FIRST DIVISION official functions.
It is well-settled principle of law that a public
G.R. No. 125865           January 28, 2000
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
International Law; Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Immunity;
Courts; Due Process; Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on
its face a communication from the Department of Foreign
Affairs that a particular person is covered by any immunity;
Due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the
prosecution.—Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face
the communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any
immunity. The DFA’s determination that a certain person is
covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding
effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA’s advice and in motu
proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the
prosecution, the latter’s right to due process was violated. It
should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much
as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity
petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires
for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at
the proper time. At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere
invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the
dropping of the charges.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; Slander; Slandering a
person could not possibly be covered by the immunity
agreement between the Asian Development Bank and the
Republic of the Philippines because our laws do not allow the
ccmmission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of
official duty.—Slandering a person could not possibly be covered
by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the
commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official
duty. The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of
official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad
faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. It
appears that even the government’s chief legal counsel, the
Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken by petitioner
and that of the DFA.
Courts; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation;
Preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases
cognizable by the MeTC—being purely a statutory right, it may
be invoked only when specifically granted by law.—On the
contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted,
suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of
right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar. Being
purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked
only when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal
procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Besides, the
absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court’s
jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render it defective.
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development
Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory
words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City
with two counts of grave oral defamation docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of
a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner's bail at
P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the
custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC
judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by
immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country.
Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is
immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a
motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When
its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter
court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the
motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the
case to this Court via a petition for review arguing that he is
covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no
preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were
filed in court.1âwphi1.nêt
The petition is not impressed with merit.
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the
communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any
immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is
covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding
effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and in motu
propio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the
prosecution, the latter's right to due process was violated. It
should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much
as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity
petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires
for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at
the proper time.1 At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere
invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the
dropping of the charges.2
Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:
Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of
this Article experts and consultants performing missions
for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and
immunities:
a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts
performed by them in their official capacity except
when the Bank waives the immunity.
the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the
exception that the acts was done in "official capacity." It is
therefore necessary to determine if petitioner's case falls within
the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been
given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be
accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence,
should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the
immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the
commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official
duty.3 The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of
official functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public
official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad
faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. 4 It
appears that even the government's chief legal counsel, the
Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken by petitioner
and that of the DFA.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a
diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity
from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case
of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his
official functions.5 As already mentioned above, the commission of
a crime is not part of official duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary
investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary
investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the
MeTC such as the one at bar. 6 Being purely a statutory right,
preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically
granted by law.7 The rule on the criminal procedure is clear that no
preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the
jurisdiction of the MeTC.8 Besides the absence of preliminary
investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction nor does it
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective.9

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt