CERTIORARI District, Pasig City, while ASB would construct, and shoulder the cost
of construction and development of the condominium building.
G.R. No. 192685               July 31, 2013
OSCAR R. AMPIL, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, POLICARPIO L.
ESPENESIN, Registrar, Register of Deeds, Pasig City, FRANCIS
SERRANO, YVONNE S. YUCHENGCO, and GEMA O.
CHENG, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 199115
OSCAR R. AMPIL, Petitioner,
vs.
POLICARPIO L. ESPENESIN, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
No less than the Constitution maps out the wide grant of investigatory
powers to the Ombudsman.1 Hand in hand with this bestowal, the
Ombudsman is mandated to investigate and prosecute, for and in
behalf of the people, criminal and administrative offenses committed
by government officers and employees, as well as private persons in
conspiracy with the former.2 There can be no equivocation about this
power-and-duty function of the Ombudsman.
Before us are consolidated petitions separately filed by Oscar R. Ampil
(Ampil): (1) one is for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
docketed as G.R. No. 192685; and (2) the other is for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court docketed as G.R. No.
199115.
Challenged in the petition for certiorari is the Resolution3 of the
Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-07-0444-J, dismissing the criminal complaint
filed by Ampil against respondents Policarpio L. Espenesin (Espenesin),
Francis Serrano (Serrano), Yvonne S. Yuchengco (Yuchengco) and
Gema O. Cheng (Cheng), and the Order4 denying Ampil’s motion for
reconsideration thereof. Ampil’s complaint charged respondents with
Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised
Penal Code and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No.
3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended.
The appeal by certiorari, on the other hand, assails the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 113171, which affirmed the Order
dated 13 July 2009 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-07-0474-J on the
administrative aspect of the mentioned criminal complaint for
Falsification and violation of Republic Act No. 3019 against the
Registrar of Deeds, respondent Espenesin. Initially, the Ombudsman
issued a Decision dated 30 April 2008, finding Espenesin guilty of
Simple Misconduct and meting on Espenesin the penalty of one (1)
month suspension. On motion for reconsideration of Ampil, the
Ombudsman favored Espenesin’s arguments in his Opposition, and
recalled the one-month suspension the Ombudsman had imposed on
the latter.
These consolidated cases arose from the following facts.
On 9 November 1995, ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan
Insurance Company (MICO) entered into a Joint Project Development
Agreement (JPDA) for the construction of a condominium building to
be known as "The Malayan Tower." Under the JPDA, MICO shall
provide the real property located at the heart of the Ortigas Business
1
A year thereafter, on 20 November 1996, MICO and ASB entered into
another contract, with MICO selling to ASB the land it was contributing
under the JPDA. Under the Contract to Sell, ownership of the land will
vest on ASB only upon full payment of the purchase price.
Sometime in 2000, ASB, as part of the ASB Group of Companies, filed
a Petition for Rehabilitation with Prayer for Suspension of Actions and
Proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As
a result, the SEC issued a sixty (60) day Suspension Order (a)
suspending all actions for claims against the ASB Group of Companies
pending or still to be filed with any court, office, board, body, or
tribunal; (b) enjoining the ASB Group of Companies from disposing of
their properties in any manner, except in the ordinary course of
business, and from paying their liabilities outstanding as of the date of
the filing of the petition; and (c) appointing Atty. Monico V. Jacob as
interim receiver of the ASB Group of Companies.5 Subsequently, the
SEC, over the objections of creditors, approved the Rehabilitation Plan
submitted by the ASB Group of Companies, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the objections to the rehabilitation plan
raised by the creditors are hereby considered unreasonable.
Accordingly, the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by petitioners is hereby
APPROVED, except those pertaining to Mr. Roxas’ advances, and the
ASB-Malayan Towers. Finally, Interim Receiver Mr. Fortunato Cruz is
appointed as Rehabilitation Receiver.6 (Emphasis supplied).
Because of the obvious financial difficulties, ASB was unable to
perform its obligations to MICO under the JPDA and the Contract to
Sell. Thus, on 30 April 2002, MICO and ASB executed their Third
contract, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), 7 allowing MICO to
assume the entire responsibility for the development and completion of
The Malayan Tower. At the time of the execution of the MOA, ASB had
already paid MICO ₱427,231,952.32 out of the ₱640,847,928.48
purchase price of the realty.8
The MOA specifies the entitlement of both ASB and MICO to net
saleable areas of The Malayan Tower representing their investments.
It provides, in pertinent part:
Section 4. Distribution and Disposition of Units. (a) As a return of its
capital investment in the Project, each party shall be entitled to such
portion of all the net saleable area of the Building that their respective
contributions to the Project bear to the actual construction cost. As of
the date of the execution hereof, and on the basis of the total costs
incurred to date in relation to the Remaining Construction Costs (as
defined in Section 9(a) hereof), the parties shall respectively be
entitled to the following (which entitlement shall be conditioned on,
and subject to, adjustments as provided in sub-paragraph (b) of
Section 4 in the event that the actual remaining cost of construction
exceeds the Remaining Construction Cost):
(i) MICO – the net saleable area particularly
described in Schedule 2 hereof.
(ii) ASB – the following net saleable area:
(A) the net saleable area which ASB had
pre-sold for an aggregate purchase
price of ₱640,085,267.30 as set forth in
Schedule 1 (including all paid and
unpaid proceeds of said presales);
 (B) the net saleable area particularly
described in Schedule 3 hereof which
shall be delivered to ASB upon
completion of the Project; and,
(C) provided that the actual remaining
construction costs do not exceed the
Remaining Construction Cost, the net
saleable area particularly described in
Schedule 4 hereof which shall be
delivered to ASB upon completion of the
Project and determination of its actual
construction costs. If the actual
remaining construction costs exceed the
Remaining Construction Cost, sub-
paragraph (b) of this Section 4 shall
apply.
(b) In the event that the actual remaining construction costs
exceed the Remaining Construction Cost as represented and
warranted by ASB to MICO under Section 9(a) hereof, and
MICO pays for such excess, the pro-rata sharing in the net
saleable area of the Building, as provided in sub-paragraph
(a) of this Section 4 shall be adjusted accordingly. In such
event, MICO shall be entitled to such net saleable area in
Schedule 4 that corresponds to the excess of the actual
remaining cost over the Remaining Construction Cost.
(c) To ensure the viability of the Project, the parties agree
on a single pricing system, which MICO shall have the
exclusive right to fix and periodically adjust based on
prevailing market conditions in consultation with, but without
need of consent of, ASB, for each party’s primary sale or
other disposition of its share in the net saleable area of the
Building. In accordance with the immediately preceding
provision, MICO hereby adopts the selling prices set forth in
Schedule 5 hereof. Each party or its officers, employees,
agents or representatives shall not sell or otherwise dispose
any share of said party in the net saleable area of the
Building below the prices fixed by MICO in accordance with
this Section 4 (c). MICO shall have the exclusive right to
adopt financing and discounting schemes to enhance
marketing and sales of units in the Project and such right of
MICO shall not be restricted or otherwise limited by the
foregoing single pricing system provision.
(d) Each party shall bear the profits earned and losses
incurred as well as any and all taxes and other expenses in
connection with the allocation or sale of, or other transaction
relating to, the units allotted to each party.9
On 11 March 2005, Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) for 38
units10 and the allotted parking spaces were issued in the name of
ASB. On even date but prior to its release, another set of CCTs
covering the same subject units but with MICO as registered owner
thereof, was signed by Espenesin in his capacity as Registrar of Deeds
of Pasig City. Notably, Espenesin had likewise signed the CCTs which
were originally issued in ASB’s name.
On 2 April 2006, counsel for ASB wrote Espenesin calling his attention
to the supposed amendment in the CCTs which he had originally
issued in ASB’s name.11 Counsel for ASB demanded that Espenesin
effect in the second set of CCTs, the registration of the subject units in
The Malayan Tower back to ASB’s name.
representation, we gathered, covers the interest of both MICO and
ASB in as far as the titling of the condominium units are concerned.
Sometime ago Serrano requested that condominium titles over
specified units be issued in consonance with the sharing in the joint
venture MOA. Titles were correspondingly issued as per request, some
in the name of MICO and some in the name of ASB. Before its release
to the parties, Atty. Serrano came back and requested that some titles
issued in the name of ASB be changed to MICO because allegedly
there was error in the issuance.
Believing it was a simple error and on representation of the person we
came to know and considered the representative of both parties, we
erased the name ASB Realty Corporation on those specified titles and
placed instead the name Malayan Insurance Company.
To our mind, the purpose was not to transfer ownership but merely to
rectify an error committed in the issuance of titles. And since they
were well within our capacity to do, the titles not having been released
yet to its owner, we did what we believed was a simple act of
rectifying a simple mistake.12
After learning of the amendment in the CCTs issued in ASB’s name,
Ampil, on 23 January 2007, wrote respondents Yuchengco and Cheng,
President and Chief Financial Officer of MICO, respectively, introducing
himself as an unsecured creditor of ASB Holdings, Inc., one of the
corporations forming part of the ASB Group of Companies.13 Ampil
averred that MICO had illegally registered in its name the subject units
at The Malayan Tower which were reserved for ASB under the MOA,
and actually, already registered in ASB’s name with the Register of
Deeds of Pasig City. Ampil pointed out that the "condominium units
should have benefited him and other unsecured creditors of ASB
because the latter had categorically informed them previously that the
same would be contributed to the Asset Pool created under the
Rehabilitation Plan of the ASB Group of Companies." Ultimately, Ampil
demanded that Yuchengco and Cheng rectify the resulting error in the
CCTs, and facilitate the registration of the subject units back to ASB’s
name.
Respondents paid no heed to ASB’s and Ampil’s demands.
As previously adverted to, Ampil charged respondents with Falsification
of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code
and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before
the Office of the Ombudsman, alleging the following:
1. Respondents, in conspiracy, erased the name of ASB, and
intercalated and substituted the name of MICO under the
entry of registered owner in the questioned CCTs covering
the subject units of The Malayan Tower;
2. The alterations were done without the necessary order
from the proper court, in direct violation of Section 108 14 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529;
3. Respondents violated Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal
Code by:
3.1 Altering the CCTs which are public documents;
3.2 Effecting the alterations on genuine
documents;

On 17 May 2006, Espenesin replied and explained, thus: 3.3 Changing the meaning of the CCTs with MICO
now appearing as registered owner of the subject
The registration of the Malayan-ASB Realty transaction, from its units in Malayan Tower; and
inception up to the issuance of titles, were all handled by respondent
Atty. Francis Serrano. He therefore appeared and we have considered
him the legitimate representative of both parties (sic). His

2
 3.4 Effectively, making the documents speak
something false when ASB is the true owner of the
subject units, and not MICO.
4. Ampil, as unsecured creditor of ASB, was unjustly
prejudiced by the felonious acts of respondents;
5. Respondents violated Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic
Act No. 3019:
5.1 Respondent Espenesin, as Registrar of the
Pasig City Registry of Deeds, committed an
offense in connection with his official duties by
allowing himself to be persuaded, induced or
influenced by respondent Serrano into altering the
questioned CCTs; and
5.2 The actions of respondent Espenesin
demonstrate manifest partiality, evident bad faith
and/or, at the least, gross inexcusable negligence.
6. Respondents Yuchengco and Cheng, being responsible
officers of MICO, as principals by inducement and
conspirators of Espenesin and Serrano, are likewise liable for
falsification of the CCTs and violation of Sections 3(a) and
(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.15
As required by the Ombudsman, respondents filed their counter-
affidavits: Espenesin and Serrano filed individually, while Yuchengco
and Cheng filed jointly. Respondents’ respective counter-affidavits
uniformly denied petitioner’s charges and explicated as follows:
Respondent Espenesin countered, among others, (i) that their
intention was only to cause the necessary rectification on certain errors
made on the CCTs in issue; (ii) that since the CCTs were not yet issued
and released to the parties, it is still within his authority, as part of the
registration process, to make the necessary amendments or
corrections thereon; (iii) that no court order would be necessary to
effect such changes, the CCTs still being within the control of the
Register of Deeds and have not yet been released to the respective
owners; (iv) that the amendments were made not for the purpose of
falsifying the CCTs in issue but to make the same reflect and declare
the truth; and (v) that he merely made the corrections in accordance
with the representations of respondent Serrano who he believed to be
guarding and representing both the interests of MICO and ASB.
Respondent Serrano, on the other hand, argued: (i) that the units in
issue are not yet owned by ASB; (ii) that these units were specifically
segregated and reserved for MICO in order to answer for any excess in
the estimated cost that it will expend in the completion of the Malayan
Tower; (iii) that ASB is only entitled to these reserved units only after
the Malayan Tower is completed and that the units are not utilized to
cover for the increase in the cost expended by MICO pursuant to
Section 4(c) of the MOA; (iv) that the Malayan Tower was still
incomplete at the time when the alterations were made on the CCT,
hence, the claim of ownership of ASB over the reserved units is
premature and totally baseless; (v) that prior to the fulfillment of the
resolutory condition, that is, after the completion of the Malayan
Tower and there remains a balance in the Remaining Construction
Cost, the units still rightfully belongs to MICO; and (vi) that the
alteration was made merely for the purpose of correcting an error.
Respondents Cheng and Yuchengco, while adopting the foregoing
arguments of Espenesin and Serrano, further averred that: (i) Ampil
has no legal personality to file this suit, he being merely an unsecured
creditor of ASB whose interest was not definitively shown to have been
damaged by the subject controversy; (ii) that their participation as
respondents and alleged co-conspirators of Serrano and Espenesin was
not clearly shown and defined in the complaint; (iii) the CCTs issued in
the name of ASB have not yet been entered in the Registration Book at
3
the time when the alterations were effected, hence, the same could
still be made subject of appropriate amendments; (iv) that the CCTs in
issue named in favor of ASB were mere drafts and cannot legally be
considered documents within the strict definition of the law; (v) that
court order authorizing to amend a title is necessary only if the deed or
document sought to be registered has already been entered in the
registration book; and (vi) that MICO is the duly registered owner of
the land on which Malayan Tower stands and ASB was merely referred
to as the developer.16
Thereafter, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution in G.R. No.
192685 dismissing Ampil’s complaint. For the Ombudsman, the
resolution of whether respondents falsified the CCTs must be prefaced
by a determination of who, between MICO and ASB, is the rightful
owner of the subject units. The Ombudsman held that it had no
authority to interpret the provisions of the MOA and, thus, refrained
from resolving the preliminary question of ownership. Given the
foregoing, the Ombudsman was hard pressed to make a categorical
finding that the CCTs were altered to speak something false. In short,
the Ombudsman did not have probable cause to indict respondents for
falsification of the CCTs because the last element of the crime, i.e.,
that the change made the document speak something false, had not
been established.
Significantly, the Ombudsman did not dispose of whether probable
cause exists to indict respondents for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e)
of Republic Act No. 3019.
Ampil filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, in yet another
setback, the Ombudsman denied Ampil’s motion and affirmed the
dismissal of his complaint.
On the administrative litigation front and as previously narrated, the
Ombudsman found Espenesin liable for Simple Misconduct. However,
on motion for reconsideration of Ampil praying for a finding of guilt
against Espenesin for Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty, the
Ombudsman reconsidered its earlier resolution and recalled the one-
month suspension meted on Espenesin.
Thereafter, Ampil filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court before the appellate court. And as already stated, the
appellate court affirmed the Ombudsman’s resolution absolving
Espenesin of not just Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty, but also of
Simple Misconduct.
Hence, this dual recourse by Ampil: first, alleging grave abuse of
discretion in the Ombudsman’s failure to find probable cause to indict
respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6)
of the Revised Penal Code, and for their commission of corrupt
practices under
Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019; and second, raising
grievous error of the Court of Appeals in affirming the Ombudsman’s
absolution of Espenesin from administrative liability.
To obviate confusion, we shall dispose of the first issue, i.e., whether
probable cause exists to indict respondents for Falsification of Public
Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and for
their commission of corrupt practices under Sections 3(a) and (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019.
Despite the Ombudsman’s categorical dismissal of his complaint, Ampil
is adamant on the existence of probable cause to bring respondents to
trial for falsification of the CCTs, and for violation of Sections 3(a) and
(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. In fact, he argues that Espenesin has
been held administratively liable by the Ombudsman for altering the
CCTs. At the time of the filing of G.R. No. 192685, the Ombudsman
had not yet reversed its previous resolution finding Espenesin liable for
simple misconduct. He insists that the admission by respondents
Espenesin and Serrano that they altered the CCTs should foreclose all
questions on all respondents’ (Espenesin’s, Serrano’s, Yuchengco’s and
Cheng’s) liability for falsification and their commission of corrupt
practices, under the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 3019,
respectively. In all, Ampil maintains that the Ombudsman’s absolution
of respondents is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
G.R. No. 192685 is partially impressed with merit. Accordingly, we find
grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman’s incomplete disposition
of Ampil’s complaint.
That the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty bound to
"investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient"17 brooks no objection. The Ombudsman’s conduct of
preliminary investigation is both power and duty. Thus, the
Ombudsman and his Deputies, are constitutionalized as protectors of
the people, who "shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the government x x x,
and shall, x x x notify the complainants of the action taken and the
result thereof."18
The raison d'être for its creation and endowment of broad investigative
authority is to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the long
tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges’ and fiscals’
offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials,
and through the execution of official pressure and influence, quash,
delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances
committed by public officers.19
Plainly, the Ombudsman has "full discretion," based on the attendant
facts and circumstances, to determine the existence of probable cause
or the lack thereof.20 On this score, we have consistently hewed to the
policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its
constitutionally mandated powers.21 The Ombudsman’s finding to
proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal case can only be
assailed through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the ground
that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion which
contemplates an abuse so grave and so patent equivalent to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.22
However, on several occasions, we have interfered with the
Ombudsman’s discretion in determining probable cause:
(a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused;
(b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice
or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
(c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
(d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority;
(e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance
or regulation;
(f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution;
(i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by
the lust for vengeance.23 (Emphasis supplied).
4
The fourth circumstance is present in G.R. No. 192685.
While we agree with the Ombudsman’s disquisition that there is no
probable cause to indict respondents for Falsification of Public
Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code, we are
puzzled why the Ombudsman completely glossed over Ampil’s charge
that respondents committed prohibited acts listed in Sections 3(a) and
(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Nowhere in the Resolution or in the
Order denying reconsideration thereof did the Ombudsman tackle and
resolve the issue of whether respondents violated the particular
provisions of Republic Act No. 3019.
Curiously, the Ombudsman docketed Ampil’s complaint-affidavit as one
"for: Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Sections 3(a)
and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended." 24 The Ombudsman
even prefaced the Resolution, thus: "this has reference to the
complaint filed by Oscar Ampil on 17 September 2007 against
respondents, for Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of
Sections 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended."25
The Ombudsman’s silence on the component anti-graft charges is
pointed up by the specific allegations in Ampil’s complaint-affidavit
that:
18. The acts of ATTY. ESPENESIN and his co-conspirators are clear
violations of Section 3 paragraph (a) and/or (e) of Republic Act No.
3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act x x
x;
xxxx
19. On the basis of the evidence x x x and the admissions of the
conspirators themselves, ATTY. ESPENESIN is liable under both pars.
(a) and (e) thereof or either of the two. By maliciously and feloniously
altering the subject CCT’s (sic), contrary to law and to the prejudice of
ASB and Ampil, ATTY. ESPENESIN committed an offense in connection
with his official duties and he admitted having done so in conspiracy
with his co-respondents. x x x ATTY. ESPENESIN allowed himself to be
persuaded, induced or influenced into committing such violation or
offense which is the substance of par. (a) of RA 3019;
20. In committing such unauthorized and unlawful alterations on the
subject CCT’s (sic), ATTY. ESPENESIN caused undue injury to ASB and
to AMPIL as an unsecured creditor, who is ultimately one of the
beneficiaries of said CCT from the ASSET POOL created by the SEC,
and gave MICO unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official duties as Register of Deeds of Pasig City. Such
acts were admitted by ATTY. ESPENESIN in his letter to ASB x x x.
Such acts, taken together with his admission, indubitably show ATTY.
ESPENESIN’s manifest partiality, evident bad faith and/or, at the least,
his gross inexcusable negligence in doing the same;
21. ATTY. ESPENESIN is liable under Section 3 pars. (a) and/or (e) of
RA 3019, as well as under Article 171 par. 6 of the RPC. ATTY.
SERRANO, YVONNE S. YUCHENGCO and (sic) GEMMA O. CHENG are
also liable for violation of the said provisions of law in conspiracy with
ATTY. ESPENESIN, the latter as a principal via direct participation,
ATTY. SERRANO, as principal by inducement and YUCHENGCO and
CHENG, also by inducement, who being responsible officers of MICO
ultimately benefited from said unlawful act.26 and the pith of the
Resolution which carefully and meticulously dissected the presence of
the first three definitive elements of the crime of falsification under
Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code:
The first three definitive elements of the crime, albeit present, are
defeated by the absence of the fourth.
The respondents readily admitted that an alteration was indeed made
on the CCTs in issue allegedly for the purpose of correcting a mistake
in the name of the registered owner of the condominium units
involved. Said alteration had obviously changed the tenor of the CCTs
considering that ASB, the initially named owner, was changed into
MICO. The first and third elements are undeniably present.
Anent the second element, the respondents argued that the CCTs in
issue were mere drafts and are not legally considered "genuine
documents" within the strict definition of the law. Albeit the contention
is partially true, no proof has been shown to prove that the CCTs
issued in favor of ASB were mere drafts.
The CCTs of ASB are obviously complete. If we are to compare it with
the appearance and contents of the CCTs issued in favor of MICO, one
will notice no definitive difference between the two except that one set
was named in favor of ASB and the other set, in favor of MICO.
Nothing is shown that will clearly prove that the former were mere
drafts and the latter are the final copies. As far as the appearance of
the CCTs of ASB is concerned, all appear to be complete and genuine.
Proof to the contrary must be shown to prove otherwise.
Delivery of the titles to the named owners is not a pre-requisite before
all these CCTs can be legally categorized as genuine documents. The
fact that the same had already been signed by respondent Espenesin
in his capacity as Registrar of Deeds of Pasig City and the notations
imprinted thereon appeared to have been entered on March 11, 2005
at 11:55 a.m. at the Registry Books of Pasig City, the CCTs in issue are
bound to be treated as genuine documents drafted and signed in the
regular performance of duties of the officer whose signature appears
thereon.27
On the whole, the Ombudsman’s discussion was straightforward and
categorical, and ultimately established that Espenesin, at the urging of
Serrano, altered the CCTs issued in ASB’s name resulting in these CCTs
ostensibly declaring MICO as registered owner of the subject units at
The Malayan Tower.
Despite the admission by Espenesin that he had altered the CCTs and
the Ombudsman’s findings thereon, the Ombudsman abruptly
dismissed Ampil’s complaint-affidavit, resolving only one of the charges
contained therein with nary a link regarding the other charge of
violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Indeed, as
found by the Ombudsman, the 4th element of the crime of Falsification
of Public Documents is lacking, as the actual ownership of the subject
units at The Malayan Tower has yet to be resolved. Nonetheless, this
circumstance does not detract from, much less diminish, Ampil’s
charge, and the evidence pointing to the possible commission, of
offenses under Sections 3(a) and (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 reads:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to
perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly
promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with
the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded,
induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
5
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
The elements of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 are:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) the offender persuades, induces, or influences another
public officer to perform an act or the offender allows
himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit
an act;
(3) the act performed by the other public officer or
committed by the offender constitutes a violation of rules
and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or
an offense in connection with the official duty of the latter.
(Emphasis supplied).
Whereas, paragraph (e) of the same section lists the following
elements:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer’s
official, administrative or judicial functions;
(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and
(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or gave any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference.28
As Registrar of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, Espenesin is
tasked, among others, to review deeds and other documents for
conformance with the legal requirements of registration.29 Section 10
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, Amending and Codifying the Laws
Relative to Registration of Property and for Other Purposes provides:
Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. – The office of the
Register of Deeds constitutes a public repository of records of
instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands and chattel
mortgages in the province or city wherein such office is situated.
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an
instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal
property which complies with all the requisites for registration. He shall
see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary and
science stamps and that the same are properly cancelled. If the
instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration
thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the
ground or reason therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by
consulta in accordance with Section 117 of the Decree.
Most importantly, a Registrar of the Registry of Deeds is charged with
knowledge of Presidential Decree No. 1529, specifically Sections
5730 and 108.31
In the instant case, the elements of the offenses under Sections 3(a)
and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, juxtaposed against the functions of a
Registrar of the Registry of Deeds establish a prima facie graft case
against Espenesin and Serrano only. Under Section 3(a) of Republic
Act No. 3019, there is a prima facie case that Espenesin, at the urging
of Serrano, allowed himself to be persuaded to alter the CCTs
originally issued in ASB’s name, against the procedure provided by law
for the issuance of CCTs and registration of property. In addition,
under Section 3(e) of the same law, there is likewise a prima facie
case that Espenesin, through gross inexcusable negligence, by simply
relying on the fact that all throughout the transaction to register the
subject units at The Malayan Tower he liaised with Serrano, gave
MICO an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the
registration of the subject units.
In Sison v. People of the Philippines, we expounded on Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019:
The third element of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 may be committed in
three ways, i.e., through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these three in connection with
the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is enough to
convict.
Explaining what "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" mean,
we held:
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to
see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are."
"Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or
intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence
has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even
slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty
to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious
indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be
affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and
thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property."
In the instant case, petitioner was grossly negligent in all the
purchases that were made under his watch. Petitioner’s admission that
the canvass sheets sent out by de Jesus to the suppliers already
contained his signatures because he pre-signed these forms only
proved his utter disregard of the consequences of his actions.
Petitioner also admitted that he knew the provisions of RA 7160 on
personal canvass but he did not follow the law because he was merely
following the practice of his predecessors. This was an admission of a
mindless disregard for the law in a tradition of illegality. This is totally
unacceptable, considering that as municipal mayor, petitioner ought to
implement the law to the letter. As local chief executive, he should
have been the first to follow the law and see to it that it was followed
by his constituency. Sadly, however, he was the first to break it.
Petitioner should have complied with the requirements laid down by
RA 7160 on personal canvass, no matter how strict they may have
been. Dura lex sed lex. The law is difficult but it is the law. These
requirements are not empty words but were specifically crafted to
ensure transparency in the acquisition of government supplies,
especially since no public bidding is involved in personal canvass.
Truly, the requirement that the canvass and awarding of supplies be
made by a collegial body assures the general public that despotic,
irregular or unlawful transactions do not occur. It also guarantees that
no personal preference is given to any supplier and that the
government is given the best possible price for its procurements.
The fourth element is likewise present. While it is true that the
prosecution was not able to prove any undue injury to the government
as a result of the purchases, it should be noted that there are two
ways by which Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be violated—the first, by
causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or the
second, by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference. Although neither mode constitutes a distinct
offense, an accused may be charged under either mode or both. The
use of the disjunctive "or’ connotes that the two modes need not be
present at the same time. In other words, the presence of one would
suffice for conviction.
Aside from the allegation of undue injury to the government, petitioner
was also charged with having given unwarranted benefit, advantage or
6
preference to private suppliers. Under the second mode, damage is not
required.
The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support;
unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason.
"Advantage" means a more favorable or improved position or
condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course
of action. "Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or
desirability; choice or estimation above another.
In order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the
accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the
exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions. Petitioner
did just that. The fact that he repeatedly failed to follow the
requirements of RA 7160 on personal canvass proves that unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference was given to the winning suppliers.
These suppliers were awarded the procurement contract without the
benefit of a fair system in determining the best possible price for the
government. The private suppliers, which were all personally chosen
by respondent, were able to profit from the transactions without
showing proof that their prices were the most beneficial to the
government. For that, petitioner must now face the consequences of
his acts.32 (Emphasis supplied).
We stress that the Ombudsman did not find probable cause to indict
respondents for falsification simply because the Ombudsman could not
categorically declare that the alteration made the CCT speak falsely as
the ownership of the subject units at The Malayan Tower had yet to be
determined. However, its initial factual findings on the administrative
complaint categorically declared, thus:
x x x Espenesin justified his action by asseverating that since the CCTs
were still under the possession and control of the Register of Deeds
and have not yet been distributed to the owners, amendments can still
be made thereon.
It is worthy to note that the CCTs of ASB, at the time when the
amendment was made, were obviously complete. From its face, we
can infer that all have attained the character of a binding public
document. The signature of Espenesin is already affixed thereon, and
on its face, it was explicitly declared that the titles have already been
entered in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Pasig City
on March 11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m. Allegations to the contrary must be
convincingly and positively proven, otherwise, the presumption holds
that the CCTs issued in the name of ASB were regular and the
contents thereon binding.
Stated in a different light, delivery of the titles to the named owners is
not a pre-requisite before all these CCTs can be legally categorized as
genuine documents. The fact that the same had already been signed
by x x x Espenesin in his capacity as Register of Deeds of Pasig City
and the notations imprinted thereon appeared to have been entered
on March 11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m. at the Registry Books of Pasig City,
the CCTs in issue are bound to be treated as genuine documents
drafted and signed in the regular performance of duties of the officer
whose signature appears thereon. The law has made it so clear that it
is the entry of the title in the Registration Book that controls the
discretion of the Register of Deeds to effect the necessary
amendments and not the actual delivery of the titles to the named
owners.
This being the case, strict compliance with the mandates of Section
108 of P.D. 1529 is strictly called for. The provision is clear that upon
entry of a certificate of title (which definitely includes Condominium
Certificate of Title) attested to by the Register of Deeds, no
amendment shall be effected thereon except upon lawful order of the
court.
In the instant case, it became obvious that after the CCTs of ASB were
entered in the Registration Book on March 11, 2005 at exactly 11:55
a.m., the notations thereon were thereafter amended by Espenesin
when Atty. Serrano purportedly informed him of the alleged error
inscribed therein. The proper remedy that should have been
undertaken by Espenesin soon after he was informed of the error is to
either initiate the appropriate petition himself or to suggest to the
parties to the MOA to file said petition in court for the amendment of
the CCTs. An amendment by way of a shortcut is not allowed after
entry of the title in the Registration Book.
xxxx
If the Regional Trial Court sitting as a land registration court is not
legally authorized to determine the respective rights of the parties to
the MOA when deciding on the petition for amendment and
cancellation of title, all the more with the Registrar of Deeds who is
legally not empowered to make such determination and to cause an
automatic amendment of entries in the Registration Book on the basis
of his unauthorized determination.
Espenesin’s liability is grounded on the untimely and unauthorized
amendment of the CCTs in issue. This is regardless of whether the
amendment had made the CCTs speak of either a lie or the truth.
What defines his error is his inability to comply with the proper
procedure set by law.33 (Emphasis supplied).
We likewise stress that the determination of probable cause does not
require certainty of guilt for a crime. As the term itself implies,
probable cause is concerned merely with probability and not absolute
or even moral certainty;34 it is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief.35 It is sufficient that based on the preliminary investigation
conducted, it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. Well-settled in jurisprudence, as in
Raro v. Sandiganbayan,36 that:
x x x Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.37
Probable cause is a reasonable ground for presuming that a matter is
or may be well-founded on such state of facts in the prosecutor's mind
as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe —
or entertain an honest or strong suspicion — that it is so.38
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that more likely than not a crime has been committed and there is
enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither
on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.39
A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether
there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it
is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence
of the prosecution in support of the charge.40
A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand
trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
x x x Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.41 (Emphasis and italics
supplied).
In this instance, Espenesin explains and categorically admits that he
altered, nay corrected, 38 certificates of title which we again reproduce
for easy reference:
7
Sometime ago Serrano requested that condominium titles over
specified units be issued in consonance with the sharing in the joint
venture MOA. Titles were correspondingly issued as per request, some
in the name of MICO and some in the name of ASB. Before its release
to the parties, Atty. Serrano came back and requested that some titles
issued in the name of ASB be changed to MICO because allegedly
there was error in the issuance.
Believing it was a simple error and on representation of the person we
came to know and considered the representative of both parties, we
erased the name ASB Realty Corporation on those specified titles and
placed instead the name Malayan Insurance Company.
To our mind, the purpose was not to transfer ownership but merely to
rectify an error committed in the issuance of titles. And since they
were well within our capacity to do, the titles not having been released
yet to its owner, we did what we believed was a simple act of
rectifying a simple mistake.42
The letter of Espenesin itself underscores the existence of a prima
facie case of gross negligence:
1. Serrano transacted the registration of the units in The
Malayan Tower with the Office of the Register of Deeds,
Pasig City;
2. Serrano had previously presented a joint venture
agreement, the MOA, which Espenesin followed in the initial
preparation and issuance of the titles;
3. Before some CCTs initially issued in ASB’s name were
released, Serrano returned and requested that some titles
issued in the name of ASB be changed to MICO because
those titles were supposedly erroneously registered to ASB;
and
4. Just on Serrano’s utterance and declaration which
Espenesin readily believed because he considered Serrano
the representative of both parties, and without any other
documentation to base the amendment on, Espenesin
erased the name of ASB on those specified titles and
replaced it with the name of MICO.
Espenesin, a Registrar of Deeds, relied on Serrano’s word alone that a
supposed error has been committed. Even if ownership of the units
covered by the amended CCTs has not been categorically declared as
ASB’s given the ongoing dispute between the parties, the MOA which
Espenesin had previously referred to, allocates those units to ASB:
Section 4. Distribution and Disposition of Units. (a) As a return of its
capital investment in the Project, each party shall be entitled to such
portion of all the net saleable area of the Building that their respective
contributions to the Project bear to the actual construction cost. As of
the date of the execution hereof, and on the basis of the total costs
incurred to date in relation to the Remaining Construction Costs (as
defined in Section 9(a) hereof), the parties shall respectively be
entitled to the following (which entitlement shall be conditioned on,
and subject to, adjustments as provided in sub-paragraph (b) of
Section 4 in the event that the actual remaining cost of construction
exceeds the Remaining Construction Cost):
(i) MICO – the net saleable area particularly
described in Schedule 2 hereof.
(ii) ASB – the following net saleable area:
 (A) the net saleable area which ASB had pre-sold for an
aggregate purchase price of ₱640,085,267.30 as set forth in
Schedule 1 (including all paid and unpaid proceeds of said
pre-sales);
(B) the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 3
hereof which shall be delivered to ASB upon completion of
the Project; and,
(C) provided that the actual remaining construction costs do
not exceed the Remaining Construction Cost, the net
saleable area particularly described in Schedule 4 hereof
which shall be delivered to ASB upon completion of the
Project and determination of its actual construction costs. If
the actual remaining construction costs exceed the
Remaining Construction Cost, sub-paragraph (b) of this
Section 4 shall apply.43
The MOA even recognizes and specifies that:
E. ASB has pre-sold a number of condominium units in the Project to
certain buyers as set forth in Schedule 1 hereof, and in order to
protect the interests of these buyers and preserve the interest in the
Project, the goodwill and business reputation of Malayan, Malayan has
proposed to complete the Project, and ASB has accepted such
proposal, subject to the terms and conditions contained herein,
including the contribution to the Project (a) by Malayan of the Lot and
(b) by ASB of its interest as buyer under the Contract to Sell.
xxxx
Section 3. Recognition of ASB’s Investment. The parties confirm that
as of the date hereof, ASB invested in the Project an amount
equivalent to its entitlement to the net saleable area of the Building
under Section 4 below, including ASB’s interest as buyer under the
Contract to Sell.44
One fact deserves emphasis. The ownership of the condominium units
remains in dispute and, by necessary inference, does not lie as well in
MICO. By his baseless reliance on Serrano’s word and representation,
Espenesin allowed MICO to gain an unwarranted advantage and
benefit in the titling of the 38 units in The Malayan Tower.
That a prima facie case for gross negligence amounting to violation of
Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 exists is amply
supported by the fact that Espenesin disregarded the well-established
practice necessitating submission of required documents for
registration of property in the Philippines:
Documents Required for Registration of Real Property with the
Register of Deeds:
1. Common Requirements
o Original copy of the Deed or Instrument (Original Copy +
2 duplicate copies)If the original copy cannot be produced,
the duplicate original or certified true copy shall be
presented accompanied with a sworn affidavit executed by
the interested party why the original copy cannot be
presented.
o Owner’s copy of the Certificate of Title or Co-owner’s copy
if one has been issued. (Original Copy + 2 duplicate copies)
o Latest Tax Declaration if the property is an unregistered
land. (Original Copy + 2 duplicate copies)
2. Specific Requirements
8
1. Deed of Sale/Transfer
xxxx
 For Corporation
1. Secretary’s Certificate or Board Resolution to
Sell or Purchase (Original Copy + Duplicate Copy)
2. Articles of Incorporation (for transferee
corporation) (1 Certified Copy of the Original)
3. Certificate of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) that the Articles of
Incorporation had been registered . (1 Certified
Copy of the Original)
4. For Condominium or Condominium Certificate of
Transfer, affidavit/certificate of the Condominium
Corporation that the sale/transfer does not violate
the 60-40 rule.(Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
5. Subsequent transfer of CCT requires Certificate
of the Condominium Management. (Original Copy)
6. Sale by a Corporation Sole, court order is
required.(Original copy of the Court Order)
Additional Requirements
xxxx
11. Condominium Projects
 Master Deed (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
 Declaration of Restriction (Original Copy + 1
Duplicate Copy)
 Diagrammatic Floor Plan (Original Copy + 1
Duplicate Copy)
If the Condominium Certificate of Title is issued for the first
time in the name of the registered owner, require the
following:
o Certificate of Registration with the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (Original Copy + 1
Duplicate Copy)
o Development Permit (Original Copy + 1
Duplicate Copy)
o License to Sell (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate
Copy)45
Espenesin, by his own explanation, relied on nothing more than
Serrano, who he "came to know and considered as representative of
both parties," and Serrano’s interpretation of the MOA that Serrano
had brought with him.
On the whole, there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that respondents Espenesin and Serrano committed prohibited
acts listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
As regards Yuchengco and Cheng, apart from Ampil’s general
assertions that the two, as officers of MICO, benefited from the
alteration of the CCTs, there is a dearth of evidence pointing to their
collective responsibility therefor. While the fact of alteration was
admitted by respondents and was affirmed in the Ombudsman’s
finding of fact, there is nothing that directly links Yuchengco and
Cheng to the act.
We are aware that the calibration of evidence to assess whether a
prima facie graft case exists against respondents is a question of fact.
We have consistently held that the Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of
certiorari where neither questions of fact nor law are entertained, but
only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion.46 In this case, however, certiorari will lie, given that the
Ombudsman made no finding at all on respondents possible liability for
violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
We hasten to reiterate that we are only dealing herein with the
preliminary investigation aspect of this case. We do not adjudge
respondents’ guilt or the lack thereof. The assertions of Espenesin and
Serrano on the former’s good faith in effecting the alteration and the
pending arbitration case before the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission involving the correct division of MICO’s and ASB’s net
saleable areas in The Malayan Tower are matters of defense which
they should raise during trial of the criminal case.
As regards the administrative liability of Espenesin, the basic principle
in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states
that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer, Espenesin in
these cases, may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability.
An action for each can proceed independently of the others.47
On this point, we find that the appellate court erred when it affirmed
the Ombudsman’s last ruling that Espenesin is not administratively
liable.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a
public officer.48
In Grave Misconduct, as distinguished from Simple Misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rules, must be manifest49 and established by
substantial evidence. Grave Misconduct necessarily includes the lesser
offense of Simple Misconduct.50 Thus, a person charged with Grave
Misconduct may be held liable for Simple Misconduct if the misconduct
does not involve any of the elements to qualify the misconduct as
grave.51
In (G.R. No. 199115), the elements particular to Grave Misconduct are,
by the Ombudsman’s own finding, present. Corruption, as an element
of Grave Misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary
person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to
procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to
duty and the rights of others.52 This has already been demonstrated as
discussed above. And, there is here a manifest disregard for
established rules on land registration by a Register of Deeds himself.
As he himself admits in his letter, Espenesin erased the name of ASB
on the specified CCTs because he believed that Serrano’s request for
the re-issuance thereof in MICO’s name constituted simple error.
Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides:
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure,
alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book
after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and
the attestation of the same be Register of Deeds, except by order of
the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner of other person
having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the
9
Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land
Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that
the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent,
expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated
and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate
have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in
entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or, on any
duplicate certificate; or that the same or any person on the certificate
has been changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if
registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no
right or interests of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a
corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has
not convened the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon
any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine
the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the
entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a
memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such
terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may
consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be
construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree
of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court
which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a
certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without
his or their written consent. Where the owner's duplicate certificate is
not presented, a similar petition may be filed as provided in the
preceding section.
The foregoing clearly speaks of a court order prior to any erasure,
alteration or amendment upon a certificate of title.
In reversing its prior ruling, the Ombudsman cavalierly dismisses the
fact of Espenesin already signing the CCTs issued in ASB’s name as
"only a part of the issuance process because the final step in the titling
procedure is indeed the release of the certificate of title."53 The
Ombudsman further ruled:
Considering that prior to the release of titles, Espenesin merely
rectified what was represented to this office as error in the preparation
of typing or the certificates, hence, it is wrong to subject him to an
administrative sanction. This is bolstered by the fact that, at the time
of release (and perhaps even up to the present time), there was no
final determination yet from the land registration court as to who has a
better right to the property in question.54 (Emphasis supplied).
This statement of the Ombudsman is virtually a declaration of
Espenesin’s misconduct. It highlights Espenesin’s awareness and
knowledge that ASB and MICO are two different and separate entities,
albeit having entered into a joint venture for the building of "The
Malayan Tower."
As Registrar of Deeds, Espenesin was duty bound to inquire and
ascertain the reason for Serrano’s new instruction on those specific set
of CCTs and not just heed Serrano’s bidding. He heads the Office of
Register of Deeds which is constituted by law as "a public repository of
records of instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands x x x
in the province or city wherein such office is situated." He should not
have so easily taken Serrano’s word that the amendment Serrano
sought was to correct simple and innocuous error. Espenesin could
have then easily asked, as he is obliged to, for a contract or an
authenticated writing to ascertain which units and parking slots were
really allotted for ASB and MICO. His actions would then be based on
what is documented and not merely by a lame claim of bona fides
mistake.
Moreover, Espenesin was previously presented a MOA, and consulted
this same MOA, in the initial preparation and issuance of the 38 CCTs
in ASB’s name. Certainly, a Registrar of Deeds who is required by law
to be a member of the legal profession,55 possesses common sense
and prudence to ask for documents on which to base his corrections.
Reliance on the mere word of even the point person for the
transaction, smacks of gross negligence when all transactions with the
Office of the Register of Deeds, involving as it does registration of
property, ought to be properly recorded and documented.
That the Office of the Register of Deeds requires documentation in the
registration of property, whether as an original or a subsequent
registration, brooks no argument. Again, and it cannot be overlooked
that, Espenesin initially referred to a MOA albeit Serrano worked on
the registration transaction for both ASB and MICO. Subsequently,
Serrano returns, bearing ostensible authority to transact even for ASB,
and Espenesin fails to ask for documentation for the correction Serrano
sought to be made, and simply relies on Serrano’s word.
We are baffled by the Registrar of Deeds’ failure to require
documentation which would serve as his basis for the correction. The
amendment sought by Serrano was not a mere clerical change of
registered name; it was a substantial one, changing ownership of 38
units in The Malayan Tower from one entity, ASB, to another, MICO.
Even just at Serrano’s initial request for correction of the CCTs, a red
flag should have gone up for a Registrar of Deeds.1âwphi1
Espenesin splits hairs when he claims that it is "in the Registration
Book where the prohibition to erase, alter, or amend, without court
order, applies." We disagree with Espenesin. Chapter IV on Certificate
of Title of Presidential Decree No. 1529,56 specifically Sections 40, 42
and 43 belie the claim of Espenesin:
Section 40. Entry of Original Certificate of Title. Upon receipt by the
Register of Deeds of the original and duplicate copies of the original
certificate of title the same shall be entered in his record book and
shall be numbered, dated, signed and sealed by the Register of Deeds
with the seal of his office. Said certificate of title shall take effect upon
the date of entry thereof. The Register of Deeds shall forthwith send
notice by mail to the registered owner that his owner's duplicate is
ready for delivery to him upon payment of legal fees.
Section 42. Registration Books. The original copy of the original
certificate of title shall be filed in the Registry of Deeds. The same shall
be bound in consecutive order together with similar certificates of title
and shall constitute the registration book for titled properties.
Section 43. Transfer Certificate of Title. The subsequent certificate of
title that may be issued by the Register of Deeds pursuant to any
voluntary or involuntary instrument relating to the same land shall be
in like form, entitled "Transfer Certificate of Title", and likewise issued
in duplicate. The certificate shall show the number of the next previous
certificate covering the same land and also the fact that it was
originally registered, giving the record number, the number of the
original certificate of title, and the volume and page of the registration
book in which the latter is found.
Recording or entry of the titles, whether an original or a subsequent
transfer certificate of title in the record, is simultaneous with the
signing by the Register of Deeds. The signature on the certificate by
the Registrar of Deeds is accompanied by the dating, numbering and
sealing of the certificate. All these are part of a single registration
process. Where there has been a completed entry in the Record Book,
as in this case where the Ombudsman found that "the signature of
Espenesin is already affixed on the CCTs, and on its face, it was
explicitly declared that the titles have already been entered in the
Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Pasig City on March 11,
2005 at 11:55 a.m.," the Register of Deeds can no longer tamper with
entries, specially the very name of the titleholder. The law says that
the certificate of title shall take effect upon the date of entry thereof.
10
To further drive home the point, as Registrar of Deeds, Espenesin
knew full well that "there is no final determination yet from the land
registration court as to who has a better right to the property in
question." Espenesin’s attempt to minimize the significance of a
Registrar of Deed’s signature on a CCT only aggravates the lack of
prudence in his action. The change in the titleholder in the CCTs from
ASB to MICO was an official documentation of a change of ownership.
It definitely cannot be characterized as simple error.
Grave misconduct, of which Espenesin has been charged, consists in a
public officer’s deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior. It is regarded as grave when the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules
are present.57 In particular, corruption as an element of grave
misconduct consists in the official’s unlawful and wrongful use of his
station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another
person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.58
In sum, the actions of Espenesin clearly demonstrate a disregard of
well-known legal rules.59 The penalty for Grave Misconduct is
dismissalfrom service with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of
retirement benefits, cancellation of eligibility, and perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in the government service,
including government-owned or controlled corporation.60
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 192685 is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The Resolution of the Ombudsman dated 30 April 2008 in OMB-C-C-
07-0444-J is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Ombudsman is hereby
directed to file the necessary Information for violation of Sections 3(a)
and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against public respondent Policarpio
L. Espenesin and private respondent Francis Serrano.
The petition in G.R. No. 199115 is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 28 September 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 113171
and the Order dated 13 July 2009 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-07-
0474-J are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Policarpio L.
Espenesin is GUlLTY of Grave Misconduct and we, thus, impose the
penalty of DIMISSAL from service. However, due to his retirement
from the service, we order forfeiture of all his retirement pay and
benefits.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200804               January 22, 2014
A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her husband, EFREN
MONDEJAR, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse1 to the Court from the Decision 2 dated
November 23, 2011and Order3 dated February 16, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 45 (RTC) in RTC Case No.
11-13833 which dismissed, on the ground of improper remedy,
petitioner A.L. Ang Network, Inc.'s (petitioner) petition for certiorari
from the Decision4 dated June 10, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities of Bacolod City, Branch 4 (MTCC) in Civil Case No. SCC-1436, a
small claims case for sum of money against respondent Emma
Mondejar (respondent).
The Facts
On March 23, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint 5 for sum of money
under the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases 6 before the MTCC,
seeking to collect from respondent the amount of ₱23,111.71 which
represented her unpaid water bills for the period June 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2005.7
Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and
collect payment therefor from the homeowners of Regent Pearl
Subdivision, one of whom is respondent who owns and occupies Lot 8,
Block 3 of said subdivision. From June 1, 2002 until September 30,
2005, respondent and her family consumed a total of 1,150 cubic
meters (cu. m.) of water, which upon application of the agreed rate of
₱113.00 for every 10 cu. m. of water, plus an additional charge of
₱11.60 for every additional cu. m. of water, amounted to
₱28,580.09.8 However, respondent only paid the amount of ₱5,468.38,
thus, leaving a balance of ₱23,111.71 which was left unpaid despite
petitioner’s repeated demands.9
In defense, respondent contended that since April 1998 up to February
2003, she religiously paid petitioner the agreed monthly flat rate of
₱75.00 for her water consumption. Notwithstanding their agreement
that the same would be adjusted only upon prior notice to the
homeowners, petitioner unilaterally charged her unreasonable and
excessive adjustments (at the average of 40 cu. m. of water per
month or 1.3 cu. m. of water a day) far above the average daily water
consumption for a household of only 3 persons. She also questioned
the propriety and/or basis of the aforesaid ₱23,111.71 claim.10
In the interim, petitioner disconnected respondent’s water line for not
paying the adjusted water charges since March 2003 up to August
2005.11
The MTCC Ruling
On June 10, 2011, the MTCC rendered a Decision 12 holding that since
petitioner was issued a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC)13 by
the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) only on August 7, 2003,
then, it can only charge respondent the agreed flat rate of ₱75.00 per
month prior thereto or the sum of ₱1,050.00 for the period June 1,
2002 to August 7, 2003. Thus, given that respondent had made total
payments equivalent to ₱1,685.99 for the same period, she should be
considered to have fully paid petitioner.14
The MTCC disregarded petitioner’s reliance on the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board’s (HLURB) Decision 15 dated August 17, 2000 in
HLURB Case No. REM C6-00-001 entitled Nollie B. Apura, et al. v. Dona
Carmen I Subdivision, et al., as source of its authority to impose new
water consumption rates for water consumed from June 1, 2002 to
August 7, 2003 in the absence of proof (a) that petitioner complied
with the directive to inform the HLURB of the result of its consultation
with the concerned homeowners as regards the rates to be charged,
and (b) that the HLURB approved of the same.16
Moreover, the MTCC noted that petitioner failed to submit evidence
showing (a) the exact date when it actually began imposing the NWRB
approved rates; and (b) that the parties had a formal agreement
containing the terms and conditions thereof, without which it cannot
establish with certainty respondent’s obligation. 17 Accordingly, it ruled
that the earlier agreed rate of ₱75.00 per month should still be the
basis for respondent’s water consumption charges for the period
August 8, 2003 to September 30, 2005.18 Based on petitioner’s
computation, respondent had only paid ₱300.00 of her ₱1,500.00
obligation for said period. Thus, it ordered respondent to pay petitioner
the balance thereof, equivalent to ₱1,200.00 with legal interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from date of receipt of the extrajudicial demand
on October 14, 2010 until fully paid.19
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari20 under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court before the RTC, ascribing grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the MTCC in finding that it (petitioner) failed to establish
with certainty respondent’s obligation, and in not ordering the latter to
pay the full amount sought to be collected.
11
The RTC Ruling
On November 23, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision21 dismissing the
petition for certiorari, finding that the said petition was only filed to
circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases as
provided under Section 2322 of the Rule of Procedure on Small Claims
Cases. To this end, the RTC ruled that it cannot supplant the decision
of the MTCC with another decision directing respondent to pay
petitioner a bigger sum than that which has been awarded.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration23 but was denied in an
Order24 dated February 16, 2012, hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the RTC erred in
dismissing petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims
case.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:
SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its
decision on the same day, based on the facts established by the
evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately be entered by
the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof
forthwith served on the parties.
The decision shall be final and unappealable.
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the
above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the
prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its
execution.25 Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims
cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available
remedy,26 does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This general rule has
been enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance
Corporation,27 wherein it was held that:
In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the
extraordinary writ of certiorari is always available where there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law." In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co., the Court ruled:
x x x Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that
the special civil action of certiorari may only be invoked when "there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course
of law," this rule is not without exception. The availability of the
ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to
prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally
beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy – not the mere
absence – of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of
justice without the writ that usually determines the propriety of
certiorari.
This ruling was reiterated in Conti v. Court of Appeals:
Truly, an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary
remedies under the Rules is an absence of an appeal nor any "plain,
speedy and adequate remedy" in the ordinary course of law, one
which has been so defined as a "remedy which (would) equally (be)
beneficial, speedy and sufficient not merely a remedy which at some
time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment x x x
complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that
judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal" concerned. x x
x (Emphasis supplied)
In this relation, it may not be amiss to placate the RTC’s apprehension
that respondent’s recourse before it (was only filed to circumvent the
non-appealable nature of [small claims cases], because it asks [the
court] to supplant the decision of the lower [c]ourt with another
decision directing the private respondent to pay the petitioner a bigger
sum than what has been awarded."28 Verily, a petition for certiorari,
unlike an appeal, is an original action29 designed to correct only errors
of jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is therefore
incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted
the MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the
petition based on an evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely
abused its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily
disregarding evidence that is material to the controversy.30
In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner correctly
availed of the remedy of certiorari to assail the propriety of the MTCC
Decision in the subject small claims case, contrary to the RTC’s ruling.
Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before
the proper forum (i.e., the RTC).1âwphi1 To be sure, the Court, the
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari.31 Such concurrence of
jurisdiction, however, does not give a party unbridled freedom to
choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy
dictates that petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari against first
level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort may be had
before the Court.32 This procedure is also in consonance with Section
4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.33
Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in
Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts,34 certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed
before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner
complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the
RTC which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. In
fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground that it
was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must
be reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November
23, 2011 and Resolution dated February 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City, Branch 45 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. RTC
Case No. 11-13833 is hereby REINSTATED and the court a quo is
ordered to resolve the same with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190566               December 11, 2013
MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR), as represented by its incumbent Chairman EFRAIM
GENUINO, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
12
Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of
the Resolution2 dated September 30, 2009 issued by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA"".G.R. SP No. 110048, which outrightly dismissed
the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioner Mark Jerome S.
Maglalang (petitioner). Also assailed is the appellate court's
Resolution3 dated November 26, 2009 which denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
The facts follow.
Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch,
Angeles City, which was operated by respondent Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), a government-owned
or controlled corporation existing by virtue of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1869.4
Petitioner alleged that in the afternoon of December 13, 2008, while
he was performing his functions as teller, a lady customer identified
later as one Cecilia Nakasato5 (Cecilia) approached him in his booth
and handed to him an undetermined amount of cash consisting of
mixed ₱1,000.00 and ₱500.00 bills. There were 45 ₱1,000.00 and ten
₱500.00 bills for the total amount of ₱50,000.00. Following casino
procedure, petitioner laid the bills on the spreading board. However,
he erroneously spread the bills into only four clusters instead of five
clusters worth ₱10,000.00 per cluster. He then placed markers for
₱10,000.00 each cluster of cash and declared the total amount of
₱40,000.00 to Cecilia. Perplexed, Cecilia asked petitioner why the latter
only dished out ₱40,000.00. She then pointed to the first cluster of
bills and requested petitioner to check the first cluster which she
observed to be thicker than the others. Petitioner performed a recount
and found that the said cluster contained 20 pieces of ₱1,000.00 bills.
Petitioner apologized to Cecilia and rectified the error by declaring the
full and correct amount handed to him by the latter. Petitioner,
however, averred that Cecilia accused him of trying to shortchange her
and that petitioner tried to deliberately fool her of her money.
Petitioner tried to explain, but Cecilia allegedly continued to berate and
curse him. To ease the tension, petitioner was asked to take a break.
After ten minutes, petitioner returned to his booth. However, Cecilia
allegedly showed up and continued to berate petitioner. As a result,
the two of them were invited to the casino’s Internal Security Office in
order to air their respective sides. Thereafter, petitioner was required
to file an Incident Report which he submitted on the same day of the
incident.6
On January 8, 2009, petitioner received a Memorandum7 issued by the
casino’s Branch Manager, Alexander Ozaeta, informing him that he was
being charged with Discourtesy towards a casino customer and
directing him to explain within 72 hours upon receipt of the
memorandum why he should not be sanctioned or dismissed. In
compliance therewith, petitioner submitted a letter-explanation8 dated
January 10, 2009.
On March 31, 2009, petitioner received another Memorandum9 dated
March 19, 2009, stating that the Board of Directors of PAGCOR found
him guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino customer and imposed on
him a 30-day suspension for this first offense. Aggrieved, on April 2,
2009, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 10 seeking a reversal
of the board’s decision and further prayed in the alternative that if he
is indeed found guilty as charged, the penalty be only a reprimand as
it is the appropriate penalty. During the pendency of said motion,
petitioner also filed a Motion for Production11 dated April 20, 2009,
praying that he be furnished with copies of documents relative to the
case including the recommendation of the investigating committee and
the Decision/Resolution of the Board supposedly containing the latter’s
factual findings. In a letter-reply12 dated June 2, 2009, one Atty. Carlos
R. Bautista, Jr. who did not indicate his authority therein to represent
PAGCOR, denied the said motion. Petitioner received said letter-reply
on June 17, 2009.
Subsequently, on June 18, 2009, PAGCOR issued a PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PENALTY
Memorandum13 dated June 18, 2009 practically reiterating the contents
of its March 19, 2009 Memorandum. Attached therewith is another
Memorandum14 dated June 8, 2009 issued by PAGCOR’s Assistant Vice
President for Human Resource and Development, Atty. Lizette F.
Mortel, informing petitioner that the Board of Directors in its meeting
on May 13, 2009 resolved to deny his appeal for reconsideration for
lack of merit. Petitioner received said memoranda on the same date of
June 18, 2009.
On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition15 for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, before the
CA, averring that there is no evidence, much less factual and legal
basis to support the finding of guilt against him. Moreover, petitioner
ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the
charge, in failing to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of
its decision and in imposing the harsh penalty of a 30-day suspension.
Justifying his recourse to the CA, petitioner explained that he did not
appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) because the penalty
imposed on him was only a 30-day suspension which is not within the
CSC’s appellate jurisdiction. He also claimed that discourtesy in the
performance of official duties is classified as a light offense which is
punishable only by reprimand.
16
In its assailed Resolution  dated September 30, 2009, the CA
outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for being premature as
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking
recourse from the CA. Invoking Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution,17 the CA held that the CSC has jurisdiction over issues
involving the employer-employee relationship in all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters such as PAGCOR. Petitioner filed his Motion for
Reconsideration18 which the CA denied in the assailed
Resolution19 dated November 26, 2009. In denying the said motion,
the CA relied on this Court’s ruling in Duty Free Philippines v.
Mojica20 citing Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp. v. CA,21 where
this Court held as follows:
It is now settled that, conformably to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), [of the
1987 Constitution] government-owned or controlled corporations shall
be considered part of the Civil Service only if they have original
charters, as distinguished from those created under general law.
PAGCOR belongs to the Civil Service because it was created directly by
PD 1869 on July 11, 1983. Consequently, controversies concerning the
relations of the employee with the management of PAGCOR should
come under the jurisdiction of the Merit System Protection Board and
the Civil Service Commission, conformably to the Administrative Code
of 1987.
Section 16(2) of the said Code vest[s] in the Merit System Protection
Board the power inter alia to:
a) Hear and decide on appeal administrative cases involving officials
and employees of the Civil Service. Its decision shall be final except
those involving dismissal or separation from the service which may be
appealed to the Commission.
Hence, this petition where petitioner argues that the CA committed
grave and substantial error of judgment
1. IN OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI FILED BY PETITIONER AND IN DENYING THE
LATTER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION[;]
2. IN RULING THAT THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HAS
APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER THE SUSPENSION OF THE
13
INVOLVED IS NOT MORE THAN THIRTY (30) DAYS[;]
3. IN RESOLVING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED
BY PETITIONER IN A MANNER WHICH IS UTTERLY
CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE[;]
4. IN UNJUSTIFIABLY REFUSING TO RENDER A DECISION
AS TO THE PROPRIETY OR VALIDITY OF THE SUSPENSION
OF THE PETITIONER BY THE RESPONDENT[;]
5. IN UNDULY REFUSING TO RENDER A DECISION
DECLARING THAT THE ASSAILED
DECISIONS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT ARE NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD[; AND]
6. IN UNJUSTIFIABLY REFUSING TO RENDER A DECISION
DECLARING THAT THE ASSAILED
DECISIONS/RESOLUTIONS OF RESPONDENT WERE ISSUED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.22
Petitioner claims that the CA clearly overlooked the applicable laws and
jurisprudence that provide that when the penalty involved in an
administrative case is suspension for not more than 30 days, the CSC
has no appellate jurisdiction over the said administrative case. As
authority, petitioner invokes our ruling in Geronga v. Hon.
Varela23 which cited Section 47,24 Chapter 1, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V
of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 otherwise known as The
Administrative Code of 1987. Said Section 47 provides that the CSC
may entertain appeals only, among others, from a penalty of
suspension of more than 30 days. Petitioner asserts that his case,
involving a 30-day suspension penalty, is not appealable to the CSC.
Thus, he submits that his case was properly brought before the CA via
a petition for certiorari.25
On the other hand, PAGCOR alleges that petitioner intentionally
omitted relevant matters in his statement of facts. PAGCOR essentially
claims that petitioner refused to apologize to Cecilia; that he treated
Cecilia’s complaint with arrogance; and that before taking the
aforementioned 10-minute break, petitioner slammed the cash to the
counter window in giving it back to the customer. PAGCOR argues that
the instant petition raises questions of fact which are not reviewable in
a petition for review on certiorari. PAGCOR maintains that the CA’s
ruling was in accordance with law and jurisprudence. Moreover,
PAGCOR counters that petitioner’s remedy of appeal is limited as
Section 37 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service provides that a decision rendered by heads of agencies
whereby a penalty of suspension for not more than 30 days is imposed
shall be final and executory. PAGCOR opines that such intent of
limiting appeals over such minor offenses is elucidated in the
Concurring Opinion of former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in CSC v.
Dacoycoy26 and based on the basic premise that appeal is merely a
statutory privilege. Lastly, PAGCOR submits that the 30-day suspension
meted on petitioner is justified under its own Code of
Discipline.27 Prescinding from the foregoing, the sole question for
resolution is: Was the CA correct in outrightly dismissing the petition
for certiorari filed before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies?
We resolve the question in the negative.
Our ruling in Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc.28 on the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is instructive, to wit:
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should
have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted
first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature
invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of
action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based
on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy
entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity
and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to
give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct
its error and dispose of the case.
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
absolute as it admits of the following exceptions:
(1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action
is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when
there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
(5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President
bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the
subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when
the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the
complainant; (12) where no administrative review is provided by law;
(13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14) where
the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot.29
The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the
law per se provides no administrative review for administrative cases
whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law,
rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more
than 30 days.
Section 37 (a) and (b) of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines, provides for the unavailability of any
appeal:
Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.
(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a
penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an
amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or
salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from Office. A
complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a
private citizen against a government official or employee in
which case it may hear and decide the case or it may
deputize any department or agency or official or group of
officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the
investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with
recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other
action to be taken.
(b) The heads of departments, agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall
have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine
in an amount not exceeding thirty days’ salary. In case the
decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable
to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to
the department and finally to the Commission and pending
14
appeal, the same shall be executory except when the
penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be
executory only after confirmation by the department head.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Similar provisions are reiterated in the aforequoted Section 4730 of E.O.
No. 292 essentially providing that cases of this sort are not appealable
to the CSC. Correlatively, we are not unaware of the Concurring
Opinion of then Chief Justice Puno in CSC v. Dacoycoy,31 where he
opined, to wit:
In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by
the Civil Service Law.1âwphi1 For what the law declares as "final" are
decisions of heads of agencies involving suspension for not more than
thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days
salary. But there is a clear policy reason for declaring these decisions
final. These decisions involve minor offenses. They are numerous for
they are the usual offenses committed by government officials and
employees. To allow their multiple level appeal will doubtless
overburden the quasijudicial machinery of our administrative system
and defeat the expectation of fast and efficient action from these
administrative agencies. Nepotism, however, is not a petty offense. Its
deleterious effect on government cannot be over-emphasized. And it is
a stubborn evil. The objective should be to eliminate nepotic acts,
hence, erroneous decisions allowing nepotism cannot be given
immunity from review, especially judicial review.  It is thus non
sequitur  to contend that since some decisions exonerating public
officials from minor  offenses can not be appealed, ergo, even a
decision acquitting a government official from a major  offense like
nepotism cannot also be appealed.
Nevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies which are declared
final and unappealable by law are still subject to judicial review.
In Republic of the Phils. v. Francisco,32 we held:
Since the decision of the Ombudsman suspending respondents for
one (1) month is final and unappealable, it follows that the CA
had no appellate jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse the same.
The Ombudsman was not estopped from asserting in this Court that
the CA had no appellate jurisdiction to review and reverse the decision
of the Ombudsman via petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court. This is not to say that decisions of the Ombudsman cannot
be questioned. Decisions of administrative or quasi-
administrative agencies which are declared by law final and
unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test
of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion,
fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial
bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a
contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual
findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be
reviewed, modified or reversed via petition
for certiorari  under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding
that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.It bears stressing that the judicial recourse petitioner
availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil action for
certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. Suffice it
to state that an appeal and a special civil action such as certiorari
under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from each other. One
cannot file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where
appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of
discretion. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only
when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a
case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy,
as the same should not be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive.33
In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of petitioner's allegation
that P AGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal
standing and should therefore be set aside.
Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only
when the question involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions.
Hence, courts exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from
reviewing factual assessments of the respondent court or agency.
Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual
matters when the evidence on record does not support those factual
findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the
bare or incomplete facts appearing on record.34 Considering the
circumstances and since this Court is not a trier of facts, 35 remand of
this case to the CA for its judicious resolution is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
September 30, 2009 and November 26, 2009 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 110048 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
instant case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 208290               December 11, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUANITO C. CASTANEDA, JR., HONORABLE
CAESAR A. CASANOVA, HONORABLE CIELITO N. MINDARO-
GRULLA, AS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SPECIAL SECOND
DIVISION, COURT OF TAX APPEALS; and MYRNA M. GARCIA
AND CUSTODIO MENDOZA VESTIDAS, JR., Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeking to review the March 26, 20131 and May 15, 20132 Resolutions
of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in CTA Crim. Case No. 0-285,
ordering the dismissal of the case against the private respondents for
violation of Section 36023 in relation to Sections 2503 and 2530 (f) (i)
and 1, (3) (4) and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Codeof the
Philippines, as amended, on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
The antecedentsas culled from the records:
Private respondents Myrna M. Garcia (Garcia) and Custodio Mendoza
Vestidas, Jr.(VestidasJr.)were charged before the CTA under an
Information which reads:
That on or about November 5, 2011, or prior or subsequent thereto, in
the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused Myrna M. Garcia and
Custodio Mendoza Vestidas, Jr. as owner/proprietress and broker of
Plinth Enterprise respectively, conspiring and confederating with each
other, with intent to defraud the government, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and fraudulently import into the Port of Manila, 858
cartons of 17,160 pieces of Anti-Virus Software Kaspersky Internet
Security Premium 2012, subject to customs duties,by misdeclaration
under Import Entry No. C-181011 and Bill of Lading No. PFCMAN1715,
filed with the Bureau of Customs (BOC),covering One Forty Footer
(1x40) container van shipment bearing No. KKFU7195683 which was
15
falsely declared to contain 40 pallets/1,690 cartons of CD kit cleaner
and plastic CD case, said imported items having customs duties
amounting to Three Million Three Hundred Forty One Thousand Two
Hundred Forty Five Pesos (Php 3,341,245) of which only the amount of
One Hundred Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Two Pesos (Php100,362)
was paid, in violation of the above-captioned law, and to the prejudice
and damage of the Government in the amount of Three Million Two
Hundred Forty Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Three Pesos
(Php3,240,883).4
In a hearing held on August 1, 2012, Garcia and VestidasJr.pleaded
"Not Guilty" to the aforementioned charge. Thereafter, a preliminary
conference was held on September 5, 2012 followed by thepre-trial on
September 13, 2012. Both the prosecution and the defense agreed to
adopt the joint stipulations of facts and issues entered in the course of
the preliminary conference.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented a number of witnesses whoessentially
observed5 the physical examination of Container Van No. KKFU
7195638 conducted6 by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) and
explained7 the process of electronic filing under the Electronic to
Mobile (E2M) Customs Systems of the BOC and the alleged
misdeclared goods therein.
Subsequent to the presentation of witnesses, the prosecution filed its
Formal Offer of Evidence on December 10, 2012.
On January 15, 2013, Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. filed their Omnibus
Motion to File Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court to Cancel
Hearing Scheduled on January 21, 2013,whichwas grantedby the CTA.
Thereafter, they filed theDemurrer to Evidence, dated January 13,
2012, claimingthat the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the following reasons:
a)The pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the
prosecution were inadmissible incourt;
b)The object evidence consisting of the allegedly
misdeclared goods were not presented as evidence; and
c)None of the witnesses for the prosecution made a positive
identification of the two accused as the ones responsible for
the supposed misdeclaration.
Despite opposition, the CTA dismissed the caseagainst Garcia and
Vestidas Jr.in its March 26, 2013 Resolution, for failure of the
prosecution to establish theirguilt beyond reasonable doubt.
According to the CTA, "no proof whatsoever was presented by the
prosecution showing that the certified true copies of the public
documents offered in evidence against both accused were in fact
issued by thelegal custodians."8 It cited Section 26, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court, whichprovidesthat"when the original of a
document is a public record, it should not generally be removed from
the office or place in which it is kept."9 As stated in Section 7, Rule
130,10 its contents may be proven using secondary evidence and such
evidence may pertain to the certified true copy of the original
document issued by the public officer in custody thereof.Hence, the
CTA wrotethat the certified true copiesof the public documents offered
in evidence should have been presented in court.
Anent its offer of private documents,11 the prosecution likewise failed
to comply with Section 27, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which
reads, "[a]n authorized public record of a private document may be
proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the
legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that such
officer has the custody." Considering that the private documents were
submitted and filed with the BOC, the same became part of public
records. Again, the records show that the prosecution failed to present
the certified true copies of thedocuments.
The CTA noted that,in its Opposition to the Demurrer,the prosecution
even admitted that none of their witnesses ever positively identified
the accused in open court and that the alleged misdeclared goods
were not competently and properly identified in court by any of the
prosecution witnesses.
The prosecution filed its motion for reconsideration, but it was
deniedby the CTAin its May 15, 2013 Resolution, stressing, among
others, that to grant it would place the accused in double jeopardy.12
On July 24, 2013, the Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group,
Revenue Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG), as counsel for the BOC,
received a copy of the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering
the entry of judgment in the case.
Hence,this petition for certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on
the part of theCTA when in ruled that: 1) the pieces of documentary
evidence submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible in evidence;
2) the object evidence consisting of the alleged misdeclared goods
were not presented as evidence; and 3) the witnesses failed to
positively identifythe accused as responsible forthe misdeclaration of
goods.
The Court agrees with the disposition of the CTA.
At the outset, it should be noted that the petition was filed beyond the
reglementary periodfor the filingthereof under Rule 65. The petition
itself statedthat a copy of the May 15, 2013 Resolution was received
by the BOC two (2) days after its promulgation, or on May 17, 2013.
Nonetheless, the RATS was only alerted by the developments in the
case on July 24, 2013, when Atty. Danilo M. Campos Jr. (Atty.
Campos) received the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the
entry of judgment in the case, considering that no appeal was taken
by any of the parties. According toAtty. Campos, it was only on that
occasion when he discovered the May 15, 2013 Resolution of the
CTA.Thus, it was prayed that the petitionbe given due course despite
its late filing.
This belated filing cannot be countenanced by the Court.
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedureis explicit in
stating thatcertiorarishould be instituted within a period of 60 days
from notice of the judgment, orderor resolution sought to be assailed.
The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that
would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition
of their case.13 While there are recognized exceptions14 to such strict
observance, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for
his/her failure to comply with the rules.15
In the case at bench, no convincing justification for the belated filing
of the petition was advanced to warrant the relaxation of the
Rules.Notably, the records show that the petition was filedonly on
August 12, 2013, or almost a month late from the due date which fell
on July 16, 2013. To excuse this grave procedural lapse will not only
be unfairto the other party, but it will also sanction a seeming
rudimentary attempt to circumvent standing rules of procedure. Suffice
it to say, the reasons proffered by the petitioner do not carry even a
tinge of merit that would deserve leniency.
The late filing of the petition was borne out of the petitioner’s failure to
monitor incoming court processes that neededto be addressed by the
office. Clearly, this is an admission of inefficiency, if not lack of zeal, on
the part of an office tasked toeffectively curb smuggling activities
which rob the government of millions of revenue every year.
16
The display of patent violations of even the elementary rules leads the
Court to suspectthat the case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. was
doomed by designfrom the start. The failure to present the certified
true copies of documentary evidence; the failure to competently and
properly identify the misdeclared goods; the failure to identify the
accused in court; and,worse, the failure to file this petition on time
challenging a judgment of acquittal, are tell-tale signs ofa reluctantand
subduedattitude in pursuing the case. This stance taken by the lawyers
in government service rouses the Court’s vigilance against inefficiency
in the administration of justice. Verily, the lawyersrepresenting the
offices under the executive branchshould be reminded that theystill
remain as officers of the courtfrom whom a high sense of competence
and fervor is expected. The Courtwill not close its eyes to this sense of
apathy in RATS lawyers, lest the government’s goal of revenue
enhancement continues to suffer the blows of smuggling and similar
activities.
Even the error committed by the RATS in filing a motion for
reconsideration with the CTA displays gross ignorance as to the effects
of an acquittal in a criminal case and the constitutional proscription on
double jeopardy. Had the RATS been eager and keen in prosecuting
the respondents, it would have, in the first place, presented its
evidence with the CTA in strict compliance with the Rules.
In any case, even if the Court decides to suspend the rules and permit
this recourse, the end result would remain the same. While a judgment
of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,it must be shown that
there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process.In this case, a perusal of the
challenged resolutions ofthe CTAdoes not disclose any indication of
grave abuse of discretion on its partor denial of due process.The
records are replete with indicators that the petitioner actively
participated during the trial and, in fact, presented its offer of evidence
and opposed the demurrer.1âwphi1
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.16 Here, the subject resolutions of the CTA have been issued in
accordance with the rules on evidence and existing jurisprudence.
On a final note, the Court deems it proper to remind the lawyers in the
Bureau of Customs that the canons embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility equally apply to lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official tasks. 17 Thus, RA TS lawyers
should exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed March 26,
2013 and May 15, 2013 Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals are
AFFIRMED.
The Office of the Ombudsman is hereby ordered to conduct an
investigation for possible criminal or administrative offenses committed
by the Run After the Smugglers (RA TS) Group, Revenue Collection
Monitoring Group (RCMG), Bureau of Customs, relative to the filing
and handling of the subject complaint for violations of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the President,
the Secretary of Finance, the Collector of Customs, and the Office of
the Ombudsman for their guidance and appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS and
DR. OLIVIA C. CAOILI in her capacity as Secretary of the
Board, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN in her capacity as Presiding Judge
of Branch 87, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and RAMON
P. NADAL, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly the
university of the people, the U.P. administration conceptualized and
implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through
the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly
known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. Spawned by the public
clamor to overcome what was perceived as the sharpening elitist
profile of the U.P studentry, the STFAP aspired to expand the coverage
of government educational subsidies so as to include the deserving in
the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder.
After broad consultations with the various university constituencies by
U.P. President Jose V. Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regents issued on
April 28, 1988 a Resolution establishing the STFAP. A year later, it was
granted official recognition when the Congress of the Philippines
allocated a portion of the National Budget for the implementation of
the program.
In the interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all
students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which include
reduction in fees, living and book subsidies and student assistantships
which give undergraduate students the opportunity to earn P12.00 per
hour by working for the University.
Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among
others, they state the amount and source of the annual income of the
family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances
from which the University may evaluate their financial status and need
on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets. At the end
the application form, the student applicant, as well as his parent, signs
a sworn statement, as follows:
Statement of the Student
I hereby certify, upon my honor, that all the data and information
which I have furnished are accurate and complete. I understand that
any willful misinformation and/or withholding of information will
automatically disqualify me from receiving any financial assistance or
subsidy, and may serve as ground for my expulsion from the
University. Furthermore, is such misinformation and/or withholding of
information on my part is discovered after I have been awarded tuition
scholarship or any form of financial assistance, I will be required to
reimburse all financial benefits plus the legal rate of interest prevailing
at the time of the reimbursement without prejudice to the filing of
charges against me. (Emphasis supplied for emphasis)
Moreover, I understand that the University may send a fact-finding
team to visit my home/residence to verify the veracity of the
information provided in this application and I will give my utmost
cooperation in this regard. I also understand that my refusal to
cooperate with the fact-finding team may mean suspension of
withdrawal of STFAP benefits and privileges.
———————
Student's Signature
Statement of the Applicant's Parent or Guardian
I hereby certify to the truthfulness and completeness of the
information which my son/daughter/dependent has furnished in this
application together with all the documents attached. I further
17
recognize that in signing this application form, I share with my
son/daughter/dependent the responsibility for the truthfulness and
completeness of the information supplied herein. (Emphasis supplied
for emphasis)
Moreover, I understand that the University may send a fact-finding
team to visit my home/residence to verify the information provided in
this application and I will give my utmost cooperation in this regard. I
also understand that my refusal to cooperate with the fact-finding
team may mean suspension or withdrawal of STFAP benefits and
privileges of my son/daughter/dependent.
—————————————————
Parent's/Legal Guardian's/Spouse's Signature1
From the early stages of its implementation, measures were adopted
to safeguard the integrity of the program. One such precautionary
measure was the inclusion as one of the punishable acts under Section
2 (a) of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline
of the University the deliberate falsification or suppression/withholding
of any material information required in the application form.
To further insure the integrity of the program, a random sampling
scheme of verification of data indicated in a student's application form
is undertaken. Among those who applied for STFAP benefits for School
Year 1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of
Law.
On March 14, 1991, a team composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose
Carlo Manalo conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal
at 31 Twinpeaks Drive, Blue Ridge, Quezon City.
Ms. Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the team
submitted a home visit report. Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship Affairs
Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and
Nadal's application form. Forthwith, she and Bella M.
Villanueva, head of the Office of Scholarships and
Student Services, presented the matter to the Diliman
Committee on Scholarships and Financial Assistance. 2
In compliance with the said Committee's directive, Bella Villanueva
wrote Nadal informing him that the investigation showed that he had
failed to declare, not only the fact that he had been maintaining a
1977 Corolla car which was owned by his brother but also the income
of his mother who was supporting his brothers Antonio and Federico.
Nadal was likewise informed that the Diliman Committee had
reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June
1989, unless he could submit "proofs to the contrary." Nadal was
required "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees" with
"interest based on current commercial rates." Failure to settle his
account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and
the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also
warned that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary
Tribunal for further investigation.3
On July 12, 1991, Nadal issued a certification stating, among other
things, that his mother migrated to the United States in 1981 but
because her residency status had not yet been legalized, she had not
been able to find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment." He also
stated that his mother, jointly with his brother Virgilio, was shouldering
the expenses of the college education of his two younger brothers.4
Noting further discrepancies between Nadal's application form and the
certification, the U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary
Tribunal (SDT) on August 23, 1991 with the following:
That respondent RAMON P. NADAL (UP Student
No. 83-11640), a student of the College of Law,
 UP System, Diliman, Quezon City, and STFAP
(ISKOLAR NG BAYAN) recipient (Bracket 4 for SY
1989-1990; Bracket 5 for SY 1990-1991) in his
applications for STFAP (ISKOLAR NG BAYAN)
benefits which he filed for schoolyear 1989-1990,
and schoolyear 1990-1991, with the Office of
Scholarship and Student Services (formerly
Scholarship and Financial Assistance Service)
voluntarily and willfully withheld and did not
declare the following:
(a) That he has and maintains
a car (Toyota Corolla, Model
1977); and
(b) The income of his mother
(Natividad Packing Nadal) in
the U.S.A., in support of the
studies of his brothers Antonio
and Federico,
which acts of willfully withholding information is
tantamount to acts of dishonesty in relation to his
studies, in violation of paragraph (a), Section 2, of
the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and
Discipline, as amended. (Approved by the B.O.R.
at its 876th meeting on 02 September 1976,
amended at the 923rd B.O.R. meeting on 31
January 1980, and further amended at its 1017th
B.O.R. meeting on 08 December 1988).5
On October 27, 1992, after hearing, the SDT6 rendered a decision in
SDT Case No. 91-026 exculpating Nadal of the charge of deliberately
withholding in his STFAP application form information that he was
maintaining a Toyota Corolla car, but finding him guilty of "wilfully and
deliberately withholding information about the income of his mother,
who is living abroad, in support of the studies of his brothers Antonio
and Federico, 7 which is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in relation to
his studies in violation of paragraph [a], Section 2 of the Rules [now
covered by paragraph (i), Section 2 of the Rules, as amended 25 June
1992]." As such, the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty
of expulsion from the University and required him to reimburse all
STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily make
reimbursement, it shall be "effected by the University thru outside
legal action."8
The SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the
Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman for review pursuant to Sec. 20 of
the U.P. Rules on Student Conduct and Discipline. On November 26,
1992, the Executive Committee, voting 13:4, affirmed the decision of
the SDT; whereupon, Nadal appealed to the Board of Regents (BOR).
The appeal was included in the agenda of the BOR meeting on January
25, 1993.9
On January 18, 1993, upon her assumption to the Chairmanship of the
Senate Committee on Education, thereby making her automatically a
member of the BOR, Senator Leticia Ramos-Shahani wrote the BOR a
letter expressing her view that, after a close review of Nadal s case by
her legal staff, "it is only fair and just to find Mr. Nadal's appeal
meritorious and his arguments worthy of belief. Consequently, he
should be allowed to graduate and take the bar examinations this
year." 10
At its January 25, 1993 meeting, the BOR affirmed the decision of the
SDT but because "the Board was willing to grant a degree of
compassion to the appellant in view of the alleged status and
predicament of the mother as an immigrant 'TNT' in the United
States," the penalty was modified "from Expulsion to One Year-
Suspension, effective immediately, plus reimbursement of all benefits
received from the STFAP, with legal interest." The BOR also decided
against giving Nadal, a certification of good moral character. 11
18
Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR decision,
allegedly against the advice of his counsel. 12 The motion was placed
on the agenda of the February 25, 1993 meeting of the BOR. A day
before said date, Senator Shahani wrote the BOR another letter
requesting that deliberation on Nadal's case be deferred until such
time as she could attend a BOR meeting.
On March 15, 1993, the U.P. filed an opposition to Nadal's motion for
reconsideration. Thereafter, the BOR held a special meeting to
accommodate the request of Regent Shahani with Nadal's case as the
sole item on its agenda. Again, Nadal's motion for reconsideration was
included in the March 23, 1993 agenda but in view of the absence of
Senator Shahani, the decision thereon was deferred.
At the special meeting of the BOR on March 28, 1993 at the Board
Room of the Manila Polo Club in Forbes Park, Makati, Regent Antonio
T. Carpio raised the "material importance" of verifying the truth of
Nadal's claim that earlier, he was a beneficiary of a scholarship and
financial aid from the Ateneo de Manila University (AdeMU). Learning
that the "certification issued by the AdeMU that it had not given Nadal
financial aid while he was a student there was made through a
telephone call," Regent Carpio declared that there was as yet "no
direct evidence in the records to substantiate the charge." According to
Carpio, if it should be disclosed that Nadal Falsely stated that he
received such financial aid, it would be a clear case of gross and
material misrepresentation that would even warrant the penalty of
expulsion. Hence, he cast a conditional vote that would depend on the
verification of Nadal's claim on the matter.
U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva countered by
stating that "a decision should not be anchored solely on one piece of
information which he considered irrelevant, and which would ignore
the whole pattern of the respondent's dishonesty and deception from
1989 which had been established in the investigation and the reviews."
He added that "the respondent's eligibility for his AdeMU high school
scholarship and financial assistance from 1979 to 1983 does not in any
way establish that he is 'not guilty as charged' before the SDT," since
the formal charges against him do not include withholding of
information regarding scholarship grants received from other schools.
At the said March 28, 1993 special meeting, the Board decided to go
into executive session where the following transpired:
The Chairman of the Board, together with the
President, directed the Secretary to reflect in the
minutes of the meeting the following decisions of
the Board in executive session, with only the
Board members present.
A vote was held by secret ballot on whether
Ramon P. Nadal was guilty or not guilty as
charged of willful withholding of information in
relation to his application for Socialized Tuition
and Financial Assistance Program (STFAP) benefits
which he filed for Schoolyears 1989-1990 and
1990-1991 which is tantamount to act of
dishonesty in relation to his studies, in violation of
paragraph (a), Section 2 of the Rules and
Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, as
amended.
The Chairman gave the following results of the
Board action during the Executive Session: four
(4) voted guilty; three (3) voted not guilty; and
three (3) gave conditional votes, pending
verification with Father Raymond Holscher of
Ateneo de Manila University of Ramon P. Nadal's
statement in his STFAP application that he was
granted scholarship while he was in high school.
Should Ateneo confirm that Nadal had not
received financial assistance, then the conditional
 votes would be considered as guilty, and if
otherwise, then not guilty. The Chairman
requested the President to make the verification
as soon as possible the next day. In answer to a
query, the Chairman clarified that once the
information was received from Ateneo, there
would be no need for another meeting to validate
the decision.
The President reiterated his objections to the
casting of conditional votes.
The Chairman himself did not vote. 13
In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a certification to
the effect that Nadal was indeed a recipient of a scholarship grant
from 1979 to 1983. That evening, the BOR met again at a special
meeting at the Westin Philippine Plaza Hotel. According to Regent
Carpio, in executive session, the BOR found Nadal "guilty" as the
members voted as follows: six members — guilty, three members —
not guilty, and three members abstained. 14 Consequently, the BOR
imposed on Nadal the penalties of suspension for one (1) year
effective March 29, 1993, non-issuance of any certificate of good moral
character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not
reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12% interest  per
annum from march 30, 1993 and non-issuance of his transcript of
records until he has settled his financial obligations with the
university. 15
On March 30, 1993, Nadal wrote President Abueva a handwritten letter
stating that "after learning of the latest decision" of the BOR, he had
been "intensely concentrating on (his) job so that (he) can earn
enough to pay for (his) financial obligations to the University." Alleging
that he was "now letting nature take its course," Nadal begged
President Abueva not to issue any press release regarding the case. 16
However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and
prayer for a temporary restraining order against President Abueva, the
BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and
Olivia C. Caoili. The petition prayed:
After trial on the merits, judgment be rendered as
follows:
a. Making the preliminary injunction permanent;
b. Ordering respondents 'to uphold and implement
their decision rendered on 28 March 1993,
exonerating petitioner from all the charges against
him, and accordingly dismissing SDT No. 91-026;
c. Ordering respondents jointly and severally to
pay petitioner litigation expenses of at least
P150,000.00.
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed
for. 17
The motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and the
writ of preliminary injunction was immediately set for hearing. At the
May 10, 1993 hearing, the lower court declared that the only issue to
be resolved was "whether or not the respondents in Civil Case No. 93-
15665 violated (Nadal's) right to due process when it rendered a
decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges against him" during the
March 29, 1993 meeting. After the respondents had presented their
first witness, Dr. Olivia C. Caoili, the lower court asked respondents'
counsel whether they were amenable to maintaining the status quo.
Said counsel replied in the negative, asserting the University's
19
prerogative to discipline students found guilty of violating its rules of
discipline.18
On the same day, the lower court 19 issued the following Order:
The parties were heard on their respective
positions on the incident (application for
preliminary injunction and prayer for temporary
restraining order and opposition thereto). For lack
of material time set this for continuation on May
17 and 18, 1993 both at 2:30 p.m.
In the meantime, in order that the proceedings of
this case may not be rendered moot and
academic, the respondents herein, namely: Jose
V. Abueva, President of the University of the
Philippines and Vice-Chairman of the U.P. Board of
Regents, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura
and Armand V. Fabella, members of the U.P.
Board of Regents, Olivia C. Caoili, the officers,
agents, representatives, and all persons acting in
their behalf, are hereby temporarily restrained
from implementing their decision rendered on
March 29, 1993 in Administrative SDT Case No.
91-026 entitled University of the Philippines vs.
Ramon P. Nadal, as reflected in the Minutes of the
1062nd meeting of the Board of Regents, U.P.
held at the Romblon Room, Westin Phil. Plaza,
Manila, until further order from this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Thereafter, Nadal presented as witnesses Regents Emerenciana Y.
Arcellana, Ariel P. Tanangonan, Leticia R. Shahani and Antonio T.
Carpio. The University, on the other hand, presented Dr. Olivia Caoili
and Nadal himself as a hostile witness. On May 29, 1993, the lower
court issued the following Order:
The petitioner complains that he was not afforded
due process when, after the Board Meeting on
SDT Case No. 91-026 on March 28, 1993 that
resulted in a decision of "NOT GUILTY" in his
favor, the Chairman of the U.P. Board of Regents,
without notice to the herein petitioner, called
another meeting the following day to deliberate on
his (the Chairman's) MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, which this time resulted in a
decision of "GUILTY." While he main issue of
violation of due process raised in the petition
pends trial and resolution, the petitioner prays for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
prohibiting the respondents from further
proceeding with SDT Case No. 21-026 and from
suspending the petitioner for one year.
It is a basic requirement in the issuance of the
preliminary injunctive writ that there must be a
right to be protected. As the issue in the case at
bar is due process in the March 29 Board meeting,
there is, indeed, a right to be protected for, in
administrative proceedings, a respondent's right to
due process exists not only at the early stages but
also at the final stage thereof.
With the circulation to the members of the Board
of Regents, as well as to other UP personnel, of
the Minutes of the March 29, 1993 meeting, even
after this case had already been filed, the Court is
convinced that there now exists a threat to the
petitioner (respondent in SDT Case No, 91-026)
that the decision of the Board of Regents finally
 finding him guilty of willfully withholding
information material to his application for
Socialized Tuition and Financial Assistance
Program (STFAP) benefits, will be implemented at
any time, especially during the enrollment period,
and this implementation would work injustice to
the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his
course, and, consequently, in getting a decent and
good paying job. The injury thus caused would be
irreparable.
"Damages are irreparable
within the meaning of the rule
where there is no standard by
which their amount can be
measured with reasonable
accuracy. Where the damage
is susceptible of mathematical
computation, it is not
irreparable." (Social Security
Commission v. Bayona, et al.,
G.R. No. L-13555, May 30,
1962).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and so as not to
render moot the issues in the instant proceedings,
let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
restraining the respondents, their officers,
agent(s), representatives, and all persons acting in
their behalf, from further proceeding with SDT
Case No. 91-026, and from suspending petitioner,
upon the latter's filing a bond in the amount of
P3,000.00.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 20
Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the
petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of an injunction or temporary restraining order,
raising the following issues: whether or not Nadal was denied due
process in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against him, and,
whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in
issuing the May 29, 1993 writ of preliminary injunction thereby
preventing the BOR from implementing the suspension penalty it had
imposed on Nadal.
Before proceeding with the discussion of the merits of the instant
petition, we shall confront a threshold issue raised by private
respondent, namely, that Dr. Caoili, not having been authorized by the
Board of Regents as a collegial body to file the instant petition, and Dr.
Abueva, who verified the petition, not being the "Board of Regents"
nor "the University of the Philippines," they are not real parties in
interest who should file the same. 21
A real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 'Interest'
within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in
issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest."22 Undoubtedly, the U.P. Board of Regents has an interest to
protect inasmuch as what is in issue here is its power to impose
disciplinary action against a student who violated the Rules and
Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline by withholding
information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits,
which information, if disclosed, would have sufficed to disqualify him
from receiving the financial assistance he sought. Such dishonesty, if
left unpunished, would have the effect of subverting a commendable
program into which the University officials had devoted much time and
expended precious resources, from the conceptualization to the
implementation stage, to rationalize the socialized scheme of tuition
20
fee payments in order that more students may benefit from the public
funds allocated to the State University.
Having specifically named Drs. Abueva and Caoili as respondents in the
petition for mandamus that he filed below, Nadal is now estopped
from questioning their personality to file the instant
petition.23 Moreover, under Sec. 7 of the U.P. Charter (Act 1870) and
Sec. 11 of the University Code "all process" against the BOR shall be
served on "the president or secretary thereof'." It is in accordance with
these legal provisions that Dr. Caoili is named as a petitioner.
Necessarily, Dr. Abueva, the University President and member of the
BOR, has to verify the petition. It is not mandatory, however, that
each and every member of the BOR be named petitioners. As the
Court has time and again held, an action may be entertained,
notwithstanding the failure to include an indispensable party where it
appears that the naming of the party would be but a formality. 24
No longer novel, as this is not a case of first impression, is the issue on
the right of an academic institution to refuse admission to a student
arising from the imposition upon him of an administrative disciplinary
sanction. In our recent decision in Ateneo de Manila University
v. Hon. Ignacio M. Capulong,25 wherein certain law students were
dismissed for hazing resulting in the death of another, we held that the
matter of admission of students is within the ambit of academic
freedom and therefore, beyond the province of the courts to decide.
Certain fundamental principles bear stressing.
One of the arguments of Nadal in his petition for mandamus below
was that he was denied due process. To clarify, the so-called lack of
due process referred only to the March 29, 1993 meeting of the BOR.
As stated by respondent's counsel: "What was conceded by
undersigned counsel was that Nadal was afforded due process from
the start of the administrative proceeding up to the meeting of the
Board of Regents on March 28, 1993."26
With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent considers the
same as "unquestionably void for lack of due process" inasmuch as he
was not sent a notice of said meeting. Counsel cites the ruling in Non
v. Dames II 27 that imposition of sanctions on students requires
"observance of procedural due process," 28 the phrase obviously
referring to the sending of notice of the meeting.
Attention is drawn to the disparate factual environments obtaining
in Non v. Dames II and in the instant case. In the former case, the
students were refused admission for having led or participated in
student mass actions against the school, thereby posing a collision
between constitutionally cherished rights — freedom of expression and
academic freedom. In the case at bar, Nadal was suspended for
having breached the University's disciplinary rules. In the Non case,
the Court ruled that the students were not afforded due process for
even the refusal to re-enroll them appeared to have been a mere
afterthought on part of the school administrators. Here, Nadal does
not dispute the fact that his right to due process was held inviolate
until the BOR decided to meet on March 29, 1993 with his case as the
sole item on the agenda.
In any event it is gross error to equate due process in the instant case
with the sending of notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to
respondent. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR
meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the
agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of students whose
disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the
final review body. At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice
given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings
where his case was up for deliberation. He would make an exception
of the March 29, 1993 meeting for it was "supposed to reconsider the
decision made on March 28, 1993 exonerating respondent Nadal from
all administrative charges against him." 29
Regent Antonio T. Carpio, in his testimony before the lower court on
May 25, 1993 admitted that there was no final verdict at the March 28,
1993 meeting in view of the conditional votes resulting from his Responsibility states: "A lawyer shall not engage in
assertion that he was "not morally convinced that there was sufficient unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Further on, Canon
evidence to make a finding of guilty against Nadal because there was 7, Rule 7.01 provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly
no direct evidence that his mother received income from the United making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection
States and this income was sent to the Philippines to support the with his application for admission to the bar." (Emphasis supplied for
studies of the children." 30 Two regents shared the view of Regent emphasis)
Carpio, with the following result: four voted guilty, three, not guilty,
and three cast conditional votes. The BOR agreed that, upon the
Surely, it is not too early to warn entrants to the noble profession of
suggestion of Regent Carpio, they would still verify from the AdeMU
law that honesty and integrity are requirements no less weighty than
about Nadal's alleged scholarship as a student in said institution.
hurdling the Bar examinations. This is the reason why a certification of
Consequently, no definitive decision was arrived at by the BOR on
good moral character is one of the documents that must be submitted
March 28, 1993, Much less was a verdict of exoneration handed down
in applying to take said examination. In fact, a charge of immoral or
as averred by respondent.
deceitful conduct on the part of an applicant, when proved, is a ground
for disqualifying him.
Regent Carpio testified, with respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting
where all twelve members of the BOR were present, that all of them
To revert to the instant case, inasmuch as it has been shown
participated in the voting held to reconsider the previous day's
sufficiently that respondent has committed an act of dishonesty in
decision. He stated "I remember Regent Arcellana questioning the
withholding vital information in connection with his application for
voting again on the ground that there was already a final decision, but
STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the Rules and Regulations on
there was a vote taken on whether a motion for reconsideration can
Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner University, the latter's
be decided by the board, and a majority of the board ruled that the
inherent power and authority to impose disciplinary sanction may be
matter can be reconsidered again upon motion of the chairman." 31
invoked and rightfully exercised.

At said meeting, six (6) regents voted to find respondent guilty, three
As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without discipline is like a mill
(3) voted that he was not guilty and three (3) abstained. As succinctly
without water." Insofar as the water turns the mill, so does the
announced by Regent Carpio, the final decision was that which was
school's disciplinary power assure its right to survive and continue
rendered on March 29, 1993 as "no other decision was made by the
operating. In more relevant terms, through its power to impose
Board with respect to the same issue." 32
disciplinary sanctions, an educational institution is able to exercise its
academic freedom which is, in the case at bar, the right to suspend
Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that his client was and refuse admission to a student who has subverted its authority in
"not given due process in the March 29 meeting because the ground the implementation of the critically important STFAP.
upon which he was again convicted was not the same as the original
charge."33 Obviously, he was referring to the basis of the conditional
At the risk of being repetitious, the matter of admission to a University
votes on March 28, i.e., whether or not Nadal was telling the truth
is encompassed by the right of academic freedom. In Garcia v. The
when he claimed that he received a scholarship grant from the AdeMU.
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology  36 the Court
However, Regent Carpio himself testified that the charge considered
stated that a school or college which is possessed of the right of
was "exactly the same charge" of withholding information on the
academic freedom "decides for itself its aims and objectives and how
income of Nadal's mother. 34 It should be stressed that the reason why
best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference
Regent Carpio requested a verification of Nadal's claim that he was a
save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some
scholar at the AdeMU was that Regent Carpio was not "morally
restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the
convinced" yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In other words, he sought
choice of students." Elucidating, in Ateneo de Manila University
additional insights into the character of Nadal through the information
v. Hon. Ignacio M. Capulong, 37 the Court further expounded:
that would be obtained from the AdeMU.

Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we

In this regard, we find such information to be irrelevant and a mere
have consistently upheld the salutary proposition
superfluity. In his July, 12, 1991 certification aforementioned, Nadal
that admission to an institution of higher learning
admitted, although inconsistently, that his mother was a "TNT" who
is discretionary upon a school, the same being a
could not find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment" but that she
privilege on the part of the student rather than a
was supporting the education of his brothers with the help of another
right. While under the Education Act of 1982,
son. To our mind, this constitutes sufficient admission that Nadal
students have a right "to freely choose their field
withheld information on the income, however measly and irregular, of
of study, subject to existing curricula and to
his mother. Unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond
continue their course therein up to graduation,"
reasonable doubt as basis for a judgment, in administrative or  quasi-
such right is subject, as all rights are, to the
judicial  proceedings, only substantial evidence is required, that which
established academic and disciplinary standards
means more than a mere scintilla or relevant evidence as a reasonable
laid down by the academic institution.
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. 35 In light
of the foregoing circumstances, we find that Nadal has been For private schools have the right to establish
sufficiently proven to have violated his undertaking to divulge all reasonable rules and regulations for the
information needed when he applied for the benefits of the STFAP. admission, discipline and promotion of students.
This right . . . extends as well to parents . . . as
parents are under a social and moral (if not legal)
Let it not be forgotten that respondent aspires to join the ranks of the
obligation, individually and collectively, to assist
professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that justice may
and cooperate with the schools.
prevail. The sentinels who stand guard at the portals leading to the
hallowed Temples of Justice cannot be overzealous in admitting only
those who are intellectually and morally fit. In those who exhibit Such rules are "incident to the very object of
duplicity in their student days, one spots the shady character who is incorporation and indispensable to the successful
bound to sow the seeds of chicanery in the practice of his profession. management of the college. The rules may include
those governing student discipline." Going a step
further, the establishment of rules governing
Having reached his senior year, respondent is presumably aware that
university-student relations, particularly those
the bedrock axiom, Canon I, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded

21
 as vital, if not merely to the smooth and efficient
operation of the institution, but to its very survival.
Within memory of the current generation is the
eruption of militancy in the academic groves as
collectively, the students demanded and plucked
for themselves from the panoply of academic
freedom their own rights encapsulized under the
rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, in
Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty,
that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid
down by the school. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the second issue presented for adjudication, the Court finds that
the lower court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ
was based on the lower court's finding that the implementation of the
disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal "would work injustice to
the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and
consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job." Sadly, such a
ruling considers only the situation of Nadal without taking into account
the circumstances clearly of his own making, which led him into such a
predicament. More importantly, it has completely disregarded the
overriding issue of academic freedom which provides more than ample
justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon an erring
student of an institution of higher learning.
From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should
have restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed
by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a
clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner being required. 38 It
is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty
requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. 39
Hence, by issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the lower court
dared to tread upon legally forbidden grounds. For, by virtue of the
writ, the University's exercise of academic freedom was peremptorily
curtailed. Moreover, the door was flung wide open for Nadal to do
exactly what the decision of the BOR prohibited him from doing and
that is, to violate the suspension order by enrolling for the first
semester of 1993-1994. It must have been with consternation that the
University officials helplessly watching him complete his academic
requirements for taking the Bar. 40 In the event that he be allowed to
continue with his studies he would, in effect render moot and
academic the disciplinary sanction of suspension legally imposed upon
him by the BOR's final decision of March 29, 1993. What is to prevent
other aspirants for STFAP scholarships from misleading the University
authorities by misrepresenting certain facts or as in instant case,
withholding vital information and stating downright falsehoods, in their
application forms with impunity? Not only would this undermine the
authority of the U.P. to discipline its students who violated the rules
and regulations of the institution but, more importantly, subvert the
very concept and lofty intent to give financial assistance to poor but
deserving students through the STFAP which, incidentally, has not
ceased refining and modifying it's operations.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the lower court is
hereby ordered to DISMISS the petition for mandamus.
SO ORDERED.
22
G.R. No. 70484 January 29, 1988
ROMAN C. TUASON and REMEDIOS V. TUASON, by attorney-
in-fact Trinidad S. Viado, petitioners,
vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS, CALOOCAN City, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE,
and the NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents. TOMASA
BARTOLOME, in her own behalf and in behalf of the other
members of the "Consuelo Heights Homeowners
Association," petitioners-intervenors.
NARVASA, J.:
A more despotic, capricious, oppressive and unjustifiable exercise of
government power than that manifested in this case can scarcely be
found in the sordid annals of the martial law regime. Relief to the
victims must be as it is hereby extended by the grant to them of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari and prohibition condemning as
unconstitutional, and annulling and perpetually enjoining the acts
complained of.
Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers.
On April 6, 1965, with funds pooled from their retirement benefits and
savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. (hereafter simply,
Carmel) a piece of land measuring about 8,756 square meters, in the
latter's subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. In virtue of this
sale, Carmel's Torrens title (No. 64007) over the lot was cancelled and
a new one (No. 8314) issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons
took possession of their property.
Some eight (8) years thereafter, the Tuasons' travails began. They
woke up one morning to discover that by presidential flat, they were
no longer the owners of the land they had purchased with their hard-
earned money, and that their land and the other lots in the subdivision
had been "declared open for disposition and sale to the members of
the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona
fide  occupants thereof."
On September 14, 1973-a year almost to the day after the declaration
of martial law Mr. Ferdinand Marcos, then president of the country,
invoking his emergency powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293
with immediate effect. The decree invalidated inter alia  the title of the
Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the
Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into several lots
for sale to the public (the Tuasons being among the buyers). The land
bought by Carmel was part of the Tala Estate (one of the so-called
"Friar Lands"). Carmel had bought the land under Act No. 1120 and
C.A. No. 32, as amended. Under these statutes:
1) a bona fide  settler or occupant was allowed to purchase (if he did
not wish to lease) the portion occupied by him at the price fixed by the
Government, in cash or on installment; the interested buyer was given
a certificate of sale, which was regarded as an agreement by him to
pay the purchase price in the and at the interest specified, the
acceptance of such certificate making the occupant a debtor of the
government;
2) until the price was fully paid however, title was reserved in the
Government, and any sale or encumbrance made by the purchaser
prior to such full payment was explicitly declared to 'be invalid as
against the Government ... and ... in all respects subordinate to its
prior claim;"
3) in the event of default by a purchaser to pay any installment of
purchase money and interest thereon, the Chief of the Bureau of
Public Lands (now Director of Lands) had the duty at once to protect
the Government from loss by bringing suit to obtain judicial authority
to enforce the Government's lien on the "and by selling it in the same
manner as for foreclosure of mortgages, the purchaser at such sale
being deemed to acquire a good and indefeasible title, and the
proceeds of the sale being applied to the payment of the costs of the covering lots 1, 2 and 3, PCS-4383, all in the name
court and all installments due or to become due; and of Carmel Farms, Inc., which are a consolidation
and subdivision survey of the lots hereinbefore
enumerated, are declared invalid and considered
4) in the event of completion of payment, the Government transferred
cancelled as against the Government; and that
title to the land to the purchaser "by proper instrument of
said lots are declared open for disposition and sale
conveyance," the certificate of title over the land to issue and become
to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners
effective in the manner provided by the Land Registration Act. 1
Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants
thereof, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32,
Said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding 2 that Carmel had as amended.
failed to complete payment of the price. It adjudged that —
On the strength of this presidential decree, the Register of Deeds of
... according to the records of the Bureau of Caloocan City caused the inscription on the Tuasons' title, TCT No.
Lands, neither the original purchasers nor their 8314, of the following:
subsequent transferees have made full payment of
all installments of the purchase money and
MEMORANDUM. — Pursuant to Presidential Decree
interest on the lots claimed by the Carmel Farms,
No. 293, this certificate of title is declared invalid
Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the
and null and void ab initio  and considered
members of said Association  3 stand. Hence, title
cancelled as against the Government and the
to said land has remained with the Government,
property described herein is declared open for
and the land now occupied by the members of
disposition and sale to the members of the
said association  has never ceased to form part of
Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc.
the property of the Republic of the Philippines, any
and all acts affecting said land and purporting to
segregate it from the said property of the Republic The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition
of the Philippines being therefore null and void ab for certiorari assailing the Marcos decree as an arbitrary measure
initio  as against the law and public policy. which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in
violation not only of the constitutional provisions on due process and
eminent domain 5 but also of the provisions of the Land Registration
Upon this adjudgment, Mr. Marcos invalidated the titles of Carmel
Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles; 6 and they prayed that the
Farms, Inc. and all those derived therefrom, and declared as
Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory inscription on
aforestated "the members of the Malacanang Homeowners
their title and restore its efficacy, or in the alternative, that they be
Association, Inc. the present bona fide occupants"  of the lots which, in
compensated for the loss from the Assurance Fund.
consequence, thereby became open to them for "disposition and
sale ... pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32, as amended." 4
Mr. Marcos' Solicitor General sought to sustain the decree. In his
comment on the petition, 7 he questioned the propriety of the remedy
It seems to have completely escaped Mr. Marcos' attention that his
of certiorari resorted to by the petitioners, it not appearing that the
decree contained contradictory declarations. While acknowledging on
public respondents were being sued as judicial or quasi-judicial officers
the one hand that the lots in the Carmel Subdivision were occupied by
who had acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave
the buyers thereof, and in fact the latter's dwellings stood thereon , he
abuse of discretion. He opined that the petitioner spouses had no
states on the other that the "members of the Malacanang
cause to complain of unjust deprivation of property because in legal
Homeowners Association, Inc. (are) the present bona fide occupants"
contemplation 8 they had never become owners thereof because of
of all said lots. The latter averment is not only essentially inconsistent
non-payment of the purchase price by their predecessor-in-interest;
with the former but is both a physical and legal fallacy. Well known is
and the decree was justifiable under the social justice clause of the
the rule of physics that two objects cannot occupy the same space at
Constitution and the police power, being in response to the pressing
the same time. And the absurdity of the subsumed proposition is self-
housing need of the employees of the Office of the President who
evident for persons not in possession of land, who probably have not
were left homeless and landless after they were asked to vacate
even set foot thereon, cannot be deemed "occupants" thereof, much
Malacanang Park where they had theretofore been residing. He
less "bona fide" occupants.
expressed the view, too, that petitioner spouses were not entitled to
recover anything from the Assurance Fund.
But this notwithstanding, and upon the factual premise already
indicated, Mr. Marcos disposed of the land of the petitioner spouses
Petitions for intervention have of late been filed by sixty-four (64)
and others similarly situated as they, in the following imperious
persons, members of the "Consuelo Heights Homeowners Association"
manner:
headed by Tomasa Bartolome, on the claim that they, too, had been
divested of their lands by the same Presidential Decree No. 293,
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, adopting as their own the allegations and prayer embodied in the
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the Tuasons' petition.
powers vested in me by the Constitution as
Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of
The procedural issue is quite easily disposed of. It is true that the
the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation
extraodinary writ of certiorari 9 may properly issue to nullify
1081, dated September 21, 1972, and General
only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which
Order No. 1, dated September 22, 1972, do
may be directed against acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1,
hereby order and decree that any and all sales
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in relation
contracts between the government and the
to "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, while
original purchasers, are hereby cancelled, and
Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation
those between the latter and the subsequent
to "proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person ...
transferees, and any and all transfers thereafter,
exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the petition will be
covering lots 979, 981, 982, 985, 988, 989, 990,
shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawful
991 new, 1226, 1228, 1230, and 980-C-2 (LRC
exercise of judicial power.
PSD-1730), all of Tala Estate, Caloocan City, are
hereby declared invalid and null and void ab
initio  as against the Government; that Transfer The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial
Certificates of Title Nos. 62603, 62604, 62605, function. He made a determination of facts, and applied the law to

23
those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the
premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function, 10 or
an exercise of jurisdiction —  which is the power and authority to hear
or try and decide or determine a cause. 11 He adjudged it to be an
established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their
subsequent transferees have made full payment of all installments of
the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by Carmel Farms,
Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of ...
(the) Association (of homeowners) stand." And applying the law to
that situation, he made the adjudication that "title to said land has
remained with the Government, and the land now occupied by the
members of said association has never ceased to form part of the
property of the Republic of the Philippines," and that 'any and all acts
affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the said
property of the Republic ... (were) null and void ab initio as against the
law and public policy.
These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari,
because done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a
judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr.
Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone
knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as
may be established by law 12 — the judicial acts done by him were in
the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The
acts were completely alien to his office as chief executive, and utterly
beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had
assumed as head of the martial law regime.
Moreover, he had assumed to exercise power — i.e. determined the
relevant facts and applied the law thereto without a trial at which all
interested parties were accorded the opportunity to adduce evidence
to furnish the basis for a determination of the facts material to the
controversy. He made the finding ostensibly on the basis of "the
records of the Bureau of Lands." Prescinding from the fact that there is
no indication whatever the nature and reliability of these records and
that they are in no sense conclusive, it is undeniable that the petitioner
Tuasons (and the petitioners in intervention) were never confronted
with those records and afforded a chance to dispute their
trustworthiness and present countervailing evidence. This is yet
another fatal defect. The adjudication was patently and grossly
violative of the right to due process to which the petitioners are
entitled in virtue of the Constitution. Mr. Marcos, in other words, not
only arrogated unto himself a power never granted to him by the
Constitution or the laws but had in addition exercised it
unconstitutionally.
In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the petition
for certiorari as one for prohibition if the averments of the former
sufficiently made out a case for the latter. 13 Considered in this wise, it
will also appear that an executive officer had acted without jurisdiction
— exercised judicial power not granted to him by the Constitution or
the laws — and had furthermore performed the act in violation of the
constitutional rights of the parties thereby affected. The Court will
grant such relief as may be proper and efficacious in the premises
even if not specifically sought or set out in the prayer of the
appropriate pleading, the permissible relief being determined after all
not by the prayer but by the basic averments of the parties'
pleadings. 14
There is no dispute about the fact that title to the land purchased by
Carmel was actually issued to it by the Government. This of course
gives rise to the strong presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed, 15 that official duty being in this case the
ascertainment by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands of the
fulfillment of the condition prescribed by law for such issuance, i.e.,
the payment in full of the price, together with all accrued interest.
Against this presumption there is no evidence. It must hence be
accorded full sway in these proceedings. Furthermore, the title having
been duly issued to Carmel, it became "effective in the manner
provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land
Registration Act." 16
24
It may well be the fact that Carmel really did fail to make full payment
of the price of the land purchased by it from the Government pursuant
to the provisions of Act 1120. This is a possibility that cannot be totally
discounted. If this be the fact, the Government may bring suit to
recover the unpaid installments and interest, invalidate any sale or
encumbrance involving the land subject of the sale, and enforce the
lien of the Government against the land by selling the same in the
manner provided by Act Numbered One Hundred and Ninety for the
foreclosure of mortgages. 17 This it can do despite the lapse of a
considerable period of time. Prescription does not lie against the
Government. But until and unless such a suit is brought and results in
a judgment favorable to the Government, the acquisition of title by
Carmel and the purchases by the petitioners and the petitioners-
intervenors from it of portions of the land covered by its original title
must be respected. At any rate, the eventuation of that contingency
will not and cannot in any manner affect this Court's conclusion, herein
affirmed, of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of Presidential Decree
No. 293, and the absolute lack of any right to the land or any portion
thereof on the part of the members of the so-called "Malacanang
Homeowners Association, Inc." The decree was not as claimed a licit
instance of the application of social justice principles or the exercise of
police power. It was in truth a disguised, vile stratagem deliberately
resorted to favor a few individuals, in callous and disdainful disregard
of the rights of others. It was in reality a taking of private property
without due process and without compensation whatever, from
persons relying on the indefeasibility of their titles in accordance with
and as explicitly guaranteed by law.
One last word, respecting the petitioners in intervention, Their petition
to intervene substantially fulfilled the requirements laid down for a
class suit 18 and was consequently given due course by the Court. They
are therefore covered by this judgment.
WHEREFORE, Presidential Decree No. 293 is declared to be
unconstitutional and void ab initio  in all its parts. The public
respondents are commanded to cancel the inscription on the titles of
the petitioners and the petitioners in intervention of the memorandum
declaring their titles null and void and declaring the property therein
respectively described open for disposition and sale to the members of
the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. to do whatever else is
needful to restore the titles to full effect and efficacy; and henceforth
to refrain, cease and desist from implementing any provision or part of
said Presidential Decree No. 293. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 230953, June 20, 2018
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM BOARD OF
TRUSTEES AND CRISTINA V. ASTUDILLO, Petitioners, v. THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS - CEBU CITY AND FORMER JUDGE
MA. LORNA P. DEMONTEVERDE, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeking the review and nullification of the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated February 17, 20161 and February 16, 20172 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 08362, for allegedly having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The facts are as follows:
Private respondent, retired Judge Ma. Lorna P. Demonteverde
(Demonteverde) started her service in the government on July 1, 1963
with the National Electrification Administration (NEA) until her
resignation on. February 15, 1967.3 She then transferred to the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) - Bacolod and served until
December 31, 1986. On January 29, 1987, she transferred to the
Public Attorney's Office (PAO) where she served until June 29, 1995.
All in all, Demonteverde served in the said government agencies for a
total of 32 years, from 1963 to 1995.
On June 30, 1995, Demonteverde joined the Judiciary as Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City until
her retirement on February 22, 2011.
In a letter dated July 28, 1995, Demonteverde requested from the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) a refund of the
retirement premiums she paid under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
11464 and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6605 in excess of the retirement
premiums that she should pay under R.A. No. 910, as amended, the
law on retirement benefits for Judges and Justices applicable to her
when she joined the Judiciary on June 30, 1995.
However, instead of issuing a refund only of the excess of the
contributions paid, the GSIS, on August 23, 1995, refunded to
Demonteverde the amount of P16,836.60 representing her retirement
premiums, or her total personal share with interest, under R.A. No.
660.
On February 11,2011, Demonteverde filed with the Supreme Court her
retirement application under R.A. No. 910,6 as amended, for her
service in the Judiciary from June 30, 1995 until her retirement on
February 22, 2011.
On March 3, 2011, Demonteverde likewise filed an application with the
GSIS for retirement benefits under R.A. No. 82917 covering her
government service outside of the Judiciary from July 1, 1963 until
June 29, 1995.
In a letter dated October 14, 2011, the manager of the GSIS Bacolod
informed Demonteverde that the retirement laws covering her service
in the government from July 1, 1963 to June 29, 1995 were P.D. No.
1146,8 R.A. No. 660, and R.A. No. 1616. The GSIS thus returned the
application of Demonteverde so that she may choose from the modes
of retirement enumerated.
On November 28, 2011, Demonteverde wrote a letter to the GSIS
requesting a re-evaluation of her application for retirement under R.A.
No. 8291.
Demonteverde's request was referred to the GSIS Committee on
Claims (COC) for evaluation, and on May 18, 2012, GSIS Bacolod
informed her of the COC's issuance of Resolution No. 021-2012
denying her request to retire under R.A. No. 8291. Demonteverde then
appealed the COC's Resolution to the GSIS Board of Trustees (GSIS
BOT).
Given the issues raised in Demonteverde's case, the GSIS inquired with
both the PAO and the Supreme Court as to whether Demonteverde
received gratuity benefits and if her entire government service was
covered in her retirement under R.A. No. 910, respectively.
In response to the inquiry, the PAO replied that Demonteverde did not
apply for nor receive gratuity benefits from the said agency when she
transferred to the Judiciary in 1995.9
On the other hand, the Supreme Court, through the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), advised the GSIS that pursuant to R.A. No. 910,
as amended by R.A. No. 9946, and its implementing guidelines, judges
who have rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service in the
Judiciary or in any branch of the government, or both, and who retired
compulsorily upon reaching the age of seventy (70) years, shall, upon
retirement, be automatically entitled to a lump sum of five (5) years'
gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary, plus the
highest monthly Representation and Transportation Allowance and
other allowances which they were receiving on the date of their
retirement.10
The OCA confirmed that:
3. Judge Demonteverde was able to meet the minimum fifteen (15)
years government service required to be entitled to full pension
benefits under Section 1 of R.A. No. 910, as amended, and thus, her
25
services rendered outside of the Judiciary is no longer needed in the
determination/computation of her retirement benefits under R.A. No.
910, as amended.11
The OCA likewise clarified that the monetary value of the accrued
terminal leave benefits that Demonteverde earned in her government
service prior to joining the Judiciary was already included by this Court
in the payment of her retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910. The
OCA added that this Court will request reimbursement from
Demonteverde if the GSIS decides to grant retirement benefits.12
In a Decision dated October 10, 2013, the GSIS BOT granted
Demonteverde's petition, to wit:
Wherefore, all the foregoing considered, the Petition is GRANTED.
The Petitioner is allowed to retire under R.A. No. 8291 for her period
of services outside the judiciary from 01 July 1963 to 29 June 1995.
The payment of her benefits shall be reckoned from 22 February 2011,
the date when her actual separation from service took place.
SO ORDERED.13
On December 12, 2013, Demonteverde filed a Motion for
Execution14 of the Decision of the GSIS BOT, stating therein that she
received a notice of the October 14, 2013 Decision on November 11,
2013; that more than 15 days had elapsed since her receipt of the
copy of the decision; and that the same had become final and
executory and ripe for implementation.15 Said Motion for Execution was
granted by the GSIS BOT on even date.
However, on January 6, 2014, Demonteverde filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (Partial MR) and Withdrawal of Motion for
Execution16 of the October 10, 2013 GSIS BOT Decision. She
questioned the accrual date of her retirement benefits under R.A. No.
8291, arguing that the date of her retirement should be the date when
she reached sixty (60) years of age, even when she was still in active
government service at that time, and not on February 22, 2011, or the
date of her actual retirement from government service. Demonteverde
likewise denied receiving a copy of the GSIS BOT Decision, and denied
that the later Notice of Decision dated November 19, 2013 contained a
copy of the GSIS BOT Decision.
In its Resolution No. 1217 dated February 13, 2014, the GSIS BOT
denied Demonteverde's Partial MR and Withdrawal of Motion for
Execution, for allegedly having been filed out of time.
Aggrieved, Demonteverde filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari,
Mandamus, and Prohibition under Rule 65 dated March 21, 2014,
seeking to modify and set aside the October 10, 2013 Decision and
Resolution No. 12 dated February 13, 2014 of the GSIS BOT. 18
In a Resolution19 dated June 19, 2014, the CA dismissed the said
petition, ratiocinating that the course of action taken by Demonteverde
was erroneous as the proper mode of appeal from a decision of a
quasi-judicial agency such as the GSIS is by filing a verified petition for
review with the CA under Rule 43. The appellate court added that a
perusal of Demonteverde's petition showed procedural defects, to wit:
a. Petitioner failed to incorporate therein a written
explanation why the preferred personal mode of
filing the petition under Section 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Court was not availed of.
b. Petitioner failed to attach a clearly legible
duplicate original or certified true copy of the
assailed October 10, 2013 Decision, December 12,
2013 Order and February 13, 2014 Resolution of
the GSIS, in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. While petitioner
appended to the Petition copy of the assailed
October 10, 2013 Decision and February 13, 2014
Resolution of the GSIS they were mere
photocopies. The assailed December 12, 2013
Order of the Hearing Officer of the GSIS appears
also to be a mere photocopy.
 c. Petitioner failed to properly verify the Petition in
accordance with A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC amending
Section 4, Rule 7 in relation to Section 1, Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which now
requires that a pleading must be verified by an
affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
the allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge or based on authentic
records. Petitioner did not to (sic) incorporate in
the Verification and Certification of Non Forum
Shopping the phrase "or based on authentic
records."
d. Petitioner failed to attach copies of all pleadings
and documents, which are necessary for a
thorough understanding and resolution of the
instant Petition, such as, but not limited to,
following:
1. Petitioner's July 28, 1995 letter to the
GSIS requesting for a refund of her
retirement premiums.
2. Petitioner's February 11, 2011 and
March 3, 2011 applications for claim of
retirement benefits field (sic) with the
GSIS, Baco1od Branch.
3. The October 14, 2011 letter of the GSIS'
Bacolod Branch Manager, Ms. Vilma
Fuentes.
4. Petitioner's November 28, 2011 letter to
the GSIS requesting for a re-evaluation
of her application for retirement
benefits.
5. Petitioner's Petition filed with the GSIS
[C]ommittee on Claims.
6. The GSIS Committee on Claims' Answer
to petitioner's Petition.
7. The March 26, 2013 letter of the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO Chief
Administrative Officer. (sic)
8. The July 23, 2013 and September 17,
2013 letters of the Office of the Court
Administrator of the Supreme Court.
e. The Notarial Certificate in the Verification and
Certification of Non Forum Shopping and in the
Affidavit of Service did not contain the province or
city where the notary public was commissioned,
the office address of the notary public, in violation
of Section 2(c) and (d), Rule VIII of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice.20
Upon Demonteverde's motion for reconsideration, the CA, in the
assailed February 17, 2016 Resolution, reversed itself and reinstated
Demonteverde's Petition. It agreed with Demonteverde that the case
may be classified as an exception to the general rule that certiorari is
not a substitute for a lost appeal under any of the following grounds:
where appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy, and
for certain special considerations, such as public welfare or public
policy.21 Thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:
1. GRANT the Motion for Extension to file Comment and the Second
26
Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment filed by respondent
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
2. ADMIT the Comment and Opposition (To the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 19, 2014) filed by the
GSIS.
3. GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner and SET
ASIDE the June 19, 2014 Resolution.
4. REINSTATE the instant petition and DIRECT respondents
to FILE their COMMENT (not a Motion to Dismiss) to the petition
within TEN (10) days from receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is
given five (5) days from receipt of Comment within which to file a
Reply, if petitioner so desires.
SO ORDERED.22
GSIS BOT moved for reconsideration and filed an Opposition to the
Petition, but the CA, in its February 16, 2017 Resolution, denied the
said motion for reconsideration and directed the GSIS BOT to file its
comment to Demonteverde's petition.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, with the GSIS BOT raising the issue
of whether the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its February 17, 2016 Resolution
reinstating Demonteverde's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus; and February 16, 2017 Resolution denying GSIS' Motion
for Reconsideration of the February 17, 2016 Resolution. It alleges the
following issues in support of its petition:
I.
THE ASSAILED GSIS BOT DECISION IS FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND
NOT SUBJECT TO ANY MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR APPEAL.
II.
A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 IS NOT
AN ALTERNATE REMEDY FOR LOST APPEALS UNDER RULE 43 AND
THE TWO ACTIONS ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.
III.
THE ISSUES RAISED IN FORMER JUDGE DEMONTEVERDE'S PETITION
DO NOT AFFECT PUBLIC POLICY.
IV.
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS TAINTED WITH MANY
PROCEDURAL INFIRMITIES WHICH ARE FATAL TO THE PETITION.23
The main issue for resolution is whether the CA acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing its Resolution dated February 17, 2016 reinstating
Demonteverde's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus; and
Resolution dated February 16, 2017 denying GSIS BOT's Motion for
Reconsideration of the February 17, 2016 Resolution.
This Court resolves to grant the instant petition.
A special civil action for certiorari, under Rule 65, is an independent
action based on the specific grounds therein provided and will lie only
if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. 24 A petition for certiorari will prosper only
if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist.
"Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, refers to the arbitrary or
despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal
hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power
that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to
be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion,
the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.25
Having said this, there is a preliminary need to address the GSIS-BOT's
argument that Demonteverde should have filed an appeal under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court instead of filing the certiorari suit before the
CA.
A special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not be a
cure for failure to timely file an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.26 Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as
a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, especially if
such loss or lapse was occasioned by one's own neglect or error in the
choice of remedies.27 As this Court held in Butuan Development
Corporation v. CA:28
A party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the remedy of appeal. The existence
and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availability
of the special civil action of certiorari. Remedies of appeal (including
petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not
alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a
substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in
one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the
requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is
grave abuse of discretion.
Nonetheless, the general rule that an appeal and a certiorari are not
interchangeable admits of exceptions. This Court has, before, treated a
petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly:
(1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period
within which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors
of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to
justify the relaxation of rules.29
Likewise, in Department of Education v. Cuanan,30 where this Court
exercised liberality and considered the petition for certiorari filed
therein as an appeal, the Court identified exceptions to the general
rule. Thus:
The remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution issued by the CSC
is to file a petition for review thereof under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court within fifteen days from notice of the resolution. Recourse to a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 renders the petition dismissible for
being the wrong remedy. Nonetheless, there are exceptions to this
rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public
policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c)
when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned
order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
In the instant case, the CA itself, in its June 19, 2014 Resolution,
initially dismissed Demonteverde's special civil action for certiorari,
reasoning that Demonteverde had the remedy of appeal under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court. Citing the case of Madrigal Transport, Inc. v.
Lapanday Holdings Corporation,31 the CA thus said:
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action
for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including
petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not
alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a
substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in
one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the
requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefore is
grave abuse of discretion.
The CA even categorically ruled that the present circumstances in
Demonteverde's case did not warrant the application of the exceptions
to the general rule provided by Rule 43,32 thereafter proceeding to
identify the aforementioned procedural defects in the petition.
Yet, when the CA, upon Demonteverde's motion for reconsideration,
reversed itself and reinstated the latter's Petition for Certiorari,
Mandamus, and Prohibition in the assailed February 17, 2016
Resolution, it failed to substantiate its decision to grant the said motion
and set aside its June 19, 2014 Resolution. Apart from Demonteverde's
bare allegations in her pleadings and her own testimony that her case
falls under the exception to the general rule that if appeal is
available, certiorari is not a remedy, there is nothing on record that
27
would warrant the grant of her motion for reconsideration and the
setting aside of the CA's June 19, 2014 Resolution.
A reading of the CA's assailed February 16, 2017 Resolution reveals
that Demonteverde's motion for resolution of the CA's June 19, 2014
Resolution was approved hastily. While the CA appears to have ruled
on the merits of Demonteverde's motion, its ratiocination merely
consists of two paragraphs and it summarily made a conclusion that
Demonteverde's case may be classified as an exception to the general
rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. In doing so, the
CA did not clearly and distinctly explain how it reached such
conclusion. To wit:
In the case of Andrew James Mcburnie vs. Eulalio Ganzon, EGI-
Managers, Inc. and E. Ganzon, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the
Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines
in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that
dispenses it, for otherwise, court will be mere slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts
in rendering real justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the
other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate
language of Justice Makalintal, should give way to the realities of the
situation.
Applying the above-cited jurisprudence in Andrew James Mcburnie vs.
Eulalia Ganzon, EGI-Managers, Inc. and E. Ganzon, Inc. , and upon
perusal of the arguments contained in the instant Motion for
Reconsideration, there is basis to reconsider the dismissal of the
instant Petition. The Court agrees with petitioner, that the instant case
may be classified as an exception to the general rule that certiorari is
not a substitute for a lost appeal under any of the following grounds:
where appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy and
for certain special considerations as public welfare or public policy. In
this case, the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration on the assailed
GSIS decision maybe [sic] dispensed with on the same cited grounds
of public welfare and the advancement of public policy and in addition,
in the broader interests of justice.33
"Public policy" has a specific definition in jurisprudence. It has been
defined as that principle of the law which holds that no subject or
citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the
public of against public good. 34 It is the principle under which freedom
of contract or private dealing is restricted for the good of the
community.35
Demonteverde's claim of public policy as a justification of her inability
to comply with the general rule on appeal is unacceptable in the
absence of legal and factual bases for its invocation. The assumption
of the appellate court that Demonteverde could possibly face "a grim
prospect of a lengthy appeal as it is very likely that the resolution will
not happen during her lifetime as she is already seventy-three years
old" is inconsistent with the aforementioned definition of public policy.
Demonteverde failed to substantiate through clear and well-established
grounds exactly how her case warrants a deviation from the general
rule that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal
is available to an aggrieved party.
Moreover, Demonteverde failed to overcome in her petition the.
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions of
public officers. She failed to present clear and convincing evidence to
corroborate her claim that the notice of decision as regards the
October 10, 2013 Decision of the GSIS BOT failed to attach a copy of
the written decision.36 As petitioner GSIS BOT pointed out,
Demonteverde could not have claimed in her Motion for Execution -
which she ultimately attempted to withdraw - that the GSIS BOT
October 10, 2013 Decision had attained finality if she indeed had not
received a copy of it and read its full text.
In her Motion for Reconsideration37 of the CA's June 19, 2014
Resolution, Demonteverde claims that the GSIS BOT Decision had not
yet attained finality because the GSIS BOT "did not rule on the merits
of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration."38 To wit:
Petitioner's mode of appeal via Rule 65 of the Rules was guided by the
pronouncements of the court in the case of Page-Tenorio vs. Tenorio,
G.R. No. 138490, November 24, 2004. Her motion for partial
reconsideration and withdrawal of motion for execution dated 2
January 2014 was denied by respondents on a dubious technical
ground of having been filed out of time, without resolving on the
merits the reckoning period that were never taken up during the
proceedings, thus denying her due process. Petitioner was never
given a chance to be heard on the matter.39
While the CA gave credence to this claim and granted Demonteverde's
motion, this Court cannot sustain the CA's resolution.
It should be emphasized that the resort to a liberal application, or
suspension of the application of procedural rules, must remain as the
exception to the well-settled principle that rules must be complied with
for the orderly administration of justice.40 While procedural rules may
be relaxed in the interest of justice, it is well settled that these are
tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. The relaxation of
procedural rules in the interest of justice was never intended to be a
license for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. Liberality
in the interpretation and application of the rules can be invoked only in
proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While
litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice.41
Applying this to the instant case, there is nothing dubious about the
GSIS BOT's denial of her Partial Motion for Reconsideration and
Withdrawal of Motion for Execution on the ground that the said motion
was filed out of time. Demonteverde filed her Partial Motion for
Reconsideration and Withdrawal of Motion for Execution only on
January 6, 2014, fifty-six (56) days after November 11, 2013, which is
the date of receipt of the GSIS BOT Decision indicated in her Motion
for Execution, and forty-eight (48) days after November 19, 2013,
when she officially received a copy of the GSIS BOT Decision. Clearly,
Demonteverde had, by then, lost her right to question the Decision of
the GSIS BOT through a motion for reconsideration or through any
other form of appeal. Thus, the CA should have dismissed her petition
outright on the ground of erroneous cause of action as the remedies of
appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or cumulative.
This Court likewise rejects Demonteverde's assertion that she was
never given a chance to be heard on the matter. On the contrary, the
records show that she was given ample opportunity to present her
retirement claims and her arguments before the GSIS COC, the GSIS
BOT, and the CA. In fact, the GSIS BOT even approved her request to
retire under R.A. No. 8291 for her period of services outside the
Judiciary from July 1, 1963 to June 29, 1995. The only issue that
protracted the instant case is Demonteverde's single-minded insistence
that the accrual date of her retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291
should be the date when she reached sixty (60) years of age, even.
when she was still in active government service at that time, and not
on February 22, 2011, or the date of her actual retirement from
government service.
To give merit to this argument would be preposterous.
The reason for providing retirement benefits is to compensate service
to the government. Retirement benefits to government employees are
part of emolument to encourage and retain qualified employees in the
government service. These benefits are meant to reward them for
giving the best years of their lives in the service of their country.42
However, the right to retirement benefits accrues only upon certain
prerequisites. First, the conditions imposed by the applicable law must
be fulfilled. Second, there must be actual retirement.43 Prior to
retirement, an employee who has served the requisite number of
years, such as Demonteverde, is only eligible for, but not yet
entitled to, retirement benefits.44 Retirement means there is a
bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between the
employer and the employees whereby the latter after reaching a
certain age agrees and/or consents to sever his or her
employment with the former.45
Severance of employment is a condition sine qua non for the release of
28
retirement benefits. Retirement benefits are not meant to recompense
employees who are still in the employ of the government; that is the
function of salaries and emoluments. Retirement benefits are in the
nature of a reward granted by the State to a government employee
who has given the best years of his life to the service of his country.
While Demonteverde met the two conditions for entitlement to benefits
under R.A. No. 8291 in 2001, i.e., she had rendered at least fifteen
(15) years in government service as a regular member, and she turned
sixty (60) years of age, she continued to serve the government and did
not, at that time, sever her employment with the government. Thus,
not having retired from service when she turned 60 on February 22,
2001, she cannot claim that her right to retirement benefits had
already accrued then.
In fine, this Court finds it proper to emphasize that Demonteverde's
filing of separate retirement claims for her government service outside
of the Judiciary and in the Judiciary was unnecessary and
unwarranted. Apart from the fact that she continued to serve the
government as a trial court judge after serving the NEA, the DBP, and
the PAO for a total of 32 years, her service in these government
agencies is creditable as part ofher overall government service for
retirement purposes under R.A. No. 910, as amended.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 910, as amended by R.A. No. 9946, provides:
SECTION 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a
Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit
court, or any other court hereafter established who has rendered at
least fifteen (15) years service in the Judiciary or in any other
branch of the Government, or in both, (a) retires for having
attained the age of seventy years x x x he/she shall receive during the
residue of his/her natural life, in the manner hereinafter provided, the
salary which plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation,
representation and other allowances such as personal economic relief
allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance which
he/she was receiving at the time of his/her retirement x x x
Considering the express wordings of R.A. No. 910, which include
service "in any other branch of the Government" as creditable service
in the computation of the retirement benefits of a justice or judge,
Demonteverde's years of service as in the NEA, the DBP, and the PAO
were already correctly credited by the OCA as part of her government
service when it granted her retirement application for her service in
the Judiciary from June 30, 1995 until her retirement on February 22,
2011.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the
petition and NULLIFIES AND SETS ASIDE the Resolutions dated
February 17, 2016 and February 16, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 08362 for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and DISMISSES the Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and
Prohibition under Rule 65 dated March 21, 2014 of private respondent
Ma. Lorna P. Demonteverde, former Judge of the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Bacolod City, which sought to set aside the October 10, 2013
Decision and Resolution No. 12 dated February 13, 2014 of the GSIS
BOT.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 203797-98, June 27, 2018
CARMENCITA O. REYES, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST
DIVISION), OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order, seeking to set aside the Resolutions dated February 29,
20122 and August 13, 20123 of the First (1st) Division of the
Sandiganbayan in Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0089 to 0101 and SB-11-
CRM-0111 to 0113. The said Resolution dated February 29, 2012
denied petitioner's Urgent Omnibus Motion dated July 19, 2011, 4 while
the Resolution dated August 13, 20125 denied the Motion for
Reconsideration thereof.
THE ANTECEDENTS
This case stemmed from the investigation of various transactions of
the famous P728,000,000.00 fertilizer fund allegedly involving public
officers from the Department of Agriculture (DA) and others.
On July 9, 2008, the Task Force Abono, Field Investigation Office (FIO)
of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint 6 with the Office of
the Ombudsman against some persons which included petitioner
Carmencita O. Reyes (Reyes).
Reyes was charged for alleged violation of Article 220 (Illegal Use of
Public Funds or Property, commonly known as Technical Malversation)
of Act 3135, otherwise known as the "Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines" (RPC); and Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."
Thereafter, Reyes then filed a consolidated counter affidavit 7 upon
which Task Force Abono filed its Reply8 on November 26, 2008.
Based on the said Complaint, the Ombudsman filed two (2)
Informations against Reyes, one for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 30199 docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-11-CRM-0100; and the
other for violation of Article 220 of the RPC10 docketed as Criminal
Case No. SB-11-CRM-0113, both of which were allegedly committed
during the incumbency of Reyes as Provincial Governor of Marinduque.
The Informations were consolidated into one case with the First (1st)
Division of the Sandiganbayan (Sandiganbayan). The accusatory
portion of the said Informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. SB-11-CRM-0100
That on or about the period covering 30 April to 08 December 2004, or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
CARMENCITA O. REYES, a high ranking official being then the
Governor of the Province of Marinduque, DENNIS B. ARAULLO, a high
ranking official being a Regional Executive Director with Salary Grade
28, RODOLFO M. GUIEB, MARIE PAZ JASMINE M. CABUCOL,
RAYMUNDO E. BRAGANZA, GROVER L. DINO, DORY A. IRANZO,
ABELARDO BRAGAS, FELIX RAMOS, OFELIA MONTILLA and
GREGORIO SANGALANG; all of the Department of Agriculture Regional
Field Unit IV (DA-RFU IV), while in the performance of their official
functions and committing the offense in relation to their office, taking
advantage of their official positions, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, acting with manifest partiality and
evident bad faith or through gross inexcusable negligence, at the very
least, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause
undue injury to the government, through the issuance of Bids and
Awards Committee (BAC) Resolution No. 290, dated 30 April 2004,
upon the order of accused REYES as evidenced by her letter and
purchase requests dated 30 April 2004 and 03 May 2004, respectively,
which requests have induced the accused DA-RFU IV employees to
transact with LCV Design and Fabrication Corporation (LCV), with
accused REMUS C. VILLANUEVA as president, in whose favor the
purchase order and payment for one (1) unit Shredding Machine, one
(1) unit Hammermill/Shifter, one (1) unit Pelletizer and one (1) unit
Tornado Brush Chipper/Shredder as listed under Purchase Order No.
119-04, dated 05 May 2004, duly signed by accused MARIE PAZ
JASMINE M. CABUCOL, amounting to Five Million Pesos
(Php5,000,000.00), Philippine currency, charged against the Farm
Input Fund for the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani Program of the DA as
29
covered by SARO No. E-04-00164, has been awarded by accused BAC
Members ABELARDO BRAGAS, FELIX RAMOS, OFELIA MONTILLA and
GREGORIO SANGGALANG; without the conduct of a public bidding,
thereby resorting to Direct Contracting, thus, giving said corporation
unwarranted benefit, preference or advantage, knowing fully well that
at the time of procurement, the patent application of said corporation
for the equipment purchased has not yet been approved as evidenced
by a notation "Subject to the condition that the patent will be
approved by the Bureau of Patent. Patent of the ff: 12) Shredding
Machine 2) Hammermill 3) Pelletizer 4) Brush Chipper" appearing on
Disbursement Voucher Nos. 2004-07-2941 dated 30 July 2004, and
2004-12-6056 dated 08 December 2004, duly signed by accused
DENNIS B. ARAULLO, RODOLFO M. GUIEB and RAYMUNDO E.
BRAGANZA, hence, said corporation cannot as yet then be considered
as the exclusive distributor of the equipment purchased and public
bidding should have been conducted, aside from the fact that the
purchase of said equipment was not in accordance with the purpose
for which said funds as covered by SARO No. E-04-00164 has been
appropriated, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the
amount of Five Million Pesos(Php5,000,000.00), Philippine currency,
covered by check nos. 270843-CL dated 30 July 2004 as signed by
accused DORY A. IRANZO and DENNIS B. ARAULLO and 274415-CL
dated 08 December 2004 as signed by accused GROVER L. DINO and
DENNIS B. ARAULLO.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
Criminal Case No. SB-11-CRM-0113
That from the period covering 30 April to 08 December 2004, or for
some time prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
CARMENCITA O. REYES, a high ranking public officer being then the
Governor and now the Representative of the Province of Marinduque,
DENNIS B. ARAULLO, also a high ranking public officer being the
Regional Executive Director (Salary Grade 28), Department of
Agriculture-Regional Field Unit No. IV, RODOLFO M. GUIEB, MARIE
PAZ JASMINE M. CABUCOL, RAYMUNDO E. BRAGANZA, GROVER L.
DINO, DORY A IRANZO, ABELARDO BRAGAS, FELIX RAMOS, OFELIA
MONTILLA and GREGORIO SANGALANG, all employees of the
Department of Agriculture Regional Field Unit IV (DA-RFU IV), being
the OIC-Regional Executive Director (Salary Grade 26), Chief
Accountant (Salary Grade 15), Regional Accountant (Salary Grade 18),
Cashier I, Cashier IV-B (Salary Grade 14), members of the Bids and
Awards Committee-CALABARZON, respectively, and as such is
responsible/accountable for the P5,000,000.00 which they received
from DA-Central Office by reason of their office, which amount is part
of the P728 Million Fertilizer Fund released by the Department of
Budget and Management to the Department of Agriculture under SARO
No. E-04-00164 dated February 3, 2004 and allocated by Republic Act
No. 8435, otherwise known as the "Agricultural and Fisheries
Modernization Act (AFMA)  for the purchase of fertilizer by the
identified beneficiaries/proponent in different regions of the country in
line with the "Ginintuang Masaganang Ani Program" of the Department
of Agriculture, while in the performance of their official functions and
committing the offense in relation to their office, taking advantage of
their official positions, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, either by awarding the transaction to LCV Design and
Fabrication Corporation through Bids and Awards Committee
Resolution No. 290, dated 30 April 2004, signing, certifying, or
approving, Purchase Request 119-04, dated 05 May 2004,
Disbursement Voucher Nos. 2004-07-2941, dated 30 July 2004, and
2004-12-6056, dated 08 December 2004, and Check Nos. 270843-CL,
dated 30 July 2004, or accepting the items delivered by LCV Design
and Fabrication Corporation , did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously allow/cause the diversion/conversion of the said
P5,000,000.00 fertilizer fund for the purpose for which it was intended,
i.e. purchase of fertilizer, by purchasing, upon request/inducement of
accused Reyes and in fact she received, one (1) unit Shredding
Machine, one unit (1) unit Hammermill/Shifter, one (1) unit Pelletizer
and one (1) unit Tornado Brush Chipper/Shredder from LCV Design
and Fabrication Corporation, without the benefit of public bidding and
knowing fully well that the equipment purchase was not in accordance
with the purpose for which the fund was appropriated under Republic
Act No. 8435, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.12
On July 19, 2011, Reyes filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion (For Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause and Deferment of Arraignment set
for 28 July 2011)13 in the anti-graft case, and another Urgent Omnibus
Motion (For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; and Deferment
of/Holding in Abeyance the Arraignment) on September 12, 201114 in
the technical malversation case.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) filed a Consolidated
Opposition/Comment dated August 18, 201115 and an
Opposition/Comment dated October 5, 2011 16 upon which Reyes filed
her Consolidated Reply.17
In a Resolution dated February 29, 2012,18 the Sandiganbayan
resolved the said Urgent Omnibus Motions denying both motions. The
said Resolution dated February 12, 2012 disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court hereby
resolves as follows:
xxxx
7. To FIND THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS to issue warrant of
arrest against accused Reyes [herein Petitioner] in Crim. Cases No. SB-
11-CRM-0100 and No. SB-11-CRM-0113; x x x.
However, considering that the accused had already posted their bail
bonds, the Court will no longer issue a warrant of arrest against them.
xxxx
SO ORDERED." 19
On March 29, 2012, Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration20 of the
said Resolution dated Febn1ary 29, 2012. However, it was denied in a
Resolution dated August 13, 2012.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Reyes submits the following issues for Our Resolution:
1. Does the evidence, relied on by the Ombudsman, justify the
conclusion that there is probable cause to charge the
petitioner for the violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019,
as amended?
2. Does the evidence, relied on by the Ombudsman, justify the
conclusion that there is probable cause to charge the
petitioner for the Illegal Use of Public Funds/Technical
Malversation under Article 220 of the RPC?
3. Did the respondent court commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied
the assertion of the petitioner that no probable cause exists
for either case?
4. Is the petitioner entitled to injunctive relief?21
30
In the petition, Reyes argues that there is no probable cause to charge
her for the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. 22 She claims that
among the elements to hold a person criminally liable under Sec. 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019, no other element is present in this case except that
she was a public officer.23 She explains that the primary evidence as
per Information, i.e. the letter request24 and the purchase
request,25 merely show the letter is simply a request and the purchase
request shows on its face that it was the DA officials who made the
same. Reyes likewise claims that no real evidence of conspiracy was
found or established by the evidence.26
Moreover, Reyes argues that there is no probable cause to charge her
under Article 220 of the RPC. 27 She claims that she is not the
administrator of the funds in question with whom it remains.28 She
further claims that nothing of inducement is stated in the letter
request29 She concluded in accordance with Article 220 of the RPC, it is
already clear that not all the elements of the crime charged are met.30
Reyes further argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied
her assertion that no probable cause exists for either case. Reyes
assails the Sandigabayan's reliance on the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee Report being not part of the record of the case and
considers it hearsay, as well as the finding that the "arguments
propounded by the accused-movants reveal that they are matters of
defense."31
Ruling of this Court
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it bears to stress that a certiorari proceeding is limited in
scope and narrow in character. The special civil action for certiorari lies
only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari will issue only
to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in
the findings or conclusions of the lower court.32
After a careful and thorough review of the facts and the issue at hand,
as well as the law and jurisprudence pertinent thereto, this Court finds
that the First Division of the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
the denied peititioner's Urgent Omnibus Motion/s (For Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause).
As to the first two issues, Reyes contends that the letter request and
purchase request are incomplete to show that the elements are
present for charges of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and
Article 220 of the RPC, further claiming no evidence to show
conspiracy.
We are not persuaded.
In this case, Reyes's contentions are matters of defense that should be
resolved in a trial.
As public respondent correctly contends:
At first glance and on its face, petitioner Reyes' request had the
appearance of being regular. But after a careful analysis, her request
was actually inducing and/or even ordering the DA to procure the
subject equipments from the LCV as the latter, according to petitioner
Reyes, was "the inventor, manufacturer and exclusive distributor "
thereof. Indeed, petitioner Reyes' mere mention in her letter of the
name "LCV" as the alleged "inventor; manufacturer and exclusive
distributor" of the equipment could be considered as a strong
indication that she seriously wanted DA to procure the equipments
with LCV. As a matter of fact, in the Purchase Request dated May 3,
2004, and the Requisition and Issue Slip dated May 5, 2004, petitioner
Reyes had categorically mentioned the brand name "TORNADO" Brush Thus, We once more find favor m the Resolution of the
Chipper/ Shredder, which was the brand claimed to be exclusively Sandiganbayan, viz:
distributed by LCV Moreover, no less than her co-respondents in the
case, the DA FRFU-IV employees, in their Joint-Counter-Affidavit,
The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office
openly alleged that the proponents, petitioner Reyes included, had a
of the Ombudsman when it found probable cause to file the
direct hand in the purchase of the equipments, viz:
Information against the accused in these cases. x x x It is noteworthy
that aside from its own exhaustive investigation, the Office of the
11.) With respect to paragraph 13, it must be pointed out that the four Ombudsman also referred to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
(4) proponents (Congressmen Nanette Daza, Federico Sandoval, and Report to supplement its findings of probable cause, on the basis of
Oscar Gozos, and Governor Carmencita Reyes) not only had direct which the investigating prosecutors were able to determine that an
hand in the questioned transactions but much more than that. They offense had probably been committed and that the accused probably
were not only ordinary proponents or endorsers of the farm perpetrated it.37
implements in question, but they actually initiated the transactions in
question as borne out by their respective letters to Respondent Dennis
On the basis of these findings, the Sandiganbayan cannot be said to
B. Araullo, then the Regional Executive Director of the DA RFU No. IV
have committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
The four (4) elective public officials concerned categorically and
of jurisdiction when it denied Reyes's assertion that no probable cause
unmistakably manifested in their respective letters the extent of their
exists for both cases.In a petition for certiorari, the public respondent
participation and the fact their sole determination of the specifications
acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to
(and even the supplier) of the items purchased, purpose and
determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the
justification why the various farm implements or machines were
respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case,
purchased for their constituencies, ...33
oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of
discretion where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical,
From the foregoing, it is shown that the letter request and purchase arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be
request are enough to engender a well-founded belief that the crime said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is
charged may have been committed by Reyes and that any assertion by not enough.38 Here, there is none.WHEREFORE, the Petition
Reyes that negates the complication of the documents are matters of is DENIED. The Resolutions dated February 29, 2012 and August 13,
defense. Besides, the Requisition and Issue Slip34 dated May 5, 2004, 2012 of the First (1st) Division of the Sandiganbayan in Case Nos. SB-
as alluded to by the Ombudsman, would show that petitioner Reyes 11-CRM-0089 to 0101, and SB-11-CRM-0111 to 0113 insofar as the
had categorically mentioned the brand name "TORNADO" Brush petitioner in this case is concerned, are AFFIRMED.
Chipper/Shredder, which was the brand claimed to be exclusively
distributed by LCV Design and Fabrication Corporation. On this score,
SO ORDERED.
said connections can also establish probable cause which the
Sandiganbayan may disprove during the trial. Under these
circumstances, We concur with the Sandiganbayan as it aptly found,
thus:

A judicious reading of the arguments propounded by the accused-

movants reveal that they are matters of defense which should be
ventilated during the trial proper. Indubitably, whether or not undue
injury was caused or unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
was extended to any party when direct contracting was resorted to
instead of public bidding in the acquisition of the subject equipment
from LCV in the case of DA RFU IV, and whether or not said supplier
was indeed its exclusive distributor of the equipment which could be
considered as farm inputs/farm implements to fall under the category
provided under the GMA program, and which in effect would help
settle the issue if there was illegal use of public funds or not, are
matters of defense which are not relevant considerations during the
initial stage of the proceedings.35

As to the third issue, Reyes contends that the Sandiganbayan

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied her assertion that no probable cause exists
for both cases. In addition to her previous contentions, Reyes assails
the Sandigabayan's reliance on the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Report being not part of the record of the case and considers it
hearsay. She considers such as highly irregular and improper for the
Sandiganbayan to have used the findings of such report as bases for
upholding the existence of probable cause.36

Reyes's contention is misplaced.

It must be emphasized that the Ombudsman itself conducted its own

preliminary investigation in this case. It was during this investigation
that the Ombudsman, faced with the facts and circumstances extant
herein, was led to believe that (1) a crime has been committed; and
(2) there is probable cause that Reyes was guilty thereof. That the
Ombudsman referred to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Report as
additional basis for its findings does nothing to refute the validity of
the preliminary investigation, the evidence gathered therein, or the
conclusion of the Ombudsman after that investigation.

31