First Order Mathematical Logic.

by Angelo Margaris
Review by: A. H. Lighstone
The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Sep., 1972), p. 616
Published by: Association for Symbolic Logic
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 616 REVIEWS

turn are intended to suggest the grammatical terms gerade Rede and ungerade Rede). In the
present German translation Frege's use of ungerade is mentioned on page 102, but unclearly, as
the same passage also misquotes the Fregean terminology by speaking of "einen 'indirekten
Sinn' in der Fregeschen Terminologie." It would seem to be better, in translating from English
back into German, just to restore the original words gerade and ungerade everywhere. (Frege,
however, generally says gewohnlich in place of gerade.)
In a footnote on page 23 the translator explains that sentence has been translated as Aussage,
statement as Behauptung, proposition as Proposition, thought as Gedanke, judgment as Urteil. But
the first two of these translations are dubious. Translating in the other direction, the reviewer
would prefer to render Aussage as statement and Behauptung as assertion. For the grammatical
term sentence, the well established German equivalent is Satz. And though in mathematical
and logical contexts Satz is often used for proposition, it would seem that the equivocacy has
been remedied by importing the term Proposition into German, so that Satz may then safely be
used for sentence.
On page 21, logical oddity is translated as logischer Unsinn. The translator indicates her doubt
by quoting the English in a footnote. The reviewer suggests that logische Seltsamkeit better
represents the intention of the original.
The notations A and V for the quantifiers, already less distinctly legible than the Peano-
Russell notations, are made still less so in the volume under review by a style of setting formulas
which (with random exceptions) inserts a space between the symbol A or V and the following
variable. ALONZOCHURCH
ANGELO MARGARIS. First order mathematical logic. Blaisdell Publishing Company,
Waltham, Massachusetts, Toronto, and London, 1967, x + 211 pp.
This attractive and well-written introduction to the elements of mathematical logic is aimed
primarily at undergraduates with several years of university mathematics and some degree of
mathematical maturity. Consisting of three chapters labeled Introduction, The predicate calculus,
and First order theories, this interesting book begins with a brief account of symbolic logic and
set theory, which quickly leads to a presentation of the statement calculus and the predicate
calculus, following traditional lines. The third chapter studies first-order theories in some detail,
with special emphasis on number theory. After a discussion of truth and models, the completeness
theorem is proved. Some basic ideas of model theory are presented, followed by a brief account
of Gbdel's incompleteness theorem.
In spite of a few minor oversights and some obvious misprints, this is an excellent introduction
to the subject. A. H. LIGHTSTONE
WILLIAM CRAIG. Bases for first-order theories and subtheories. The journal of symbolic
logic, vol. 25 no. 2 (for 1960, pub. 1961), pp. 97-142.
Here, for any first-order theory S, a subtheory of S is a set S such that for some non-logical
predicate symbols R1 , R2, .- *, the set S- consists of those formulas in S from which R1,
R2 , - - - are absent. A basis for a theory S is any subset B of S such that S is the closure of B
under logical deduction. Given any basis B for a theory S and any predicate symbols R1 ,
R2, ? * * determining a subtheory S - of S, a basis B - for S - is constructed such that there are
deductions from B of the formulas in B- in which not all of the deductive operations of the
theory are needed and in which some regularity conditions are satisfied. There are different
results of this kind corresponding to the different cases of whether the given basis B is finite and
whether the given first-order theory S is a theory with identity. Two concepts of axiomatiz-
ability by a scheme of kind I and by a scheme of kind 2 are introduced in connection with de-
scriptions of bases B - for subtheories. For a first-order predicate calculus with identity, finite
axiomatizability using additional predicate symbols and axiomatizability by a scheme of kind I
coincide. Also for first-order theories with only a finite number of non-logical constants or free
individual variables, and with or without axioms for identity, recursive enumerability and
axiomatizability by a scheme of kind 2 coincide. M. R. KROM
HARTLEY ROGERS, Jr. An example in mathematical logic. The American mathematical
monthly, vol. 70 (1963), pp. 929-945.
The example referred to is a decision procedure for the elementary theory of the ordering of

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