Ariel Paolo A. Ante v.

University of the Philippines Student Disciplinary Tribunal and

University of the Philippines
GR No. 227911 March 14, 2022
Hernando, J.:
Facts:
Seven disciplinary actions were filed by UP before the SDT against Ante and others. The
disciplinary actions, in the form of formal charges, were prompted by the death of Chris Anthony
Mendez allegedly due to hazing activities/initiation rites conducted by the Sigma Rho Fraternity.
Ante filed his answer emphasizing that under the Rules Governing Fraternities, a valid
preliminary inquiry must first be conducted to determine whether a formal charge against any
member or officer of a fraternity, sorority, or other student organization is warranted.
Ante later filed an omnibus motion, seeking for the quashal of the formal charges and declaration
of all the proceedings as void due to an invalid preliminary inquiry. In seeking for the quashal of
the formal charges, Ante reasoned that the preliminary inquiry was invalid for violating the
Rules Governing Fraternities, which requires that the preliminary inquiry be conducted "by any
member of the Tribunal."
SDT denied the omnibus motion. Citing Black's Law Dictionary, SDT emphasized that
the word "by," as utilized in the Rules Governing Fraternities, meant "through the means, act,
agency, or instrumentality" of any member of the SDT. SDT further explained that any of its
members may thus be present during the preliminary inquiry called by itself, and if two or more
members attend and exercise the authority, such would be in accordance with the Rules
Governing Fraternities. With this denial, Ante claimed that he verbally moved for its
reconsideration, and the same was also denied by SDT.
Ante filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Quezon City. The
Regional Trial Court found merit in Ante’s petition and nullified the proceedings of SDT. RTC
agreed with Ante's argument that the preliminary inquiry was conducted not by SDT, but by the
University Prosecutor, in violation of the Rules Governing Fraternities.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. the CA disagreed with the R TC' s
conclusion and instead held that the preliminary inquiry conducted by SDT was valid and in
accordance with the Rules Governing Fraternities.
Issues:
a. Was the remedy of Ante to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition proper?
b. Was the preliminary inquiry conducted by SDT valid?
Ruling:
a. No.
 Ante filed the petition upon the denial of his omnibus motion by SDT. In support of his
petition, Ante argued that certiorari was proper since the denial of his omnibus motion was an
interlocutory order; hence, unappealable. Meanwhile, SDT maintained that Ante was wrong,
considering that while the denial may be interlocutory, Ante nevertheless had a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy: to go to trial. This should have barred him from filing the petition.
In resolving the issue, the CA held in its Decision that Ante's petition should have been
dismissed summarily for the latter's failure to file a written motion for reconsideration of the
denial of his omnibus motion, which is a condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari
may be filed. Ante claimed that he verbally moved for reconsideration, which should have
satisfied the requirement.
The Court agrees with Ante in so far as he claims that a written motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with in this particular situation. Indeed, Section 7, Rule IV of
the Rules Governing Fraternities prohibits the filing of such motion.
In the case at bar, we find that the filing of a written motion for reconsideration before
SDT would have been useless, and thus falls on the exceptions above, precisely because it is
prohibited by the Rules Governing Fraternities. Thus, the same may be dispensed with and
should not operate as a bar to the filing of a petition for certiorari, contrary to the pronouncement
of the CA. This, however, does not mean that the petition was proper, for the Court agrees with
SDT that Ante had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; that is, to go to trial.
In Enrile v. Manalastas, the Court declared that the remedy against the denial of a motion
to quash is for the movant to go to trial. Further, the Court explained that the denial, being an
interlocutory order, is not appealable, and may not be the subject of a petition for certiorari due
to other remedies available to the movant. Considering that Ante himself likened the proceedings
before SDT to a preliminary investigation in a criminal case, we see no reason not to apply the
same principle to the present case.
In summary, the Court holds that the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Ante
before the RTC should have been summarily dismissed; not because of Ante's failure to file a
motion for reconsideration, but because the denial of a motion to quash is not the proper subject
of a petition for certiorari.
b. Yes.
The disagreement as to the validity of the preliminary inquiry conducted by SDT all boils
down to the interpretation of Section 1, Rule III of the Rules Governing Fraternities, which
states:
SECTION 1. No member or officer of a fraternity, sorority or student
organization shall be formally charged before the SDT unless a preliminary
inquiry has been conducted by any member of the SDT, which must be
finished not later than five (5) working days from the date of filing of the
complaint; x x x28 (Emphasis supplied).
 In particular, the parties argue over the correct interpretation of the phrase "by any
member of the SDT." Since it is undisputed that the University Prosecutor performed the
preliminary inquiry, Ante theorizes that this is in violation of the provision, by making a
distinction between the terms "by" and "before"; he argues that the preliminary inquiry was done
by the University Prosecutor, and not by SDT, although before it. On the other hand, SDT, citing
Black's Law Dictionary, contends that the phrase should be construed as "through the means, act,
agency or instrumentality" of "any member of the SDT," thus making the preliminary inquiry
compliant with the provision and therefore, valid.
We disagree with Ante.
As correctly held by the CA, simply because SDT stated in the formal charges that the
preliminary inquiries were conducted "before" them, does not mean that they themselves did not
conduct nor participate in the same. The term "inquiry," which means "to request for
information" in its ordinary sense, necessarily implies that SDT took part in the conduct of such.
This alone, satisfies the requirement that the preliminary inquiry be conducted "by a member of
the SDT." Moreover, we agree with the CA that it would be bordering absurdity if the statement
be interpreted to mean that SDT "merely served as observers of the University Prosecutor, with
themselves physically present thereat but meaning nothing at all." Thus, contrary to Ante's
assertion, to split hairs between the phrases "by the Student Disciplinary Tribunal" and "before
the Student Disciplinary Tribunal" is actually a trifling matter.
Moreover, the interchangeability of the terms "by" and "before," when being used in rules
or in statutes, and provided it would not cause grammatical confusion, is actually not unheard of.
The Court aims to highlight the fact that these terms are in fact sometimes being used
interchangeably, either for sense or for style, and should not always be given strict and literal
meaning, contrary to Ante's assertions.
The Court holds that the preliminary inquiry conducted by SDT was valid. The petition is
then dismissed and the resolution of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
 Heirs of Jose De Lara, Sr. v. Rural Bank of Jaen, Inc.
G.R. No. 212012 March 28, 2022

Hernando, J.:
Facts:
Jose, a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer of Presidential Decree No. 27 was
awarded a parcel of land in Dampulan (now Vicente), Jaen, Nueva Ecija. TCT No. EP-86727
under the Department of Agriculture Reform (DAR) Emancipation Patent (EP) No. 00735825
covering the subject land was issued in favor of Jose.
Subsequently, Jose obtained a loan from respondent bank secured by a mortgage over the subject
land. Unfortunately, he failed to pay his obligation hence, the mortgage was foreclosed. A public
auction was held wherein respondent bank was declared the highest bidder. The Reginal Trial
Court issued a Certificate of Sale to respondent bank and the bank registered the sale with the
Register of Deeds.
A year passes but neither Jose nor his heirs redeemed the land. Respondent bank then executed
an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership.
Respondent bank then filed a verified petition for cancellation of TCT No. EP-86727 covering
the subject land before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). Petitioners filed
an Answer and sought the dismissal of the petition arguing that PARAD did not acquire
jurisdiction over them for failure to implead necessary parties.
PARAD ruled that TCT No. EP-86727 ought to be cancelled and a new one issued in the name
of respondent bank.
DARAB reversed the PARAD’s decision.
CA reversed DARAB’s decision and reinstated PARAD’s decision.
Issue: Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction over the case in dispute?
Ruling:
DARAB has no jurisdiction over the case at bench as there is no agrarian dispute between the
parties.
There was no tenancy relationship between petitioners and respondent bank over the subject
land. Neither did they have any leasehold or agrarian relation when respondent bank filed its
petition with the DARAB. In fact, respondent bank did not allege in its petition that such kind of
relationship exists between them. What is crystal clear in the instant case is that respondent
bank’s petition for cancellation of certificate of title stemmed from the subject land’s foreclosure.
There was therefore no agrarian dispute notwithdtanding the fact that the land involved is an
agricultural land. Thus, respodnent’s petition should have been dismissed by the DARAB for
lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent bank’s recourse should have been with the Register of Deeds, not before the
DARAB.
 RENATO C. TACIS AND DIONICIO LAMIS III vs. SHIELDS SECURITY SERVICES,
INC. et. Al
G.R. No. 234575, July 07, 2021
HERNANDO, J.:
FACTS:

Petitioners Tacis and Lamis alleged that they were hired as security guards on April 4,
2007 and May 1, 2012, respectively. They were assigned at Texas Instruments, Inc. (Texas
Instruments) located in Loakan Road, Baguio City and were then receiving a daily wage of
P280.00.

Sometime in November 2013, the Company deployed more or less 15 new security
guards at Texas Instruments and instructed petitioners to train the new recruits for three
days. However, on November 29, 2013, Morante informed petitioners that the old security
guards of Texas, including herein petitioners, were relieved and terminated from service and that
the 15 new hirees will replace them as per the client's (Texas Instruments) request. Morante then
gave petitioners checks representing their "retirement pay" and advised them that the other
benefits due them such as 13th month pay and last salary shall be given upon their return to
Manila.

The petitioners objected to their severance arguing that there was no valid ground for
their dismissal as they did not commit any infraction during their employment with the
Company. In order to appease petitioners, Morante made a commitment to transfer them to
Soliman Security Services (Soliman Security), a sister company of Shields Security effective
January to February 2014. Morante even made petitioners fill out application forms for their
eventual transfer to Soliman Security.

Convinced that they would be absorbed by Soliman Security, petitioners submitted their
respective resignation letters and quitclaims as pre-requisites for their receipt of cash benefits,
e.g. separation pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, cash bond, uniform allowance
and last salary. However, upon inquiry of Tacis as to the status of their transfer to Soliman
Security sometime in January 2014, Morante informed him that there was no vacancy at Soliman
Security. This prompted petitioners to file the instant complaint before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch in Baguio City.

Respondents belied petitioners' claim of illegal dismissal. They averred that petitioners
voluntarily resigned from their employment as evidenced by their individual handwritten
resignation letters which were duly accepted by the Company. In fact, they were given the option
to go to Manila for their next assignment but they opted to resign. In addition, petitioners were
already paid their separation benefits and in return, they have executed a Quitclaim, Release and
Waiver therefor. Moreover, petitioners processed the documents required of resigning employees
such as their exit interview, company clearance and information sheets. The petitioners also
voluntarily agreed upon by petitioners when they signed a Statement of Understanding and
Participation in the said program, authorizing automatic deduction from their salary of death
contribution during paydays.

The LA held that there was no valid cause for petitioners' dismissal. The LA also stressed
that the resignation letters submitted by petitioners to the Company were pro-forma, thus, were
involuntary, and that petitioners were tricked into executing the same in exchange for their
monetary claims.

On appeal before the NLRC, reversed the LA Decision finding that petitioners'
resignation was voluntary as shown by their expression of gratitude and appreciation to the
Company for the opportunity given to them. Further, the quitclaim and waiver executed by
petitioners confirmed their resignation from the company. 
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA ascribing upon the
NLRC grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it held that no
illegal dismissal took place and that petitioners voluntarily resigned from the Company but the
petitioner claim that they were deceived into resigning.
The CA concluded that petitioners failed to substantiate their claim of vitiated consent.
Other than their respective affidavits, no controverting evidence was adduced by petitioners to
refute the fact that they voluntarily filed their respective resignation letters with the Company
and that the same were accepted by respondents. The appellate court further emphasized that
petitioners processed the documents to be accomplished by resigning employees and they were
paid their separation and other monetary benefits. Petitioners did not question the reasonableness
of the amount given by the Company and in fact executed a quitclaim and waiver therefor
without evidence of force and intimidation employed by the Company. Thus, the appellate court
upheld petitioners' resignation and quitclaim as valid and binding.
ISSUE:
Are the petitioners constructively dismissed from employment a question of fact which
can be entertained by the Court?
RULING:
Yes. Petitioners were constructively dismissed from employment is evidently factual
because it requires an examination of the evidence on record.
As a general rule, A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
should cover only questions of law. However, The Court has enumerated several exceptions to
this rule:
(1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based;
(7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record;
(8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court;
(9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and
(11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.
Here, the factual findings of the LA conflict with that of the NLRC and the CA. In
particular, the arbiter found facts supporting the conclusion that there was constructive dismissal,
while the NLRC and the CA found none. Considering the different findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the arbiter and the appellate court, the Court shall entertain this petition,
although it involves questions of fact.