1. Arigo vs.

Swift, 735 SCRA 102, September 16, 2014

Case Summary:

On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067, otherwise known as the
“Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009” “to ensure the protection and
conservation of the globally significant economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and
scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity.”The USS Guardian is an Avenger-
class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in
the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the
territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of
routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 15, 2013, the USS
Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17,
2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side
of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one
was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil. The salvage
operations were completed on March 30,2013.On April 17, 2013, petitioners on their behalf
and in representation of their respective sector/organization and others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for
the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M.
No. 09-6-8SC,(including a prayer to Allow for continuing discovery measures, among
others) . Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging andpost-salvaging operations of the
USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to
affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique,Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros
Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

In their consolidated comment with opposition to the application for a TEPO and ocular
inspection and production orders, respondents asserted among others that the grounds relied
upon for the issuance of a TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have become fait accompli as the
salvage operations on the USS Guardian were already completed.

Court Ruling on the Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for TEPO and ocular inspection:

The court agreed with the respondents asserting that this petition has become moot in the
sense that the salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been
accomplished when petitioners sought recourse from this Court. But insofar as the
directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef structure and
marine habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are
entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS Guardian
from the coral reef. However, the Court is mindful of the fact that the US and Philippine
governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the matter of compensation
for the damage caused by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy has also declared it is closely
coordinating with local scientists and experts in assessing the extent of the damage and
appropriate methods of rehabilitation. Xxx In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the
Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and rehabilitation measures through
diplomatic channels.

“WHEREFORE,the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is
hereby DENIED.”
2. Concerned Citizens of Sta. Cruz, Zambales v. Hon. Ramon J.P. PAJE
GR No.236269 March 22,2022

Case Summary:
The petitioners aver that respondent mining companies(ZDMC, EMI, BNMI and LAMI/FMC)
have adopted unsystematic mining practices; Xxx that the unsustainable activities being
implemented by said mining companies also resulted to the following:(a) the destruction of
the ecosystem in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, and its neighboring Municipality of Candelaria,
both of the Province of Zambales, Zambales, and extended up to the Municipality of Infanta,
Province of Pangasinan; (b) water, air and soil pollution; (c)heavy nickel laterite siltation of
river systems, coasts, farmlands, fishponds and residential areas; (d) forest denudation
resulting in soilerosions; (e) exacerbated flood problems during typhoons and heavy rains;
(f) destruction of irrigation system in the Municipality of Sta.Cruz, Province of Zarnbales that
severely reduced the palay production of the rice granary of the Province of Zarnbales; and
(g)heavily affected the livelihood of the residents.In their appeal for the issuance of the Writ
of Kalikasan, the petitioners posit that the documented disastrous effects of the continued
mining operations in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of Zarnbales have shown that
respondent mining companies have not followed a waste-free and efficient mine development
plan. The Court found the petition to be sufficient in form and substance; thus, it issued the
Writ of Kalikasan prayed for. The Environmental Mines Bureau (EMB) issued Cease and
Desist to EMI and BNMI. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) issued suspension orders ordering Zambales
Diversified Metals Corporation (ZDMC), EMI, BNMI, and LnL Archipelago Minerals, Inc.
(LAMI.

On February 27, 2017, petitioners filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Ocular Inspection
(for possible violation of the writ), alleging that despite the' issuance of the writs of kalikasan
and continuing mandamus, respondent mining companies have been continuing their
extraction and hauling operations.

In the assailed Resolution dated May 22, 2017, the CA denied petitioners' Petition for Writ of
Kalikasan, application for TEPO, and Urgent Motion for Ocular Inspection. The CA ruled that
prior to the referral of the petition by the Court,the DENR Region III and the MGB Region III
already issued a series of Joint Suspension Orders against ZDMC, BNMI, and LAMI; that
during the pendency of the case, the DENR already conducted an audit of the mining
operations of respondent mining companies, after finding that respondent mining companies
violated pertinent environmental and mining laws, the DENR, through then Secretary Regina
Lopez (Sec. Lopez), issued separate orders canceling the Mineral Production Sharing
Agreements {MPSA) of respondent mining companies, resulting in the closure of their mining
operations. The CA further ruled that with the closure of the mining companies, "there can
be no unlawful act or omission that may be committed by respondent mining
companies that would result in actual or threatened violation of petitioner's
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology" and as such, there is no more
actual controversy between the parties.

Supreme Court’s Ruling:

It bears stressing that the CA denied the petitioners' petition for writ of kalikasan, as well as
their application for TEPO and Urgent Motion for Ocular Inspection, on the sole basis of the
DENR Closure Orders dated February 8, 2017 which cancelled the respective MPSAs of
respondent companies. The CA underscored that with the closure of the mining operations,
"there can be no unlawful act or omission that may be committed by respondent mining
companies that would result in actual or threatened violation of petitioners' constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology." For the CA, the DENR Closure Orders have rendered
the case moot. Thus, it found that "no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the
merits of the petition. "

The foregoing ruling of the CA no longer holds, owing to the subsequent and supervening
events as manifested by the OSG and LAMI, more particularly on the lifting of the DENR
Closure Order dated February 8, 2017 which previously cancelled the respective MPSA's of
respondent mining companies. Indeed, with the lifting of the Closure Orders dated February
8,2017 and the resumption of the mining operations of respondent companies as manifested
by the OSG, petitioners' allegations-i.e., that respondent companies conduct unsystematic
mining activities, and that their mining operations violate pertinent environmental and mining
laws, which were considered by the DENR in the issuance of said Closure. Orders-become_
material and significantly relevant in the subject petition for writ of kalikasan. Thus, the
propriety of the ultimate relief in a petition for writ of kalikasan, that is, to prevent further
violations of the constitutionally protected rights to a balanced and healthful ecology remains
a justiciable controversy.

NOTE: In this case, the presence of subsequent and supervening events—that is the lifting
of the suspension orders, which have not been squarely passed upon or resolved by the CA,
became the Supreme Court’s basis for remanding the case to the CA. But in the absence of
such events (meaning had the closure orders became permanent and never lifted), the
petition for writ of kalikasan as well as their application for TEPO and Urgent Motion for Ocular
Inspection, could have been denied for the same explanation that “there can be no unlawful
act or omission that may be committed by respondent mining companies that would result in
actual or threatened violation of petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology".

OTHER CASES: Denial of petition for Ocular Inspection (non-Writ of Kalikasan cases)

3. LUCIO DIMAYUGA vs. ANTONIO J. DIMAYUGA

G.R. No. L-6740 April 29, 1955
Case Summary:

The plaintiff filed an action in the CFI of Batangas against defendant praying that the latter be
ordered to deliver to the former the possession of a parcel of land. On April 8, 1952, defendant
filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint does not state a cause of
action, to which plaintiff filed a written opposition. The motion was denied. The case was set
for hearing. The court rendered judgment as prayed for in the complaint, whereupon the
defendant interposed the present appeal. In this appeal, appellant pretends that the lower
court erred: (1) in not dismissing the complaint for want of cause of action, or for being
premature; (2) in not granting his petition for ocular inspection to better appreciate the
merits of his petition to dismiss; and (3) in not granting his petition for postponement of the
hearing of the case.

The motion to dismiss filed by appellant is mainly predicated on the ground that the complaint
does not state a cause of action f or the reason that the period stipulated in the contract of
lease on which plaintiff bases his right of possession has not yet expired in view of a condition
therein contained. This condition recites that if at the expiration of the contract there should
exist on the land some sugar cane to be cut it shall be understood as extended until after the
cane had been cut. It is contended that there was still some standing sugar crop upon the
expiration of the ten-year period agreed upon in the contract and, hence, the same cannot be
deemed to have expired when this action was instituted. This claim is disputed by the
appellee who reasons out that the same does not appear in the complaint.

Supreme Court’s Ruling:

When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, the rule
provides that its sufficiency can only be determined by considering the facts alleged in the
complaint, and no other. "It has been said that the test of the ufficiency of the facts alleged
in a petition, to constitute a cause of action, is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the
court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the
petition.

It is true that the appellant has invoked in his motion to dismiss the condition in the
contract of lease to the effect that if at the expiration of said contract there would exist
on the land sugar crop to be cut it shall be deemed extended until after the same had
been cut, and to substantiate his claim he asked the court that an ocular inspection be
made of the property so that it may see for itself the truth of such claim cannot be
entertained for the reason that such condition does not appear in the complaint. At
best, this is a matter which the appellant could establish by proper evidence when the
time for trial comes, and not at this stage of the proceeding. The rule is that, when the
motion to dismiss is based on the ground above invoked, no evidence may be allowed
and the issue should only be determined in the light of the allegations of the complaint
[Asejo vs. Leonoso,* 44 Off. Gaz. (No. 10) 3807]. The lower court, therefore, did not err
in denying the petition for ocular inspection.

4. Abellera vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 127480 February 28, 2000

Case Summary:

ISSUE:
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT SITTING AS AN APPELLATE COURT TO ISSUE AN ORDER FOR THE
CONDUCT OF AN OCULAR INSPECTION

Supreme Court’s Ruling:

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Regional Trial Courts could not, in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction, hear the case de novo in the guise of clarificatory hearings, during
which additional evidence was presented by the parties and an ocular inspection was
conducted.
Basis:

The extent of jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court on appeal is established as follows:

Section 22, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 –

SEC. 22. Appellate Jurisdiction. Regional Trial Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over
all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the
basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such
memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial
Courts. The decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition
for review to the Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the petition
shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant
a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed. (underscoring
ours).

Section 21(d), Interim Rules of Court -

Section 21. Appeal to the Regional Trial Courts. -
(d) Within fifteen (15) days from receipt by the parties of the notice referred to in the preceding
paragraph, they may submit memoranda and/or briefs, or be required by the regional trial
court to do so. After the submission of such memoranda and/or briefs, or upon the expiration
of the period to file the same, the regional trial court shall decide the case on the basis of
the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda
and/or briefs as may have been filed.

Section 45, Republic Act No. 6031 -

Section 45 x x x "Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis
of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts: Provided,
That the parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so requested:
Provided, however, That if the case was tried in a city or municipal court before the latter
became a court of record, then on appeal the case shall proceed by trial de
novo." (underscoring ours)
Thus, there can be no trial de novo. The appellate court must decide the appeal on the basis
of the records and memoranda/brief.

Nevertheless, it ruled that petitioner was estopped from claiming that the trial court acted in
excess of jurisdiction as she herself had participated in the trial de novo and failed to object,
through counsel, to the issuance of the order to conduct an ocular inspection.