Section- V

Principles of Strict Liability/Absolute Liability

Introduction

In law, strict liability is a standard for liability which may exist in either as criminal or civil law context.
So, the concept of strict liability can be found in criminal law, contract law as well as in tort law. A rule
specifying strict liability makes a person legally responsible for the damage and loss caused by his/her
acts and omissions regardless of culpability (including fault in criminal law terms, typically the presence
of mens rea). Under strict liability, there is no requirement to prove fault, negligence or intention. That
is how it is a strict liability. Strict liability is prominent in tort law especially, in the instances of leakage
of hazardous materials, flooding and product liability.

“Anyone who in the course of non-natural use of his land, accumulates thereon for his own purposes
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes is answerable for all direct damage thereby caused” (Rylands
v. Fletcher1). Strict liability is a kind of automatic responsibility (without having to prove negligence) for
damages done due to possession of equipments, materials which are inherently dangerous such as petrol,
gas, water, explosives, wild animals, poisonous snakes or assault weapons. The list is not closed. The
keeper keeps them at his own peril. A strict liability tort holds a person or entity responsible for
unintended consequences of his actions or omissions. In other words, some circumstances or activities are
known to be fundamentally dangerous. So, when something goes wrong, the perpetrator is held legally
responsible.

Elements

The essential elements of strict liability are as follows:

 There has to be some hazardous thing brought by the defendant on his land (Accumulation)
 Escape of the hazardous thing from the territory of the defendant (Escape)
 There must be a non-natural use of land (Non-natural user)
 Damage directly caused to person or property (Direct Damage)

Exceptions:

 Escape of the hazardous goods was because of plaintiffs own consent

 Fault of the plaintiff

1
[1868] UKHL 1

1
In tort law, strict liability is the imposition of liability on a party without a finding of fault (such as
negligence or tortious intent). The claimant need only prove that the tort occurred and that the defendant
was responsible. The law imputes strict liability to situations it considers to be inherently dangerous.[1] It
discourages reckless behavior and needless loss by forcing potential defendants to take every possible
precaution. It also has the effect of simplifying and thereby expediting court decisions in these cases.
A classic example of strict liability is the owner of a tiger rehabilitation center. No matter how strong the
tiger cages are, if an animal escapes and causes damage and injury, the owner is held liable. Another
example is a contractor hiring a demolition subcontractor that lacks proper insurance. If the subcontractor
makes a mistake, the contractor is strictly liable for any damage that occurs. A more everyday example is
that of a passenger on public transport who was unable to purchase a valid ticket for the journey due to
extraneous circumstances. Under strict liability, it does not matter if the ticket machine was broken, or the
train was early, or there were no staff at the counter. The legal responsibility for holding a valid ticket
falls on the passenger and the passenger should not have travelled without one regardless of the
circumstances.
In strict liability situations, although the plaintiff does not have to prove fault, the defendant can raise a
defense of absence of fault, especially in cases of product liability, where the defense may argue that the
defect was the result of the plaintiff's actions and not of the product, that is, no inference of defect should
be drawn solely because an accident occurs. If the plaintiff can prove that the defendant knew about the
defect before the damages occurred, additional punitive damages can be awarded to the victim in some
jurisdictions. The doctrine's most famous advocates were Learned Hand, Benjamin Cardozo, and Roger J.
Traynor.
Under English and Welsh law, in cases where tortious liability is strict, the defendant will often be liable
only for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his act or omission (as in nuisance). Strict liability is
sometimes distinguished from absolute liability. In this context, an actus reus may be excused from strict
liability if due diligence is proved or availability of recognized admissible defences. Absolute liability,
however, requires only an actus reus. Liability under Rylands v. Fletcher is now regarded as a
particular type of nuisance. It is a form of strict liability, in that the defendant may be liable in the absence
of any negligent conduct on their part. Imposing liability without proof of negligence is controversial and
therefore a restrictive approach has been taken with regards to liability under Rylands v. Fletcher. There
have been attempts to do away with liability under Rylands v. Fletcher but the House of Lords have
retained it.

Strict liability under Rylands v. Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1

“Anyone who in the course of non- natural use of his land, accumulates thereon for his own purposes
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes is answerable for all direct damage thereby caused”. This is the
rule in Rylands v. Fletcher where the defendant employed independent contractors to construct a water
reservoir on the land, which was separated from the plaintiff’s land by adjoining land. In the course the
works the contractors came upon some old shafts and passages filled with earth. The contractors did not
block them up. Unknown to them, the shafts connected their land with the plaintiff’s mines. When the
water filled the reservoir, it seeped through the old shafts and into the plaintiff’s mines thence flooding
them. It was found as a matter of fact that the defendant was not negligent, although the contractors had
been. However, although the defendant was neither negligent nor vicariously liable in the tort of his
independent contractors, he was held liable by the Court of Exchequer chamber and then upheld by the

2
House of Lords. The judgment of the Court of Exchequer chamber was delivered by Blackburn J. at P.
279 -280 and it has become a classical exposition of doctrine.

“We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purpose brings on his land and
collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he
does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequences of its
escape.” This may be regarded as the ‘rule in Rylands v. Fletcher’

But what follows is equally important. The court further said:

“He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff’s default; or the act of God:
it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient”.

The general rule, as above stated, seems to be just in principle.

“The person whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbor, or whose mine is
flooded by the water from the neighbor’s reservoir, whose cellar is invaded by filth of his neighbors or
whose habitation is made unhealthy by the fumes and noise and vapours of his neighbors alkali works, is
damnified without any fault of his own; and it seems reasonable and just that the neighbor, who has
brought something on his own property which was naturally there harmless to others so long as it is
confirmed to his own property, but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbors should
be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his property.
But for his act in bringing it there no mischief could have accrued, and it seems but just that he should at
his peril keep it there so that no mischief may accrue, or answer for the natural and anticipated
consequences and upon authority, this we think is established to be the law whether the things so brought
be beasts, or water, or filth, or stenches.”

Lord Cairns in the House of Lords upheld this judgment but restricted the scope of the rule to where the
defendant made a “non-natural use” of the Land.

This decision makes it clear that liability was strict in the sense that the defendant’s liability was neither
personal nor based on a mere vicarious liability for the negligence of his independent contractors

Hazardous Things

The rule has been applied to a large number of objects including water, gas, chemicals, electricity,
explosives, oil, explosives, vibrations, poisonous leaves of trees, a flag post, a revolving chair at a fair
ground, acid smuts from a factory, a car (no longer because a parked car is not inherently dangerous, see
Mason’s case below), fire and even at one time gypsies. But the list is not a closed one.

3
In Musgrove v. Pandelis, the court applied Blackburn J’s test literally where the collected thing did not
itself escape but caused the escape of something else. In this case, the defendant was held liable under
Rylands v. Fletcher for the escape of a fire which started in the engine of his car was found to be an object
likely to do mischief if it escaped. The artificiality (literal application of the principle) of this approach
was however rejected in Mason v. Levy Auto parts in relation to a fire which began in wooden packing
cases stored in the defendant’s land. The test applied was whether the objects were likely to catch fire and
the fire spread outside the defendant’s premises. The liability was a strict one if this occurred. In A.G. v.
Corke a landowner was held liable under Rylands v. Fletcher for permitting the camping on his land of
gypsies (caravan-dwellers) who trespassed and committed damage on the neighboring land. This case was
however received general disapproval in applying the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher to human beings. The
objection has been that ‘things’ does not include human beings and that liability in the above case should
have been based on nuisance or negligence.

A thing likely to do mischief if escapes, is enough. It now appears that the thing need not be
inherently hazardous, it need only be a thing likely to cause damage if it escapes: See Hale v. Jennings
Bros [1938] 1 All ER 579, Shiffman v. The Grand Priory of St John [1936] 1 All ER 557.

1. Accumulation

The defendant must bring the hazardous material on to his land and keep it there. The thing must be
brought into the land for the defendant’s purposes. The defendant need not own the land into which the
thing is brought. A temporary occupier of land such as a lessee or a person physically present on the land
but not in legal occupation of it such as a licensee is equally within the scope of the rule and is liable for
damage caused upon escape or a thing he has brought onto the land. In Charing Cross Electricity Supply
Co-v- Hydraulic Power Company, the rule applied to one who had the statutory power to lay electricity
cables under the highway.
In Rigby v. Chief Constable of Northamptonshire 2, the court stated that the rule applied to cases were the
defendant was in no sense in occupation of the land; in this case by firing a canister of gas into the
plaintiffs. The requirement that the thing should be on the land for the purpose of the defendant does not
mean that it must benefit the defendant. In this case, necessity was a justifiable defence. In Smeaton v.
Ilford Corporation it was stated that a local authority which was under a statutory duty to collect sewage
collected it for its own purposes within the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.Where the thing is naturally present
on the defendant cannot be liable for its escape under Rylands-v-Fletcher. The escape of weeds, rocks and
floodwater is thus outside the scope of the rule but recent decisions have established possibility of can
action in nuisance for such escape.

The accumulation must thus be voluntary. If the thing is already on the land or is there naturally, no
liability will arise under Rylands v. Fletcher: see also Giles v Walker [1890] 24 QBD 656, Pontardawe
2
[1985] 2 All ER 986, [1985] 1 WLR 1242

4
RDC v Moore-Gwyn [1929] 1 Ch 656, Carstairs v. Taylor (1871) LR 6 Ex 217, Ellison v. Ministry of
Defence (1997) 81 BLR 101

The thing must be accumulated for the defendant's own purposes:

Dunne v. North West Gas Board [1964] 2 QB 806

Pearson v. North Western Gas Board [1968] 2 All ER 669

The thing that escapes need not be the thing accumulated:

Miles v. Forest Rock Granite (1918) 34 TLR 500

2. Escape

There must be an escape from the defendant's land. The House of Lords emphasized that the absence of
an escape was the basis of their decision in Ponting v. Noakes (1849)3. An injury inflicted by the
accumulation of a hazardous substance on the land itself will not invoke liability under Rylands v.
Fletcher: There is no liability under the rule unless there is an escape of the substance from the land
where it is kept. In Read v. Lyons & co Ltd4. the defendants operated on ammunition factory as agents of
the Ministry of Supply. The plaintiff was an appointed inspector for the ministry. In course of carrying
out her duties in the factory, an explosion occurred causing her injuries. She based her claim against the
defendants on Rylands v. Fletcher making no assertion that the defendants had been negligent. In fact,
there was no evidence that negligence had caused the explosion. It was held by the House of Lords that
Rylands v. Fletcher was inapplicable because there had been no escape of the thing that inflicted the
injury. The House of Lords defined escape as:

“Escape from a place where the defendant had occupation and control over land to a place which
is outside his occupation or control.”

It was stated further in this case that Rylands v. Fletcher is conditioned by 2 elements;

a) The condition of escape from the land of something likely to do mischief if it escaped.
b) The condition of non-natural user of the land.

3
2 QB 281
4
[1947] AC 146

5
The courts have not always strictly applied these requirements: Hale v Jennings Bros [1938] 1 All ER
579, Shiffman v The Grand Priory of St John [1936] 1 All ER 557.

3. Non-natural use

This is the most flexible and elusive ingredient of liability. Blackburn J. understood ‘natural’ to mean
things naturally on the land and not artificially created. However, uncertainty crept as a result of Lord
Cairns qualification that must be ‘a non-natural user’ of the land.

Through a series of cases, courts have come to look upon ‘natural’ as signifying something which is
ordinary and usual even though it might be artificially instead of non-artificial. Non-natural use of land
was explained by the Privy Council in Richard v. Lothian5 as per Lord Moulton.

‘It must be some special use bringing with it increased danger to others and must not merely be the
ordinary use of the land or such a use as is proper for the general benefit of the community.’

What is natural is now viewed differently in different cases. Non-natural use of land is generally
constituted by certain activities as the storage on the land in bulk of water, electricity, gas and the
collection of sewage by local authorities. It is however, arguable that many of the above examples should
be held to be natural use according to the Privy Council’s definitions as being for the general benefit of
the community. In British Celenese Ltd v. A.H. Hunt Ltd6, it was held that the benefit derived by the
community from the manufacturing of electrical and electronic components made the use of land for such
purpose and the storing of strips of metal foil thereon a natural use of the land.

It is thus to be noted that the scope of ‘non-natural user’ of land has narrowed over the years.

The decision will now depend on the facts of each case. It has been held that generating steam or
electricity is not ‘non-natural’ but that storing of industrial water under pressure, or gas and electricity in
bulk is a non-natural use. (Transco v. Stockport MBC [2004] 1 All ER 589 Ellison v. Ministry of
Defence (1997) 81 BLR 101).

An open fire in a domestic fire grate does not constitute a non-natural use of land (Sochacki v. Sas7 )

4. Damage and Remoteness of damage

5
[1913] AC 263
6
[1969] 2 All ER 1252, [1969] 1 WLR 959
7
[1947] All ER 344

6
Rylands v..Fletcher is not actionable per se and therefore there must be proof of actual damage. This
appears to mean actual damage to person or property and it excludes a mere interference with the
plaintiff’s enjoyment of this land, such as would be a ground in an action in nuisance. Damage
recoverable under the rule is limited to damage to person or property. In Hale v. Jennings Bros, the court
held that an occupier of land was entitled to damages for personal injury under the Rule in Rylands v.
Fletcher. In Cattle v. Stocker Waterworks co, it was, however, held that purely economic loss was not
recoverable. Liability in Rylands v. Fletcher is subject to the rules on “remoteness of damage”. This
point was established in the Cambridge Water v. Eastern Counties Leather [1994]8 .

Defences

1. Act of God (vis major)

An ‘Act of God’ is defined as a direct, sudden, insanely violent, natural, and irresistible act of nature, one
which could not by any amount of care would have been foreseen, or if it has been foreseen, could not be
avoided by any amount of care by any individual. Natural calamities and disasters include, earthquakes,
floods, tornadoes, wildfires, volcanic eruptions etc. In such occurrences, lives are lost, properties are
destroyed or significantly damaged when the forces of the nature strike harshly and suddenly. To afford
the defence of vis major, there must be an immediate or proximate cause (Causa causans) and not just a
cause had it not existed might never have led to the damage caused or complained of (causa sine quo
non). An act of God is an accident which is caused by the operations of the extraordinary natural forces
and its effects include total destruction or loss at a very high scale as these are unpredictable and cannot
be controlled. A storm, an earthquake, falling of a tree, a flash of lightening, a tornado, volcanic eruption
or a flood and such other intervention by natural forces occurring suddenly causing damage without any
intervention from human agency form part of act of God.

In Nichols v. Marsland9 the defendant diverted a natural stream on his land to create ornamental lakes.
Exceptionally heavy rain caused the artificial lakes and waterways to be flooded and damage adjoining
land. The defendant was held not liable under Rylands v Fletcher as the cause of the flood was an act of
God. Mellish LJ observed,

“Now the jury have distinctly found, not only that there was no negligence in the construction or the
maintenance of the reservoirs, but that the flood was so great that it could not reasonably have been
anticipated, although, if it had been anticipated, the effect might have been prevented; and this seems to
us in substance a finding that the escape of the water was owing to the act of God. However great the
flood had been, if it had not been greater than floods that had happened before and might be expected to
occur again, the defendant might not have made out that she was free from fault; but we think she ought
not to be held liable because she did not prevent the effect of an extraordinary act of nature, which she
could not anticipate.”

8
2 AC 264

9
(1876) 2 Ex D 1

7
In Carstairs. v. Taylor10 the claimant stored rice in the ground floor of a warehouse which he leased from
the defendant. The defendant used the upper floor for storage of cotton. A rat gnawed through a gutter
box draining water from the roof of the warehouse. Following this, a heavy rainfall caused the roof to
leak and damaged the claimant’s rice. The defendant was not found liable under Rylands v. Fletcher. The
claimant had not brought the water onto his land to accumulate it. The heavy rain and actions of the rat
were classed as an act of God.

Inevitable Accidents

An accident is "one out of the ordinary course of things, something so unusual as not to be looked for by a
person of ordinary prudence." (Greene M.R). An inevitable accident is an event which happens not only
without the concurrence of the will of a man but in spite of all the efforts that a man may put on his part
to prevent it from happening. Sir Frederick Pollock has defined an inevitable accident as, “not avoidable
by any such precautions as a reasonable man, doing such an act then there could be expected to take.”

The traditional test for the inevitable accident defence was established in McIntosh v. Bell :

… a person relying on inevitable accident must [show] that something happened over which he had no
control, and the effect of which could not have been avoided by the greatest care and skill. The test
requires a defendant to show two things: (1) the external event occurred without any input or contribution
from the defendant (i.e. it was out of his control and unforeseeable); and (2) the resulting collision, could
not have been avoided by the greatest use of care and skill.

In Ellis v. Angwyn (1390)11, the defendant pleaded that unknown to him and "against his will, a fire
suddenly arose by mischance" in his house, and was spread by "a great gust of wind" to the plaintiff's
houses. The plea says nothing about what the defendant did to prevent the fire from arising or spreading.
The act of God was thus incorporated (though not by that name) in a plea of accident to show that the
harm was inevitable.

In Vedantacharya v. Highways Department of South Arcot 12 Supreme Court of India held that even if the
event is like heavy rain and flood but if the same can be anticipated and guarded against and the
consequences can be avoided by reasonable precautions, the defense of inevitable accident cannot be
pleaded.

Differences

1. Inevitable accidents may occur by reason of the play of natural forces or by intervention of human
agency or by both.
2. Acts of God or Vis Major occur without any intervention of human agency. They occur by reason of
the play of natural forces (Storms, earth-quakes, volcanic eruptions etc.) and cannot be controlled.
3. The Courts have discretionary power in determining the defendant’s tortious liability in case of
inevitable accidents. But in case of Act of God the Courts have no discretionary power.

2. Act of Stranger

10
(1871) LR 6 Ex 217
11
43 Emory L.J. 575, Pg (611)
12
1972 1 Comp Cas 168 SC, (1987) 3 SCC 400

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If the escape was caused by the act of a stranger over which the defendant has no control, the defendant
will escape liability (Box v. Jubb13). On the other hand, the act which caused the escape was
committed by a person over whom the defendant may exercise some control the defendant may still be
liable (Ribee .v Norrie14) . In LMS International v. Styrene Packaging and Insulation Ltd 15 A fire started
in the defendant’s factory. The factory contained a large quantity of flammable material. The fire services
arrived within 5 minutes of being alerted, however, the fire spread to the claimant’s adjoining property.
The claimant brought an action based on Rylands v. Fletcher, nuisance and negligence. The defendant
was held liable under the principle in Rylands v. Fletcher as it had accumulated things which were a
known fire risk. They were stored in a position close to hot wire cutting machines which made ignition
more likely and where any fire was likely to spread. The storage represented a recognisable risk to the
claimant and a non-natural user of the land. The defendant was also liable in negligence and nuisance.

In Rickards v. Lothian the plaintiff failed in his claim against the defendant where a third party had
deliberately blocked up the waste pipe of a lavatory basin in the defendant premises, thereby, flooding the
plaintiff’s premises.

The basis of the defense is the absence of any nature of control by the defendant over the acts of a
stranger on his land and thus the burden is on him to show that the escape was due to the unforeseen act
of a stranger without any negligence on his own part.

If on the other hand, the act of the stranger could reasonably have been anticipated or its consequences
prevented, the defendant will still be liable.

While it is clear that a trespasser is a ‘stranger’ for this purpose, other person included in this term depend
on circumstances. The occupier is of course liable for the defaults of these servants in the course of an
independent contractor useless it is entirely collateral. He is also liable for the folly of a lawful visitor as
well as misconduct of any member of his family on he has control over them. It has also been argued that
he ought to be responsible for guests and licensees on his land but a distinction ought to be taken here or
it would be harsh to hold an occupier liable for the act of every casual visitor who has bare permission to
enter his land and of whose propensities to evil he may know nothing of e.g. an afternoon caller who
leaves the garden gate open or a tramp who asks for a can of water and leaves the tap on. Possibly the test
is, “can it be inferred from the facts of the particular case that the occupier and such control over the
licensee or over circumstances which made his act possible that he ought to have prevented it? If so, the
occupier is liable, otherwise not.” As regards the issue of dangerous elements brought on the owner’s land
by another person, the owner is not liable under the rule as in Whitemorses v. Standford

3. Statutory authority
13
LR 4 Ex Div 76
14
[2000] EWCA Civ 275
15
[2005] EWHC 2065

9
Charing Cross Electric Supply Co v Hydraulic Power Co [1914] 3 KB 772

Smeaton v Ilford Corporation [1954] Ch 450

Green v Chelsea Waterworks Co (1894) 70 LT 547

4. Consent/Benefit

If the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to accumulate the thing the escape of is complained of, then he
cannot sue if it escapes. Implied consent will also be a defence; thus a person becoming a tenant of
business or domestic premises that the time when the condition of the adjoining premises occupied by the
landlord is such that the happening of the Ryland v. Fletcher type is likely to ensue, is deemed to have
consented to take the risk of such an event occurring.

In Kiddle v.City Business Properties Ltd, the plaintiff became a tenant of the defendant in a house below
the house occupied by the defendant (Landlord). The gutter of the Landlord’s house was blocked and
when it rained, an overflow of rainwater from the blocked gutter at the bottom of the sloping roof in
possession of the Landlord and above the tenant’s premises damaged the stock in the tenant’s premises. It
was held that the Landlord had a defence as the tenant impliedly consented to the risk of rainwater
overflowing into his premises.

If the accumulation benefits both the plaintiff and the defendant, the plaintiff may be deemed to have
consented to its accumulation e.g. where for the benefit of several occupants’ rainwater is accumulated on
the roof or a water closet installed or water pipes fitted, the several occupants are deemed to have
consented. On the other hand, the defence is not available as between a commercial supplier of gas in
respect of gas mains under the highway. In any event an occupier will not be presumed to have consented
to installations being left in a dangerously unsafe state.

If the claimant receives a benefit from the thing accumulated, they may be deemed to have consented to
the accumulation: Peters v Prince of Wales Theatre [1943] KB 73.

For purposes of liability for harm other than trespass, the law distinguishes between domesticated and wil
d animals. Thekeeper of domesticated animals, which include dogs, cats, cattle, sheep, and horses, is strict
ly liable for the harm they causeonly if the keeper had actual knowledge that the animal had the particular
trait or propensity that caused the harm. The traitmust be a potentially harmful one, and the harm must cor
respond to the knowledge. In the case of dogs, however, somejurisdictions have enacted statutes that imp
ose absolute liability for dog bites without requiring knowledge of the dog'sviciousness.

In other words, strict liability tort means a defendant is held fully liable for any injury sustained by
another party regardless of whether the injury was intended. Dangerous animals are just one of three
major strict liability categories. Strict liability categories include:

 Animals, owned or possessed

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  Abnormally dangerous acts
 Product liability

Animals, Owned or Possessed

The law recognizes the differences between domesticated animals and wild animals in considering
whether a circumstance is subject to absolute liability. There are otherwise three categories of animals
subject to strict liability:

Livestock

The owner of livestock, which refers to animals that are generally kept as an asset, rather than a pet, is
liable for any physical harm or damages caused by an animal’s intrusion onto someone else’s property.
This might occur if:

 a few head of cattle broke through their fence, then wandered through a neighbor’s alfalfa crop,
eating and trampling it.
 a passing car hits a horse that has come through a broken fence and wandered out onto the road
 failure to notify neighboring farms of, and to take adequate precautions to contain, a diseased herd.

Dogs in General

Dogs are special, in that they intersect two categories: livestock, and dangerous animals. While dogs have
been domesticated for thousands of years, some are capable of causing serious injury or damages. If an
individual has a dog, regardless of breed, that is known to be dangerous, it falls under the category of
“dangerous animals” for strict liability purposes.

Under the livestock category, an individual’s dogs may subject the owner to absolute liability in such
circumstances as:

 A farm dog wanders off its property to kill livestock belonging to a neighboring farm
 A friendly and excited dog jumps up on a visitor, startling her, and causing her to stumble and fall
 A dog trained to guard the owner’s property attacks a utility worker as he attempts to read the
home’s utility meter

In each of these cases, a normally friendly and useful dog has caused some type of damages or injury that
were not necessarily the owner’s fault. The laws of most states hold dog owners responsible if their dogs
bite any person, regardless of the situation or perceived fault. Each of these situations requires the dog’s
owner to pay for the damages incurred by others at the “paws” of his dog.

Dangerous Animals

This category refers to any pet or other animal that the owner knows has dangerous or violent tendencies.
The owner may be strictly liable for any injuries or damages caused by the animal, even if he is not at
fault. Commonly thought-of examples of dangerous animals include dogs kept for fighting or serious
protection, such as pit bulls and rottweilers.

Dogs are not the only animals that may fall under this category, however. Situations and animals that may
subject the owner to strict liability include:

 a housecat that is known for attacking small children who visit the home
 a parrot that is not social, and has previously attacked a visitor with its deadly claws

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  It is not the species or breed of the animal under this category, but its known propensity for
violence, that subjects the owner to strict liability.

Wild Animals
someone in possession of a wild animal is liable for harm done by the animal to someone else’s person or
property, even if the person possessing the animal has taken great care to ensure it is confined to prevent
it from doing harm. In the eyes of the law, wild animals are those that have not been widely domesticated,
regardless of how long the animal has lived in a captive environment. Examples of wild animals include
coyotes, badgers, rattlesnakes, monkeys, elephants, lions, tigers, and bears.
The owner or person in possession of certain types of animals is liable for injuries if the animal causes
injury to another person or animal. This may include livestock, like cows, horses, bulls or
goats. Abnormally dangerous animals also fall under this category and may include snakes, tigers,
monkeys or bears. You may think wild animals are not included because, well, they live in the wild. But
that is not true. If a person is in possession of a wild animal or has wild animals on their land, like animals
that are housed at a zoo, and the animal causes injury, liability is assumed.
Livestock and domestic animal ownership is fairly easy to prove. Livestock is generally branded, and
domestic animals require registration in their place of residence. Wild animals, on the other hand, are
more difficult to track. In an interesting case that remains in litigation as of late summer of 2013, the
question of possession and ownership of suspect wild animal remains unanswered.
Arizona-Sonora Desert Museum is located in a remote area of Tucson, Pima County. It is a place where
tourists can experience Arizona's indigenous landscape. Back in 2009, a Dutch tourist and plaintiff,
Zegerius, was brutally attacked by a wild javelina while touring the grounds. The victim sustained
extensive damage, including torn muscles and severed veins and arteries to his calf and hand. So much
damage was done that he was hospitalized for over a week.
As a side note, javelinas are a member of the peccary family. Although they are not particularly
aggressive, they will attack if cornered. Javelinas were commonly seen on the trails within the museum.
Although the museum did not own the animals, they were part of the scenery in a wildlife attraction. The
question remained: who was in possession of this peccary? This is where it gets a little muddy.
The museum operators claim that this particular javelina was not one of the commonly seen animals on
their property. They performed blood tests on the javelina in their possession, and it turned out that no
match could be determined. In fact, the javelina that attacked Zegerius was never found. But the looming
question of strict liability was still left unanswered. At last report, the plaintiff's attorneys filed further
action claiming that, regardless of the ownership, possession is all the law requires.
Javelinas are wild animals. No provisions were made to corral the owned javelinas; therefore, other
javelinas can come and go freely across the boundaries. While, as of late summer of 2013, no verdict had
been rendered yet, this case proves that strict liability may be applied to cases where ownership does not
have to be established.

Abnormally Dangerous Acts

Another form of strict liability comes with engaging in abnormally dangerous acts. An abnormally
dangerous act can be defined as an act that carries a substantial risk to oneself and others' personal
property and physical being. That's plenty of legal mumbo jumbo, think pyrotechnics, nuclear power
plants and blasting rock with dynamite.
In Miller v. Civil Constructors, Inc., a bullet fired from a nearby quarry struck a person. The quarry,
owned by Civil Constructors, was used for police target practice. The case seems rather cut and dry.

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Remember, in strict liability cases, negligence does not have to be proven. What does have to pan out is
whether using a quarry to discharge a firearm is considered abnormally dangerous. Here is what the court
will consider:

 The activity is highly risky and could cause harm to a person, chattel or property.
 It is highly likely that harm will result from the activity.
 The risk could not be mitigated easily even if reasonable care is taken.
 The act is not one that is commonly recognized.
 It is inappropriate to be carried out in the location.
 Whether its value to the community outweighs the risk involved.

It does not take all conditions for an act to be considered dangerous. One or more elements are enough.
So, how did the court rule? Interestingly enough, the court deemed that target practice for police officers
outweighed the dangers involved in the actual practice. It was also noted that while guns can be
dangerous, misuse of gun holds more risk.
Examples of abnormally dangerous activities:

 Blasting or explosive demolition activities

 Storing explosives
 Using or transporting certain chemicals, such as combustibles and acids
 Disposing of hazardous chemical wastes
 Production or containment of radioactive emissions
 Performing controlled burns
 Certain product defects

Product Liability

Cases involving injuries caused by manufactured goods, strict liability has had a major impact on
litigation since the 1960s. In 1963, in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, th
e CaliforniaSupreme Court became the first court to adopt strict tort liability for defective products. Injure
d plaintiffs have to prove theproduct caused the harm but do not have to prove exactly how the manufactu
rer was careless. Purchasers of the product, aswell as injured guests, bystanders, and others with no direct
relationship with the product, may sue for damages caused bythe product.

An injured party must prove that the item was defective, that the defect proximately caused the injury, an
d that the defectrendered the product unreasonably dangerous. A plaintiff may recover damages even if th
e seller has exercised all possiblecare in the preparation and sale of the product.

To be successful in making a products liability claim under strict liability, the plaintiff must prove that
there was a defect in the product when it left the defendant’s possession. He must also prove that he was a
logical and foreseeable user of the product who used the product as it was intended. Additionally, the
plaintiff must prove that he was injured by use of the product, and that it was caused by the product’s
defective nature.

There are three primary types of defect in products liability cases:

1. Manufacturing Defects – an irregularity or flaw in a product that was mass-produced, the defect of
which makes it more dangerous. When a manufacturer sells a product in defective condition, it is

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 strictly liable for any damages or injuries that the product causes. Having used reasonable care to
prevent defects is not a valid defense in such cases.
2. Design Defects – at times an entire product line is defective as a result of faulty design. The
manufacturer of such products is absolutely liable for injuries or damages caused by the products. In
addition, it may be held liable for any foreseeable injuries that could occur due to the design defect,
if there is a cost-effective way to reconstruct the product to make it safe, but the manufacturer
continues to produce and sell the defective items.
3. Failure to Warn – a product manufacturer is responsible for warning consumers if there is an
inherent, but not obvious, danger in using the product. For instance, the manufacturer of chocolate
raisin bars makes the bars in a plant that also processes peanuts. Because it is common for some
residue to remain in the equipment, which has the potential to cause serious injury or death to some
people, the manufacturer must warn consumers about the possible presence of peanuts.

Once a plaintiff proves a strict liability personal injury claim, a defendant is pretty much on the hook for
the damages, regardless of their disclaimers. Disclaimers and waivers of liability for products are often
invalidated by courts as against public policy (courts should not condone the manufacture and distribution
of defective products) and warranties are typically limited so that manufacturers and retailers are held
responsible for personal injuries caused by the use of the product.

Strict Liability in Prescription Drug Case

In 1999, the mega pharmaceutical company Merk released their new non-steroidal anti-inflammatory
drug (“NSAID”), Vioxx. Hailed as the newest and greatest answer to the aches and pains of arthritis and
menstrual pain, Vioxx proved to be disastrous for the many patients who suffered strokes, heart attacks,
and death while taking the drug.

While Merk denied their medication caused these problems, a study by the University of Michigan
Medical School, referred to as “VIGOR,” proved an astounding correlation between taking Vioxx, and
seriously increased risk of heart attack and stroke.

Merk refused to recall the drug, but eventually agreed to change the label, warning patients of the
potential risks associated with taking the drug. In 2004, a second study, in the form of a clinical trial,
confirmed that people taking Vioxx worldwide developed severe cardiovascular problems. Merk was
finally forced to implement a global recall of Vioxx, but by that time, as many as 25 million people in the
U.S. alone were taking the dangerous drug.

This strict liability case falls into the category of design defects. In this strict liability case, the
formulation of the drug itself was defective, placing everyone who took it in harm’s way. Once the
connection was made, individuals who suffered damages because they were taking Vioxx could sue the
company under strict liability, with no need to prove that it acted negligently.

Absolute Liability

Absolute liability is a stricter form of strict liability. It refers to the no fault theory liability in which the
wrongdoer is held absolutely liable for the act of omission or commission without any defences which are
available to the rule of strict liability. It is applicable only to those people who are involved in hazardous
or inherently dangerous activity whereby they become absolutely liable to full compensation for the harm
caused to anyone resulting from the operation of such hazardous activity. The rule of absolute liability
was first laid down in M.C Mehta v. Union of India (Oleum gas case).

Absolute liability is strict liability minus defences. So, absolute liability is absolute and stricter than strict
liability. In other words, there is no escape from liability if damages occur as a result of escape of

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dangerous materials and things stored or accumulated. One can store or accumulate them at his own peril.
Absolute Liability can arise from inherently dangerous activities or defective products that are likely to
result in harm to another, regardless of protection taken. Negligence is not required to be proven.

In India, absolute liability is a standard of tort liability which stipulates that

“where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to
anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity
resulting, for example, in escape of toxic gas the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate
all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which
operate vis-à-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.”

In other words, absolute liability is strict liability without any exception. This liability standard has been
laid down by the Indian Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Oleum Gas Leak Case). These
exceptions include:

 Plaintiff’s own mistake

 Plaintiff’s consent
 Natural disasters
 Third Party’s mistake
 Part of a statutory duty

The Indian Judiciary tried to make a strong effort following the Bhopal Gas Tragedy, December, 1984
(Union Carbide Company vs. Union of India) to enforce greater amount of protection to the Public. The
Doctrine of Absolute Liability was therefore evolved in Oleum Gas Leak Case and can be said to be a
strong legal tool against rogue corporations that were negligent towards health risks for the public. This
legal doctrine was much more powerful than the legal Doctrine of Strict Liability developed in the case
of English tort law Rylands v. Fletcher [1868]. This meant that the defaulter could be held liable for even
third party errors when the public was at a realistic risk. This could ensure stricter compliance to
standards that were meant to safeguard the public.

In Kenya “ultra hazardous” doctrine is applied: The “ultra hazardous” activity doctrine states that certain
activities are create a serious risk of danger and that liability must be placed on persons engaging in this
activity regardless of fault. In this legal definition the plaintiff under Kenya laws must have engaged in an
ultra hazardous activity which caused the plaintiff to suffer injury, loss or damage and the defendant
should have recognized the likelihood or damage to the plaintiff during the course of this activity. Some
examples of ultra hazardous activity include demolition and the handling of dangerous animals.

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