Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Mangila v. CA
Mangila v. CA
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* THIRD DIVISION.
163
164
165
licenses and permits, register its business name, and pay taxes to
the national government. The law does not vest a separate legal
personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or
defend an action in court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the residence of the proprietor
which should be considered as one of the proper venues, not the
business address of the sole proprietorship.—Thus, not being
vested with legal personality to file this case, the sole
proprietorship is not the plaintiff in this case but rather Loreta
Guina in her personal capacity. In fact, the complaint in the lower
court acknowledges in its caption that the plaintiff and defendant
are Loreta Guina and Anita Mangila, respectively. The title of the
petition before us does not state, and rightly so, Anita Mangila v.
Air Swift International, but rather Anita Mangila v. Loreta
Guina. Logically then, it is the residence of private respondent
Guina, the proprietor with the juridical personality, which should
be considered as one of the proper venues for this case. All these
considered, private respondent should have filed this case either
in San Fernando, Pampanga (petitioner’s residence) or Parañaque
(private respondent’s residence). Since private respondent
(complainant below) filed this case in Pasay, we hold that the case
should be dismissed on the ground of improper venue.
Same; Same; The objective of the rules on venue to insure a
just and orderly administration of justice or the impartial and
evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding will not
be attained if the plaintiff is given unrestricted freedom to choose
where to file the complaint or petition.—The rules on venue, like
other procedural rules, are designed to insure a just and orderly
administration of justice or the impartial and evenhanded
determination of every action and proceeding. Obviously, this
objective will not be attained if the plaintiff is given unrestricted
freedom to choose where to file the complaint or petition.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The Facts
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167
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4Ibid.
168
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10 Ibid.
11 Records, p. 86.
12 Ibid., p. 91.
13 Ibid., p. 97.
14 Ibid., p. 102.
15 Ibid., p. 100.
16 Ibid., p. 131.
169
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17 Ibid., p. 161.
18 Rollo, p. 13.
19 Records, p. 182.
170
The Issues
I.
II.
III.
IV.
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171
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172
“It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the
Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of
defendant—issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of
attachment—these do not and cannot bind and affect the
defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is
eventually obtained by the court, either by service on him of
summons or other coercive process or his voluntary submission to
the court’s authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper
officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it is
essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the
applicant’s affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of
attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also
the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the
complaint x x x.” (Emphasis supplied.)
order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.
In the instant case, the Writ of Preliminary Attachment
was issued on September 27, 1988 and implemented on
October 28, 1988. However, the alias summons was served
only on January 26, 1989 or almost three months after the
implementation of the writ of attachment.
The trial court had the authority to issue the Writ of
Attachment on September 27 since a motion for its
issuance can be filed “at the commencement of the action.”
However, on the day the writ was implemented, the trial
court should have, previously or simultaneously with the
implementation of the writ, acquired jurisdiction over the
petitioner. Yet, as was shown in the records of the case, the
summons was actually served on petitioner several months
after the writ had been implemented.
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173
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24 Rollo, p. 102.
25 UCPB v. Ongpin, G.R. No. 146593, October 26, 2001, 368 SCRA 464.
Sec. 14. Service upon defendant, whose identity or whereabouts are
unknown.—In any action where the defendant is designated as an
unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown
and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service, may, by leave of
court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order.
174
Improper Venue
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175
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176
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33 Rule 4, Section 2.
34 119 SCRA 367 (1982).
177
VOL. 387, AUGUST 12, 2002 177
Mangila vs. Court of Appeals
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35 Records, p. 31.
36 TSN, October 24, 1989, p. 2.
37 Records, p. 1.
38 Yao Ka Sin Trading v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 763 (1992) citing
Jariol, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 188 SCRA 475 (1990).
39 Juasing Hardware v. Hon. Mendoza, 201 Phil. 369; 115 SCRA 783
(1982), also cited in the Yao Ka Sin Trading case.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
178
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43 Records, p. 31.
44 Ibid., p. 107.
45 Ibid., p. 131.
46 Rollo, p. 1.
47 Sy v. Tyson Enterprises, Inc., see note 34.
179
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