ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:

1. CONCEPT:
Administrative law belongs to the field of public law which includes
constitutional law, criminal law, and international law. There is no
agreement as to the scope or bounds of the term.

Administrative Law is a study of the laws that regulate the administrative

organization and operations of the governmental organs of the State and
determines the competence of the administrative authorities and the
remedies available to the individual in case of violation of his rights.

Narrow Definition:
It is "that branch of modern law under which the executive department of
government acting in a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial capacity,
interferes with the conduct of the individual for the purpose of promoting
the well-being of the community, as under laws regulating public
corporations, business affected with a public interest, professions, trades
and callings, rates and prices, laws for the protection of the public health
and safety and the promotion of the public convenience and advantage."

Quasi-judicial/Quasi-Legislative capacities:
- Powers are usually delegated by law – it is not an original power
- Can be inferred that it is a delegated act
- It is an interference of our freedom for the purpose of the well-being
of the community

2. Administrative bodies - promote the well-being of the community e.g.

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC)

Administrative Law is the law that provides authority to regulate for the purpose
of the well-being of the community, for the general welfare through the
administrative agencies/bodies.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
- As generally understood today and for the purpose of this work, it
means that part of the law which governs the organization, functions,
and procedures of administrative agencies of the government to which
(quasi) legislative powers are delegated and (quasi) judicial powers are
granted, and the extent and manner to which such agencies are
subject to control by the courts."

SCOPE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:

Broadly conceived, administrative law covers the following:

(1) the law which fixes the administrative organization and structure of the
government;
(2) the law, the execution or enforcement of which is entrusted to
administrative authorities;
(because there are certain administrative agencies that provides for the
administrative function; here comes other administrative law – which provides
for its enforcement)

(3) the law which governs public officers including their competence (to act),
rights, duties, liabilities, election, etc.;
(that is why, this is coupled with Law on Public Officers)

(4) the law which creates administrative agencies, defines their powers and
functions, prescribes their procedures, including the adjudication or settlement
by them of contested matters involving private interests;

(5) the law which provides the remedies, administrative or judicial, available to
those aggrieved by administrative actions or decisions;

(6) the law which governs judicial review of, or relief against, administrative
actions or decisions;
(e.g. Civil Service Commission – complaints; in administrative proceedings, it
does not end with the President, it also goes to the judicial recourse- but in this
case, e.g. it is already judicial , but appeal can be administrative law)

7) the rules, regulations, orders and decisions (including presidential

proclamations) made by administrative authorities dealing with the
interpretation and enforcement of the laws entrusted to their administration;
and
(e.g. memorandum circulars, memorandum orders)

(8) the body of judicial decisions and doctrines dealing with any of the above.

Meaning part of administrative law is jurisprudence involving administrative

cases…this becomes part of administrative law.

Thus, administrative law embraces not only the law that governs administrative
authorities, i.e., the Constitution (pertinent provisions thereof), statutes, and
judicial decisions that construe and apply them as well as appropriate principles
of justice and equity in particular cases, but also the law made by
administrative authorities, i.e., rules, regulations, orders and decisions, whether
of general or particular applicability.

ISSUANCES SUCH AS MCS ARE BINDING TO THEM ONLY AND TO THOSE

DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE MCS.

Malaga vs. Penachos, 213 SCRA 516

Malaga vs. Penachos (Digest)

Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., et.al.
GR No. 86995 03 September 1992

Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined.

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-
qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the
November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation
to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice
announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification
requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received
and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE

Construction and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-
qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988.
Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three
of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were
considered late.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC
against the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them
resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They
sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance
of their documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been
conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project pending
resolution of their complaint.

On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC
from conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a
motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited
from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They
also contended that the preliminary injunction had become moot and academic
as it was served after the bidding had been awarded and closed.

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the
petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be
constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling
within the coverage of the subject law.
ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the
provisions of PD 1818?

RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as

follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction
by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term
includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or
controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:

Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a
special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific
constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities
and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory
Provisions).

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is
therefore covered by P.D. 1818.

There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government

instrumentality. First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries
development policy of the State, a priority program of the government to effect
the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of
the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its
accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly
authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National
Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the
president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even
the services of such employees as can be spared without serious detriment to
public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out
of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that
the funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in
the General Appropriations Law.

Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the

prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the
transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the
award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).

De la Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 296

De La Llana v. Alba
March 12, 1982 |G.R. No. L-57883

FACTS:
Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled, “An act reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes” was passed, providing
for the separation of Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of
Appeals to municipal circuit courts (except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan
and the Court of Tax appeals). The honorable petitioner sought to prohibit the
respondents from implementing BP 129, alleging that the security of tenure
provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded. Furthermore,
they assert that the reorganization was done in lack of good faith. However, the
Solicitor General denies his claim and maintains that the allegation of lack of
good faith is unwarranted and devoid of any support in law, and that BP 129
was a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to
reorganize the judiciary.

ISSUE:
Was there lack of good faith in reorganizing the judiciary?

HELD:
No. The Court held that there was good faith in reorganizing the judiciary.
Citing the separate opinion of Justice Laurel in the case of Zandueta v. De La
Costa, the Court similarly maintains that the passage of BP 129 was in good
faith seeing as its purpose was for the fulfillment of what was considered a
great public need by the legislative department, not intended to adversely affect
the tenure of judges or any particular judge. While it is possible that the
legislature could deliberately abuse the power to reorganize the judiciary, thus
lacking good faith, the Court is unconvinced that such was the case in this
situation. Thus, where the Court holds that the reorganization of the judiciary
by virtue of BP 129 was done in good faith, the “separation” of the petitioner
due to the abolition of his office is valid and constitutional.

Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. v SEC, 16 SCRA 623 (1955)

Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. vs. Securities and Exchange Commission and
Manila Stock Exchange

G.R. No. L-23004 June 30, 1965

Ponente: Bengzon, C. J.

Nature of the case

Petition for Review

Brief

Makati Exchange Commission (MakEC) filed a review on the resolution issued by

the SEC denying them to operate a stock exchange on the ground that the list
of securities on its trading board is already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange
(ManEC).

Facts

Makati Exchange Commission (MakEC) filed a review on the resolution issued by

the SEC denying them to operate a stock exchange because the list of securities
on its trading board is already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange (ManEC).
MakEC argued that the Commission has no power to impose it because it is
illegal, discriminatory and unjust.

Under the law, a stock exchange can only do a business in the Ph when it is
previously registered with the Commission by filing a statement containing the
information required by law (Sec. 17, Securities Act/ Commonwealth Act 83). It
is assumed that the Commission may permit registration if this is complied
with; if not, it may refuse.

MakEC is challenging this particular requirement of the Commission (rule

against double listing) may deemed to have shown inability or refusal to abide
by its rules, and thereby given ground for denying registration.

Rule against double listing

Such rule provides: “… nor shall a security already listed in any securities
exchange be listed anew in any other securities exchange… .”

Objection of the MakEC on the above rule

The ManEC has been operating alone for 25years, and presumably, all available
securities for trading in the market are already listed there. In effect, the
Commission permits MakEC to deal only with other securities, which
tantamount to a monopoly.

The Commission’s order/resolution makes it impossible for the MakEC to

operate, thus, “permission is tantamount to prohibition.

Issue/s

Whether or not the Commission has authority to promulgate and implement

rules prohibiting another exchange to operate on the ground that it is of the
protection of “public interest”.
Whether or not the establishment of another exchange environs of Manila
would be inimical to the public interest
Whether or not the double or multiple listing of securities should be prohibited
for the “protection of the investors”
Action of the court

The Court granted the petition.

Court rationale on the above case

Authority of the Commission to promulgate and implement the rule in question

It is fundamental that an administrative officer has only such powers as are

expressly granted to him by the statute, and those necessarily implied in the
exercise thereof.

The test is not whether the Act forbids the Commission from imposing a
prohibition, but whether it empowers the Commission to prohibit. No specific
portion of the statute has been cited to uphold this power.

The general power to “regulate” which the Commission has (Sec. 33) does not
imply authority to prohibit.

ManEC contends that the power may be inferred from the express power of the
Commission to suspend trading in a security, under said sec. 28:

And if in its opinion, the public interest so requires, summarily to suspend

trading in any registered security on any securities exchange … . (Sec. 28[3],
Securities Act.)

The Commission has not acted in pursuance of such authority, for the simple
reason that suspension under it may only be for ten days. Besides, the
suspension of trading in the security should not be on one exchange only, but
on all exchanges; bearing in mind that suspension should be ordered “for the
protection of investors” (first par., sec. 28) in all exchanges, naturally, and if
“the public interest so requires” [sec. 28(3)].
The law allows the operation of two or more exchanges

Wherever two or more exchanges exist, the Commission, by order, shall require
and enforce uniformity of trading regulations in and/or between said
exchanges. (Sec. 28b-13, Securities Act.)

The legislature has specified the conditions under which a stock exchange may
operate (Sec. 17, Securities Act); it is not for the Commission to impose others.
Until otherwise directed by law, the operation of exchanges should not be so
regulated as practically to create a monopoly by preventing the establishment
of other stock exchanges and thereby contravening:

the organizers’ (Makati’s) Constitutional right to equality before the law;

their guaranteed civil liberty to pursue any lawful employment or trade; and
the investor’s right to choose where to buy or to sell, and his privilege to select
the brokers in his employment.
Where the licensing statute does not expressly or impliedly authorize the officer
in charge, he may not refuse to grant a license simply on the ground that a
sufficient number of licenses to serve the needs of the public have already been
issued.

Ruling

Surely, this petition for review has suitably been coursed. And making
reasonable allowances for the presumption of regularity and validity of
administrative action, we feel constrained to reach the conclusion that the
respondent Commission possesses no power to impose the condition of the
rule, which, additionally, results in discrimination and violation of constitutional
rights.

ACCORDINGLY, the license of the petition to operate a stock exchange is

approved without such condition. Costs shall be paid by the Manila Stock
Exchange. So ordered.