to the Chief Ministers raises a legal,
not a political issue arising out of the existence and extent of a legal right
falling within the purview of Article 131.”

Justice Bhagwati in State of Karnataka vs Union of India, AIR 1978 SC

131, defining the scope of Article 131 pointed that what has, therefore,
to be seen in order to determine the applicability of Art. 131 is whether there is
any relational legal matter involving a right, liberty, power or immunity qua
the parties to the dispute. If there is, the suit would be maintainable but not
otherwise.
2. Subject-matter -The dispute must involve any question on which the
existence or extent of a legal right depends. A legal right is an interest
recognised and protected by a rule of legal justice an interest the violation of
which would be a legal wrong done to him whose interest it is, and respect for
which is a legal duty.

What Article 131 requires is that the dispute must be one which involves 'a
question' on which the existence or extent of 'a legal right depends'. This
article does not say that the legal right must be of the plaintiff. It may be of the
plaintiff or of the defendant. What is necessary is that the existence or extent
of the legal right must be in issue in the dispute between the parties.

There is no reference to a suit or ‘cause of action' in Article 131 and the article
confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court with reference to the character of
the dispute which may be brought before it for adjudication. The requirement
of 'cause of action', which is necessary in a suit, cannot, therefore, be imparted
while construing the scope and ambit of Article 131. The word 'right' is used
therein in a generic sense.

Thus in the Rajasthan Dissolution case, 1977 3 SCC 592, it was held that
the suit was maintainable within the scope and ambit of Article 131 as it sought
to enforce a legal right of the States under the Constitution due to the
unconstitutional exercise of power by the President under Article 356 affecting
adversely the rights of several persons and infringing not only the individual
rights of the members of the Legislative Assembly but also the constitutional
rights of the States to insist that their constitutional status shall not be violated
by unconstitutional assault under Article 356.

Article 132: Constitutional Appeals: deals with question involving

interpretation of the Constitution arising out of any proceeding in a High
Court - a civil, criminal or other proceeding. The scheme of the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court clearly indicates that questions relating to
the interpretation of the Constitution are placed in a special category
irrespective of the nature of the proceedings in which they may arise and a
right of appeal of the widest amplitude is allowed in cases involving such
question.

State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Thakur Ganga Singh, AIR 1960 SC

356, Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Rao, AIR 1953 SC 210.
The idea is that on question involving the divergent interpretation or
constitutional questions by different High Courts would be very undesirable.
With the object, the article is freed from other limitations imposed under
Arts. 133 and 134.

Moreover, as per the provisions of Art. 132, a speedy determination on

constitutional issues going to the root of the case is aimed at.

Accordingly, provisions are made in this article that when a certificate is given
by the High Court in any judgment, decree or final order made by it in a civil,
criminal or other proceeding to the effect that the case involves a substantial
question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, an appeal will lie to
the Supreme Court.

There are three conditions for the grant of the certificate by the High
Court under Clause (1). Firstly, the order appealed against should be a
judgment, decree or final order made by the High Court in a civil, criminal or
other proceeding.

Secondly, the case should involve a question of law as to the interpretation of

the Constitution. The word "involve" is important. It implies a considerable
degree of necessity. The mere circumstance that a question of law is raised in a
case would not justify the inference that the proposed appeal involves a
substantial question of law unless it is necessary to decide the question of law
for a proper decision of the case.

Thirdly, the question involved must be a substantial question of law. The

word "substantial" here means a question regarding which there is difference
of opinion. T.M. Krishnswami Pillai v. Governor General in Council,
AIR 1947 FC 37, a case involving the interpretation of the expression
"substantial question of law" occurring in s.205 of the Government of India
Act, 1935.

Article 133 Civil Appeal: This article lays down that apart from appeal by
Special leave under Art. 136 and appeal under Art. 132, appeal shall lie to the
Supreme Court from a civil proceeding before any High Court in the territory
of India, only on the following conditions.

a) The subject of appeal is a ‘judgment, decree or final order’.

 b) The High Court grants a certificate for such appeal –
i. There is no case where the certificate may be obtained as a right.
ii. In all cases, irrespective of value, the certificate is at the discretion
of the High Court that the case is a fit one for decision of Supreme
Court on appeal, provided, of course the case involves a
‘substantial question of law’.

Art. 133 discards the distinction between the appellate and original
jurisdiction of the High Court. Art 133 deliberately uses the words which are as
wide as language can make them. It includes all judgements, decrees and
orders passed in exercise for appellate and ordinary civil jurisdiction.

Article 133 of the Constitution does not in any way limit the scope of an
appeal and the Supreme Court undoubtedly has the power to review even the
concurrent finding of fact. But it is a longstanding practice of the Privy Council
not to interfere with such findings unless and otherwise there were exceptional
circumstances.

This practice has been followed by the Supreme Court since its inception.
Ordinarily, the Supreme Court does not go behind the findings of fact, unless
the High Court has overlooked important materials on record, failed to
consider material facts and admissions, misread the evidence and the findings
are vitiated by errors of record and are manifestly wrong by reason of
unreasonable approach.
But in a case where the appreciation of evidence by court below has resulted in
miscarriage of justice, the Supreme Court will interfere. In many cases, it has
been observed that where the High Court has not considered the matter has
been remanded for fresh consideration. (Amar Dyee Chem Ltd. vs UOI,
AIR 1974SC 636)

In State of Kerala v. Chokala Lonappan Palu, (1979) 3, SCC 780, it

was held that the Supreme Court in appeal under Art.133(1) would not
interfere nor it would reappreciate the evidence unless some principles have
been violated or gross injustice perpetrates. The general rule regarding non-
interference in finding of fact is applied more forcefully, when there is
concurrent finding of fact by courts below.
Article 133 does not in any way limit the scope of an appeal
provided. So, proper and valid certificate is issued by the High Court there
under. The Apex Court has undoubtedly the power to review the concurrent
findings of fact arrived at by the courts below in appropriate cases.
Whatever may be the reason for the rule, the practice has been fairly
crystallised and the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the
concurrent finding of fact except in exceptional cases. Where the findings are
such that it shocks the con- science of the court or by disregard to the form of
legal process or some violation of the same principles of natural justice or
otherwise substantial and grave injustice has been made. It is neither possible
nor advisable to define these circumstances. It is necessary to be left to the
discretion of the Supreme Court having regard to the facts of the case."

Thus, if there has been a miscarriage of justice or the violation of some

principles of law of procedure, the Supreme Court might interfere with
concurrent findings of fact."

A finding of fact recorded by High Court overlooking the incontrovertible

evidence when points to the contrary and, therefore, utterly unsustainable
cannot come in the way of the Supreme Court reaching a correct conclusion on
facts and the examination of evidence by the court cannot be impeded by a
mere submission that the court does not interfere with findings of fact.

A finding based on affidavit evidence, the Supreme Court will be reluctant to

interfere. But in cases where the status of a high public official is affected, the
Supreme Court may interfere with such finding since the question of bias'
needs to be carefully examined before an adverse verdict is pronounced."

Where on identical facts, another court has entered into a different finding,
the Supreme Court may interfere on finding of fact.

Where the High Court decides the case without full and complete data, the
Supreme Court will interfere.

It also made an exception on humanitarian grounds where a large number of

tenants of small means would otherwise be thrown out. (Prabha M.I.C.S vs
Banwari, AIR 1989 SC 989)

Art. 134: Criminal Appeal:

Prior to the Constitution, there was no court of criminal appeal over the High
Courts. No doubt the Privy Council entertained appeals in criminal cases,
within a very limited range, but in the exercise of this jurisdiction, the judicial
Committee would not sit as a court of appeal, as it would (to hear appeals in
civil cases) under Secs. 109-10 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is by special
leave of the Judicial Committee that such appeal in criminal cases lay (as will
be shown under Art. 136, post), and it is only in exceptional cases that the
Judicial committee interfered, in the exercise of the prerogative of the
Sovereign, to review the course of criminal justice
Secondly, there was no provision for a second appeal in criminal
proceedings, in any case.

Though with a limited jurisdiction at the outset, the Constitution for the
first time sets up a court of criminal appeal over the High Courts and also
creates a right of second appeal, at least in one case. But Art. 134 constitutes
Supreme Court as a court of criminal appeal in a limited sense of cases only,
and clearly implies that no appeal lies to it as a matter of course or right except
in cases provided therein. (Pritam Singh vs State, AIR 1950, SC 169)

The function of the Supreme Court which is not an ordinary court of criminal
appeal is not so much to weigh and appraise the evidence again, to find out the
guilt or innocence of the accused to see that the accused gets a fair trial on
proper evidence. (Darshan Singh Balwant Singh vs State of Punjab,
AIR 1953 SC83)

While exercising the powers under this Article, the Supreme Court can go into
the merits of the case and has the same power as the High Court.' The
provisions of Art. 134(1), by which this jurisdiction is created, are left to be
supplemented or extended by Parliamentary legislation [Cl. (2)].

The provisions in the Constitution under Art. 134 regulating the Criminal
appeal to the Supreme Court are so designated as to permit only important
criminal cases to come before the Supreme Court.

Art. 134 confers a limited criminal appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme

Court. The Supreme Court hears exceptional matters where justice demands
interference by the Apex Court. It was necessary to restrict the flow of criminal
appeals to the Supreme Court, otherwise large number of such appeals would
have made it physically impossible for the court to cope with them.

The paramount duty of the court is to ensure miscarriage of justice

is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the
guilty is no less than from conviction of an innocent. In a case where
admissible evidence is ignored a duty is cast upon the Appellate Court to
re=appreciate the evidence in a case where any of the accused has been
acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether the accused
committed any offence or not.

The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal

against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere when there are compelling and
substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly
unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference."

Article 134 constitutes the Supreme Court as a court of criminal appeal in a

limited class of cases only, and clearly implies that no appeal lies to
it as a matter of course or right except in cases specified therein."

The function of the Supreme Court which is not an ordinary court of appeal is
not so much to weight and appraise the evidence again to find out the guilt or
innocence of the accused so as to see that the accused gets a fair trial on proper
evidence." In deciding an appeal, the Supreme Court has the same power as
the High Court and it is entitled to go into the merits of the case.

Art. 134A: Art. 134A was enacted to make good the deficiencies in Art. 132,
133 and 134 regarding the time in which an application for a certificate under
any of those articles would be made before the High Court and also as power
of High Court to issue a certificate Suo moto under those articles. It is ancillary
to Arts. 132(1), 133(1) and 134(1)(c)

The High Court can issue a certificate only when the condition in Arts. 132 or
133 or 134, as the case may be, are satisfied. When the certificate does not
satisfy the condition, the Supreme Court may consider whether the petition of
appeal could be treated as an SLP." A certificate under this Article cannot be
granted unless there is a question of law of general importance requiring the
decision ion of the Supreme Court

The criminal appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is

primarily confined to cases where the sentence is one of death.
Ordinarily, in other cases where the sentence is not one of death, no appeal
will lie. Quite a large number of members of the Constituent Assembly wanted
to enlarge the criminal appellate jurisdiction. For, the then existing provision
did not entitle an accused person to move the Supreme Court even when the
sentence is a sentence of death, if he was found guilty and was award- ed death
sentence by the Sessions Court and in confirmation proceedings, the sentence
of death was confirmed by the High Court.
Art. 136: The power of the Court under article 136 is plenary, the court was
forced to set some limits on itself. These limitations were categorized as
follows:
exhaustion of alternative remedy,
locus standi,
res judicata,
necessary parties,
delay
Interlocutory orders.

Article 136, is worded in the widest possible terms. It confers a wide discretion
on the Supreme Court to entertain appeals in suitable cases not otherwise
provided for by the Constitution. It is in the p of a residuary or reserve power
and, therefore, it cannot be defined exhaustively. nature Decided cases,
however, establish that the Supreme Court will grant special leave to appeal in
exceptional cases where grave and substantial injustice has been done by
disregard to the forms of legal process or violation of the principles of natural
justice or otherwise." The discretionary nature of the power continues until the
disposal of the appeal.

In express terms, Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal on a party as
such but it confers a wide discretionary power on the Supreme Court to grant
special leave to appeal in suitable cases. Though it is a residuary power and
extraordinary in its terms, it shall be exercised by the Supreme Court in
accordance with the well-established judicial principles, or the well-known
norms of procedure which have been recognised for long as precedents. Thus
while considering a petition under Article 136, it is reasonable to assume that
the norms of fair procedure implied in Article 21 are adequately met and the
procedure followed in disposing of a petition under Article 136 is consistent
with the procedure contemplated by Article 21.

In Pritam Singh vs State, AIR 1950 SC 169, in explaining how the

discretion will be exercised generally in granting special leave to appeal, the
Supreme Court observed as follows:
“the wide discretionary power with which this court is invested under it is to
be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only, and as far as possible a
more or less uniform standard should be adopted in granting special leave in
the wide range of matters which can come up before it under this article. By
virtue of this article we can grant special leave in civil cases, in criminal
cases, in income tax cases, in cases which can come up in different tribunals
and in a variety of other cases. The only uniform standard which, in our
opinion, can be laid in the Constitution is that the Court should grant special
leave to appeal only in those cases where special circumstances are shown to
exist.”

Again in Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills Ltd. vs C.I.T, AIR 1955 SC 65, the
Supreme Court said:

“It is not possible to define …the limitations on the exercise of the

discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Article 136. The limitation
whatever they may be, are implicit in the nature and character of the power
itself. It being an exceptional and overriding power, naturally it has to be
exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special and extraordinary
situations. Beyond that, it is not possible to fetter the exercise of this power
by any set formula. “

The residuary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 has more
frequently been invoked in criminal appeals. But the Supreme Court has not
been disposed to interfere lightly. It has more than once been declared that the
Supreme Court will not grant special leave to appeal under Article 136(1) of the
Constitution unless it is shown that special and exceptional
circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and
the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review
of the decision appealed against. Further, in the exercise of its special leave
appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court will not interfere with the
concurrent findings of the court unless, of course findings are perverse or
vitiated by error of law, or if there is gross miscarriage of justice.

But in case of grave injustice the Court is duty-bound to interfere with the
findings of fact even if they have been affirmed thrice.

The Supreme Court ordinarily does not go into the sufficiency of evidence
Leave cannot be granted merely against adverse exercise of discretionary
power when no illegality has been committed nor any unreasonable restriction
placed on any fundamental right of the appellant.
The Supreme Court does not interfere with the exercise of discretionary power
by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 merely because two views are
possible on the facts of the case

The Court may refuse to give relief under Article 136 to a person who does not
come before it with clean hands, for example, if he has suppressed some facts.

In case of statutory restrictions in the wide discretionary powers of Art. 136, if

there is an alternate remedy, the Supreme Court will not interfere under A.
136. Exception is that even if there is an alternative and is not being exhausted
to Supreme Court, in exceptional case will always interfere.

In Bharat Bank vs The Employees of Bharat Bank AIR 1950 SC 188,

while discussing the non-obstante clause in the Article 136 indicates intention
of constitution is to disregard in extraordinary cases the limitations contained
in the previous provisions of constitution.

With regard to same non-obstante clause, in Bengal Chemical and

Pharmaceutical Works vs Workmen AIR 1959 SC 633, it was opined
that even if law says that an adjudication of particular tribunal will be final and
conclusive.

Ordinarily the Court insists that appellant has to pursue and

exhaust the alternative remedies by way of appeal or revision
provided by the relevant las due to the heavy burden it experienced.

In Ballah vs Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 814 where the appellant having reached
the High Court by way of reference from the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal
and getting an adverse verdict sought to appeal to the Supreme Court from the
tribunal's order and not from the High Court decision. The apex court held
that rule of exhaustion remedies was not rigid as it was self-imposed
restriction. The Court might relax it if there were special circumstances such
as breach of the principle of natural justice or jurisdictional errors.

In Mahadayal Premachandra v. C.T.O., 1959 SCR 51, the Supreme

Court heard an appeal from C.T.O.'s order because the assessment had been
made behind the back of the assessee and there was breach of natural justice.
The appellant in the instant case without exhausting the alternative remedies
approached the Court. The facts show that the assessing officer had not
exercised his own judgment in the matter of assessment and had not given any
opportunity to counter the point. The Court heard an appeal directly from the
appellate tribunal as the assessee had lost his remedy of reference to the High
Court owing to a delay not attributable to him.

In Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel, AIR 2010 SC 1099, wherein the court
held that Article 136 was never meant to be an ordinary forum of appeal at all
like Section 96 or even Section 100 CPC. Under the constitutional scheme,
ordinarily the last court in the country in ordinary cases was meant to be the
High Court.
The Supreme Court as the apex court in the country was meant to deal with
important issues like constitutional questions, questions of law of general
importance or where grave injustice had been done. If the Supreme Court
entertains all and sundry kinds of cases it will soon be flooded with a huge
amount of backlog and will not be able to deal with important questions
relating to the constitution or the law or where grave injustice has been done,
for which it was really meant under the constitutional scheme. After all, the
Supreme Court has limited time at its disposal and it cannot be expected to
hear every kind of dispute.

In Shahid Balwa v. Union of India (2014) 2 SCC 687 the court pointed
that that Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India enables
this Court to pass such orders, which are necessary for doing complete
justice in any cause or matter pending before it and, any order so made, shall
be enforceable throughout the territory of India.

In Dr Monica Kumar vs State of UP AIR 2008 SC 2781 the court held

that the court's power to do complete justice is entirely of different level and
of a different quality. What would be the need of justice in a cause or matter
would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and while
exercising that power the court would take into consideration the express
provisions of a substantive statute

The court further expressed that any prohibition or restriction contained in

ordinary laws cannot act as a limitation on the constitutional power of this
court.