Dynamics and Policies

of Prejudice from the

Eighteenth to the
Twenty-first Century
Dynamics and Policies
of Prejudice from the
Eighteenth to the
Twenty-first Century
Edited by

Giuseppe Motta
Dynamics and Policies of Prejudice from the Eighteenth
to the Twenty-first Century

Edited by Giuseppe Motta

This book first published 2018

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2018 by Giuseppe Motta and contributors

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without
the prior permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN (10): 1-5275-0862-5

ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-0862-0
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword .................................................................................................... ix
Giuseppe Motta

Chapter One
The Impact of Modernization:
Old and New Bias in the Age of Transition

Lucien Bonaparte’s La Tribu Indienne, ou Edouard et Stellina,

Germaine de Staël’s “Zulma”, and Chateaubriand’s Atala:
Colonialism and the Enlightenment Paradox of Freedom ........................... 3
Sharon Worley

With Pride and Prejudice: Paìsiy Hilendàrski and the Perception

of Bulgaria’s Neighbours in the Late Eighteenth Century......................... 15
Francesco Dall’Aglio

Reflection of Social Prejudice in Georgian Literary Fiction ..................... 25

Mariam Chkhartishvili

The Role of Stereotypes in the Consolidation of National Unity:

Queen Marie as “the Supreme Ambassador of the Just Romanian Cause” ..... 39
Mihaela MehedinĠi-Beiean

Chapter Two
The Anti-Semitic Disease:
From Prejudice to Annihilation

Jews in Russia between the End of the Empire and Soviet Era:
Jewish Humour in Response to Discrimination ......................................... 55
Manuela Pellegrino

The Shape of Discrimination: Anti-Jewish Laws in Central-Eastern

Europe in the Early Twentieth Century ..................................................... 67
Giuseppe Motta
vi Table of Contents

Italian Fascism and the Racial Laws of 1938: The Politics and Birth
of Doctrinal Tragedy ................................................................................. 81
Patrick Anthony Cavaliere

Constrained Anti-Semitism? Nuances of Nazi Racist Discourse

with Respect to Iberian America and Portugal .......................................... 99
Fernando Clara

Chapter Three
Shaping Identities and National Consciousness

From the Turkish Religion to the Muslim Nation: The Case of Bosnian
Muslims, Serbo-Croatian Literary Influences, and the Austro-Hungarian
Government ............................................................................................. 113
Jovana Šaljiü

Invisible Scapegoats: The Turkish Dönmes............................................. 123

Fabio L. Grassi

Between Modernism and Nationalism: Hungarian Literature

and the Search for National Identity ........................................................ 135
Andrea Carteny

Heritage of Fear: The Sèvres Syndrome, Turkishness and Otherness ..... 143
Iulia-Alexandra Oprea

Chapter Four
Ethnic and Religious Conflicts

Discrimination and Mistrust: Hungarian-Romanian Mutual Reprisals

in Transylvania during WWII.................................................................. 157
Alessandro Vagnini

The End of the “Long Romance”: The Image of Greece in Italy

between the Two World Wars ................................................................. 171
Andrea Giovanni Noto

The Liberation Struggle in Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot Press:

The Position of the Leading Greek Cypriot Newspaper
O Phileleftheros in 1957-1960 ................................................................ 185
Euripides Antoniades
 Dynamics and Policies of Prejudice from the Eighteenth vii
to the Twenty-first Century
Copts and Power in Egypt, Before and After the Arab Spring ................ 203
Ana-Maria Gajdo

Chapter Five
Balkanization

The Spread of Gobineau’s Racial Ideas to Greece in the Nineteenth

and Twentieth Centuries .......................................................................... 219
Fotini Assimakopoulou

Serbia and the Macedonian Question: The Intertwining of Politics

and Science .............................................................................................. 235
Biljana Vuþetiü

Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey: The Role of Cham

Albanians ................................................................................................. 249
Blerina Sadik

The Savages Attack from Behind: Anthropological Stereotypes

about Albanians in Serbian Public Discourse .......................................... 257
Vladan Jovanoviü

Chapter Six
The Russian Neighbour

The Russkiy Mir Formula and the Hypothesis of a “New” Cold War..... 273
Gabriele Natalizia

The Concept of “Russkiy Mir” as an Official Agenda for Prejudice....... 289

Michaá Wawrzonek

Russia and Italy: Past and Present. Fantasies and Prejudices Compared
through a Reading of Sebastiano Ciampi's Work .................................... 305
Paolo De Luca

Chapter Seven
Multidisciplinary Perspectives

The Recognition of Self through the History of Individual and Social

Identities .................................................................................................. 319
Francesca Romana Lenzi
viii Table of Contents

Media, Prejudice, Identity: The Role of Narrative Practices

from an Ethical Perspective ..................................................................... 327
Ludovica Malknecht

Born to Learn, Taught to Hate: Children as the Most Vulnerable

Victims of Prejudice ................................................................................ 339
Zorica Petroviü

Chapter Eight
A Question of Gender

The Discursive Construction of Reproductive Rights in Poland:

Anti-Abortionism, “True Polishness” and State Legitimation................. 351
Giulia Capacci

Media Bias toward Women in Politics, and Gender Discrimination ....... 363
Alessandra Castellani

Discriminatory Language as a Manifestation of Prejudice from the

Twentieth to the Twenty-first Century: The Case of Tunisian Women... 385
Rym Lajmi

Chapter Nine
Dealing with Prejudice:
Responses and Analysis of Discrimination

Georgia: The Communist Experiment and Transformational

Economic Policy ...................................................................................... 395
Eka Lekashvili

The Contested Journey of Social Inclusion Policy in Serbia:

An Anthropological Perspective .............................................................. 411
Tijana Moraþa

Discrimination, Racism and Social Exclusion of the Minority:

European Court of Human Rights Asserts Protection of the Roma ......... 427
Cristina Montefusco

Online Hate Speech, Marginalized Groups and Minorities:

Considerations about Types of Discrimination in the Age
of Social Networks and Media ................................................................ 431
Roberto Bortone and Alessandro Pistecchia
 THE CONCEPT OF “RUSSKIY MIR”
AS AN OFFICIAL AGENDA FOR PREJUDICE

MICHAà WAWRZONEK*

According to the statements of its numerous supporters, the “Russkiy Mir”

is a concept defining the alleged premises concerning the cultural and,
consequentially, political unity of the post-Soviet space. What is important
to bear in mind is that this community sees itself as separate and different
from the West.

While the Russian Federation is regarded as Russkiy Mir's leading

advocate, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow has stated that the Russkiy Mir also
includes people “who call themselves by many names, including Russians,
Ukrainians, and Belarusians”. Patriarch Kirill asserts that people who are
“entirely foreign to the Slavic world” can also participate in this “separate
civilization”, under the condition that they accept its “spiritual and cultural
elements as their own” (ɋɥɨɜɨ ɩɚɫɬɢɪɹ 2014).

The statements by the current superior of the Russian Orthodox Church

are no coincidence. The beliefs, practices and the institution of the
Orthodox Church are part of a cultural identity that is a crucial element of
the Russkiy Mir. This legacy is often conveyed through the strongly
mythologized symbol of the “Holy Rus”. Mikhail Suslov describes the
concept of “Holy Rus” as “a decentralized network model of a
transnational society that goes beyond the 'nation-state' and offers new
ways to give meaning to identity in the post-Soviet space”. According to
Suslov, this “Holy Rus” is likely to be “a utopian space of unity masked
by apparent heterogeneity” (Suslov 2015, 57).

It is worth noting that the ontological status of the Russkiy Mir is seen by
its advocates in the spirit of primordialism (Smith 1998, 145-158). This
community is to be based on cultural elements recognized as “given” in
advance, as well as on natural primordial bonds regarding the identity-

*
Jagiellonian University, Cracow.
290 The Concept of “Russkiy Mir” as an Official Agenda for Prejudice

related choices of an individual and social reality. This train of thought is

evident in the statements made by Patriarch Kirill, and in particular, when
he affirmed that “Russians, even those who call themselves Russians” are,
in many cases, outside the Russkiy Mir since they do not identify
themselves with “Russian tradition, spirituality, and culture” and instead
“have other views and convictions”. While Kirill acknowledges an
individual’s rights to such other views, he says that when people take
advantage of this right, they “lose their bond with their own civilization”.
Thus, according to the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, they place
themselves outside of the “Russian” nation.

Year after year, the statements made by the representatives and advocates
of the Russkiy Mir are becoming increasingly categorical. At the end of
2013, Patriarch Kirill emphasized that the Russkiy Mir civilization had
managed to develop a “social symphony” model based on “brotherly
cooperation and mutual care”. Unfortunately, according to the leader of
the Russian Orthodox Church, the world today is dominated by a model of
society based on “conflict, a system plagued by permanent disputes,
competition, and struggle”. Considering this, Patriarch Kirill went on to
affirm that “the spiritual resources and values vested upon our nation, our
country (...) have many times paved the way for compassion in the crucial
moments of our history (...) This has been the case until the present, and
ought to be so in the future” (Cɥɨɜɨ Cɜɹɬɟɣɲɟɝɨ ɉɚɬɪɢɚɪɯɚ 2013).

One year earlier, another high official of the Russian Orthodox Church
and advocate of the Russkiy Mir, Father Vsevolod Chaplin declared, “Our
civilization has answers to the questions in the face of which most of the
world’s elites are at a loss”. And while Father Chaplin felt this did not
represent a reason for self-content, he concluded that “a bold and explicit
view on the direction of worldwide changes should be expressed in a wise
and uncompromising manner” (ɉɪɨɬɨɢɟɪɟɣ ȼɫɟɜɨɥɨɞ ɑɚɩɥɢɧ 2014). On
30 January 2014, Father Chaplin spoke out again, stating that his
community “had a lot to say” in the field of international relations, social
life, economic life, and the place of religion in society regarding “the
moral assessment of all that is of this world”. The Moscow Patriarchate
official concluded that the Russian Orthodox Church should become one
of the communities that decide on the “image of the world and its future”
(ɉɪɨɬɨɢɟɪɟɣ ȼɫɟɜɨɥɨɞ ɑɚɩɥɢɧ 2014), and it promoted the Russian
Orthodox Church as the potential global leader. He currently states that
“Russia is the centre, and maybe the only centre, of the world … [Russia]
has more grounds to be such a centre than any European capital or the
United States” (Church Spokesman 2014). The cited comments illustrate
 Michaá Wawrzonek 291

reasonably well how specific expectations and purely political claims are
closely linked to aspirations associated with spiritual leadership in the
concept of the Russkiy Mir.

The essence of the Russkiy Mir community is defined through affirmations

and negation. On the one hand, we receive a compilation of beliefs about
the ontological status of the “Russkaya” civilization, what it is, its
characteristics and mission. On the other hand, it is defined by
contradistinctions, by statements about what it is not, who its enemy is,
and what threatens it most. Thus, the concept of the Russkiy Mir consists
of a series of critical views about Western civilization. Russia’s past
relationships with the West are considered one of the main ingredients of
the historical legacy underpinning the Russkiy Mir. These relationships
are recreated according to the rules of neo-traditionalization.

According to Jadwiga Staniszkis, neo-traditionalization is a strategy of

social modernization that is typical of post-communist societies. This
process consists of attempts to rediscover the legacy of the past. However,
as a result, it leads to re-appropriation of original tradition. Its particular
elements are separated from their primary connotations and adapted to
their new functions or even submitted to them. Neo-traditionalization also
entails the “sharpening” of the meaning of the arbitrarily selected elements
and their idealization. Another consequence of this process is the radical
breaking of the rule of sequencing, which is the essence of tradition and
the source of its legitimacy (Staniszkis 2005, 137).

As a result, the West is considered by the adherents of the concept of the

Russkiy Mir to be an eternal source of threats. Tellingly, in this regard, on
25 December 2014, Father Chaplin once again identified the core of
Russia’s mission, stating that its task is to stop the “American Project”. In
the model of the history of Russia that Father Chaplin embraces as “his
own”, the following are presented as equivalent and equally dangerous:
the “American Project”, “Napoleon’s Project” and … “Hitler’s Project”
(Church Spokesman 2014).

The image of the West was developed in the Russkiy Mir concept using a
number of prejudices. Natalia Narochnickaya, a member of the board of
trustees of the Russkiy Mir Foundation, the President of the Historical
Perspective Foundation and director of the Paris office of the Russian
Institute of Democracy and Cooperation (Russkiy Mir Foundation
website), can be considered a typical and influential representative of the
current Russian discourse on Russia’s identity and international relations
292 The Concept of “Russkiy Mir” as an Official Agenda for Prejudice

(Ɉɫɬɛɺ 2012, 108), and she has made some noteworthy statements with
reference to how these prejudices are introduced into public discourse.

Obviously, the primary association with the West is “liberalism”.

Narochnickaya asserts that liberalism is a “philosophical worldview based
on the Enlightenment’s idea of the autonomy of the individual relating to
God”. As a result, this would lead to man's liberation from “all higher
values: family, nation, and state” (Ⱥɤɫɸɱɢɰ, ɇɚɪɨɱɧɢɰɤɚɹ 2014, 64).
According to Narochnickaya, the so-called “liberal values” are: “personal
success”, “a good salary”, “a single-family home, an expensive car”, and
so forth. The “liberal lifestyle” presented is thus allegedly deprived of
such elements as friendship, peace of mind, and responsibilities
concerning loved ones and society.

Narochnickaya argues that the “open society” model developed against

this liberal backdrop is an expression of a “pervasive longing for
egalitarianism” and for a “history without focusing on morality”. Another
influential participant of the debates over Russia's international identity,
Sergei Karaganov, asserts that the liberal society model prevailing in the
West has no place for “a person’s customary devotion to some higher
purpose”. Under these circumstances, this model is dominated by such
quasi-values as “multiculturalism, excessive tolerance, and unusual sexual
and family relations” (Karaganov 2016).

Another frequent topic in the discourse of Russkiy Mir advocates is the

thesis that Western liberal democracy constitutes a threat to mankind,
similar to what Soviet communism represented in the past. Karaganov
asserts that “Democracy” and “liberalism” are “godless”. Furthermore, he
compares the Western policies of supporting the processes of
democratization to the Soviet policies of “exporting the revolution
(socialism)” (Karaganov 2016). While a thesis about the global expansion
of the West is obviously not new nor insightful, Karaganov affirmed
something else, namely, that this expansion is similar to the politics of
broadening the zone controlled by the Soviet empire. He relates his
statement to the genesis of these two “expansions” as well as to their
mechanisms and results. Instead, Narochnickaya argues merely that the
essence of Western expansion has always been oppressing other nations.
This statement, which refers mainly to the democratization process in
Central and Eastern Europe, should be recognized as one of the leading
prejudices at the core of the concept of the Russkiy Mir.
 Michaá Wawrzonek 293

Narochnickaya calls liberalism “a cousin of Marxism” (Ⱥɤɫɸɱɢɰ,

ɇɚɪɨɱɧɢɰɤɚɹ 2014, 77). According to her, a catalogue of the basic
Western values is “a new liberal communist manifesto of apostasy in the
twenty-first century”. Furthermore, she also criticizes elements of Western
political culture such as: “human rights” and “respect for the mundane life
as the highest value”(Ⱥɤɫɸɱɢɰ, ɇɚɪɨɱɧɢɰɤɚɹ 2014, 77). On another
occasion, speaking as the head of the Paris office of the Russian Institute
of Democracy and Cooperation, Narochnickaya stated that “all communist
interdictions – censorship and total control” are currently in force in the
West. Narochnickaya has claimed that people in the USA are afraid of
speaking openly about their worldviews. This issue is worth noting,
because another proponent of the Russkiy Mir, Father Dimitriy Smirnov,
told a correspondent of The New York Times that he witnessed situations
in the United States where “clergymen would only discuss some topics by
whispering to each other in their cars”. Father Smirnov accordingly
asserted to the New York Times journalist that life in the USA “is more
regulated” than in Russia. (ɂɧɬɟɪɜɶɸ ɠɭɪɧɚɥɢɫɬɤɟ 2016)

Patriarch Kirill stated that foreign forces were challenging the right of
“Eastern Slavs who are united under one faith and one historical tradition”
to possess their “common spiritual and cultural space”, and that “today we
are consequently witnessing an ongoing battle for this space”. It should be
noted that this statement was made on 6 September 2014, with direct
reference to the then current situation in Ukraine.

Why does Ukraine hold such a prominent place within the Russkiy Mir? If
the Russkiy Mir is to be regarded as a community based on the beliefs,
practices and the institution of the Orthodox Church, it will not make
sense without Ukraine. The cultural identity of such a society would
inevitably be linked to Kiev, the symbolic capital located in Ukrainian
territory, which was the seat of the founders of “Holy Rus” (ɋɥɨɜɨ
ɩɚɫɬɢɪɹ 2014).

Ukraine has a pivotal role in Russkiy Mir not only with regard to
symbolism, but also because Moscow's Patriarchate needs the Ukrainian
religious infrastructure that is considered indispensable for the Russian
Orthodox Church to maintain its image as a leader of the Eastern world's
Christianity. Over one-third of the Moscow Patriarchate's parishes are
registered in Ukraine. Apart from these, there are many Orthodox
communities which are independent of the Moscow Patriarchate (Ⱦɨɤɥɚ
ɋɜɹɬɟɣɲɟɝɨ 2010, Ɋɟɥɿɝɿɣɧɿ ɨɪɝɚɧɿɡɚɰɿ 2011).
294 The Concept of “Russkiy Mir” as an Official Agenda for Prejudice

It is worth comparing the assumptions regarding the social importance of

the Orthodox Church with the results of empirical studies about the
manifestations of religiosity in the indisputable centre of the Russkiy Mir,
namely, Russia. According to the research, 55-60% of Russian citizens
claim to be Orthodox Christians. However, only a fraction of them
participates in religious life in any way. In Moscow, the seat of “Orthodox
civilization”, the Ministry of the Interior estimates that only 3.3% of the
city’s population goes to church on the most important holiday (Easter),
while attendance in other major cities does not exceed 1% of the
population. Less than 7% of citizens attend mass “from time to time” in
the Russian part of the Russkiy Mir, and studies demonstrate that only
10% of couples receive sacramental marriage. (Mitrokhin 2009, 291) By
comparison, in 2010, 20.8% of respondents in Ukraine declared that they
attended mass at least once a month (Ɋɟɥɿɝɿɣɧɿɫɬɶ ɭɤɪɚʀɧɰɿɜ 2013, 22).

An “adequate” cultural and geopolitical orientation of the authorities in

Kiev would have been a confirmation of the “natural” affiliation of
Ukraine with the Russkiy Mir. Victor Yanukovych and his political ties
would have assured the participation of Ukraine in Moscow's plans for a
reintegration of the post-Soviet space, and that is why Kremlin supported
Yanukovych.

While the “Orange Revolution” of 2004 should have been treated by

Russian elites as a severe warning and proof that there is a significant
disparity between their way of perceiving Ukraine and Ukrainian social
and political reality, it is hard to notice any essential and relevant change
in the Kremlin's ways of conceptualizing relationships with Ukraine.

Professor Viacheslav Morozov claimed that during the “Orange revolution,

[...] contrary to testimonies of witnesses, an overwhelming majority of
Russians was convinced that only cynical mercenaries rallied at the
Maidan, and these people received remuneration almost directly from
Washington” (Ɇɨɪɨɡɨɜ 2005). Such convictions had little in common
with reality. However, this coincided perfectly with the often-repeated
stereotype of the Western model of social and political life being based
exclusively on material stimuli. Therefore, all pro-Western attitudes and
behaviours would be theoretically manifested in this type of situation,
especially if it were to concern the post-Soviet space. The “Orange
revolution” merely updated that conviction.

The failures of Russian policies with respect to Ukraine were explained

due to intervention “from abroad”, meaning from the West. The idea of an
 Michaá Wawrzonek 295

orthodox community opposing the Western civilization community

became an important element for legitimizing Russian policies regarding
the post-Soviet space soon after the presidential elections in Ukraine in
2004. These policies were implemented using such institutions as the
Russkiy Mir Foundation and the Russian Orthodox Church. These were
important tools for Russian “soft power”, not only in Ukraine but within
the entire space that Russia recognizes as its zone of influence (Curanoviü,
2012).

It seemed that developments after the “Orange Revolution” validated the

basic assumptions of Russian policies towards Ukraine. From the
Kremlin’s point of view, Yanukovych lost the presidential election in 2004
due to “foreign” (American) intervention. However, the attempts thereafter
to introduce Western patterns into Ukrainian social life led to chaos. Pro-
Western and pro-democratic factions appeared very weak. Yanukovych
and his pro-Russian ties consequently regained their positions. His
presidential election in 2010 suggested the return of the previous “natural”
order. Yanukovych seemed destined to become a typical leader of the
Russkiy Mir country.

This was evident during the presidential inauguration when Patriarch Kirill
was invited as a special guest. The patriarch's presence at the ceremony
was to give credibility to the concept of the integration of Ukraine and
Russia, according to the “Russkiy Mir formula” (ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ-2013 2013, 3).
Incidentally, the superior of the Russian Orthodox Church visited Ukraine
three times during that year.

In addition, Yanukovych became a member of the “Economy and Ethics

Experts Council under the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia”. The
Council was part of the official agenda in the structure of the Patriarchy,
which focused its efforts, among other things, on promoting the idea of
building a “united economic space” that would be based on “the values of
the Orthodox civilization and practical business ethics”. The Council, in
which Yanukovych served, promoted the idea of Eurasian integration as a
prescription for an “unprecedented breakthrough for raising the level of
morality in the economy, politics, and society as a whole” (Ɇɨɫɤɨɜɫɶɤɢɣ
ɩɚɬɪɿɚɪɯɚɬ 2010).

The Patriarch of Moscow spared no effort in helping to shape Yanukovych

as a leader of a country belonging to the Russkiy Mir. During a visit in
July 2010, the patriarch painted a picture of the Ukrainian president as a
“deeply religious man”, whose political activity was based on the
296 The Concept of “Russkiy Mir” as an Official Agenda for Prejudice

“Orthodox worldview” and who was seeking the “spiritual enlightenment

of his people” (ɉɚɬɪɿɚɪɯ Ʉɢɪɢɥɨ 2010).

It is also worth noting that President Viktor Yanukovych won the Patriarch
Alexy II Award in January 2011, for “outstanding achievements in
strengthening the unity of Orthodox nations” and for “the strengthening
and implementation of Christian values in the life of society”. The prize
was awarded by the International Social Unity of Orthodox Nations Fund
at the request of an activist of the Communist Party of Ukraine who was a
board member of the fund, and it was bestowed by Patriarch Kirill
(əɧɭɤɨɜɢɱ ɨɬɪɢɦɚɽ 2011).

The Euro-Maidan crisis soon tested the effectiveness of the attempts to

embellish the Yanukovych team's charisma through its links with the
authority of the Moscow Patriarchate. It seems that the deaths of dozens of
protestors during the Euro-Maidan, the annexation of Crimea, and the role
which Russia played (and still plays) in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine,
had the effect of eradicating any goodwill generated through Russkiy Mir
discourse.

In these circumstances, the negative prejudices of the Russkiy Mir become

very significant. There is no explanation of the reasons for the failures of
previous policies regarding Ukraine, nor is there any analysis of prior
objectives and the methods used to achieve them. Andrei Fursov, a
representative of the Russian Academy of Science and a member of an
influential Russian think-tank in the Izborsk Club, makes a very telling
statement in this regard, with a biased explanation of the reasons for the
dramatic escalation of the Euro-Maidan crisis when many of the anti-
Yanukovych protesters were killed: “What happened in Ukraine from 19
to 22 February 2014 was indisputably a concealed (though not a very well-
concealed) form of American aggression against the Russian World, a
continuation of implementation of the Anaconda Plan for encircling,
squeezing, and finally suffocating Russia” (Fursov 2016, 51).

The Russkiy Mir concept thus appears to be a kind of defensive doctrine.

On the one hand, the Russkaya civilization and its representatives are
theoretically striving for external expansion, which is vehemently opposed
by the West. On the other hand, in cases like Ukraine, they claim to be the
ones being terrorized. According to the narrations of Russkiy Mir
advocates, this is not merely a fight against foreign cultural patterns and an
external social model: it is a fight for existence. Not only is the identity of
the Russkiy Mir threatened, but also the very lives of the people in the
 Michaá Wawrzonek 297

Russkiy Mir. This is presented not only as a civilizational threat, but also
as an existential threat.

An image of this sort is precisely what emerges from President Putin’s

speech to the joint chambers of the Russian Federation on 18 March 2014,
when he justified the reasons for the annexation of Crimea.

Amongst other things, he stated that “an entire series of controlled ‘colour’
revolutions” in several states had imposed standards “that did not in any
way correspond to these peoples’ way of life, traditions or cultures”. The
case of Ukraine in 2004 was also related to this process. But this time “an
organized and well-equipped army of militants was thrown in” (i.e. ten
years after) to impose these standards. The Russian president went on to
assert, “We understand what is happening; we understand that these
actions were aimed against Ukraine and Russia and Eurasian integration”.
According to President Putin, the Euro-Maidan was a coup d’etat, carried
out by “Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes, and anti-Semites”. They
achieved their goal using “terror, murder and riots” and thanks to “the
foreign sponsors”. Putin stated that “those who opposed the coup were
immediately threatened with repression. Naturally, the first in line here
was Crimea, the Russian-speaking Crimea. Because of this, the residents
of Crimea and Sevastopol turned to Russia for help in defending their
rights and lives”. Of course, according to the official Russian narration,
the annexation of Crimea did not improve the fate of the hypothetical
adherents of the Russkiy Mir living in other parts of Ukraine. In one of his
public statements in September 2014, Patriarch Kirill talked about the
“tragic” news coming to him from Ukraine. According to this information,
“people from an opposite camp” were killing all who were brave enough
to confirm their allegiance to the Russkiy Mir. As a result, those who
“aren’t strong enough” have been intimidated and “are either silent or
saying something that their persecutors would like to hear” (ɋɥɨɜɨ
ɩɚɫɬɢɪɹ 2014).

Particular emphasis should be placed on those “silent adherents”. In

Ukraine, the advocates of the concept of the Russkiy Mir have
continuously grappled with the problem of a lack of interest in the idea of
a civilized community with Russia, as the agenda for the future. Patriarch
Kirill's narration develops an entirely different image of the situation,
which is not representative of the marginal social groups who are
advocates of the Russkiy Mir in Ukraine, but of brave individuals who
express the will of the terrorized part of Ukrainian society.
298 The Concept of “Russkiy Mir” as an Official Agenda for Prejudice

Is the concept of the Russkiy Mir in such guise capable of being an

effective tool for legitimizing Kremlin authorities and their policies,
whether internal or external? In searching for answers to this question, the
Russkiy Mir concept can be considered an act of social communication. Its
common target is a specific type of recipient: Homo sovieticus (post-
sovieticus) (see: Ʌɟɜɚɞɚ 2000, 2001, 2004).

Homo sovieticus (post-sovieticus) is a useful term to describe a specific

social personality and one of the critical factors shaping social reality in
the post-Soviet space (Ƚɪɚɛɨɜɫɶɤɢɣ, 2000). Serhii Hrabovskyi described
post-Soviet men as a special type of community - a “socio-ethnos”. At the
same time, the Ukrainian researcher opposed the temptation to consider
this community as a separate “Soviet” nation. Hrabovskyi emphasizes that
a nation is a community of free people, but he also affirms that every
Soviet man was formed in a totalitarian regime where “a free citizen as
such was officially absent” (Ƚɪɚɛɨɜɫɶɤɢɣ, 2000) and there was only one
single right idea where compulsory unanimity prevailed.

The “Soviet man” has some distinctive features. Above all, a “Soviet man”
is “other-directed”. In an exemplary way, he should be an unthinking
“ideal executor” who needs “external impulses even in the case of
fulfilling life’s rudimentary functions” (Ƚɪɚɛɨɜɫɶɤɢɣ, 2000). Murab
Mamardashvili described this phenomenon as “atrophy of the muscle of
self-reliance” (Ƚɪɚɛɨɜɫɶɤɢɣ, 2000). As a result, a personality shaped
under Soviet totalitarianism embodies a type of confessor opposing a
citizen. He does not really have to believe in the genuineness and
advisability of the rules and ideas promoted by the authority. It is enough
if he subordinates himself to them and recognizes their “compulsory
normativity”.

The personality of the Soviet man was developed under conditions of strict
isolation from the external world. In his consciousness, he maintained a
hostile attitude towards everything that came “from abroad”. A mythologized
image of the world was divided into two opposite parts: the “human (ours)
and non-human (the imperialists)” (Ƚpɚɛɨɜɫɶɤɢɣ, 2000).

Hrabovskyi also remarked that “the separation of thinking and action” is a

typical characteristic of the “Soviet man”. According to Hrabovskyi, homo
sovieticus uses words “in a magical way to relieve the possible
disturbances in social reality” (Ƚɪɚɛɨɜɫɶɤɢɣ, 2000). Thus, practical
actions might be utterly contrary to verbal statements.
 Michaá Wawrzonek 299

Yurii Levada named this phenomenon “doublethink”. From his point of

view, it is “the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one's mind
simultaneously” (Levada 2003, 66). An excellent example of such “double
thinking” is a statement by Patriarch Kirill, who just a few months after
the annexation of Crimea, when the Russian Army was involved in the
conflict in Eastern Ukraine, assured that “any war with people with other
views and opinions” is “absolutely strange” to the mentality cultivated
under the Russkiy Mir scheme. As he explained, the central place in the
design of this civilization was filled by “Evangelical values” or those
values that stemmed from other religious systems, which were in many
ways analogous to “the Evangelical message”. The leader of the Russian
Orthodox Church assured that “our people” are peaceful in nature due to
this religious component in the design of the Russkiy Mir. (ɋɥɨɜɨ
ɩɚɫɬɢɪɹ 2014).

Levada asserts that one of the consequences of “doublethink” is “confusing

desire with reality”. He also concluded that neither “the lower tiers of the
social and political pyramid” nor “the upper classes” deal with problems
concerning the perception of reality (Levada 2003, 66-7). The statement of
Patriarch Kirill quoted above might confirm this diagnosis.

The conception of the Russkiy Mir was adapted to a social reality which
developed in the framework of post-communist Russia. This implies that
the “homo sovieticus” is a very significant, influential social personality.
The results of the research show that “submission” to authority is a
dominant attitude in this sort of society. Great importance is attributed to
hierarchical relations in society and to receiving and acting upon signals
“from above” directing those who are lower in the status hierarchy. Their
respect for the hierarchy of ruling authority is the high value placed on
“order”, in compliance with prohibitions dictated “from above”
(Mukomel’ 2015, 43-4). In these circumstances, the claiming of threats
“from the outside” could be considered by state leaders as very useful,
since distrust in the external environment “coincides with a higher level of
trust in authority figures” (Mukomel’ 2015, 43-4).

At the same time and for different reasons, complete isolation from this
“non-Russian” world is impossible. Interactions with “others” are
unavoidable. As a consequence, the problem of defining or verifying one's
identity arises. Interactions with the real “others” expose a weakness and
instability of the identity constructed “from above”.
300 The Concept of “Russkiy Mir” as an Official Agenda for Prejudice

Aleksandr Verkhovskii observes that “comparisons with the West are

probably the most stable feature of the Russian political thought of recent
centuries, regardless of the political orientation” (ȼɟɪɯɨɜɫɤɢɣ, ɉɚɢɧ
2010, 73). Under these circumstances, if separation is impossible, “the
ideological border has to be developed that directs such a comparison
towards negative assessments, and that creates an image of the West as an
eternal enemy of civilization” (ȼɟɪɯɨɜɫɤɢɣ, ɉɚɢɧ 2010, 73).

A couple of years ago, Bruno Bettelheim and Moris Janowitz researched

sources of prejudice towards Jews and Negros in American society.
According to their findings, one of the underlying reasons for the growth
of intolerance was the “anxiety of being a nobody”. According to these
researchers, one of the means to quell this fear was a specific formula of
self-appeasement: “At least I am not a Negro or a Jew; and this makes me
at least something more than nobody” (Bettelheim, Janowitz 1967, 58). It
could be transformed to apply to our case: “At least I am not from the
West, and this makes me at least something more than a nobody”.

Humans tend to defend themselves against identity loss by using

prejudice, which is partly a natural element of human nature. In other
words, “exclusion of others who are ‘different’ in skin colour or cultural
background” should be regarded “as the necessary defence against a sense
of identity diffusion”, especially when it concerns anyone who “has not
yet reached a secure personal identity of his own”. Such a person is
particularly “threatened by feelings of self-doubt, by confusion about who
he is” (Bettelheim, Janowitz 1967, 58). Following the collapse of the
Soviet Union, many of the middle-aged and elderly, whose identity was
shaped under the “homo sovieticus” model, probably found themselves
precisely in such a predicament.

The fears related to identity diffusion have been instrumental in the

Russkiy Mir concept. They have become a tool for legitimizing political
power and its goals. What kind of consequences might such prejudices
lead to? The results of a survey published at the end of 2014 provide some
evidence. According to this data, a vast majority of Russians has never
heard of the “Russkiy Mir” («Ɋɭɫɫɤɢɣ Ɇɢɪ» ɢ ɤɚɤ ɟɝɨ 2014). Those who
were familiar with this concept had fascinating opinions regarding the
spatial reach of the “Russkaya” community.

Some 75% of the supporters of the existence of the Russkiy Mir named the
Donetsk Basin as part of it. Respondents willing to include Transnistria
(63%), Abkhazia (55%) and South Ossetia (52%) in the Russkiy Mir were
 Michaá Wawrzonek 301

twice as numerous as the respondents willing to do so with regard to

central and western Ukraine (29%). As it turned out, the respondents were
much more precise about the inclusion of Serbia in the Russkiy Mir (48%)
than about the actual areas defined in the official narration as the core of
the “Orthodox civilization”, which establishes the mythologized Kiev as
the cradle of civilization («Ɋɭɫɫɤɢɣ Ɇɢɪ» ɢ ɤɚɤ ɟɝɨ 2014).

The prejudices incorporated in the Russkiy Mir concept maintain the

conviction that there is an inevitable conflict with a foreign and inherently
hostile Western civilization. Prejudices that were initially rooted in culture
are used to legitimize specific political actions. The promoters of
prejudices attempt to blur the difference between i) a defence of the
necessity to keep their own identity and ii) expansion and aggression. The
annexation of Crimea and hybrid warfare on the Ukrainian-Russian
borderland are excellent examples of the exploitation of such prejudices.

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 Michaá Wawrzonek 303

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