692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC—
Liang vs. People
G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000.*
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
International Law; Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic
Immunity; Courts; Due Process; Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on
its face a communication from the Department of Foreign Affairs that a
________________
*FIRST DIVISION.
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Liang vs. People
particular person is covered by any immunity; Due process is a right
of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution.—Courts cannot blindly
adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that
petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA’s determination that a
certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no
binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA’s advice and in motu
proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the
prosecution, the latter’s right to due process was violated. It should be
noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the
prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at
the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary
basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time. At any rate, it has
been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso
facto result in the dropping of the charges.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; Slander; Slandering a person
could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement between the Asian
Development Bank and the Republic of the Philippines because our laws do
not allow the ccmmission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of
official duty.—Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the
immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. The imputation of
theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled
principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
It appears that even the government’s chief legal counsel, the Solicitor
General, does not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the
DFA.
Courts; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Preliminary
being purely a statutory right, it may be invoked only when specifically
granted by law.—On the contention that there was no preliminary
investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is
not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at
bar. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be
invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal
procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases
falling within the 7
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694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Liang vs. People
jurisdiction of the MeTC. Besides, the absence of preliminary
investigation does not affect the court’s jurisdiction nor does it impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Br. 160.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for
petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank
(ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against
fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral
defamation docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner
was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing
petitioner’s bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him
to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge
received an “office of protocol” from the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process
under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter
Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that
petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was
1
denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC
rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it
earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner
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Liang vs. People
elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review arguing that he is
covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary
investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the
communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity.
The DFA’s determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is
only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-
parte the DFA’s advice and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal
cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter’s right to due process was
violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as
much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity
petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its
resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper
time.1 At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the
immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.2
Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:
“Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article
experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the
following privileges and immunities:
1. a.)immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by
them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the
immunity.”
the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the
exception that the act was done in “official capacity.” It is therefore
necessary to determine if petitioner’s case falls within the ambit of Section
45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut
the DFA protocol
________________
1See United States v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 (1990).
2Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282 (1991).
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696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Liang vs. People
and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting
evidence, should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the
immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.3 The imputation of
theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled
principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.4 It
appears that even the government’s chief legal counsel, the Solicitor
General, does not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the
DFA.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a
diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action
relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.5 As
already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official
duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation
conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter
of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar.6 Being
purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only
when specifically granted by law.7 The rule on criminal procedure is clear
that no preliminary investigation is required in cases
_______________
M.H. Wylie v. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357, 368 (1992).
3
Shauf v. CA, 191 SCRA 713 (1990); Ammos v. Phil. Veterans Affairs
4
Office, 174 SCRA 214 (1989); Dumlao v. CA, 114 SCRA 247 (1982).
5 Section 31, 1 (c); See also Minucher v. CA, 214 SCRA 242 (1992).
6 See Del Rosario, Jr. v. Bartolome, 270 SCRA 645 (1997).
7 People v. Abejuela, 38 SCRA 324 (1971).
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Liang vs. People
falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.8 Besides, the absence of
preliminary investigation does not affect the court’s jurisdiction nor does it
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
2
 SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.—In Public International Law, when a state or international
agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court,
it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the
court that said defendant is entitled to immunity. In the United States, the
procedure followed is the process of “suggestion,” where the foreign state
or the international organization sued in an American court requests the
Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to
immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune
from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a
“suggestion” that the defendant is entitled to immunity. In the Philippines,
the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization
to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its
endorsement to the courts varies. (Holy See, The vs. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA
524 [1994])
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system
of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political
question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the
________________

8 Section 1, Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure.

9 People v. Gomez, 117 SCRA 72 (1982); People v. Casiano, 1 SCRA
478 (1961).
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698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Liang vs. People
government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and
affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar,
it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon
appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the
Solicitor General or other officer acting under his direction. (Lasco vs.
United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration, 241
SCRA 681 [1995])

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