HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SEPTEMBER 3, 2013

FACTS:

-Property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of

land situated in Barangay Tibig Silang Cavite with an area of 71,
324 sq m.
-February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased
the property to Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land
registration covering the property in the RTC in Tagaytay City
Cavite claiming that the property formed part of the ALIENABLE
AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN and that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had in open, continuous, uninterrupted,
public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more
than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of
this title.
-To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification
dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR.
-RTC rendered judgement granting Malabanan’s application for land
registration.
-The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgement
to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the
property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
-On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing
the RTC and dismissing the application for registration of
Malabanan.
-Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of
possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-
DENR certification stated the property had been declared alienable
and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession prior
to March 15, 1982 could be tacked for purposes of computing
Malabanan’s period of possession.

- They point out ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration
of the land subject of mere OBITER DICTUM considering that the
land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and
declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial
hearing.
-According to them, what was essential was that the property had
been “converted” into private property by reason of the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their
predecessor-in-interest of an alienable land of the public domain for
more than 30 years through prescription at the time of the
application without regard to whether the property sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public
domain.

ISSUE:

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable

primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the
Constitution.

Interpretation of Section 11 (4), in relation to Section 48 (b) of the

Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino
citizen of the land since June 12, 1945 or earlier, viz.

RULINGS:
-Regalian Doctrine “all lands of the public domain belong to the
State.”
-All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are
presumed to belong to the state. Also, public lands remain part pf
the inalienable land of the public domain unless the state shown to
have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.
-1935 Consitution, lands of the public domain were classified into
three namely, AGRICULTURAL, TIMBER and MINERAL.
-Section 10, Article 14 of 1973 Constitution classified lands of the
public domain into seven, specifically, AGRICULTURAL, INDUSTRIAL
OR COMMERCIAL, RESIDENTIAL, RESETTLEMENT, MINERAL TIMBER
OR FOREST AND GRAZINF LAND.
-1987 Constitution-AGRICULTURAL, FOREST OR TIMBER AND
MINERAL AND NATIONAL PARKS.
- Agricultural further classified by law according to the uses to
which they may be devoted.
-Legal classification is done exclusively by and through positive act
of the Executive Department.

-ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE STATE (a)

Patrimonial lands of the state, classified as lands of private
ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code without limitation (b)
lands of the public domain or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral or national
parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are
reclassified as agricultural.
-A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands
under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in
the courts. If, however, public land will be classified as neither
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park or when
public land is no longer intended for public service or for the
declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or the President declares that the State
no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

-The character of the property subject of the application as

alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain
determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership of
title over it. By virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire
lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already
converted to private ownership, by operation of law as a result of
satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public
Land Act.. It is for this reason that the property subject of the
application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire
duration of the requisite period of possession.
-To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of
the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the
presumption that the land is inalienable.

-The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to

determine the point at which prescription may run against the
State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under
SECTION 48(B) OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT is title that is acquired by
reason of the applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable
and disposable agricultural land of of the public domain. Where all
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are
complied with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive
and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by
operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the
Government because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be
issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain,
namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and
are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and,
therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes
enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as
alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the
land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant arises, 36 and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of
an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has
become private property.37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into
patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of
acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or
extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive
prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the
State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period
of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration
of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law
or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth. 1âwphi1

LUIS MARCOS VS HON. ZUES C. ABROGAR

JANUARY 13, 2009

FACTS:

-Article 308 of RPC

-PLDT argues that “taking” in relation to theft under RPC does not
require “asportation”, the sole requisite being that the object should
be capable od “appropriation”. The element of “taking” referred to
in Article 308 of the RPC means the act of depriving another of the
possession and dominion of a movable coupled with the intention,
at the time of the “taking” of withholding it with the character of
permanency. There must be intent to appropriate which means to
deprive the lawful owner of the thing. Thus the term “personal
properties” under Article 308 of the RPC is not limited to only
personal properties which are “susceptible of being severed from a
mass or larger quantity and of being transported from place to
place.”

-Assuming the correct indictment should have been under RA 8484,

the quashal of the information would still not be proper. The charge
of theft as alleged in the information should be taken in relation to
RA 8484 because it is the elements, and not the designation of the
crime that control.
ISSUE:

Whether or not “the unauthorized use or appropriation of PLDT

international telephone calls, service and facilities, for the purpose
of generating personal profit or gain that should have otherwise
belonged to PLDT, constitutes theft.

RULING:

Intangible property such as electrical energy is capable of

appropriation because it may be taken and carried away. Electricity
is personal property under Article 416 (3) of the Civil Code, which
enumerates “forces of nature which are brought under control by
science.”

It cannot be said that such international long distance calls were

personal properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not
have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely ENCODES,
AUGMENTS, ENHANCES, DECODES and TRANSMITS SAID CALLS
using its complex communications infrastructures and facilities.
PLDT not being the owner of said telephone calls, then it could not
validly claim communications facilities without consent of PLDT that
constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the
telephone services and business.

Therefore, the business of providing telecommunications and the

telephone service are personal property under Article 308 of the
RPC, and the act of engaging ISR (International Simple Resale) is
an act of “subtraction” penalized under said article. However, the
Amended Information describes the thing taken as, “international
long distance calls”, and only later mentions “stealing the business
from PLDT” as the manner by which the gain was derived by the
accused. In order to correct this inaccuracy of description, this case
must be remanded to the trial court and the prosecution directed to
amend the Amended Information, to clearly state that the property
subject of the theft are the SERVICES AND BUSINESS OF
RESPONDENT PLDT. Parenthetically, this amendment is not
necessitated by a mistake in charging the proper offense, which
would have called for the dismissal of the information under Rule
110, Section 14 and Rule 119, Section 19 of the Revised on
Criminal Procedure. The crime if properly designated as one of the
theft. The purpose of the amendment is simply to ensure that the
accused is fully and sufficiently apprised of the nature and cause of
the charge against him, and thus guaranteed of his right under the
Constitution.
THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE VS CITY OF
ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE

MARCH 28, 1968

FACTS:

-1945, the capital of Zambonga Province was transferred to

Dipolog.

-June 16, 1948, RA 268 was approved creating the municipality of

Molave and making it the capital of Zamboanga Province.

-May 26, 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor

General, pursuant to Commonwealth Act 39, fixed the value of the
properties and buildings in question left by Zamboanga Province in
Zamboanga City at 1,294,244.00 pesos.

-June 6, 1952, RA 711 approved dividing the province of

Zamboanga into two (2) Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del
Sur.

 Pursuant thereto, the Auditor General, on January 11, 1955, apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct
Province of Zamboanga as follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur.
Zamboanga del Norte therefore became entitled to 54.39% of P1,294,244.00, the total value of the lots and buildings
in question, or P704,220.05 payable by Zamboanga City.

-June 17, 1961, RA 3039 was approved amending Section 50 of

Commonwealth Act 39: All buildings, properties and assets
belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within
the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in
favor of the said City of Zamboanga.

-Constrained plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga Del Norte to file on

March 5, 1962, a complaint entitled “Declaratory Relief with
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction” (a) RZ 3039 be declared
unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff province of property without
due process and just compensation; (b) Plaintiff’s rights and
obligations under said law be declared © the Secretary of Finance
and the Internal Revenue Commissioner be enjoined from
reimbursing the sum of 57,373. 46 to defendant city and (d) The
latter be ordered to continue paying the balance of 704,220.05 in
quarterly installment of 25% of its internal revenue allotments.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 3039 is unconstitutional

RULINGS:

IF PROPERTY IS OWNED BY THE MUNICIPALITY (MEANING

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION) IN ITS PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENTAL
CAPACITY, THE PROPERTY IS PUBLIC AND CONGRESS HAS
ABSOLUTE CONTROL OVER IT. BUT IF THE PROPERTY IS OWNED IN
ITS PRIVATE OR PROPRIETARY CAPACITY, THEN IT IS
PATRIMONIAL AND CONGRESS HAS NO ABSOLUTE CONTROL. THE
MUNICIPALITY CANNOT BE DEPRIVED OF IT WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS AND PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION.

PASTOR AGO VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

OCTOBER 31, 1962

FACTS:

-Pastor Argo bought sawmill machineries and equipments from

GRACE PAK ENGINEERING DOMINEERING, INC. Executing chattel
mortgage to secure payment of balance price remaining P 32,000
which Pastor Argo agreed to pay on installment basis.

-Pastor Ago defaulted in his payment (fail to pay in installment) and

so Grace Park Engineering Inc., instituted EXTRA-JUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS OF THE MORTGAGE. The parties
arrived at a compromise agreement and submitted in court
(instituted SPECIAL CIVIL CASE NO. 53 IN THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF AGUSAN) whereas the Hon. Judge Montano Ortiz
dictated a decision in open court on January 28, 1959.

-Pastor Agro continued ti default in his payments. Motion of

execution filed by Grace Park in the lower court was granted and a
WRIT OF EXECUTION released dated September 23, 1959.

-These machineries and equipments had been taken to and

installed in a sawmill building owned by GOLDEN PACIFIC SAWMILL
INC., to whom Pastor Argo alleges sold them on February 16, 1959
(A DATE AFTER THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT BUT BEFORE
LEVY BY THE SHERIFF).