Public Faces and Private Spaces:: Islam in the Japanese Context

Author(s): Michael Penn

Source: Asia Policy , No. 5 (JANUARY 2008), pp. 89-104
Published by: National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/24904647

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 asia policy, number 5 ( january 2008 ) , 89–104
•   http://asiapolicy.nbr.org   •

Public Faces and Private Spaces:

Islam in the Japanese Context

Michael Penn

michael penn  is Executive Director of the Shingetsu Institute for the Study
of Japanese-Islamic Relations in Kitakyushu, Japan. His research addresses
Japan’s modern encounters with the Islamic world and in particular West Asia.
He can be reached at <shingetsu_institute@hotmail.com>.

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 asia policy

executive summary

This essay examines Japanese views and attitudes toward Muslims living in
Japan and the implications of Japanese perspectives for U.S. policy and other
matters.

main findings
• Muslims in Japan face many challenges in Japanese society due to the
negative image of Islam that has arisen primarily from the media.
• These challenges—mostly involving a lack of sensitivity toward Muslim
religious needs—stem more from ignorance on the part of the Japanese
than from any specific hostility toward Islam.
• The attacks of September 11 and policies related to the war on terrorism
have exacerbated these negative attitudes directed toward Muslims in
Japan.
• Despite the challenges they face, members of the Muslim community in
Japan are not particularly bitter toward their Japanese hosts.
• The Japanese government or society itself will not likely undertake any
dramatically restrictive initiatives toward this religious minority.

policy implications
• From the perspective of the U.S., there is little need to formulate specific
policies toward these Muslim communities in Japan given that the Muslim
population in Japan is very small and has little political influence.
• Rather than framing this minority’s presence as a security issue, the U.S.
could assume a general approach that encourages Japan to adopt anti-
discrimination laws and to create a more open society toward foreigners.
Such an approach would help ensure Japan’s future as a stable, liberal
democracy and position the country as a role model for other Asian
nations.
• Such policies would also serve to prevent negative developments within
the local Muslim communities themselves, thus avoiding the development
of new problems in the future.

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 penn  •  public faces and private spaces

M uslims living in Japan comprise a small community of foreigners of

many nationalities as well as some ethnic Japanese. Japanese society
presents unique challenges for resident Muslims, and concern over the
activities of Muslim minorities in many countries—for example, terrorist
activities involving a handful of Muslims residing in Britain and other parts
of Europe—has been high in the U.S. policy community. Does a potential
for radicalization also exist in Japan? In addressing this question, this essay
examines Japanese views and attitudes toward Muslims living in Japan and
the possible implications for U.S. policy.
Although Muslim residents in Japan face many social difficulties, this
essay concludes the risk of radicalization is very small. That said, policies
encouraging the Japanese to adopt anti-discrimination laws (as UN
representatives have encouraged) and to create a more open society toward
foreigners in general would, in the long term, help ensure Japan’s future as a
stable, liberal democracy and would position the country as a role model for
other Asian nations.
This essay is divided into five sections:
u pp. 91–94 provide an overview of religion in contemporary Japanese
society and a basis for analyzing Japanese views toward Muslims
u pp. 94–99 examine the challenges faced by Muslims in Japan and their
reactions to these challenges
u pp. 99–100 discuss the unique challenges that ethnic Japanese Muslims
face
u pp. 100–102 examine the impact of the events of September 11 on
Muslims in Japan
u pp. 102–4 consider the future development of Islam in Japan and the
proper role of U.S. policy in shaping the outcome

religion in contemporary japanese society

Many facets of the challenges and conditions of Muslim life in Japan are
consequences of the role religion plays in Japanese society. An understanding
of this broader context can provide a basis for analyzing Japanese perspectives
of contemporary Islam and the country’s Muslim minority.

Japanese Religions
Shinto and Buddhism dominate the religious landscape of Japan. Shinto
is a native Japanese religion focusing on spirits of nature and human ancestors;

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 asia policy

evidence of the practice of Shinto by the Yamato people dates back to the dawn
of their recorded history.1 The introduction of Buddhism from China in the
sixth century, together with the earlier adoption of Chinese writing, marked
the beginning of a period of significant cultural development on the Japanese
islands. Both religions have deep and venerable roots in Japanese culture.
Of the many “new religions” appearing in Japan in modern times the
oldest is Tenrikyo, established in 1838 by Miki Nakayama, a Japanese woman
who claimed to have experienced divine revelations. Other noted new religions
include Oomoto, Soka Gakkai, Mahikari, and Makuya. Although most of these
belief systems are related to Shinto and Buddhism, some contain Jewish and
Christian elements. An estimated 1.4 million Japanese practice Christianity,
which has been present in the country in some form since 1549. Estimates
place the number of Japanese Muslims at approximately 6,000; assuming
this number is correct, Japanese Christians outnumber Japanese Muslims by
nearly 233 to 1.

Japanese Approaches toward Religion

Although in some ways appearing to exhibit a profusion of religious
sentiment, Japan is in other ways one of the most secular major societies in
the world. Much depends on how religiosity is defined. With the exception
of the more devoted followers of the new religions, most Japanese do not
engage in daily religious practices or seem to concern themselves with
broad philosophical questions regarding the meaning of life or the nature
of existence. Studies of Japanese religion tend to agree that this-worldliness
and lack of concern for abstract concepts characterize most Japanese
religious attitudes.
The Japanese approach to religion is also notable for its syncretism.
An individual’s religious beliefs will often incorporate elements of Shinto,
Buddhism, and sometimes Christianity, making few distinctions among
them. Most Japanese will offer prayers at a Shinto shrine or Buddhist temple
without concern over which god is enshrined there or to which denomination
the temple may belong. One prominent scholar aptly characterizes the
Japanese as not living “in a system that demands full-blooded, belief-oriented
and exclusive commitment that precludes any other” and suggests that as a

1 “Yamato people” refers to ethnic Japanese in distinction to various ethnic minorities.

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 penn  •  public faces and private spaces

consequence “religious organizations that demand single adherence have not,

as a rule, got very far in Japan.”2
Indeed, though in Japan practices that are in some way linked to religion
are common, the Japanese often view both discussion of religious beliefs and
individuals who seem too interested in religion with a degree of suspicion.
Religion, like politics, is a topic that many Japanese simply feel uncomfortable
discussing and regard best kept confined to a person’s inner thoughts and
to interactions with family or a tight circle of friends. Public displays of
religiosity outside of socially sanctioned periods such as hatsumode or o-bon
are usually frowned upon.3 Even these and other supposedly religious festivals
are notable for their atmosphere of celebration (and intoxication) rather than
for sustained religious solemnity. Most Japanese appear to view these festivals
foremost as cultural rather than religious events.
To the extent that most Japanese do concern themselves with religion, it is
usually as a family affair. Notions of family responsibilities and obligations are
major components of religious practices such as the veneration of ancestors:
cleaning the graves and maintaining the shrines of close family members
consoles the spirits of dead relatives, and appealing to the spirits of one’s
ancestors or a merciful local god can provide the luck or skill necessary in
times of trouble or special need. Ian Reader and George J. Tanabe, Jr., two
scholars that have studied Japanese religion for many years, argue that Japanese
participate in religious activities primarily in the hope of gaining tangible,
this-worldly benefits. Amulets, charms, and small “miracles” lie at the heart
of the Japanese religious experience. “Rather than being (say) ‘Buddhist’ or
‘Shinto,’ ” Reader and Tanabe suggest, “Japanese people really are members of
a common Japanese religion centered on practical benefits.”4
A connection between religion and tradition also is central to the Japanese
outlook. Religion is part of the cherished traditional culture of Japan; most
Japanese regard maintaining old customs as important for the sake of family
tradition and as part of their Japanese identity. Although not necessarily
believing in the effectiveness of these kinds of measures, many Japanese do in
any case figure that there is no harm in covering all the bases. For example, one
Japanese woman, when pressed to explain why these customs were important,

2 Ian Reader, Religion in Contemporary Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), 16.
3 Hatsumode is the first shrine visit of the new year and o-bon is a festival in which the Japanese
commemorate their ancestors. These are two of the most important Japanese holidays.
4 Ian Reader and George J. Tanabe, Jr., Practically Religious: Worldly Benefits and the Common
Religion of Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998), 52–53.

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 asia policy

speculated that the significance must be related to social stability and order.5
Reflected in this view is a fear that abandoning traditions and adopting foreign
ways too rapidly could lead to a breakdown in Japanese society.

the challenges of islam in a japanese context

Many of the challenges faced by Muslims in Japan are consequences of

the differences between Japanese and Muslim approaches toward religion.
Although both Islam and the religions more common to Japan involve rites
and observances, in general the Japanese do not view the purpose of religious
practices in the same way that many Muslims do. Another difference is
that the main body of the Islamic community has been moving—especially
since the late nineteenth century—away from syncretism and toward more
puritanical and dogmatic forms of belief. The Japanese syncretic approach to
religion does not correspond well in many ways to this contemporary trend
in the Islamic world.

Japanese Perceptions of Muslims: Statistical Evidence

The majority of Japanese have no direct experience with Muslims.
Japanese views of Muslims are therefore largely shaped by media depictions,
most of which involve Muslims in the context of wars, terrorism, and acts of
violence. Recently published research by Professor Toru Miura of Ochanomizu
University and high school teacher Takaaki Matsumoto underscores the
significant impact of the media on perceptions of Japanese students: 92%
of high school students and 78% of university students surveyed identified
television as their main source of information about Islam.6 Of the high school
students surveyed:
• 75% believed that Islam was aggressive
• 72% thought that Islam involved strange customs
• 70% associated Islam with a lack of freedom

5 Author’s interview with a Japanese woman, March 13, 2007.

6 Toru Miura, “Perceptions of Islam and Muslims in Japanese High Schools,” Annals of the Japan
Association for Middle East Studies 21, no. 2 (March 2006): 173–91; and Matsumoto Takaaki,
“Nihon no Kokosei ga Idaku Isuraamu-zo to sono Zesei ni Muketa Torikumi” [Images of Islam
among High School Students in Japan and Proposals for Correction of Student Misperceptions],
Annals of the Japan Association for Middle East Studies 21, no.2 (March 2006): 193–214. A
summary is available in Michael Penn, “The Perception of Islam in Japanese Schools,” Shingetsu
Newsletter 261, May 7, 2006.

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 penn  •  public faces and private spaces

• 69% found Islam to be mysterious or exotic

• 59% thought that Islam was intolerant
• 54% believed that Islam involved rigid doctrines
• 53% associated Islam with backward regions of the world7

Based on these survey results Matsumoto concluded that his high school
students held the following perceptions of Islam:
• rigid, many commandments, and not free
• strange and incomprehensible
• intolerant and aggressive
• practiced by bearded men living in desert areas8

Miura also indicated that some high school textbooks present a similar
view. One such passage cited, for instance, states that “the belief and doctrine
of Islam has been established in severe natural conditions (of the desert) and
characteristics of strictness and strength, quite different from the Japanese
preference for mildness, warmth, and ambiguity.”9
Most Japanese view Islam negatively as having characteristics very
different from the typical, easygoing Japanese religious practices. Indeed,
every Muslim residing in Japan interviewed by this author agreed not
only that the Japanese had a negative view toward Islam but also that the
predominant feeling of Japanese toward Islam is fear. The events of September
11 have played a major role in these negative perceptions; precise data on the
evolution of Japanese opinion over the years, however, does not exist. Overall,
though, the general reception of Islam in Japan involves a high degree of both
ignorance and suspicion. In the words of Takuo “Amir” Arai, a representative
of the Japan Muslim Association, “In the Islamic world today there are many
cases of wartime conditions, terrorism, poverty, and chaos. Because this is
what appears on TV, many Japanese have a negative image of Islam.”10 Both
non-Muslim Japanese and resident foreign Muslims share this analysis.
The social environment for Muslims in Japan, however, is not as adverse
as the foregoing suggests. Japanese keep their thoughts to themselves, keeping

7 Matsumoto, “Nihon no Kokosei ga Idaku Isuraamu-zo to sono Zesei ni Muketa Torikumi,” 211–13.
8 Ibid., 194.
9 Miura, “Perceptions of Islam and Muslims in Japanese High Schools,” 182.
10 Author’s e-mail with Takuo “Amir” Arai, March 10, 2007.

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 asia policy

any negative views quiet and private for the most part. Unlike in some parts
of Europe, in Japan there is no threat of violence and little vandalism against
resident Muslims, whose personal, physical security is as assured as it is for
any other group of foreigners in the country. Though Muslims may encounter
a sense of fearfulness or evasiveness when interacting with most Japanese,
any displays of emotion are usually quite subtle, with the most direct action
limited to unfriendly stares by some passersby. The problems that Muslims
do encounter in Japan relate not to personal safety but to the conveniences of
everyday social life.

Daily Challenges Facing Muslims in Japan

In many respects, Islam is a community religion. When Muslim
communities are small and isolated as they are in Japan, however, the social
challenges can be formidable.
As also noted in Keiko Sakurai’s essay, one of the greatest challenges for
Muslims in Japan is finding halal food. When at home, of course, Muslims
can prepare their own foods and assure themselves that all of the dishes are
halal; eating out, however, is a challenge for devout Muslims in Japan because
ordinary Japanese have little consciousness of Muslim dietary practices.
Another challenge is the limited extent of social services and community-
building that resident Muslims can provide for themselves. Muslim women
who do not fit readily into the typical categories of married students, laborers,
or Japanese Muslim housewives face additional challenges, as testified by one
Pakistani-American woman:
I am a young, single Muslimah, and there aren’t many options for
me socially as far as my age group goes, or those who may share
similar hobbies, etc. I am no longer a student, nor in a university
here, so I don’t get to meet people of my own age range. The Muslim
women here tend to be Japanese, which leads to a language barrier.
Additionally, the few Pakistani women I have met, as sweet as they
are, are not in my age range and have the responsibilities that come
with married life…This has been the most disappointing aspect of
being a practicing Muslim here, since sometimes it feels as though
you’re in a glass cage and there is (in most cases) a complete lack
of any real unity among Muslims in Japan.11

The size and resources of the Muslim community in Japan are still quite
limited, even in Tokyo. The lack of services is more acute in regions outside

11 Author’s e-mail with a Pakistani-American, February 27, 2007.

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 penn  •  public faces and private spaces

of the big cities, where local Muslims in a given region sometimes number in
the single digits.12
Another key challenge is fulfilling the Islamic injunction to pray five
times daily. Muslims who take a more relaxed attitude toward performing
prayers find adapting to Japanese society easier than those who take a
stricter approach. For example, a committed Muslim community leader in
western Japan stated that when in a public place at the time for prayer he
has been told by some business owners to leave the premises if he wants
to pray. “Some people, of course, look at me like I’m crazy when I do my
prayers,” he added.13 Similarly, an Egyptian Muslim residing in a rural area
of Japan complained that he had no place to pray except at home with his
family. Although a small community of Muslims resides at a local Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) facility nearby, this individual
has been barred from performing his prayers at the JICA dormitory because
local regulations discourage use of the facilities by non-residents, a policy
this man views as inconsiderate of his religious needs.14
More troubling can be the difficulty of praying at work. As a matter
of courtesy, many Japanese employers allow employees to pray but are
not legally obligated to do so. Cases of discrimination do occur, a most
egregious example of which was reported in the Daily Yomiuri newspaper.
An Indonesian woman in her twenties who was working in eastern Japan as
a trainee at a sewing factory was forced to sign a note promising neither to
pray at company facilities nor to fast for Ramadan. Employers also kept her in
prison-like conditions, prohibiting her from owning a phone, having guests,
or sending or receiving letters. The Daily Yomiuri quoted a Japanese human
rights activist as speculating that “the prohibitions were likely enforced in the
service of two aims: [to raise] worker efficiency and [to] prevent [the trainees]
from escaping.”15
Cases as extreme as this one likely are quite rare, yet the fact that Muslims
have few legal protections from discrimination at work remains a real
concern. Although most ordinary Japanese are considerate enough to allow
Muslims personal space, Muslims have little official recourse when facing
discriminatory practices.

12 Another challenge related in part is the education of Muslim children, which is addressed in Keiko
Sakurai’s contribution.
13 Author’s interview with a Muslim community leader, Fukuoka, Japan, March 15, 2007.
14 Author’s interview, Kitakyushu, Japan, March 18, 2007.
15 “Factory Denies Muslim Basic Human Rights,” Daily Yomiuri, December 5, 2006.

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 asia policy

Wearing hijab presents similar problems for Muslim women. Not every
Muslim woman wears a headscarf or a burkah; those who do not probably face
fewer social obstacles in Japan. Those Muslim women who do accept more
conservative Islamic practices, however, are likely to encounter suspicion and
doubt or be stared at in public. Japanese Muslim women, in particular, may
face criticism from family and friends. Generally speaking, most ordinary
Japanese associate hijab with the oppression of women and are reluctant
to see veiling through any alternative framework. Japanese women—often
deeply concerned with issues of fashion and style—find it incomprehensible
that some women would give up contemporary attire.
The common Islamic practice of abstaining from alcohol can also cause
difficulties. Drinking not only is quite common in Japan but in some social
contexts is almost required. Even more than in Western countries, alcohol
serves an important social role in Japan by allowing work colleagues to relax
together and share thoughts that are not always expressed in the workplace. In
many Japanese companies supervisors expect employees to attend after-hours
drinking sessions where social bonds are more easily forged. A Muslim or
other non-drinker refusing to participate in these affairs can easily experience
a lack of trust and intimacy with coworkers that can be a serious disadvantage
in some types of business.
The experience of a devout Muslim couple who opened an Egyptian
restaurant in western Japan illustrates the difficulties faced by observant
Muslims.16 The couple would not serve or allow alcohol at their restaurant,
and although business went well during the lunch period (when few Japanese
drink), the restaurant was usually empty for dinner. The ban on alcohol, they
were sure, was to blame. On one occasion an angry customer even lectured
them on the unreasonableness of not allowing alcohol, arguing that it was
unacceptable for them to impose their beliefs on others. The restaurant
eventually closed, although the enterprising couple rebounded by catering
Egyptian meals at a major university.
Important to underscore is that despite these challenges Muslims
residing in Japan encounter little to no active hostility. Though held widely,
the negative image of Islam is not held deeply. The Japanese are quick to
revise their impressions upon personal experience and, given a chance to
interact with Muslims, can usually be won over. The problems that Muslims
face stem almost entirely from ignorance and inflexibility in some parts of
Japanese society.

16 Author’s interview with an Egyptian Muslim couple, Kitakyushu, Japan, March 18, 2007.

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 penn  •  public faces and private spaces

Most Muslims, quick to understand these facts, generally exhibit a

distinct lack of bitterness toward the Japanese. When interviewed, many
foreign Muslims describe episodes of discrimination but in the next breath
make excuses for their hosts. Pointing out that the Japanese merely do not
know about Islam and mean no harm, those interviewed regard Japanese
views as natural for an isolated, island country.
In contrast, this lack of bitterness is not characteristic of Muslim
minorities in many parts of Europe, where evidence of heightened sensitivity
in response to insults and instances of prejudice may be attributable to the
intense history of conflict in the relationship between Europe and Islam
and to continuing clashes in Israel and Palestine, Iraq, and Iran. The eager
optimism of Muslims in their dealings with the Japanese may be in part a
reaction to the sourness of the Muslim relationship with Europe and the
United States. Muslims in Japan are usually quick to absolve the Japanese
for prejudices and policies often arising from ignorance of Islamic or foreign
customs. Much of the prejudice and discrimination is aimed at foreigners in
general, not necessarily at Islam in particular.

the advantages and disadvantages

of being a japanese muslim

Native-born Japanese Muslims, subject to the sometimes onerous

requirements of being “Japanese,” may be in a more difficult situation than
foreigner Muslims. In Japan, people are expected to study hard and work long
hours with few open complaints. By and large, discipline is maintained by
cultural norms prizing cooperation and conformity rather than by intrusive
policing measures or heavy official penalties. These values are drilled into
Japanese from a very young age through their families and schools. By the
time young people reach adulthood, the requirements of being “Japanese” are
already second nature.
Of course, even Japan has its rebels. The price of rebellion in Japan can
be social ostracism or denial of the economic and social security associated
with employment in government or a major private enterprise. Converting
to Islam, an “un-Japanese” act at some level, can expose an individual to
these real-world effects. Some Japanese Muslims thus behave outwardly as
any other Japanese would do but keep their faith to themselves and their
families. Others seek new forms of employment that allow them to practice
their faith with fewer hindrances. Still others brave the social and economic
consequences. Many face objections to conversion from family members.

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 asia policy

From a Japanese perspective, discontinuing practices that honor one’s

ancestors in the traditional way may be seen as a betrayal of family ritual
responsibilities—a kind of selfishness that places personal beliefs ahead of
family or collective duties.
Full fluency in the local language and a native understanding of Japanese
behavior do give Japanese Muslims a distinct advantage over foreign Muslims
in Japan. As one of the major problems that she faced, the Pakistani-American
Muslim quoted above cited the language barrier, an obstacle contributing to
a sense of disconnectedness between Japanese and Muslim communities.
Ethnic Japanese Muslims, however, are presumably more skillful in navigating
the challenges of their native society.

the impact of september 11

and the war on terrorism

The September 11 terrorist attacks in New York City killed 24 Japanese

citizens and deepened the association of Islam and terrorism in the minds
of most Japanese. Several Muslims interviewed insisted that terrorism alone
dominates the Japanese view of Islam today. Allegations that al Qaeda and
other radical Islamist groups have established a presence among the Muslim
community in Japan have deepened this association.
Naturally, many Japanese were alarmed when a message from Osama bin
Laden airing on al Jazeera in October 2003 included a verbal threat against
Japan. Threatening retaliation if the Self Defense Forces were sent to Iraq, bin
Laden declared, “We reserve the right to respond at the appropriate time and
place against all the countries participating in this unjust war, particularly
Britain, Spain, Australia, Poland, Japan, and Italy.”17 The next month a more
specific al Qaeda threat followed, stating that Tokyo would be attacked.
A report released at the end of 2005 suggested that a member of Sipah-
e-Sahaba Pakistan—a banned Sunni extremist group—had entered Japan
in 2003 and told worshippers at a mosque that he sought to establish a cell
of the organization inside the country.18 Apparently finding little or no
support among Muslims in Japan, the agitator later departed. More recently,
ABC News quickly fingered al Qaeda as the likely culprit behind two small

17 Guido Olimpo, “Japan: A Target for al-Qaeda?” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 4, no.
5, March 9, 2006 u http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369922.
18 Sudha Ramachandran, “Terror: What Japan Has to Fear,” Asia Times Online, January 12, 2006 u
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HA12Df02.html.

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 penn  •  public faces and private spaces

explosions outside the U.S. military base at Zama on February 12, 2007. The
report included claims attributed to unnamed intelligence analysts that al
Qaeda had “a small but powerful presence” in Japan; days after the release
of the report, however, a Japanese leftist group claimed responsibility for the
statement.19
Within the Japanese government, the National Police Agency (NPA) has
also been spreading fearful tales about the domestic threat of Islamist terrorism.
The rhetoric in NPA pamphlets can be heavy-handed and overheated. A
selection from a December 2005 pamphlet, for example, reads:
Japan is not immune to the threat of international terrorism…
Many people from Islamic countries are living and forming
communities in Japan. It is of concern that in the future, Islamic
extremists may take advantage of such communities to procure
funds and materials, as well as to take various opportunities to
influence youths into becoming extremists.20

The truth regarding allegations that Islamist terrorist networks exist

inside Japan is impossible to know with certainty. Apparently based on thin
evidence, the allegations are probably exaggerated. Regardless, the Japanese
public does perceive a domestic threat of terrorism, and certain vested interests
are willing to exploit these fears for their own purposes. This perception no
doubt affects the responses of Japanese to all Muslims residing in Japan.
Interviews have revealed that many Muslim leaders in Japan have been
directly contacted by the police, who have asked these leaders point-blank
whether they had information regarding any Islamic terrorist plots in Japan.
Some Muslims regarded this as a form of official intimidation, while others
were more philosophical toward such questioning. One case involved the
Egyptian couple from Western Japan (mentioned above) who reported that in
2002 the police appeared at their shop to question them about terrorism. The
husband, who became upset, told the policemen to leave immediately. The
police did leave and the couple heard nothing more on the matter.21
Another Muslim interviewed spoke of a university’s Muslim Student
Association, which had purchased land to construct a mosque, being asked by
the police to work with the local community to avoid friction.22 The Muslim

19 “Blasts Near U.S. Base in Japan Could be Al-Qaida’s Work: ABC News,” Kyodo News, February 19,
2007.
20 “The Oncoming Threat of Terrorism: The Growing Severity of the International Terrorism
Situation,” National Policy Agency, Focus 271, December 2005 u http://www.npa.go.jp/keibi/
kokutero1/english/index.html.
21 Author’s interview with an Egyptian Muslim couple, Kitakyushu, Japan, March 18, 2007.
22 Author’s interview with a Muslim community leader, Fukuoka, Japan, March 15, 2007.

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 asia policy

association extended an invitation to the local Japanese community offering

an opportunity for representatives to observe prayers and learn about the
basic character of Islam. Although the local Japanese at first strongly objected
to having a mosque in their neighborhood, most of the residents gradually
were won over and reached agreement with the association. This all took place
unofficially with coordination from the local government and police.
Local police departments around Japan, apparently taking the alleged
threat of domestic Islamist terrorism seriously, are keeping a close watch on
the foreign Muslim community. Some of these efforts, however, seem rather
awkward—more akin to the harassment of Muslims living ordinary lives than
to the detection of any genuine domestic terrorist plots. Seeming nonetheless
to cope well with these police intrusions, some Muslim leaders in Japan
apparently even welcome such visits as a chance to connect with and reassure
mainstream Japanese society and to explain the nature of their faith.

conclusion:
implications for japan and the united states

From a Christian or Muslim perspective, Japan may seem to be a “religious

vacuum” waiting for true faith to take hold. In reality, however, the Japanese
have persistently held to their own religious beliefs for many centuries, even
with the waning of active displays of faith. Brought to Japan by Europe over
four centuries ago, Christianity was systematically propagated by any number
of sects; yet today estimates are that only one in ninety Japanese claims to be
Christian. Though Christianity has now gained a degree of acceptance as a
“Japanese” religion, Islam remains very far from gaining such a status.
Japanese religion encompasses specific notions of Japanese culture and
identity. The “common Japanese religion”—a blend of Shinto and Buddhism—
is practiced casually in religious festivals or at times of ancestral veneration.
Most Japanese thus see Islam not as a universal religion that applies to them
but rather as the ethnic custom of peoples from other parts of the world.
Moreover, the line between secular and religious in Japan is not well
defined. Festivals that involve drinking and socializing are both religious
and social events. Though most Japanese do not stop to deeply ponder or
intellectualize these issues, traces of religion permeate Japanese society.
Japanese identity is a total system, involving notions of race, language,
nationality, character, and religion. Even those converting to a “new religion”
are quick to incorporate distinctively Japanese elements into their faith. As
Reader notes, “Many of the new religions of Japan have taken on strongly

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 penn  •  public faces and private spaces

ethnocentric and nationalistic undertones, placing Japan at the centre of

the world and positing it as the vehicle for world salvation.”23 Most Japanese
shy away from religions that—as characteristic of most forms of Islam—
demand full, exclusive belief. To have a major impact on the religious future
of Japan, Islam would likely need to appear in a heterodox form—a blend of
Islam with the pre-existing religious attitudes of the Japanese. Such a blend
might involve some kind of Sufism integrated into a new religion, similar to
the mixed elements of Christianity and Judaism found in the Makuya faith,
for example.
The major trends within the Islamic world would, however, argue against
this possibility. Globally, for over a century Islam has been moving toward
“reform” movements that emphasize orthodoxy and the Salafist vision of
“true Islam.” Sufism and heterodox movements, usually frowned upon as
corruptions of the faith, are weakening in many parts of the Islamic world.
With the Muslim world’s understanding of Islam growing more austere, a
syncretic form of the religion with Japanese characteristics seems unlikely
to generate much enthusiasm. The only possible exception might be if some
liberal form of Islam were to arrive in Japan via North America or Europe.
Whether this comes to pass or not, the number of foreign Muslims in
Japan might still increase. Population decline may lead to more aggressive
efforts to promote immigration, conceivably resulting in many Indonesians,
for example, being invited into the country as laborers. The economic logic
behind such a possibility would, however, clash with the persistent cultural
conservativeness and quite strong elements of xenophobia in Japanese
society. A large-scale influx of immigrants—from any source—would require
flexibility and a cultural adaptation that most Japanese seem loathe to make.
Encouragement of immigration for economic reasons is a major national
issue that goes far beyond the much smaller issue of Islam in Japan.
Islam in Japan will likely remain a marginal issue for the foreseeable
future. By most estimates less than 100,000 Muslims reside in the country
now, and there is no certainty that this population will grow much larger
anytime soon.24 The Japanese are not hostile toward Islam, but neither are
they welcoming. The overall attitude of Japanese has been one of indifference,
with increased elements of fear and suspicion having crept in after September
11. Because the political influence of the Muslim presence in Japan is still

23 Reader, Religion in Contemporary Japan, 28.

24 See Keiko Sakurai’s contribution to this roundtable for more information on the demographics of
Japan’s Muslim population.

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 asia policy

inconsequential, little need exists for the United States to formulate any
specific policies toward these Muslim communities. Rather than framing
this minority’s presence as a security issue, the United States could assume
a general approach that encourages Japan to adopt anti-discrimination laws
and to create a more open society toward foreigners. By reducing Muslims’
alienation from their host society, such an approach would serve to prevent
negative developments within the local Muslim communities in Japan. Such an
approach would also help ensure Japan’s future as a stable, liberal democracy
and position the country as a role model for other Asian nations. 

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