TORT LAW 2022/2023

WEEK 4

CAUSATION & REMOTENESS

Essential Reading

P Giliker, Tort (Sweet and Maxwell, 7th Ed, 2020) Chapter 6.

Further Reading
Horsey & Rackley, Tort Law (OUP, 7th Ed 2021) Chapter 9

LECTURE 10

2 parts remoteness and intervention

1. Remoteness
a. Cannot recover if losses and breach are to far removed
b. Old rule
i. Defendant liable for all direct physical consequnences of their negligent
1. Did not matter if it was forseeable or far removed, if it
2. Re polemis and furness
a. Emlpyes, moving thing s in ship, plank fell below deck
which caused spark then explosion and then destroyed
paryt of ship, def argued that plank falling and cousing
explosing was not foreseeable.
b. Court held that it was not remote
2. Current rule

Reasonably foreseeably of damage of that kind if the d failed to take reasonable care

i. Overseat tankship (the wagon mound)

1. Furnace oil had spilled and oil travled for days and reached a place
where they were welding and caused flaim
2. Not forseeable that oil on water would cause that damage
3. • “[T]he essential factor in determining liability is whether the
damage is of such a kind as the reasonable man should have
foreseen”
4. • “After the event, even a fool is wise. But it is not the hindsight of a
fool; it is the foresight of the reasonable man which alone can
determine responsibility
ii. Only type of dharm needs to be forseeable. Not the extent of the harm or
the way it occurred
iii. How should a type or kind of harm to be interpereted? Broadly or narrowly
b. Hughes v lord advocate
 i. Type or kind of harm that was foreseeable as a result of leaving lamps
unattended was burning. Therefore boy’s injuries not too remote & the
defendant was liable.
ii. Defs were working on a manhole and later covered it and put lit lamps
around it to alet people. Kid pucks up the lamps and child fell and gasses
ignited,
iii. Defs argued that it was not forseeable that child would do that and would
not get burned
iv. Injury was burning and the lamps were to cuase burns and he got burned so
ti was forseeable
v. “No doubt it was not to be expected that the injuries would be as serious as
those which the appellant in fact sustained. But a defender is liable,
although the damage may be a good deal greater in extent than was
foreseeable. He can only escape liability if the damage can be regarded as
differing in kind from what was foreseeable.”
c. Bradford v robinson s rentals
i. He got frostbite, he argued that frostbite is not usual in uk. Court
disagreed, because common cold and pneumonia is common from the cold
then frostbite is an extension of that and
d. Jolley v Sutton London
i. Boat unattended. 2 boys decided to fix it. One on top other on bottom. The
boat fell on the one on bottom. Argument was that the way and manner
that the injury was not forseeable. As long as the type of injury was
forseeable it does not matter how it happened
ii. • Neither the precise way in which a harm occurred or the extent of it
needed to be foreseeable. Only type/kind of harm needed to be
foreseeable.. “Some physical injury” foreseeable therefore harm not too
remote.
e. Dougthy v turner manufacturing co ltd
i. Narrowly decided forseeablility
ii. Claimant wand defs were walking with chemicals, one fell vat of hot
chemicals, and boiled and exploded and hurt the claimant, looked at the
extent of the harm, what is forseeable is a splash and not a explosion,
iii. • No liability: injury by “explosion” was too different to be the same risk as
the “perils from splashing.
f. • Cf Vacwell Engineering Co Ltd v BDH Chemicals Ltd [1971] 1 QB 88.
i. Made glassware for defs. Glassware was supposed to have safety warning.
Def whil cleaning it with water and chemicals caused it to explode, one died
ii. Type of harm is burning, way of happenting des not matter and extent
does not matter
g. Tremain v pike
i. Negligently let rats getting the farm, claimant (employe) suffered wells
disease, took him to court. Issue Wheater wails disseas was weather it was
to remote? Court said that what is forseeable to the rats, is rat bites or rat
urine diseases. As result the claimant lost the case. What is important is
the kind of harm. If kind of harm is not forseeable it is remote.
ii. Distinguished bradford, the problem was the extent (the most sever of the
type of harm) while weils disease is diffentent than the bite.
3. Remoteness : egg shell-skull rule (part 2)
a. Once type of damage is foreseeable, the defendant is liable for all damages caused
even where the extent of damage is not foreseeable. This include where C suffers
more harm than might be expected owing to existing susceptibilities/weakness.
b. • Smith v Leech Brain & Co Ltd [1962].
i. Claimant had precancer condition (precipitable to cancer) was exposed by
employer to chemicals and burned his lip, caused him to get cancer, and his
death. They argued they were not liable for the severe consequences. As
long as harm is foreseeable, whatever then happens because of the harm
falls on you
ii. Claimant takes victom as he is
c. Robinson v Post Office [1974] 2 All ER 737
i. Def negligently injured claimant, and had to get tetnous shot, he was allergic
to needles, such accident it is forseeable that it would require tetnous shot
which requreis needle
d. • Great Lakes Steamship Co v Maple Leaf Milling Co (1924) 41 TLR 21. The
i. Lighten ship, the defendants did not lighten the ship negligently, lowering
water, unknowning to all, the anchor destroyed the ship, ship would come
to the bottom (harm) ship breaking is the extent so it he is liable
4. Novus Actus interventines
a. Intervention such that the damage suffered is obvious that the new intervention
caused it
b. Act of nature
i. The subsequent natural event must be something overwhelming and
unpredictable, such that it cannot be said that the defendant acting earlier
in time had an obligation to take care to avoid it
ii. Carslogie Steamship Co Ltd v Royal Norwegian Government [1952] AC 292.
1. • Defendants were only liable for the loss of profit caused by
collision but not for damage caused by the storm. The storm broke
the chain of causation.
2. Damaged ship, takent to us to get fixed, stomr caused more
damage, only liable for the damage caused bt the collison not the
storm
c. Intervention by 3rd party
i. If it is likely to happen it will be continuation if it is unlikely to happen it
will be novus actus
ii. Subsequent criminal act may break the chain of causation and be deemed a
novus actus interveniens.
iii. • Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1920]
1. • Subsequent negligent act is unlikely to break the chain of
causation where they are very likely to happen owing to defendant’s
negligence.
iv. • Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970]. •
1. Boys actions did not break the chain between the guard’s
negligence and the damage to the claimant’s yacht. Destruction
“very likely to happen” as a result of negligence.
v. Rouse v squers
 1. Car crashed into truck, third truck, stoped, fouth truck hit third and
killed,
2. Original driver liable. Crash by 4th driver a “reasonable likelihood” of
the original accident
3. Both shared liablity
vi. • Knightley v Johns [1982] CA.
1. Police to other police to block road by going in the wrong direction.
A car hit the police care and died.
2. Breacking the chain of causation of car chase because not forseeable
for police to give wrong info
vii. Wrote v lodge
1. Car stopped and she tried to restart. Lorry going over speed limit, hit
her, caused injury to passenger, also flipped to other side of road
and hit car.
2. Car driver was joined liable using the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act
1978 • The car driver was found to have been negligent in not
pushing the car to the hard shoulder, and was ordered to pay 10% of
her passenger's damages. However, with respect to the injuries to
the other claimants, the lorry driver was found to have broken the
chain of causation that went back to the car driver and should
therefore be held wholly responsible for the compensation that had
to be paid to them.
d. Medical negligace
i. • Subsequent medical negligence will not be held to be a novus actus unless
it is gross or egregious in nature. • Wright (A Child) v Cambridge Medical
Group (A Partnership) [2011] In cases of successive negligent acts,
intervening medical negligence would not ordinarily break the chain of
causation unless it were gross or egregious. • Webb v Barclays Bank [2001].
The doctor's actions did not break the chain of causation, but the Bank was
entitled to a contribution from the Trust to reflect the proportion of pain,
suffering and loss of amenity caused by them.
e. Intervention by claimant
i. A very unreasonable and unforeseeable subsequent action taken by the
claimant s necessary to break chain of causation and constitute novus actus
interveniens.
ii. • McKew v Holland & Hannan & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd [1969].
1. • if the injured man acts unreasonably, he cannot hold the defender
liable for injury caused by his own unreasonable conduct. His
unreasonable conduct is novus actus interveniens.
2. Claimant jumped to lessen the injury and broke his ankle
iii. Whyland v
1. Claimant injured def, needed to wear brace, they could not wear
glasses and fell down the stairs. She was careful and actions was not
unreasonable
iv. Reeves v commissioner of plice
1. Police held liable, police has responsibility that claimant does not
harm himself in custody (he killed himself)
LEGAL CAUSATION

We can break the rules of legal causation into two parts:

1. Remoteness – C cannot recover losses which are regarded as too remote or too far removed
from the D’s breach.

2. Novus actus interveniens – there will be no recovery where there was an intervening event or
act between the D’s breach and C being injured which is viewed as breaking the chain of
causation.

a. Remoteness

Old Rule:

Re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co Ltd 1921

Overruled by Overseas Tankship (UK) v Morts Dock and Engineering Co (The Wagon Mound) No 1
[1961] PC

The basic test is one of reasonable foreseeability. A claimant can recover so long as it was reasonably
foreseeable that she may suffer losses of that kind if the defendant failed to take reasonable care.
Here, C can be denied recovery on the basis that the kind of harm/injury/loss suffered is a very
unusual or remote consequence of D’s conduct.

Overseas Tankship (UK) v Morts Dock and Engineering Co (The Wagon Mound) No 1 [1961] PC

This is seemingly more defendant friendly rule.

What matters is that the type/kind of damage is foreseeable not the extent of damage suffered, or the
way it occurred.

Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963]

Bradford v Robinson Rentals Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 267

Jolley v Sutton London Borough Council [1998] 1 WLR 1546 (CA); [2000] 1 WLR 1082 (HL).

However, kind/type of loss has been construed narrowly.

Tremain v Pike [1969] 3 All ER 1303

Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Co Ltd [1964] 1 QB 518. Cf Vacwell Engineering Co Ltd v BDH
Chemicals Ltd [1971] 1 QB 88

See also, Alexis v Newham London Borough Council [2009] ICR 1517]

The Eggshell/thin skull rule

Once type of damage is foreseeable, the defendant is liable for all damages caused even where the
extent is not foreseeable. This include where C suffers more harm than might be expected owing to
existing susceptibilities/weakness. This is called Egg-shell/thin skull rule. Essentially, the defendant
must take the claimant ‘as he found him’.

Smith v Leech Brain & Co Ltd [1962]

Robinson v Post Office [1974] 2 All ER 737.

Great Lakes Steamship Co v Maple Leaf Milling Co (1924) 41 TLR 21.

b. Novus actus interveniens – Intervening Acts

A subsequent occurrence between the defendant’s action and the claimant’s harm; which is of such
significance that the law deems it to break the link between the two and be itself the true cause of the
claimant’s harm.

i. Act of Nature
The subsequent natural event must be something overwhelming and unpredictable, such that it cannot
be said that the defendant acting earlier in time had an obligation to take care to avoid it.

Carslogie Steamship Co Ltd v Royal Norwegian Government [1952] AC 292.

ii. Intervening acts of 3rd parties

Subsequent criminal act may break the chain of causation and be deemed a novus actus interveniens.

Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1920]

Subsequent negligent act is unlikely to break the chain of causation where they are very likely to
happen owing to defendant’s negligence.

Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970]

Rouse v Squires [1973]

Compare with:

Knightley v Johns [1982] CA

Subsequent reckless conduct may be considered as novus actus interveniens.

Wright v Lodge [1993]

Subsequent medical negligence will not be held to be a novus actus interveniens unless it is gross or
egregious in nature.

Webb v Barclays Bank [2001].

Wright (A Child) v Cambridge Medical Group (A Partnership) [2011]

iii. Intervening acts of the claimant

An unreasonable and unforeseeable subsequent act of the claimant is necessary to break chain of
causation to constitute novus actus interveniens.

McKew v Holland & Hannan & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd [1969].

Wieland v Cyril Lord Carpets Ltd [1969] 3 All ER 1006.

Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd [2008].

Compare with:

Reeves v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2000].

SUMMARY

So, once duty and breach are proved, a C will be able to recover compensation for his losses provided:

1. He would not have suffered the loss but for the D’s negligence (Exceptions in Bonnington;
McGhee/Fairchild).

2. It was reasonably foreseeable that breach might cause him to suffer losses of that kind, and no
intervening event or act is to be regarded as having broken the chain of causation