Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No.

157870, 3 November 2008

Assigned to: Adap, Roberto Anton Candelario Topic: Dangerous Drugs (RA 9165)
Keywords: random drug test, students, employees, arrested

Doctrine:
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students,
the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for
students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they
seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental
authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional
soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the
reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

Facts:
Petition questioning the constitutionality of the following provisions of RA 9165:
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government
forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the
DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among
others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as
well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening
test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

xxxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary schools
shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student
handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public
and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug
test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing
the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs
shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination,
subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil
Service Law;

xxxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo
a mandatory drug test;

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(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for
dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.

Issue: Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically,
do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative
power?

Held:
Sec. 36 (g) unconstitutional

(c) and (d) constitutional

(f) and (g) to not be implemented

FOR SCHOOL RANDOM DRUG TESTING AND PRIVATE AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are:

(1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students;

(2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and
supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools;

(3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their
students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and

(4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and
non-discriminatory.

In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when
they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental
authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional
soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the
reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

MANDATORY DRUG TESTING FOR PERSONS ACCUSED OF CRIMES

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We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's
office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment.

The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless."

In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing
can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked;
neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will.

The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure,
let alone waive their right to privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of
RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2,
Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate
themselves.

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People v. Sullano, G.R. No. 228373, 12 March 2018
Assigned to: Aquino, Elen Cia Panglinan Topic: Dangerous Drugs (RA 9165)
Keywords: 50 random selected police officer. Section 15 and section 36

Doctrine:

The elements to be charged under Section 15 of R.A. 9165 are as follows:

1. 1) a person is apprehended or arrested;
2. 2) the said person was subjected to a drug test; and
3. 3) the person tested positive for use of any dangerous drug after a confirmatory
test.

4. Section 15 cannot be expanded to include respondent, who underwent mandatory drug

testing pursuant to Section 36 (e), Article III of R.A. No. 9165 where the information
only alleged a violation of Section 15.

Facts:
On October 16, 2012, Senior Superintendent Nerio T. Bermudo (P/SSupt. Bermudo), the
City Director of the Butuan City Police Office, ordered fifty (50) randomly selected
police officers under the Butuan City Police Office to undergo drug testing pursuant to
Section 36, Article III of R.A. No. 9165. Among those who underwent testing was the
respondent, a police officer at Butuan City Police Station .

The respondent's urine specimen gave a positive result for the presence of
methamphetamine.

Given the result of the random drug test and confirmatory test, P/SSupt. Bermudo filed
a Complaint Affidavit against respondent for violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165.

Respondent pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. After the prosecution
rested its case, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence. In his Demurrer to Evidence,
respondent argued that the case against him should be dismissed as the State failed to
adduce sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The essential
elements of the crime were not proven as it was never asserted that respondent
was apprehended or arrested or actually caught using any dangerous drug.

RTC ruling- granted the demurrer to evidence

CA-Due to the dismissal of the case, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA, alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer
to evidence. Denied the petition for certiorari.

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In the case at bar, the first element for private respondent to be charged under
Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is absent. It bears stressing that private respondent was
not apprehended nor arrested

Issue:
1. Whether Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 requires the apprehension or
arrest of a person for the latter to be considered as violating the provision.
2. Whether section 15 should be read in conjunction with Section 36 in this case
Held:
1. Yes. Taking into consideration the text of the law itself, general criminal law principles,
and previous jurisprudential interpretation, the answer is in the affirmative, given the
specific facts of this case.

Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. — A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to
be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty
of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense,
subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug
for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos
(PhP50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00): Provided, That this Section
shall not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such
quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the
provisions stated therein shall apply

2. No. Petitioner claims that this section should be read in conjunction with Section 36, Article
III of the same law, which mandates the random drug testing for certain employees, and
pertinently includes police officers like respondent. Section 36, Article III of R.A. No. 9165.

As stated, several factors militate against petitioner’s construction of the phrase “a person
apprehended or arrested” appearing in Section 15. It is likewise important to note that the
allegations in the information against respondent clearly state that he is only being prosecuted
for Section 15 and nowhere in the information was it stated that it should be read in relation to
Section 36.

Section 15 cannot be expanded to include respondent, who underwent mandatory drug

testing pursuant to Section 36 (e), Article III of R.A. No. 9165 where the information only
alleged a violation of Section 15.

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People v. Laba, G.R. No. 199938, 28 January 2013
Assigned to: Arcilla, Steve Rojano Topic: Dangerous Drugs (RA 9165)
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

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Estipona v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, 15 August 2017
Assigned to: Arcilla, Stevie Rojano Topic: Dangerous Drugs (RA 9165)
Keywords: Plea bargaining
Doctrine:
Plea bargaining is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. However, a defendant has no
constitutional right to plea bargain. It is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of
the offended party and the prosecutor.

Facts:
Petitioner, Salvador Estipona, Jr., was accused of having in his possession, control, and
custody 0.084 grams of white crystalline substance which, when examined, were found to be
positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of Sec.
11, Art. II of RA 9165. Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of
guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of the same law (Possession of Equipment,
Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of
rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the
dangerous drug seized in his possession. He then assailed the constitutionality of Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165 for it allegedly violates the rule-making authority of the SC, and the principle
of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.
The respondent issued an Order denying the petitioner’s motion. The petitioner then
filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether Sec. 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of the said law is
unconstitutional
Held:
YES, Sec. 23 of RA 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the
rule-making authority of the SC. The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches
of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules
of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of the Court. The other branches
trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or
modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.
The Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the
preservation of substantive rights. The rules on plea bargaining do not diminish, increase, nor
modify substantive rights. They were introduced in order to provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts.
Plea bargaining is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. Considering the
presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take
away a vested right. However, a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. It is not a
demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor. The

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reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his
duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the
evidence on hand can sustain. The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court, which may allow the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged.

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People v. Romy Lim, G.R. No. 231989, 4 September 2018 and 13 November 2018
Assigned to: Basabas, Dana Ellaine Ortega Topic: Dangerous Drugs (RA 9165)
Keywords:

Section 21; RA 9165

Doctrine:
Strict adherence to Section 21 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is
miniscule, since it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering or alteration of evidence.

Facts:

Based on a report of a confidential informant (CI) that a certain “Romy” has been engaged in
the sale of prohibited drugs in Zone 7, Cabina, Bonbon, CDO, IO1 Orellan and his teammates
were directed by the Regional Director to gather for a buy-bust operation. During the briefing,
IO2 Orcales, IO1 Orellan, and IO1 Carin were assigned as the team leader, the arresting
officer, and the poseur-buyer, respectively.

When the team arrived in the target area at around 10:00 PM, IO1 Carin and the C1 alighted
from the vehicle near the house of “Romy”, while IO1 Orellan and the other team members
positioned themselves in the area to observe. Upon reaching the house, IO1 Carin and the C1
encountered Gorres who invited them inside, Lim was sitting on the sofa watching TV. When
the C1 introduced IO1 Carin as a buyer, Lim nodded and told Gorres to get one inside the
bedroom. Gorres handed a small medicine box to Lim, who then took 1 sachet of shabu and
gave it to IO1 Carin, who in turn paid him with the ₱500 buy-bust money. After examining the
sachet, IO1 Carin made a signal and the team immediately rushed to Lim’s house. IO1 Orellan
declared that they were PDEA agent and informed Lim and Gorres of their arrest for selling
dangerous drug. Thereafter, IO1 Orellan conducted a body search on both of them. The team
brought Lim and Gorres to the PDEA Regional Office, with IO1 Orellan in possession of the
seized items. Likewise, he made the Inventory Receipt of the confiscated items, however, it
was not assigned by Lim and Gorres. There also no signature of an elected public official and
the representatives of the DOJ and the media as witnesses.

The RTC handed a guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession and sale of shabu and acquitted
Gorres for lack of sufficient evidence linking him as a conspirator. CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Romy Lim is guilty of violating R.A. 9165

2. Whether or not the procedure mandated in Section 21(1), Art II of R.A. No. 9165 was
followed by the apprehending team?

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Held:

1. Accordingly, accused appellant Romy Lim y Miranda is acquitted on reasonable doubt

and ordered immediately released from detention, unless he is being lawfully held for
another cause. It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the 3 witnesses to the
physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to
reason/s such as: (1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a
remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs
was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person(s)
acting for and in their behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the
punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a
DOJ or media representative and an elected public official within the period required
under Art. 125 of the RPC prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers; (5)
time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of
confidential assets, prevented the low enforcers from obtaining the presence of the
required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.

2. No. The Police Officers did not follow the procedures laid down in Section 21, Article
II of R.A No. 9165, hence accused Lim should be acquitted. Section 21, Article II of
R.A No. 9165 enumerates three witnesses that should be present during the conduct of
the inventory and photographing of the seized evidence, namely: (1) a media
representative, (2) an elected public official and (3) a DOJ representative.

In the present case, the three witnesses required under Section 21, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 were not present during the conduct of the inventory and the photographing
of the seized items. Further, the police officers failed to justify the absence of the three
witnesses. The police officers’ reasoning that it was already late at night, it was raining
and therefore unsafe for them to wait for the arrival of the witnesses at Lim’s house,
was not accepted by the SC as valid justification for the absence of the three witnesses.
The SC found that there was no genuine and sufficient attempt to comply with the law.
The police officers failed to establish the details of an earnest effort to coordinate with
and secure the presence of the required witnesses.

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People v. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, 14 September 1987
Assigned to: Bautista, Angelica Painitan Topic: Article 247
Keywords:
Bar Review, Illicit relationship, Mahjong session, gunshot
Doctrine:
Article 247 does not define and provide for a specific crime, but grants privilege or benefit to
the accused for the killing of another or the infliction of serious physical injuries under the
circumstances therein mentioned.

Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is banished, but that is
intended for his protection.

It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not being a
punishable act, cannot be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying
circumstances.

Facts:
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had illicit relationship.
The illicit relationship apparently began while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the
1983 Bar examinations. His wife was left behind in their residence in Tacloban, Leyte. On July
15, 1984, after leaving his father’s residence, he went home. He arrived at his residence in
Tacloban City at around 6pm.

Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of
sexual intercourse. Accused Abarca jumped and ran away when the two noticed him. He went
to look for a firearm at Tacloban City and went to the house of a PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo.
He got Talbo’s firearm, M-16 rifle, and went back to his house. When he was not able to find
his wife and Koh there, he proceeded to the “mahjong session” as it was the hangout place of
Khingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mah-jong. He fired at Khingsley Koh three
times with his rifle. Koh was hit. Occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was
playing mah-jong were Arnold and Lina Amparado who were also hit by the shots fired by the
accused.

Khingsley Koh died instantaneously of cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and haemorrhage
as a result of multiple gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and abdomen. Arnold Amparado
was hospitalized and operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet, while his wife, Lina
Amparado, was also treated in the hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments.

RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated
murder as charged.

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Issue: WON the RTC is correct in convicting the accused for the crime charged (complex
crime of murder with double frustrated murder) instead of entering a judgment of conviction
under Art. 247 of the RPC
Held: The RTC is wrong.

There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this
case in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit
of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally
married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter.
These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant of
murder, therefore erred.

Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the
accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time
the latter was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the
pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant. The RPC, in requiring that the accused “shall
kill any of them or both of them. . . immediately” after surprising his spouse in the act of
intercourse, does not say that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires
that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after
chancing upon his spouse in the bases act of infidelity. But the killing should have been
actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been influenced by external
factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused’s rage.

We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this case. It shall likewise be noted that
inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not being a punishable act, cannot be
qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying circumstances.

Further, we disagree with the solicitor general recommending the finding of double frustrated
murder against the Amparados. Here the accused was not committing murder when he
discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not
murder. We cannot therefore hold that the accused is liable for frustrated murder for the
injuries suffered by Amparados.

This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility.
Granting the fact that he was not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he
cannot be said to be entirely without fault.Accordingly, he is liable under the first part, 2nd
paragraph, of Art. 365, that is, less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or
negligence.

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People v. Oyanib, G.R. No. 130634, 12 March 2001
Assigned to: Bello, Nerissa Mauricio Topic: Article 247
Keywords: Stabbing the wife & paramour

Doctrine:
An absolutory cause is present where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public
policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed.
Facts:
Due to marital differences, Manolito and Tita separated, with Manolito keeping custody of
their two (2) children. Tita rented a room at the second floor of the house of Edgardo Lladas
x
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted all efforts towards
reconciliation. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with Manolito. In fact, she was
very open about her relationship with other men. One time, he chanced upon his wife and her
paramour, Jesus, in a very intimate situation.

One evening Manolito received a letter from the school of their son. The letter mentioned that
his son Julius failed in two subjects and invited his parents to a meeting at the school.
Because he had work all day the next day, Manolito went to Tita’s house to ask her to attend
the school meeting on his behalf.

Upon reaching Tita’s rented place, he caught his wife Tita and Jesus having sexual
intercourse.

Manolito stabbed Jesus and stabbed Tita in the left breast, and three more times in different
parts of her body. Tita fell near the lifeless body of her paramour. It was at this point that
Edgardo appeared from the ground floor and inquired about what had happened.

Manolito left the house of Edgardo. He threw away the knife he used in stabbing his wife and
her paramour.

When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his wife’s place, Manolito said that
he brought it for self-defense. Prior to the incident, he received threats from his wife and her
paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him so they could live together.

Manolito was convicted for Homicide and Parricide.

Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed them both under the exceptional
circumstances provided in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is entitled to the exceptional privilege und2er Art. 247

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Held:
Yes. Accused invoked Art. 247 of the RPC as an absolutory and an exempting cause. An
absolutory cause is present where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy
and sentiment there is no penalty imposed.

Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to prove the exempting
circumstances to the satisfaction of the court in order to be relieved of any criminal liability.
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the following essential elements for such a
defense:

(1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his
wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.

Accused must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise his defense
would be untenable. The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put,
the killing by the husband of his wife must concur with her flagrant adultery.

There is no question that the first element is present in the case at bar. The crucial fact that
accused must convincingly prove to the court is that he killed his wife and her paramour in the
act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.

After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the testimonies of the witnesses, we
find accused to have acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code.Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised his wife and her lover in the act
of sexual intercourse.

To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon Jesus at the
place of his wife. He saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse. Blinded
by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who fought off and kicked the accused. He
vented his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in support of Jesus.
Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
surrendered to the police when a call for him to surrender was made.

The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording the offended spouse the
opportunity to avail himself of Article 247, Revised Penal Code. As the Court put it in People
v. Wagas:

The vindication of a Mans honor is justified because of the scandal an unfaithful wife creates;
the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with death. But
killing the errant spouse as a purification is so severe as that it can only be justified when the
unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted to only with great

14
caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted only during the sexual intercourse
or immediately thereafter

The trial court’s decision was REVERSED. The Court sentences accused Manolito Oyanib y
Mendoza to two (2) years and four (4) months of destierro.

15
Dungo v. People, G.R. No. 209464, 1 July 2015
Assigned to: Enriquez, Darla Claire Taclibon Topic: RA 8042 as amended by 11053
Keywords:
Los Banos; UP; APO; Hazing; Fake Name; Actual participation; Alibi; Mere presence;
Conspiracy to Haze
Doctrine:
Section 4, paragraph 6 thereof provides that the presence of any person during the hazing is
prima facie evidence of participation as principal, unless he prevented the commission of the
punishable acts.
Facts:

At around 3:20 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, the victim Marlon Villanueva was
brought to the emergency room of JP Rizal Hospital. Dr. Ramon Masilungan, who was then
the attending physician at the emergency room, observed that Villanueva was motionless, not
breathing and had no heartbeat. Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Villlanueva for about 15 to 30
minutes. Villanueva, however, did not respond to the resuscitation and was pronounced dead.
Dr. Masilungan noticed a big contusion hematoma on the left side of the victim's face and
several injuries on his arms and legs. He further attested that Villanueva's face was cyanotic,
meaning that blood was no longer running through his body due to lack of oxygen; and when
he pulled down Villanueva's pants, he saw large contusions on both legs, which extended from
the upper portion of the thighs, down to the couplexial portion, or back of the knees. Dr.
Masilungan disclosed that two (2) men brought Villanueva to the hospital. The two told him
that they found Villanueva lying motionless on the ground at a store in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba
City, and brought him to the hospital. When he asked them where they came from, one of them
answered that they came from Los Baños, Laguna, en route to San Pablo City. He questioned
them on how they found Villanueva, when the latter was in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City. One
of the men just said that they were headed somewhere else. Dr. Masilungan reduced his
findings in a medico-legal report. Due to the nature, extent and location of the injuries, he
opined that Villanueva was a victim of hazing. He was familiar with hazing injuries because he
had undergone hazing himself when he was a student, and also because of his experience in
treating victims of hazing incidents. Pursuant to the standard operating procedure of the
hospital, the security guards did not allow the two men to leave the hospital because they
called the police station so that an investigation could be conducted. Two policemen arrived
later at the hospital. During his testimony, Natividad identified Sibal and Dungo as the two
persons who brought Villanueva to the hospital.

Issue:
WON mere presence during the hazing is actual participation/WON the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt
Held:
The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum. The act of hazing itself is not
inherently immoral, but the law deems the same to be against public policy and must be
prohibited. Accordingly, the existence of criminal intent is immaterial in the crime of hazing.
Also, the defense of good faith cannot be raised in its prosecution. It was made malum

16
prohibitum to discount criminal intent and disallow the defense of good faith. It took into
consideration the different participants and contributors in the hazing activities. While not all
acts cited in the law are penalized, the penalties imposed therein involve various and serious
terms of imprisonment to discourage would-be offenders. Indeed, the law against hazing is
ideal and profound. R.A. No. 8049, nevertheless, presents a novel provision that introduces a
disputable presumption of actual participation; and which modifies the concept of conspiracy.
Section 4, paragraph 6 thereof provides that the presence of any person during the hazing is
prima facie evidence of participation as principal, unless he prevented the commission of the
punishable acts. This provision is unique because a disputable presumption arises from the
mere presence of the offender during the hazing, which can be rebutted by proving that the
accused took steps to prevent the commission of the hazing. Verily, the disputable presumption
under R.A. No. 8049 can be related to the conspiracy in the crime of hazing. The common
design of offenders is to haze the victim. Some of the overt acts that could be committed by the
offenders would be to (1) plan the hazing activity as a requirement of the victim's initiation to
the fraternity; (2) induce the victim to attend the hazing; and (3) actually participate in the
infliction of physical injuries. After a careful review of the records, the Court agrees with the
CA and the RTC that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was
overwhelming enough to establish the guilt of the petitioners beyond a reasonable doubt. The
unbroken chain of events laid down by the CA leaves us no other conclusion other than the
petitioners' participation in the hazing. They took part in the hazing and, together; with their
fellow fraternity officers and members, inflicted physical injuries to Villanueva as a
requirement of his initiation to the fraternity. The physical injuries eventually took a toll on the
body of the victim, which led to his death. Another young life lost. With the fact of hazing, the
identity ,of the petitioners, and their participation therein duly proven, the moral certainty that
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind has been satisfied.

17
People v. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, 18 February 2015
Assigned to: Bravo - Dinio, Lea Petita Dilao Topic: RA 8042 as amended by 11053
Keywords: Hazing; accomplice
Doctrine:
1. The case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the
absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter;
or even the latter's acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact
been established.

2. The information charging persons with an offense be "sufficient." One of the key
components of a "sufficient information" is the statement of the acts or omissions
constituting the offense charged, subject of the complaint.

Facts:

Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. (Balidoy) was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the PMMA.
In order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to successfully complete the
mandatory "Indoctrination and Orientation Period," which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001.
Balidoy died on 3 May 2001.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) probed the death of Balidoy. After months of
investigation, it forwarded its findings to the provincial prosecutor of Zambales for the
preliminary investigation and possible criminal prosecution of those involved in the orientation
and indoctrination of the PMMA Class of 2005. A criminal case against Alvarez, et al., as
principals to the crime of hazing, was then filed with the RTC-Zambales. A criminal case was
also filed against the school authorities (collectively, respondents) as accomplices to the crime
of hazing.

The RTC-Zambales issued an Order dismissing the Information against the principal accused,
Alvarez, et al. The Order was later entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment.

Issue:

I. Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can proceed in
spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused

II. Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the material averments for
the prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law

Held:

FIRST ISSUE: YES

18
In People v. Rafael, the Supreme Court En Banc reasoned thus: "The corresponding responsibilities of the
principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be
duly established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed
independently of that of theprincipal." Accordingly, so long as the commission of the crime can be duly proven,
the trial of those charged as accomplices to determine their criminal liability can proceed independently of that of
the alleged principal.

We note in the present case that Bayabos,et al. merely presented the Order of Entry of Judgment
dismissing the case against Alvarez, et al. Nowhere is it mentioned in the order that the case was dismissed
against the alleged principals, because no crime had been committed. In fact, it does not cite the trial court's
reason for dismissing the case. Hence, the Sandiganbayan committed an error when it simply relied on the Order
of Entry of Judgment without so much as scrutinizing the reason for the dismissal of the case against the
purported principals..

SECOND ISSUE: NO

The basic test is to determine if the facts averred would establish the presence of the essential elements of the
crime as defined in the law.

The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are established:

(1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or

psychological suffering or injury; and

(2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the person's admission or entry into an organization. In
the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against persons defined
under Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code is the infliction by a person of physical or psychological
suffering on another in furtherance of the latter's admission or entry into an organization.

In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the act, they may
nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that

(1) hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred;

(2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and

(3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite of actual knowledge
thereof.

The indictment merely states that psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is
no allegation that the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization.
Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of
the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term — in
this case,hazing — is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly committed
and thus a mere conclusion of law.

19
Dabalos v. RTC, G.R. No. 193960, 7 January 2013
Assigned to: Camalig, Ylleanne Meridee Topic: RA 9262
Gaco
Keywords: Broke up before incident, sought payment of money lent accused could not pay

Doctrine:
RA 9262 is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts
to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is
committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender's wife, former wife, or
with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child;
and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.

Facts:
Karlo Dabalos was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 for using personal
violence on the complainant: by pulling her hair and punching her back, shoulder and left eye.
Dabalos then filed a motion Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion
to Quash the Information, averring that at the time of the alleged incident, he was no longer in
a dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable. Private
Respondent admitted that her relationship with the petitioner had ended prior to the subject
incident. On that day she sought payment of the money she had lent to petitioner but the latter
could not pay. She then asked if he was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he
admitted. She then slapped him causing the latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged
in the Information

Dabalos that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is not covered by
RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead, he claims that
the offense committed was only slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code which
falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court. The RTC denied the motion. It did not
consider material the fact that the parties' dating relationship had ceased prior to the incident,
ratiocinating that since the parties had admitted a prior dating relationship, the infliction of
slight physical injuries constituted an act of violence against women and their children as
defined in Sec. 3 (a) of RA 9262.
Issue:
Whether or not the act is covered by RA 9262
Held:
YES. The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of
acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1)
it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender's wife, former

20
wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a
common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.

In Ang v. Court of Appeals,the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against
women through harassment:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of
harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her

Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with
the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of
violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be
inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of
violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. As
correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as
there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship between
the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed. Consequently, the Court
cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner's assertion that the
act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.

Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity because
there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the degree of
physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is
sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative
intent is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s
physically harm women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or
their children with the end in view of promoting the protection of women and children.

21
Melgar v. People, G.R. No. 223477, 14 February 2018
Assigned to: Cantolino, Jerico Art Pacis Topic: RA 9262
Keywords:

Doctrine:
To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof o
commission of any of the acts enumerated in Sec. 5(i) or similar acts.
Thus, in cases of support, it must be first shown that the accused’s denial thereof - which is, by
itself, already a form of economic abuse - further caused mental or emotional anguish to the
woman-victim and/or to their common child.

Facts:
An Information was filed before the RTC charging Melgar with violation Section 5 of RA
9262 the said accused, having the means and capacity to give financial support, with deliberate
intent, did then and there commit acts of economic abuse against one AAA, and her minor son,
BBB (12 years old), by depriving them of financial support, which caused mental or emotional
anguish, public ridicule or humiliation, to AAA and her son.

After arraignment wherein Melgar pleaded not guilty to the charge against him, he and AAA
entered into a compromise agreement on the civil aspect of the case. After approval of the
compromise agreement by the Court, the criminal aspect of the case was provisionally
dismissed with Melgar's conformity. However, one (1) year later, Melgar sold the property,
which was supposed to, among others, answer for the support-in-arrears of his son, BBB, from
2001 to 2010 pursuant to their compromise agreement. Consequently, the RTC revived the
criminal aspect of the case and allowed the prosecution to present its evidence.

The RTC found Melgar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.

The RTC found Melgar to have committed economic abuse against AAA and their son, BBB,
when he stopped supporting them.

The CA affirmed Melgar's conviction.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Melgar's conviction for violation of Section 5 (e) of
RA 9262.
Held:
In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of violation of Section 5 (e)
of RA 9262 are present, as it was established that: (a) Melgar and AAA had a romantic
relationship, resulting in BBB's birth; (b) Melgar freely acknowledged his paternity over BBB;
(c) Melgar had failed to provide BBB support ever since the latter was just a year old; and (d)
his intent of not supporting BBB was made more apparent when he sold to a third party his
property which was supposed to answer for, among others, his support-inarrears to BBB.

22
In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed deprived AAA and
BBB of support, no evidence was presented to show that such deprivation caused either AAA
or BBB any mental or emotional anguish. Therefore, Melgar cannot be convicted of violation
of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262. This notwithstanding – and taking into consideration the variance
doctrine which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is different from
but necessarily included in the crime charged – the courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar of
violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 as the deprivation or denial of support, by itself and even
without the additional element of psychological violence, is already specifically penalized
therein.

23
Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 232678, 3 July 2019
Assigned to: Castaneda, Keanu Pineda Topic: RA 9262
Keywords: Abandonment, RA 9262

Doctrine:

Facts: An Information, dated June 5, 2006, was filed on September 26, 2006 before the RTC
against Reyes designating the crime as one for violation of Section 5(e), paragraph 2 of R.A.
No. 9262.

On June 11, 2009, Reyes filed a Motion to Quash6 the Information anchored on the ground that
the allegations set forth therein do not constitute the crime of violation of Section 5(e), par. 2
of R.A. No. 9262. He contended that "abandoning without financial support," which is
different from deprivation or denial of financial support, is not criminalized under R.A. No.
9262.

Issue:

I. Whether abandoning without financial support is punishable under RA 9262? YES

II. Whether a valid marriage is a requisite to be liable under RA 9262? NO

Held:
I.
Section 5(i) of R.A No. 9262 penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted
on victims who are women and children through the following acts:

XXX (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or
her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
financial support or custody of minor children or access to the woman's child/children.

Reyes committed psychological violence against AAA when he deprived her of financial
support beginning July 2005 and onwards which caused her to experience mental and
emotional suffering to the point that even her health condition was adversely affected.

II.

R.A. No. 9262 defines and criminalizes violence against women and their children perpetrated
by the woman's husband, former husband or any person against whom the woman has or had a
sexual or dating relationship with, or with whom the woman has a common child, or against
her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in
or likely to result in, inter alia, economic abuse or psychological harm or suffering. Thus, the
offender need not be related or connected to the victim by marriage or former marriage, as he
could be someone who has or had a sexual or dating relationship only or has a common child
with the victim.

24
Ang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182835, 20 April 2010
Assigned to: Castillo, Francis Angelo Lirio Topic: RA 9262
Keywords: Scandalous pictures, Obscene Picture
Doctrine:

Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the "on-and-off"
variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time and on a
continuing basis." But the two of them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits,
from October to December of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of
mutual trust and love.

An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their

taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed
broken up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish
explained that at times, when she could not reply to Rustan’s messages, he would get angry at
her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic relation as continuous.

Facts: Irish Sagud and Rustan Ang became "on-­and-­off" sweethearts until Irish decided to
break up with Rustan after learning that he had taken a live­‐in partner whom he had gotten
pregnant. Before Rustan got married, he tried to convince Irish to elope with him. Irish,
however, rejected his proposal. She changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow
managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. He used two cellphone numbers for
sending his messages. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her
alone.

On June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a
naked woman with her face superimposed on the figure. The sender's cellphone number was
one of the numbers that Rustan used. After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text
messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous
pictures of her. He also threatened to spread the picture through the internet. Irish sought the
help of the police in apprehending Rustan. Under police supervision, she contacted Rustan and
asked him to meet her at the Lorentess Resort.

When Rustan came, police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and
seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being
questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"

Rustan claims that he went to meet Irish because she asked him to help her identify a prankster
who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender's number and, pretending
to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages from the
prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. According to him, this explained
why the obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan
claims that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture to him.

25
The RTC found Irish's testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous
manner. The trial court found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. The
CA affirmed the RTC decision and denied Rustan’s MR. Rustan filed a petition for review on
certiorari before the SC.

Issue:
1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is
defined in R.A. 9262; and

2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this case,
already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.

Held:
1. YES. Section 3 (e) of R.A. 9262 taken together with Sec 5(h) indicate that the elements of
the crime of violence against women through harassment are:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of

harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress

to her.

Section 3(a) of RA 9262 provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where the
parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the
relationship. The law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a
sexual act. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couple's relationship, i.e., "a love
affair. The law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Section 3(e)
defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to
a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child." The dating
relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse
taking place between those involved. An "away­‐bati" or a fight‐and‐kiss thing between two
lovers does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up
during periods of misunderstanding.

2. YES. Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence
against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence,
would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only
violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones. What is obscene and
injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances
of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish's
head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one.
Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and

26
pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish
testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must
have given her a nightmare.

27
AAA v. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, 11 January 2018
Assigned to: Collado, Monique Cabral Topic: RA 9262
Keywords: Singapore, chef, Lisel Mok, marital infidelity, R.A 9262

Doctrine:
RA. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but the psychological violence
causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted
under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law
is only one of the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover,
depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit
relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife. Thus,
the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the
commission of the offense

Facts: Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union
produced two children. In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he
acquired permanent resident status in September of 2008. This petition nonetheless indicates
his address to be in Quezon City where his parents reside and where AAA also resided from
the time they were married until March of 2010, when AAA and their children moved back to
her parents' house in Pasig City.

AAA claimed that BBB sent little to no financial support, and only sporadically. This allegedly
compelled her to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs to augment her income as a flight
attendant. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their
son CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse, BBB supposedly started
having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with whom he allegedly has
been living in Singapore.

Things came to a head on April 19, 2011 when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a
hotel room in Singapore during her visit with their kids.As can be gathered from the earlier
cited Information, despite the claims of varied forms of abuses, the investigating prosecutor
found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and emotional anguish
through his alleged marital infidelity.

The Court is not convinced by the prosecution's argument that since [AAA] has been suffering
from mental and emotional anguish "wherever she goes", jurisdiction over the offense attaches
to this Court notwithstanding that the acts resulting in said suffering had happened outside of
the Philippines. To the mind of the Court, with it noting that there is still as yet no
jurisprudence on this score considering that Republic Act 9262 is relatively a new law, the act
itself which had caused a woman to suffer mental or emotional anguish must have occurred
within the territorial limits of the Court for it to enjoy jurisdiction over the offense.

28
Issue: Are Philippine courts deprived of territorial jurisdiction over a criminal charge of
psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 when committed through marital infidelity and the
alleged illicit relationship took place outside the Philippines.

Held: No. PHILIPPINE COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER PSYCHOLOGICAL

VIOLENCE UNDER R.A. NO. 9262 BECAUSE WHAT THE LAW PUNISHES IS THE
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, NOT THE MARITAL
INFIDELITY PER SE.

As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or Information, threshing out the essential elements of psychological abuse under
R.A. No. 9262 is crucial. In Dinamling v. People, this Court already had occasion to
enumerate the elements of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, as
follows:

The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender
has a common child. As for the woman’s child or children, they may be legitimate or
illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the
children or similar such acts or omissions.

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or
emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the
perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained
by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is
necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar
such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the
testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party.

R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on
the wife, NOT marital infidelity per se. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the
circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of
the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on
the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or
may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or
emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the commission of the
offense.

In criminal cases, the venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Trenas v. People, the Court explained
that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but
is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be

29
acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot
take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that
limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined
by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may
validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows
that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want
of jurisdiction.

Section 7, R.A. 9262 “Venue” pertains to jurisdiction.

As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where the
crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. While the
psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable
element of the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish
which is personal to the complainant. The resulting mental or emotional anguish is analogous
to the indispensable element of damage in a prosecution for estafa, viz:

The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses employed by the accused,
as shown in the vouchers, might have been perpetrated in Quezon City does not preclude the
institution of the criminal action in Mandaluyong where the damage was consummated. Deceit
and damage are the basic elements of estafa. The estafa involved in this case appears to be a
transitory or continuing offense. It could be filed either in Quezon City or in Rizal. The theory
is that a person charged with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the
offense is in part committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material
and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in
another, the court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the
first court taking cognizance of the case will exclude the others.

Acts of violence against women and their children may manifest transitory or continuing
crimes; meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their
consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such
cases, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed
maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance
of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime
may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.

It is necessary for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of
violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (c) was
committed outside the Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the
complaint was filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In
the present scenario, the offended wife and children of the respondent husband are residents of
Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over
the case.

30
Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information relates to BBB’s
marital infidelity must be proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the
husband, and to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction. It
likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband. What this case concerns
itself is simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may
even be filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that
even if the alleged extra-marital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish
is committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 is absolutely
beyond the reach of Philippine courts.

31
Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 166441, 8 October 2014
Assigned to: Constantino, Jon Arvin Gamboa Topic: Art 266(a)
Keywords: Rape; tent; plastic ware

Doctrine: The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female Without such
showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.

Facts: Norberto and his wife employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling their plastic
wares and glasswares in La Union. Upon reaching the place, they set up their tents to have a
place to sleep. Petitioner’s wife and their driver went back to Manila to get more goods. At
around 1 AM, AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was on top of her. The person
was Norberto who was mashing her breast and touching her private parts. He fought back and
kicked Norberto twice. He was not able to pursue his lustful desires; he offered AAA money
and told her not to tell the incident to her mother. Thirty minutes later, when AAA returned to
her tent, she again saw Norberto touching private parts of BBB. Later that day, they reported
the incident to the police. Norberto was summoned to the police station which resulted in an
argument. He denied the allegation contending that there were many people around who were
preparing for the “simbang gabi”, and that once AAA and BBB would scream, the policemen
cc
Issue: Whether or not Noberto is guilty of Attempted Rape

Held: No, Noberto is only guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness. The Court held that In attempted
rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of
execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia
consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement of the
commission of the felony directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of
execution that should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by
the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a
clear showing of his intent to lie with the female.

In this case, his embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did not directly manifest
his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erect penis being in the position to
penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her.
At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her.

32
People v. Baay, G.R. No. 220143, 7 June 2017
Assigned to: Cumigad, Rotciv Anjello Reyes Topic: Art 266(a)
Keywords:
Palay, mental retard, 22 years old
Doctrine:

Facts:

AAA testified that sometime in July 2005, she was drying palay when the accused-appellant
invited her to go to the forest. Upon arrival thereat, the accused-appellant pulled down her
shorts and underwear, then inserted his penis in her vagina and started a pumping motion. It
lasted quite long, after which, a white liquid came out of the penis of the accused-appellant.
Thereafter, she went home. After the incident, AAA got pregnant.

On cross-examination, she testified that she practiced and was coached by her mother on what
she had to say in court and to point to the accused-appellant as the one who had sex with her
but in fact, the accused-appellant did not have sex with her.

The trial court, however, noted that as AAA's examination continued, AAA made conflicting
answers to the query as to whether or not accused-appellant had sex with her, which prompted
the court to reset the hearing to give the witness time to rest. The defense objected to the
resetting, arguing that it would give the prosecution the opportunity to coach AAA.

BBB testified that she came to know that her daughter was pregnant when she brought her to
Dr. Hector Flores for a medical check-up and therein, AAA told her about the rape incident in
the forest. BBB also brought AAA to Dra. Leah Florence Adicula-Sicad to assess AAA's
mental/psychological status and then to the police for the purpose of filing the complaint. On
April 21, 2006, AAA delivered a baby. This is AAA's second child, the first was fathered by a
certain DDD.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA, in affirming the decision of the RTC, erred in convicting the
accused-appellant of Statutory Rape
Held:

We, however, find it erroneous for the RTC and the CA to convict accused-appellant of
Statutory Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph l(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape under the said. provision is the carnal
knowledge of a woman below 12 years old.28 To convict an accused of the crime of s

33
tatutory rape, the prosecution must prove: first, the age of the victim; second, the identity of
the accused; and last but not the least, the carnal knowledge between the accused and the
victim. 29

In this case, it is not disputed that AAA was already 22 years old when she was raped albeit
she has a mental age of 4-5 years old.

34
People v. Deniega, G.R. No. 212201, 28 June 2017
Assigned to: Dagalangit, Hidaya Guiling Topic: Art 266(a)
Keywords:
basketball game; statutory rape; mental age below 12 years old=statutory rape

Doctrine:
Sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate, with a mental age below 12 years
old, constitutes statutory rape under par. 1(d) and not par. 1 (b), Article 266-A of RPC.

In determining whether a person is 12 years of age under Article 266-A (1)(d), the basis should
either be the chronological age of the child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual
disability, or the mental age if intellectual disability is established.

Facts:
At around 11 in the evening of May 2, 2007, AAA, who was then 16 years old but with
mental capacity of a 6-year old child, returned home, after supposedly watching a basketball
game nearby. AAA’s mother then noticed that AAA’s pants were wet and her underwear
emitted the scent of semen. AAA eventually told her mother that the accused, Rodolfo
Deniega, who was known to them as a delivery boy in the neighborhood, invited AAA to go to
another basketball court to talk. When they arrived, the accused undressed AAA, made her lie
down, removed his pants and underwear, went on top of her, inserted his penis in her vagina
and made “up-and-down” movements” as per AAA.

The barangay authorities and some police officers eventually arrested accused who was then
very drunk. After sobering up the next morning, accused admitted to having sex with AAA,
and claimed that he loves her and even offered to marry her.

An Information was filed against accused, which states among others that when the accused
had carnal knowledge with the minor AAA whose mental age is only 6 years old, he was
fully aware that AAA is suffering from mental disability and/or disorder .
Accused was eventually found guilty by the RTC for the crime of statutory rape and was
sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole. CA also affirmed
said conviction.

Accused appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court and questioned the credibility of the
witness.
Issue: Whether accused is guilty of statutory rape?

Held:

35
YES, the accused is guilty.

Statutory rape is committed when: (1) offended party is under 12 years of age; and (2)
accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or
intimidation, whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness, or whether it was
done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is
proven and that there was sexual intercourse.
What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years old.
The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her
tender years.

It is also a settled rule that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate,
with a mental age below 12 years old, constitutes statutory rape under par. 1(d) (or when
offended party is 12 years of age or demented) and not par. 1 (b) (or when offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, Article 266-A of RPC.
In determining whether a person is 12 years of age under Article 266-A (1)(d), the basis should
either be the chronological age of the child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual
disability, or the mental age if intellectual disability is established.

In this case, elements of statutory rape are present.

For one, the information alleged that the victim was 16 years old but with the mental age of a
6-year old child, at the time of the commission of the crime as established by AAA’s birth
certificate and clinical abstract prepared by a psychiatrist, among others. Thus AAA, the
offended party considered below 12 years of age.

As to the second element, the SC found no reason to disturb the finding of RTC and CA in
finding AAA’s testimony that accused had sexual intercourse with her to be consistent and
unwavering. This testimony was even corroborated by the medical findings of the presence of
a “deep healing laceration” in AAA’s hyment which was caused by a blunt object.

As to penalty, statutory rape carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua. If the crime is however
attended by qualifying circumstances under Article 266-B of RPC, the death penalty shall be
imposed.
Here, because it was alleged in the information and established by the prosecution that accused
had knowledge of the victim’s mental disability, which is a qualifying circumstance under
266-B, the imposable penalty should be death but since it is now prohibited, the penalty is
reclusion perpetua. This is however without eligibility for parole since the crime of qualified
rape is still classified as heinous.

36
People v. Niebres, G.R. No. 230975, 4 December 2017
Assigned to: Dela Cruz, Jasmin Denisse Juico Topic: Art 266(a)
Keywords: Qualified Rape, Simple Rape, Knowledge, Mental Disability, Under 12 years of
age, Relationship by Affinity

Doctrine:
The offender’s knowledge of the mental disability of the victim during the commission of the
crime must be sufficiently alleged in the indictment and proved during trial to be properly
appreciated as a special qualifying circumstance. Here, while the offender’s knowledge of the
mental disability was alleged in the information, prosecution did not adduce supporting
evidence to qualify the rape. Moreover, mere relationship by affinity of the offender and the
victim does not suffice to prove that the former knew of the latter’s disability. There must be
conclusive proof of the offender’s knowledge, absent evidence of external manifestations of
the victim’s mental condition.
Facts:
Rico Niebres was charged of Rape committed against AAA, a 16 year-old girl, who is
suffering from mild mental retardation. The prosecution alleged that Niebres, together with his
wife (AAA's sister) and six (6) children, went to the house of his parents-in-law to participate
in a traditional palay harvesting called "basok/hasok.” They arrived at the house of his
parents-in-law at around 8AM and went to the field until late afternoon. After dinner, Niebres
went out to drink with his father-in-law and brother-in-law and came home at around midnight.
He directly went to the room where AAA and his family were sleeping and lied beside her to
sleep.

At about 5AM the next day, AAA suddenly woke up and noticed Niebres kissing her on the
cheeks, neck, and down her body. Niebres then pulled down her shorts, unzipped his pants, and
proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her. After repeatedly making a push and pull motion on
AAA, Niebres finally pulled out his penis and dismounted from her. AAA claimed that the
incident produced so much pain, and it caused her vagina to bleed profusely. This
notwithstanding, she could not tell anyone about it, as she was afraid of what Niebres and her
parents would do to her. According to AAA, this was not the first time Niebres sexually
abused her, claiming that Niebres also raped her several weeks before the said incident.

When AAA complained of abdominal pains, her mother, BBB, brought her to the healthcare
center. The doctors discovered that AAA was approximately 5 to 6 months pregnant. When
AAA finally admitted to BBB that Niebres raped her, they reported the matter to the police and
filed a Complaint. A psychiatrist later revealed that AAA was suffering from a mild mental
retardation with an I.Q. equivalent to a 9-year old child.

Niebres verbally denied raping AAA. He claimed that the filing of the case against him was
actuated by ill motive, considering that his parents-in-law were angry at him when he
demanded his share in the proceeds of the cow, which was purportedly sold to cover the
wedding expenses of his brother-in-law. RTC found Niebres guilty of rape. On appeal, CA
upgraded his conviction to qualified rape.

37
Issue:
Whether or not Niebres’ conviction of rape should be upheld.
Held:
SC deemed it proper to modify Niebres’ conviction from Qualified Rape to Simple Rape. The
Information reveals that Niebres was charged of the crime of Qualified Rape, as defined and
penalized under Article 266-A (1), in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC:

ART. 266-A. Rape is committed:

xxx
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxx

ART. 266-B.
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
xxx
10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder
and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission
of the crime.

For the successful prosecution of the crime of Rape by sexual intercourse under Article
266-A(1) of the RPC, it is necessary that the elements thereof are proven beyond reasonable
doubt, to wit:
(a) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
(b) he accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation, when the victim was
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, by means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority, or when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.
Moreover, case law states that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate, with
a mental age below 12 years old, constitutes statutory rape.

A person's capacity to decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to an adult

activity is determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or her mental age.
Therefore, in determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years of age" under Article
266-A(1)(d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological age of the
child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual
disability is established.

In this instance, the prosecution competently established the elements of the crime of Rape, as
it was shown that:
(a) AAA was suffering from mild mental retardation, which has an I.Q. equivalent
to a nine (9)-year old child;
(b) Niebres successfully had carnal knowledge of AAA sometime in October
2010; and

38
 (c )Niebres was able to accomplish the said act because AAA, being a mental
retardate, was deprived of reason at the time of the incident.

Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the commission of the
crime of rape is a special qualifying circumstance, which makes it punishable by death. Such
qualifying circumstance, however, must be sufficiently alleged in the indictment and proved
during trial to be properly appreciated by the trial court. In this case, while the qualifying
circumstance of knowledge of Niebres of AAA's mental retardation was specifically alleged in
the Information, no supporting evidence was adduced by the prosecution. Hence, the special
qualifying circumstance does not apply.

Additionally, mere relationship by affinity between Niebres and AAA does not sufficiently
create moral certainty that the former knew of the latter's disability. There must be conclusive
proof that accused had knowledge of the mental retardation of the victim absent evidence of
external manifestations of her mental condition. Here, the prosecution did not present any
evidence that AAA exhibited external manifestations of her mental condition. On the contrary,
the mental retardation of AAA only became noticeable the moment a psychological test was
conducted on her. When AAA engaged in other activities, she actually performed and
functioned like a normal person.

By and large, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Niebres was aware
of AAA's mental disability at the time he committed the crime and, thus, he should be
convicted of the crime of Simple Rape only.

39
People v. Caga, G.R. No. 206878, 22 August 2016
Assigned to: Dela Rosa, Patricia Mae Estacio Topic: Art 266(a)
Keywords: RAPE,

Doctrine:

Facts:
Caga was charged with the crime of rape for having carnal knowledge of "AAA" with her and
her boyfriend."AAA" and her boyfriend, Randy Bomita, went to Caga's residence at No. 2027
Kahilum II, Pandacan, Manila fora drinking spree. After consuming about four bottles of Red
Horse Grande, "AAA" and Randy decided to spend the night at Caga's house since they were
both very intoxicated. In fact "AAA" vomited a couple of times due to her alcohol intake.

Caga was already asleep on a foam cushion on the floor when "AAA" and Randy slept beside
him. While still in toxicated and asleep, "AAA" felt someone kiss her vagina. At first, she
thought it was her boyfriend Randywho did it. She tried to push him away as she had
menstruation at that time, but failed to stop him as this person proceeded to kiss her on the lips
and then went on to take undue liberties with her person. Indeed, inno time at all Caga
succeeded in mounting her and in penetrating her private parts with his penis. All the while,
"AAA" thought that it was her boyfriend Randy who was having coitus with her.When she
("AAA") slowly opened her eyes, a tiny glimmer of light coming from the window revealed
that it was Caga who had copulated with her while she was in a drunken stupor. "AAA" then
became hysterical. She started hitting and slapping Caga and accused him of violating her. She
also kicked Randy who was still asleep on the floor. She yelled at Randy exclaiming, "Bakit
mo ako pinabayaan?"

"AAA" immediately reported the incident at the Barangay Hall and the Police Station in
Pandacan, Manila; and thereafter submitted herself to a medical examination at the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH).RTC of Manila, Branch 263 rendered judgment finding Caga guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the, crime ofrape. Appellant appealed to the CA contending that
the RTC gravely erred in finding him guilty based only on the incredible, implausible and
uncorroborated testimony of "AAA." The CA however, rejected this posture.
Issue:
Whether or not Accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable Doubt of the crime of Rape.
(YES)
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the RTC and the CA correctly found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

Under Article 266-Aof the RPC, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of thefollowing circumstances:
1.By using force, threat, or intimidation;
2.When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

40
3.By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
4. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of thecircumstances mentioned above be present
This Court finds that Caga did have sexual intercourse with "AAA" when she was asleep and
still under theinfluence of alcohol. The case thus falls under the second paragraph of rape.

41
People v. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, 21 April 2014
Assigned to: Desingaño, Harris Jayson Ursal Topic: Art 266(a)
Keywords:
RAPE in marriage,
Doctrine:
Marriage does not amount to an implied consent to have sex with your wife/husband.

Facts:
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about their
nightly routine. Soon after, the accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him
to their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK complied. Once in the
bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon
with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. He initially
ordered her to sleep beside him in their conjugal bed by violently throwing the cot where she
was resting. In order not to aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated for
them to have sex. When she rejected his advances due to abdominal pain and headache, his
request for intimacy transformed into a stubborn demand. KKK held her panties but the
accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down causing it to tear apart. She was not feeling well
so she begged him to stop. He flexed her two legs apart, gripped her hands, mounted her,
rested his own legs on hers and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.

On October 17, 1998, after the appalling episode in the conjugal bedroom the previous
night, KKK decided to sleep in the children's bedroom. The accused-appellant barged
into the room and berated her for refusing to go with him to their conjugal bedroom.
When KKK insisted to stay in the children's bedroom, the accused-appellant got angry
and pulled her up. MMM's attempt to pacify the accused-appellant further enraged him. He
ordered the children to go out of the room and thereafter proceeded to force KKK into sexual
intercourse. He forcibly pulled down her short pants and p
anties as KKK begged that her body is aching and that she cannot withstand sex. The
accused-appellant removed his shorts and briefs, spread KKK's legs apart, held her hands,
mounted her and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.

The trial court convicted him. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not there can be a marital rape.
Held:
YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their wives’
bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.

42
 The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which was raised
by the accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting
husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.

According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence,
exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will
commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its
accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

43
Lutap v. People, G.R. No. 204061, 5 February 2018
Assigned to: Distura, Quennie Topic: Art 266(a)
Keywords: playing text cards
Doctrine: Rape, under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 8353 or the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997" can be committed in two ways: Article
266-A paragraph 1 refers to rape through sexual intercourse, the central element of which is
carnal knowledge which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt; and Article 266-A
paragraph 2refers to rape by sexual assault which must be attended by any of the
circumstances enumerated in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.

Facts: At the time of the incident, AAA was only six (6) years old. Petitioner, who was also
known as "Egay", frequently visits the house of AAA’s family, being the best friend of
AAA's father. AAA was then wearing short pants and was sitting on the floor with her legs
spread apart while watching television and playing with "text cards." Petitioner then
touched AAA's vagina. AAA reacted by swaying off his hand.

BBB who was the younger brother of AAA saw what happened and immediately told their
mother DDD. The latter asked AAA how many times have petitioner tickled her vagina and
AAA answered, "many times in [petitioner's] house" and that he also "let her go on the bed,
remove her panty, open her legs and lick her vagina."

As such, DDD confronted petitioner and asked why he did that to AAA. Petitioner said that
it was because AAA's panty was wet and that he was sorry.

The RTC convicted Lutap for the crime of Rape under Article 226-A par 2 in relation to
Article 266-B taking into consideration the aggravating circumstance that the victim was
only six (6) years old at the time of the commission of the offense. The CA however ruled
that since petitioner's finger merely touched AAA's vagina and that there was no
penetration, petitioner can only be held liable for attempted rape.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in convicting petitioner for the crime of attempted rape on the
basis of the evidence thus presented.
Held: YES. The direct examination of AAA and BBB, as well as the clarificatory questions
interposed by the RTC, while convincingly prove that there was malicious touching of
AAA's sexual organ, nevertheless invite doubts as to whether petitioner indeed inserted his
finger inside AAA's vagina.

People v. Mendoza, explains that for a charge of rape by sexual assault with the use of one's
fingers as the assaulting object, as in the instant case, to prosper, there should be evidence of
at least the slightest penetration of the sexual organ and not merely a brush or a graze of its

44
surface, being that rape by sexual assault requires that the assault be specifically done
through the insertion of the assault object into the genital or anal orifices of the victim.

Touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact,
stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of
the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and
convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and
not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
consummated rape. xxx

xxx Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be
consummated and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a
grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mans pubis of the pudendum is
not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest
penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis,
there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness.

What was established beyond reasonable doubt in this case was that petitioner touched,
using his middle finger, AAA's sexual organ which was then fully covered by a panty and a
short pants. However, such is insufficient to hold petitioner liable for attempted rape by
sexual assault. As above intimated, the mere touching of a female's sexual organ, by itself,
does not amount to rape nor does it suffice to convict for rape at its attempted stage. Instead,
petitioner's lewd act of fondling AAA's sexual organ consummates the felony of acts of
lasciviousness.

It is likewise undisputed that at the time of the commission of the lascivious act, AAA was
six (6) years old which calls for the application of Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610
defining sexual abuse of children and prescribing the penalty therefor. Conclusively, the
elements of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC and of lascivious conduct
under R.A. 7610 were established in the present case. Following People v. Caoili petitioner
should be convicted of the offense designated as acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the RPC in relation to Section 5 of R.A. 7610 since the minor victim in this case is below 12
years old and the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period.

45
Ricalde vs. People, G.R. 211002, 21 January 2015
Assigned to: Enriquez, Darla Claire Taclibon Topic: Art 266(a)
Keywords:
Youth; Distant Relative; Textmate; Rape; No physical trauma; Variance doctrine; No Sperm;
RA 7610;
Doctrine:
Even men can become victims of rape. The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is "the
insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into another person’s genital or anal orifice."
Facts:
On January 30, 2002, XXX requested his mother to pick up Ricalde at McDonald’s Bel-Air,
Sta. Rosa at past 8:00 p.m. Ricalde, then 31 years old, is a distant relative and textmate of
XXX, then 10 years old. After dinner, XXX’s mother told Ricalde to spend the night at their
house as it was late. He slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living room floor. It was
around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as "he felt pain in his anus and stomach and something
inserted in his anus." He saw that Ricalde "fondled his penis." When Ricalde returned to the
sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s room to tell her what happened. He also told his mother
that Ricalde played with his sexual organ. XXX’s mother armed herself with a knife for
self-defense when she confronted Ricalde about the incident, but he remained silent. She asked
him to leave. XXX’s mother then accompanied XXX to the barangay hall where they were
directed to report the incident to the Sta. Rosa police station. The police referred them to the
municipal health center for medical examination. Dr. Roy Camarillo examined XXX and
found no signs of recent trauma in his anal orifice that was also "NEGATIVE for
spermatozoa."

RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

CA: affirm but lowered amount of damages

Hence this petition:

1. Medical findings of no physical signs or external signs of recent trauma or trace of
spermatozoa
2. Inconsistent testimonies of XXX
3. Court should apply the variance doctrine in People vs. Sumingwa
Issue:
WON the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt petitioner Richard Ricalde’s guilt for
the crime of rape through sexual assault
Held:
Yes. Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as "instrument or object
rape," "gender-free rape," or "homosexual rape." The gravamen of rape through sexual assault
is "the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice."

46
1. Medical findings of no physical signs or external signs of recent trauma or trace of
spermatozoa
Petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s finding of no recent trauma in XXX’s anal orifice,
or any trace of spermatozoa, lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal orifice
does not negate the possibility of an erection and penetration. This result does not contradict
the positive testimony of XXX that the lower courts found credible, natural, and consistent
with human nature.
2. Inconsistent testimonies of XXX
In a long line of cases, this court has given full weight and credit to the testimonies of child
victims. Their "[y]outh and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity." XXX, then
8only 10 years old, had no reason to concoct lies against petitioner. This court has also held
that "[l]eeway should be given to witnesses who are minors, especially when they are relating
past incidents of abuse.
3. Court should apply the variance doctrine in People vs. Sumingwa
Section 4 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for
the "variance doctrine." In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and
what was proven during trial. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all
elements of the crime of rape through sexual assault. XXX testified that he "felt something was
inserted [into his] anus." The slightest penetration into one’s sexual organ distinguishes an act
of lasciviousness from the crime of rape. People v. Bonaagua considers a woman’s private
organ since most if not all existing jurisprudence on rape involves a woman victim.
Nevertheless, this interpretation can apply by analogy when the victim is a man in that the
slightest penetration to the victim’s anal orifice consummates the crime of rape through sexual
assault.

The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim’s dignity. The degree of penetration is
not important. Rape is an "assault on human dignity."

Penalty:
We affirm petitioner’s conviction but modify the penalty imposed by the lower court to the
penalty under Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act." The fact
that XXX was only 10 years old when the incident happened was established by his birth
certificate, and this was admitted by the defense. His age of 10 years old was alleged in the
Information. The higher penalty under Republic Act No. 7610, as discussed in People v.
Chingh, applies in this case. Having sex with a 10-year-old is child abuse and is punished by a
special law (Republic Act No. 7610). It is a progression from the Revised Penal Code to
provide greater protection for children.

Rape is rape. Rape of a child is clearly, definitely, and universally child abuse.

47
People v. Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, 12 March 2019
Assigned to: Esnara, Jessica Marie Digman Topic: RA 7610
Keywords: nine year old

Doctrine:
It is only when the victim of the lascivious conduct is 18 years old and above that such crime
would be designated as "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC" with the
imposable penalty of prision correccional.

Facts:
Salvador Tulagan, in two separate occasions, did willfully, and unlawfully, assaulted and had
forcefully had intercourse with a nine year old. Both occasions were in the same year. Salvador
denied the allegations claiming that he was out gathering banana leaves during the incident and
that the grandmother of the victim was spreading false rumours as she had squabble with his
mother. The RTC ruled that statutory rape was established. CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC.

Issue: Whether or not that the testimony of the victim was fraught with inconsistencies and
lapses which affected her credibility.

Held:
No. Time and again, we have held that when it comes to the issue of credibility of the victim or
the prosecution witnesses, the findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect and,
generally, the appellate courts will not overturn the said findings unless the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case.

*Discussion on Nomenclature of the crime:

It is only when the victim of the lascivious conduct is 18 years old and above that such crime
would be designated as "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC" with the
imposable penalty of prision correccional.

Considering the development of the crime of sexual assault from a mere "crime against
chastity" in the form of acts of lasciviousness to a "crime against persons" akin to rape, as well
as the rulings in Dimakuta and Caoili. We hold that if the acts constituting sexual assault are
committed against a victim under 12 years of age or is demented, the nomenclature of the
offense should now be "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in
relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610" and no longer "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article
336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," because sexual assault as a form
of acts of lasciviousness is no longer covered by Article 336 but by Article 266-A(2) of the

48
RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353. Nevertheless, the imposable penalty is still reclusion
temporal in its medium period, and not prision mayor.

Whereas if the victim is 12 years old and under 18 years old, or 18 years old and above
under special circumstances, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Lascivious Conduct
under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610" with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua, but it should not make any reference to the provisions of
the RPC. It is only when the victim of the sexual assault is 18 years old and above, and not
demented, that the crime should be called as "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A
of the RPC" with the imposable penalty of prision mayor.

49
Soriano v. Sandiganbayan, L-65952, 31 July 1984
Assigned to: Espinosa, Renea Lizette Bugarin Topic: RA 3019 Sec. 3(b)
Keywords: Contract, Transaction, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

Doctrine: A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some consideration as in credit
transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner.

Facts: Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft. The case was assigned for investigation to the
petitioner who was then an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation the petitioner
demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to the
National Bureau of Investigation which set up an entrapment. The entrapment succeeded and an
information was filed with the Sandiganbayan accusing LAURO G. SORIANO for Violation of Section
3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Issue: Whether or not the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted by a Fiscal is a
"contract or transaction" so as to bring it within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Held: No. It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither
was it a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A
transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions and this
element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner. IN THE LIGHT OF
THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is modified in that the petitioner is deemed
guilty of bribery as defined and penalized by Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.

50
Peligrino v. People, G.R. No. 136266, 13 August 2001
Assigned to: Fonacier, Gian Carlo Panol Topic: RA 3019 Sec. 3(b)
Keywords: Boodle money

Doctrine: Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended)
provides: Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for
js

himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and
any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
chanrob

Facts: On October 15, 1991, accused EUTIQUIO PELIGRINO y ALAAN, a public officer
being then an Examiner II of Region IV-A of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and as such was
tasked among others, to examine or investigate Books of Accounts for Income and Business
tax returns earned by professionals (medical practitioners) in order to determine their
compliance and/or tax deficiencies and to collect payments thereof, while in the performance
of his official duties as such public officer, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally demand the amount of P 200,000.00 from Dr. Antonio N. Feliciano, a practicing
genetology, found by the accused to have incurred an alleged deficiency income tax
assessment of P500,000.00 for the calendar years 1988-1989, received P200,000.00,
P51,858.57 was in the form of Prudential Bank Check No. 914077 dated October 15, 1991
payable to the Bureau of Internal Revenue as full payment of Dr. Felicianos tax liabilities and
the remaining balance to be appropriated to himself.

Issue: WoN the Sandiganbayan erred in finding that petitioner demanded and received the envelope with
the boodle money

Held: The elements of this offense were summed up in Mejia v. Pamaran, 15 and we restate them here: (1)
the offender is a public officer (2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a percentage, or a
benefit (3) on behalf of the offender or any other person (4) in connection with a contract or transaction with
the government (5) in which the public officer, in an official capacity under the law, has the right to
intervene.

Petitioner is a BIR examiner assigned to the Special Project Committee tasked."to undertake verification of
tax liabilities of various professionals particularly doctors within the jurisdiction of Revenue Region No.
4-A, Manila " Since the subject transaction involved the reassessment of taxes due from private
complainant, the right of petitioner to intervene in his official capacity is undisputed. Therefore, elements
(1), (4) and (5) of the offense are present.
chanrob

In the case at bar, petitioner opened the envelope containing the boodle money, looked inside, closed it and
placed the envelope beside him on the table. Such reaction did not signify refusal or resistance to bribery,
especially considering that he was not supposed to accept any cash from the taxpayer. The proximity of the
envelope relative to petitioner, as testified to by NBI Agent Ragos, also belies petitioner’s contention that he
refused the bribe.
chanrob1e

51
Valera v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 167278, 27 February 2008
Assigned to: Gray, Conie Mai Vergara Topic: RA 3019 Sec. 3(d)
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

52
Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 177105, 4 August 2010
Assigned to: Hermogino, Ma. Venice Kate Topic: RA 3019 Sec. 3(e)
Mancenido
Keywords:
Provincial Adjudicator; bad faith; bias; manifest partiality
Doctrine:
The essential elements of the offense under Section 3 (e) are the following:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official
functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.
Facts:
Belen Lopez Vda. de Guia (Belen) was the registered absolute owner of two parcels of
agricultural land with an area of 197,594 square meters located in Santa Barbara, Baliwag,
Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 209298 of the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan. On March 19, 1975, Belen's son, Carlos de Guia (Carlos), forged a deed of
sale, in which he made it appear that his mother had sold the land to him.

The Register of Deeds of Bulacan cancelled TCT No. 209298 and issued TCT No. 210108 in
Carlos’ name. On March 20, 1975, Carlos sold the land to Ricardo San Juan (Ricardo). The
latter registered the deed of sale in the Registry, which cancelled TCT No. 210108 and issued
TCT No. 210338 in Ricardo’s name. He subsequenty mortgaged the land to Simeon Yangco
(Simeon). Upon learning the transfers of her land, Belen filed a civil action for cancellation of
sale, reconveyance, and damages against Carlos, Ricardo and Simeon, before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Baliwag, Bulacan but was dismissed. Her appeal to the Intermediate
Appellate Court (IAC) was also dismissed for non-payment of docket fees. Ricardo executed
a deed of reconveyence in favor of the tenants. Due to this, TCT No. 210338 was cancelled
and TCT No. 301375 was issued in the names of the tenants. The land was subdivided into
several lots, and individual TCTs were issued in the names of the tenants.

Upon discovering for the first time that her appeal had been dismissed for nonpayment of
docket fees, Belen filed a motion to reinstate her appeal. The IAC granted the appeal (AC-GR
CV-02883), declaring as null and void the deed of sale executed by and between Belen and
Carlos, ordering Ricardo to to reconvey to Belen the lands, and ordering the Register of Deeds
of Bulacan to cancel and/or annul TCT No. 210338 and 210108 and to reinstate TCT No.
209298 in the name of Belen. The IAC decision became final on March 15, 1986.

On December 18, 1986, Belen filed a motion for execution before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) which was subsequently granted. Upon learning about the deed of reconveyance, she
also filed before the a motion to declare Ricardo and the tenants in contempt of court for
circumventing the final and executory judgment.

53
The RTC held the latter in contempt of court and ordered each of them to pay Php 200.00.
Despite their appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC order with modifications.
Meanwhile, Belen, through her daughter and attorney-in-fact, Melba G. Valenzuela (Melba),
filed in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint for
ejectment and collection of rents against the tenants. Petitioner Jose Reyes Y Vacio, as
Provincial Adjudicator, dismissed her complaint in favor of the tenants; the TCTs issued in the
name of the tenants, respectively, were consequently affirmed (DARAB Case No. 034-Bul88).
Despite the appeal and the urgent motion to set aside the writ of execution (following the grant
of the tenant’s motion for execution), DARAB Central Office affirmed the petitioner’s ruling
on October 24, 1994.

In due course, the CA reversed and set aside the decision, and was affirmed by the Supreme
Court. On May 13, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed two Informations in the
Sandiganbayan, one charging the petitioner with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 for
“acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality [when he] willfully, unlawfully and
criminally render his decision in DARAB Case No. 034-Bul-88 favorable to the tenants […]
thereby ignoring and disregarding the final and executory CA decision in AC-GR CV-02883
which declared [Belen] as the true owner of the lands subject of the litigation […]”. He was
also charged with usurpation of judicial functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). Despite pleading not guilty to each Information, the Sandiganbayan found the
petitioner guilty of both charges.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 in rendering his
decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL-88 when he disregarded the final and executory
decision of the CA and declared Belen as the true owner of the 2 parcels of lands.
Held:
Yes, the petitioner is guilty of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 when he disregarded the final
and executory decision of the CA and declared Belen as the true owner of the 2 parcels of
lands in his Decision.

The essential elements of the offense under Section 3 (e) are the following:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official
functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.

The petitioner was a Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB discharging the duty of
adjudicating the conflicting claims of Parties when he rendered his decision in DARAB Case
No. 034 BUL88. This establishes the first element.

The second element includes the different and distinct modes by which the offense is
committed, that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable

54
negligence. Proof of the existence of any of the modes suffices to warrant conviction under
Section 3 (e).

Manifest partiality, which is synonymous with bias, exists when the accused has a clear,
notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or one person rather than
another.

The petitioner was fully aware of the finality of the AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 Decision, having
actually admitted to having read and examined the following documents, to wit: (1) Belen's
position paper in the DARAB Case in which she stated that the decision in AC-G.R. CV No.
02883 had become final and executory; (2) The entry of judgment issued in AC-G.R. CV No.
02883; (3) Belen's TCT No. 209298, reflecting the entry of judgment issued in AC-G.R. CV
No. 02883 and the cancellation of the TCTs of the tenants, and (4) Addendum to Belen's
position paper, mentioning the decree in the AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 Decision. He thereby
exhibited manifest partiality when he rendered his decision in the DARAB Case that
completely contradicted and disregarded the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883. His granting
the tenants' motion for execution made his partiality towards the tenants and bias against
Belen.

Similiarly, the petitioner's evident bad faith displayed itself by his arrogant refusal to recognize
and obey the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883, despite his obligation as Provincial
Adjudicator to abide by the CA's ruling.

Lastly, the expenses incurred by Belen and the needless prejudicial delay in the termination of
the cases unduly deprived her of exclusive ownership over the parcels of land. This sufficiently
establishes the third element.

55
Sison v. People, G.R. No. 170339, 9 March 2010
Assigned to: Ibon, Criszus Niño Valles Topic: RA 3019 Sec. 3(e)
Keywords: Partiality, Bad faith, Gross Negligence

Doctrine:

Facts: Petitioner Rolando E. Sison was the municipal mayor while Rigoberto de Jesus was the
municipal treasurer of Calintaan, Occidental Mindoro. On July 18, 1994, state auditor Elsa E.
Pajayon conducted a post-audit investigation which revealed that during petitioners’
incumbency, no public bidding was conducted for the purchase of a Toyota Land Cruiser, 119
bags of Fortune cement, an electric generator set, construction materials, two Desert Dueler
tires, among others. Pajayon also found out that there were irregularities in the documents
supporting the acquisitions.

On June 4, 1998, petitioner and de Jesus were indicted before the Sandiganbayan for seven
counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) 3019. Petitioner pleaded not guilty to
all the Informations. Accused de Jesus has remained at large.

During the trial, it was admitted that no public bidding was conducted insofar as the purchases
he was being accused of were concerned. When asked how the purchases were made, he
answered that they were done through personal canvass. Accordingly, no public bidding could
be conducted because all the dealers of the items were based in Manila. It was therefore
useless to invite bidders since nobody would bid anyway.

The Sandiganbayan found the petitioner guilty as charged. He was meted out with an
imprisonment ranging from six years and one month as minimum to ten years as maximum
and perpetual disqualification from holding public office. The Sandiganbayan also ordered that
an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused de Jesus.

On appeal, the Court dismissed the same.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019?

Held: YES. To be found guilty under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the following elements must
concur: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the act was done in the discharge of the public
officers official, administrative or judicial functions; (3) the act was done through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (4) the public officer caused
any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference.

It is undisputed that the first two elements are present. The third element of Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019 may be committed in three ways: manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross

56
inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these three in connection with the prohibited acts
mentioned in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is enough to convict.

Partiality is synonymous with bias which excites a disposition to see and report matters as
they are wished for rather than as they are. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the
nature of fraud. Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want
of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in
so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive
and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property.

In the instant case, the petitioner was grossly negligent in all the purchases that were made
under his watch. Petitioner's admission that the canvass sheets sent out by de Jesus to the
suppliers already contained his signatures because he pre-signed these forms only proved his
utter disregard of the consequences of his actions. Petitioner also admitted that he knew the
provisions of RA 7160 on personal canvass but he did not follow the law because he was
merely following the practice of his predecessors. This was an admission of a mindless
disregard for the law in a tradition of illegality.

The fourth element is likewise present. While it is true that the prosecution was not able to
prove any undue injury to the government as a result of the purchases, it should be noted that
there are two ways by which Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be violated the first, by causing
undue injury to any party, including the government, or the second, by giving any
private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. Although neither mode
constitutes a distinct offense, an accused may be charged under either mode or both. The use of
the disjunctive or connotes that the two modes need not be present at the same time. In other
words, the presence of one would suffice for conviction.

57
Bautista v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 136082, 12 May 2000
Assigned to: Latigay, Louise Ann Orlino Topic: RA 3019 Sec. 3(e)
Keywords:
hiring of 192 workers, peace and order fund
Doctrine:

The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation, or as
different modes of committing the offense (Santiago v. Garchitorena). This does not indicate
that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be charged
under either mode or under both.

Facts:

Petitioner Franklin P. Bautista, incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Malita, Davao del Sur,
was charged for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019. The letter-complaint, which was
prepared by the Contractors Association of Davao del Sur and initiated by the Good
Government Employees of Davao del Sur, alleged, among others, that petitioner caused the
hiring of one hundred and ninety-two (192) casual employees in the municipal government for
political considerations and that the payment of their honoraria and salaries was charged to the
peace and order fund of the municipality.

Despite arguing in his counter-affidavit that the hiring of 192 casual employees and the use of
the peace and order fund for their honoraria and salaries did not justify the charges filed
against him, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO II) Corazon A. Arancon, in his Resolution, found
a prima facie case for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, which was approved by the
Ombudsman. An Information for such violation was filed against the petitioner before the
Sandiganbayan, which read –

[…] the abovenamed accused, a high ranking public officer, being the Mayor,
Municipality of Malita, Davao del Sur, while in the performance of his official
functions, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to his
office, with manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
caused the hiring of some one hundred ninety-two (192) casual employees in flagrant
disregard of Secs. 288 and 289 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual
(GAAM), the honoraria and salaries of whom were charged to the peace and order fund
and to the project component and other services activity fund, respectively and which
represented 72.5% of the total personnel services expenditures, thereby giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to the said casuals, causing undue
injury to the Municipality of Malita.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, stating that the acts charged did not
constitute the offense indicated in Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, and that more than one (1)
offense was charged in the Information – the giving of unwarranted benefits, advantage and

58
preference to the casual employees in question and causing undue injury to the Municipality.
The Sandiganbayan denied the Motion by stating that all the essential elements for the crime
charged were sufficiently alleged in the Information which charged only 1 offense.

Issue:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the petitioner’s Motion to Quash the
Information despite the fact that there were two (2) offenses charged, and as such, should be
charged in separate Informations.

Held:

No, the Sandiganbayan did not err in denying the petitioner’s Motion to Quash the Information
since the latter was only charged with 1 offense.

There were two (2) ways of violating Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, namely, (a) by causing
undue injury to any party, including the Government, and (b) by giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes
that either act qualifies as a violation, or as different modes of committing the offense
(Santiago v. Garchitorena). This does not indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense,
but rather, that an accused may be charged under either mode or under both.

For hiring 192 casuals and the charging of their honoraria and salaries to the peace and order
fund, the petitioner gave them unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference and caused
undue injury to the Municipality of Malita; or thereby caused undue injury to the Municipality
of Malita. In either case, the Information will not suffer any defect, as it is clear that petitioner
is charged with violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, as amended, with either mode of
commission obtaining or with both manners of violation concurring.

59
Fuentes v. People, G.R. No. 186421, 17 April 2017
Assigned to: Lontoc, Lorissa Eres Macalalad Topic: RA 3019 Sec. 3(e)
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

60
People v. Go, G.R. No. 168539, 25 March 2014
Assigned to: Lopez, Juan Miguel Fallaria Topic: RA 3019 Sec. 3(g)
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

61
Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 149175, 25 October 2005
Assigned to: Loquinario, Sean Thomas Topic: RA 3019 Sec. 3(h)
Palmero
Keywords: Conspiracy, Intervention by a public official in a transaction in which he has a financial or
pecuniary interest
Doctrine:
- Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated by the
performance of an overt act leading to the crime committed. To establish conspiracy, direct
proof of an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and the decision to commit it is
not necessary. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the
commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community
of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a
chain of circumstances. Once established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as
co-principals regardless of the degree of participation of each of them, for in contemplation of
the law the act of one is the act of all.
- The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction. The
second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution or by
law.
Facts:
Petitioner Domingo was serving his third term as mayor of the Municipality of San Manuel,
Isabela. Petitioner Garcia is the proprietor of D.T Garcia Construction Supply and incidentally,
is the godson of Domingo in Marriage. During Domingo’s incumbency, a Multi-Purpose
Pavement (MPP) project was undertaken on the 18 barangays of the municipality for the
paving and repair of the barangay roads. A special audit team was created by Commission on
Audit (COA) to examine the infrastructure and EDF expenditures of the municipality during
the incumbency of petitioner Domingo. Two checks were discovered during the audit
amounting to P114,350 and P20,000 to have been issued by the municipality to Domingo. It is
indicated that the claimant for the sum of the two checks was D.T Garcia Construction Supply.
The auditing team also found out that there was no contract of agreement between the
municipality and D.T Garcia Construction Supply. The auditing team concluded that D.T
Garcia Construction Supply was used by Domingo as a dummy to cover up his business
transaction with the municipality of San Manuel. Garcia submitted an affidavit and a
counter-affidavit supporting Domingo and the contract for supply and delivery is between D.T
Garcia Construction Supply and the municipality of San Manuel. The checks in the payment
transaction were to be issued in the name of Domingo to pay off the load obtained by his
mother Anicia Garcia, from Domingo’s wife, Consolacion Domingo. The prosecutor filed a
motion to discharge Garcia as a state witness. Because of this Garcia contradicted his
testimonies and pointed out that there was no existing contract between his business entity and
the municipality of San Manuel.
Issue: Whether or not the SANDIGANBAYAN overlooked matters of substance which if properly
considered would have cast reasonable doubt as to the guilty of petitioner.
Held:

62
- Petitioner Domingo violated the provisions of RA 2019 by intervening or taking part in his
official capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in the transaction
regarded the supply and delivery of mixed gravel and sand to the constituent barangays. If
indeed such loan obligation existed, as accused would have it appear, accused Domingo and
Garcia are not the parties thereto and therefore, it was highly irregular for the municipal
treasurer to issue the checks in Domingo’s name, when the voucher specifically states that they
are intended as payment for the deliveries of sand and gravel to the municipality. Conspiracy is
present when one occurs with the criminal design of another indicated by the performance of
an overt act leading to the crime committed. It is interesting to note that Garcia started to sing a
different tune after the prosecution moved for his discharge as State Witness. The court
believes that accused Mayor Domingo entered a business transaction with his own municipality
in clear violation of the provisions of Sec. 3(h) of RA3019.The prosecution’s evidence has
established the conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.

63
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, 19 December 2001
Assigned to: Lumanlan, Efigenio Atibagos Topic: RA 7080
Keywords: Plunder case

Doctrine: The Court affirmed the constitutionality of RA 7080, otherwise known as the
Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659. The Plunder Law contained ascertainable standards
and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his
violation. Indeed, it can be understood that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a
public officer in amassing ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000 through a series or
combination of acts enumerated in the Plunder Law. Petitioner bewailed the failure of the law
to provide statutory definitions of the terms used. The Court, however, ruled that the same will
not render the law void and the words of the statute will be interpreted in their ordinary
acceptation. Hence, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is misplaced.
That the Plunder Law requires only proof of pattern of the criminal acts showing unlawful
scheme, the Court ruled that the same does not do away with the requirement of proving guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. However, what the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable
doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would
constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000. There is no need to prove
each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in
furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass ill-gotten wealth.||| (Estrada
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, [November 19, 2001], 421 PHIL 290-515)

Facts:
Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.

On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos through any or a combination or a
series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at
the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:

1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness

2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions

3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code.

Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations against petitioner.

Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation,

reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but was denied.

Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a probable cause for the
offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.

64
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein
did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness
and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one offense. Same was denied.

Issue:
WON the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?

Held:
NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it
what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information
itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense
w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed.

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms
“combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These
omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague
and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence
violative of his fundamental right to due process.

A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
“chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to
go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law
cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

65
Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, G.R. No. 220598, 19 July 2016
Assigned to: Macalinao, Charise Jessa Topic: RA 7080
Malaluan
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

66
Napoles v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 224162, 7 November 2017
Assigned to: Maghirang, Maria Charmaine Topic: RA 7080
Lopez
Keywords: Janet Napoles Case

Doctrine:

Facts:
On September 16, 2013, the Ombudsman received the report of the NBI recommending that
Napoles, former Senator Enrile, Atty. Reyes (Enrile’s former Chief of Staff) and several other
named individuals be charged with the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under Section
2 of RA No. 7080, as amended, for essentially misappropriating Enrile’s Priority Development
Assistant Fund (PDAF) through non-governmental organizations that were selected without
the required bidding procedure.

The Ombudsman Special Panel of Investigators found probable cause to indict Napoles,
among other accused, with 1 count of Plunder and 15 counts of violating Section 3(e) of RA
No. 3019. An Information was filed charging Napoles with Plunder before the Sandiganbayan.
On July 7, 2014, Napoles filed her Petition for Bail, arguing that the evidence of the
prosecution is insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She particularly assailed
the credibility of the State witnesses (whistle blowers) as these are allegedly mere hearsay,
tainted with bias, and baseless. Citing the res inter alias acta rule, Napoles submitted that the
testimonies of these whistleblowers are inadmissible against her.

In view of Napoles’ application for bail, the Sandiganbayan conducted bail hearings. After the
conclusion of the prosecution’s presentation of evidence, Napoles manifested that she is not
presenting any evidence for her bail application. The Sandiganbayan denied the petition for
Bail.

Napoles thus filed the present petition, via Rule 65, alleging that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in denying her bail
application.

Issue: Was there strong evidence of guilt on the part of Napoles?

Held:

YES. Napoles bears the burden of showing that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of her bail
application was capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic, so as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion. The prosecution bears the burden of proving that the evidence of Napoles’ guilt for
the crime of Plunder is strong.

67
The right to bail is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, except when the accused is charged with a
capital offense. While bail may generally be granted as a matter of right prior to the conviction
of the accused, those charged with a capital offense is granted bail only when the evidence of
guilt is not strong.

The trial court is granted the discretion to determine whether there is strong evidence of guilt
on the part of the accused. In Cortes v. Catral, this Court laid down the following duties of the
trial court in cases of an application for bail:
In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court);

Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused
is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Sections 7 and
8, supra).
Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;

If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
Since Napoles was charged with the crime of Plunder, which carries the imposable penalty of
reclusion perpetua, she cannot be admitted to bail when the evidence of her guilt is strong.
This was the burden that the prosecution assumed in the subsequent hearings that followed the
filing of the Petition for Bail. The bail hearings are limited to the determination of whether
there is a strong presumption of Napoles’ guilt. It is merely a preliminary determination, and
the Sandiganbayan may deny admission to bail even when there is reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of Napoles. As held in People v. Cabral:

By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or the
presumption of guilt is strong. “Proof evident” or “Evident proof’ in this connection has been
held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate judgment to the
conclusion that the offense has been committed as charged, that accused is the guilty agent,
and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is administered. “Presumption great”
exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be
drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all
reasonable probability of any other conclusion. Even though there is a reasonable doubt as to
the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire record the presumption is great that
accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be refused.

As a lesser quantum of proof than guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Sandiganbayan may
deny the application for bail on evidence less than that required for the conviction of Napoles.
The prosecution was able to establish with evident proof that Napoles participated in the
implied conspiracy to misappropriate public funds and acquire ill-gotten wealth. Napoles’
participation in the conspiracy was established through testimonial evidence, not only from

68
one of her former employees, but from four (4) witnesses – all of whom corroborate each other
on material points. More importantly, they testified on the minute details of the scheme that
only those privy to the conspiracy would be able to provide. Notably, Napoles did not even
refute their claims.

The Sandiganbayan may rely on the testimonies of the whistleblowers, especially since these
were corroborated by other available evidence. The mere fact that the whistleblowers were
conspirators themselves does not automatically render their testimonies incredible and
unreliable. The Court is not the proper forum to weigh the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. It is elementary that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the
assessment or appreciation of the testimonies of witnesses, are accorded great weight and
respect.

Unfortunately for Napoles, there is nothing in the records showing that the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the
petition is DISMISSED.

69
People v. Borja, G.R. No. 199710, 2 August 2017
Assigned to: Maligaya, Gregorio II Alvarez Topic: Article 267
Keywords: Kidnapping (a crime committed by private persons), P03 Borja (a public officer
being a policeman
Doctrine:
Although the crime of kidnapping can only be committed by a private individual, the fact that
the accused is a public official does not automatically preclude the filing of an information for
kidnapping against him.
Facts:

In the Information dated May 28, 2004, Borja was charged with kidnapping punished under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

PO3 Borja entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment. Trial on the merits ensued.

Based on the collective testimonies of its witnesses, the prosecution alleged that at about 10:00
a.m. on May 26, 2004, Ronalyn Manatad and her friend, Vicky Lusterio, were walking along
Agham Road, Diliman, Quezon City. Suddenly, a man who was later identified as PO3 Borja,
grabbed Ronalyn by her right forearm and forcibly took her inside a gray van where three (3)
other men were waiting. Both Ronalyn and Lusterio shouted for help but no one came to their
rescue. Lusterio managed to escape. She immediately reported the incident to Ronalyn's
mother, Adelina Manatad.

Meanwhile, PO3 Borja and his companions drove the van around Quezon City. One (1) of
Ronalyn's abductors, a certain Major Clarito, asked for her relatives' contact numbers.
Ronalyn gave the number of her brother, Edwin G. Silvio (Edwin). Adelina received a phone
call from one (1) of the kidnappers, who demanded P200,000.00 in exchange for Ronalyn's
liberty. Adelina informed him that their family could not afford to pay the ransom due to their
financial condition. Suddenly, the caller hung up. Edwin thereafter arrived and negotiated for a
reduced ransom when one (1) of the kidnappers called again. The kidnappers acceded and
lowered their demand to P100,000.00.

Despite the successful entrapment operation, the authorities failed to rescue Ronalyn. While
she was inside the van, Ronalyn heard one (1) of her abductors say that PO3 Borja was
entrapped. The others cursed her and said, "Putang ina, iyung kapatid mo. Tumawag ng
taga-NAKTAF." Afterwards, she was taken by her captors to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency where she was charged with illegal sale of shabu.

Accused-appellant anchors his arguments on the arrest and subsequent conviction of Ronalyn
for the sale of shabu. He argues that it is absurd to convict him of kidnapping considering that
the alleged victim was caught in flagrante delicto during a buy-bust operation on the day of the
alleged incident. Furthermore, Ronalyn was found guilty of violation of Republic Act No.
9165 by both the Court of Appeals and this Court. She is now serving her sentence in the
Women's Correctional in Mandaluyong.

70
Issues:
1. WON the arrest and subsequent conviction of Ronalyn for the sale of shabu barred the
prosecution of PO3 Borja.
2. WON PO3 Borja, a public officer, can be held liable under Art. 267 for Kidnapping
Held:
1. NO. Ronalyn's apprehension for violation of Republic Act No. 9165 does not
automatically negate the criminal liability of accused-appellant. It also does not
exclude the possibility of the commission of the crime with which accused-appellant is
charged. The buy-bust operation carried out against Ronalyn and her kidnapping are
events that can reasonably co-exist.

Furthermore, a violation of Republic Act No. 9165 bears no direct or indirect relation
to the crime of kidnapping. Ronalyn's arrest and conviction are immaterial to the
determination of accused-appellant's criminal liability. In other words, Ronalyn's
innocence or guilt would neither affirm nor negate the commission of the crime of
kidnapping against her. Therefore, the resolution of this case will depend solely on
whether the prosecution has established all the elements of kidnapping under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code.

2. YES. Although the crime of kidnapping can only be committed by a private individual,
the fact that the accused is a public official does not automatically preclude the filing of
an information for kidnapping against him.

A public officer who detains a person for the purpose of extorting ransom cannot be
said to be acting in an official capacity. In People v. Santiano, this Court explained that
public officials may be prosecuted under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code if they
act in their private capacity.

In this case, Ronalyn was clearly deprived of her liberty. She was forcibly taken inside
a vehicle by accused-appellant and his cohorts and was driven around Quezon City for
at least five (5) hours

71
People v. Dionaldo, G.R. No. 207949, 23 July 2014
Assigned to: Marasigan, Marc Andrew Manco Topic: Article 267
Keywords: “Health is Wealth, Alat”
Doctrine:
Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the
killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or
homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but
shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended
by RA No. 7659.
Facts:
An appeal assailing the Decision CA finding accused-appellants Armando Dionaldo, Renato
Dionaldo, Mariano Gariguez, Jr., and Rodolfo Larido guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.

Roderick Navarro dropped his brother Edwin Navarro off at the Health Is Wealth Gym in
Caloocan City. Thirty minutes later, he received a text message from another brother who told
him that Edwin had been kidnapped. Records show that three (3) men, forcibly dragged a
bloodied Edwin down the stairway of the gym and pushed him inside a Toyota car. Roderick
immediately reported the incident to the police.

He received a phone call from Edwin's kidnappers who threatened to kill Edwin if he should
report the matter to the police. Roderick received another call from the kidnappers, who
demanded the payment of ransom money in the amount of P15M. Roderick told them he had
no such money, as he only had P50K. After negotiations over the telephone, the kidnappers
agreed to release Edwin in exchange for the amount of P110K.

Roderick was then instructed to bring the money to Batangas and wait for their next call.
Roderick received another call and was told to park beside the Libingan ng mga Bayani. After
several hours, an orange Mitsubishi car pulled up in front of his vehicle where four (4) men
alighted. Roderick saw one of the men take a mobile phone and upon uttering the word "alat,"
the men returned to their car and drove away.

Meanwhile, a team had been organized to investigate the kidnapping of Edwin. During the
course of the investigation, Rodolfo, an employee at the Health Is Wealth Gym, confessed to
PO3 Acebuche that he was part of the plan to kidnap Edwin, as in fact he was the one who
tipped off Mariano, Renato, Armando and a certain Virgilio Varona on the condition that he
will be given a share in the ransom money. Rodolfo gave information on the whereabouts of
his cohorts, leading to their arrest. In the early morning of the following day, the PACER team
found the dead body of Edwin at Laurel, Batangas, which Roderick identified.

While the RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses prove that the victim
Edwin was abducted, deprived of liberty, and eventually killed, a fact which is supported by
the subject certificate of death, it did not consider said death in its judgment. The RTC

72
convicted accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention. The
CA affirmed in toto the RTC's conviction of accused-appellants.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention. No.
Held:
The Court is, however, constrained to modify the ruling of the RTC and the CA, as the crime
the accused-appellants have committed does not, as the records obviously bear, merely
constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but that of the special complex crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in view of the victim's (i.e.,Edwin's) death,
which was (a) specifically charged in the Information, and (b) clearly established during the
trial of this case. Notably, while this matter was not among the issues raised before the Court,
the same should nonetheless be considered in accordance with the settled rule that in a
criminal case, an appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire case wide open for review, and
the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed
judgment.

Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom, accused-appellants' conviction must be modified from Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention to the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide.

73
People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 217978, 30 January 2019
Assigned to: Montesa, Romar Bae Topic: RA 9208
Keywords:
Trafficking, pimp
Doctrine:
The crime is still considered trafficking if it involves the "recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harboring[,] or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation" even if it does not involve any of the
means stated under the law. Trafficking is considered qualified when "the trafficked person is a child[.]"
Facts:
PO1 Nemenzo and a team member, Police Officer 1 Llanes (PO1 Llanes), ordered beers and waited for
the pimps. Two (2) women approached them and introduced themselves as AAA and BBB. Upon
hearing that they would need two (2) more girls, another woman approached them and introduced
herself as Nancy, who was later identified as Ramirez. She told the police officers that she could
provide the girls. Then, BBB and Ramirez left, and after a while, returned with two (2) more girls.
They agreed that each girl would cost P600.00 as payment for sexual services. After Ramirez provided
the four (4) girls, the group left and hailed a taxi heading for ________ Motel. Ramirez had told the
girls to accept the money that they would be given. In the taxi, PO1 Llanes handed P2,400.00 to one (1)
of the girls. As soon as the girl received it, PO1 Nemenzo and PO1 Llanes introduced themselves as
police officers, and turned the girls over to their team leader in a civilian van parked near them. The
police officers were told to return to the area and await the other teams' return. Later, Ramirez was
arrested when BBB pointed to her as the pimp.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution proved accused-appellant Nancy Lasaca Ramirez' guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of qualified trafficking of persons
Held:
Yes. Here, accused-appellant was charged with having violated qualified trafficking in relation
to Section 4 (e) of Republic Act No. 9208, which provides that it is unlawful for anyone "[t]o
maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography[.]"

The prosecution established that on the night of December 5, 2009, accused-appellant

approached PO1 Nemenzo and offered him the sexual services of four (4) girls, two (2) of
whom were minors, for P2,400.00. The police operation had been the result of previous
surveillance conducted within the area by the Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force.
Both minor victims testified that this incident was not the first time that accused-appellant
pimped them out to customers, and that any payment to them would include the payment of
commission to accused-appellant.

This Court in People v. Rodriguez acknowledged that as with Casio, the corroborating
testimonies of the arresting officer and the minor victims were sufficient to sustain a
conviction under the law. In People v. Spouses Ybañez, et al., this Court likewise affirmed the
conviction of traffickers arrested based on a surveillance report on the prostitution of minors
within the area. In People v. XXX and YYY, this Court held that the exploitation of minors,

74
through either prostitution or pornography, is explicitly prohibited under the law. Casio also
recognizes that the crime is considered consummated even if no sexual intercourse had taken
place since the mere transaction consummates the crime.

Here, accused-appellant cannot use as a valid defense either BBB's and AAA's consent to the
transaction, or that BBB received the payment on her behalf. In Casio:

The victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive
means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of
coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out of his or her
own free will.

In any case, PO1 Nemenzo had categorically testified that he and PO1 Llanes were approached
by accused-appellant, who had negotiated prices on AAA and BBB's behalf. 51
Accused-appellant has not alleged any ill motive on PO1 Nemenzo's part to testify against her.

This Court, therefore, affirms the trial court and the Court of Appeals' conviction of accused-appellant
in violation of Republic Act No. 9208, Section 4 (e), as qualified by Section 6 (a) and punished under
Section 10 (c).

75
People v. XXX and YYY, G.R. No. 235652, 9 July 2018
Assigned to: Lopez, Robert Topic: RA 9208
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

76
People v. Mora, G.R. No. 242682, 1 July 2019
Assigned to: Nakagawa, Mark Hiro De Los Topic: RA 9208
Santos
Keywords: Otoy’s videoke bar, entertainer, minor.

Doctrine: Trafficking in persons of minors instructs that the victim's consent is rendered
meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of
human trafficking.

Facts: The prosecution claimed that on November 26, 2011, Mora was able to convince AAA,
then a minor, to come with her to Buraburan, Buhi, Camarines Sur. Upon arriving thereat,
Mora left AAA at Otoy's Videoke Bar (Otoy's) owned by Polvoriza; thereafter, Polvoriza
locked AAA inside a room therein, prohibited her from going out, and took her mobile phone
and destroyed its SIM card. Polvoriza then made AAA work as an entertainer at Otoy's under
the stage name "Rizza M. Rañada," forcing her to take shabu, dance naked, and even have sex
with the customers. Eight (8) months later, AAA was able to escape from Polvoriza's custody
and return to her father, to whom she narrated her ordeal. Her father then took AAA to the
police station to report the matter and also to a medico-legal, who, after examination,
confirmed, inter alia, that AAA sustained multiple hymenal lacerations which could have
resulted from consensual and forcible sexual contact.

In her defense, while Mora admitted knowing Polvoriza, she denied being close friends
with her. She also averred that she and AAA had been close to each other and even treated the
latter as her own sister. She then narrated that on November 26, 2011, AAA insisted that she
accompany her to Buraburan, Buhi, Camarines Sur, to which Mora reluctantly agreed. Upon
arrival thereat, AAA proceeded inside Otoy' s and a few moments later returned outside to give
her ₱200.00. Thereafter, she returned home. Finally, she claimed that when she first met AAA,
she thought that the latter was already of age based on her physical appearance.

For her part, Polvoriza maintained that she first saw AAA in the evening of November
26, 2011 when the latter went inside Otoy's, introduced herself as "Rizza M.Rañada," and
expressed her desire to work therein. According to Polvoriza, she initially declined as she did
not hire entertainers for her bar, but nonetheless, she let AAA stay because she was "nice." A
few days later, AAA returned to Otoy's and handed her a pink card, which Polvoriza knew to
be a health card secured by entertainers from health centers. Finally, Polvoriza claimed that she
only learned of AAA's true identity when she was arrested in connection with the instant
criminal case.

The RTC and CA convicted Nerissa Mora a.k.a. Neri Balagta Mora for the crime of
Qualified Trafficking in Persons.

Issue: Whether or not Mora's conviction for Qualified Trafficking in Persons should be upheld.

77
Held: Yes. Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 defines the term "Trafficking in Persons" as the
"recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the
victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of
force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position,
taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose
of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or
sale of organs." The same provision further provides that "the recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered
as 'trafficking in persons' even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding
paragraph. The crime of "Trafficking in Persons" becomes qualified when, among others, the
trafficked person is a child. As correctly ruled by the courts a quo, Mora and Polvoriza are
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged as the prosecution had clearly
established the existence of the elements thereof, as seen in the following:

(a) Mora, through deception and by taking advantage of AAA's vulnerability as a minor, was
able to "convince" the latter to go to Buraburan, Buhi, Camarines Sur;

(b) upon arrival thereat, Mora took AAA to Polvoriza's videoke bar, i.e., Otoy's, and left her
there; and (c) since then and for the next eight (8) months, Polvoriza forced AAA to work as a
prostitute in Otoy's, coercing her to perform lewd acts on a nightly basis, such as dancing
naked in front of male customers and even having sex with them.

In this regard, the courts a quo correctly found untenable Mora and Polvoriza's insistence
that it was AAA who voluntarily presented herself to work as an' entertainer/sex worker in
Otoy's, as trafficking in persons can still be committed even if the victim gives consent, most
especially in cases where the victim is a minor. In this regard, case law instructs that the
victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means
employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or
deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out of his or her own free will.

78
Arambulo v. People, G.R. No. 241834, 24 July 2019
Assigned to: Natividad, Genesis Joy Azarcon Topic: RA 9208
Keywords:
Qualified Trafficking in Persons
Doctrine:
Section 3 of RA 9208 merely provides for the general definition of “Trafficking in
Persons”; the punishable acts are found in Sections 4 and 5.
Qualified Trafficking in Persons" shall rest on: (a) the commission of any of the acts
provided under Sections 4, 4-A, 4-B, 4-C, or 5; and (b) the existence of any of the
circumstances listed under Section 6. Otherwise stated, one cannot be convicted of
"Qualified Trafficking in Persons" if he is not found to have committed any of the
punishable acts under the law.
ELEMENTS: For a successful prosecution of Trafficking in Persons, the following
elements must be shown:
(1) the act of recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with
or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;
(2) the means used which include threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another;' and
(3) the purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

Facts:
Petitioner Fernando Arambulo was found by the RTC (Calamba) guilty of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons. Based on the findings of fact, the petitioner and his minor son
Dominique invited the latter’s 3 minor schoolmates AAA, BBB and CCC to their house. While
the 4 minors were inside the house, petitioner revealed that the purpose of their meeting was to
commit a robbery with their help. Upon learning about the petitioner's plan, CCC expressed his
desire to leave. However, petitioner punched him in the face and forced him to stay. AAA,
BBB, and CCC all testified that petitioner was the mastermind of the series of robberies in
Calamba and that he was the driver of their getaway tricycle.

On the other hand, petitioner and his son testified that the allegations were not true. He
claimed that it was only an act of retaliation by Lt. Hosena who filed a case for theft against
them.

The CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modification and found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons, defined and penalized under

79
Section 4 (k) (4) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9208 as
amended by RA 10364, otherwise known as the "Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2012. In view thereof, the instant case is filed by the petitioner contending that he cannot be
convicted for an alleged violation of Section 4 (k)(4) of RA 9208 as amended by RA 10364
because the same provision was not yet in effect at the time the he committed the acts
complained of. The said provision was only enacted on February 2013 while the period upon
which he allegedly committed the acts complained of covers 2011 to 2012.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's conviction for Qualified Trafficking in
Persons

Held:
Yes, however his conviction is based on a different provision of the law. Petitioner
correctly pointed out that he cannot be convicted for an alleged violation of Section 4(k)(4)
of RA 9208 as amended because the said provision only took effect after the period the
acts complained of were committed. However, this will not this will not ipso facto result in
his acquittal, as his acts of recruiting minors for the purpose of committing a series of
robberies reasonably fall under Section 4 (a) of RA 9208 in its original form, which reads:
Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. — It shall be unlawful for any
person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by
any means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas
employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary
servitude or debt bondage; (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Relatedly, Section 3 (d) of RA 9208 in its original form defines the term "forced labor and
slavery" as "the extraction of work or services from any person by means of
enticement, violence, intimidation or threat, use of force or coercion, including
deprivation of freedom, abuse of authority or moral ascendancy, debt-bondage or
deception."
The prosecution had clearly established the existence of the elements of violation of
Section 4 (a) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208 in its original form, as evinced
by the following: (a) petitioner, through his minor son, Dominique, recruited three (3) other
minors AAA, BBB, and CCC; (b) based on AAA, BBB, and CCC's testimonies, petitioner
was able to do so by taking advantage of their vulnerability as minors, particularly through
enticement, violence, and use of force and coercion; and (c) petitioner recruited them for
the purpose of engaging them to perform illicit work/services, i.e., commit a series of
robberies. Notably, the ultimate facts constitutive of these circumstances were clearly
alleged and contained in the Information.

80
 Note on Consent: Case law instructs that "the victim's consent is rendered meaningless due
to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human
trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's
consent is not given out of his or her own free will.

|||

81
Caluag v. People, G.R. No. 171511, 4 March 2009
Assigned to: Ortigoza, Beatriz Anne Diaz Topic: Threats
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

82
Paera v. People, G.R. No. 181626, 30 May 2011
Assigned to: Osmeña, Ramon Vicenzzo Topic: Threats
Elauria
Keywords: Grave Threats, Papatayin kita, Communal water from a communal tank

Doctrine:
- These threats were consummated as soon as Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente heard the
petitioner utter his threatening remarks. Having spoken the threats at different points in
time to these three individuals, albeit in rapid succession, petitioner incurred three
separate criminal liabilities.
- Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats “any person who shall threaten
another with the infliction upon the person x x x of the latter or his family of any wrong
amounting to a crime [.]” This felony is consummated “as soon as the threats come to
the knowledge of the person threatened.”

Facts:

Santiago Paera, a Punong Barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, allocates limited
distribution of communal water from a communal tank to his constituents. The tank was
located at the property of Vicente Darong, the complainant, father of Indalecio Darong, a
complainant. Despite the petitioners’ scheme, Indalencio continued drawing water from the
tank. On April 7, 1999, Santiago Paera reminded Indalencio of the water scheme and cut
Indalencio’s access.

The following day the petitioner inspected the tank due to his constituents’ complaints about
the water interruption supply and discovered a tap on the main line and he disconnected it. To
stop water from leaking, petitioner borrowed a bolo and made a wooden plug, this was when
Indalecio arrived. What happened next was contested by both parties.

According to the prosecution, Paera without any warning charged and shouted at Indalencio
“patyon tikaw!” (I will kill you). Indalencio ran for safety and passing along the way Diosetea
his wife who followed him going to the tank. Diosetea asked the petitioner what’s the matter
and instead of replying, petitioner should “wala koy gipili, bisag babaye ka patyon tikaw!”, (“I
don’t spare anyone, even if you’re a woman, I will kill you!”). Diosotea also ran and sought
refuge at a nearby house of her relative. Unable to pursue Diosotea, petitioner turned his back
to Indalecio. As he chased Indalencio, he came across Vicente, father of Indalecio and
recognizes him and thrusts his bolo towards him shouting, “bisag gulang ka, buk-on ko imo
ulo!” (“even if you’re old I will crack open your skull”).

According to petitioner, it was Indalecio who threatened him with a bolo. Angrily inquiring
why the petitioner cut his supply of water connection. Forcing the petitioner to take a
defensive stance and using a borrowed bolo makes Indalencio run away.

83
Except for the father of Indalencio, Vicente who was seriously ill, the Darong’s testified during
trial. The petitioner was the defense lone witness.
Issue: Whether or not Santiago Paera is guilty of three counts of grave threats
Held:

The nature of the crime of Grave Threats and the proper application of the concepts of
continued and complex crimes preclude the adoption of petitioner’s theory.

Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats any person who shall threaten another
with the infliction upon the person of the latter or his family of any wrong amounting to a
crime. This felony is consummated as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the person
threatened.

Santiago Paera’s threat to kill Indalencio and Diosetia and crack open Vicente’s skull are
wrongs amounting to homicide and serious physical injuries as penalized in Revised Penal
Code. The threats were consummated as soon as the Darongs heard Paera said his threatening
remarks.

The proof of grave threats against Vicente came from the prosecution’s evidence on the
testimonies of Indalencio and Diosetia and two witnesses who corroborated with them
indisputably showing the threat of Paera on killing Vicente. Vicente’s absence on the stand
does not affect the veracity and strength of the prosecution’s evidence.

There is no justifying circumstances attended on Paera’s commission of grave threats. His

claim of defence of a stranger under rule number 3 of Article 11 of the RPC which negates the
criminal liability of “anyone who acts in defence of his persons or rights of a stranger,
provided that the first and second requisites in the next preceding circumstance are present and
the person defending be not induced by resentment, revenge or any other evil motives” which
requires 1. Unlawful aggression 2. Reasonable necessity of means to avoid or repeal it and 3.
Lack of provocation on the part of the person being attacked. None of these requisites was
obtained. This claim of Paera has no merit on having acted to protect and defend the water
rights of his constituents in the lawful exercise of his office as punong barangay.

The justifying circumstances of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office under Article 11

paragraph 5 lies upon a proof the offense was committed was the necessary consequence of the
due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of office. When Paera barred the Darong’s
access to communal water, arguably, he acted in the performance of his duty to ensure the
delivery of basic services. But he excessively exceeded the bounds of his office when he
chased the Darong’s with a bladed weapon, threatening harm on their persons for violation on
his orders.

84
Escolano v. People, G.R. No. 226991, 10 December 2018
Assigned to: Pagdanganan, Stephanie Ann Topic: Threats
Guingona
Keywords: Section 10 (a) RA 7610

Doctrine:Debasement is defined as the act of reducing the value, quality, or purity of

something; degradation, on the other hand, is a lessening of a person’s or thing’s character or
quality; while demean means to lower in status, condition, reputation or character.

Facts:This appeal by certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the June 15, 2016 Decision and
August 12, 2016 Resolution of the CA. The CA affirmed the December 5, 2014 Decision of
Branch 94 (RTC, Quezon city), finding Escolano guilty of violation of Section 10(a) of R.A.
No. 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act. AAA, 11, BBB, 9, and CCC, 8, were flying paper planes
from the third floor of their house when the planes landed in front of the house of Perlin
Escolano, the daughter of petitioner. Perlin uttered "putang ina" directed at CCC. The
following day, AAA threw a sachet of ketchup at Erlinda. She scolded AAA saying, "Huwag
kang mamamato." Instead of desisting, AAA and his brothers BBB and CCC continued to
throw ketchup sachets. Thereafter, AAA shouted, "Linda, putang ina mo, wala kang kwenta."
Petitioner warned that she would report them to DDD, their mother. DDD suddenly arrived
uttering invectives and pointing her finger at petitioner while uttering, "Linda, putang ina mo!
Bobo ka! Wala kang pinag¬ aralan!" Erlinda pointed her finger at DDD and uttered, "Hoy,
putang ina mo," got a bolo, and yelled "Kaya ninyo ito? Pagtatatagain ko kayo." Thereafter,
DDD noticed a change in the behavior of private complainants as they no longer played
downstairs and they even transferred residence because of the incident. DDD averred that her
children were traumatized, and they were in constant fear because of petitioner's threat.

Issue: Whether the petitioner violated SECTION 10(A) OF R.A. NO. 7610.

Held:Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, in relation thereto, Sec. 3(b) of the same law, highlights that
in child abuse, the act by deeds or words must debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being. Debasement is defined as the act of reducing the
value, quality, or purity of something; degradation, on the other hand, is a lessening of a
person’s or thing’s character or quality; while demean means to lower in status, condition,
reputation or character.

When this element of intent to debase, degrade or demean is present, the accused shall be
convicted of violating Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, which carries a heavier penalty compared
to that of slight physical injuries or other light threats under the RPC.

85
In this case, the Court finds that the act of petitioner in shouting invectives against private
complainants does not constitute child abuse under the foregoing provisions of R.A. No. 7610.
Petitioner had no intention to debase the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child. It was rather
an act carelessly done out of anger. The circumstances surrounding the incident proved that
petitioner’s act of uttering invectives against the minors AAA, BBB, and CCC was done in the
heat of anger.

It is clear that petitioner’s utterances against private complainants were made because there
was provocation from the latter. AAA, BBB, and CCC were throwing ketchup sachets at
petitioner’s daughter Perlin. The latter evaded this by getting inside their house, so that private
complainants hit petitioner on the head and feet, instead. The complainants continued to throw
these sachets which angered petitioner. Evidently, petitioner’s statements “bobo, walang utak,
putang ina” and the threat to “ipahabol” and “ipakagat sa aso” were all said out of frustration
or annoyance. Petitioner merely intended that the children stop their unruly behavior.

On the other hand, the prosecution failed to present any iota of evidence to prove petitioner’s
intention to debase, degrade or demean the child victims. The record does not show that
petitioner’s act of threatening the private complainants was intended to place the latter in an
embarrassing and shameful situation before the public. There was no indication that petitioner
had any specific intent to humiliate AAA, BBB, and CCC; her threats resulted from the private
complainants’ vexation.

Verily, as the prosecution failed to specify any intent to debase the “intrinsic worth and
dignity” of complainants as human beings, or that she had intended to humiliate or embarrass
AAA, BBB, and CCC; thus, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable under Sec. 10(a) of
R.A. No. 7610.

86
Consulta v. People, G.R. No. 179462, 12 February 2009
Assigned to: Paril, Jan Rafael Figuerres Topic: Coercion
Keywords:
Robbery or Grave Coercion
Doctrine:
The difference in robbery and grave coercion lies in the intent in the commission of the act.

Facts:

Pedro Consulta and his family used to rent the ground floor of Nelia’s house in Pateros. Nelia
is his godmother. The adjacent house was occupied by Nelia’s parents with whom she often
quarreled as to whom the rental payments should be remitted. Because of the perception of the
parents of Nelia that his family was partial towards her, her parents disliked his family. Nelia’s
father even filed a case for maltreatment against him which was dismissed and, on learning of
the maltreatment charge, Nelia ordered him and his family to move out of their house and filed
a case against him for grave threats and another for light threats which were dismissed or in
which he was acquitted.

Pedro Consulta went on to claim that despite frequent transfers of residence to avoid Nelia, she
would track his whereabouts and cause scandal.

Pedro’s witness Darius Pacaña testified that on the date of the alleged robbery, Nelia, together
with her two companions, approached him while he was at Ambel Street in the company of
Michael Fontanilla and Jimmy Sembrano, and asked him (Pacaña) if he knew a bald man who
is big/stout with a big tummy and with a sister named Maria. As he replied in the affirmative,
Nelia at once asked him to accompany them to the appellant's house, to which he acceded. As
soon as the group reached Pedro’s house, appellant, on his (Pacaña’s) call, emerged and on
seeing the group, told them to go away so as not to cause trouble. Retorting, Nelia uttered
“Mga hayop kayo, hindi ko kayo titigilan.”

Issue:
Whether or not the accused are guilty of Grave Coercion or Robbery?
Held:

The accused is guilty of Grave Coercion.

The difference in robbery and grave coercion lies in the intent in the commission of the act.
The motives of the accused are the prime criterion: “The distinction between the two lines of
decisions, the one holding to robbery and the other to coercion, is deemed to be the intention
of the accused. Was the purpose with intent to gain to take the property of another by use of
force or intimidation?

Then, conviction for robbery. Was the purpose, without authority of law but still believing
himself the owner or the creditor, to compel another to do something against his will and to

87
seize property? Then, conviction for coercion under Article 497 of the Penal Code. The
motives of the accused are the prime criterion. And there was no common robber in the present
case, but a man who had fought bitterly for title to his ancestral estate, taking the law into his
own hands and attempting to collect what he thought was due him. Animus furandi was
lacking.”

88
Maderazo v. People, G.R. No. 165065, 26 September 2006
Assigned to: Perez, Lalaine Gay Pascua Topic: Coercion
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

89
Baleros v. People, G.R. No. 138033, 22 February 2006
Assigned to: Piego, Melvin John Castelo Topic: Coercion
Keywords:

Unjust Vexation; Handkerchief; Chloroform;

Doctrine:

As aptly observed by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there is no need to allege malice,
restraint or compulsion in an information for unjust vexation. As it were, unjust vexation exists
even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term is broad
enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or
material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.
Facts:

On December 13, 1991 around 1:30am the petitioner Renato Baleros Jr, (CHITO), arrived at
the Celestial Marie Building (“Building”) at Sampaloc Manila. He was allowed to enter the
Building to go to Room 306 where his friend, Joseph Bernard Africa, was staying.

Early morning of that same day, the victim, Malou, who was staying the Room 307 of the said
building was suddenly woken up when an unidentified person was pressing down on her body
and her mouth with a piece of cloth with a smell of chemical. She struggled and was able to
broke free from the assailant’s grasp and was able to call for help. She was not able to
positively identify the assailant but was able to describe that the person was wearing a soft
cotton like upper garment like a t-shirt and a satin-like lower garment. She also found out that
her nightdress was stained in blue and that the assailant escaped from the open window of the
room which leads to Room 306.

Investigation ensued later that morning by the CIS. Chito and Joseph were apprehended for
questioning. A bag was also found in the building containing the T-Shirt with blue stain, the
satin-like shorts and a handkerchief with a chemical odor. The bag was positively identified to
belong to Chito and Chito was positively identified by some of the witnesses to be the one
wearing the T-Shirt and Shorts found.

An information was filed against him for attempted rape. The trial court convicted him for the
said crime based on the corroborative testimonies of the witness and object evidence found in
the scene. The CA affirmed such decision. Hence, the petition.
Issue:

Whether or not Chito is liable for the crime of attempted rape.

Held:

90
No. The Supreme Court held that Chito is not liable for attempted rape but of unjust vexation
or light coercion punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The Supreme Court ruled in this
wise:

After a careful review of the facts and evidence on record in the light of applicable
jurisprudence, the Court is disposed to rule for petitioner’s acquittal, but not necessarily
because there is no direct evidence pointing to him as the intruder holding a chemical-soaked
cloth who pinned Malou down on the bed in the early morning of December 13, 1991.

There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal

knowledge in the present case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is whether or
not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of
Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.

It would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the
mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and
necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not commence at all the performance
of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized
that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let
alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious,
if that was really his immediate intention, is anybody’s guess.

Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent, under the
premises, of any wrongdoing whatsoever. The information filed against petitioner contained an
allegation that he forcefully covered the face of Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in
chemical. And during the trial, Malou testified about the pressing against her face of the
chemical-soaked cloth and having struggled after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her
down. Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted
rape, as earlier discussed, they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under
the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code. In the context of the
constitutional provision assuring an accused of a crime the right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation, it cannot be said that petitioner was kept in the dark of the
inculpatory acts for which he was proceeded against. To be sure, the information against
petitioner contains sufficient details to enable him to make his defense. As aptly observed by
then Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there is no need to allege malice, restraint or compulsion in an
information for unjust vexation. As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of
restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to include any human
conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly
annoy or irritate an innocent person. The paramount question is whether the offender’s act
causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to
whom it is directed. That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating to her
classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for
attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of
petitioner.

91
Laurel v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, 27 February 2006 and Resolution dated 13 January
2009
Assigned to: Prats, Jacquelina Martina Barrios Topic: Theft
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

92
Worldwide Web v. People, G.R. No. 161106, 13 January 2014
Assigned to: Ragot, Joanie Mae Dela Peña Topic: Theft
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

93
Ablaza v. People, G.R. No. 217722, 26 September 2018
Assigned to: Ramos, Lara Linda Lazo Topic: Robbery vs Theft
Keywords: necklace

Doctrine: Where there is nothing in the evidence to show that some kind of violence had been
exerted to accomplish the snatching, and the offended party herself admitted that she did not
feel anything at the time her watch was snatched from her left wrist, the crime committed is
not robbery but only on simple theft.

Facts:
The accused,on July 29, 2010, conspiring, confederating together, and mutually helping one
another, with intent to gain, and by mean of force and violence, against Rosario Snyder, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and forcibly grab, take, steal and carry away
three (3) pieces of necklace worth Php 43,800.00, Php 12,800.00, and Php Php13,500.00
respectively, or in the total amount of Php 70,000.00, belonging to said complainant, to her
damage and prejudice. She had receipts to prove her ownership. She bought them at a jewelry
store. Snyder was certain about the identity of the petitioner since she had a good look at the
robbers’ faces when they looked back at her before speeding away and also because petitioner
was not wearing any helmet at that time. The CA was not swayed by the petitioner's assertions
and found no merit in the appeal and saw no reason not to believe Snyder’s testimony and
found all the elements of robbery obtained. In debunking the petitioner’s claim that the
element of violence was absent, the CA stated that the only way that the necklace could have
been taken from Snyder was through the use of violence and physical force.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner should be acquitted of the crime of robbery or, in the alternative,
that he be held liable only for theft.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the petitioner must be held liable only for theft and not robbery.
In determining the existence of the fourth requisite in cases of simple robbery under Article
294, courts should not look into whether the taking of personal property is with violence
against or intimidation of persons and not on whether there was force. The phrase by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons in Article 312 must be construed to refer to the
same phrase used in Article 294. Paragraphs 1-4 of Article 294 involve the use of violence
against persons. Clearly, for the requisite of violence to obtain in cases of simple robbery, the
victim must have sustained less serious physical injuries or slight physical injuries in the
occasion of the robbery. In this case, Snyder did not sustain any kind of injury at all.

94
Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 235739, 22 July 2019
Assigned to: Real, Christian Villanueva Topic: Robbery vs Theft
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

95
People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 200081, 8 June 2016
Assigned to: Reyes, Rea Glaiza Ramos Topic: Article 294
Keywords: Qualified Theft; Manager
Doctrine:
The elements of Qualified Theft (Art. 310, RPC) committed with grave abuse of confidence
are as follows: (1) Taking of personal property; (2) That the said property belongs to another;
(3) That the said taking be done with intent to gain; (4) That it be done without the owner’s
consent; (5) That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things; and, (6) That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. All
the elements of Qualified Theft are present in this case.

As the crime committed is qualified theft, we do not apply the rule in simple theft that the
maximum penalty cannot exceed 20 years. . The penalty for qualified theft has no such
limitation.

Circumstantial evidence is defined as that which "goes to prove a fact or series of facts other
than the facts in issue, which, if proved, may tend by inference to establish a fact in issue."
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the requirements in order for
circumstantial evidence can sustain conviction: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Facts:
Complainant Carlos put up a business (Chromax Marketing) engaged in the sale of and
services for tires. Carlos employed accused Cruz as the Manager to register and manage the
business, attend to the needs of the customers, receive orders, issue receipts and accept
payments, and to prepare daily sales report. Despite the increase in sales, Chromax's financial
capital remained unimpressive. Upon inquiry prompted by suspicion, Carlos discovered that
Cruz was stealing from Chromax. He discovered that the remaining balance of their customers
and Cruz's advances (vale) totaled P97,984.00. At the bottom of the balance sheet was an
acknowledgment that the amount stated as lost was actually used by Cruz for his personal
benefit. Carlos also discovered an irregularity in the receipts issued by the Cruz to services
rendered to Miescor.

Carlos filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against Cruz. During arraignment, Cruz
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. RTC convicted Cruz finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft. The RTC opined that Cruz's admission of
taking the amount stated as loss for his personal use is enough to sustain his conviction.

The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and found that all the elements of theft, together with
the circumstances that led to the appreciation of the crime as qualified theft, were sufficiently
established by the prosecution.

96
Cruz appealed the CA Decision before the SC on the basis that the CA erred in convicting
Cruz on the basis of insufficient circumstantial evidence.

Issue:
Whether or not Cruz is guilty of Qualified Theft (Art. 310, RPC)
Held:
The Court finds the accused guilty of Qualified Theft under Art. 310 of RPC. The elements of
Qualified Theft committed with grave abuse of confidence are as follows: (1) Taking of
personal property; (2) That the said property belongs to another; (3) That the said taking be
done with intent to gain; (4) That it be done without the owner’s consent; (5) That it be
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
things; and, (6) That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. All the elements of Qualified
Theft are present in this case.

The records reveal that it is by Cruz's own admission why a conviction can be sustained. Cruz
declared that he took the money for his personal use. Nevertheless, even without Cruz's own
admission and direct evidence proving Cruz's guilt, a conviction can still be sustained. As
correctly held by the CA, direct evidence is not the sole means to establish guilt because the
accused's guilt can be proven by circumstantial evidence.

Cruz's guilt was also proven through the following circumstantial evidence: Cruz, as the
manager of Chromax, had sole access to the money and other collectibles of Chromax; he had
sole authority to issue receipts; he gave commissions without Carlos' authority; he forged the
amount in the sales report and receipts; and finally, insinuated that it was Albaitar who
misappropriated the money without providing any scintilla of proof to support his accusations.

Imposable Penalty: The penalty for qualified theft is based on the value of the property
stolen, which in this case is P97,984.00. To compute the imposable penalty, first take the basic
penalty for theft (prision mayor). To determine the additional years of imprisonment to be
added to the basic penalty, the amount of P22,000.00 is deducted from P97,984.00, which
leaves a difference of P75,984.00. This amount is divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any
amount less than P10,000.00. The resulting quotient then is 7 years, which is added to the
basic penalty. In this case, because Cruz committed qualified theft, his penalty is two degrees
higher than the penalty for simple theft (reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods) which shall be added to the 7 years. Thus, the range of the imposable penalty is 25
years, 2 months, and 21 days to 27 years.

As the crime committed is qualified theft, we do not apply the rule in simple theft that the
maximum penalty cannot exceed 20 years. The penalty for qualified theft has no such
limitation. His penalty exceeds 20 years of reclusion temporal, the penalty that should be
imposed, therefore, is reclusion perpetua.

People v. Escote, G.R. No. 140756, 4 April 2003

97
Assigned to: Rivera, Emmanuel Jr. Mendoza Topic: Article 294
Keywords: Five Star Bus; Aggravating Circumstance cannot be appreciated if not alleged in
the Information; Robbery with Homicide

Doctrine: a)ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; ELEMENTS. — The Court

finds that the trial court committed no error in convicting Juan and Victor of robbery with
homicide. . . . To warrant the conviction of Juan and Victor for the said charge, the prosecution
was burdened to prove the confluence of the following essential elements: . . . (a) the taking of
personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property
thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus
lucrandi and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide,
which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed.
b) ID.; ID.; INTENT TO ROB MUST PRECEDE THE TAKING OF HUMAN LIFE. — The
intent to rob must precede the taking of human life. In robbery with homicide, so long as the
intention of the felons was to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.
c) ID.; ID.; COMMITTED EVEN IF THE VICTIM OF ROBBERY IS OTHER THAN THE
VICTIM OF THE HOMICIDE. — Even if the victim of robbery is other than the victim of the
homicide committed on the occasion of or by reason of the robbery, nevertheless, there is only
one single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. All the crimes committed on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged and integrated into a single and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide.
d) ID.; ID.; ALL THOSE WHO TOOK PART IN THE ROBBERY WILL BE HELD GUILTY
THEREOF ALTHOUGH THEY DID NOT TAKE PART IN THE HOMICIDE, UNLESS IT
APPEARS THAT THEY ENDEAVORED TO PREVENT THE HOMICIDE.
e) ID.; PENALTIES; TREACHERY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A GENERIC
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE FOR THE
IMPOSITION OF THE PROPER PENALTY. - Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that in diminishing or increasing the penalty for a crime, aggravating
circumstances shall be taken into account. However, aggravating circumstances which in
themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in
defining a crime and prescribing a penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the
purpose of increasing the penalty. Under paragraph 2 of the law, the same rule shall apply with
respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of
necessity accompany the commission thereof. Treachery is not an element of robbery with
homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime specially punishable by law nor is it included by
the law in defining the crime of robbery with homicide and prescribing the penalty therefor.
Treachery is likewise not inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide. Hence, treachery
should be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide for the
imposition of the proper penalty for the crime.
f) ID.; ID.; TREACHERY SHALL BE APPRECIATED AGAINST ALL THE FELONS
WHO HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE MANNER OF KILLING OF VICTIMS OF
HOMICIDE.
g) ID.; TREACHERY CANNOT AGGRAVATE THE PENALTY FOR THE CRIME IF NOT
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION EVEN IF PROVEN DURING THE TRIAL. — Be that
as it may, treachery cannot be appreciated against Juan and Victor in the case at bar because

98
the same was not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Facts: Rodolfo Cacatian, driver of Five Star Passenger Bus, drove the bus from its terminal at
Pasay City to its destination in Bolinao, Pangasinan. Also on board was Romulo Digap,
conductor of the bus, as well as some passengers. At Camachile, Balintawak, six passengers
boarded the bus, including Victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. SPO1 Jose C. Manio
Jr.,was also a passenger, a resident of Angeles City. When the bus was travelling along the
highway in Plaridel, Bulacan, Juan and Victor suddenly stood up, whipped out their handguns
and announced a holdup.Juan and Victor divested from the passengers of their money and
valuables. Juan divested Romulo of the fares he had collected from the passengers. The felons
then went to the place Manio, Jr. was seated and demanded that he show them his
identification card and wallet.Victor and Juan shot the police officer (Manio, Jr.), him on the
mouth, right ear, chest and right side of his body. Victor and Juan ordered Rodolfo to stop the
bus along the overpass in Mexico, Pampanga where they alighted from the bus. The robbery
was over in 25 minutes. When the bus reached Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, Rodolfo and
Romulo reported the incident to the police authorities.In the course of the investigation, Juan
admitted to the police investigators that he and Victor, staged the robbery on board Five Star
Bus and are responsible for the death of SPO1 Manio, Jr.
An information charging Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan with robbery with
homicide was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan.

Issues: a) Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the two (2) accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.
b) Whether or not treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide.
c) Whether or not treachery may be appreciated against Juan and Victor.

Held: a)The trial court committed no error in convicting Juan and Victor of robbery with
homicide pursuant to Art. 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
7659. To warrant the conviction of Juan and Victor for the said charge, the prosecution was
burdened to prove the confluence of the following essential elements:
a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence of intimidation against a
person;
b) the property thus taken belongs to another;
c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi and
d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is
herein used in a generic sense, was committed.
The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life.In robbery with homicide, so long as
the intention of the felons was to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.
Even if the victim of robbery is other than the victim of the homicide committed on the
occasion of or by reason of the robbery, nevertheless, there is only one single and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide.Case law has it that whenever homicide has been committed
by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the
robbery will also be held guilty as principals of robbery with homicide although they did not
take part in the homicide, unless it appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide.

99
In this case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Juan and Victor conspired
and confabulated together in robbing the passengers of the Five Star Bus of their money and
valuables and Romulo of his collections of the fares of the passengers and in killing SPO1
Manio, Jr. with impunity on the occasion of the robbery. Hence, both Juan and Victor are
guilty as principals by direct participation of the felony of robbery with homicide under par. 1,
Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death.

b) Treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in the felony of robbery with homicide, a

special complex crime and at the same time a single and indivisible offense. However, this
Court in two cases has held that robbery with homicide is a crime against property and hence
treachery which is appreciated only to crimes against persons should not be appreciated as a
generic aggravating circumstance. Case law supports that in robbery with homicide or robbery
with rape, homicide or rape are merely incidents of the robbery, with robbery being the main
prupose and object of the criminal.
In sum then, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide when
the victim of homicide is killed by treachery.

c) The Court ruled in the affirmative. Be that as it may, treachery cannot be appreciated against
Juan and Victor in the case at bar because the same was not alleged in the Information.

100
People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 179943, 26 June 2009
Assigned to: Rodriguez, Rica Joy Caoile Topic: Article 294
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

101
People v. Sultan, G.R. No. 132470, 27 April 2000
Assigned to: Roxas, Arjuna Debi Uy Topic: Article 294
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

102
Napolis v. Court of Appeals, L-28865, 28 February 1972
Assigned to: Salem, Laleine Almira Buen Topic: Article 299
Keywords: robbery

Doctrine: When the elements of both provisions(Art. 299 and 294) are present, that the crime
is a complex one, calling for the imposition -- as provided in Art. 48 of said Code -- of the
penalty for the most serious offense, in its maximum period, which, in the case at bar, is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period.
Facts:

At about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 1, 1956, Mrs. Casimira Lagman
Peñaflor, 47-year old wife of Ignacio Peñaflor, the owner of a store located at the new
highway, Hermosa, Bataan, after answering a minor call of nature, heard the barkings of the
dog nearby indicating the presence of strangers around the vicinity. Acting on instinct, she
woke up husband Ignacio Peñaflor who, after getting his flashlight and .38 caliber revolver,
went down the store to take a look. As he approached the door of the store, it suddenly gave
way, having been forcibly pushed and opened by 4 men, including accused Napolis, one of
them holding and pointing a machine gun. Confronted by this peril, Ignacio Peñaflor fired his
revolver but missed. Upon receiving from someone a stunning blow on the head, Ignacio fell
down but he pretended to be dead. He was hogtied by the men. The fact, however, was that he
did not lose consciousness. The men then went up the house. One of the robbers asked Mrs.
Casimira L. Peñaflor for money saying that they are people from the mountain. Mrs. Casimira
L. Peñaflor, realizing the danger, took from under the mat the bag containing P2,000.00 in cash
and two rings worth P350.00 and delivered them to the robber. Thereupon, that robber opened
and ransacked the wardrobe. Then they tied the hands of Mrs Casimira L. Peñaflor and those
of her two sons. After telling them to lie down, the robbers covered them with blankets and
left. The revolver of Ignacio, valued at P150.00, was taken by the robbers. The spouses
thereafter called for help and Councilor Almario, a neighbor, came and untied Ignacio
Peñaflor.

The robbery was reported to the Chief of Police of Hermosa and to the Philippine
Constabulary. Before the conclusion of the trial, the court of first instance of Bataan dismissed
the case against defendants Flores, Anila, Casimiro and De la Cruz. In due course, said court
convicted Nicanor Napolis, Bonifacio Malana and Apolinario Satimbre, as above indicated.
Said defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, dismissed Malana’s appeal,
and affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance, insofar as Napolis and Satimbre are
concerned, Satimbre did not appeal from said decision of the Court of Appeals, whereas
Napolis alleges that said court has erred in its decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court convicting Napolis and his band of the crime of robbery committed
by armed persons, in an inhabited house, entry therein having been made by breaking a wall,
as provided in ART 229 (a) of RPC and sentencing Napolis to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from 10 yrs & 1 day (prision mayor) as minimum, to 17 yrs & 4 mos. & 1day
(reclusion temporal) as maximum.

103
Issue:
1. W/n the facts of the case constitute complex crime?
2. W/n the penalties imposed by Ct of Appeals correct?
Held:

When the elements of both provisions are present, that the crime is a complex one, calling for
the imposition -- as provided in Art. 48 of said Code -- of the penalty for the most serious
offense, in its maximum period.

1. Yes. The elements of both provisions (Arts 299 (a) & 294 (5)) are present calling for the
imposition, as provided in Art 48 of the RPC, of the penalty for the most serious offense, in its
maximum period for being a complex crime. For a complex crime to concurr, there must be
two or more grave or less grave offenses, covered within the same title of the revised penal
code.

2. SC modified the penalties imposed and affirmed the decision of Ct of Appeals. Penalty
should be imposed in its maximum period- from 19 yrs, 1 mo & 11 days to 20 yrs of reclusion
temporal- owing to the presence of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime.

It should be noted that the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting
Napolis, Malana and Satimbre of the crime of robbery committed by armed persons, in an
inhabited house, entry therein having been made by breaking a wall, as provided in Article 299
(a) of the Revised Penal Code, and, accordingly, sentencing Napolis and Satimbre to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17
years, four 4 months and one 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, which is in
accordance with said legal provision. In addition, however, to performing said acts, the male-
factors had, also, used violence against Ignacio Peñaflor, and intimidation against his wife,
thereby infringing Article 294 of the same Code, under conditions falling under sub-paragraph
(5) of said article, which prescribes the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its medium period, which is lighter than that prescribed in said Article 299,
although, factually, the crime committed is more serious than that covered by the latter
provision. The doctrine laid down in previous cases decided by the Court where in case of
robbery inside an inhabited house, the thief, in addition, lays his hands upon any person
without committing any of the crimes or inflicting any of the injuries mentioned in
sub-paragraphs (1) to (4) of Art 294 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty decreed
under paragraph (15) thereof is much lighter defies logic and reason and is now expressly
abandoned. It is more plausible to believe that Art. 294 applies only where robbery with
violence against or intimidation of person takes place without entering an inhabited house,
under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code, The Court deems it more
logical and reasonable to hold that when the elements of both provisions are present, that the
crime is a complex one, calling for the imposition as provided in Art. 48 of said Code of the
penalty for the most Serious offense, in its maximum period, which, in the case at bar, is
reclusión temporal in its maximum period.

104
Fransdilla v. People, G.R. No. 197562, 20 April 2015
Assigned to: Santos, Juan Carlo Levanza Topic: Article 299
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

105
Benabaye v. People, G.R. No. 227698, 31 January 2018
Assigned to: Simbulan, Joanna Colleen Asis Topic: Article 315
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

106
Khitri v. People, G.R. No. 210192, 4 July 2016
Assigned to: Sta. Romana, Catherine Teneza Topic: Article 315
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

107
Lee v. People, G.R. No. 157781, 11 April 2005
Assigned to: Suerte, Althea Manzares Topic: Article 315
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

108
Wong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117857, 2 February 2001
Assigned to: Sunga, Agnieszka Ma. Mijares Topic: BP 22
Keywords: Holder in due course , guarantee, presumption juris tantum

Doctrine: An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or
drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the
check upon its presentment

Facts: Petitioner Wong, acting as an agent for Limtong Press Inc, upon getting orders, would
forward them to LPI. After printing the calendars, LPI would ship the calendars directly to the
customers. Thereafter, the agents would come around to collect the payments. Customers were
required to issue post dated checks. In December 1985, Wong issued 6 postdated checks and
drawn payable to the order of LPI. The checks were initially intended as guarantee for the
calendar orders of customers who failed to issue post dated checks. However, following
company policy, LPI refused to accept the checks as guarantees. Instead, the parties agreed to
apply the checks to the payment of petitioner's unremitted collections for 1984. Before
maturity of the checks, petitioner prevailed upon LPI not to deposit the checks and promised to
replace them within 30 days. He failed to honor his words and upon deposit of LPI, the checks
were returned for the reason of "account closed”. Wong was then charged 3 counts of BP22
after failing to secure payment numerous times.

Issue: (1) Is petitioner, as the drawer of the guarantee checks which lost their reason for being,
still bound under BP 22 to maintain his account
(2) whether or not the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22.

Held: (1) No. That although initially intended to be used as guarantee for the purchase orders
of customers, they found the checks were eventually used to settle the remaining obligations of
petitioner with LPI. While the checks were initially intended to guarantee the calendar orders
of customers who failed to issue post-dated checks. However, following company policy, LPI
refused to accept the checks as guarantees. Instead, the parties agreed to apply the checks to
the payment of petitioner's unremitted collections for 1984 amounting to P18,077.07

(2) Yes. The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 under the first situation, pertinent to the present case, are:

"(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

109
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in
full upon its presentment; and

(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment."

An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the
check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its
presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a
prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the
drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety
(90) days from the date of the check."

110
Domagsang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139292, 5 December 2000
Assigned to: Tamano, Amil Jibril Ahmad Topic: BP 22
Bernabe
Keywords: BP22, Dishonour of Check

Doctrine:

To secure conviction for the violation of BP 22, the prosecution must establish the fact that the check was
dishonoured AND that the accused has been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor.

The law does not presume that the offender knows of the fact of dishonor from merely making an instrument
without value. As such, the accused is still entitled to notice of such dishonour.

Facts:On May 8, 1992, Criminal case was filed against petitioner Josephine Domagsang by private complainant
Ignacio H. Garcia in RTC Makati , which read that she issued a Php50,000 Trader's Royal Bank check postdated
January 24, 1991 payable to him, but upon deposit of the check, the checks were dishonored by the bank because
the account where the funds to be drawn was closed. Later, subsequent information filed against her by Garcia for
remaining 17 Trader's Royal Bank checks, charging the same accusation as the previous suit. The said 18
postdated checks were issued by Josephine Domagsang in Garcia's name as repayment of the loan that she
obtained from him for financial assistance. Garcia failed to receive payment for the dishonored checks. He
demanded payment from her by allegedly calling her office and stating the dishonor of the issued checks. He
made a subsequent demand for payment (through his lawyer) to Domagsang, but his demands were ignored by
her.

She filed with leave of court demurrer to evidence on September 7, 1993, stating that there was absence of a
demand letter from Garcia and that the checks were issued as collaterals or evidence of indebtedness and not as
payment. During the hearing on February 17, 1994, Domagsang through her counsel waived her right to present
evidence in her defense. Later on, the trial court convicted her of 18 counts of violating BP 22 and she was
sentenced for 1 year of imprisonment for each count, and was ordered to pay Garcia the amount of Php573, 800.
The trial court's decision was affirmed by the CA in its February 15, 1999 decision. She asked for the appellate
court for reconsideration of its decision, but the CA expressed its denial via its July 9, 1999 resolution.

Domagsang raised that there was no proper written letter of demand served upon her person, thus she must not be
charged for the violation of BP 22. According to Domagsang, even if she was informed of the dishonour by
Garcia through a telephone call, the same is not sufficient to convict.

Issue: Whether Garcia's alleged verbal demand of payment to Domagsang was sufficient to convict of violating
the Anti-Bouncing Checks Law and that written notice of dishonor is required for such conviction?

Held: While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in
conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with
such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal," a mere oral
notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law.

111
The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be
punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused
has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonour.

Evidently, the appellate court did not give weight and credence to the assertion that a demand letter was sent by a
counsel of the complainant because of the failure of the prosecution to formally offer it in evidence. Courts are
bound to consider as part of the evidence only those which are formally offered,for judges must base their
findings strictly on the evidence submitted by the parties at the trial. Without the written notice of dishonor, there
can be no basis, considering what has heretofore been said, for establishing the presence of "actual knowledge of
insufficiency of funds.

There is no prima facie presumption of the knowledge of dishonour in BP 22, thus notice of dishonour (written) is
required to secure conviction.

The law enumerates the elements of the crime to be:

(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

There is deemed to be a prima facie evidence of knowledge on the part of the maker, drawer or issuer of
insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank of the check issued if the dishonored check is presented
within 90 days from the date of the check and the maker or drawer fails to pay thereon or to make arrangement
with the drawee bank for that purpose.

The statute has created the prima facie presumption evidently because "knowledge" which involves a state of
mind would be difficult to establish. The presumption does not hold, however, when the maker, drawer or issuer
of the check pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon or makes arrangement for payment in full by the
drawee bank of such check within 5 banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee bank.

112
113
Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 163494, 3 August 2016
Assigned to: Tanio, Regina Divina Topic: BP 22
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

114
US v. Valdes, G.R. 14128, 10 December 1918
Assigned to: Tomenio, Katryna Anne Topic: Arson
Keywords:
Jute sack and rag soaked with kerosene set beside the house; frustrated arson
Doctrine:
The fact of setting fire to a jute sack and a rag, soaked with kerosene oil and placed beside an
upright of the house and a partition of the entresol of the building, thus endangering the
burning of the latter, constitutes the crime of frustrated arson of an inhabited house, on an
occasion when some of its inmates were inside of it.
Facts:
April 28, 1918, 8 to 9 AM—Mr. Lewin was absent from his residence. Mrs. Auckland, his
neighbor, called Mrs. Lewis to report that much smoke was issuing from their house. She
instructed Banal, a servant, to look for the fire. He found kerosene oil and a piece of jute sack
burning between a post of the house and a partition of entresol. At that moment Valdes was in
the entresol engaged in the work of cleaning and the other defendant, Labarro was cleaning the
horses kept at the place.
Police arrested the defendant in the same morning where Valdes admitted before the
policemen that he was who had set the fire, that he also started several other fires on the
previous days, that he performed the acts through inducement of Labarro who promised that
he would receive a peso for each fire the he should start. He denied that he placed the jute sack
soaked with kerosene that Banal found and that the latter was the one who had done so.
Labarro’s case was dismissed for lack of evidence.
Issue:
Is there a consummated crime of arson?
Held:
No. The crime is classified only as frustrated arson, in as much as the defendant performed all
the acts conceived to the burning of said house, but nevertheless, owing to causes independent
of his will, the criminal act which he intended was not produced.
This crime of provided for and punished by article 549, in connection with articles 3,
paragraph 2, and 65 of the Penal Code, and the sole proven perpetrator of the same by direct
participation is the defendant Severino Valdes, for, notwithstanding his denial and
unsubstantiated exculpations, the record discloses conclusive proof that it was he who
committed the said unlawful act, as it was also he who was guilty of having set the other fires
that occurred in said house. There is no extenuating or aggravating circumstance to be
considered in a connection with the commission of the crime, and therefore the penalty of
presidio mayor, immediately inferior in degree to that specified in article 549 of the Penal
Code, should be imposed in its medium degree. In addition thereto, the accessory penalties
prescribed in article 57 of the Code. The defendant shall also pay the costs of both instances.

115
Buebos v. People, G.R. No. 163938, 28 March 2008
Assigned to: Torres, Ma. Nicolai Mendoza Topic: Arson
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

116
People v. Malngan, G.R. No. 170470, 26 September 2006
Assigned to: Torrevillas, Jamie Lean Roman Topic: Arson
Keywords:

Housekeeper Unpaid Salary; Complex crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide

Doctrine:

There is no complex crime of arson with homicide under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
because the crime of arson absorbs the resultant death; if the main objective is the burning of
the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime
is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed.
Facts:

Remigio Bernardo and his tanods saw the accused-appellant EDNA, one hired as a housemaid
by Roberto Separa, Sr., hurriedly leaving the house of her employer at Tondo, Manila. She was
seen to have boarded a pedicab which was driven by Rolando Gruta. Thirty minutes later,
Barangay Chairman Bernardos group later discovered that a fire gutted the house of the
employer of the housemaid. When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the Barangay
Hall, he received a report from pedicab driver Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, that
shortly before the occurrence of the fire, he saw accused-appellant coming out of the house.
The Tanods proceeded to Balasan Street and found the accused-appellant. Mercedita Mendoza,
neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr. and whose house was also burned, identified the woman as
accused-appellant as the housemaid. Upon inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside
accused- appellant EDNA's bag. Thereafter, EDNA confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo
in the presence of angry residents outside the Barangay Hall that she set her employer's house
on fire because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and that she wanted to go
home to her province but her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going home. When
asked how she burned the house, accused-appellant said that she crumpled newspapers, lighted
them with a disposable lighter and threw them on top of the table inside the house.

The accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide. RTC
held that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide or Arson
resulting to the death of six (6) people. Due to the death penalty imposed by the RTC, the case
was directly elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review. Conformably with the
decision in People v. Mateo, the case was referred and its records to the CA for appropriate
action and disposition. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modification.
Issue:

Whether or not there is Complex Crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide.

Held:

No. Accused-appellant is being charged with the crime of arson. It is clear that her intent was
merely to destroy her employer's house through the use of fire.

117
The Information in this case erroneously charged the accused-appellant with a complex crime,
i.e., Arson with Multiple Homicide. Presently, there are two (2) laws that govern the crime of
arson where death results therefrom- Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7659 and Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1613.
Art. 320 of the RPC, as amended, with respect to destructive arson, and the provisions of PD
No. 1613 respecting other cases of arson provide only one penalty for the commission of
arson, whether considered destructive or otherwise, where death results therefrom. The raison
d'être is that arson is itself the end and death is simply the consequence.

In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes
was/were perpetrated - whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to
ascertain the main objective of the malefactor:
(a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results
by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting
homicide is absorbed;
(b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in
a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the
crime committed is murder only; lastly,
(c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has
already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are
two separate and distinct crimes committed - homicide/murder and arson.

In this case, the intent of the accused-appellant was merely to destroy her employer's house
through the use of fire. The Supreme Court described the crime as simple arson but the penalty
imposable is that prescribed under Section 5 of PD No. 1613, which punishes arson where
death resulted

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Intestate Estate of Gonzales v. People, G.R. No. 181409, 11 February 2010
Assigned to: Tuason, Natassia Marie Sanchez Topic: Article 332
Keywords:
Sold properties; Estafa; Exempting circumstance

Doctrine:
Death does not extinguish relationship by affinity

Facts:
On November 24, 1992, William Sato, a Japanese national, defrauded his deceased wife’s
mother, Manolita Gonzales Vda De Carungcong (79), who was already blind. William made
her sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney authorizing his daughter, Mitsuko Sato
(then 20) to sell, assign, transfer, or dispose to anyone the properties of Gonzales at Tagaytay.
William made Manolita believe that the document involved only taxes. Mediatrix Carungcong,
the duly appointed administratix of the intestate estate of her now deceased mother, Manlolita,
filed a complaint against her brother in law, William. William was able to sell the properties
through Mitsuko, collected an amount exceeding ₱22 million and failed to account for the
same and never delivered the proceeds to Manolita who died in 1994. William Sato is accused
of estafa, but he moved to quash the information, claiming that his relationship to Manolita as
his mother in law was an exempting circumstance (Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code).
Issue:
W/N The death of Zenaida, who was the wife of William Sato, dissolved the relationship by
affinity of William Sato and Manolita., making Article 332 inapplicable to William.
Held:
No, the relationship by affinity is not dissolved. Article 332 provides for a absolutory cause in
the crimes of theft, estafa, and malicious mischief. It limits the responsibility of the offender to
civil liability only. In the American legal system, there are two views on the subject – one is
that relationship by affinity is terminated by the death of a spouse. The view supported by most
judicial authorities is that if the spouses have no living issues or children, and a spouse dies,
then the relationship of affinity is dissolved. On the other hand, if the spouses have children,
then the relationship by affinity is continued. Because of the principle of in dubio pro reo, or
when in doubt, rule for the accused, the second view is applied.
No, William Sato cannot avail of Article 332 in his favor. Article 332, which is limited to the
felonies mentioned, plainly and unmistakably shows that it applies only to simple crimes. This
situation is complexed with another crime as estafa through falsification of public documents.
Since the crime that William Sato was charged with was not simple estafa, William cannot

119
avail of Article 332’s provisions in his favor. His crimes of estafa and falsification were not
separate but component crimes of a single complex crime. The accused is found guilty.

120
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, 18 February 2004
Assigned to: Valdez, Jose Joshua Castillo Topic: Bigamy
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

121
Manila Bulletin v. Domingo, G.R. No. 170341, 5 July 2017
Assigned to: Valencia, Ronnie James De Lara Topic: Libel
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

122
Tulfo v. People, G.R. No. 161032, 16 September 2008
Assigned to: Vicera, Khrysstal Revil Topic: Libel
Keywords: tabloid REMATE, Bureau of Customs, false allegation

Doctrine: The Court has long respected the freedom of the press, and upheld the same when it came
to commentaries made on public figures and matters of public interest. The Court, however, has
stressed that such freedom is not absolute and unbounded.

In order that the publication of a report of an official proceeding may be considered privileged, the
following conditions must exist:
(a) That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not
of confidential nature, or of a statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other
act performed by a public officer in the exercise of his functions;
(b) That it is made in good faith; and
(c) That it is without any comments or remarks.
Facts: Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs filed 4 separate informations against Erwin
Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing editor, Rey Salao, as national editor, Jocelyn
Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as president of the Carlo Publishing House, Inc., of the daily
tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel in connection with the publication of the articles in the column
"Direct Hit" in the issues of May 11, 1999; May 12, 1999; May 19, 1999; and June 25, 1999. Wherein
the complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and having illegally
acquired wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and
ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion. He testified that petitioner Tulfo's act of imputing upon
him criminality, assailing his honesty and integrity, caused him dishonor, discredit, and contempt. He
further testified that he included in his complaint for libel the officers of Remate such as the publisher,
managing editor, city editor, and national editor because under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), they are equally responsible and liable to the same extent as if they were the author of the
articles.

In his defense, petitioner Tulfo testified that he did not write the subject articles with malice, that he
neither knew Atty. So nor met him before the publication of the articles. He testified that his criticism
of a certain Atty. So of the South Harbor was not directed against the complainant, but against a person
by the name of Atty. "Ding" So at the South Harbor. He further testified that he did not do any research
on Atty. So before the subject articles, because as a columnist, he had to rely on his source, and that he
had several sources in the Bureau of Customs, particularly in the South Harbor.

RTC found petitioners guilty of the crime of libel. The Eighth Division of the CA dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Issue:
1. WON Honorable CA erred in not declaring the assailed articles as privileged
2. WON CA erred in its application of Article 360 of RPC by holding Cambri, Salao and Barlizo liable
for the defamatory articles when they had no participation in the editing or publication of the
defamatory articles in question
Held:

123
1. No. The petitions must be dismissed. There is no question of the status of Atty. So as a public
official, who served as the OIC of the Bureau of Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) at the time of the printing of the allegedly libelous articles.
The Court has long respected the freedom of the press, and upheld the same when it came to
commentaries made on public figures and matters of public interest. The Court, however, has stressed
that such freedom is not absolute and unbounded. In his series of articles, he targeted one Atty. "Ding"
So of the Bureau of Customs as being involved in criminal activities, and was using his public position
for personal gain. And when Atty. So filed a libel suit against him, Tulfo wrote another article,
challenging Atty. So, saying, "Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty. So dahil binabantayan ko siya at in-
expose ang kagaguhan niya sa [Bureau of Customs]." The exercise of press freedom must be done
"consistent with good faith and reasonable care". Borjal may have expanded the protection of qualified
privileged communication beyond the instances given in Art. 354 of the RPC, but this expansion does
not cover Tulfo. The expansion speaks of "fair commentaries on matters of public interest". While
Borjal places fair commentaries within the scope of qualified privileged communication, the mere fact
that the subject of the article is a public figure or a matter of public interest does not automatically
exclude the author from liability. Borjal allows that for a discreditable imputation to a public official to
be actionable, it must be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. As
previously mentioned, the trial court found that the allegations against Atty. So were false and that
Tulfo did not exert effort to verify the information before publishing his articles. Tulfo's articles related
no specific details or acts committed to prove Atty. So was indeed a corrupt public official. Jurado also
established that the journalist should exercise some degree of care even when writing about public
officials. Tulfo has clearly failed in this regard. His articles cannot even be considered as qualified
privileged communication under the second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC which exempts from the
presumption of malice "a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or any
statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions." This particular provision has several elements which must be
present in order for the report to be exempt from the presumption of malice. The provision can be
dissected as follows:

In order that the publication of a report of an official proceeding may be considered privileged, the
following conditions must exist:

(a) That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not
of confidential nature, or of a statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other
act performed by a public officer in the exercise of his functions;
(b) That it is made in good faith; and
(c) That it is without any comments or remarks.

The articles clearly are not the fair and true reports contemplated by the provision. They provide no
details of the acts committed by the subject, Atty. So. Breaking down the provision further, looking at
the terms "fair" and "true", Tulfo's articles do not meet the standard. "Fair" is defined as "having the
qualities of impartiality and honesty". "True" is defined as "conformable to fact; correct; exact; actual;

124
genuine; honest." Tulfo failed to satisfy these requirements, as he did not do research before making his
allegations, and it has been shown that these allegations were baseless. The articles are not "fair and
true reports", but merely wild accusations. In claiming that his articles were covered by qualified
privileged communication, Tulfo argues that the presumption of malice in law under Art. 354 of the
RPC is no longer present, placing upon the prosecution the burden of proving malice in fact. The fact
that Tulfo published another article lambasting respondent Atty. So can be considered as further
evidence of malice.

Tulfo also argues that the lower court misappreciated the evidence presented as to the identity of the
complainant: that Tulfo wrote about Atty. "Ding" So, an official of the Bureau of Customs who worked
at the South Harbor, whereas the complainant was Atty. Carlos So who worked at the NAIA. In the last
column he wrote on the matter, Tulfo launched further attacks against Atty. So, stating that the libel
case was due to the exposés Tulfo had written on the corrupt acts committed by Atty. So in the Bureau
of Customs. This last article is an admission on the part of Tulfo that Atty. So was in fact the target of
his attacks. He cannot now point to a putative "Atty. Ding So" at South Harbor, or someone else using
the name of Atty. So.

2. No. Petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay all claim that they had no participation in the
editing or writing of the subject articles, and are thus not liable. The argument must fail. The language
of Art. 360 of the RPC is plain. It lists the persons responsible for libel:

Art. 360. Persons responsible . — Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same
extent as if he were the author thereof.

On the theory that it is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control the contents of the paper,
it is held that said person cannot evade responsibility by abandoning the duties to employees, so that it
is immaterial whether or not the editor or manager knew the contents of the publication. Under Art. 360
of the RPC, as Tulfo, the author of the subject articles, has been found guilty of libel, so too must
Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay.

Though we find petitioners guilty of the crime charged, the punishment must still be tempered with
justice. Petitioners are to be punished for libel for the first time. CA Decision is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATIONS that in lieu of imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon petitioners
shall be a fine of six thousand pesos (PhP6,000) for each count of libel, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.

125
Nova Communications v. Canoy, G.R. No. 193276, 26 June 2019

Assigned to: Villanueva, Kristine Topic: Libel

Keywords: Published articles, Atty. Canoy as lunatic, rebellion

Doctrine: In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be

construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it
appears that they were used and understood in another sense.

Facts:

In 1990, Col. Alexander Noble, a Philippine Military Academy led a rebellion in

Mindanao. Atty. Canoy was suspected to be one of Col. Noble’s supporters because of
his involvement with the Independent Mindanao Movement which espoused the view of
independent Mindanao. On October 1990, a series of articles were written by Locsin, Jr.
and Molina that were printed in the Philippine Free Press. The excerpts of the articles
described Canoy as a lunatic or mad man for joining Col. Noble in the rebellion. Because
of the subject articles, Atty. Canoy and his wife filed a civil case for damages for the
libelous articles. Atty. Canoy claimed that the articles were designed to malign,
embarrass, humiliate and ridicule him and his wife. LRP Publications maintained that the
articles in question were made without malice and without any intention to cast
dishonour, discredit, contempt or ridicule upon Atty. Canoy and his wife, that the same
were made in good faith and for a justifiable reason, that is pursuant to its duty to protect
the government from threats of rebellion of Col. Noble. Further, Atty. Canoy is a
national and political figure, as such, he has effectively placed himself under public
scrutiny. Nova Communications claimed that Atty, Canoy was merely mentioned in the
subject articles with no intention to cast dishonour or ridicule upon his person. During
the trial, Locsin, Jr. testified stating that the articles were made in good faith as part of
his moral commitment to defend the government from threats of rebellion and
insurrection. In a Decision issued by the RTC, it ruled in favor of Atty. Canoy and
ordered the petitioners as well as defendant Locsin, Jr. to pay petitioner for damages.
Aggrieved petitioners filed an appeal to the CA, who affirmed RTC’s ruling but only
reduced the amount. Hence, this petition.

126
 Issue:

Whether the subject articles are libelous.

Held:

The petition is denied. Libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice
or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstances
tending to cause dishonour, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead. Thus, it is an offense of injuring a person’s
character or reputation through false and malicious statements. In Manila Bulleting
Publishing Corp. v. Domingo, the court said that: In determining whether a statement is
defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in
their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by
persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another
sense. The words imputed to Atty. Canoy as a veritable mental asylum patient, a
madman and a lunatic, are conditions or circumstances tending to dishonour or discredit
him. As such, these are defamatory or libelous per se. under Art. 354 of the RPC, it is
provided that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be with malice, even if the
same is true, unless it was made with good intention and justifiable motive. Examination
of the defamatory remarks reveals that the same pertain to Atty. Canoy’s mental capacity
and not to his alleged participation in the rebellion. The remarks were directed to Atty.
Canoy as a private individual and not in his public capacity. As such, these statements
are defamatory and is therefore libelous.

Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, 18 February 2014

Assigned to: Yap, Leandro Angelo Uy Topic: RA 10175
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

127
Issue:

Held:

128
Bonifacio v. RTC, G.R. No. 184800, 5 May 2010
Assigned to: Adap, Roberto Anton Candelario Topic: Cyberlibel
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

129
Tolentino v. People, G.R. No. 240310, 6 August 2018
Assigned to: Aquino, Elen Cia Panglinan Topic: Cyberlibel
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

130
Enrile v. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217
Assigned to: Arcilla, Steve Rojano Topic: Rebellion/Insurrection/Coup d’etat
Keywords:
Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

131
Enrile v. Amin, 189 SCRA 573
Assigned to: Arcilla, Stevie Rojano Topic: Rebellion/Insurrection/Coup d’etat
Keywords: Theory of Absorption in rebellion cases
Doctrine:
Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion, though crimes in themselves, are deemed
absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. All crimes, whether punishable under a special
law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance
thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as
separate crimes in themselves.
Facts:
Together with the filing of an information charging the petitioner Enrile, as an alleged
co-conspirator of Ex.-Lt. Col. Honasan, of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated
murder with the RTC of Quezon City, government prosecutors filed another information
charging him for violation of PD 1829 with the RTC of Makati, allegedly for harboring and
concealing Honasan in his house, knowing that the latter has committed a crime. Petitioner
filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the information on the ground, among others, that the
pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against him
preclude the prosecution for harboring or concealing Honasan on the same occasion under PD
1829. The respondent court issued an order denying the motion, thereby sustaining the charge
of violation of PD 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case on the theory that the former
involves a special law while the latter is based on the RPC. Hence, this petition imputing grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent
court in refusing to quash/dismiss the information.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829
notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him
Held:
NO. The complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion
thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity
that constitutes rebellion, is prohibited. The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is
described as a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Jurisprudence
tells us that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion, though crimes in themselves, are
deemed absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. In this case, the act of harboring or
concealing Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in
furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge.
The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a
fugitive is punishable under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the RPC; hence,
prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is
specious in rebellion cases. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law,
which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become
absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in
themselves. Case law mentions common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These
common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as

132
provided in the RPC. The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to
rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes
but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political
offense.

133
People v. Dasig, 221 SCRA 549
Assigned to: Basabas, Dana Ellaine Ortega Topic: Rebellion/Insurrection/Coup d’etat
Keywords:

Rebellion; extra-judicial killing

Doctrine:

The crime of rebellion consists of may acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of
intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are
deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. The act of killing a police officer, knowing
too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion
or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.

Facts:

Appellants Rodrigo Dasig, Edwin Nuñez and 6 others were charged together of shooting
Redempto Manatad, a police officer, as he died while performing duties. Upon arraignment,
appellant and Edwin Nuñes entered a plea of "not guilty." However, after the prosecution had
presented its first witness, accused Nuñes changed his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." Hence,
the lower court held in abeyance the promulgation of a judgment against said accused until the
prosecution had finished presenting its evidence. While trial was still ongoing, Nuñez died on
March 10, 1989, thereby extinguishing his criminal liability.

At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8) persons, one of whom
he identified as Edwin Nuñez, acting suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions
to two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers
were tasked to conduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of the sparrow unit
located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon reaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and
Edwin Nuñes trying to escape. The team of Capt. Antonio Gorre captured Nuñes and
confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3 magazines and ammunitions, while the group of Sgt.
Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig, who threw a grenade at his pursuers, but was shot on his left
upper arm and subsequently apprehended while a .38 caliber revolver with 17 live
ammunitions were confiscated from him. Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for
treatment, while Nuñes was turned over to the Metrodiscom for investigation. Dasig confessed
that he and the group of Edwin Nuñes killed Pfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and
Nuñes were members of the sparrow unit and the their aliases were "Armand" and "Mabi,"
respectively.

The extra-judicial confession of appellant was signed by him on every page thereof with the
first page containing a certification likewise signed by him. However, Dasig contends that the
procedure by which his extra-judicial confession was taken was legally defective, and contrary
to his Constitutional rights. He further contends that assuming he conspired in the killing of
Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple rebellion and not murder with direct
assault. Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was done while he was still very

134
sick and consequently, he could not have fully appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a
serious offense.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused-appellant is liable for extra-judicial killing of the deceased and
participated in the act of rebellion?

Held:

Yes. Accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion beyond
reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8)
years of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc. Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity.

Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the government, among other means.
(Article 135, Revised Penal Code). In this case, appellant not only confessed voluntarily his
membership with the sparrow unit but also his participation and that of his group in the killing
of Pfc. Manatad while manning the traffic in Mandaue City in the afternoon of August 4, 1987.
It is of judicial notice that the sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army
with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to
comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of
the subversive ends of the NPA. Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime of rebellion, not
murder with direct assault upon a person in authority.

As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to
persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor
General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a
fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion.
However, in the case at bar, there is no evidence to prove that appellant Dasig headed the
crime committed. As a matter of fact he was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as
the person giving instructions to the group which attacked Pfc. Manatad.

Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed the command of an
unknown leader. Hence, he should be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8)
years of prision mayor. For the resulting death, appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of
Pfc. Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.

135
People v. Lovedioro, 250 SCRA 389
Assigned to: Bautista, Angelica Painitan Topic: Rebellion/Insurrection/Coup d’etat
Keywords:
policeman, gunshot through the head
Doctrine:

Facts:
Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos Street, away from
the public market when a man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his
waist, aimed the gun at the policeman’s right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three
other companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the
ground. After taking the latter’s gun, the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled.
Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds on the face,
the chest, and other parts of the body. On autopsy, it is established that he died of hypovolemic
shock.

The incident was witnessed by a certain Nestor Armenta, a 25 year-old welder from
Pilar, Sorsogon. He claimed that he knew both the victim and the man who fired the fatal shot.
Armenta identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedio, his nephew, and that
he knew the victim from the fact that the latter was a resident of Bagumbayan.

Provincial prosecutor of Albay: charged the accused Lovedioro of the crime of murder
under Article 248 of the RPC.

RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, as principal. (His
co-accused are still at large)

Issue:
WON the RTC is correct in finding him guilty of the crime of murder and not rebellion

Held:
Yes, the RTC is correct.

If no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the
common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere
membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of
itself, suffice.

The gravamen of the crime of rebellion (Article 134 of the RPC) is an armed public uprising
against the government. By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or
multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a priori within predetermined
bounds. One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that other acts committed in

136
its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself because they acquired a political
character. In the case of People vs. Hernandez, it has been ruled that Political crimes are those
directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed
to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive.

From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are
duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of the crimes. With either
of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases
where the act complained of were committed simultaneously with or in the course of the
rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc., were accomplished for private purpose or profit,
without any political motivation, it has been held that the crime would be separately
punishable as a common crime and would not be absorbed by the crime of rebellion.

137
People v. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64
Assigned to: Bello, Nerissa Mauricio Topic: Sedition
Keywords:
Philippine Constabulary
Doctrine:
Sedition is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state.
Facts:
The Philippine Constabulary has grudges against the police of Manila and they want to inflict
revenge for the following reasons:
(1) On December 13, 1920, a Manila police arrested a woman who is a member of the
household of a constabulary soldier and was allegedly abused by the said policeman.
(2) Private Macasinag of the Constabulary was shot by Manila police and was mortally
wounded.

A day after the incident, a rumor spread among the Constabulary that the Police who shot
Macasinag was back to his original duties while Macasinag was declared dead. There were
also rumors that the said shooting was ordered.

On the night of December 15 some members of the Constabulary escaped their barracks
through a window (the saw out the window bars). They had rifles and ammunition and were
organized in groups under the command of their sergeants and corporals. They attacked some
Manila policemen in these specific instances:
(1) On Calle Real, Intramuros, a group of the Constabulary shot and killed an American
Policeman and his friend.
(2) The Constabulary indiscriminately shot at a passerby, causing a death and wounding most
of the passengers.
(3) While riding a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, Captain William E. Wichman
(asst. chief of police in Manila) was shot and killed together with Saplala
Issue:
(1) Is there connivance/conspiracy between the accused - yes
(2) Are the accused properly convicted of a violation of the Treason and Sedition Law - yes
Held:
(1) Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and
circumstances which vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. If it be proved that
the defendants pursued by their acts the same object, one performing one part and another
another part of the same, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object,
one will be justified in the conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to the effect that
object. It is incontestable that all of the defendants were imbued with the same purpose, which
was to avenge themselves on the police force of Manila. A common feeling of resentment
animated all.

(2) Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the
State. The Philippine law on the subject makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly

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and tumultuously in order to obtain by force of outside of legal methods any one of five
objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of
any official or agent of the Insular government or of a provincial or municipal government.
The counsel contested that it is necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the
offended party a public functionary, and what really happened was a fight between two armed
bodies of the Philippine Government. The court held that this contention is without foundation.
The Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies.
What is important is that there is a public rising to incite or inflict any act of hate or revenge
upon the person or property of any official or agent of the Insular government or of a
provincial or municipal government.

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US v. Tolentino, 5 Phil. 682
Assigned to: Betita, Maureen Lubuguin Topic: Inciting to Sedition
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

140
Espuelas v. People, 90 Phil. 524
Assigned to: Bravo - Dinio, Lea Petita Dilao Topic: Inciting to Sedition
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

141
Ivler v. San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, 17 November 2010
Assigned to: Enero, Monica Topic: Article 365
Keywords:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

142