Confucian Ethics and the Spirit of World Order: A

Reconception of the Chinese Way of Tolerance

Ming Dong Gu

Philosophy East and West, Volume 66, Number 3, July 2016, pp. 787-804 (Article)

Published by University of Hawai'i Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2016.0052

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/626959

[ Access provided at 14 Sep 2021 12:05 GMT from Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek Bonn ]
CONSORTIUM PAPERS

Confucian Ethics and the Spirit of World Order: A Reconception

of the Chinese Way of Tolerance

Ming Dong Gu
School of Foreign Studies, Yangzhou University, China
School of Arts and Humanities, University of Texas at Dallas
mdgu@utdallas.edu

No new global order without a new global ethic!

From the Declaration of the 1993 Parliament of the World’s Religions

Since the ending of the Cold War, the world has not gone in the direction of peace,
harmony, stability, and cohesion. If during the Cold War period the world was
divided into two large camps, it has today fragmented into many regions in strife,
conflict, and war. Instead of a centripetal force that works toward a global unity ac-
companying the process of globalization, we are witnessing a centrifugal force that
tears different countries and regions apart and turns formerly ideological conflicts
into what Samuel Huntington calls a “clash of civilizations.” As a consequence, the
world has been gripped by a paradoxical trend. The process of globalization should
bring about unity and cohesiveness among the peoples of the world, but instead
this process has been accompanied by an increasingly accelerated tendency toward
division, fragmentation, and confrontation among nations, ethnic groups, and value
systems, each claiming rights to independent rule and self-determination, thereby
creating conditions that, rather than contributing to the resolution of such global
problems as environmental, energy, and humanitarian crises, are aggravating these
problems.
In the face of these large-scale crises, many believe that Western universalism,
based on equality, freedom, individualism, democratic elections, and free-market
capitalism, is close to the best solution for eventually resolving the world’s problems
and making the world a global village of peace, harmony, and prosperity. But stark
reality informs us that Western universalism is far from being a panacea and is likely
to resolve only material problems and not the emotional, spiritual, ethical, and cul-
tural problems that underlie the clash of civilizations. It is quite ironic that the West-
ern ideas of individualism, democracy, freedom of expression, and even globalization
have somehow contributed to the widening of gaps between individuals, ethnic
groups, nations, and civilizations and set the stage for conflicts and confrontations
among ethnic groups, nations, cultural value systems, and religious denominations.
Thus, the value system based on liberalism has proven to be inadequate, to say the
least, for constructing a new world order.

Philosophy East & West  Volume 66, Number 3 July 2016 787–804 787
© 2016 by University of Hawai‘i Press
 To construct a viable and healthy world order, it is necessary to recognize that
political and economic approaches are far from adequate and that there is an urgent
need to approach global predicaments from the perspective of common ethics. Al-
though liberalism is inadequate in providing an ethical system accepted by all, it still
has its value in formulating a common ethics, but we need to move beyond the
­bifurcation of liberal and illiberal approaches to world order. In the interest of all
global villagers, Western liberal ethics needs to be enriched and empowered by eth-
ical values from non-Western traditions.
In 1993, the Council for a Parliament of the World’s Religions issued a Declara-
tion, “Toward a Global Ethic,” signed by more than two hundred leaders from over
forty different faith traditions and spiritual communities. It contains a self-evident
truism, stated in the aphorism “No new global order without a new global ethic!”
This truism leads us to ask the question: In the construction of a new world order,
what moral principle or, in Kantian terms, categorical imperative can we find in
Confucianism that lies at the heart of Confucian universalism and may serve as the
spirit of a new world order? This is a question that has been raised on important
­occasions when people have been engaged in locating an ethical foundation for
cross-cultural dialogue that can be stated in words like the aphorism just given, ac-
cepted by all people regardless of their race, ethnicity, nationality, class, gender, and
religious faith. In this article, I wish to explore how we can formulate a modernized
Confucian ethical theory and examine its value and meaning for a new world order
in this age of globalization.

Tolerance: The Ethical Foundation of a New World Order

I suggest that a viable new world order should be constructed not solely on the
­foundations of politics, economics, and culture, or solely on any ideological faith
such as individualism, liberalism, or any particular religion, but on the spiritual
­foundation of a common ethics. To adequately tackle the problems that accom­
pany globalization, we should shift our attention from the social and cultural di­
mensions of a world outlook to its moral and ethical dimensions. I believe that
for Western universalism to work, it is necessary to draw spiritual resources and
­values from non-Western ­traditions. Confucian universalism, which stresses per­
sonal cultivation rather than individual freedom, has much that can offset the
­limitations of individualism and liberalism. Among the miscellaneous spiritual re-
sources of Confucianism, Confucian ethical theory, especially its way of toler-
ance (shudao 恕道), offers much of great value in the reconstruction of a new world
order.
Why is the Confucian way of tolerance so valuable for our times? At the turn of
the twenty-first century, the then secretary general of the United Nations invited
world thinkers and spiritual leaders to participate in a project to explore the common
foundations for dialogue among civilizations. Among those invited were Tu Wei-
ming, the leading scholar of Neo-Confucianism, and Hans Küng, the renowned
Catholic theologian and President of the Foundation for a Global Ethic. In a Chinese-­

788 Philosophy East & West

language article, Tu Wei-ming recommended the Confucian tenet “Do not do to
others what you do not desire for yourself” (己所不欲,勿施于人), while Hans Küng
offered the Christian “Golden Rule”: “Do unto others as you would have them do
unto you.” According to Tu, in addition to the Christian tenet, Küng also stated that
good things should be shared with others and that the Christian Gospel should be
imparted to others. Although Tu endorsed the idea of the Gospel in principle, he
­expressed his concern that the Christian Golden Rule might be alienating as an ex-
pression of abstract universalism. To show the difference between the Confucian and
Christian tenets, he pointed out that the Confucian idea is based on respect for others
and recognition of differences, which are necessary conditions for dialogue and ex-
change. In contrast, if a Christian wants to transmit the good tidings of the Gospel to
a Muslim in terms of this Christian tenet, conflict is bound to arise. Tu therefore con-
cluded that the Confucian tenet is better qualified to serve as a mechanism for dia-
logue among civilizations.1
Tu’s argument makes much sense, but it may be objected to on a number of
grounds. First, he overlooks the fact that the ideas contained in the Confucian tenet
are not entirely alien to other religious traditions, and, in fact, similar maxims are
found in other traditions. Second, in rendering the Christian tenet as Ji suo yu, shi yu
ren 己所欲,施于人 (What you desire, bestow on others), he may have oversimplified
both the surface and deep meanings of the saying. Moreover, he did not comment in
depth on why the Confucian tenet has more universal significance.
In spite of my reservations, I fully agree with Tu Wei-ming that the Confucian way
of tolerance can serve as a foundation for dialogue across civilizations. In fact, I wish
to press the idea further and argue that it may serve as the spirit of an emerging world
order in this age of globalization. But people from non-Chinese traditions may argue
that tolerance is not an idea alien to other cultural traditions, and, in fact, it has been
very much emphasized from ancient times to the present. Indeed, it has been rigor-
ously promoted today in cross-cultural encounters. And the word is frequently on the
lips of famous personages and statesmen all over the world. It is therefore reasonable
to ask: In what ways can the Confucian idea of tolerance be preferable to ideas from
other traditions as one considers its eligibility to be called the spirit of a new world
order?

Existing Models of Tolerance

In attempting to answer the question just raised, it is necessary to examine the core
ideas of tolerance across cultural traditions and the existing models growing out of
them. The easiest way is to compare dictionary definitions in Chinese and Western
languages. The Oxford English Dictionary offers four definitions of “tolerance,” three
of which are directly related to our discussion:

1. “The action or practice of enduring or sustaining pain or hardship; the power

or capacity of enduring; endurance”;
2. “The action of allowing; license, permission granted by an authority”;

Ming Dong Gu 789

 3. “The action or practice of tolerating; toleration; the disposition to be patient
with or indulgent to the opinions or practices of others; freedom from bigotry
or undue severity in judging the conduct of others; forbearance; catholicity
of spirit.”

Despite its various modern denotations, the root meaning of the word comes
from Latin: tolerāntia (noun) and tolerāre (verb), both of which have the undesirable
denotations of “to bear, endure, suffer and put up with” and the negative connotation
of “moral distaste and disapproval.” In the Chinese tradition, the comparable word
for “tolerance” is shu 恕. The Hanyu da zidian (Great Chinese dictionary) offers two
basic definitions for this word:

1.  原谅 (pardon), 宽容 (accommodate);

2. 以自己的心推想别人的心 (to infer another person’s inner thoughts in terms of
one’s own thoughts).

In terms of its denotations and connotations, the Chinese word has numerous
­ uanced expressions: shudao 恕道, shuyou 恕宥, shuliang 恕谅, shusi 恕思, shuxin
n
恕­ 心, shuzui 恕罪, rongren 容忍, baorong 包容, kuanrong 宽容, raoshu 饶恕, kuan-
shu 宽恕, zhongshu 忠恕, renshu 仁恕, cishu 慈恕, jingshu 镜恕, cashu 察恕, tuishu
推恕, lianshu 廉恕, qingshu 情恕, kuanshu 宽恕, yourong naida 有容乃大, et cetera.
This is but an incomplete list of the words related to tolerance. I do not know of any
other cultural tradition that has such a large vocabulary for this word.
Numerous as the expressions are, at the core is the idea of shu 恕, which is free
from the sense of negativity commonly found in the idea of tolerance in other cul­
tural traditions. The earliest dictionary definition comes from Xu Shen’s 许慎 (ca. 58–
147 c.e.) Shuowen jiezi 说文解字 (Characters defined and words annotated), the
earliest comprehensive dictionary of the Chinese language, compiled in the first
­century a.d. In this dictionary, Xu Shen defines shu 恕 as follows: “tolerance means
benevolence; it takes the heart radical as a component” (仁也,从心).2 With this defi-
nition, the word “tolerance” (恕) is interchangeably glossed as “benevolence.” Xu
Shen’s definition indicates that tolerance is a kind of virtue like benevolence and
must be rendered with one’s heart.
In terms of historical development, the Chinese idea of tolerance started very
early and has been continuously enriched since high antiquity. The earliest idea can
be traced to the middle of the Eastern Zhou period (770–221 b.c.e.) Although the idea
appeared in the writings of some other thinkers of this period, it is Confucius who first
promoted it as a virtue and raised it to the status of the Way, on a par with the highest
principle of ren (benevolence). In the ensuing development of the Confucian tradi-
tion, tolerance is promoted not just as a moral idea; it has developed into an ethical
theory as well as a way of life, called shudao 恕道 (Way of Tolerance). The earliest
mention of it was made by Liu Xiang 刘向 (ca. 77–6 b.c.) of the Han. In his treatise
on how to work for the public interest, he cites two virtuous ministers who promoted

790 Philosophy East & West

the public good through the way of tolerance: “Yiyin and Lü Shang are two worthies
who promoted the way of tolerance and exercised power without forming a clique”
(推之以恕道,行之以不党,伊吕是也).3 Liu Xiang may have been the first person to
coin the term, but the Way of Tolerance has its origin in the teachings of Confucius.
In Analects 4/15 there is a passage that lays the foundation for the Way of Tolerance:
The Master said, “Zeng, my friend! My way (dao 道) is bound together with one continu-
ous strand.”
Master Zeng replied, “Indeed.”
When the Master had left, the disciples asked, “What was he referring to?”
Master Zeng said, “The way of the Master is doing one’s utmost (zhong 忠) and putting
oneself in the other’s place (shu 恕), nothing more.”4

Confucius summarized his way as having a continuous theme. Master Zeng ex-
plained Confucius’s way as founded on two ideas, zhong and shu. Ames and Rose-
mont’s translation adequately transmits the possible ideas in Confucius’s saying.
They do not use any existing translations but render the word shu as “putting oneself
in the other’s place.” Their translation, I believe, is the most adequate one because it
takes the etymology of shu 恕 into consideration.
I propose that in this passage not only the Confucian way of tolerance but also
Confucian ethics had already begun to take shape in its initial form. My idea finds
support in the Chinese thinker Li Zehou’s reading of this passage. He suggests that
zhong and shu should be interpreted as standing, respectively, for the two basic di-
mensions of ethics in his ethical theory: “religious and private morality” and “social
and public morality”:

Could we regard the former as an individual’s unconditional obedience to the categorical

imperatives of one’s ruler, superior, father and elder brother as well as heaven, earth, and
the gods, and view the latter as embodying the fundamental rules and regulations that
safeguard social groups and address interpersonal relationships?5

Instead of a statement, Li Zehou expresses his opinion as a question. His unsure tone
testifies to the complexity of the issue. I can interpret from just the opposite direc-
tion in terms of his bifurcated notion of morality. As zhong refers to loyalty to an au-
thority, it may also stand for social and public morality. Similarly, as shu refers to an
individual’s beliefs in moral behavior, it may also stand for religious and private
morality. The complexity of the two ideas stems from the fact that both are based on
an individual’s emotional and psychological construction.
Li Zehou offers a similar opinion in his interpretation of the second appearance
of the word shu in the Analects. In Analects 15/4, Confucius’s disciple Zigong asked
for a word to serve as the guideline for his whole life:
Zigong asked, “Is there one expression that can be acted upon until the end of one’s
days?”
The Master replied, “There is shu: do not impose on others what you yourself do not
want.”6

Ming Dong Gu 791

 Li suggests that if shu is interpreted in terms of the traditional understanding of mea-
suring one’s heart against another’s heart, it should be deemed “religious and private
morality.”7 Whether shu should be interpreted as “religious and private morality” or
“social and public morality,” the Analects imparts a clear message that the idea of
tolerance is the core of Confucian ethics. For Confucius considers shu adequate to
serve as one’s lifetime guideline. Afraid that his student did not adequately catch
what he meant, he explains it in terms of the famous rule of thumb. His explana-
tion confirms that tolerance is the cardinal principle in Confucian ethics. It is equiv-
alent to a Kantian categorical imperative or the Golden Rule. We know that, in
Kantian ethics, a categorical imperative is an unconditional moral obligation one
must observe in all circumstances and is independent of one’s personal inclination
or purpose. Confucius spoke of his idea of tolerance with the same categorical tone
as Kant formulated his first moral maxim: “Act only according to that maxim where-
by you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law without
­contradiction.”8
My reexamination of the classical locus of tolerance in the Analects is meant not
only to show the early appearance of tolerance in the Chinese tradition but also to
suggest that, in the Confucian system of ethics, the idea of tolerance as an ethical
principle for human actions had already occupied the center of Chinese ethics, in
contrast to its marginal status in other traditions. It is not a random aphorism, as it
was the case in other traditions up to modern times. It is an ethical principle contin-
uously emphasized and self-consciously raised to the metaphysical status of Dao
(Way) and viewed as an indispensable means to realize the ultimate goal of Confu-
cianism: ren or benevolence. In contrast to the Western idea of tolerance, which, as
I will demonstrate, is a modern Western way to regulate aversion and defuse con-
flicts, the Confucian way of tolerance is an ethical approach to human relations that
recognizes the innate differences between individuals, classes, races, nations, and
cultural traditions and ranks it at the same level as the cardinal principle of ren and
Dao.
Comparatively speaking, tolerance in the Western tradition is only a modern
idea. A look at the examples in the Oxford English Dictionary, which glosses the
idea in history, informs us that the earliest appearance of tolerance appeared in the
fifteenth century and a doctrine was not formulated until the eighteenth century. In
her study of the genealogy of tolerance in her widely acclaimed, recent book, Regu-
lating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire, Wendy Brown writes:
“Tolerance as a principle of governance in the West is inaugurated with the Renais-
sance humanist counsel of toleration of heretics in the fifteenth and sixteenth centu-
ries.”9 But she qualifies this statement by saying: “It is, of course, the Reformation
rather than the Renaissance that produced the doctrine widely considered to be
the origins of tolerance in liberalism” (ibid.). In her elaborate study of tolerance as
an idea that appeared in the works of Baruch Spinoza, John Milton, G. E. Lessing,
Pierre Bayle, Roger Williams, John Goodwin, John Lock, and other modern thinkers,
she argues:

792 Philosophy East & West

 Only recently has tolerance become an emblem of Western civilization, an emblem that
identifies the West exclusively with modernity, and with liberal democracy in particular,
while also disavowing the West’s savagely intolerant history, which includes the Cru-
sades, the Inquisition, witch burnings, centuries of anti-Semitism, slavery, lynching, geno-
cidal and other violent practices of imperialism and colonialism, Nazism, and brutal
responses to decolonization. But even more than an emblem, tolerance has become a
discursive token of Western legitimacy in international affairs.10

Brown’s study leads us to ask one question: Are there distinct differences among
the various ideas of tolerance across cultural traditions? The existing scholarship sug-
gests the affirmative answer to this question. Will Kymlicka, who studies tolerance in
various traditions, classifies the different ideas of tolerance in world history into two
categories subsumed under two models: a liberal model of tolerance based on indi-
vidual liberty and a communitarian model based on group rights. While the former
is the major model associated with the West, the latter is largely adopted in non-­
Western regions covering the Near East, Middle East, and Far East, including China.11
I wish to argue that Kymlicka’s conception of two models is less than adequate to
cover the diverse forms of tolerance in the world because the Chinese idea of toler-
ance does not fit into either of his models. It is inconceivable to include ancient
China in the first model because individual liberty is only a modern idea introduced
to China in modern times. Nevertheless, it is also inappropriate to put China in the
second model because tolerance as practiced in ancient China differed significantly
from the Ottoman Empire’s “millet system,” which permitted the Jews and Christians
to have certain degrees of religious freedom and self-government.
There is a third model, which distinguishes the Chinese idea of tolerance from
other forms of tolerance. The core of the difference lies in shudao, the Confucian way
of tolerance. In Western and non-Western traditions excluding China, the adoption
of tolerance is largely a move prompted by necessity, as a political strategy to recon-
cile differences and conflicts involving race, ethnicity, religion, and ways of life, and
to find a middle ground between the rejection and assimilation of alien elements
and groups. As Brown aptly puts it, “If tolerance poses as a middle road between
rejection on the one side and assimilation on the other, this road, . . . is paved by
necessity rather than virtue; tolerance, as Nietzsche would say, becomes a virtue
only retroactively and retrospectively.”12 But, as I have shown and will continue to
show in the following section, in the Chinese tradition the Confucian way of toler-
ance is adopted as a human ideal and practiced as a moral virtue. This necessitates
the conception of a third model of tolerance: tolerance as a moral virtue.
Although the idea of tolerance across cultures shares a good deal of common
ground, there are still some distinct differences that suggest that the Confucian way
of tolerance seems to have greater credentials for serving as the spirit of a new world
order. There are several reasons for making this claim. First, the idea of tolerance
does not have a time-honored history in many cultural traditions, especially in the
West. Second, the idea appeared haphazardly in most traditions and did not form a
systematic ethical theory. Third, the idea of tolerance in other traditions did not rise

Ming Dong Gu 793

 to the exalted position of categorical imperative. And last but not least, it carries with
it negative connotations of distaste, disapproval, aversion, and resignation.
Wendy Brown elaborates the last point in her systematic study of the idea of
tolerance in Western history and contemporary life, in which she exposes the un-
qualified achievement of the modern West to have had a shady past, and its emer-
gence can only be traced to early modern times in Europe. Over the course of its
development, despite the historical fact that it has been accepted as an essential
approach to resolving conflict across a wide range of dividing lines including racial,
ethnic, sexual, and cultural, at its core it has been endowed with dark and troubling
implications of dislike, disapproval, control, and containment. Although it is hailed
in the modern West as the achievement of liberal democracy, its exalted triumph
conceals the hidden forms of hegemonic control: as a code word for mannered ra-
cialism, discourses of Western power, supremacy, governmentality, museum object,
and the disguised source of Western cultural superiority. Brown even charges the
liberal idea of tolerance as serving the agenda of Western imperialism and playing a
role in justifying violence.13 In a word, she argues that the Western idea of tolerance
is not concerned with the universal meaning of human virtue, but with the bifurcated
meaning of politics and ideology in the form of “a domestic discourse of ethnic,
­racial, and sexual regulation” and “an international discourse of Western supremacy
and imperialism.”14

The Chinese Model of Tolerance

By contrast, the Chinese idea of tolerance differs radically from that of the West in
that it is based on a model of moral virtue rather than on ideology and group rights.
Moreover, it has a time-honored history, constitutes a complete system, and has ex-
erted a powerful impact upon Chinese thought and the Chinese way of life since high
antiquity. In addition to various ideas of tolerance in the Confucian School, other
schools of thought in China have numerous sayings similar in wording and spirit to
the Confucian way of tolerance. If one takes the time to thumb through classic works
from Chinese tradition, one will easily find numerous ideas, maxims, aphorisms, and
treatises addressing the idea of tolerance. Here, it will suffice to cite from the thought
of two thinkers who differ from Confucius. Mozi, who pioneered a school of thought
opposed to that of Confucius, posited the idea of jian’ai (universal love), similar to
the Confucian idea of ren. Just as ren can only be realized through tolerance, Mozi’s
idea of universal love would not be possible without one putting oneself in another’s
position. Mozi advocates the idea of treating others as oneself:

视人之国,若视其国;视人之家,若视其家;视人之身,若视其身。
One should regard another person’s country as though it were his own country, another
person’s family as though it were his own family, and another person’s body as though it
were his own body.15

He sincerely believed that if everyone acted according to this reciprocal rule, the
world would be at peace, for one would do for others as one would do for oneself.

794 Philosophy East & West

 Laozi, who differed radically from Confucius in ethical thought, nevertheless
expressed similar ideas of tolerance:

Those who are good I treat as good. Those who are not good I also treat as good. In so
doing I gain in goodness. Those who are of good faith I have faith in. Those who are lack-
ing in good faith I also have faith in. In so doing I gain in good faith.16

Laozi was believed to have uttered an expression that replicates the root meaning of
shu: “View the good fortune of others as your good fortune and view the ­losses of
others as your own loss.”17 Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in providing an overview of how the way
of tolerance influenced Chinese culture, made this remark:

恕道亦是我民族文化之表現,亦就是仁,而士者在內修身,在外言語的表現即是以恕道行
仁。
The way of tolerance is the cultural manifestation of our nation, which is also benevo-
lence. Scholars’ inner cultivation of self and outer expression in language constitute the
practice of benevolence by the means of tolerance.

This succinct observation aptly captures the way Confucius’s initial idea of tolerance
has developed over time into a system of ethics that has formed the foundation of
Chinese culture. I have yet to find another cultural tradition or spiritual system that
attributes as much value to tolerance as its first moral principle.
But it must be recognized that it is in Confucianism that one locates the most
concentrated and profound expressions of tolerance in the Chinese tradition. In ad-
dition to the foundational saying in the Analects, we can easily identify numerous
ideas, tenets, aphorisms, maxims, and exhortations on accommodation and toler-
ance both in Confucius’s teaching and in the writings of other Confucian thinkers. In
Analects 5/12 (“Gong Ye Chang” 公冶长), Confucius’s disciple Zigong makes a state-
ment that is clearly an extension of Confucius’s teaching:

子贡说:我不欲人之加诸我也,吾亦欲无加诸人。
I do not want others to impose on me; in like manner, I do not want to impose on others.

In Analects 6/30 (“Yong Ye” 雍也), we find:

夫仁者,己欲立而立人,己欲达而达人。能近取譬,可谓仁之方也已。
For benevolence, if you want to establish yourself, you ought to establish others first;
if you want to reach an objective, you ought to let others reach it first. Once you
can draw an analogy from near [i.e., from within], it may be said to be a method for
­benevolence.

In Mencius 7A4 (“Qiang Shu Pian” 强恕篇) it is stated:

强恕而行,求仁莫近焉。
Try your best to treat others as you would wish to be treated yourself, and you will find
that this is the shortest way to benevolence.18

In his description of an ideal society, Mencius offered this maxim (1A7, “Liang Hui
Wang Shang” 梁惠王上):

Ming Dong Gu 795

 老吾老以及人之老,幼吾幼以及人之幼。天下可运于掌。
Do reverence to the elders in your own family and extend it to those in other fami-
lies; show loving care to the young in your own family and extend it to those in other
families.19

This idea of Mencius’s is an extension of a Confucian idea, the “World of the Great
Commonality” (Datong 大同), propounded in the “Li Yun” 礼运 chapter of the Liji
礼­记 (Record of rites):

故人不独亲其亲,不独子其子。
Therefore one should not limit one’s kindness to one’s own blood relatives and to one’s
children alone.20

In the Liji chapter titled “Zhongyong” 中庸 (Golden mean), which is believed to

have been composed by Confucius’s grandson Zisi, there is the following:

忠恕违道不远,施诸己而不愿,亦勿施于人。
When one cultivates to the utmost the principles of his nature, and exercises them on the
principle of reciprocity, he is not far from the path. What you do not like when done to
yourself, do not do to others.21

In the “Daxue” 大学 (Great learning) chapter of the Liji there is a detailed instruc-
tion on how not to impose on others:

所恶于上,毋以使下。所恶于下,毋以事上。所恶于前,毋以先后。所恶于后,毋以从
前。所恶于右,毋以交于左。所恶于左,毋以交于右。此之谓系矩之道。
What a man dislikes in his superiors, let him not display in the treatment of his inferiors;
what he dislikes in inferiors, let him not display in the service of his superiors; what he
hates in those who are before him, let him not therewith precede those who are behind
him; what he hates in those who are behind him, let him not therewith follow those who
are before him; what he hates to receive on the right, let him not bestow on the left; what
he hates to receive on the left, let him not bestow on the right:  — this is what is called ‘The
principle with which, as with a measuring-square, to regulate one’s conduct.’22

In later annotations of the Analects, the way of tolerance was regarded as the
key to attaining the Confucian first principle, Ren. One classical scholar, Liu Baonan
刘宝楠 (1791–1855), comments on his understanding of the Analects:

恕者行仁之方也,尧舜之仁,终身恕焉而已矣。勉然之恕,学者之行仁也。自然之恕,­
圣人之行仁也。能恕则仁矣。
Tolerance is the way to exercising benevolence. The benevolence of Yao and Shun is
nothing but practicing tolerance all their lives. The tolerance practiced with an effort is the
way for scholars to exercise benevolence. The tolerance practiced in a natural manner is
the sages’ way of exercising benevolence. He who is capable of tolerance is benevolent.23

In his advocacy of tolerance, Confucius was not unaware of unethical deeds in recip-
rocal relationships. In Analects 14/34 (“Xian Wen” 宪问), someone asks whether it is
the right way to repay injury with kindness:

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 或曰：「以德报怨,何如？」子曰：「何以报德？以直报怨,以德报德。」
“Then how would one repay beneficence?” Confucius: “Repay ill will by remaining true.
Repay beneficence with gratitude.”24

Although in pre-Qin times, the ideas concerning tolerance were abundant in

various schools of thought, they were not self-consciously formulated into a coherent
system of ethical theory until the Han dynasty; nor were they elevated to the status of
a Dao until the Former Han dynasty, when Liu Xiang coined the term shudao (the
way of tolerance). Before Liu Xiang, the famous literatus Jia Yi 贾谊 (200–168 b.c.)
supplemented Confucius’s idea of tolerance with a new dimension: “To measure
­another person’s feelings by relying on one’s own is called ‘tolerance’” (以己度人谓
之恕).25 Thus, by the second century b.c., the way of tolerance was already estab-
lished in China as a high virtue and as a practical means to attain benevolence. Later,
scholars of the Tang and Song continued to enrich the idea of way of tolerance.
During the Song dynasty the major thinkers of the time all participated in expounding
it. Cheng Yi 程颐 wrote:
以己及物,仁也;推己及物,恕也。
To extend oneself to others is benevolence; to think of others in terms of oneself is
­tolerance.26

Cheng Hao 程颢 explained Confucius’s saying about loyalty and tolerance thus:
忠者天理,恕者人道。忠者无妄,恕者所以行乎忠也。忠者体,恕者用,大本达道也。
Loyalty is the heavenly principle, tolerance is the human way. Tolerance is the means to
practice loyalty. Loyalty is the substance while tolerance is its application. Following the
great root reaches the Dao.27

The two ideas form a complementary relationship between content and form with
tolerance as the manifestation of the inner spirit. Zhu Xi 朱熹 promoted Cheng Hao’s
idea:
尽己之谓忠,推己之谓恕. . . . 忠恕两个离不得。
To exert oneself to the utmost is loyalty; to extend oneself to others is tolerance. . . . The
two ideas cannot be separated.28

In the Ming Dynasty, Wang Fuzi 王夫之 conducted a systematic study of the way of
tolerance and further developed it. He followed Xu Shen’s definition and enriched it
by saying: “To compare one’s heart with another person’s heart is called tolerance”
(­如心谓之恕).29
In her study of tolerance, Wendy Brown has proven that the idea of tolerance in
the West contains the unpleasant implications that something undesirable has to be
permitted to exist because it has a power of its own and cannot be eradicated. If there
is the possibility of removing that power, no tolerance would be meted out. Thus,
tolerance in the West is not based on a moral recognition of the raison d’être of the
other but a resigned acceptance of an unpleasant thing — like a bad tooth, which one
has to put up with for lack of any means to cure it. If conditions permit, efforts would

Ming Dong Gu 797

 be made to pull the bad tooth out. This notion of tolerance is entirely different from
the Confucian way of tolerance. From a positive angle, Voltaire offered a view of
tolerance that is basically similar to the Confucian way of toleration: “What is toler-
ation? It is the endowment of humanity. We are all steeped in weakness and errors;
let us forgive each other our follies; that is the first law of nature.”30
Here, I will analyze a passage in the Analects to show how the Confucian idea
of tolerance is not a necessity but a moral virtue. In Analects 16/1, the first section
narrates an extended conversation between Confucius and his two disciples, Ran You
and Zilu, who were serving the powerful Ji clan, which ruled the state of Lu. In the
narrative, the Ji clan was preparing to subjugate a vassal state, Zhuanyu, because the
latter, occupying a strategic position, was growing in strength and it was suspected
that it was about to rebel. Confucius’s students are opposed to the planned attack. So,
they go to see Confucius for advice on how to diffuse the situation and prevent the
potential threat. Confucius blames his students for not giving good advice to their
ruler, resulting in the incendiary situation. To diffuse this explosive situation, Con-
fucius gives the following advice:

If the wealth is equitably distributed, there will be no poverty; if the people are harmoni-
ous, they won’t be few in number; if the people are secure, they would not feel unstable.
If these circumstances exist, but the people of the far-off lands still do not submit, then
the ruler should persuade them to join him through the cultivation of his own refine-
ment (wen 文) and excellence (de 德), and once they have joined him, he makes them
feel secure [远人不服,则修文德以来之]. Where there is contentment there will be no
upheaval.31

Confucius then attributes the root cause of instability, division, and threats of insur-
gency to the inability of his students to correctly advise the ruler, and identifies the
ruler’s inner weakness in moral virtue as the potential danger. This conversation ad-
dresses a common issue in any conflict, whether personal, racial, social, or cultural:
resistance and submission. There are two basic ways to neutralize resistance and gain
submission: coercion by force and consent by persuasion. Confucius dismisses coer-
cion by brutal force and favors consent through moral persuasion. In this conversa-
tion, there is the famous saying “if . . . the people of the far-off lands still do not
submit, then the ruler should persuade them to join him through the cultivation of his
own refinement (wen 文) and excellence (de 德)” (远人不服,则修文德以来之). This
moral maxim has played a significant role in Chinese history in the willing sub­
mission of ethnic groups to the central government and contributing significantly to
the process of ethnic assimilation, harmony, and unity. In today’s world it still has
value and validity in contributing to peace, harmony, and human happiness and the
potential to contribute to a new world order that would benefit all humanity.
The foregoing analysis shows that the Confucian way of tolerance is founded on
neither the liberal model of individual freedom nor the communitarian model of
group rights. It is based on a moral-virtue model that recognizes diversity and dif­
ference in humanity and the categorical imperative for viewing the other as self in
self-other interrelations. In Confucianism, tolerance (恕) is glossed as another form of

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benevolence (仁). While benevolence is the substance, tolerance is its application.
The Chinese character 仁 has a host of meanings. The Liji states: “Benevolence is
humanity” (仁者,人也). The character 仁 can be analyzed in two parts, suggesting
the idea of two persons in mutual interaction (二人为 “仁”). An understanding com-
ing out of this composite ideograph is that when two persons come together, each
treats the other as a human being or as a blood relation, following Xu Shen’s dic­
tionary definition: “Benevolence is blood relationship” (仁,亲也). Confucius’s own
definition of ren, “Benevolence is to love humanity” (仁者爱人), affirms the idea that
benevolence is an example not simply of the principle of reciprocity but of a self-­
other relationship in which the former treats the latter as an object of love on the
basis of his or her humanity.
As shu (tolerance) is the application of ren (benevolence), in Cheng Hao’s inter-
pretation, the Confucian way of tolerance dovetails with Kant’s supreme ground
of morals, the principle of humanity, and is a practical means to achieving his cate-
gorical imperative, which advocates treating every human being as an end in her- or
himself. Kant’s further explication of his categorical imperative supplies an insight
into why tolerance must be related to benevolence:

[T]here is still only a negative and not a positive agreement with humanity as an end in
itself unless everyone also tries, as far as he can, to further the ends of others. For, the ends
of a subject who is an end in itself must as far as possible be also my ends, if that repre-
sentation is to have its full effect in me.32

Both tolerance and benevolence are possible only when they are practices in recip-
rocal relations. In contradistinction to the liberal and communitarian models of
­tolerance in other cultural traditions, the Confucian way of tolerance is based on a
model of perfect virtue, which recognizes each person’s humanity and differences
and constitutes a moral principle that coordinates and guides human relationships.
In the final analysis, it is based on a humanistic model that integrates religious ethics
with social ethics.

Reformulating the Way of Tolerance as the Spirit of World Order

Having examined the existing models of tolerance across cultures, I will draw ethical
resources from the Confucian way of tolerance and make an attempt to reformulate
some chosen Confucian ideas of tolerance into a modern way of tolerance so as
to meet the demands of the age of globalization. In my comparative study of the
­various ideas and models of tolerance across cultures, I have demonstrated that Con-
fucianism as a “secular religion” has a host of ethical principles that transcend the
limitations of regional religions and spiritual faiths, and may be reconceived into a
universal ethics likely to be accepted by all and serve as the inner spirit of a new
world order. The establishment of this new world order should be based on locating
ethical principles that can regulate the relationship between individuals and resolve
human conflicts at all levels, as small as between two individuals and as large as
between two nations. Tolerance is now acknowledged as the ethical key to regulating

Ming Dong Gu 799

 Figure 1. A pyramid of practical ethics

human differences and resolving conflicts involving class, race, religion, nation, and
culture. The idea of tolerance is found in all cultural and spiritual traditions, but it is
only in Confucianism that the idea of tolerance was elevated to a way of life, an eth-
ical theory, and to the exalted status of Dao (恕道) two millennia ago, and it has
­remained so since. It is my belief that the Confucian way of tolerance may be recon-
ceived as the spirit of the globalized world order. Tentatively, I reconceive the new
Confucian way of tolerance according to some basic ideas, which form a series of
related practical rules. These rules can be structured into a pyramid of practical ethics
(see fig. 1).
1. The Golden Rule. “Do not do to others what you do not want yourself” (己所
不欲,勿施于人). This rule comes directly from Confucius. The reason why it should
be accepted as the Golden Rule is because it is what one can do under whatever
circumstances and it contains the implication: “Do not do to others what they do not
want” (人所不欲,勿施于人). It is the most basic rule of thumb and therefore should
serve as the foundation of a reformulated way of tolerance.
2. The Silver Rule. “Recommend to others what you want for yourself” (己所欲,
荐于人). As another person may not agree with you on what is good, this rule would
enable one to avoid imposing on others what one wants. By recommending to others
what you think is good, you will enable them to contemplate the value of what is

800 Philosophy East & West

recommended. When they see its true value, they may accept it. The Silver Rule
takes into account the fact that the best intention may result in a worst situation, de-
scribed in the famous aphorism: “The road to hell is paved with good intentions.” To
impose what one desires on another person may be morally wrong in terms of indi-
vidual freedom, but not to let others be aware of what one thinks is good is morally
irresponsible.
3. The Platinum Rule. “Help others realize what is good in what they desire”
(­人­所欲,成人之美). This rule is indebted to Confucius’s famous saying, “A gentleman
helps others accomplish what is good” (君子成人之美). People may have different
desires, some of which are morally good, some not. The morally correct way is to
help others accomplish what is morally good and advise against what is morally bad
(不成人之恶).
4. The Iron Rule. “Repay kindness with kindness and repay injury with justice”
(­以德报德,以直报怨). This rule is taken from Confucianism. It recognizes both good
and evil in human nature and promotes what is good while discouraging what is bad.
It promotes principled action and has an advantage over blind forgiveness. The Chris-
tian idea of “turning the other cheek” is morally lofty and noble, but it is idealistic in
nature and may unwittingly encourage wrongdoing and condone wickedness. The
iron rule may serve as an ethical guard against moral depravity.
5. The Jade Rule. “A civilized person seeks harmony but not conformity. If an­
other person does not follow you, try to win him over by your exemplary cultivated
virtue” (文明人和而不同,他人不从,则修文德以服之). Jade in Chinese culture sym-
bolizes the moral virtue of a Confucian exemplary person. The Jade Rule behooves
one to treat dissension and disagreement by others in a gentlemanly manner and to
win them over by moral example and persuasion, rather than by force and coercion.
It is not idealistic or unprincipled but makes high demands on a person who abides
by it. It is therefore a noble and practical rule.
These five rules, be they taken directly from Confucius or inspired by his moral
teaching, are structured into a pyramid with the Golden Rule as the base; the Silver
Rule, Platinum Rule, and Iron Rule in the middle; and the Jade Rule at the pinnacle.
The pyramid structure is a visual representation of the interrelations of the rules
showing an internal logic based on an order of importance and an inverse order
of practical applicability. Working together, they pay due respect to the liberal and
democratic conception of the individual as a discrete, free, self-determining agent
and the Confucian concept of an individual as an interdependent person, embedded
in negotiative patterns of relations and nurtured by mutually beneficial actions. Taken
as a whole, they form a new Confucian way of tolerance grounded on a model of
moral virtue as well as a humanistic model.
The reformulated Confucian way of tolerance comes close to Kant’s view of
­moral law, and as the basis for a common ethics may have some advantages over the
purely formal Kantian categorical imperatives. In his ethical theory, Kant posits the
concept of categorical imperative as an unconditional and absolute moral law whose
validity does not depend on any ulterior motive. Although he formulates this moral
law in various ways, he finally settles on this formula: “So act that you use humanity,

Ming Dong Gu 801

 whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as
an end, never merely as a means.”33 Despite wide endorsement and appreciation of
Kant’s moral law, thinkers like Hegel nevertheless argue that Kant’s ethical theory,
because of its purely formal abstraction, is devoid of practical substance and hard to
implement in practical ways. By contrast, the reformulated Confucian way of toler-
ance integrates rationality with emotion, individual freedom with communitarian
values, and ethical ideals with practical behavior; it is free from the conceptual hol-
lowness of idealistic ethics and relatively easy to follow as moral guidelines in every-
day life. I believe, when they are taken together as an ethical theory, they can make
up for the inadequacies of liberalism, meet the moral demands of the global age, and
are endowed with potentially universal value. The reconceived Confucian way of
tolerance may therefore be qualified to serve as the spiritual core of a new world
order.

Notes

1    –    Tu Wei-ming 杜维明, “Rujia de shudao shi wenming duihua de jichu” 儒家的
恕道是文明对话的基础 (The Confucian way of tolerance is the foundation for
dialogue among civilizations), an article from Renmin luntan 人民论坛 (Peo-
ple’s Forum) 2013 (24): 76–77.
2    –    Xu Shen 许慎, Shuowen jiezi 说文解字 (Chinese characters and words defined
and annotated) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1979), p. 218.
3    –    Liu Xiang 刘向, Shuoyuan 说苑, “Zhigong” 至公, juan 14.
4    –    The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation: A New Translation
Based on the Dingzhou Fragments and Other Recent Archaeological Finds,
trans. with introd. Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr. (New York: Ballantine
Books, 1998), p. 92.
5    –    Li Zehou 李泽厚, Lunyu jindu 论语今读 (Reading the Analects of Confucius in
our time) (Beijing: Shenghuo Dushu Xinzhi Sanlian Shudian, 2004), p. 122.
6    –    Ames and Rosemont, The Analects of Confucius, p. 189.
7    –    Li Zehou, Lunyu jindu, p. 434.
8    –    Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W.
­Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), p. 30.
9    –    Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 30.
10    –    Brown, Regulating Aversion, p. 37.
11    –    Will Kymlicka, “Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance,” in David Heyd, ed.,
Toleration: An Elusive Virtue (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996),
p. 96.

802 Philosophy East & West

12    –    Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion, p. 27.
13    –    Ibid., pp. 1–24.
14    –    Ibid., p. 7.
15    –    Mo Di 墨翟, Mozi 墨子 (Mozi / The Mencius), juan 4, in Ershi’er zi 二十二子
(Writings of twenty-two masters) (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 1986),
p. 236.
16    –    Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, trans. D. C. Lau (London: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 110.
17    –    Li Ying-chang, Lao-tzu’s Treatise on the Response of the Tao: T’ai-shang kan-
ying p’ien, trans. with introd. Eva Wong (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins,
1994), p. 13.
18    –    Mencius, trans. by D. C. Lau (London: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 182.
19    –    Mencius, quoted from Library of Chinese Classics (Beijing: Foreign Language
Press, 1999), p. 19.
20    –    Shisanjing zhushu (Thirteen Classics Annotated) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,
1980), p. 1414.
21    –    The Doctrine of the Mean, trans. James Legge (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Univer-
sity Press, 1960), chap. 13, p. 394.
22    –    The Great Learning, trans. James Legge (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University
Press, 1960), pp. 373–374.
23    –    Lunyu zhengyi 论语正义 (Correct meanings of the Analects of Confucius),
comp. and annot. Liu Baonan 刘宝楠 (reprint, Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2009).
24    –    Ames and Rosemont, The Analects of Confucius, p. 179.
25    –    Jia Yi 贾谊, Jia Yi ji 贾谊集 (Collected writings of Jia Yi) (reprint, Shanghai: Shang-
hai Renmin Chubanshe, 1976), juan 8, Daoshu 道术 (The Way and technique).
26    –    Cheng Hao 程颢 and Cheng Yi 程颐, Er Cheng yishu 二程遗书 (Testament of the
two Chengs) (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 2000), juan 11.
27    –    Cheng Hao 程颢 and Cheng Yi 程颐, Er Cheng ji 二程集 (Collected writings of
the two Chengs) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1981), p. 124.
28    –    Zhu Xi 朱熹, Lunyu jizhu 论语集注 (Analects of Confucius variorum) ( Jinan:
Qilu Shushe, 1992).
29    –    Wang Fuzhi 王夫之, Chuci tongshi 楚辞通释 (Collected Interpretations of the
Chuci) (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1975).
30    –    François Voltaire, A Philosophical Dictionary, vol. 2 (New York: Basic Books,
1962), p. 482.
31    –    Analects 16/1, “Ji Shi” 季氏. The present translation is based on a collation of
two existing versions, one by Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont, and the other
by Arthur Waley. See Ames and Rosemont, The Analects of Confucius, p. 196;

Ming Dong Gu 803

 Arthur Waley, trans., The Analects of Confucius (New York: Vintage Books,
1938), p. 203.
32    –    Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and ed. Mary
Gregor, with introd. Christine M. Korsgaard (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), p. 39.
33    –    Ibid., p. 38.

804 Philosophy East & West