Professional Documents
Culture Documents
(Strict Liability)
Law of torts seeks to achieve what is called distributive justice, where the person
responsible for the injury caused to the plaintiff has to bear the burden.
If the defendant is responsible, i.e., is at fault, he has to compensate the plaintiff, and
thus bear the burden.
If the plaintiff is responsible he should bear the burden.
If both are at fault, they should share the burden.
If neither of them is at fault, the plaintiff has to bear the loss.
Further, law of torts does not hold the defendant liable for any loss that may be caused to
the plaintiff on account of defendant’s act. The loss must be caused due to breach of
some legal duty on the part of the defendant towards the plaintiff (damnum sine injuria
and injuria sine damno).
During the development of law of torts, distinction between two general classes of duties
came to be recognised:
1. Duties not to injure intentionally, recklessly or negligently. - Fault Liabilty
2. Duties not to injure simpliciter. - No Fault Liability.
When a person is engaged in a duty of normal risk, he has the duty not to injure
intentionally, etc. But, when he is engaged in an activity which is regarded by law as
inherently and extremely dangerous, such as handling explosives, there is a duty not to
injure simpliciter.
A distinction is made in tort between fault liability and strict liability:
Fault liability – someone is only liable if they are at fault in some way, e.g. acting
negligently.
Strict liability – even though someone has not done anything wrong (i.e. there is
no fault) they are liable. The principle of strict liability applies in some statutes
and in the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.
In Rylands v. Fletcher, the defendant got a reservoir constructed, through independent
contractors, over his land for providing water to his mill. There were old disused shafts
under the site of the reservoir, which the contractors failed to observe and so did not
block them. When the water was filled in the reservoir, it burst through the shafts and
flooded the plaintiff’s coal-mines on the adjoining land. The defendant did not know of
the shafts and had not been negligent although the independent contractors had been.
Even though the defendant had not been negligent, he was held liable.
D's Reservoir
Flooding of C’s mine
Mine Shaft
The rule in Rylands v Fletcher was set out by Blackburn J at first instance:
‘… the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps
there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and if he
does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural
consequence of its escape’.
The House of Lords added that the defendant’s use of land must be non-natural. The
principle of strict liability has some defences available. Rylands v Fletcher must be
considered alongside nuisance. They both deal with activities on land which affect other
land. To sue under these torts a person needs an interest in land.
The defendant must bring something on to his land. There is no liability for things which
are naturally on the land e.g. weeds growing naturally which are blown from the
defendant’s land on to neighbouring land.
It must be something which is likely to do mischief. This covers not only inherently
dangerous things e.g. chemicals, gas, electricity, fire, explosives, a lion, etc. but also
normally safe things which can cause damage if they escape e.g. water, strips of metal
foil. In Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2003] Lord Bingham said that it had to be shown
that the defendant ought to have recognised that there was ‘an exceptionally high risk of
danger or mischief if there should be an escape’.
The claimant must establish that the defendant’s use of land is non-natural.
‘Non-natural’ use means something which is not an ordinary use of land. What is an
‘ordinary’ use will depend on all the circumstances.
What is ordinary use will also change over time e.g. using electricity for domestic
purposes is now an ordinary use but would not have been 100 years ago.
In Rickards v Lothian [1913] Lord Moulton said that the use of land must bring increased
danger to others and is not merely ordinary use or use for ‘the general benefit of the
community’.
However, in Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather [1994] Lord Goff said
that storing chemicals in industrial premises was a ‘non-natural’ use. He added that if
something was a benefi t to the community it did not make it a natural use.
In Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2003] Lord Hoffmann said
that in deciding if something is a non-natural use, ask if the damage was something which
the occupier could reasonably be expected to have insured against. The result would be
that if insurance should have been taken out it would not be a non-natural use.
Damage is foreseeable
The original rule imposed strict liability. The decision in the next case added the
requirement that damage had to be foreseeable.
Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994]
The defendant leather company used a chemical solvent in its tanning process
until 1976. Over the years some of this was spilt on the concrete floor. The
chemical seeped into the soil and went into the claimant’s borehole, which was
over one mile away (over one kilometre) from the tannery and contaminated the
water. The contamination was only discovered in 1983 when new regulations
required testing the water. The claimants had to drill a new borehole at a cost of
£1m. The House of Lords said that to claim under Rylands v Fletcher
foreseeability of damage had to be proved. At the time the solvent was brought
onto the land the defendants could not foresee that it would damage the
claimant’s water supply and the defendants were not liable.
The test of foreseeability is that at the time the thing was brought onto the land the
defendant had to foresee that, if it escaped, it would cause the particular type of damage
which was suffered. In the Cambridge Water case it was foreseeable that the solvent
might cause some damage but not damage to the claimant’s water supply over a mile
away.