LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES

CASES:

a. Federation Of Coron, Busuanga, Palawan Farmer's Association, Inc.

(FCBPFAI), et al. v. The Secretary Of The Department Of Environment And
Natural Resources (DENR), G.R. No. 247866, 15 September 2020

FACTS:
Several groups of farmers occupied and tilled vast lands in Coron, Palawan.
Sometime in 2020, these farm lands were placed under the coverage of the
CARP by the DAR. These lands had titles in the name of Mercury Group of
Companies and Jose Sandoval (succeeded by Josefa) . However, the
implementation of the CARP was halted because the lands were discovered to
be unclassified forest lands under Sec 3(a) PD 705, and thus are inalienable
and belong to the government. As forest lands, they must be under the
administration of the DENR and not DAR. The farmers argue that Sec 3(a) PD
705 violates the Constitution that traces its origin from Philippine Bill 1902
which allegedly states that when an unclassified lot is not covered by trees, it
should be agricultural land.

ISSUE:
Is Sec 3(a) PD 705 unconstitutional? Are unclassified lands not covered by
lands automatically deemed agricultural lands?

RULING:
NO. Sec 3(a) is constitutional and consistent with the Constitution which
adapted the Regalian Doctrine that declares all lands of the public domain
belong to the State. If We accept the position of private claimants, the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all
lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral
land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State
ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally
repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian Doctrine. A forested area
classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not
have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered
by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea
water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of
its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in
an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation
of imperfect title do not apply.

b. Heirs Of Mario Malabanan v. Republic Of The Philippines, G.R. No.

179987, 03 September 2013

FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D,
Silang Cadastre
Malabanan... claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco,[3] and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for
more than thirty (30) years.
Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his
witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the
property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by
his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
The Republic of the Philippines likewise did... not present any evidence to
controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification
dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural
Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was "verified... to be
within the Alienable or Disposable land
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in
finding that he had been in possession of the property in the... manner and for
the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as
alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted
that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was
declared alienable and... disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos'
possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the
period of possession.
ISSUES:
Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names
under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or
both?

RULING:
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more
extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the
acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial
property," while Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands."
It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2)
as a ground for application for registration, and that the 30-year possession
period refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, and not the concept of... prescription under the Civil Code. The
OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can
run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the
public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the... property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It
is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by
the State to be no... longer intended for public service or for the development
of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to
run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress
or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is... duly
authorized by law.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that
Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his... predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence
the Tax Declarations they presented in particular is to the year 1948. Thus,
they cannot... avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982,
there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use
service or for the development of the national... evidence, conformably with
Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status
as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. 
Thus, it is... insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

c. Republic Of The Philippines v. Tri-Plus Corporation, G.R. No.

150000, 26 September 2006

FACTS:
Tri-Plus alleged that it is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcels of land,
including the improvements thereon, having acquired the same through
purchase; and that it is in actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and
peaceful possession of the subject properties in the concept of an owner for
more than 30 years, including that of its predecessors-in-interest.
On September 4, 1997, the trial court received an Opposition to the
Application for Registration filed by the Republic of the Philippines through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on the grounds that neither the
applicant nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the muniments of title submitted by
the applicant which consists, among others, of tax declarations and receipts of
tax payments, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona
fide acquisition of the land applied for or of its open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto.

MTC RULING:
The totality of the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, of the
applicant clearly shows that it and its predecessors-in-interest had been in
actual, public, exclusive and continuous possession in concept of owner of the
parcels of land above-mentioned for no less than thirty (30) years prior to the
filing of the instant petition for registration of its imperfect title. 

CA RULING:
The CA rendered the presently assailed Decision finding no reversible error in
the appealed judgment, thereby, affirming the same.
Petitioner contends that since the applicant failed to discharge the burden of
proving that the subject properties are alienable and disposable, there is no
basis for the CA to rule that these properties are private lands.

ISSUE:
WON the assailed land is a private land?
RULING:
No, the assailed land is not a private land.
Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the
classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable,
mineral or forest land is the prerogative of the Executive Department. Under
the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to
any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain.
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a)
that the land forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim
of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
In the present case, the Court finds merit in petitioner's contention that
respondent failed to prove the first requirement that the properties sought to
be titled forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper
government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed
alienable and disposable. As to the second requirement, respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest failed to prove that they had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject properties
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, as
required by law.
Hence, the assailed land is not a private land.

d. The Secretary Of The Department Of Environment And Natural

Resources, et al. v. Mayor Jose S. Yap, et al., G.R. No. 167707, 08 October
2008
 
FACTS:
 On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc.
No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas
in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).  President Marcos
later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to
implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded
them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants  Mayor .  Yap, Jr.,
and others  filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo,
Aklan
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their
occupied lands.  They declared that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier
since time immemorial.  They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid
realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No.
1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the
commerce of man.  Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was
susceptible of private ownership.  Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. 
The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the
public domain.  It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public
forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of 
the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG maintained that
respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
was misplaced.  Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by
Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended.  Since Boracay
Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever
possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-
claimants, declaring that, “PD 1810 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised
Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic
then appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto  the
RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly
denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay
Island partly reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly
agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in
Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus,
and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege  that the Proclamation
infringed on their “prior vested rights” over portions of Boracay.  They have
been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions

ISSUE:
 the main issue is whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over
their occupied portions in Boracay.
 
HELD:
The petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064.   Such
unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of
the public domain as public forest.  Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines
a public forest as “a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the
subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands
are needed for forest purpose and which are not.”  Applying PD No. 705, all
unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered
public forests.  PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to
its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or timber, such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The
1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one
addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be
alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island
had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these
grand divisions.  Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required.  In
keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and
again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or
a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government
that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years
is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming
such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative
action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court.  The records
are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay
occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation
that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay
Island as alienable and disposable land.  If President Marcos intended to
classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would
have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in
Proclamation No. 1064.  This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

e. Republic Of The Philippines v. The Heirs Of Meynardo Cabrera, et

al., G.R. No. 218418, 08 November 2017

 
 
DOCTRINE:
 
The  classification and  reclassification  of  public  lands  into  alienable  or 
disposable, mineral  or   forest   land  is   the   exclusive   prerogative  of   the  
Executive  Department,  and   is exercised    by  the  latter through  the
President. Furhter, owing to the nature of  reversion proceedings and  the
outcome which a favorable decision therein entails, the State bears the burden
to prove that   the land previously decreed or adjudicated in favor of the
defendant constitutes land which  cannot be owned by private individuals.

FACTS :
Sometime in 1971, the Bureau of Lands issued Free Patent No. 516197 in favor
of
Meynardo, covering two (2) lots. On the basis of said patent, the ROD issued
Original Certificate   of   Title   covering   both   lots   in   Meynardo's   name.  
Thereafter,   Lot   1-A   was transferred to Consolacion. Thus, on April 6, 1982,
TCT No. 16580 covering Lot 1-A was issued in Consolacion's name. Later still,
Consolacion sold portions of Lot 1-A to several purchasers. Learning of the
issuance of TCT No. 16580, the De Castros, claiming to be the actual
possessors of Lot 1-A, filed before the DENR a petition urging DENR to
conduct an investigation to determine Lot 1-A's land classification status.
 
Consequently, in the DENR Final Report issued by Erwin D. Talento of the
DENR
Land Management Office, Free Patent No. 516197, covering Lots 1, 1-A, and 2 
(collectively, Roxas Properties), was declared null and void for having been
issued over  land forming part of the public domain (forest lands).
 
Later, the Republic filed against the Respondents a complaint for the
annulment
and/or cancellation of Free Patent No. 516197, OCT No. RP-132 (P-9193), and
TCT No. 16580. The Complaint also prayed for the reversion of the Roxas
Properties in the State's favor.  
 
In this Petition, the Republic maintains that the Court's ruling in  Animas  did
not
have the effect of making a positive executive act a necessary requirement for
the  purpose of proving the reclassification of alienable and disposable land.
Instead, the  Republic posits that Animas affirms its right to institute
reversion proceedings in  instances where portions of forest land are
erroneously included within the scope of land    patents. Moreover, the
Republic argues that in reversion proceedings, the State should  not be made
to bear the burden of proving that the land in question constitutes public 
domain (i.e., forest land). In any  case,  the  Republic  posits   that  the 
documentary   and    testimonial  evidence  it   had
presented sufficiently proved such fact.
 
 
ISSUES :
 
Whether the CA is correct when it held that a positive act of government is  
necessary to evince the reclassification of land from alienable and disposable
to forest. 
 
RULING :
 
YES. The CA did not err when it affirmed the RTC, as the Republic failed to 
establish that the Roxas Properties were classified as forest land at the time
Free  Patent No. 516197 was issued. 
The power to classify and reclassify land lies solely with the Executive
Department.  The Regalian Doctrine has long been recognized as the basic
foundation of the State's property regime, and has been consistently adopted
under the  1935,  1973,    and 1987 Constitutions; it espouses that all lands of
the public domain belong to the  State, and that, as a consequence thereof, any
asserted right of ownership over land    necessarily traces back to the State. At
present, Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the
public domain into five (5) categories — forest lands,    agricultural lands,
timber lands, mineral lands, and national parks. In the absence of any prior
classification by the State, unclassified lands of the public domain assume the
category of forest lands not open to disposition. 
 
 
The fact that   the   classification   of   unclassified   lands   of   the   public  
domain,   and   the reclassification of those previously classified under any of
the categories set forth in  the 1987 Constitution (such as the Roxas
Properties), are governed by Commonwealth  Act No. 141 otherwise known
as the Public Land Act.  The   provisions   thereof   are   clear   and  leave   no  
room  for   interpretation  —   the classification and reclassification of public
lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department, and is exercised by  the latter
through the President, or such other persons vested with authority to
exercise  the same on his behalf. Since the power to classify and reclassify land
are executive in  nature, such acts, effected without executive authority, are
void, and essentially ultra  vires.
A land registration proceeding is the manner through which an applicant
confirms
title to real property. In this proceeding, the applicant bears the burden of
overcoming  the presumption of State ownership. Accordingly, the applicant
is bound to establish,  through incontrovertible   evidence,   that   the   land  
sought   to   be   registered   had   been    declared alienable or disposable
through a positive act of the State. Conversely, reversion proceeding is the
manner through which the State seeks to revert land to the mass of the public
domain; it is proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed
of in favor of private individuals or corporations, or when a person obtains a 
title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which
cannot be  registered under the Torrens system as they form part of the public
domain.  
Owing to the nature of reversion proceedings and the outcome which a
favorable
decision therein entails, the  State  bears the  burden to prove that  the land 
previously decreed or adjudicated in favor of the defendant constitutes land
which cannot be owned by private individuals. Hence, to resolve this Petition,
the Court must determine whether the documentary and testimonial evidence
offered by the Republic are sufficient to  sustain its cause.
Therefore, the complaint should be dismissed as the Republic failed to show
that the Roxas Properties including Lot 1-A  were classified as forest land at
the time free patent no.516197 was issued in Meynardo’s favour.
f. Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et
al., G.R. No. 152613, 23 June 2006

FACTS:
A motion for reconsideration was filed by SEM. The Assailed Decision held
that the assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEM violated
one of the conditions stipulated in the permit. It also ruled that the transfer of
EP 133 violated Presidential Decree No. 463, which requires that the
assignment of a mining right be made with the prior approval of the Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Moreover,
the Assailed Decision pointed out that EP 133 expired by non-renewal since it
was not renewed before or after its expiration. It likewise upheld the validity
of Proclamation No. 297 absent any question against its validity. 
 
In view of this and considering that under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942,
otherwise known as the “Mining Act of 1995,” mining operations in mineral
reservations may be undertaken directly by the State or through a contractor,
the Court deemed the issue of ownership of priority right over the contested
Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as having been overtaken by the said
proclamation.
 
Thus, it was held in the Assailed Decision that it is now within the
prerogative of the Executive Department to undertake directly the mining
operations of the disputed area or to award the operations to private entities
including petitioners Apex and Balite, subject to applicable laws, rules and
regulations, and provided that these private entities are qualified. 
 
Apex, for its part, filed a Motion for Clarification of the Assailed Decision,
praying that the Court elucidate on the Decision’s pronouncement that
“mining operations, are now, therefore within the full control of the State
through the executive branch.” Moreover, Apex asks this Court to order the
Mines and Geosciences Board (MGB) to accept its application for an
exploration permit. Balite echoes the same concern as that of Apex on the
actual takeover by the State of the mining industry in the disputed area to the
exclusion of the private sector. In addition, Balite prays for this Court to direct
MGB to accept its application for an exploration permit. Camilo Banad, et al.,
likewise filed a motion for reconsideration and prayed that the disputed area
be awarded to them. In the Resolution, the Court En Banc resolved to accept
the instant cases.
 
ISSUES:
1. Whether the transfer or assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 by MMC
to SEM was validly made without violating any of the terms and conditions
set forth in Presidential Decree  No. 463 and EP 133 itself.
 
2. Whether Southeast Mindanao Mining Corp. acquired a vested right over
the disputed area, which constitutes a property right protected by the
Constitution. 
 
3. Whether the assailed Decision dated 23 June 2006 of the Third Division in
this case is contrary to and overturns the earlier Decision of this Court in
Apex v. Garcia (G.R. No. 92605, 16 July 1991, 199 SCRA 278). 
 
4. Whether the issuance of Proclamation No. 297 declaring the disputed area
as mineral reservation outweighs the claims of SEM, Apex Mining Co. Inc.
and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative over the Diwalwal Gold
Rush Area. 
 
5. Whether the issue of the legality/constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297
was belatedly raised.

RULING:
 
1. The assailed Decision did not overturn the 16 July 1991 Decision in Apex
Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia. The former was decided on facts and issues that
were not attendant in the latter, such as the expiration of EP 133, the violation
of the condition embodied in EP 133 prohibiting its assignment, and the
unauthorized and invalid assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM, since this
assignment was effected without the approval of the Secretary of DENR; 
 
2. SEM did not acquire vested right over the disputed area because its
supposed right was extinguished by the expiration of its exploration permit
and by its violation of the condition prohibiting the assignment of EP 133 by
MMC to SEM. In addition, even assuming that SEM has a valid exploration
permit, such is a mere license that can be withdrawn by the State. In fact, the
same has been withdrawn by the issuance of Proclamation No. 297, which
places the disputed area under the full control of the State through the
Executive Department;
 
 3. The approval requirement under Section 97 of Presidential Decree No. 463
applies to the assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM, since the exploration
permit is an interest in a mining lease contract; 
 
4. The issue of the constitutionality and the legality of Proclamation No. 297
was raised belatedly, as SEM questions the same for the first time in its
Motion for Reconsideration. Even if the issue were to  be entertained, the said
proclamation is found to be in harmony with the Constitution and other
existing statutes; 
 
5. The motion for reconsideration of CamiloBanad, et al. cannot be passed
upon because they are not parties to the instant cases;
 
 6. The prayers of Apex and Balite asking the Court to direct the MGB to
accept their applications for exploration permits cannot be granted, since it is
the Executive Department that has the prerogative to accept such
applications, if ever it decides to award the mining operations in the disputed
area to a  private entity;

g. Bangus Fry Fisherfolk Diwata Magbuhos, et al. v. The Honorable

Enrico Lanzanas As Judge Of The Regional Trial Court Of Manila, Branch
VII, et al., G.R. No. 131442, 10 July 2003

FACTS:
On 30 June 1997, Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe of Region
IV DENR, issued an Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) in favor of
respondent National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). The ECC authorized
NAPOCOR to construct a temporary mooring facility in Minolo Cove,
Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The Sangguniang Bayan
of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a mangrove area and breeding
ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone.
The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of
NAPOCOR's power barge, which, due to turbulent waters at its former
mooring site in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, required relocation to a safer site
like Minolo Cove. The 14.4 megawatts power barge would provide the main
source of power for the entire province of Oriental Mindoro pending the
construction of a land-based power plant in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The
ECC for the mooring facility was valid for two years counted from its date of
issuance or until 30 June 1999.4
Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto
Galera, sought reconsideration of the ECC issuance. Principe, however,
denied petitioners' plea on 15 July 1997. On 21 July 1997, petitioners filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, for the
cancellation of the ECC and for the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the
construction of the mooring facility. Petitioners further prayed for the
demolition of mooring structures that respondents had already built.
On 28 July 1997, prior to the filing of the amended complaint, the trial court
issued a 20-day temporary restraining order enjoining the construction of the
mooring facility. However, the trial court lifted the same on 6 August 1997 on
NAPOCOR's manifestation that the provincial government of Oriental
Mindoro was the one undertaking the construction of the mooring facility.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of
cause action and lack of jurisdiction.
RULING:
The petition has no merit.
The Court commends petitioners for their courageous efforts to safeguard and
maintain the ecological balance of Minolo Cove. This Court recognizes the
utmost importance of protecting the environment. Indeed, we have called for
the vigorous prosecution of violators of environmental laws. Legal actions to
achieve this end, however, must be done in accordance with established rules
of procedure that were intended, in the first place, to achieve orderly and
efficient administration of justice. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for
lack of merit.
 
As to jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over the case, Jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law. Such jurisdiction is determined by
the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought.
Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
issuance of the ECC, although it could not issue an injunctive writ against the
DENR or NAPOCOR. However, since the construction of the mooring facility
could not proceed without a valid ECC, the validity of the ECC remains the
determinative issue in resolving petitioners' complaint.
As to exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, the settled rule is before a party
may seek the intervention of the courts, he should first avail of all the means
afforded by administrative processes. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery is still available, with a procedure prescribed
pursuant to law for an administrative officer to decide the controversy, a
party should first exhaust such remedy before resorting to the courts. The
premature invocation of a court's intervention renders the complaint without
cause of action and dismissible on such ground.
Instead of following the foregoing procedure, petitioners bypassed the DENR
Secretary and immediately filed their complaint with the Manila RTC,
depriving the DENR Secretary the opportunity to review the decision of his
subordinate, RED Principe. Under the Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 and
applicable jurisprudence, petitioners' omission renders their complaint
dismissible for lack of cause of action. Consequently, the Manila RTC did not
err in dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of cause of action.
 
 
 
 
 

h. Hon. Jose D. Lina, Jr., et al. v. Hon. Francisco Dizon Paño, G.R. No.
129093, 30 August 2001

Jose Lina Jr. v. Francisco Dizon Paño

G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001

Facts:
Private respondent Tony Calvento, was appointed agent by PCSO to install a
terminal for the operation of lotto, applied for a mayor’s permit to operate a
lotto outlet in San Pedro,Laguna. It was denied on the ground that an
ordinance entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna prohibited gambling in the province, including the
operation of lotto. With the denial of his application, private respondent filed
an action for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
private respondent enjoining petitioners from implementing or enforcing the
subject resolution.
Issue:
Whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna and the denial of a mayor’s permit based thereon are valid
Held:
No. The questioned ordinance merely states the “objection” of the council to
the said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local
council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to
prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. As a
policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such
resolution is valid. This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its
views which may be contrary to that of the national government’s. However,
this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments
may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress.
Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should
not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of
lotto. Moreover, ordinances should not contravene statutes as municipal
governments are merely agents of the national government. The local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers which have been conferred on
them by Congress. The delegate cannot besuperior to the principal or exercise
powers higher than those of the latter. This being thecase, these councils, as
delegates, cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powershigher than
those of the latter. The question of whether gambling should be permitted is
for Congress to determine, taking into account national and local interests.
Since Congress has allowed the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO seeks
to conduct in Laguna, pursuant toits legislative grant of authority, the
province’s Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the exercise of said
authority by preventing something already allowed by Congress.

i. Engineer Ben Y. Lim, et al. v. Hon. Sulpicio G. Gamosa, et al., G.R. No.
193964, 02 December 2015

Engineer Ben Y. Lim, et al. v. Hon. Sulpicio G. Gamosa, et al., G.R. No.
193964, 02 December 2015
Facts:
Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community filed a petition before the NCIP
against Engr. Lim, RBL Fishing Corporation, Palawan Aquaculture Corp and
Peninsula Shipyard Corporation for violation of its Free Prior and Informed
Consent (FPIC). The Tagbanua’s assailed that the workers of Engr Lim and its
corporation had destroyed the houses of tribal members, coerced some to stop
from cultivating their lands and had set up houses within the said portions of
their ancestral domains. Prior to the enactment of IPRA of 1997, the
Tagbanua’s have filed their claims for recognition of their ancestral domains
with the DENR. Provincial Special Task Force on Ancestral Domain
(PSTFAD) recommended to validate their proof and claims with NCIP for
their CADTs.
Engr. Lim filed a petition to reserve, annul and set aside the NCIPs resolution
due to lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. However, the CA denied
the petition and affirmed the resolution of NCIP.
Issue:
Whether or not NCIP has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
persons accused under section 66 of the IPRA.
Ruling:
No, NCIP has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the persons
accused.
The Court ruled that NCIP has no original and exclusive jurisdiction to all
claims and disputes involving rights of Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. This is based on Section 66 of IPRA where
it requires both parties are ICCs/IPs who exhausted all remedies under
customary law before bringing their claim and dispute to the NCIP. It limits
the Jurisdiction of the NCIP to cases of claims and disputes involving rights of
IPs where both parties belong to Indigenous Cultural Community/Indigenous
Peoples. IPRA recognizes customs and customary law cannot be applied to
non-IPs/ICCs since Indigenous communities are recognized as a distinct
sector of Philippine Society. NCIP has no competence to determine the rights,
duties and obligations on non IPs under other laws. However, the issue may
be brought before a Court of General Jurisdiction within the legal bounds of
rights and remedies. Therefore, the petition was granted.

j. Juan Antonio, Anna Rosario And Jose Alfonso, All Surnamed Oposa, et
al., v. The Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 101083, 30 July
1993

OPOSA vs. FACTORAN

FACTS
After exhausting the remedies in the DENR the petitioners asked the RTC of
Makati to cancel all Timber Licensing agreement and for the DENR to stop
issuing renewal of LTAs. The trial court agreed with the DENR that the
petitioners have no cause of action against the DENR and granting their
petition would impair the contracts between DENR and those that was
granted with TLA. 

The petitioners sought the aid of the Supreme Court contending that they
have cause of action on the basis of the concept of generational genocide in
Criminal Law and the concept of man’s inalienable right to self-preservation
and self-perpetuation embodied in natural laws. They also alleged that they
have cause of action on the basis of their rights in Section 16, Article II of the
1987 constitution that was transgressed. The DENR avers that the petitioners
failed to show any injury or legal right violated by the DENR.  

ISSUE

1. Does the generation yet unborn have legal standing in

environmental cases?

2. What was the legal rights of the petitioners that was violated?
RULING

1. Yes This case, however, has a special and novel element.

Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling
that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and
for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality
to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and
harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its
entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next
to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

2. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in ruling that
there was no legal right violated in this case and presented that
the Section 15, and 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. Further
the Supreme Court said:

1.

Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it

concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation
— aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced
 and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies
by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the
present generation, but also for those to come — generations which
stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining
life.

k. Victoria Segovia, et al. v. The Climate Change Commission, et al., G.R.

No. 211010, 07 March 2017

FACTS:

This is a petition for the issuance of Writ of Kalikasan and continuing

mandamus to compel the implementation of the following environmental
laws and executive issuances – Republic Act No. 9729 (Climate Change Act),
and Republic Act 8749 (Clean Air Act); Executive Order No. 774 (BO 774), AO
254 s. 2009 (AO 254); and Administrative Order No. 171, s. 2007 (AO171).

In gist, petitioners contend that respondents’ failure to implement the

foregoing laws and executive issuances resulted in the continued degradation
of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation of the petitioner’s
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, and may even be
tantamount to deprivation of life sources and land, water and air, by the
government without due process of law.

Respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General assert that petitioners
are not entitles to a writ of kalikasan because they failed to show that the
public respondents are guilty of an unlawful act or omission; state the
environmental law/s violated; show environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants of two or
more cities; and prove that non-implementation of Road Sharing Principle
will cause environmental damage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should

issue.

RULING:

NO.

For a writ of Kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:

1. There is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a

balanced and healthful ecology.
2. The actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or
entity; and
3. The actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issue of a

writ of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation was
violated or would be violated.

In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right

to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology and bare allegations
that their right was violated, the petitioners failed to show that public
respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes
a violation of the petitioner’s right to a balanced and healthful ecology.

Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue.

Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely

ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary, and the official
can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or
another. As its core, what the petitioners are seeking to compel is not
the performance of a ministerial act, but a discretionary act – the
manner of implementation of the Road Sharing Principle. Clearly,
petitioners’ preferred specific course of action bifurcation of roads to
devote for all-weather sidewalk and bicycling and Filipino-made
transport vehicles to implement the Road Sharing Principle finds no
 textual basis in law or executive issuances for ir to be considered an act
enjoined by law as a duty, leading to the ecessary conclusion that the
continuing mandamus prayed for seeks not the implementation of an
environmental law, rule or regulation, but to control the exercise of
discretion of the executive as to how the principle enunciated in an
executive issuance relating to the environment is best implemented.
Hence, the continuing mandamus cannot issue,

Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.

l. Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court Of Appeals, et al., G.R.

No. 110120, 16 March 1994
FACTS:

The City Gov't of Caloocan disposed approx. 350 tons of garbage daily in Tala
Estate, Brgy. Camarin against the wishes of the local residents.

Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish filed a

complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) to end the
operation of the dumpsite, because of the dumpsite’s “harmful effects on the
health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of
the surrounding area” investigation of the LLDA found that the City Gov’t of
Caloocan was maintaining the dumpsite without a legally required
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC); LLDA issued a Cease and
Desist Order

Operation of the dumpsite stopped for a few months but resumed again, and
LLDA re-issued a Cease and Desist Order

In September of 1992, The City Gov’t of Caloocan filed a petition seeking to be

declared “the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and
enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within
its territorial jurisdiction”

Trial court and the C.A. granted the City Gov’t of Caloocan this order and
ruled that the LLDA had no power and authority to issue a cease and desist
order enjoining the dumping of garbage

LLDA appealed to the Supreme Court

LAW/S: RA No. 4850 as amended by PD No. 813 and EO No. 927 ⎫

Granted administrative quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution
abatement case⎫ authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order
requiring the discontinuance or pollution⎫

Explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in

the exercise of its jurisdiction.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and
desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the
basis of the facts presented in this case

RULING:

YES, LLDA HAS POWER ⎫ RA No. 4850 as amended, authorizes the LLDA
to “make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution” ⎫
While the LLDA was not expressly granted a power to make ex parte Cease
and Desist Orders, such a power was necessarily implied from its broad
powers to make orders stopping pollution

NOTE:

Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the

Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a
fundamental human right

Article II, section16 of the Constitution guaranteed a right to “a balanced and

healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature,” and
that there was a declared state policy to protect and promote the right to
health

Art. II, Section 15, 1987 Constitution "to protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness among them."

m. Hilarion M. Henares, Jr., et al. v. Land Transportation Franchising And

Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 158290, 23 October 2006

Facts:
Petituiner challenge the court to issue a writ if mandamus commanding
respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulartory Board and
Depaerment of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) as alternative
fuel. Petitioner cited statistics to present a compelling case for judicial action
against the ban of air pollution and related environmental hazards.

Petitioner allege that mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke and liquid droplets have
caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and overall
quality of life.

Further, petitioner refer to the study of Philippine Environmental Monitor

2002, stating that in four country's major cities, Metro Manila, Davao, Cebu
and Baguio, the exposure to PM, which can penetrate deep into lungs causing
serious health problems is estimated at over US430 million.

To counter the detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs, petitioners

propose the use of CNG. According to petitioners, CNG id a natural gas
comprised mostly of methane which although containing small amount of
propane and butane, and considered as the cleanest fossil fuel because it
produces much less pollutants than coal and petroleum.

Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that bases for their
petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use
CNG as an alternative fuel.

The respondents in their comment cites Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised

Rules of Court and explains that writ of mandamys is not the correct remedy
since the writ may be issued only to command a tribunal, corporation, board
or person to do an act since the writ may be issued only to command a
tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act that is required to be done.
Issues: 1. Whether petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition
before us?

2. Whether mandamus be issued against respondents to compel to PUVs to

use CNG as alternative fuel?

Ruling:

1. Yes, there is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case
before this Court. Even respondents do not question their standing. This
petition focuses on one fundamental legal right of petitioners, their right to
clean air. Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing before this Court is
a procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of the Court's discretion,
be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised. We brush aside this
issue of technicailty under the principle of the transcendantal importance to
the public, especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.

Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount

importance to petitioners for it concerns the air they breathe, but is also
impressed with public interest. The consequences of the counter-productive
and retrogressive effects of a neglected enivornment due to emissions of
motor vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being of petitioners. On these
considerations, the legal standing of the petitioners deserves recognition.

2. NO, under section 3, rule 65 of the rules of court, mandamus lies under any
of the following cases: 1. Against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; 2. In case of
any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station;
and 3. In case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully exlcudes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.

There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is tasked
to set the emission standards for fuel use and the task of developing an action
plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and
the line agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an
action plan and implement the emission standards for motor vehicles, namely
the LTFRB.

Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in
their prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents
to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel. Although both are general
mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of any kind of fuel,
particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order implementing a
program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. Executive Order No. 290,
entitled Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for Public Transport
(NGVPPT), took effect on February 24, 2004. The program recognized, among
others, natural gas as a clean burning alternative fuel for vehicle which has
the potential to produce substantially lower pollutants; and the Malampaya
Gas-to-Power Project as representing the beginning of the natural gas
industry of the Philippines. Paragraph 1.2, Section 1 of E.O. No. 290 cites as
one of its objectives, the use of CNG as a clean alternative fuel for transport.
Furthermore, one of the components of the program is the development of
CNG refueling stations and all related facilities in strategic locations in the
country to serve the needs of CNG-powered PUVs. Section 3 of E.O. No. 290,
consistent with E.O. No. 66, series of 2002, designated the DOE as the lead
agency (a) in developing the natural gas industry of the country with the
DENR, through the EMB and (b) in formulating emission standards for CNG.
Most significantly, par. 4.5, Section 4 tasks the DOTC, working with the DOE,
to develop an implementation plan for "a gradual shift to CNG fuel utilization
in PUVs and promote NGVs [natural gas vehicles] in Metro Manila and
Luzon through the issuance of directives/orders providing preferential
franchises in present day major routes and exclusive franchises to NGVs in
newly opened routes…" A thorough reading of the executive order assures us
that implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed. To a
certain extent, the instant petition had been mooted by the issuance of E.O.
No. 290.

It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the
premium we have placed on the protection of the environment in the
landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air pollution,
with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal as
these pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring resort
to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we
must admit in particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that
imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of
the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It
appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the
specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by
herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken

n. Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., G.R. No.
156052, 07 March 2007

G.R. No. 156052

FACTS:

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted to protect the residents of Manila from the
catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack.
The ordinance ordered the cease and desist from operation of several
businesses 6 months from its effectivity, among which were the so-called
Pandacan Terminals of oil companies. However, 6 months later, City of
Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum
of understanding (MOU) allowing the oil companies to continuously operate
in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting
from the joint operations and the scale down program.

The Social Justice Society filed this original action for mandamus
praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil
companies. They averred that Atienza has the mandatory legal duty to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local
Government Code (RA 7160) and order the removal of the Pandacan
Terminals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mayor Atienza has the mandatory legal duty to

enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the
Pandacan terminals.

RULING:

Yes. Mayor Atienza has no other choice but to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
and order the removal of the Pandacan terminals.

The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as City
Mayor of Manila, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city, he has the duty to put into effect Ordinance No. 8027
as long as it had not been repealed by the Sanggunian or negated by the
courts.

The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila and no

reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed. Hence,
Mayor Atienza was directed by the Court to enforce Ordinance No. 8027

o. Department Of Transportation (DOTR), et al. v. Philippine Petroleum

Sea Transport Association, et al., G.R. No. 230107, 24 July 2018

FACTS

This case involves the question of constitutionality and validity of Section 22

of the RA 9498 raised by the respondent (Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport,
et. al). Due to damages caused by oil spill in 2005(Antique) and
2006(Guimaras) the Congress enacted RA 9483 as an act Providing For The
Implementation of the Provisions of the 1992 International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the 1992 International
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation
for Oil Pollution Damage, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for
Other Purposes.

Section 22 of the law instituted the Oil Pollution Management Fund (OPMF)
which seeks to finance the Immediate containment, removal, clean-up
operations of the PCG of oil pollution and for capacity building of
government agencies tasked to monitor and enforce the law. The source of
this accumulated funds are to be collected from operators of tankers barges
hauling oil at 10 centavos per liter for every delivery of transshipments of oil.

Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport and others filed before the RTC of
Quezon City arguing that the said provision of law and its IRR violates their
rights to equal protection of the law, that the 10 centavo impost is confiscatory
and violates the right to due process; and that Section 22 is an undue
delegation of legislative power.

The RTC agreed with the arguments of the respondents.

ISSUE

Whether the Section 22 of RA 9498 is unconstitutional according to the

following:

1) the creation of OPMF in Section 22 of RA 9498 is a proscribed rider.

2) The classification in Section 22 violates the equal protection clause
 3) Undue delegation of legislative power to the OPMF committee in
imposing the rate after the first year of implementation.
4) The 10 centavo imposition violate the due process clause.

RULING

1) No. The provision instituting the OPMF accordingly is essential

provision of RA 9498. The SC stated that the Conventions cover the
compensation from loss or damage caused outside the ship by
contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the
ship, wherever such escape or discharge may occur. This is consistent
with the RA 9498 and so the Section 22 of the law is essential.
2) No. The Supreme Court states that the classification was valid since
there is substantial distinction of the vessel carrying the oil from other
vessels. The provision of law is not limited to existing condition since
the law is also applicable to future oil spill in the Philippines.
3) No, there is no undue delegation of power in the OPMF committee
having the power to fix the rate to be collected in the succeeding years
after the first year of implementation. The supreme Court stated that
the delegation was complete in itself, that it must set forth the policy to
be executed by the delegate and (2) it must fix a standard - limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable - to which the
delegate must conform.
4) No. Accordingly the determination of whether a measure or charge is
confiscatory or not, within the purview of the due process clause, will
not solely depend on the amount that will be accumulated therefrom.
The 10 centavos is to be treated as administrative charge or fee which
was imposed on covered entities to protect a resource and territory that
those in the industry directly use in the conduct of their business, that
is, the country's maritime domain.

p. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, et al. v. Concerned

Residents Of Manila Bay, et al., G.R. Nos. 171947-48, 18 December 2008

FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against several government
agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and
protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the water quality of
the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law,
specifically PD 1152. Respondents, as plaintiffs, prayed that petitioners be
ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete
plan of action for the purpose.
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, ordering the defendant-
government agencies to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.

Petitioners, before the CA, argued that PD 1152 relates only to the cleaning of
specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Apart from
raising concerns about the lack of funds, petitioners also asserted that the
cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act, which can be compelled by
mandamus.

The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in
toto. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

Does PD 1152 include a cleanup in general or is it limited only to the cleanup

of specific pollution incidents?

Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to clean up and

rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

RULING:

Issue 1:

PD 1152 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned
ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning
operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. The underlying duty to
upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any
pollution incident.

Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically

prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women
representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of
Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as
possible.

Issue 2:

Yes, petitioners may be compelled.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth not only in
the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This
duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterised as
discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right
given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their
judgment or conscience.
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters would yield to the
conclusion that these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of
statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or
indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the
Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.

The petition is DENIED.

q. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, et al. v. Concerned

Residents Of Manila Bay, et al., G.R. Nos. 171947-48, 15 February 2011

GR No. 171947-4818 December 2008

FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against several government

agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and
protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the water quality of
the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law,
specifically PD 1152. Respondents, as plaintiffs, prayed that petitioners be
ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete
plan of action for the purpose.

RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, ordering the defendant-

government agencies to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.

Petitioners, before the CA, argued that PD 1152 relates only to the cleaning of
specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Apart from
raising concerns about the lack of funds, petitioners also asserted that the
cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act, which can be compelled by
mandamus.

The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in
toto. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1.) Does PD 1152 include a cleanup in general or is it limited only to the

cleanup of specific pollution incidents?
2.) Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to clean up
and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

RULING:

Issue 1:

PD 1152 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned
ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning
operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. The underlying duty to
upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any
pollution incident.

Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically

prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women
representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of
Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as
possible.

Issue 2:

Yes, petitioners may be compelled.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth not only in
the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This
duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterised as
discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right
given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their
judgment or conscience.

A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters would yield to the

conclusion that these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of
statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or
indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the
Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.

The petition is DENIED.

r. Heirs Of Tunged, et al. v. Sta. Lucia Realty And Development, Inc. And
Baguio Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 231737, 06 March 2018
FACTS:

Petitioners Rosita Yaris-Liwan being members of the Ibaloi tribe who are the
original settlers in Baguio city filed a violation of their rights under the
Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA) and Environmental laws specifically
Presidential Decree 1586 (PD 1586) and also violated the environmental
compliance certificate against Baguio Properties Incorporated which
demolished and bulldozed the subject land that petitioners own and is an
ancestral land that they have been occupying in the concept of an owner since
time immemorial through their ancestors, and that such ownership was
recognized by the IPR, On March 2017 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) as an
environmental court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, The RTC
held that the recognition of the petitioners’ rights as indigenous people’s is
not the proper subject of an environmental case, and should be separated in
an appropriate proceeding governed by the law relied upon by the
petitioners.

The RTC also held that the case falls within the coverage of Administrative
Matter (AM) No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, Sec. 4, Rule 2 which requires that an action under said Rules must be
filed by a real party-in-interest for the enforcement or violation of any
environmental law.

According to the RTC, without the confirmation of their rights as Indigenous

People (IP) to the property, the filing of this case is premature. As such, the
petitioners do not have the legal personality to initiate the same. The RTC
disposed.

ISSUE:

Was the RTC’s outright dismissal of the case proper?

HELD:

NO, The RTC dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, finding
that the petitioners’ case is grounded on their claim of being members of the
IPs and their assertion of ownership over their ancestral land, Further, the
RTC ruled that even if the case is covered by A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, the same is
still dismissible considering that petitioners' right over the subject property is
yet to be established as can be gleaned from their prayer for the recognition of
ownership rights as IPs over the subject land.

Petitioners, therefore, prayed for the following reliefs, 1.) issuance of an ex
parte 72-hour Environmental Protection Order to immediately stop
respondents from their earthmoving activities not only because they violate
petitioners' rights under the IPRA, but also because they failed to comply
with the ECC and/or because they operated without such ECC, violative of
PD 1586 for posing grave and/or irreparable danger to the environment, life
and property; 2.) after trial, make the Environmental Protection Order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction permanent; 3.) recognize the rights of the
petitioners as IPs to their ancestral land subject of this case; and 4.) compel
respondents to restore the denuded areas within the subject land to maintain
ecological balance and to compensate petitioners of their damaged resources.

A careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction
over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise
between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP.

The qualifying provision requires two conditions before such disputes may be
brought before the NCIP, which are: 1.) exhaustion of remedies under
customary laws of the parties, and 2.) compliance with condition precedent
through the said certification by the Council of Elders/Leaders. This is in
recognition of the rights of ICCs/IPs to use their own commonly accepted
justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building processes or
mechanisms and other customary laws and practices within their respective
communities, as may be compatible with the national legal system and with
internationally recognized human rights.

Therefore, pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have

jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when
they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When
such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong
to the same ICC/IP, parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or where one of the
parties is a non-ICCIIP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper
Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP.

In this case, while most of the petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe,

respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP. Thus, even if the real issue
involves a dispute over land which appear to be located within the ancestral
domain of the Talaandig Tribe, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which shall
have the power to hear, try and decide this case.

The court a quo erred in finding that the petitioners have no legal personality
to file the complaint. It is noteworthy that petitioners supported their
allegations with pertinent documents such as the report and recommendation
of the NCIP on petitioners' Petition for the Identification, Delineation and
Recognition of Ancestral Claim and Issuance of CALTs pending before the
said Commission. In the said document, the NCIP concluded that, among
others, the petitioners have established themselves as the heirs of Tunged and
that the subject land was proven to be part of the vast tract of land that
Tunged and his successors possessed and occupied. Hence, petitioners'
averments in their Complaint taken together with such supporting documents
are sufficient to establish petitioners' locus standi in instituting this action, as
well as to bring petitioners' case within the purview of the court a quo's
jurisdiction as conferred by the law.

Ultimately, petitioners' cause of action is grounded upon the alleged

earthmoving activities and operations of the respondents within petitioners'
ancestral land, which violated and continue to violate petitioners'
environmental rights under the IPRA and PD 1586 as the said activities were
averred to have grave and/or irreparable danger to the environment, life, and
property. Clearly, such cause of action is within the jurisdiction of the
RTC, sitting as a special environmental court, pursuant to AO No. 23-2008 in
relation to BP 129 and A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC. Whether or not petitioners are
entitled to their claim is irrelevant in the preliminary issue of jurisdiction.

s. Mayor Tomas R. Osmeña, v. Joel Capili Garganera, et al., G.R. No. 231164,
20 March 2018
FACTS:

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) issued an

Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) to the Solid Waste Sanitary
Landfill Project at Inayawan landfill proposed by the Metro Cebu
Development Project Office (MCDPO). Thereafter the Inayawan landfill
served as the herbage disposal area of Cebu, City. The Cebu city local
government resolved to close the Inayawan landfill per SP resolution and EO
of former Cebu City mayor Rama. In 2015, Inayawan landfill was formally
closed. However under the administration of Mayor Osmena the city
government sought to temporarily open the Inayawan Landfill. Acting mayor
Margot Osmena officially re opened the said landfill on 2016. Notice of
violation and technical conference was issued by the EMB to Mayor Osmena
regarding City, Governments operation of the Inayawan Landfill and its
violations of the ECC. The DOH issued an inspection report wherein it
recommended among others the immediate closure of the landfill due to the
lack of sanitary requirements, environmental, health and community safety
issues. Respondent filed a petition for writ of kalikasan with prayer for the
issuance of TEPO before the CA. He asserted that the continued operation of
the Landfill causes serious environmental damage which threatens and
violates their right to a balanced and healthful ecology. The CA granted the
privilege of the writ of kalikasan which ordered Mayor Osmena and his
representatives to permanently cease and desist from dumping or disposing
of garbage or solid waste at the Inayawan landfill and to continue to
rehabilitate the same. Mayor Osmena’s motion for reconsideration was
denied hence this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the 30 day prior notice requirement for citizen suits under
RA 9003 and RA 8749 is needed prior to the filing of the instant petition.

2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirements for the grant
of the privilege of the writ of kalikasan were sufficiently established.

RULING:

1. NO, the present petition for the writ of kalikasan under the RPEC is a
separate and distinct action from RA 9003 and RA 8749. A writ of kalikasan is
an extraordinary remedy covering environmental damage of such magnitude
that will prejudiced the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces. It is designed for a narrow but special purpose: to accord a
stronger protection for environmental rights, aiming among others, to
provide a speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the violation of
one’s constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology that transcends
political and territorial boundaries and to address the potentially exponential
nature of large-scale ecological threats. Sec 3 rule 7 of RPEC allows direct
resort to this court with any of the stations of the CA which states: Sec 3.
Where to file- the petition shall be filed with the Supreme Court or with any
of the stations of the court if appeals. Given that the writ of Kalikasan is an
extraordinary remedy and the RPEC allows direct action to this Court and the
CA where it is dictated by public welfare, this Court is of the view that the
prior 30 day notice requirement for the citizen suits under RA 9003 and RA
8749 is inapplicable. It is ultimately within the courts discretion whether or
not to accept petitions brought directly before it. Section 5.Citizen Any
Filipino citizen in representation of others. including minors or generations
vet unborn. may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under
environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an
order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the
relief prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to
intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff
may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the
Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order. Citizen suits
filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. 9003 shall be governed by their respective
provisions. Section 1, Rule 7 of RPEC also provides:
Section 1. Nature of the writ.-The writ is a remedy available to a natural or
juridical person, entity authorized by law, people's organization, non-
governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or
registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in
two or more cities or provinces.

2. YES, the court affirmed the CA when it ruled that the requirements for the
grant of the privilege of the writ of kalikasan were sufficiently established.
Under section 1 of rule 7 of the RPE, the following requisites must be present
to avail of this extraordinary remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened
violation if the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the
actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a
public officer or employer or private individual or entity and (3) the actual or
threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in to
more cities or provinces.

Expectedly, the rules do not define the exact nature or degree of

environmental damage but only that it must be sufficiently grave, in terms of
the territorial scope of such damage, so as to call for the grant of this
extraordinary remedy. The gravity of environmental damage sufficient to
grant the writ is, thus, to be decided on a case to case basis. Wherefore the
petition is denied.

t. INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-

BIOTECH APPLICATIONS, INC. vs.
GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES)
GR No. 209271 | December 08, 2015

Facts
In 2010, In pursuance of a collaborative research and development project on
eggplants that are resistant to the fruit and shoot borer, a Memorandum of
Undertaking was executed between International Service for the Acquisition
of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), University of the Philippines Los
Banos Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI), and UP Mindanao Foundation, Inc.
(UPMFI). The UPLB is another partner agency in the research. It stated that
the pest-resistant crop subject of the field trial was described as a “bio-
engineered eggplant”. The National Committee on Biosafety of the
Philippines (NCBP) issued a Certificate of Completion of Contained
Experiment which was conducted from 2007 to 2009; that when the
experiment was being conducted, all the biosafety measures have been
complied with and there were no inconvenient incidents that happened. The
Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI) issued biosafety permits to UPLB and the field
testing commenced on the trial sites. On 2012, Greenpeace, MASIPAG, and
individual respondents filed a petition for a writ of kalikasan and a writ of
continuing mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) alleging that the Bt Talong Field
Trials violate their constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology. The
Supreme Court issued the writ of kalikasan against ISAAA, EMB, BPI, FPA,
and UPLB, ordering them to file a verified return. The respondents contend
that all environmental laws were complied with; that the Bt Talong Project is
not covered by the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement Law; that the
allegations regarding the safety of the Bt Talong are irrelevant in the field trial
stage since it would not be consumed by humans or animals; that Greenpeace
have no legal standing because they do not stand to suffer any direct injury as
a result of the field tests; that the Precautionary Principle does not apply since
the field testing is only part of a continuing study to ensure that the field trials
have no negative impact on the environment.

Issue/s:
1. WON Greenpeace, et al. has a legal standing
2. WON the case is moot and academic
3. WON there is a violation of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and
exhaustion of administrative remedies
4. WON the law on environmental impact statement/assessment applies on
projects involving the
introduction and propagation of GMOs in the country
5. WON there is neglect or unlawful omission committed by the public
respondents in the
processing and evaluation of the applications for Bt Talong Field Testing
6. WON the Precautionary Principle applies

SC Ruling:
∙YES. The liberalized rule on standing is now enshrined in the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental
Cases which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The
provision on citizen suits
in the Rules, “collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on
the principle that
humans are stewards of nature,” and aims to “further encourage the
protection of the environment.”
∙NO. The case falls under the “capable of repetition yet evading review”
exception to the mootness
principle. The human and environmental health hazards posed by the
introduction of a genetically
modified plant which is a very popular staple vegetable among Filipinos is an
issue of paramount
public interest.
∙NO. The provisions of DAO 2002-08 do not provide a speedy or adequate
remedy for the
respondents to determine the questions of unique national and local
importance raised in this case
that pertain to laws and rules for environmental protection, thus, Greenpeace,
et al. is justified in
coming to the SC.
∙YES. EO 514 mandates that concerned departments and agencies, most
particularly petitioners
DENR-EMB, BPI, and FPA, to make a determination whether the EIS system
should apply to the
release of GMOs into the environment and issue joint guidelines on the
matter.
∙YES. The DAO 2002-08 and related DA order are not the only legal bases for
regulating field trials
of GM plants and plant products. EO 514 clearly provides that the NBF
applies to the development,
adoption, and implementation of all biosafety policies, measures and
guidelines and in making
biosafety decisions concerning the research, development, handling and use,
transboundary
movement, release into the environment and management of regulated
articles.
∙YES. The Precautionary Principle originated in Germany in the 1960s,
expressing the normative idea that governments are obliged to “foresee and
forestall” harm to the environment.
There exists a preponderance of evidence that the release of the GMOs into
the environment
threatens to damage our ecosystems and not just the field trial sites, and
eventually the health of our
people once the Bt eggplants are consumed as food. Adopting the
precautionary approach, the SC ruled that the principles of the NBF need to
be operationalzed first by the coordinated actions of the concerned
departments and agencies before allowing the release into the environment of
genetically modified eggplants.The precautionary approach entailed inputs
from stakeholders, including marginalized farmers, not just the scientific
community. This proceeds from the realization that acceptance of uncertainty
is notonly a scientific issue, but is related to public policy and involves an
ethical dimension.

u. G.R. No. 180771 SECRETARY ANGELO REYES v. MARINE MAMMALS

OF TANON STRAIGHT

FACTS:

Petitioners, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the

petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean
species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are
joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal
guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards") who
allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned
marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and
undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others.
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE,
entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102)
with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the
Tañon Strait.

The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of

seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted
geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon
Strait. On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102
into SC-46 for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum
resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore
the Tañon Strait.

JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase
of the project. On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an
ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in
Tañon Strait.14 Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an
exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in
the western Cebu Province.15 This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008. The
petitioners insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. 
ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the on-going exploration and proposed exploitation for oil
and natural gas at, around, and underneath the marine waters of the Tañon
strait protected seascape are inconsistent with the Philippine commitments to
International Environmental laws and instruments; and

2.) Whether or not the issuance of the Environmental Compliance Certificate

(ECC) in environmentally critical areas and habitats of marine wildlife and
endangered species is legal and proper.

RULING:

1.) NO, Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 claim that SC-46 violates Section 27 of
Republic Act. No. 9147 or the Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection
Act, which bans all marine exploration and exploitation of oil and gas
deposits. They also aver that Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7586 or the
National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which
allows the exploration of protected areas for the purpose of information-
gathering, has been repealed by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 914 7. The said
petitioners further claim that SC-46 is anathema to Republic Act No. 8550 or
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, which protects the rights of the
fisherfolk in the preferential use of municipal waters, with the exception being
limited only to research and survey activities.

The Tañon Strait is a narrow passage of water bounded by the islands of Cebu
in the East and Negros in the West. It harbors a rich biodiversity of marine
life, including endangered species of dolphins and whales. For this reason,
former President Fidel V. Ramos declared the Tañon Strait as a protected
seascape in 1998 by virtue of Proclamation No. 1234 -Declaring the Tañon
Strait situated in the Provinces of Cebu, Negros Occidental and Negros
Oriental as a Protected Area pursuant to the NIP AS Act and shall be known
as Tañon Strait Protected Seascape.

True to the constitutional policy that the "State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature, Congress enacted the NIP AS Act to secure
the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through the
establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas. These
areas possess common ecological values that were incorporated into a holistic
plan representative of our natural heritage. The system encompasses
outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that
are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and animals,
biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland, or
marine.

It classifies and administers all the designated protected areas to maintain

essential ecological processes and life-support systems, to preserve genetic
diversity, to ensure sustainable use of resources found therein, and to
maintain their natural conditions to the greatest extent possible. The
following categories of protected areas were established under the NIPAS
Act:

a. Strict nature reserve;

b. Natural Park;

c. Natural monument;

d. Wildlife sanctuary;

e. Protected landscapes and seascapes;

f. Resource reserve;

g. Natural biotic areas; and

h. Other categories established by law, conventions or international

agreements which the Philippine Government is a signatory.

Under Section 4 of the NIP AS Act, a protected area refers to portions of land
and water, set aside due to their unique physical and biological significance,
managed to enhance biological diversity and protected against human
exploitation.

The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) was established in 1978

under Presidential Decree No. 1586. It prohibits any person, partnership or
corporation from undertaking or operating any declared environmentally
critical project or areas without first securing an ECC issued by the President
or his duly authorized representative.

It is true that the restrictions found under the NIP AS Act are not without
exceptions. However, while an exploration done for the purpose of surveying
for energy resources is allowed under Section 14 of the NIP AS Act, this does
not mean that it is exempt from the requirement to undergo an EIA under
Section 12.

Surveying for energy resources under Section 14 is not an exemption from

complying with the EIA requirement in Section 12; instead, Section 14
provides for additional requisites before any exploration for energy resources
may be done in protected areas. It is hereby recognized that these areas,
although distinct in features, possess common ecological values that may be
incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our natural heritage; that
effective administration of this area is possible only through cooperation
among national government, local government and concerned private
organizations; that the use and enjoyment of these protected areas must be
consistent with the principles of biological diversity and sustainable
development.

To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected Areas

System (NIPAS), which shall encompass outstandingly remarkable areas and
biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered
species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems,
whether terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which shall be designated as
"protected areas."

2.) NO, The Tañon Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside
and declared a protected area under the category of Protected Seascape. The
NIP AS Act defines a Protected Seascape to be an area of national significance
characterized by the harmonious interaction of man and land while providing
opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and tourism within the
normal lifestyle and economic activity of this areas; thus, a management plan
for each area must be designed to protect and enhance the permanent
preservation of its natural conditions. Consistent with this endeavor is the
requirement that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be made prior
to undertaking any activity outside the scope of the management plan. Unless
an ECC under the EIA system is obtained, no activity inconsistent with the
goals of the NIP AS Act shall be implemented.

The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) was established in 1978

under Presidential Decree No. 1586. It prohibits any person, partnership or
corporation from undertaking or operating any declared environmentally
critical project or areas without first securing an ECC issued by the President
or his duly authorized representative.

Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical

area, having been declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity
outside the scope of its management plan may only be implemented pursuant
to an ECC secured after undergoing an EIA to determine the effects of such
activity on its ecological system.

The public respondents argue that they had complied with the procedures in
obtaining an ECC and that SC-46 falls under the exceptions in Section 14 of
the NIP AS Act, due to the following reasons:

1.) The Tañon Strait is not a strict nature reserve or natural park;
 2.) Exploration is only for the purpose of gathering information on
possible energy resources; and 3) Measures are undertaken to ensure
that the exploration is being done with the least damage to
surrounding areas.

We do not agree with the arguments raised by the public respondents.

Sections 12 and 14 of the NIPAS Act read:

SECTION 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities

which are outside the scope of the management plan for protected areas shall
be subject to an environmental impact assessment as required by law before
they are adopted, and the results thereof shall be taken into consideration in
the decision-making process.

No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the

required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under the Philippine
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where such
activities are allowed to be undertaken, the proponent shall plan and carry
them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse effects and the
preventive and remedial action when appropriate. The proponent shall be
liable for any damage due to lack of caution or indiscretion.

The public respondents themselves admitted that JAPEX only started to

secure an ECC prior to the second sub-phase of SC-46, which required the
drilling of an oil exploration well. This means that when the seismic surveys
were done in the Tañon Strait, no such environmental impact evaluation was
done.

Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 1586 provides for the penalty involving
violations of the ECC requirement:

Section 9. Penalty for Violation. - Any person, corporation or partnership

found violating Section 4 of this Decree, or the terms and conditions in the
issuance of the Environmental Compliance Certificate, or of the standards,
rules and regulations issued by the National Environmental Protection
Council pursuant to this Decree shall be punished by the suspension or
cancellation of his/its certificates and/or a fine in an amount not to exceed
Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) for every violation thereof, at the discretion
of the National Environmental Protection Council.