Liberalism and the Art of Separation

Author(s): Michael Walzer

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Political Theory, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 1984), pp. 315-330
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191512 .
Accessed: 24/08/2012 12:12

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Theory.

http://www.jstor.org
THE RESOURCES OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM

I. LIBERALISM AND THE

ART OF SEPARATION

MICHAEL WALZER
The Institute
for AdvancedStudy

I suggestthatwe thinkofliberalismas a certainwayofdrawingthe

map ofthesocial and politicalworld.The old,preliberalmap showeda
largelyundifferentiatedlandmass,withriversand mountains, citiesand
towns,butno borders."Everymanis a pieceofthecontinent," as John
Donne wrote-and the continentwas all of a piece. Society was
conceivedas an organicand integrated whole.It mightbe viewedunder
the aspectof religion,or politics,or economy,or family,but all these
interpenetrated one anotherand constituted a singlereality.Churchand
state,church-stateand university,civilsocietyand politicalcommunity,
dynastyand government, officeand property, publiclifeand private
life,home and shop: each pair was, mysteriously or unmysteriously,
two-in-one,inseparable. Confrontingthis world, liberal theorists
preachedand practicedan artof separation.Theydrewlines,marked
offdifferent realms,and createdthesociopoliticalmap withwhichwe
arestillfamiliar.The mostfamouslineis the"wall"betweenchurchand
state,buttherearemanyothers.Liberalismis a worldofwalls,and each
one createsa newliberty.
This is thewaytheartofseparationworks.The wallbetweenchurch
and statecreatesa sphereof religiousactivity,of public and private
worship,congregationsand consciences,into whichpoliticiansand
bureaucratsmay not intrude.Queen Elizabeth was speakinglike a
liberal,thougha minimalistone, when she said that she would not
"make a windowintomen'ssouls,to pinchthemthere."'Believersare
setfreefromeverysortof officialor legalcoercion.Theycan findtheir
own wayto salvation,privatelyor collectively; or theycan failto find
theirway;or theycan refuseto look fora way.The decisionis entirely
theirown;thisis whatwecall freedomofconscienceorreligiousliberty.
Similarly,the linethatliberalsdrewbetweenthe old church-state (or
state-church)and the universities createsacademic freedom,leaving

POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 12 No. 3, August1984315-330

? 1984Sage Publications,Inc.
315
316 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1984

professorsas freeto professas believersare to believe.The university

takes shape as a kind of walled city.In the hierarchicalworldof the
middle ages, universitieswere legally walled, that is, studentsand
professorswere a privilegedgroup, protectedfrom penalties and
punishments metedout to ordinarymen.Butthiswas a functionofthe
integration of theuniversitiesand thechurch(studentsand professors
had clerical status) and then of the churchand the state. Precisely
because of this integration,scholars did not enjoy the privilegeof
hereticalthought.Today theuniversities are intellectuallythoughnot
legallywalled;studentsand professors haveno legalprivileges, butthey
are, in principleat least,absolutelyfreein the sphereof knowledge.2
Privatelyorcollectively, theycan criticize,
question,doubt,orrejectthe
establishedcreeds of theirsociety.Or, what is more likelyin any
relativelystablesociety,theycan elaboratetheestablishedcreeds,most
oftenin conventional,but sometimesin noveland experimental ways.
Similarly,again, the separationof civil societyand politicalcom-
munitycreatesthesphereofeconomiccompetitionand freeenterprise,
themarketin commodities,labor,and capital.I willfocusfornow on
thefirstofthesethreeand adoptthelargestviewofmarketfreedom.On
thisview,thebuyersand sellersofcommoditiesareentirely at libertyto
strikeanybargaintheywish,buyinganything, sellinganything, at any
pricetheycan agreeupon, withoutthe interference of stateofficials.
Thereis no suchthingas a just price,or at leastthereis no enforcement
of a just price; and, similarly,there are not sumptuarylaws, no
restrictionson usury,no qualityorsafetystandards,no minimum wage,
and so on. The maximcaveatemptor,letthebuyerbeware,suggeststhat
marketfreedomentails certain risks for consumers.But so does
religiousfreedom.Some people buyunsafeproductsand some people
are convertedto falsedoctrines.Free menand womenmustbear such
risks.I have mydoubtsabout theanalogy,sinceunsafeproductspose
actual,and falsedoctrinesonlyspeculative,risks,butI won'tpursuethis
argumenthere.My immediatepurposeis not to criticizebut onlyto
describethemaptheliberalsdrew,and on thatmapthecommodity was
givenat least as muchroom as thecreed.
Anotherexample: the abolitionof dynasticgovernment separates
familyand stateand makespossiblethepoliticalversionofthe"career
open to talents,"thehighestform,we mightsay, of thelabor market.
Onlytheeldestmalein a certainlinecan be a king,butanyonecan be a
presidentor primeminister.More generally,the line that marksoff
politicaland socialpositionfromfamilialproperty createsthesphereof
 Walzer / LIBERALISM AND SEPARATION 317

officeand thenthe freedomto competeforbureaucraticand profes-

sional place, to lay claim to a vocation, apply for an appointment,
developa specialty,and so on. The notionofone's lifeas one's project
probablyhas its originhere.It is to be contrastedwiththe notionof
one'slifeas one'sinheritance-ontheone hand,thepredetermination of
birthand blood; on the other,the self-determination of struggleand
achievement.
Finally,theseparationofpublicand privatelifecreatesthesphereof
individualandfamilialfreedom, privacyanddomesticity. Mostrecently,
thishas beendescribedas a sphereofsexualfreedom;so itis,butitisn't
originallyor primarilythat; it is designedto encompassa verywide
rangeof interestsand activities-whateverwe choose to do, shortof
incest,rape, and murder,in our own homesor amongour friendsand
relatives:readingbooks, talkingpolitics,keepinga journal, teaching
what we know to our children,cultivating(or, for that matter,
neglecting) ourgardens.Ourhomesareourcastles,andtherewearefree
fromofficialsurveillance.This is, perhaps,thefreedomthatwe most
takeforgranted-thetwo-waytelevisionscreensofOrwell's1984are a
particularly frighteningpieceofsciencefiction-so itis worthstressing
how rarea freedomitis in humanhistory."Our homesare ourcastles"
was firstofall theclaimofpeoplewhosecastlesweretheirhomes,and it
was fora verylongtimean effective claimonlyforthem.Now itsdenial
is an occasion for indignationand outrage even among ordinary
citizens.We greatlyvalue our privacy,whetheror notwe do odd and
excitingthingsin private.3

IH

The art of separationhas neverbeen highlyregardedon the left,

especiallytheMarxistleft,whereitis commonlyseenas an ideological
ratherthana practicalenterprise. Leftistshave generallystressedboth
theradicalinterdependence ofthedifferent socialspheresand thedirect
and indirectcausal linksthatradiateoutwardsfromtheeconomy.The
liberalmap is a pretense,on theMarxistview,an elaborateexercisein
hypocrisy, forin facttheprevailingreligiouscreedsare adaptedto the
ideologicalrequirements of a capitalistsociety;and theuniversities
are
organizedto reproducethehigherechelonsofthecapitalistworkforce;
and the marketpositionof thelargestcompaniesand corporationsis
subsidizedand guaranteedby the capitaliststate;and offices,though
318 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1984

notlegallyinheritable, areneverthelesspassedon and exchangedwithin

a capitalistpowerelite;and we arefreeinourhomesonlyso longas what
we do thereis harmlessand withoutprejudiceto the capitalistorder.
Liberalsdrawlinesand call themwalls,as iftheyhad thematerialforce
of brickor stone,but theyare onlylines,one-dimensional, doctrinal,
insubstantial.The contemporary social worldis stillan organicwhole,
less differentfromfeudalismthan we mightthink.Land has been
replaced by moveable wealth as the dominantgood, and whilethat
replacement reverberates throughall thespheresofsociallife,itdoesn't
altertheirdeep connectedness.
And yetMarx also believedthattheliberalartofseparationhad been
all too successful,creating,as he wrotein his essay on the Jewish
question,"an individualseparatedfromthecommunity, withdrawn into
himself,whollypre-occupiedwithhis privateinterestand actingin
accordancewithhisprivatecaprice.'" I shallwantto come back to this
argumentlateron foritmakesan important pointaboutthetheoretical
foundationsoftheliberalenterprise. For now,however,itis enoughto
saythatin Marx'seyeseventheegotismoftheseparatedindividualwas
a social product-required,indeed,bytherelationsofproductionand
thenreproducedinall thespheresofsocialactivity. Societyremainedan
organizedwholeevenifitsmembershad losttheirsenseofconnection.
It was thegoal of Marxistpoliticsto restorethatsense,or, better,to
bringmenand womento a new understanding of theirconnectedness
and so enable themto take controlof theircommonlife.For Marx,
separation,insofaras itwas real,was something to be overcome.Sepa-
ratedinstitutions-churches, universities,evenfamilies-haveno part
in hisprogram;theirdistinctive problemswillbe solvedonlybya social
revolution.Society,forMarx,is alwaysruledas a whole,nowbya single
class,ultimatelyby all of itsmembersworkingtogether.
The leftistcritiqueof liberal separationmight,however,take a
different form,holdingthatliberalismservedparticularsocial interests
and limitedand adapted itsartto thatservice.Whatis necessaryis to
maketheartimpartial-or,ifthatis a utopianproject,at leastto makeit
servea widerrangeofinterests. As theinstitutionsofcivilsocietywere
protectedfromstatepower,so nowtheymustbe protected, andthestate
too,fromthenewpowerthatariseswithincivilsocietyitself,thepower
of wealth.The point is not to rejectseparationas Marx did but to
endorse and extend it, to enlist liberal artfulnessin the serviceof
socialism.The mostimportant exampleoftheextendedartofseparation
has to do withprivategovernmentand industrialdemocracy,and I
 Walzer / LIBERALISM AND SEPARATION 319

mean to defendthatextensionat some length.But it is importantto

insistfirstthat the separationsalreadyachieved,in principleif not
alwaysin fact,havetheirvalue too. Even thecareeropen to talentsis a
leftistas well as a liberalrequirement.For socialismwill neverbe a
successso longas socialistpartiesand movementsare led,as in Robert
Michel'saccount,bya gerontocratic oligarchywhosemembers,drawn
fromthe educated and professionalmiddle class, coopt theirown
successors.5One wants energetic,politicallyskillfulworkersand
intellectuals
to riseto positionsofleadership,and so theremustbe room
forsuch people to develop theirtalentsand plan theircareers.More
generally,Marx's visionof individualand collectiveself-determination
requires(thoughhe himselfdid not understandthe requirement) the
existenceof a protectedspace withinwhichmeaningful choicescan be
made. But space of that sort can onlyexist if wealthand power are
walledin and limited.
Societyis indeedall of a piece,at leastin thissense:thatitsvarious
partsbear a familyresemblanceto one another,theoutwardreflection
of an internalgenetic(sociological,not biological)determination. But
thisfamilyresemblanceleavesa greatdeal ofroomforthesociological
versionsof siblingrivalryand maritaldiscordand grown-upchildren
withapartmentsof theirown. So the bishops of the churchcriticize
nationaldefensepolicy,the universities harborradicaldissidents,the
statesubsidizesbutalso regulatescorporateactivity, and so on. In each
case, institutionsare responsiveto theirown internallogic evenwhile
theyarealso responsiveto systemic determinations. The playofinternal
logic can only be repressedby tyrannicalforce,crossingthe lines,
breaking throughthe walls established by the art of separation.
Liberalismis best understoodas an argumentagainst that sort of
repression.It would be a meaninglessargument,and tyrannya
superfluouspolitics,unlessindependent churchesand universities, and
autonomousstates,reallyexistedor mightreallyexistintheworld.But
theycan and sometimesdo exist.The artofseparationis notan illusory
orfantasticenterprise; itis a morallyandpoliticallynecessaryadaptation
to thecomplexitiesofmodernlife.Liberaltheoryreflects and reinforces
a long-term processofsocial differentiation. I shallwantto arguethat
liberal theoristsoftenmisunderstand this process,but at least they
recognizeitssignificance.
Marxistwriterstendto denythesignificance oftheprocess.It is, on
theirview,a transformation thatdoesn'tmakea substantialdifference,
an eventor a seriesof eventsthattakes place largelyin the worldof
320 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1984

appearances.Liberalfreedomsare, all ofthem,unreal.As theformal

freedomof the workeris only a mask forwage slavery,so religious
liberty,academic freedom,free enterprise,self-determination, and
privacyare masksforcontinuedor reiterated subjection:theformsare
new,butthecontentis old. The difficulty withthisviewis thatitdoesn't
connectinanyplausiblewaywiththeactualexperienceofcontemporary
politics;it has a qualityof abstractionand theoreticalwillfulness.No
one whohas livedin an illiberalstateis goingto acceptthisdevaluation
of therangeof liberalfreedoms.The achievementof liberalismis real
even if it is incomplete.But the recognitionof this achievementis
difficultwithina Marxistframework: forthecommitment to organic
wholenessanddeepstructural transformationdoesn'treadilyaccommo-
date separated spheresand autonomous institutions.Nor is it my
purposehereto tryto workoutsuchan accommodation.I wantinstead
to pursuethe alternativecriticismthatliberalshave not been serious
enoughabouttheirownart.And I wantto suggestthatwheretheyhave
been serioustheyhave been guidedby an inadequateand misleading
theory.As withotherformsofsocial lifeand politicalaction,theliberal
enterprise lendsitselfto morethanone interpretation.

III

The art of separationdoesn't make only for libertybut also for

equality.Consideragain,one byone,theexampleswithwhichI 6egan.
Religiousliberty annulsthecoercivepowerofpoliticalandecclesiastical
officials.Hence it creates,in principle,thepriesthoodof all believers,
thatis,itleavesall believersequallyfreeto seektheirownsalvation;and
ittendsto create,inpractice,churchesdominatedbylaymenratherthan
by priests. Academic freedomprovides theoretical,if not always
practical,protectionfor autonomousuniversities, withinwhichit is
difficultto sustaintheprivileged positionofrichoraristocratic children.
The freemarketis open to all comers,withoutregardto race or creed;
alienand pariahgroupscommonlyexploititsopportunities; and though
it yields unequal results,these resultsnever simplyreproducethe
hierarchy of blood or caste or,forthatmatter,of"merit."The "career
open to talents,"if it is reallyopen, providesequal opportunities to
equallytalentedindividuals.The idea ofprivacypresupposestheequal
value,at leastso faras theauthoritiesareconcerned,ofall privatelives;
whatgoes on in an ordinaryhomeis as muchentitledto protection, and
is entitledto as muchprotection, as whatgoes on in a castle.
 Walzer / LIBERALISM AND SEPARATION 321

Under the aegis of the art of separation,libertyand equalitygo

together.Indeed, theyinvitea single definition:we can say that a
(modern,complex,and differentiated) societyenjoysbothfreedomand
equalitywhensuccessin one institutional settingisn'tconvertibleinto
successin another,thatis, whenthe separationshold, whenpolitical
powerdoesn'tshape thechurchor religiouszeal thestate,and so on.
There are, of course,constraintsand inequalitieswithineach institu-
tionalsetting,butwe willhavelittlereasonto worryabout theseifthey
reflectthe internallogic of institutionsand practices(or, as I have
alreadyarguedin Spheresof Justice,ifsocial goods likegrace,know-
ledge, wealth,and officeare distributedin accordance withshared
understandings of whattheyare and whattheyare for).6But, all too
often,theseparationsdon'thold. The liberalachievement has been to
protecta numberofimportantinstitutions and practicesfrompolitical
power,to limitthereachof government. Liberalsare quick to see the
dangerto freedomand equalitywhen the police repressa minority
religionin thenameoftheoreticaltruth,or shutdownpetty-bourgeois
enterprises in thenameofeconomicplanning,or invadeprivatehomes
in the name of moralityor law and order.They are rightin all these
cases, but theseare not the onlycases, or the onlykindsof cases, in
whichlibertyandequalityarethreatened. We needto look closelyat the
waysinwhichwealth,oncepoliticaltyranny is abolished,itselftakeson
tyrannicalforms.Limitedgovernment is thegreatsuccessoftheartof
separation,but that verysuccess opens the way for what political
scientistscallprivategovernment, and it is withthecritiqueof private
government thattheleftist
complaintagainstliberalism properly begins.
The linebetweenpoliticalcommunity and civilsocietywas meantto
markoffcoercivedecisionmakingfromfreeexchange.That'swhythe
sale of officeswas bannedand theold baronialrightto do justiceand
conscriptsoldierswas transferred to stateofficials. Andthat'swhythose
same officialsweredeniedtherightto interfere in markettransactions.
Butitis a falseviewofcivilsociety,a bad sociology,to claimthatall that
goes on inthemarketplace is freeexchangeand thatcoercionis neveran
issue there.Marketsuccessoverridesthelimitsofthe(free)marketin
threecloselyrelatedways. First of all, radical inequalitiesof wealth
generatetheirown coerciveness,so that many exchangesare only
formally free.Second,certainsortsofmarketpower,organized,say,in
corporatestructures, generatepatternsof commandand obediencein
whicheventheformalities ofexchangegivewayto something thatlooks
verymuchlike government. And third,vast wealthand ownershipor
controlofproductive forcesconvertreadilyintogovernment inthestrict
322 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1984

sense:capitalregularly and successfullycallsuponthecoercivepowerof

thestate.7
The problemhereis less importantly a failureofnervethana failure
of perception.Liberaltheoristsliterally did not"see" individualwealth
and corporatepoweras social forces,witha politicalweight,as itwere,
differentfromtheirmarketvalue. Theyaimedto createa freemarket,
and thoughtthat they had done enough when theyopposed state
intervention and setentrepreneurs free.But a freemarket,in whichthe
threekinds of coercion that I listed above are (largely)ineffective,
requiresa positivestructure.Free exchangewon't maintainitself;it
needs to be maintainedby institutions, rules,mores,and customary
practices.Considerfor a momentthe religiousanalogy. The art of
separationworkedagainststatechurchesand churchstatesnotonlyby
disestablishingthechurchbutalso bydivesting itofmaterialwealthand
power.Nor did itdo thisin thenameofprivatefaithalone,butalso in
thename of congregationalself-government. Congregationalism is by
no means the naturalor the only possible institutional arrangement
once churchand statehave been separated,but it is theculturalform
bestadaptedto and mostlikelyto reinforce theseparation.Similarlyin
theeconomicsphere:The art of separationshouldworkagainstboth
statecapitalismand thecapitaliststate,but it won'tworksuccessfully
unless it is accompanied by disestablishment and divestment-and
unlessappropriateculturalformsdevelopwithintheeconomicsphere.
The analogueto privateconscienceis individualenterprise; theanalogue
to congregational self-governmentis cooperativeownership.
Withoutdivestment and withoutcooperativeownership, themarket
is bound to take shape in ways thatdefythe art of separation.New
connectionsare quicklyestablished.As I have alreadyindicated,these
are mostimportantly connectionswiththestate,originating nowfrom
the marketside ratherthan the state side, but deep and powerful
nonetheless.In addition,unlimitedwealththreatensall theinstitutions
and practicesof civil society-academic freedom,the careeropen to
talents,the equalityof "homes" and "castles." It is less overt,more
insidious than state coercion, but no one can doubt the ready
convertability ofwealthintopower,privilege,and position.Whereare
the walls thatwall in the market?In principle,perhaps,theyalready
exist, but theywill neverbe effectiveuntilprivategovernments are
socialized,just as establishedchurchesweresocialized,thatis, turned
overto theirparticipants. Religiousdemocracymustfinditsparallelin
industrialdemocracy.I won'ttryhereto specifyany particularset of
 Walzer / LIBERALISM AND SEPARATION 323

institutionalarrangements;there are many possible arrangements

compatiblewiththetwocrucialrequirements: thatthereshouldbe room
fortheentrepreneur and thenewcompany,just as thereis roomforthe
evangelistand the"gathered"church;and thatthereshouldnotbe room
for the kind of economic power that shapes and determinespublic
policy,anymorethanforthehighecclesiasticalauthority thatroutinely
calls upon the"seculararm."
Withthisanalogy,we can glimpsea consistentliberalism-thatis,
one that passes over into democraticsocialism. But this is still a
democraticsocialismofa liberalsort;itdoes notrequiretheabolitionof
themarket(nordoes it requiretheabolitionofreligion)butratherthe
confinementof the marketto its proper space. Given an illiberal
socialism,wherethestatetakestotalcontrolofeconomiclife,thesame
imperativewouldworkin theoppositeway,notto confinethemarket
butto reassertitsindependencefromthepoliticalrealm.In theUnited
States,then,theartofseparationrequirestherestraint and transforma-
tionofcorporatepower.In theSovietUnionthesameartwouldrequire,
amongotherthings,theliberationof individualenterprise.

IV

Distributive justiceis (largely)a matterofgettingthelinesright.But

howdo we do that?How do we drawthemap ofthesocial worldso that
churchesand schools,statesand markets,bureaucraciesand families
each findtheirproperplace? How do we protectthe participantsin
thesedifferent institutional settingsfromthetyrannicalintrusions
ofthe
powerful,thewealthy,thewell born,and so on? Historically,liberals
have takenas theirfoundationa theoryof individualismand natural
rights.Theymarkout thelinesso as to guaranteethesecureexistence
and freeactivityof the individual.Conceived in thisway, the art of
separationlooks like a veryradicalproject:It givesriseto a worldin
whicheveryperson,everysingleman and woman,is separatedfrom
everyother.Thus Marx: "theso-calledrightsofman ... are simplythe
rights. . . of egoisticman, separatedfromothermen and fromthe
community.'"Institutionalautonomyis an intermediate, not an end
pointin theprocessofseparation.The end is theindividual,freewithin
his or her circle of rights,protectedfrom every sort of external
interference. Liberal society,ideally,is simplya collectionof these
324 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1984

circles,held togetherby all the tangentialconnectionsand actual

overlappingsthat their solitaryinhabitantsvoluntarilyestablish.9
Churches,schools,markets,and familiesare all theproductsofwillful
agreements amongindividuals,valuablebecause oftheagreement they
embodybut at thesame timesubjectto schism,withdrawal,cancella-
tion,and divorce.Religiousfreedomis the rightof the individualto
worshiphisGod (thepronounis important, notbecauseitis masculine,
it can as easilybe feminine, but because it is singularand possessive)
publiclyor privately, howeverand withwhomeverelsehechooses;ithas
nothingto do, nothingin particularto do, with the doctrinaland
institutional characterofJudeo-Christian religiosity.Academicfreedom
has nothinginparticularto do withtheuniversity as a socialsetting;itis
simplytherightoftheindividualto study,to speak,to listenas he orshe
pleases. All otherfreedomsare accountedforin similarways.
Individualagreementis indeedan importantsourceof our institu-
tions,and individualrightsof our freedoms.But takentogether,with
nothingmoresaid, theymake again fora bad sociology.Theydo not
provideeithera richor a realisticunderstanding ofsocial cohesion;nor
do theymake senseofthelivesindividualsactuallylive,and therights
theyactuallyenjoy,withintheframework ofon-goinginstitutions. The
goal thatliberalismsetsfortheartofseparation-everypersonwithin
his or her own circle-is literallyunattainable.The individualwho
stands whollyoutside institutionsand relationshipsand entersinto
them only when he or she chooses and as he or she chooses: This
individualdoes not exist and cannot exist in any conceivablesocial
world.I once wrotethatwe could understanda person'sobligationsby
studyinghis or herbiography,thehistoryofhisor heragreements and
relationships.'0 Thatis right,butonlyso longas one acknowledgesthat
personalhistory is partofsocialhistory;
biographieshavecontexts.The
individualdoes notcreatetheinstitutions thathe orshejoins;norcan he
or she whollyshape theobligationshe or she assumes.The individual
liveswithina worldhe or she did not make.
The liberal hero, author of self and of social roles, is a mythic
invention:It is Shakespeare'sCoriolanus,thataristocratic warriorand
anti-citizen, who claims(and fails)to live"as ifhe weretheauthorof
himselfand knewno otherkin."" Turnedintoa philosophicalidealand
a social policy,thisclaimhas frightening implications, foritis endlessly
disintegrative, reachinga kind of culmination,perhaps, in recent
discussionsabout the rightsof childrento divorcetheirparentsand
parentstheirchildren.But this is individualismin extremisand not
 Walzer / LIBERALISM AND SEPARATION 325

likely,I think,to be sustainedfor long. The liberal hero is more

importantas a sociologicalpretensethanas a philosophicalideal. He or
she opensthewayforshamdescriptions ofchurches,schools,markets,
andfamilies,as ifinstitutions ofthissortwereinfactcreated,andwholly
created,throughthevoluntaryacts of individuals.The sham servesa
practicalpurpose:It rulesoutstateinterference ininstitutionallife,since
the state is in its naturecoercive;and it makes it verydifficultto
recognize other, more subtle sorts of interference (includingthat
imitationof the state that I have already referredto as private
government). More concretely, itlimitstheuses ofpoliticalpowerand
sets money free, for what power takes by force, money merely
purchases, and the purchase has the appearance of a voluntary
agreementbetweenindividuals.In fact,it is oftensomethingdifferent
than that,as we can see if we place the purchasein its contextand
examineitsmotivesand effects. Andthenwe arelikelyto concludethat,
just as therearethingsthestatecannotdo, so theremustbe thingsthat
moneycannotbuy: votes,offices,jurydecisions,uiniversity places-
thesearerelatively easy-and also thevarioussortsofnationalinfluence
and local dominationthatgo alongwiththecontrolofcapital.Butto get
the limitsrightrequiresan understanding of institutionallife more
complexthantheone thatliberalindividualism provides.
Churches,schools,markets,and familiesare social institutions with
particularhistories.They take different formsin different societies,
formsthatreflectdifferent understandings of faith,knowledge,com-
modities,and kinshipobligations.In no case aretheyshapedwhollyby
individualagreements, fortheseagreementsalwaystakeplace within,
and arealwaysconstrained by,particularpatterns ofrules,customs,and
cooperativearrangements. It followsfromthisthattheartofseparation
is not rooted in or warrantedby individualseparateness(whichis a
biological,not a social,phenomenon);itis rootedin and warrantedby
social complexity.We do notseparateindividuals;we separateinstitu-
tions, practices,relationshipsof different sorts. The lines we draw
encirclechurchesand schoolsand marketsandfamilies, notyouandme.
We aim,or we shouldaim,notat thefreedomofthesolitaryindividual
butat whatcan bestbe calledinstitutional integrity.Individualsshould
be free,indeed, in all sorts of ways, but we don't set themfreeby
separatingthemfromtheirfellows.
And yet the separatedindividuallooks more fundamentalthan
institutionsand relationships,a firmerfoundationfor politicaland
social philosophy.When we build fromthe individualwe build,so it
326 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1984

seemsto theliberaleye,fromthegroundup. But in factthegroundis

always social: persons-in-societies,
not persons-by-themselves. We
neverencounterpersons-by-themselves, and theeffortto inventthem,a
strenuousexercise,has no agreed-uponoutcome. We do not know
ourselvesas strangers to one another,absolutealiens,or isolates,and
thereis no way to specifyor understandwhatit would meanforsuch
"individuals"to be free.Men and womenare freewhentheylivewithin
autonomousinstitutions. We mighttakeas ourmodeltheidea ofa free
state,one thatis not colony or a conqueredland, a stateruledby
a
internalratherthanexternalforces.The inhabitantsofsucha stateare
freeonlyina specialand limitedsense,butthatsense,as anyonewhohas
endureda military conquestknows,is realand important. And ifthose
sameindividualslivewithina statethatis internally
free(I willtryto say
whatthatmeansin a moment)and iftheyparticipatein freechurches,
freeuniversities,freefirmsand enterprises,
and so on, we willat some
pointwantto say thattheyare freegenerally.Freedomis additive;it
consistsofrightswithinsettings,and we mustunderstandthesettings,
one by one, ifwe are to guaranteethe rights.Similarly,each freedom
entailsa specificformof equalityor, better,the absenceof a speciflc
inequality-ofconquerorsand subjects,believersand infidels,trustees
and teachers,ownersand workers-and thesumoftheabsencesmakes
an egalitariansociety.

On theliberalview,menand womenare notfreeinthestateso much

as fromit;and theyareequal underthelaw. So theyare protectedfrom
politicalpower,conceivedas a monopolyofphysicalforce,immensely
threatening to thesolitaryindividual.It is immensely
threatening,and I
wantto say again thatthe limitationof poweris liberalism'shistoric
achievement.But ifwe turnfromindividualsto institutions, it is clear
thatpoliticalpoweritselfrequiresprotection-notonlyagainstforeign
conquest but also againstdomesticseizure.The stateis unfreewhen
poweris seized and held by a set of familymembers,or clergymen, or
office-holders, or wealthycitizens.Dynastic,theocratic,bureaucratic,
and plutocraticcontrolall makeforunfreedom-andforinequalitytoo.
Meritocratic controlwouldhavethesameeffect, thoughI don'tbelieve
it has ever been realized. Compared to family,church,office,and
 Walzer / LIBERALISM AND SEPARATION 327

corporation,universities and professionalschoolsare relatively weak,

though the men and women theylicense are not withoutpolitical
pretensions.A freestate,in a complexsociety,is one thatis separated
fromall otherinstitutions, thatis to say,a statethatis inthehandsofits
citizensgenerally-justas a freechurchis inthehandsofbelievers, a free
university in thehandsof scholars,a freefirmin thehandsofworkers
and managers.Andthencitizensarefreeinthestateas wellas fromit(in
fact,itis notas citizensthattheyarefreefromthestatebutas believers,
scholars,entrepreneurs, workers, parents,and so on); and theyareequal
in themakingofthelaw and not onlyunderthelaw.
The artofseparationworksto isolatesocialsettings.Butitobviously
doesn'tachieve,and can'tachieve,anything liketotalisolation,forthen
there would be no society at all. Writingin defense of religious
toleration, JohnLocke claimedthat"thechurch... is a thingabsolutely
separateand distinctfromthecommonwealth. The boundaries... are
fixedand immovable."'2Butthisis too radicala claim,deriving, I think,
more from a theory of the individual conscience than from an
understanding ofchurchesand religiouspractices.Whatgoes on in one
institutional settinginfluencesall theothers;thesamepeople,afterall,
inhabitthedifferent settings,and theysharea historyand a culture-in
whichreligionplaysa greaterorlesserrole.The state,moreover,always
has a specialinfluence, foritis theagentofseparationand thedefender,
as it were, of the social map. It is not so much a nightwatchman
protectingindividualsfromcoercionand physicalassault as it is the
builderand guardianof the walls, protectingchurches,universities,
families,and so on fromtyrannical interference. The membersofthese
institutions also, ofcource,protectthemselves as besttheycan,buttheir
ultimateresortwhentheyarethreatened is an appeal to thestate.Thisis
so even whenthethreatcomes fromthe stateitelf:Then theyappeal
fromone groupofofficialsor one branchofgovernment to another,or
theyappeal againstthegovernment as a wholeto thebodyof citizens.
One way ofjudgingthe actionsof the stateis to ask whetherthey
upholdinstitutional integrity-including theintegrity ofthestateitself.
Consider the relativelyminorexample of safetyregulation.Caveat
emptor,letthebuyerbeware,is,as I saidearlier,a ruleofthemarket,but
itcoversonlya certainrangeofwariness.It has to do withdisappoint-
ment("I don'tlook as handsomeas I thoughtI wouldlook in mynew
clothes"),frustration ("The blurbsays this book is 'accessibleto the
intelligentlayman,'so I boughtit,butnow I can'tseemto understand
it"), and even known and foreseeablerisks ("These cigarettesare
328 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1984

dangerous to my health'). Clothes and books and cigarettesare

properlymarketcommodities.Buttherangeofwarinessdoesn'textend
to unknownand unforeseeablerisksor to collectiverisks-as in the
case,say,ofunsafecarsorofcarsthatcontaminate theair.The degreeof
riskthatwe livewithon ourhighwaysand in ourcommonenvironment
is a matterforpoliticaldecision;itbelongs,so to speak,to thestateand
itscitizens,nottothemarketand itsbuyersand sellers.Atleastthatis so
on ourcurrentunderstanding, as I understandit,ofstatesand markets.
The artofseparationis properlyartfulwhenitdrawsa linethatleaves
theriskof disappointment on one side and theriskof disasteron the
other.
But this artfulness,when it comes to concretecases, is always
controversial.There are problemsof informationand problemsof
interpretation.Whatgoes on in thisor thatinstitutional setting?And
whatis theinternallogic of whatgoes on? These questionshave to be
debated,firstin particularinstitutional settingsand thenin thegeneral
settingof thestate.The artof separationis a popular,not an esoteric,
art.Liberals,however,have not alwaysrecognizeditspopularcharac-
ter,forifindividualrightsareat stakethenphilosophersandjudgescan
claim some special understanding of its requirements. It is the courts
thatdefineand patrolthe circleof rights.'3To focuson institutions,
practices,and relationshipsis to shiftthelocationofagency,to socialize
theartofseparation.Believers,scholars,workers,and parentsestablish
and guardthelines-and thenthecitizensas a bodydo so, throughthe
politicalprocess.Liberalismpassesdefinitively intodemocraticsocial-
ismwhenthemap of societyis sociallydetermined.
Butwhatifsomepoliticalmajoritymisunderstands or overridesthe
autonomyof thisor thatinstitutional setting?That is theunavoidable
riskof democracy.Since the linesdo not have the clear and distinct
characterthatLocke thoughtthemto have,theywillbe drawnhereand
there,experimentally and sometimeswrongly.The linebetweenpolitics
and exchangehas, as I have suggested,beenwronglydrawnfora long
timenow: And we sufferfromtheabuse ofmarketpower.We haveto
argue,then,aboutthelocationofthelineand fight(democratically) to
draw it differently.
Probablywe willnevergetit exactlyright,and the
changingcharacterof states and marketrequires,in any case, its
continualrevisions,so thearguingand thefighting have no visibleend.
And whatiftyrantsseizecontrolofthisor thatchurchor university
or companyor family?Michel Foucaulthas recently contendedthata
darkand rigiddisciplinehas beenclampeddownupon a wholeseriesof
 Walzer / LIBERALISM AND SEPARATION 329

institutions-andthatthisis the workof internalelites,professional

men and womenwithclaims to scientificknowledge,not of political
14 But I thinkthathe exaggerates
officials. thesuccessoftheseelitesand
theirabilityto sustaintheirdisciplinewithoutcallinguponstatepower.
It is onlyin authoritarian states,whichsystematically violateinstitu-
tional integrity, that Foucault's "disciplinarysociety"is likelyto be
realizedin anything liketheformthathe describes.Amongourselves,
the risksare of a different sort; theyinclude but are not limitedto
professionalpretensionand aggrandizement; we also have to worry
about internalcorruption, bureaucraticprivilege,popularfearfulness,
and passivity.
All of theseriskswill be reduced,perhaps,insofaras the different
institutionalsettingshave themselvesbeen socialized, so that their
participants enjoya roughequalityand no groupofbelievers,knowers,
-orownersis capable ofreachingforpoliticalpower.Ifmenand women
enjoy theirdifferent social roles,theyare more likelyto respectthe
settingswithinwhichtherolesareplayed.Thisis thesocialistformofthe
old liberalhopethatindividualssecureintheirowncircleswon'tinvade
the circlesof others.It is stilla problematicbut also I thinka more
realistichope, forit is lonelyin thosecircles;thelifeof institutions is
morelivelyand moresatisfying.

NOTES

1. J. E. Neale, Queen Elizabeth (New York: HarcourtBrace Jovanovich,1934) p.

174.
2. Draftexemptionsforcollegestudentsrepresentperhaps,a modem versionof the
medievalliberties.Theybreachtheliberalwallbetweenstateand universtiy-notbecause
theyviolateacademicfreedombutratherbecausetheyviolatepoliticalintegrity (theequal
standingof citizens).
3. The artofseparationremainsan important featureofcontemporary liberalism,as in
Rawls' Theoryof Justice.His two principles,Rawls writes,"presupposethatthesocial
structure can be dividedintotwomoreor lessdistinctparts,thefirstprincipleapplyingto
the one, the second to the other.They distinguishbetweenthose aspectsof the social
systemthatdefineand securetheequal libertiesofcitizenshipand thosethatspecifyand
establishsocial and economicinequalities,"in A TheoryofJustice(Cambridge:Harvard
University Press,1971),p. 61. Rawlsredrawstheold linebetweenthestateand themarket,
thoughin a ratherdifferent waythanI shall suggestbelow.
4. Marx, Early Writings, trans.T. B. Bottomore(London: C. A. Watts,1963),p. 26.
5. RobertMichels,PoliticalParties,trans.Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: Dover,
1959).
330 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1984

6. Walzer,SpheresofJustice:A Defenseof Pluralismand Equality(New York: Basic

Books, 1983).
7. The best recentaccountofthetransformation ofmarketpowerintopoliticalpower
is CharlesE. Lindblom,Politicsand Markets(New York:Basic Books, 1977),esp. PartV.
8. Marx, 1963,p.24.
9. I omithereanydiscussionoftheearlytwentieth-century of whom
pluralists,some
are plausiblycalled liberals,sincetheirargumentsneverattainedthehighphilosophical
respectabilityof thedoctrineof individualrights.
10. Obligations:Essayson Disobedience,War,and Citizenship (Cambridge:Harvard
University Press, 1970),p. x.
11. Coriolanus,Act V, sceneiii.
12. Locke, A LetterConcerningToleration,ed. PatrickRomanell (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill,1950),p. 27.
13. For a strongstatementof the role of courtsin defenseof rights,see Ronald
Dworkin,TakingRightsSeriously(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press,1977).
14. See especiallyFoucault's Disciplineand Punish: The Birthof thePrison,trans.
Alan Sheridan(New York: Vintage,1979).The argumentworksbestforinstitutions like
prisons,hospitals,and asylums,wherethesubjectsofdisciplinearecivically,physically,
or
mentallyincapacitated,but Foucault meansitto applyalso to schoolsand factories:pp.
293ff.

Michael Walzeris a Professorof Social Science at the Institute

for Advanced
Study in Princeton.He is the author,most recently,of Spheresof Justice:A
Defense of Pluralismand Equality(1983) and of theforthcomingExodus and
Revolution.