FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000.]

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc & De los Angeles for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

SYNOPSIS

For allegedly uttering defamatory words against a fellow Asian

Development Bank (ADB) worker, petitioner, an economist at ADB, was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) with two counts of grave oral
defamation. The MeTC judge received an "office protocol" from the Department
of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from
legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country.
Based on the said communication, the MeTC judge, without notice to the
prosecution, dismissed the two criminal cases. The motion for reconsideration
filed by the respondent was denied by the MeTC, hence, a petition for certiorari
was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC set aside the MeTC
ruling and ordered the enforcement of the warrant of arrest earlier issued.
Thus, petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court after his motion for
reconsideration was denied. He argued that he is covered by immunity and
that no preliminary investigation was held.

The Supreme Court denied the petition. According to the Supreme Court,
slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation;
the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the
dropping of the charges; and that preliminary investigation is not a matter of
right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; MOTU

PROPRIO DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL CASES, WHEN DEEMED VIOLATION OF
PROSECUTION'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS; CASE AT BAR. — Courts cannot
blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that
petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain
person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect
in courts. In receiving ex parte the DFA's advice and in motu proprio dismissing
the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to
due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what
capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for
its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time.
At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause
does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges. The immunity
mentioned under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB is not absolute,
but subject to the exception that the act was done in "official capacity." It is
therefore necessary to determine if petitioner's case falls within the ambit of
Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to
rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its
controverting evidence, should it so desire.

2. POLITICAL LAW; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; NOT APPLICABLE WHEN

DAMAGE WAS CAUSED BY PUBLIC OFFICIAL FOR HIS ACT DONE WITH MALICE
OR IN BAD FAITH OR BEYOND THE SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY OR JURISDICTION;
CASE AT BAR. — Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the
immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime,
such as defamation, in the name of official duty. The imputation of theft is ultra
vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law
that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. It appears that even the
government's chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the
stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA. Under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys
immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of
an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions. As already
mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.TaCDcE

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J : p

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank

(ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against
fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested by
virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner's bail at
P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of
protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is
covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of
the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without
notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a
motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion
was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings
and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued.
After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to
this Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity
under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the
criminal cases were filed in court. cda

The petition is not impressed with merit.

First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication
from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's
determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary
which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice
and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the
prosecution, the latter's right to due process was violated. It should be noted
that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution.
The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the
alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to
be presented at the proper time. 1 At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere
invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of
the charges. 2
Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:
"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this
Article experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank shall
enjoy the following privileges and immunities:

a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts

performed by them in their official capacity except when the
Bank waives the immunity."

the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception
that the act was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to
determine if petitioner's case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus,
the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA
protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting
evidence, should it so desire.

Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity

agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as
defamation, in the name of official duty. 3 The imputation of theft is ultra vires
and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a
public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. 4 It appears that even the
government's chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.

Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a

diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the
receiving state outside his official functions. 5 As already mentioned above, the
commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation
conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of
right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar. 6 Being purely a
statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically
granted by law. 7 The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary
investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC. 8
Besides, the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's
jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render
it defective. 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. cdll

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. See United States v. Guinto , 182 SCRA 644 [1990].

2. Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282 [1991].
3. M. H. Wylie v. Rarang , 209 SCRA 357, 368 [1992].
4. Shauf v. CA , 191 SCRA 713 [1990]; Animos v. Phil. Veterans Affairs Office ,
174 SCRA 214 [1989]; Dumlao v. CA, 114 SCRA 247 [1982].
5. Section 31, 1 (c); See also Minucher v. CA, 214 SCRA 242 [1992].
6. See Del Rosario, Jr. v. Bartolome, 270 SCRA 645 [1997].

7. People v. Abejuela , 38 SCRA 324 [1971].

8. Section 1, Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure.

9. People v. Gomez , 117 SCRA 72 [1982]; People v. Casiano , 1 SCRA 478

[1961].

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com