THE UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA

INSTITUTE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

SCHOOL OF LAW

LAW OF TORTS (LPU 2930) - TEST

STUDENT: Mulife Brian MULELE

ID No.: 22101625

CELL: +260 964 716 072

EMAIL: brian.mulele@gmail.com

COURSE: LAW OF TORT

COURSE CODE: LPU 2930

YEAR OF STUDY: 2nd YEAR

LECTURER: Mr Kafula MWICHE

CELL: +260 974 694586/ +260973936090

EMAIL: kafulamwiche@gmail.com

TASK: TEST

DATE DUE: SUNDAY, 16 JULY 2023 @ 18:00 HRS

DECLARATION: I hereby declare that this paper represents my work.

© 2023
Question 1

THE LIABILITY OF BANCROFT MINING COMPANY LIMITED AND ITS

CONTRACTORS IN THE FLOODING OF THE MINES BELONGING TO KANDABWE
MINES LIMITED.

Bancroft Milling Company Limited employed independent contractors who were apparently
competent to construct a reservoir on their property to provide water to the mill. In the course of
the work, the contractors came upon some old shafts and passages on Bancroft Milling Company
Limited’s land. The old shafts and passages connected with the mines of Kandabwe Gold Mines
Limited, neighbours to Bancroft Mining Company Limited. The shafts and passages appeared to
be filled with earth. The contractors did not block the shafts, and when the reservoir was filled
with water, the water from the reservoir burst through the old shafts and passages and flooded the
mines of Kandabwe Mines Limited in the process.

The facts outlined above are similar to the facts in Ryland v Fletcher. In this case, the defendant
owned a mill and constructed a reservoir on their land. The reservoir was placed over a disused
mine. Water from the reservoir filtered through to the disused mine shafts and then spread to a
working mine owned by the claimant causing extensive damage.

The issue is whether Bancroft Mining Company Limited and the contractors they hired are liable
for the flooding of the mines belonging to Kandabwe Mines Limited. Bancroft Mining Company
Limited and the contractors they hired are liable, for the damages caused to the mines belonging
to Kandabwe Mining Limited. The rule in Ryland v Fletcher will apply in determining the liability
owed by Kandabwe Mining Limited to Bancroft Mining Company Limited.

The type of liability enforceable under the rule of Ryland and Fletcher is strict liability, which
means Bancroft Mining Company Limited are liable whether or not they took precautions to
prevent the escape of water from the reservoir during construction, and Kandabwe Mining Limited
and was relieved of the burden of showing fault.

The rule in Ryland v Fletcher stems from the judgment made by Blackburn J:

“We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on
his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep

1
 it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage
which is the natural consequence of its escape.”
Lord Cairns added the following requirement when the case was appealed:
“The thing which escapes should and causes damage should be a non-natural user of the
defendant’s land.”
The requirements under the rule in Ryland and Fletcher are:
1. Accumulation on the defendant’s land.
In this case, Bancroft Mining Company Limited brought water onto their land
2. A thing likely to do mischief if it escapes.
The water in the reservoir was likely to cause mischief (damage) when it escapes.
3. Escape.
The water escaped when it burst from the reservoir Bancroft Mining Company Limited had
built.
4. Non-natural use of land, and
Bancroft Mining Company Limited brought water into their land, which was not a natural
user of land.
5. The damage must not be too remote.
The damage was not remote as it occurred on the adjoining plot belonging to Kandabwe

In Giles v Walker, seeds from some thistle on the defendant’s land blew into the neighbourhood
land owned by the claimant and damaged his crops. The defendants were not liable as he had not
brought the thistle onto his land and there cannot be liability under Ryland and Fletcher for a thing
that naturally accumulates on land defendant’s land.
In Hale v Jennings Bros The defendant operated a chair-o-plane roundabout at a fairground. One
of the chairs broke loose and hit the claimant. This was held to amount to an escape for the purposes
of Rylands v Fletcher. The defendant was liable for the personal injury sustained.

In Ponting v Noakes, the claimant’s horse died after it had reached over the defendant’s fence and
ate some leaves from a Yew tree. The defendant was not liable under Rylands v Fletcher as the
Yew tree was entirely in the confines of the defendant’s land and there had therefore been no
escape.

2
Charles, J in passing judgment said:

"I do not see that they can be made responsible for the eating of these Yew leaves by an
animal which, in order to reach them, had come upon his land. The hurt, which the animal
received, was due to his wrongful intrusion. He had no right to be there and the owner
therefore has no right to complain."

In Rickards v Lothian , the claimant ran a business from the second floor of a building. The
defendant owned the building and leased different parts to other business tenants. An unknown
person had blocked all the sinks in the lavatory on the fourth floor and turned on all the taps in
order to cause a flood. This damaged the claimant’s stock and the claimant brought an action
based on the principle set out in Rylands v Fletcher. It was held: The defendants were not liable.
The act, which caused the damage, was a wrongful act by a third party and there was no non-
natural use of land.

In Weller v Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute, A virus escaped from the defendant’s
premises and affected cattle rendering them unsaleable. The claimant, an auctioneer, brought an
action under Rylands v Fletcher for loss of profit he would have made had the cattle not been so
affected. Held: The claim failed. Pure economic loss is not recoverable under Rylands v Fletcher.

Bancroft Mining Company Limited will be liable to Kandabwe Mining Limited under the rule of
Ryland v Fletcher as has been shown above, unless they are able to show any of the following
defences, namely; act of a stranger, act of god, statutory authority, and consent or benefit, however,
none of these defences would apply in this case.

3
Question 2

FALSE IMPRISONMENT
According to Winfield and Jolowicz, “A defendant commits false imprisonment where he directly
and intentionally imprisons the claimant. False imprisonment is the direct or intentional
interference with a person’s liberty, it is one of the torts under Trespass to the person, the others
being Assault and Battery. The “False” in False imprisonment refers to erroneous or wrongful,
while “Imprisonment” refers to restraint of a person’s liberty.

The aim of liability in false imprisonment is to protect the liberty of the person and compensate
for psychological, physical and economic injury occasioned by the imprisonment. Articles 13 and
20 of the Constitution Cap 1 of the Laws of Zambia outlines the rights to personal liberty and
freedom of movement.

Restraint in false imprisonment must be total, if there is a reasonable escape route, there will be
no false imprisonment. In Bird v Jones, part of the Hammersmith Bridge was closed off for seating
to watch the regatta. The claimant insisted on walking on that part of the Bridge and climbed onto
the enclosure. He was prevented from going out at the other end. There was nothing to stop him
from going back the other way he had come and crossing the Bridge on the other side, which had
not been closed off. Coleridge J had this to say in passing judgment:

“A prison may have its boundary large or narrow, visible and tangible, or though real,
still the conception only, it may be movable or fixed: but a boundary it must have, and that
boundary the party imprisoned must be prevented from crossing.”

Thus, Mr Bird was not under false imprisonment as he was free to leave the way he had entered
before.

In a situation where false imprisonment occurs without the claimant’s knowledge, they can still
sue for false imprisonment. In Meering v Grahame- White Aviation Co. Ltd, the claimant was
suspected of stealing paint. He was taken to a waiting room where he was needed to give evidence.
He agreed to stay. Unknown to him, the works police had been told not to let him leave and waited
outside the room to prevent him from leaving. The Metropolitan police arrived and he was arrested.
He claimed that he had been falsely imprisoned for the hour he had waited. In his judgment, Lord
Atkin said:

4
 “It appears to me that a person could be imprisoned without his knowing it. I think a person
can be imprisoned while he is in a state of drunkenness, while he is unconscious, and while
he is a lunatic.”

Another case that illustrates that the claimant does not need to be aware that they are under false
imprisonment is that of Murray v Ministry of Defence. In this case, a woman’s home was entered
and searched in connection with terrorist matters, she knew the purpose of the visit but was not
actually arrested until she left the house some 30 minutes later, and it was unclear whether she was
aware that she was being detained throughout the period before arrest.

In his judgment, Lord Griffiths said:

“An essential element of the tort of false imprisonment is that the victim should be aware
of the fact of denial of liberty, if a person is unaware that he has been falsely imprisoned
and has suffered no harm, he has normally expected to recover no more than normal
damages.”

According to Winfield and Jolowicz, false imprisonment does not occur when a person is
prevented from leaving one’s premises because they would not fulfil a reasonable condition subject
to which they entered, as was in the case of Robinson v Balmain Ferry Co. Ltd. The claimant paid
a penny for entry to the defendant’s ferryboats. A boat had just gone and, as there was no other
one for 20 minutes, the claimant wished to leave the wharf and was directed to the turnstile, which
was its exit. There he refused to pay another penny, which was chargeable for the exit, as was
stated on a notice board, and the defendant declined to let him leave the wharf unless he paid. The
Privy Council held that this did not amount to false imprisonment:

“There is no law requiring the defendant to make the exit premises gratuitous to people
who come their upon a definite contract which involves their leaving the wharf by another
way… The question whether the notice which was affixed to these premises was brought
home to the knowledge of the plaintiff is immaterial, because the notice itself is
immaterial.”

Therefore, it goes to show that the charge of a penny for exit was regarded as reasonable by the
courts.

5
There are a number of defences to false imprisonment, namely reasonable condition of release,
lawful authority, consent and contributory negligence. In a situation where a claimant is detained
on the basis that they need to meet a reasonable condition, this will form a defence, as was in the
case of Robinson v Balmain New Ferry Co. Ltd.

Lawful authority may be a defence to false imprisonment, such as was the case under The Public
Health Act (Laws, Volume 17, Cap. 295), the Public Health (Infected Areas) (Coronavirus Disease
2019) Regulations, 2020. Through this Act, authorities were allowed to detain people suspected of
carrying the contagious Corona Virus disease. Where a lawful arrest is, made one cannot be held
liable for trespass to the person. In Albert v Lavin for example Lord Diplock stated:
“… every citizen in whose presence a breach of the peace is being, or reasonably appears
to be about to be, committed has the right to take reasonable steps to make the person who
is breaking or threatening to break the peace refrain from doing so; and those reasonable
steps in appropriate cases will include detaining him against his will …”

There are also situations when individuals concede to imprisonment, either, implicitly or explicitly
as was the case of Robinson in Robinson v Balmain New Ferry Co. Ltd, which could be a defence
to false imprisonment.