REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Commander Raymond Alpuerto, Petitioner, vs.

REV. CLAUDIO R. CORTEZ, SR., Respondent

GR. No. 197472
September 7, 2015

Facts:

Respondent Rev. Claudio R. Cortez, Sr. (Rev. Cortez), a missionary by vocation engaged in humanitarian and charitable activities,
established an orphanage and school in Punta Verde, Palaui Island, San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan. He claimed that since 1962, he
has been in peaceful possession of about 50 hectares of land located in the western portion of Palaui Island in Sitio Siwangag, Sta.
Ana, Cagayan which he, with the help of Aetas and other people under his care, cleared and developed for agricultural purposes in
order to support his charitable, humanitarian and missionary works. 4

On May 22, 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 201 reserving for military purposes a parcel of the public
domain situated in Palaui Island. Pursuant thereto, 2,000 hectares of the southern half portion of the Palaui Island were withdrawn
from sale or settlement and reserved for the use of the Philippine Navy, subject, however, to private rights if there be any.

More than two decades later or on August 16, 1994, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Proclamation No. 447 declaring Palaui Island
and the surrounding waters situated in the Municipality of Sta. Ana, Cagayan as marine reserve. Again subject to any private rights,
the entire Palaui Island consisting of an aggregate area of 7,415.48 hectares was accordingly reserved as a marine protected area.

On June 13, 2000, Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction5 against Rogelio C. Biñas in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the Philippine Naval Command in Port San Vicente, Sta.
Ana, Cagayan.1âwphi1 According to him, some members of the Philippine Navy, upon orders of Biñas, disturbed his peaceful and
lawful possession of the said 50-hectare portion of Palaui Island when on March 15, 2000, they commanded him and his men,
through the use of force and intimidation, to vacate the area. When he sought assistance from the Office of the Philippine Naval
Command, he was met with sarcastic remarks and threatened with drastic military action if they do not vacate. Thus, Rev. Cortez
and his men were constrained to leave the area. In view of these, Rev. Cortez filed the said Petition with the RTC seeking preliminary
mandatory injunction ordering Biñas to restore to him possession and to not disturb the same, and further, for the said preliminary
writ, if issued, to be made permanent.

Issue:

Whether or not Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of mandatory injunction.

Ruling:

No. He is not entitled. The Court finds that Rev. Cortez failed to conclusively establish his claimed right over the subject portion of
Palaui Island as would entitle him to the issuance of a final injunction.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The June 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in denying the appeal and affirming the
July 3, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the final injunction issued in this
case is ordered DISSOLVED and the Petition for Injunction, DISMISSED.
G.R. no. 177168

Facts:

On 1965, a certain portion of land was declared for “AFP Officer’s Village” for disposal. A month later, a part of the land was declared
to be for the VFP as a site for rehabilitation, etc.

On November 15, 1991, the property was the subject of a Deed of Sale between the Republic of the Philippines, and petitioner
NOVAI. The deed of sale was subsequently registered and from which TCT No. T-15387 was issued in NOVAI’s name.
Republic wants the title cancelled on the ground that, among others, the land covered by NOVAFs title is part of a military reservation

RTC: In favor of NOVAI, contending that the land is already A&D CA: Reversed, inalienable land as the petitioner failed to prove the
positive act of the government

Issue: Whether or not the land is already A&D and hence, can be registered.

Held: No. It is settled that the land falls under those which are reserved for public use in CA 141. In a limited sense, parcels of land
classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses under Section 9 (d) of C.A. No. 141 are still non-alienable and non disposable,
even though they are, by the general classification under Section 6, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. By specific
declaration under Section 88, in relation with Section 8 and Section 83, these lands classified as reservations are non alienable and
non-disposable.

From the perspective of the general Civil Code provisions on Property, lands which are intended for public use or public service such
as reservations for public or quasi-public uses are property of the public dominion and remain to be so as long as they remain
reserved.

Applying to the case at bar, Proclamation No. 478 was issued after Proclamation No. 461. Hence, while Proclamation No. 461
withdrew a certain area or parcel of land from the FBMR and made the covered area available for disposition in favor of the
AFPOVAI, Proclamation No. 478 subsequently withdrew the property from the total disposable portion and reserved it for the use of
the VRMTC.

Petition Denied.

Dream Village v Bases Devt Authority (July 24, 2013)

FACTS:

• Dream Village claims to represent more than 2k families, in OCEN occupation & possession of 7.8 ha land in Fort Bonifacio •
DV filed petition b4 COSLAP, seeking
o Declaration that subj property is alienable & disposable, thus outside BCDA scope;
o LMB order processing members’ sales patent application
• BCDA asserts title per RA 7227 and questioned COSLAP jurisdiction
• COSLAP ruled for Dream Village. On petition for review, CA held “COSLAP has no jurisdiction because of land’s private
ownership and its is registered under an indefeasible Torrens Title.
• Dream Village MR is denied and filed petition for review in SC.
ISSUE: WON area occupied by Dream Village is susceptible of acquisition by prescription

HELD:

• DV petition is denied. Area is not susceptible of acquisition by prescription.

• Present petition involves land titled to and managed by a govt agency expressly reserved by law for a specific public purpose
other than for settlement.
• COSLAP jurisdiction limited to
o lands govt has proprietary or regulatory interests or
o public lands covered with specific license
• Fort Bonifacio remains property of public dominion of the State.
• Though declared alienable & disposable, it is reserved for some public service or for the national wealth devt, in this case, for
the conversion of military reservations to productive civilian uses.
• Ownership of land registered under Torrens title cannot be lost by prescription or adverse possession. •
December 4, 1967
• G.R. No. L-15829ROMAN R. SANTOS, petitioner-appellee, vs.HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, as Secretary of Public Works and
Communications and JULIAN C. CARGULLO, respondents-appellants.
•
• Facts:
 • The Zobel family of Spain formerly owned vast track of marshland in the municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga province. Called
Hacienda San Esteban, it was administered and managed by the Ayala y Cia. From the year 1860 to about the year 1924
Ayala y Cia., devoted the hacienda to the planting and cultivation of nipa palms from which it gathered nipa sap or "tuba." It
operated a distillery plant in barrio San Esteban to turn nipa tuba into potable alcohol, which was in turn manufactured into
liquor. Accessibility through the nipa palms deep into the hacienda posed as a problem. Ayala y Cia., therefore dug canals
leading towards the hacienda's interior where most of them interlinked with each other. The canals facilitated the gathering
of tuba and the guarding and patrolling of the hacienda by security guards called "arundines." By the gradual process of
erosion these canals acquired the characteristics and dimensions of rivers. In 1924 Ayala y Cia shifted from the business of
alcohol production to bangus culture. It converted Hacienda San Esteban from a forest of nipa groves to a web of fishponds.
To do so, it cut down the nipa palm, constructed dikes and closed the canals criss-crossing the hacienda. Sometime in 1925
or 1926 Ayala y Cia., sold a portion of Hacienda San Esteban to Roman Santos who also transformed the swamp land into a
fishpond. In so doing, he closed and built dikes across Sapang Malauling Maragul, Quiñorang Silab, Pepangebunan, Bulacus,
Nigui and Nasi. The closing of the man-made canals in Hacienda San Esteban drew complaints from residents of the
surrounding communities. Claiming that the closing of the canals caused floods during the rainy season, and that it deprived
them of their means of transportation and fishing grounds, said residents demanded re-opening of those canals.
Subsequently, Mayor Lazaro Yambao of Macabebe, accompanied by policemen and some residents went to Hacienda San
Esteban and opened the closure dikes at Sapang Malauling Maragul Nigui and Quiñorang Silab. Whereupon, Roman Santos
filed Civil Case No. 4488 in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga which preliminarily enjoined Mayor Yambao and others
from demolishing the dikes across the canals. The municipal officials of Macabebe countered by filing a complaint (docketed
as Civil Case No. 4527) in the same court. The Pampanga Court of First Instance rendered judgment in both cases against
Roman Santos who immediately elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
•
• Issue:
• Do the streams involved in this case belong to the public domain or to the owner of Hacienda San Esteban according to law
and the evidence submitted to the Department of Public Works and Communications?
•
• Ruling:
• A private person may take possession of a watercourse if he constructed the same within his property. One and all, the
evidence, oral and documentary, presented by Roman Santos in the administrative proceedings supports the conclusion of
the lower court that the streams involved in this case were originally man-made canals constructed by the former owners of
Hacienda San Esteban and that said streams were not held open for public use. This same conclusion was reached 27 years
earlier by an investigator of the Bureau of Public Works whose report and recommendations were approved by the Director
of Public Works and submitted to the Secretary of Commerce and Communications. The streams in question were artificially
made, hence of private ownership. Pursuant to Article 71 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, and Article 408(5)
of the Spanish Civil Code, channels of creeks and brooks belong to the owners of estates over which they flow. The channels,
therefore, of the streams in question, which may be classified creeks, belong to the owners of Hacienda San Esteban. With
the exception of Sapang Cansusu, being a natural stream and a continuation of the Cansusu River, admittedly a public
stream, belongs to the public domain. Its closure therefore by the predecessors of Roman Santos was illegal. All the other
streams, being artificial and devoted exclusively for the use of the hacienda owner and his personnel, are declared of
private ownership. Hence, the dams across them should not he ordered demolished as public nuisances.
G.R. No. 163767 : March 10, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, v. ROSARIO DE GUZMAN VDA. DE JOSON,
Respondent.

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:
An application for land registration was filed in the CFI in Bulacan by herein Respondent. The subject property was a riceland with an
area of 12,342 sq.m. known as Lot 2633, Cad-297, Paombong, Bulacan. It was originally owned and possessed by one
MamertoDionision since 1907 and was, thereafter, sold to Romualda Jacinto in 1926. Upon the death of Romualda Jacinto, her sister
Maria Jacinto (mother of the respondent) inherited the land. Thereafter, upon the death of Maria Jacinto in 1963, respondent had
herself inherited the land, owning and possessing it openly, publicly, uninterruptedly, adversely against the whole world, and in the
concept of owner since then. Taxes due thereon had been paid as well.

The CFI ordered the registration of the land in favor of respondent on the ground that she had sufficiently established her open,
public, continuous and adverse possession in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. The OSG appealed to the CA and
alleged that subject land is a part of the unclassified region denominated as forest land of Paombong, Bulacan. The CA affirmed the
decision of the trial court.

ISSUES: Whether or not the land subject of the application for registration is susceptible of private

acquisition? HELD: The Court of Appealsdecision is overruled.

CIVIL LAW: land belonging to public domain

Section 14 (1) and (2) of the Property Registration Decree provides for those who may apply for registration of title to land.

The Court in Republic v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 171631 held that nder Section 14(1), respondent had to prove that: (1) the land formed
part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain and (2) she, by herself of through her predecessors-in-interest, had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of
ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.Thus, the burden of proof is on the applicant and failure to do so warrants the dismissal of
the application.

It is without question that respondent complied with the second requisite. However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first
requisite. No evidence was presented that the subject land had been declared alienable and disposable by the State.

Realizing that the burden to prove the second requisite belongs to her, respondent attached to her appellee brief the certification
dated March 8, 2000 issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office declaring that Lot 2633 falls within the alienable or disposable land of Paombong, Bulacan. The CA, however,
expunged the appellee brief. The Court in Menguito v. Republic G.R. No. 134308 declared that a survey conducted by a geodetic
engineer that included a certification on the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was not sufficient to overcome the
presumption that the land still formed part of the inalienable public domain.

It is a standing doctrine that land of the public domain, in order to be the subject of appropriation, must be declared alienable and
disposable either by the President or the Secretary of the DENR.

Granting for the sake of argument that the certification alone would have sufficed, respondent application would still be denied
considering that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable came only after the filing of the application in court in
1976. The certification indicated that the land was reclassified as alienable or disposable only on October 15, 1980.

Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree provides that ownership of private lands acquired through prescription may be
registered in the owner name. However, respondent did not acquire the land through prescription notwithstanding the fact that
possession of the same by her and her predecessors-in-interest could be traced back as early as in 1926.

The Court in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987 ruled that, roperty of public domain, which generally includes
property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. Lands of the
public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription. xxx It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin
to run./span>

Application for land registration of respondent Rosario de Guzman Vda. De Joson respecting Lot 2633, Cad-297 is DISMISSED.
Property – Concepts and Kinds #01

Maneclang v. Intermediate Appellate Court

GR L-66575 24May1988
J. Fernan
FACTS
Petitioners Adriano Maneclang et.al. filed with the CFI a complaint for quieting of title over a certain fishpond located within the 4
parcels of land belonging to them situated in Bugallon, Pangasinan. The trial court dismissed the complaint upon a finding that the
body of water traversing their land is a creek constituting a tributary to Agno River and hence public in nature and not subject to
private appropriation. The Maneclangs appealed the decision to the IAC but the IAC affirmed the trial court decision. Hence, this
instant petition for review on certiorari.
However, after having been asked by the Court to comment to the case, Petitioners manifested that for lack of interest on the part
of the awardee in the public bidding, Maza, they desire to amicably settle the case by submitting a Compromise Agreement praying
that judgment be rendered recognizing their ownership over the land and the body of water found within their titled properties.
Petitioners state that there would be no benefit on their part, but to the advantage of the municipality instead, since it is clear that
after the National Irrigation Authority built the dike over the land, no water gets in or out of the land. ISSUE
Whether the stipulations in the Compromise Agreement adjudicating ownership over the questioned fishpond in favor of the
Maneclangs are valid.
HELD/RATIO
NO, the stipulations in the Compromise Agreement are null and void and have no legal effect for being contrary to law and public
policy. The stipulations partake of the nature of an adjudication of ownership in favor of the Maneclangs of the questioned fishpond
that was clearly found to be originally a creek forming a tributary of the Agno River, which belongs to the public domain and is thus
not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
A creek, defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a property belonging to
the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, and as a public water, it cannot be
registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual and considering further that neither the mere construction of
irrigation dikes by the National Irrigation Administration which prevented the water from flowing in and out of the subject fishpond,
nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter or change the nature of the creek as a property of the public domain. The finding that the
subject body of water is a creek belonging to the public domain is a factual determination binding upon the Supreme Court. The
Municipality of Bugallon, acting thru its duly-constituted municipal council is clothed with authority to pass, as it did,the two
resolutions dealing with its municipal waters, and it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of their right to due process as
mere publication of the notice of the public bidding suffices as a constructive notice to the whole world.

Usero v CA Digest
G.R. No. 152115, 26 January 2005

Facts:
This is a consolidated petition assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA). Petitioners and the private respondent are
registered owners of neighboring parcels of land wherein between the lots is a low-level strip of land with stagnant body of water.
Whenever there is a storm or heavy rain, the water therein would flood thereby causing damage to houses of the Polinars prompting
them to build a concrete wall on the bank of the strip of land about 3meters from their house and riprapped the soil in that portion.

The Useros claimed ownership of the strip, demanded the halt of the construction but the Polinars never heeded believing that the
strip is part of a creek. However, the Polinars offered to pay for the land. As the parties still failed to settle, both filed separate
complaints for forcible entry. The Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, while the regional trial court reversed and
ordered the dismissal of the complaint and confirmed the existence of the creek between the lots.
Issue:
Whether or not the disputed strip of land is part of the creek hence part of public domain

Held:
YES. Art. 420 of the Philippine New Civil Code (NCC) provides for properties which are part of public domain. A creek is included in
the phrase "and others of similar character". A creek, which refers to a recess or arm of a river is a property belonging to the public
domain, therefore not susceptible of private ownership. Being a public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens system
under the name of any individual.
OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY v. MARIO D. EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS
G.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010

FACTS:
Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a 406 sqm. parcel of land in Parañaque City covered by Tax in the name of respondent
Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor land was
their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez, which was given to his son, Pedro Valdez, in 1930. From then on, Pedro continuously and
exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy. He also
paid taxes for the land. Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida. In April 1964 and in October
1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the construction of their house within the land.

On April 21, 1987, Pedro transferred his rights over the land in favor of Ebio. On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang
Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series of 1990 seeking assistance from the City Government of Parañaque for the
construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The proposed road will run from Urma Drive to the
main road of Vitalez Compound traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. Respondents immediately opposed and the project
was suspended.

In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from the barangay and the city planning office
proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot.

On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty
(30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property. Respondents sent a reply, asserting their claim over the subject property
and expressing intent for a further dialogue. The request remained unheeded. Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the
RTC of Parañaque City on April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners

ISSUE:
Whether or not the State may build on the land in question.

HELD:
No. It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks
of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.

ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from
the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the current of the waters.

It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public
domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only
restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system;
otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.

In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the possession of the properties
has been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding property of public domain. Even a city or municipality cannot
acquire them by prescription as against the State. Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land
which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain
by clear provision of law.

CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

384 SCRA 152

FACTS:
President Marcos through a presidential decree created PEA, which was tasked with the development, improvement, and
acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of lands. The then president also transferred to PEA the foreshore and offshore lands of
Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project.
Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of land and then, years later, PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI for the
development of the Freedom Islands. These two entered into a joint venture in the absence of any public bidding.

Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator President Maceda denouncing the JVA as the grandmother of all scams. An
investigation was conducted and it was concluded that the lands that PEA was conveying to AMARI were lands of the public domain;
the certificates of title over the
Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This prompted Ramos to form an investigatory committee on the legality of
the JVA.

Petitioner now comes and contends that the government stands to lose billions by the conveyance or sale of the reclaimed areas to
AMARI. He also asked for the full disclosure of the renegotiations happening between the parties.

ISSUE:
W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of the lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.

HELD:
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine, which holds that the State
owns all lands and waters of the public domain.

The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It declares that all-natural resources are owned by the State and except for
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated.

The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project have been
reclaimed, and the rest of the area are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay. Further, it is provided that AMARI will
reimburse the actual costs in reclaiming the areas of land and it will shoulder the other reclamation costs to be incurred.

The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public domain, waters and other natural resources and
consequently owned by the State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienable unless they are classified as
agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by the PEA doesn’t convert these inalienable natural
resources of the State into alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation
officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public
use.

REPUBLIC V. CA

FACTS:
Respondent Morato filed a free patent application on a parcel of land, which was approved and issued an original certificate of title.
Both the free patent and title specifically mandate that the land shall not be alienated nor encumbered within 5 years from the date
of the issuance of the patent. The District Land Officer, acting upon reports that Morato had encumbered the land and upon finding
that the subject land is submerged in water during high tide and low tide, filed a complaint for cancellation of the title and reversion
of the parcel of land to the public domain. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent violated the free patent condition prohibiting encumbering the land within the 5-year
period? 2. Whether or not the land is of public domain?

HELD:
1. Yes. Public Land Act Sec. 18 provides that…lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to
encumbrance or alienation from the date of approval of the application and for a term of 5 years from and after the date of issuance
of the patent or grant…The contracts of lease and mortgage executed by Morato constitute an encumbrance as contemplated by
section 18 of the Public Land Act because such contracts impair the use of the property.

2. Yes. Based from the facts, the land is clearly foreshore as it is subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. When the sea moved towards
the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain. In
Government v. Cabangis, the Court annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral proceedings when the parcel subsequently
became foreshore land. In another case, the Court voided the registration decree of a trial court and held that said court had no
jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or entity. The subject land in this case, being foreshore land should
therefor be returned to the public domain.

City of Lapu-Lapu vs. PEZA

G.R. no. 184203

Facts:
In 1995, the PEZA was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 7916 or “the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995” to operate, administer,
manage, and develop economic zones in the country. The PEZA was granted the power to register, regulate, and supervise the
enterprises located in the economic zones. By virtue of the law, the export processing zone in Mariveles, Bataan became the Bataan
Economic Zone and the Mactan Export Processing Zone the Mactan Economic Zone. The City contends that due to the enactment of
the LGC, specifically withdrawing all tax exemptions and with the PEZA law of 1995 which did not have any provisions on tax
exemptions, it maintains that PEZA is liable for real property tax.

Issue:
Whether or not PEZA should be exempted from real property taxation.

Held:
Yes. Under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, real properties owned by the Republic of the Philippines are exempt from
real property taxes. Properties owned by the state are either property of public dominion or patrimonial property as per Art. 420.

Citing Manila International Airport Authority: Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy,
encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of
public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public dominion are
subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale.

In this case, the properties sought to be taxed are located in publicly owned economic zones. These economic zones are property of
public dominion – sites which were reserved by President Marcos under Proclamation No. 1811, Series of 1979 (Mactan). Petition
Denied.

MIAA v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2005

FACTS:
The Officers of Paranaque City sent notices to MIAA due to real estate tax delinquency. MIAA then settled some of the amount. Now
when MIAA failed to settle the entire amount, the officers of Paranaque city threatened to levy and subject to auction the land and
buildings of MIAA, which they did.
MIAA then sought for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) from the CA but failed to do so within the 60 days reglementary period,
so the petition was dismissed. MIAA then sought for the TRO with the SC a day before the public auction, MIAA was granted with the
TRO but unfortunately the TRO was received by the Paranaque City officers 3 hours after the public auction.

MIAA claims that although the charter provides that the title of the land and building are with MIAA still the ownership is with the
Republic of the Philippines. MIAA also contends that it is an instrumentality of the government and as such exempted from real
estate tax. So, in other words, MIAA's bone of contention and defense lie solely on the principle that the land and buildings of MIAA
are of public dominion and therefore cannot be subjected to levy and auction sale.
On the other hand, the officers of Paranaque City claim that MIAA is a GOCC (government owned and controlled corporation)
therefore not exempted to real estate tax.

ISSUE:
1. WON MIAA is an instrumentality of the government and not a government owned and controlled corporation and as such
exempted from tax.
2. WON the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion and thus cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale.

RULING:
 1. Under the Local government code, (GOCCs) government owned and controlled corporation are NOT exempted from real estate
tax.

MIAA is not a government owned and controlled corporation, for to become one MIAA should either be a stock or non-stock
corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation for its capital is not divided into shares. It is not a non-stock corporation since it has no
members.

MIAA is an instrumentality of the government vested with corporate powers and government functions. Under the civil code,
property may either be under public dominion or private ownership. Those under public dominion are owned by the State and are
utilized for public use, public service and for the development of national wealth. When properties under public dominion cease to
be for public use and service, they form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

2. The court held that the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion. Since the airport is devoted for public use, for
the domestic and international travel and transportation. Even if MIAA charge fees, this is for support of its operation and for
regulation and does not change the character of the land and buildings of MIAA as part of the public dominion.

As part of the public dominion the land and buildings of MIAA are outside the commerce of man. To subject them to levy and public
auction is contrary to public policy. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the airport land and buildings from public
use, these properties remain to be of public dominion and are inalienable. As long as the land and buildings are for public use the
ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines

Laurel vs Garcia

Facts:
These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents from proceeding with the
bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21,
1990. The Supreme Court granted the prayer for a temporary restraining order, in favor of the petitioner, effective February 20,
1990.

The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the
Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956.
The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of property. It was given to the Filipino people in reparation for the lives and blood of
Filipinos who died and suffered during the Japanese military occupation, for the suffering of widows and orphans who lost their loved
ones and kindred, for the homes and other properties lost by countless Filipinos during the war. Amidst opposition by various
sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties
starting with the Roppongi lot.

Issue:
Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government?

Ruling:
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations
Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement, which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese
government. There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become
patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do.

As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special
collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social
group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare
and cannot be the object of appropriation.
G.R. No. 172931
Republic of the Philippines v. RTC Br. 18, Roxas City, Capiz, et al.
Facts:

Issue:
Held:

G.R. No. 145838

Alcantara vs. COSLAP

Facts:
In 1993, petitioner was granted the lease of 923 hectares of public forest land in Sitio Lanton, General Santos City through Forest
Land Grazing Lease Agreement No. 542 (FLGLA No. 542) for 25 years. Before the lease was granted, private respondent Paglangan
along with Sabel Esmael and Lasid Acop filed a letter of complaint with COSLAP to cancel FLGLA No. 542. Petitioner questioned
COSLAP’s jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public lands. COSLAP went on with the hearing and petitioner alleged that he was
not given the opportunity to be present and participate in the field investigations conducted. On August 3, 1998 COSLAP cancelled
FLGLA No. 542 and petitioner appealed to CA for certiorari. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Based on the records, the land area being claimed by private respondents belongs to the B’laan indigenous cultural
community since they have been in possession of, and have been occupying and cultivating the same since time immemorial, a fact
has not been disputed by petitioner.

Issue:
1) Whether or not CA erred in ruling that petitioner has recognized COSLAP’s jurisdiction over the case by participating actively in the
proceedings.
2) Whether or not COSLAP has jurisdiction over the case.

Held:
1) Active participation of a respondent in the case pending against him before a court or a quasi-judicial body is tantamount to
recognizing its jurisdiction and therefore cannot question it later after the decision.

2) COSLAP has jurisdiction to resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature, for instance, between
occupants and lease agreement holders.
It was likewise declared by the appellate court that FLGLA No. 542 granted to petitioner violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
410 which states that all unappropriated agricultural lands forming part of the public domain are declared part of the ancestral lands
of the indigenous cultural groups occupying the same, and these lands are further declared alienable and disposable, to be
distributed exclusively among the members of the indigenous cultural group concerned.

Heirs of Paragas vs. RD of Tarlac City

October 10, 2007

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE and
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, defendants-appellants.

Facts:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga
Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga
City.
Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that “Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to
another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General.” Such properties
include lots of capitol site, schools, hospitals, leprosarium, high school playgrounds, burleighs, and hydro-electric sites.

On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and
Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and obligations of the old province were to be divided between the two new ones, Sec. 6 of
that law provided “Upon the approval of this Act, the funds, assets and other properties and the obligations of the province of
Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the
President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor General.”

However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that, “All
buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are
hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga.”

This constrained Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5, 1962, a complaint against defendants-appellants Zamboanga City; that,
among others, Republic Act 3039 be declared unconstitutional for depriving Zamboanga del Norte of property without due process
and just compensation.
Lower court declared RA 3039 unconstitutional as it deprives Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties. Hence the appeal.

Issue:
Whether RA 3039 is unconstitutional on the grounds that it deprives Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties.

Held:
No. RA 3039 is valid. The properties petitioned by Zamboanga del Norte is a public property.

The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings thereon in question. For, the matter involved
here is the extent of legislative control over the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a province is one. The principle itself
is simple: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the
property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it
is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of
just compensation.
The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to which it is intended and devoted. Now, which of two
norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or that obtaining under the law of Municipal Corporations, must be used in classifying the
properties in question?

Civil Code
ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property. ART.
424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal
streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or
municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to
the provisions of special laws.

Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School playgrounds, could be
considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and
the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under the phrase “public works for
public service” for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by
anyone, just like the preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. The playgrounds, however, would fit into
this category.

Law of Municipal Corporations

On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the
50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be
considered public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public
education, public health, etc.

Final Ruling
The controversy here is more along the domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations — State vs. Province — than along that of Civil
Law. If municipal property held and devoted to public service is in the same category as ordinary private property, then that would
mean they can be levied upon and attached; they can even be acquired thru adverse possession — all these to the detriment of the
local community. It is wrong to consider those properties as ordinary private property.

Lastly, the classification of properties other than those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil
Code — is “… without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.” For purpose of this article, the principles, obtaining under the Law
of Municipal Corporations can be considered as “special laws.” Hence, the classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly
governmental purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code classification in this particular case.

Macasiano vs. Diokno

212 SCRA 464

Facts:
On June 13, 1990, the Municipality of Paranaque passed an Ordinance, which authorized the closure of several streets and the
establishment of a flea market thereon. The said Ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to MCC Ordinance 2
series of 1979, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets and open spaces as sites for flea market
and/or vending area under certain terms and conditions.
On June 20, 1990, the municipal council issued a Resolution authorizing the Paranaque Mayor to enter into a contract with any
service cooperative for the establishment and operation of flea markets.
On Aug 8, 1990, the municipality and Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate,
maintain and manage the flea market with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the Mun. of Paranaque. Consequently,
Palanyag put up market stalls on subject streets.
On Sept. 13, 1990, Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and
confiscation of stalls along GG Cruz and J Gabrielle St. in Baclaran. These stalls were returned to Palanyag. Thereafter, Macasiano
wrote a letter to Palanyag, giving the latter 10 days to discontinue the flea market, otherwise the market stalls shall be dismantled.
On Oct. 13, 1990, the Mun. of Paranaque and Palanyag filed a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer
for preliminary injunction. The trial court (Judge Dikono) issued an Order upholding the validity of the Ordinance allowing the use of
public streets for the operation of flea markets, and enjoining Macasiano from enforcing his letter-order to Palanyag. Hence, a
petition for certiorari was filed by Macasiano thru the OSG.

ISSUE:
WON an Ordinance or Resolution, issued by the municipal council of Paranaque, authorizing the lease and use of public streets as
sites for a flea market is valid

HELD:
No. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property (Art. 423,
Civil Code).As to property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, it consists of the provincial roads, city streets,
the squares, the fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public use paid for by said provinces, cities or
municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by the Civil Code, without prejudice
to the provisions of special laws.

In the present case, the streets in question are local roads used for public service and therefore considered public properties of the
municipality. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute
control of Congress. Hence, local government has no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless
specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.

Villanueva vs Castaneda
154 SCRA 142

Facts
Respondent Macalino, OIC of the Office of Mayor of San Fernando issued a resolution requiring the demolition of stalls constructed
on what the respondent claims to be a public land which is now proliferated with the vendors’ stalls called “talipapa.” The petitioners
contend that by virtue of the contract of lease issued to them by the previous municipal council they have the right to stay and do
business at the place in issue. Thus, the petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with the Court of First Instance contending that
they are protected by the lease contract. Their petition was denied hence this action to the Supreme Court was filed for certiorari.

Issue
Whether or not the land in issue is a public land?
Whether or not the respondent’s act to order the demolition of the stalls amount to grave abuse of discretion and whimsical?

Held
It was held by the Supreme Court that the land in issue is a public land.
In the year 1961, it appears that the municipal council of San Fernando adopted resolution no. 218 that authorized vendors to
construct permanent stalls on the land in issue by virtue of a contract of lease. The resolution was opposed in a Civil Case no. 2040. In
1964, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted resolution no. 29 declaring the land as a parking space and a public plaza of the
municipality which in effect impliedly revoked the resolution no. 218. In the Civil Case no. 2040, it was held that a public plaza is
beyond the commerce of men. The decision was not appealed nor reversed hence the court finds no need to disturb the final
adjudication of the Civil Case 2040. It is settled therefore that the land where the stalls were constructed remains a public land. The
petitioners cannot claim the right to occupy the disputed premises by invoking lease contracts. Being an object beyond the
commerce of men, the land in dispute cannot be an object of a lease contract.

The respondent has the duty to restore the public land to what it is intended in nature and no whimsical action was taken in ordering
the demolition of the stalls. It is an act within the scope of exercising police power and such police power cannot be bargained away
through a lease contract. Thus, the court ruled in favor of the respondent.

G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite. Mario Malabanan
filed an application for land registration covering the property in the RTC. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property
from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years.

Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino
Velazco. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death
of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the CENRO-DENR, which
stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC
approved the application for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to
the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court
of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the application of Malabanan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to
acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code.

RULING:
As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands
that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or
disposed.

In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as
a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only
with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property
is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil
Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public
dominion begin to run.
The petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that
is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to
private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the
State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise,
the
land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a
law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth.

Sanchez vs. Municipality of Asingan

7 SCRA 559

FACTS:
Municipality of Asingan is the owner of a triangular strip of land situated between the site of the municipal school building and the
provincial road wherein petitioner Sanchez occupied and paid its rental to the municipal. When the new local administration took
effect in 1959, the municipal passed a resolution notifying the occupants that the land was needed for certain public purposes (e.g
parking space, pedestrians among others), and that the occupants were advised to vacate the land within 5 months. Instead of
moving, petitioners filed a petition for prohibition to prevent the municipality from ejecting them from the land and with an
alternative prayer that if they will be ejected, appellee be ordered to reimburse to them the rents which they have paid for total of
P1,178.20 plus damages and attorney’s fees.
Petition was dismissed, and the court orders the appellants to vacate the land.

ISSUE:
(1) W/N the land in question belongs to the Province of Pangasinan and therefore appellee has no right to order their
ejectment? (2) W/N appellants are entitled to reimburse the W/N appellants are entitled to reimburse the rental they have paid?

Held:
(1) The premise of the contention is incorrect for the clear and specific finding of the court a quo is that the said land belongs to
Municipality of Asingan. The statement that “it is part of a broad shoulder of the provincial road” does not make the land provincial
property, such statement being merely a descriptive of its location and not indicative of its indicative of its ownership. ownership.

(2) No. Appellee’s position herein is that the land in question is patrimonial character, not being included in any of the categories of
municipal properties for public use enumerated under Art. 424 namely “streets, squares, fountains, etc.” Consequently, the implied
agreement of lease between them was not null and void, although terminable. That being so, there is no ground on which
reimbursement of the rents may be ordered. Even if the land in question is for public use, we see no justification for the stand
maintained by the appellants that having occupied said land and benefit therefrom they should be entitled to recover what they
have paid as a condition for their ejectment. That would be to enrich them unduly to the prejudice of appellee.

MUN. OF CAVITE v ROJAS

G. R. No. L-9069, 31 March 1915
Facts:
A parcel of land forming a part of the public plaza was leased to the defendants on which their house has been constructed and had
been occupying the same. The plaintiff ordered the defendants to vacate the said land as it formed integral part of the public plaza.
The defendants refused to vacate the said land because they had acquired the right of possession to it and further alleged that the
lease agreement provided that they can only be ordered to vacate the said property if the municipality needed it for decoration or
public use.

The trial court held that the municipality had no legal claim to the property. This case was appealed through bill of exceptions.

Issue:
WON the lease agreement between the parties was valid

Ruling:
The lease was null and void.
The defendant has no right to continue to occupy the land for it is an integral part of the plaza which is for public use and is reserved
for the common benefit. Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares,
streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of general service supported by said towns or provinces.
The said Plaza being a promenade for public use, the municipal council of Cavite could not in 1907 withdraw or exclude from public
use a portion thereof in order to lease it for the sole benefit of the defendant Hilaria Rojas. The plaintiff municipality exceeded its
authority in the exercise of its powers by executing a contract over a thing of which it could not dispose, nor is it empowered so to
do. The Civil Code, articles 1271, prescribes that everything which is not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a
contract, and plazas and streets are outside of this commerce. Therefore, it must be concluded that the said lease is null and void.

C. LEDESMA VS. MUN. OF ILOILO et al

G.R. No. L-26337

FACTS:
Lopez owns lot 228. In March 1915, Lopez sold to the City of Iloilo a PART of said lot, now numbered 537 and 703, payable in 10
years. A TCT was issued in favor of Lopez, including 537 and 703 (The inclusion of said lots in said TCT was evidently an error on the
part of someone connected with the office of the registrar of titles)
Lopez sold to Kalaw and wife said lot 228, including lots 537 and 703 evidently by mistake. It is said that the inclusion of said lots 537
and 703 was a mistake because Lopez as well as Kalaw and wife were ignorant of the fact that said lots were included in that TCT.

Lopez, representing. Kalaw, sold said lots (228, 537 and 703) to J. Ledesma, which sale was ratified by the couple. Later a TCT was
issued in favor of J. Ledesma. According to the admissions of J. Ledesma lots 537 and 703 were included by mistake. J. Ledesma sold
a portion of the lot. Lot 228 was made into two lots, 228-A and 228-B. Lot 228-A remained the property of J. Ledesma. Said lots 537
and 703, according to said TCT, remained the property of J. Ledesma.

J. Ledesma sold to the appellant herein lots Nos. 228-A, 537, and 703. Again, according to J. Ledesma, lots 537 and 703 were included
in the transfer of lot No. 228-A to C. Ledesma by mistake.
This action was commenced in CFI of Iloilo. Its purpose was to recover from defendant the municipality of Iloilo a sum as the value of
the two lots Nos. 537 and 703 which, the plaintiff claimed, the defendant municipality had illegally appropriated, together with
damages and costs.

The recovery of said sums was opposed by the defendants upon the ground that the plaintiff and appellant was not and never had
been the owner of said lots Nos. 537 and 703. The other defendants answered the petition and supported the contention of the
municipality.
After hearing the evidence upon the issue presented, the CFI absolved the defendants from all liability under the complaint. From
that judgment the plaintiff appealed

The theory of the appellant is that, by reason of the fact that said lots 537 and 703 had been included in the registered title of Lopez
in 1915, and Lopez included in each succeeding transfer of title to him said lots, that he was the indisputable owner thereof, and
because the City of Iloilo had appropriated said lots, that he was entitled to recover the value of said lots together with damages.

ISSUE:
WON the inclusion of lots 537 and 703 in the TCT of C. Ledesma made him the owner of such properties

HELD:
NO. An examination of the records shows that as early as April, 1915, said lots had been turned over by Lopez to the City of Iloilo
under a contract of sale for street purposes. That fact was well known. The said lots had been included as a part of the streets in the
City of Iloilo. The same were therefore illegally included, in accordance with the provisions of section 39 of Act No. 496, in the
certificate of title issued to Lopez. That fact was recognized by Lopez as well as by each of the subsequent purchasers of said lots.

The simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens system, does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all
the property described therein. If a person obtains a title, under the Torrens system, which include by mistake or oversight land
which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone, becomes the owner of the
lands illegally included.

The inclusion of public highways in a certificate of title does not thereby necessarily give to the holder of such certificate said public
highways. The appellant, therefore, even though a part of said streets (lots 537 and 703) had been included in the original certificate
of title and in the subsequent transfer of title, did not become the owner of said lots and is not therefore entitled to recover their
value from the City of Iloilo nor the damages prayed for.

United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA

G.R. No. 124293, November 20, 2000

FACTS:
The National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a government corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement
(JVA) with Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. for the construction, operation and management of the Subic National Shipyard, Inc., later
became the Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO). Under the JVA, NIDC and Kawasaki would maintain a
shareholding proportion of 60%-40% and that the parties have the right of first refusal in case of a sale.

Through a series of transfers, NIDC’s rights, title and interest in PHILSECO eventually went to the National Government. In the
interest of national economy, it was decided that PHILSECO should be privatized by selling 87.67% of its total outstanding capital
stock to private entities. After negotiations, it was agreed that Kawasaki’s right of first refusal under the JVA be “exchanged” for the
right to top by five percent the highest bid for said shares. Kawasaki that Philyards Holdings, Inc. (PHI), in which it was a stockholder,
would exercise this right in its stead.

During bidding, Kawasaki/PHI Consortium is the losing bidder. Even so, because of the right to top by 5% percent the highest bid, it
was able to top JG Summit’s bid. JG Summit protested, contending that PHILSECO, as a shipyard is a public utility and, hence, must
observe the 60%-40% Filipino-foreign capitalization. By buying 87.67% of PHILSECO’s capital stock at bidding, Kawasaki/PHI in effect
now owns more than 40% of the stock.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PHILSECO is a public utility
Whether or not Kawasaki/PHI can purchase beyond 40% of PHILSECO’s stocks

HELD:
In arguing that PHILSECO, as a shipyard, was a public utility, JG Summit relied on sec. 13, CA No. 146. On the other hand,
Kawasaki/PHI argued that PD No. 666 explicitly stated that a “shipyard” was not a “public utility.” But the SC stated that sec. 1 of PD
No. 666 was expressly repealed by sec. 20, BP Blg. 391 and when BP Blg. 391 was subsequently repealed by EO 226, the latter law
did not revive sec. 1 of PD No. 666. Therefore, the law that states that a shipyard is a public utility still stands.

A shipyard such as PHILSECO being a public utility as provided by law is therefore required to comply with the 60%-40% capitalization
under the Constitution. Likewise, the JVA between NIDC and Kawasaki manifests an intention of the parties to abide by this
constitutional mandate. Thus, under the JVA, should the NIDC opt to sell its shares of stock to a third party, Kawasaki could only
exercise its right of first refusal to the extent that its total shares of stock would not exceed 40% of the entire shares of stock. The
NIDC, on the other hand, may purchase even beyond 60% of the total shares. As a government corporation and necessarily a 100%
Filipino-owned corporation, there is nothing to prevent its purchase of stocks even beyond 60% of the capitalization as the
Constitution clearly limits only foreign capitalization.

Kawasaki was bound by its contractual obligation under the JVA that limits its right of first refusal to 40% of the total capitalization of
PHILSECO. Thus, Kawasaki cannot purchase beyond 40% of the capitalization of the joint venture on account of both constitutional
and contractual proscriptions.