MODULE I-FIRST MODULE

Ashby v. White-voting officer-inhabitant not settled-injuria sine damnum-no damage but legal right
infringed-no right without remedy-in vain to imagine right without remedy-damage hindered on his
right-

M.C.Mehta v. Union of India- evolution of tort law in india

Winterbottom v. Wright- privity of contract fallacy

Donoghue v. Stevenson-Snail in bottle-privity of contract

Klaus Mittelbachert v. East India Hotels Ltd.-sue as beneficiary of contract-plea of stranger to contract is
irrelevant in torts

Campbell v. Paddington Corporation- nuisance public and private-funeral viewing-wrongful interference

MODULE II-SECOND MODULE

ACT OR OMISSION

Glasgow corp v. Taylor- omission-7 year old kid- poisonous berries in park- def. knew- no precaution-
omission of legal duty to put proper fencing-

omission does not include moral or social wrong (fails to save a starving man)

Municipal Corp Delhi v. Subhagwanti- clock tower collapsed-no necessary repairs and no periodic check-
up-failure of duty-death-liable for omission to take care

INJURIA SINE DAMNUM

Ashby v. White-voting- election- not settled inhabitant-violation of right- exercise and enjoyment of
right- right without remedy in vain-want of right and remedy reciprocal

Bhim Singh v State of J&K-Mla Bhim singh arrested by police - 4 days no magistrate-violation human
rights-vote crucial at session-compensation-deprived of fundamental and constitutional right- 50,000
exemplary damages

Marzetti v. Williams Bank-banker-funds in hand of consumer-refusing to honour-no loss or damage

DAMNUM SINE INJURIA

Gloucester Grammar School Case-school master- rival school- reduce fee-no remedy for loss
Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v. McGregor, Gow & Co-steamship companies-drove plaintiff out of tea-
carrying trade by of -reduced freight-increasing profits- not unlawful-

P. Seetharamaya v. Mahalakshmi- owner of land- right to build fence upon land to protect from overflow
of river-diverted to neigbours and causes damage-not transfer if already upon one’s land

Dickson v, Reuter’s Telegram Co.- A to B for shipment of goods-telegram to C-C delivers to A acting on
telegram- A refuses to honour- telegram company not at fault-no duty of care- def. only owe duty to
sender of telegram and not to recipient- not liable

Ushaben v. Bhagyalaxmi Chitra Mandir- “Jai Santoshi Maa”-contention hurt religious feeling-Goddess
Saraswati, Parvati and Laxmi depicted as jealous and ridiculed- hurt of religious feelings not a legal
wrong-no right to enforce religious views on another or restrain other from doing a lawful act-no
violation of legal right-

Acton v. Blundell-def, digging coal pit-intercepted the water plaintiff’s well-less than 20 year’s old- at
distance of one mile- not laible-owns surface may dig in at free will and pleasure-exercise of rights-
intercepts and drained of water-inconvenience to neighbour damnum sine injuria-

MENTAL ELEMENT-(MALICE)

Allen v. Flood-

A trade union official-not work alongside claimants-employe pressurised to get rid of claimants-loss of
work, claimant sued official-all workers hired day by day- trade union official never threatened breach of
contract b/c contract began afresh everyday-malice there, could not render conduct unlawful b/c effect
complained of was itsel in entirely lawful-

Employers refuse to employ for most mistaken, capricious, malicious, or morally reprehensible motives
but workman has no right of action against him

Town Area Committee v Prabhu Dayal

Plaintiff case- made 16 shops on old foundations-building known as GRAHI-defendant acting through
Chairman and vice chairman (2 & 3 Def.) demolished constructions- loss of 1000 rs. –

Notice bad under Sec 186 UP Municipal Act-only 2 hour notice – not a reasonable time under Sec 302-
notice served plaintiff was out of station-action mala fide

NOT INJURIA-construction illegal-though malice

Mayor of Bradford Corp. v. Pickles

A lawful act not unlawful because of evil motive

Def. extracted percolating water-water supply to plaintiff’s reservoir reduced-def. motive to force
plaintiff to buy his land at his price-ACTION FAILED-right to extract water- though malice-unkawful act
with good intention illegal

Hollywood Silver fox Farm ltd. v. Emmett,

Plaintiff business of breeding silver foxes-breeding season, vixen nervous and liable- if disturbed refuse
to breed- miscarry kill young ones

Def. –dispute with plaintiff-made son discharge guns- injuring plaintiff’s business-plaintiff sought an
injunction-

Granted injunction-action for nuisance by noise-motive must be considered- no absolute right to create
noises-no nuisance of neighbours or public

Nuisance

Christie v Davey-

Plaintiff and defendant-lived in adjoining houses- plaintiff give music lessons and annoyed defendant-
def. banged walls-plaintiff injunction-malicious behaviour

Balak Glass Emporium v. United india Insurance Co.-

Plaintiff-firm occupying ground floor- MP of plaintiff went to studio- filled with water-water escaped
from upper storey (def. occupied)-ill will b/w 2 parties-tap left open & outlet tank closed, act by son of
joseph -wrongful intention

CAPACITY TO SUE

D. P. Y. Patnaik v. A. P.

Convicts deprived of some fundamental rights-not all-still have right to acquire land-also entt.-to Art. 21-
no deprivation of life or personal liberty-

Strict Liability

Rylands vs Fletcher

Facts: The def were owners of a mill. In order to supply it with water they constructed a reservoir upon
nearby land. The Pl was working certain coal mines, under lands, close to but not adjoining the premises
on which the reservoir was constructed.
The def employed contractors to plan and build the reservoir. The contractors, in excavating for the bed
of the reservoir, came upon five long ago abandoned vertical shafts. B/c they were filled with soil
neither the contractors nor the defs suspected that they were abandoned mine shafts. Within days one
of the shafts gave way and burst, letting water flow into the p/f’s workings, flooding their mine.

Held: Blackburn J. held the mill owner to be liable, on the principle that, “We think that the rule of law
is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything
likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape”.

Escape of Dangerous Thing

Cheater v Cater

Facts: The plaintiff was the tenant of the defendant and a field which was occupied by the defendant
was separated from a field which he had let to the plaintiff by a yew hedge. The hedge overhung the
plaintiff’s land by about three feet and a horse which belonged to the plaintiff ate some of the yew
hedge and consequently died.

Held: It was held that the defendant, who was the landlord, was not liable.

Giles v Walker

Facts: Seeds from some thistles on the defendant’s land blew into neighboring land owned by the
claimant and damaged his crops.

Held: The defendant was not liable as he had not brought the thistles onto his land and there cannot be
liability under Rylands v Fletcher for a thing which naturally accumulates on land.

Firth v Bowling Iron Co. (Wire Rope)

Read v J. Lyons & Co Ltd

Facts: The claimant was employed by the Ministry of Supply as an inspector of munitions in the
defendants’ munitions factory and, in the course of her employment there, was injured by the explosion
of a shell that was being manufactured.

Held: Not Liable. Defendants were not liable because there was no escape of the thing outside the
defendants’ premises

Non-Natural Use of Land

Noble v Harrison
Facts: There the branch of a non-poisonous tree growing on the defendant’s land, which overhung on
the highway, suddenly broke and fell on the plaintiff’s vehicle passing along the highway. The branch
had broken off due to some latent defect.

Held: It was held that the defendant could not be held liable under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher as trees
are not non-natural use of land.

T.C. Balakrishnan Menon v T.R. Subramaniam

Facts: An explosive made out of a coconut shell filled with explosive substance, instead of rising in the
sky and exploding there, ran at a tangent, fell amidst the crowd and exploded, causing serious injuries to
the respondent.

Held: It was held that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher would be applicable because the explosive is an
“extra hazardous” object. The persons using such an object are liable even for the negligence of their
independent contractor.

Act of Stranger as a defense to Strict Liability

Richards v Lothian

Facts: A basin on the property of the defendant was blocked by an unknown person causing a flood
which damaged a flat below.

Held: The defendant was not held liable as it was the act of a stranger.

Statutory Authority as a defense to Strict Liability

Green v Chelsea Waterworks Co

Facts: A main belonging to a water-works company, which was authorized by Parliament to lay the main,
burst without any negligence on the part of the company and the claimant’s premises were flooded.

Held: The Company was held not liable.

Plaintiff’s Own Default as a defense to Strict Liability

Ponting v Noakes

Facts: The claimant’s horse reached over the defendant’s boundary, nibbled some poisonous tree there
and died accordingly.

Held: It was held that the claimant could recover nothing, for the damage was due to the horse’s own
intrusion and alternatively there had been no escape of vegetation.

Applicability of Strict Liability in India

M.P. Electricity Board v Smt. Shail Kumari

Facts: The deceased was riding on his bicycle while returning from his factory in night. A snapped live
electric wire, which was from an illegally diverted line, was lying on the road. There was rain and the
road was partially filled with water. The cyclist could not notice the live electric wire and as he came in
contact with the same, he died instantaneously due to electrocution.

Held: In this case, the apex court applied the rule of strict liability. The defense of the dangerous being
an act of the stranger (an exception to the rule of strict liability) was not allowed because the same
could have been foreseen.

S K Shangring Lamkang v State of Manipur

Facts: A high tension wire fell on the person riding a scooter, electrocuting him and killing him.

Held: An “act of god” as an exception to the rule of strict liability is held not available in cases of death
due to electrocution as a result of falling of high tension electric wire from its pole due to lightning
stroke or storm.

Absolute Liability in India

M.C. Mehta v Union of India

Facts: Oleum gas leaked on 4th and 6th December, 1985 from one of the units of Shriram Foods and
Fertilizers Industries, in the city of Delhi, belonging to Delhi Cloth Mills Ltd. As the consequence of this
leakage, it was alleged that one advocate practicing in the Tis Hazari Court had died and several others
were affected by the same.

Held: Absolutely Liable. Justice Bhagwati “We would therefore hold that where an enterprise is engaged
in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in
the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity resulting, for example, in escape of
toxic gas the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the
accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-à-vis the tortious
principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher”.

Klaus Mittelbachert v East India Hotels Ltd. (AIR 1997 Del. 201)

Due to hazardous nature of the premises, the rule of absolute liability was applied and the defendants
were required to pay exemplary damages amounting to 50 lac rupees.

Vicarious Liability

Llyod v Grace Smith & co.

Facts: The plaintiff wished to sell some cottages and went to the solicitors.

Their managing clerk induced the plaintiff to transfer the cottages to him and misappropriated certain
mortgage money.

Held: The solicitors were liable to the client for the fraud of the managing clerk though it was committed
solely for his benefit.
State Bank of India v. Shyama Devi

Facts: No proof of deposit by the customers with the bank and a fake entry was made in the customer’s
passbook by the bank employee. The customer had handed over the cheque to the employee of the
bank in the capacity of a friend and not to the bank and the bank employee had misappropriated the
money.

Held: In view of this fact, the Apex Court held that the bank was not vicariously liable for the act of the
employee.

Ormrod v. Crossville Motor Service Ltd.

Facts: A car was to be transported to Monte Carlo by an agent. The driver's negligence caused an
accident.

Held: The principal was responsible for this accident in the course of a principal-agent-relationship. Lord
Denning observed that the law puts a responsibility on the owner of a vehicle who allows it to go on the
road in charge of someone else, no matter whether it is his servant, his friend or anyone else.

Tirlok Singh v Kailash Bharti

Facts: While the owner of the motor cycle was outside the country, his younger brother took the motor
cycle without his knowledge or permission and caused the accident.

Held: It was held that the younger brother could not be deemed to be the agent of the owner of the
motor cycle and the latter could not be vicariously liable for the accident.

Liability of Partners

Hamlyn v Houstan & co.

Facts: One of the two partners of the defendants firm, acting within the general scope of his authority as
a partner, bribed the plaintiff’s clerk and induced him to make a breach of contract with his employer
(pliantiff) by divulging secrets relating to his employers business.

Held: It was held that both the partners of the firm were liable for this wrongful act (inducing breach of
contract) committed by only one of them.

Liability of Master for act of his Servant

Limpus v London General Omnibus Co.

Facts: A bus driver racing to a stop to collect passengers deliberately obstructed the driver of a bus of a
rival company, overturning the latter's vehicle. The bus driver had been given instructions against
obstructing other buses.
Held: The defendants were liable. The driver was acting within the course of his employment at the
time; it was immaterial whether his act was forbidden. Otherwise, companies could exculpate
themselves simply by prohibiting their servants from committing any torts during their service.

Control Test for Employment Status

Dharangadhara chemical Works Ltd v State of Saurashtra

The Supreme Court laid down that the existence of the right in the master to supervise and control the
execution of the work done by the servant is a prima facie test, that the nature of control may vary from
business to business and is by its nature incapable of any precise definition, that it is not necessary that
the employer should be proved to have exercised control over the work of the employee, that the test
of control is not of universal application and that there are many contracts in which the master could
not control the manner in which the work was done.

Integration Test for Employment Status

Cassidy v Ministry of Health

A resident surgeon in a hospital was held to be an employee, so that the hospital was liable for his
negligence.

Savita Garg v. Director National Heart Institute

The Supreme Court with approval the following proposition form Denning L.J.·s Judgment in Cassidy’s
case observed:

The hospital authority is liable for the negligence of professional men employed by the authority under
contract for service as well as under contract of service. The authority owes a duty to give proper
treatment-medical, surgical, nursing and the like-and thought it may delegate the performance of that
duty to those who are not its servants, it remains liable if the duty be improperly or inadequately
performed by its delegates.

Exceptions to Independent Contractor Rule

Patel Maganbhai Bapujibhai v Patel Ishwarbhai Motibhai

Facts: The trustees of a temple employed a contractor to get electric connection for use of lighting and
mike arrangements in the temple from the well of an agriculturist without informing and obtaining the
permission of the Electricity Board. A person was injured as the wires used by the contractor snapped.

Held: The trustees were held liable as the act of diverting electricity without permission of the Board
was in itself an illegal act.

Tarry v Ashton
Facts: The occupier of a house employed an independent contractor to repair a rotten bracket which
projected over the pavement from his wall. A passerby was injured by the falling of a lamp from the
bracket.

Held: He was held liable.

Where an especially high duty of care is imposed upon a person by law he cannot escape liability for the
breach of that duty by employing an independent contractor

Gray v.Pullen, (1864) 5 B & S 970

Facts: A was empowered under an Act to make a drain from his premises to a sewer, by cutting a trench
across a highway, and filling it up after the drain should be completed. For this purpose he employed a
contractor, by whose negligence it was filled up improperly, in consequence of which damage ensued to
B.

Held: It was held that A was responsible in an action by B.

Where Master lends his Servant to Another Person

Mersey Docks & Harbor Board v. Coggins & Griffiths (Liverpool) Ltd.

Facts: Coggins and Griffiths hired a crane and driver from the Mersey Docks and Harbor Board. The
driver, Mr. Newall, drove the crane negligently and trapped Mr. McFarlane injuring him. The contract
between the Board and the hirers stated that the driver was to become their employee for the duration
of the hire.

Held: The Board was held liable. It was held as a fact that the hirers had power to control what Mr.
Newall lifted with the crane but not how he lifted it. Control over Mr Newall's work had not passed to
the hirers. It is not to be held that control had readily passed. Only if there is control over what work the
person does and how he does it, will control be held to pass.

Smt. Kundan Kaur v S. Shankar Singh

Facts: The partners of a firm temporarily gave their truck along with driver on hire to a transport
company for transporting certain goods. Driver negligently caused accident.

Held: There was only transfer of service and not of control of driver from the general employer to hirer
and as such the partners firm where liable.

RSRTC v K N Kothari

Facts: The RSRTC hired a bus and a driver for running a bus on specified route. The corporation also
engaged a conductor, who managed the bus, collected fare from passengers and also exercised control
over the driver.
Held: For an accident caused by the driver, the hirer (RSRTC) was vicariously liable, notwithstanding the
fact that the driver continued to be on the pay roll of the original owner. The apex court held that the
transfer of effective control over a servant would make the transferee of the vehicle liable for vicarious
liability.

Course of Employment

Century Insurance v. Northern Ireland Road Transport

Facts: A patrol lorry driver smoked a cigarette while transferring petrol from the lorry to an underground
tank, which caused an explosion and damaged B’s property

Held: It was observed that although the act of lighting a cigarette was done by the driver for his comfort
and was an act both innocent and harmless by itself, the careless act was done in the course of the
driver’s employment and was a negligent mode of conducting his work.

Beard v London General Omnibus Company

Facts: At the end of a journey the conductor of an omnibus belonging to the defendants, in the absence
of the driver, and apparently for the purpose of turning the omnibus in the right direction for the next
journey, drove it through some by-streets at a considerable pace, and while so doing negligently ran into
and injured the plaintiff.

Held: The defendants were held not liable as the conductor did an act he was not authorized to.

Outside the Course of Employment

State of Maharashtra v.Kanchanmala Vijaysing Shirke

It was held by the court that if the unauthorised and wrongful act of the servant is not so connected
with the authorised act as to be a mode of doing it, but is an independent act, the master is not
responsible; for in such a case the servant is not acting in the course of the employment but has gone
outside of it.

General Engineering Services Ltd. V .Kingston and Saint Andrew Corporation

Facts: The appellants owned certain premises at Kingston, Jamaica. A fire broke out in the said
premises on which the premises the appellants promptly informed the local fire brigade. The fire
brigade took 17 minutes in reaching the appellants premises which was at a distance of 1½ miles while
the normal time for covering this distance was 3½ minutes. By the time the fire brigade reached, the
premises were completely destroyed by fire. The reason they took so much time was because they were
following a “go slow” policy.

Held: The defendants were held not liable. The firemen’s unauthorised and wrongful act was to prolong
the time taken by the journey to the scene of the fire, as to ensure that they did not arrive in time to
extinguish it. Their mode and manner of driving, the slow progression of stopping and starting, was not
so connected with the authorised act, that is driving to the scene of the fire as expeditiously as
reasonably possible, as to be a mode of performing that act. Hence the employers cannot be held
vicariously liable.
Sitaram Motilal Kalal v. Santanuprasad Jaishankar Bhatt

Facts: The owner had entrusted his car to a drive for plying it as a taxi. The driver lent the taxi to the
cleaner for taking it to the R. T.O.·s Office for driving test. The accident happened when the cleaner was
driving while giving the driving test. The driver was then not in the vehicle. It is clear from the fact that
at the time the accident happened, the car was not being used as a taxi for the owner’s business.

Held: The owner was held not liable. The driver in lending the car to the cleaner for taking a driving test
did an act which he was not employed to perform and thus clearly acted beyond the scope of his
employment which was to drive the car as a taxi.

Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit ginning & Pressing Co. Pt. Ltd.

Facts: The manager of the defendant company was driving a car of the company on its journey from
Nagpur to Pandhurna on the Company’s business. The manager took one Purshottam as a passenger in
the car. The car met with an accident because of the negligence of the manager in driving the car and
Purshottam died.

Held: The Company was held liable by the SC. The Supreme Court observed:

´In the present case a responsible officer of the Company, the manager, had permitted Purshottam to
have a ride in the car. Taking into account the high position of the driver who was the manager of the
Company, it is reasonable to presume, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary that the manager
had authority to carry Purshottam and was acting in the course of employment.

Effect of Prohibiton

Twine v. Bean’s Express Ltd.

Facts: The defendants provided for the use of a bank a commercial van and a driver on the terms that
the driver remained the servant of the defendants and that the defendants accepted no responsibility
for injury suffered by persons riding in the van who were not employed by them. There were two
notices in the van, one stating that no unauthorised person was allowed on the vehicle, and the other,
that the driver had instructions not to allow unauthorised travellers on the van, and that in no event
would the defendants be responsible for damage happening to them. One person who was not
authorised to ride in the van got a lift in the van with the consent of the driver. Owing to the negligence
of the driver, there was an accident and that person was killed.

Held: The Company was not vicariously liable. Lord Green, M.R. observed that his act of driving was no
doubt in the course of employment but the other thing he was doing simultaneously was something
totally outside the scope of his employment, namely, giving a lift to a person who had no right
whatsoever to be there.
Defences/ justifications

Volenti Non Fit Injuria –

Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club

Facts –

Plaintiff – spectator – motor car race – defendant owner of track– collision between two cars – injury to
plaintiff

Held –

Plaintiff impliedly took risk – danger inherent and foreseeable – defendant not liable.

Padmavati v. Dugganaika

Facts –

Driver of jeep – filling petrol – two strangers took lift – bolt of a wheel gave way – strangers thrown out
– one of them died.

Held –

Neither master nor driver liable – sheer accident – strangers voluntary action of taking lift.

Illot v Wilkes

Facts –

Landowner – placed spring guns for poachers – plaintiff injured.

Held –

Not liable.

Bird v Holbrook

Facts –

Defendant - spring-gun trap – to catch an intruder – no warning by defendant – plaintiff serious damage
to knee – plaintiff sued.

Held –

Liable – no warning post – no reasonable measure used – intent to injure rather than scare-off.

R v Williams

Facts –
Defendant – music teacher – guilty of rape – sexual intercourse with 16 year old girl – pretence of an
operation to improve her voice

Held –

Liable, act done by the defendant must be the same for which the consent is given

Bowater v Rowley Regis Corp

Facts –

Plaintiff – cart driver – asked to drive a horse – both knew it was liable to bolt – plaintiff protested but
ultimately obeyed – horse bolted – plaintiff injured.

Held –

Man truly willing only when freedom to choice – full knowledge of circumstances – absence of feeling of
constraint – nothing should interfere with freedom of will.

Imperial Chemical Industries v Shatwell

Facts –

Plaintiff and brother – certified shot firers – employed in a quarry – quarry owned by defendant
company – work of plaintiff – wire detonators and check electronic circuits – old practice of
galvanometer which was outlawed by statutory regulation – claimed 50 % as vicarious liability.

Held –

Initially liable – appealed – plaintiff and brother experienced – no pressure – warning – voluntary risk –
case of volenti fit non injuria.

Wooldridge v Sumner

Facts –

Claimant – photographer at a horse show – sitting within the ring – took little interest in proceedings –
defendant’s horse – approached the bench at great speed – plaintiff frightened – fell into the course of
horses – knocked down.

Held –

No breach of duty.

ON VNFI – consent to risk of injury insufficient – consent to breach of duty.

Cutler v United Dairies (London) Ltd.

Facts –

Horse – pulling van – without driver – roadway to pvt land – driver called for help – plaintiff injured
while restraining horse – evidence that horse bolted twice before.

Held –
No negligence - novus actus interveniens – expect an injury – volenti non fit injuria

Smith v. Baker & Sons

Facts –

Claimant sued employer – employed to hold a drill – steam crane worked on stones above his head –
stone fell out and injured claimant

Held –

Liable – aware of danger – no consent to lack of care – entitled to damages.

Dann v Hamilton

Facts –

Plaintiff knew defendant was drunk – still travelled in the car – accident due to negligence – injuries to
plaintiff

Held –

Liable – though materially reduced capacity to drive safely – driver not absolved from liability due to
negligence – defence only when drunkness is extreme and glaring.

Note – awareness but no consent.

Owens v Brimmell

Facts –

Plaintiff and defendant went to a pub together – plaintiff accepted lift from def. – knew he was drunk –
negligent driving – accident – serious injuries to plaintiff.

Held –

Liable – damages reduced for contributory negligence – riding with drunk driver and no seat-belt. Note –
awareness but no consent.

Bradon v Osborne Garrett

Facts –

Plaintiff and family members in a shop – skylight in roof broken – negligence of independent contractors
– glass fell – injured plaintiff – wife tried to pull husband – she reasonably believed danger existed –
injured her leg.

Held –

Liable – person doing an act due to negligence of defendant and gets injured – entitled to compensation
unless contributory negligence exists

Dr. Laxman Balkrishnan v. Dr. Trimbak Bapu

 if a doctor has adopted a practice that is considered “proper” by a reasonable body of medical
professionals who are skilled in that particular field, he or she will not be held negligent only because
something went wrong.

Rescue Cases

Haynes v Harwood

Facts –

Policeman – saw horse running loose among children – ran out – chased it and caught it – got injured.

Held –

Horse owner liable – Damage foreseeable – policeman under a general duty to assist and might get
injured.

Wagner v International Railway

Facts –

Defendants train took curve – violent lurch – plaintiff’s cousin thrown out – plaintiff walked out and
reached the bridge – apparently the place to find his cousin – lost footing in dark – fell from structure,
injured.

Held –

The risk of rescue, if only it be not wanton, is born of the occasion – reasonable rescue attempt – liable.

Baker v TE Hopkin and Son

Facts –

Defendants called to clean a well – left petrol motored pump running – one of the defendant went down
– was overcome with fumes – the other defendant called for assistance and went down – the claimant
then went down too – all three died.

Held –

Rescuer – actions not freely and voluntarily accepting the risk – so defendant liable

Videan v British Transport Commission

Cutler vs United Dairies

The Claimant was injured when he entered a field to calm some horses. His claim for compensation was
unsuccessful as the horses presented no immediate danger to persons or property and there was no
need for him to intervene. He was thus held to be volens.

Breach Of Statutory Duty

Baddeley v. Granville
Safety required that there should be a banksman at the mine where the man was working; but the
practice was not to have a banksman at night, and the accident which caused the man's death was due
to the fact that there was no banksman on duty when it happened. The defence was that the man knew
of this practice and knew the risk which it involved but nevertheless went on working. This case was
decided before Smith v Baker & Sons and, as Wills J pointed that defence could have succeeded if there
had been no question of a breach of a statutory rule but only an unsafe system of work. But it so
happened that there was a special statutory rule for this mine which required the presence of a
banksman. So the court very wisely avoided the general question which was later decided by Smith v
Baker & Sons and founded its judgment on the existence of the statutory rule. assumed that volenti non
fit injuria is founded on an implied agreement

Act Of God

Nichols v Marsland

Facts –

Defendant created artificial lakes – dammed natural streams – extraordinary rainfall – embankments
gave way – washed away four bridges of plaintiff.

Held –

Not liable – act of God – no negligence – could not be reasonably anticipated

Greenock Corporation v Caledonian Railway

Facts –

Construction of concrete paddling pool in bed of stream– obstructed natural flow of stream –
extraordinary rainfall – stream overflow – damage to plaintiff – found out if no obstruction, no overflow.

Held –

Liable – foreseen the possibility – must have taken care.

Ramlinga nadar v Narayyana Reddiar

Facts –

Plaintiff booked goods with defendant for transportation – Criminal activity – mob robbed defendant’s
lorry

Held –

not an act of god as there was a human intervention.

Manindra nath Mukherjee v Mathuradas Chatturhuj

Facts –

Huge hoarding at crossing – severe storm – hoarding collapsed – fell on plaintiff’s head

Held –
Pure negligence and not Act of God.

Saraswati Parabhai v. Grid corporation of Orissa

Facts –

Electric pole – uprooted – fell down with livewire – death of a person.

Held –

Responsibility of defendant to provide protection of rain and storm.

Inevitable Accident

Fardon v. Harcourt Rivington

Facts –

Dog left inside shut car – quiet and docile – plaintiff passed by – dog barked and jumped – smashed glass
panel – splinter entered plaintiff’s eyes.

Held –

Extremely unlikely event – no negligence – guard against reasonable probabilities and not bound by
fantastic probabilities.

Stanley v Powell

Facts –

Defendant fired at pheasant – shot glanced off oak tree – hit plaintiff in eye

Held –

No negligence – course of nature – inevitable accident.

Holmes v Mather

Facts –

Woman on sidewalk – knocked down by horses – groom, best efforts to steer the horses back

Held –

No negligence – to constitute wrongful trespass, willful or negligence.

National Coal Board v J. E. Evans & Co. (Cardiff) Ltd.

Facts –

Plaintiff – electric cable under land – trench excavated in land by a firm – damage to cables.

Held –

Not liable – no knowledge – inevitable accident.

Plaintiff The Wrong Doer –

Bird vs Holbrook (same as above)

Private Defence –

Cherubin Gregory v State of Bihar

Facts –

Wall of toilet house of deceased fell down – used toilet of the accused – accused protested – oral
warnings ineffective – copper wire with electricity across the passage – deceased touched wire, died.

Held –

Liable – not entitled to inflict serious injury just because of trespass.

Morris v. Nuengt

Facts –

Plaintiff’s dog bit defendant – defendant raised gun – dog ran away – shot the dog.

Held –

Not justified – to justify, actually attacking the party at the time.

Necessity –

Southport Corporation v. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd.

Facts –

Tank ship – landed on prop. of plaintiff – ship made lighter to prevent from breaking – release of oil

Held –

Necessity – otherwise would have been a worse disaster.

Southwark London Borough Council v. Williams

Facts –

Homeless couple – entered a vacant house – trespass – necessity claimed.

Held –

Not a necessity.

Carter v Thomas

Kirk v Gregory

Statutory Authority

Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railway Co.

Facts –

Railway Company authorized by statute – traversed plaintiff’s land – sparks from engine – fire to
plaintiff’s woods.

Held –

Not liable. Not negligent.

Smith v. London and South Western Railway

Facts –

Servants of rly. Co. – left grass, hedges near rail line – sparks from engine – fire – fire carried to nearby
cottage due to wind – cottage burnt

Held –

Negligent – liable.

Metropolitan asylum district v Hill

Trespass to Person

Assault

Stephens v. Myers

Df pulled out of his chair, advanced towards chairman with clenched fist, but stopped midway by
another member.

Still held liable for assault – interception of blow by 3rd person will not absolve the defendant from
liability

Bavisetti Venkata Surya Rao v. Nandipati Muthaya

Plaintiff owed Rs.11.60 as land revenue. Munsif told plaintiff that his ear-rings would have to be
sold/valued by a goldsmith. When goldsmith arrives, someone else pays his debt.

No assault – as no fear or physical threat just by presence of goldsmith

AC Cama v. HF Morgan (1864)

Principle: it was observed that the usage of words cannot be considered as assault if the effect of the
words clearly shows the party threatened that the party threatening has no present intention to use
immediate criminal force.
Tuberville v. Savage (1664)

Facts: Tuberville put his hand upon his sword and said “If it were not assize-time, I would not take such
language from you.” The justices of assize were in town. Savage sued Tuberville for assault.

Principle: To be liable for assault at least one of the following must be present: 1. an act intending to
cause harmful control to another person, or imminent apprehension, or 2. a third person put in
apprehension if he believes the person can do damage. An assault exists even if the other party can
defend against the action and the action is not inevitable. Mere threats of future harm are insufficient.

Decision: In this case the court held that the declaration of Tuberville was that he would not assault
Savage at that point in time. To commit an assault there must be intention followed by an act. An assault
is present if the fear is reasonable. The court held that in this case there was clearly no intention of
assault.

Battery

Fowler v. Lanning

In the case where the stone thrown at a tree rebounds and hits the woman – risk could not be
reasonably foreseen - no negligence, - held as accident thought voluntary- no liability.

trespass to person does not lie if the injury to the plaintiff, although the direct consequence of the act of
the defendant was caused unintentionally and without negligence. onus of proving intention or
negligence lies on the plaintiff

Doreen Ann Letang Vs Frank Anthony Cooper, [1964] EWCA Civ 5

Facts: In the summer of 1957, the claimant was sunbathing outside on a piece of land which ordinarily
served as a car park. While she was sunbathing, the Defendant reversed over her legs with his car,
causing her injury. The defendant did not do it intentionally, however the claimant had the option of
claiming in negligence. She did not, immediately, choose to do so. By 1961 she had decided to start a
claim, but as a claim of negligence had limitation period of three years she made a claim under trespass
to the person.

Issues: The issue in this case was whether it was possible to make a claim under trespass to the person if
the action was negligent rather than intentional as until then the tort of trespass to the person had been
applied to both types of situation.

Decision/Outcome: Adopting the approach from Kruber v Grzesiak ([1963] VR 621) the court held that
where the damage was caused by an action which was not intentional, then the proper action is one in
negligence and not in trespass to the person. A distinction was established between the torts of
negligence and the trespass to the person based on intent.

Wilson V Pringle [1986] 2 All ER 440

Facts: The plaintiff and the defendant were two schoolboys involved in an incident in a school corridor
as the result of which the plaintiff fell and suffered injuries to his left hip. The plaintiff issued a writ
claiming damages and alleging that the defendant had committed a trespass to the person of the
plaintiff. In his defence the defendant admitted that he had indulged in horseplay with the plaintiff.

Issues: The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal, contending that the essential ingredients of
trespass to the person were a deliberate touching, hostility and an intention to inflict injury, and
therefore horseplay in which there was no intention to inflict injury could not amount to a trespass to
the person. The plaintiff contended that there merely had to be an intentional application of force, such
as horseplay involved, regardless of whether it was intended to cause injury.

Decision: An intention to injure was not an essential ingredient of an action for trespass to the person,
since it was the mere trespass by itself which was the offence and therefore it was the act rather than
the injury which had to be intentional. However, the intentional act, in the form of an intentional
touching or contact in some form, had to be proved to be a hostile touching, and hostility could not be
equated with ill-will or malevolence, or governed by the obvious intention shown in acts like punching,
stabbing or shooting or solely by an expressed intention, although that could be strong evidence.
Whether there was hostility was a question of fact in every case.

Per Curiam. Where the immediate act of touching does not of itself demonstrate hostility the plaintiff
should plead the facts alleged to do so.

Cole v. Turner (1704) 6 Mod. 149

HOLT, C.J. declared: First, that the least touching of another in anger is a battery. Secondly, if the one
touches the other gently, it will be no battery. Thirdly, if any of them use violence against the other, to
force his way in a rude inordinate manner, it will be a battery.

ROBERT GOLF, L.J. redefined battery as meaning an intentional physical contact which was not generally
acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life

Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172

Facts: A police officer wished to question a woman in relation to her alleged activity as a prostitute. The
woman decided to walk away, but the police officer was intent on stopping her and in order to do so,
grabbed her arm in order to prevent her from walking away. Under the Street Offences Act 1959 c.57,
the police officer had no power to detain the woman. The woman struggled with the police officer and
scratched him. She was charged with assaulting a police office in the course of his duty.

Issues: The issue in this case was whether the conviction for assaulting a police officer was lawful given
the lack of legal authority on the part of the police office to restrain the woman.

Decision/Outcome: It was held that the police officer was acting outside the scope of his powers as he
had no power to arrest the woman in that situation and therefore, was acting outside of the scope of his
duties as a police officer. There was no question therefore of assaulting a police officer in the course of
his duty. It was held further that the grabbing on the part of the police officer, without the power to
make an arrest, amounted to an unlawful assault (a battery). The woman had been entitled to resist as
an action of self-defence. Her conviction was therefore quashed. The court took the opportunity to
clarify the meaning of battery as a touching of another with hostile intent or in other words any
intentional touching outside of the scope of what normally acceptable.

“[A] broader exception has been created to allow for the exigencies of everyday life. Generally speaking
consent is a defence to battery; and most of the physical contacts of ordinary life are not actionable
because they are impliedly consented to by all who move in society and so expose themselves to the risk
of bodily contact . . Although such cases are regarded as examples of implied consent, it is more
common nowadays to treat them as falling within a general exception embracing all physical contact
which is generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life . . [We] think that nowadays it is more
realistic, and indeed more accurate, to state the broad underlying principle, subject to the broad
exception. . . In each case, the test must be whether the physical contact so persisted in has in the
circumstances gone beyond generally acceptable standards of conduct; and the answer to that question
will depend upon the facts of the particular case.”

- (Goff LJ)

Innes v. Wylie- BATTERY CASE

Policeman unlawfully prevented the plaintiff from entering a club

He was not held liable for battery as mere passive obstruction like door or wall, cannot be considered as
battery

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress:

Wilkinson v. Downton [1897] 2 QB 57

Facts: Downton (D) made a joke to Mrs Wilkinson (W) that her husband, Thomas Wilkinson (T) had had
an accident in which both his legs were broken and that W should go to The Elms pub where T was lying
to bring him home. These statements were false but D intended them to be believed as true by W, who
suffered a shock to her nervous system as a result. W had no predisposition to nervous shock and the
shock which caused her weeks of suffering and incapacity was not a result of previous ill-health. W
raised an action against D for compensation for her illness and suffering due to the false representation
made by D.

Issues: The issue in question was whether compensation could be made for a person’s illness and
suffering following the false representation made by the defendant, D.

Decision: D had wilfully made a false representation to W intending to cause some physical harm to W,
by infringing her right to personal safety, with no justification for doing so. Although D did not intend the
harm which was caused, this ‘wilful injuria’ is malicious in law. The injury caused to W was not too
remote and could have been foreseen, and therefore taken to have been intended, by D.
Principle: Wright J. “it is no answer in law to say that more harm was done than was anticipated, for that
is commonly the case with all wrongs”

Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721

Facts: Minna Wong (W) was employed as a wheelchair administrator by NHS Trust. In this employment,
she suffered harassment from her colleagues which resulted in physical and psychiatric harm to W. In
1995 W was successful in prosecuting M, one of the employees, for assault. In 1998 W raised an action
against the trust for negligence on the basis of its vicariously liability for the torts of its employees, and
against M for intentionally causing harm to W due to M’s harassment. The claim against M was
unsuccessful, and W appealed.

Issue: The issues in question were (1) the scope of the tort of intentionally causing harm under the
principle in Wilkinson v Downton that the behaviour was likely to result in harm that and could impute
an intention of harm; and (2) whether there was a tort of harassment at common law before the
enactment of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (1997 Act).

Held: Under the double jeopardy rule, M’s assault against W was excluded from consideration under
section 45 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. As a result, all that could be considered were
W's allegations that M had been rude and unfriendly, yet the tort of intentionally inflicting harm
required proof of actual physical harm or psychiatric illness. Therefore, in line with Wilkinson v
Downton, an intention to cause harm could not be imputed in the present case. Nor could W succeed on
the second issue, as there was no tort of intentional harassment at common law before the 1997 Act.
The appeal was dismissed.

False Imprisonment

Ram Pyare Lal v. Om Prakash

Every restraint of liberty of one person by another, is in law an imprisonment, and if imposed without
lawful cause, constitutes a false imprisonment which is both a criminal offence (section 340 IPC) and an
actionable tort.

Bird v. Jones (1845) 7 QB 742 (partial restraint case)

Facts: Bird, B, wished to cross a section of a public road which was closed off due to a boat race. Two
policemen, D, prevented B from passing in the direction he wished to go, but was allowed to go in the
only other direction in which he could pass. B refused to go in that direction and stood in the same
place. B raised an action against D for false imprisonment.
Issues: B claimed that the exclusion from using a section of the public road which prohibited him from
moving in one direction, despite all other directions remaining unobstructed, constituted false
imprisonment.

Decision/Outcome: Partial obstruction and disturbance does not constitute imprisonment. Coleridge J.
stated at paragraph 744 of his judgement that:

“a prison may have its boundary large or narrow, visible and tangible, or, though real, still in the
conception only; it may itself be moveable or fixed: but a boundary it must have; and that boundary the
party imprisoned must be prevented from passing; he must be prevented from leaving that place, within
the ambit of which the party imprisoning would confine him, except by prison-breach.”

A prison must therefore have a boundary. As there was still one direction which B could take, he could
not be said to have been imprisoned as he was not confined and prevented from passing or leaving that
place. B was at liberty to move off in another direction and no restraint or actual force was used against
him.

Ratio:Partial obstruction, unaccompanied by force or threat of force, does not constitute false
imprisonment.

Maharani of Nabha V/s. The Province of Madras, (1942)

Under official orders the Maharaja of Nabha was to be prevented from leaving the boundaries of Kodia
Kanal. But the local officers misunderstood the orders and when Maharani of Nabha was leaving for
Madras by train along with her daughter, the authorities prevented her from boarding the train. third
defendant had ordered the closure of the eastern gate of the Railway compound in order to prevent the
first plaintiff from proceeding by car with the object of boarding the train at any other station like
Dindigul and Trichinopoly. The Maharani sued the government for false imprisonment. But it was held
that there was no false imprisonment as there was no total restraint on the liberty of movement since
the Maharani could have proceeded in some other direction.

Bhim Singh v/s Jammu And Kashmir

The petitioner a member of legislative assembly of Jammu & Kashmir was arrested and detained in
police custody. He was deliberately prevented from attending the parliament sessions to be held on
11th September 1985. He was arrested under section 153A of Ranbir Penal Code was registered against
him for delivering a malicious/ seditious speech at the public gathering near the parade ground in
Jammu on 8th September 1985.

He was not produced before any magistrate until the 13th of September and he was produced before
magistrate within a requisite time period that is 24 hours. As a consequence of this, there was also a
voting session at the assembly which he apparently missed, where his vote was very crucial but the
person to whom he wanted to cast the vote won but his right to vote was infringed.
The petitioner for such gross violation of his fundamental rights granted to him by the constitution of
the country was awarded monetary compensation by way of exemplary costs

https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-6011-case-analysis-bhim-singh-v-s-jammu-and-
kashmir.html

Mee v. Cruikshank

Total restraint = false imprisonment, however short its duration.

(if there is unrisky means of escape, the restraint cannot be termed as total)

Merring v. Grahame White Aviation Co. (1919) 122 LT 44

pf suspected of having stolen a keg of varnish from the shop of employers(dfs). The df asked the pf to go
with policemen to company office, he was asked to wait there in waiting room, while 2 policemen
remained outside. The pf did not know he was free to go anywhere.

Df held liable as policemen caused apprehension of fear and he was not a free man

Rudul Shah v. State of Bihar and anr.

Prisoner’s jail sentence over, further imprisonment = unlawful detention

Anwar Hussian v. Ajoy Kumar

Judicial officer acts recklessly, illegally or maliciously in ordering arrest.

Held liable

Kundal Lal v. Dr.Des Raj

SP cancels bail bond and orders sub-inspector to arrest.

Both held liable for false imprisonment as SP did not have power to cancel the bail bond

Austin v. Dowling

The party that files complaint with judicial officer, and the judicial officer orders arrest, the party filing
complaint cannot he held liable for false imprisonment
Jhon Lewis & Co. v. Tims

Mother and daughter go to shop, daughter commits theft, both detained by staff for about an hour for
managing director to take decision, and then handed to police. On trial, daughter found guilty, mother
acquitted. Mother brings charges for false imprisonment.

Df’s held not liable, as she was not detained beyond a reasonable time for managing director to take
decision

Trespass Goods

National Coal Board v. Evans

Df’s had employed certain independent contractors to make excavations on their land. Beneath the land
the plaintiff's predecessor had laid some electric cables. The defendants had no knowledge about the
underlying cables. In course of excavations, the cable got damaged.

The df’s were not held liable for this damage as it was not known to them.

Richardson v. Atkinson

Df took some wine out of the pf’s cask and mixed water to compensate the taken wine from the cask.

The court held the defendant liable for conversion of the whole cask as he converted part of the
contents by taking them away and the remaining part by destroying their identity.

Hollins v. Fowler

If, a person innocently obtains possession of the goods of a person who has been fraudulently deprived
of them and disposes them of whether for his own benefit or that of any other person, is guilty of
conversion.

Roop Lal v Union of India

military jawans found some firewood lying by the river side and they thought that the wood probably
belonged to the government and thus took away the wood for camp fire and fuel

Union of India was liable,and the fact that the jawans did not intend to commit the theft did not absolve
the state from its liability.

Trespass to Land

Street v Mountford
A landlord of leased premises does not have exclusive possession, nor does a lodger or a licensee.
However, a tenant or subtenant does.

Bulli Coal Mining Co. v. Osborne

The Df’s mined from their land through to the Pf's land. This was held to be trespass to the subsoil

Ellis v Loftus Iron Co.

Even if you step onto plaintiff’s land, it is as bad as he walked ½ mile into it.

Holmes v Wilson and others (Trespass is continuing wrong)

The Df’s built supports for a road on Pf’s land. The Df’s paid damages for the trespass, but were held
liable again in a further action for failing to remove the buttresses.

Kelsen v Imperial Tobacco Co (Trespass in Air)

D committed trespass by allowing an advertising board to project 8 inches into P's property at ground
level and another above ground level

Aircraft Act , 1934- (Indian Act)

Reasonable altitude in air space is exclusive possession for enjoyment of property if breached it will
amount to trespass.

Joliffe v Willmett & Co.

Liability can be imposed when a person acts in a voluntary manner so even under a honest mistaken
belief. Thus, If in moving in his own land, a man inadvertently allows his blade to cut through into his
neighbor's field, he is guilty of a trespass.

Six carpenter’s case

Facts: Six carpenters (S) were served with wine and bread at a tavern which they paid for. S requested
more wine and bread afterwards, of which they were served, by this time they refused to pay. John Vaux
(J) brought an action of trespass against Thomas Newman and the five other carpenters.

Issue: The issue in question in the present case was whether the non-payment by S made the entry into
the tavern tortious and therefore trespass.
Decision/Outcome:

There was no trespass. The Court held that they were not trespassers ab initio since, the case was of
only non-payment it was non-feasance and not a case of misfeasance. When an entry, authority, or
licence, is given to any one by the law, and he abuses it, he shall be a trespasser ab initio, however it will
not be trespass where the entry or authority is given by the party and abused. An act of omission cannot
make a party a trespasser ab initio.

Chic Fashions (West Wales) v. Jones [1968] 2 QB 299 doubts the ratio in the instant case that if a man
abuses an authority given by law, he becomes a trespasser ab initio, due to the effect this would have on
the ability of constables to execute search warrants.

Defamation

Noor Mohammed Vs Mohd Jiauddin

Facts : Appellant (the bridegroom’s father) had approached the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,
appealing the Trial Court’s decision holding him liable for the loss of reputation suffered by the bride
and her family under the tort of defamation. On account of the bride’s family refusing to pay for the
services of the nautch-girl, the groom had left behind the bride and returned with his Barat resulting in
the loss of status and reputation witnessed by the 2,000 invited guests.

Decision: High Court in reaffirming the decision of the Trial Court determined the groom and his family
to be liable for defamation and damages in the sum of Rs.3,000/- and dismissed the appeal.

Principle: The legal principle established by this judgement was that of a “hybrid type” of defamation
which did not fall solely within the categories of libel or slander. The rationale for the same was that the
Appellant’s action was not founded on any spoken or written words of defamatory nature, but that its
gist consisted of act and conduct. The Court recognised that the Common Law categorisation of
defamation is crystallized and "libel" is treated as that class of statement which is addressed to the eye;
it is "slander" when it is addressed to the ear. However, given that both the eyes and ears were affected
in the case, it was determined to be of a hybrid type.

Moreover, the court acknowledged Article 19 (2) of the Constitution which uses defamation in a generic
sense of the "dignity of the individual" being ensured to every citizen. Therefore, the breach of this legal
right even if did not fall into a given type of defamation, was still a wrongful act fulfilling the gist of the
tort which consists of such acts which are aimed at harming the reputation of the plaintiff. Further
establishing that novelty is not a bar if it was a “new instance of a principle known to law and not new
principle”. Therefore, considering each of these rationales, the court put forth the principle of a hybrid
type of defamation as an original precedent.

W.B. Shanthi vs Arunachalam

Facts: Plaintiff Arunachalam has been a senior member of Tenkasi Bar. He was a lawyer of eminence.
Advocate Arunachalam has been engaged by one Kathirvel Murugan to issue a lawyer notice to the
defendant in connection with a property matter. Based on his instructions Advocate Arunachalam issued
Ex.A.1 notice to the defendant. But, it was replied to by the defendant under Ex.A.3 containing certain
imputations concerning Arunachalam as an Advocate. It is libel. “He calls the Advocate Arunachalam a
cheat, he charges him that he has disgraced, lowered down the image of, the legal profession. He also
stamped him a stooge, an agent of fraud.” Ex.A.2 is typed. Therefore, the typist knew the libelous
matter against Advocate Arunachalam. Arunachalam is having an Advocate Clerk and Juniors. It was
established that they came to know about the contents of Ex.A.2. Thus, there is publication of Ex.A.2
containing defamatory statement against Advocate Arunachalam.

Principle: Again, if the defendant knows that the letters sent to the plaintiff are usually opened by his
clerk or he ought to have anticipated that they would be opened by his spouse and the defendant sends
a libellous letter which is in fact opened by the clerk or the spouse, the defendant is liable. But if a
servant in breach of his duty and out of curiosity taken a letter or of an unclosed envelop and reads it,
there is no publication.

Berkoff v Burchill and another [1996] 4 All ER 1008

Facts: The first defendant was a journalist and, at the time, a film critic for the Sunday Times, while the
second defendant was the newspaper’s publisher. In one review, the first defendant described the
claimant (among others) as being ‘Film directors from Hitchcock to Birkoff are notoriously hideous-
looking’, and in another as “only marginally better-looking than the creature in Frankenstein”. The
claimant sued for libel.

Issues: The claimant argued that the above statements were defamatory in that they exposed him to
ridicule, or alternatively, they would cause others to avoid him. The defendants question the capability
of the statements to be defamatory. The trial judge found in favour of the claimant, so the defendants
appealed.

Decision/ Principle: Liable. The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendants’ appeal. Firstly, it held that the
while one cannot satisfactorily define the word ‘defamatory’, words that do not imply disgraceful
conduct or lack of business efficiency can still be defamatory if they cause the claimant to be subject to
ridicule, contempt or exclusion from society. However, insults not attacking a person’s standing in
society cannot constitute libel (the borderline is hardly definable). Secondly, claiming that someone was
ugly was different from attacking someone based on his physical condition, where the latter were
statement of fact. Calling a person ugly was a subjective perception and no right-minded person would
exclude another purely based on the subjective perception of a third person. Thus, the statement as to
the claimant’s ugly appearance was not defamatory. Thirdly, however, the defendants’ statements
exposed the claimant to ridicule in light of the actual words used and the actual circumstances in which
they were used. Calling someone ugly may be an expression of an opinion (and thus not defamatory) or
it may be said with the intention to expose a person to ridicule (and thus defamatory) – in the present
case it was the latter. “The fact that a statement may injure feelings of cause annoyance is irrelevant to
the question what is defamation.”

Charleston and Anr. V. News Groups Newspapers Limited and anr., HL 31 MAR 1995

Facts: The plaintiffs were actors playing Harold and Madge Bishop in the Australian soap series
‘Neighbours’. They sued on a tabloid newspaper article which showed their faces superimposed on the
near-naked bodies of models apparently engaged in sexual intercourse, with a headline ‘Strewth!
What’s Harold up to with our Madge?’. The body of the article made clear that the photographs had
been produced by pornographers without the plaintiffs’ consent.

Issues: The claim was based on the contention that some readers would have looked only at the
photographs and the headline, and complained that such readers would have thought that the plaintiffs
had in some way consented to the production of the photographs.

Decision/ Principle: Single Meaning Rule- A plaintiff in defamation proceedings may not arbitrarily split
off different parts of a publication without good reason. Words must be read in context, and as a whole.
A potentially defamatory photograph was accompanied by text which should be read with it. It was
accepted that the obviously defamatory headline and photographs were neutralised by the
accompanying text. A statement is said to have a single meaning even if different readers would read
the same statements as having different meanings. The statement must of course be read as a whole or,
as it has been put, ‘the bane and the antidote must be taken together’. The proper approach is to
determine what is the single meaning which the work conveys to the notional reasonable reader.
Whether the text of a newspaper article will, in any particular case, be sufficient to neutralise the
defamatory implication of a prominent headline will depend not only on the nature of the libel which
the headline conveys and language of the text which is relied on to neutralise it, but also on the manner
in which the whole of the relevant material is set out and presented.’: Lord Nicholls

Shubhangee Kori v. Bokhori Ram (1906)

Calling the Plaintiff’s wife a witch.

Mitha Rustomji vs. Nusserwanji Nowroji Engineer (1941) 43 BOMLR 631

Facts: This is a suit for damages for defamation consisting partly of libel and partly of slander. The words
complained of as libel were printed and published by the defendant in the issue of the Kom Sevak of
September 22, 1940, a weekly journal in Gujarati published every Sunday. Defendant was the editor,
printer and publisher. The slander was spoken by the defendant in reference to her at a public meeting
held in Sir Cowasji Jehangir Hall, Bombay, on September 26, 1940.

Issues: defence is that the words are a fair and bonafide comment on a matter of public interest, -
published on a privileged occasion. Slander- the defendant denied that he uttered the words referred to
by the plaintiff - they were spoken on a privileged occasion- not actionable per se, that is, without proof
of special, damage.
Principle: Halsbury law of England- A statement which, being published of another in the way of his
lawful trade, business, profession, calling, or office, conveys ai reflection on him calculated to disparage
or injure him therein, is a defamatory statement, even though it be not calculated to hold him up to
hatred, contempt, or ridicule.

Decision: Statements suggest that the plaintiff is unfit to carry on her classes for poor Parsi girls, because
by attending the classes their future would be ruined. She is therefore unfit to discharge the duties of
her profession, or the duties in respect of her calling; and the imputation would have a tendency to
prejudice her in the way of her profession or calling. The statements are therefore defamatory of the
plaintiff and constitute a libel.

No action, however, lies against a defendant if he can prove that the words complained of are a fair and
bonafide comment on a matter of public interest. In this case, as the imputation is not warranted by the
facts, it takes the statements out of the sphere of fair comment.

Malice destroys the privilege. The defendant must also show that what he communicated was relevant
or pertinent to the privileged occasion. Any attack or personal imputation upon a person's calling or
profession cannot be said to be relevant to, or fairly warranted by, the occasion

Plaintiff has not proved the slander.

Dixon v. Holden

A man’s reputation is his property and if possible more valuable more than any other property.

South India Rly Co. v. Ramakrishna (Non-defamatory statement example)

“I suspect you are travelling with a wrong or false ticket”.

Sim v. Stretch (Non-defamatory statement example)

“Edith resumed her services with us today. Please send her possesions and the money borrowed, also
her wages”.

SNM Abdi v. Prafulla K. Mohanta

Accused former CM of misusing man and muscle power.

Court found allegation false, baseless and defamatory, and awarded Rs. 5 lakh as damages.

Newstead v. London Express Newspaper [1940] 1 KB 377

Facts: A newspaper published details of a bigamy trial and referred to the accused as “Harold Newstead,
thirty-year-old Camberwell man.” The article mentioned that he “was jailed for nine months, liked
having two wives at once. Married legally for a second time in 1932 - his legal wife is pictured right,
above - he unlawfully married nineteen-year-old Doris Skelly (left, above). He said 'I kept them both till
the police interfered.” Another man by the name of Harold Newstead, also from Camberwell and aged
around thirty, brought an action in libel against the newspaper. He claimed that the article had been
misunderstood as referring to him.

Issues: The defendant newspaper admitted publication of the account but denied that they were
intended or understood to refer to the plaintiff or that they were defamatory of him. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendants were under a duty to take reasonable care to give a precise and detailed
description of the correct Harold Newstead, denoting him exclusively, and to ensure that the words
published were not capable of referring to any other person. They were in breach of this duty. The key
question was whether reasonable persons would understand the words complained of to refer to the
plaintiff.

Decision/Outcome: Liable. the principle in Jones v E Hulton Co applied, The Court of Appeal that liability
for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer; but on the fact of the defamation.
Accordingly, in a case such as this it may be right to direct the jury that a reasonable man, and, in
particular, a newspaper publisher, must be aware of the possibility of individuals with the same name.
The Court held that the evidence justified a finding by the jury that a reasonable man may have
understood the words complained of to refer to the plaintiff. The fact that the words were true of
another person was not a valid defence against a claim of libel.

Rahim Baksh v. Bachcha Lall AIR 1929 All 214

Facts: Bachcha Lal owned a grain company. In a criminal case in the magistrate court, Rahim Bakhsh, is
said to have interjected during the trial of the case and while the cross-examination of Chhedi was
proceeding that "they were the most dishonest men also in the city". Magistrate said that he had not
heard the remark in question and did not record the same in his proceedings. Lala Bachcha Lal instituted
the suit which has given rise to the present appeal against Munshi Rahim Bakhsh Mukhtar on 9th April
1925 for recovery of Rs. 5,100 on account of damages sustained by him by the slanderous words uttered
by Rahim Bakhsh in the Court of the Magistrate. The defendant denies having uttered the words which
are imputed to him. In the alternative he claims privilege.

Principle: The distinction between slander being actionable per se in certain cases and not being
actionable in other cases without proof of special damage has not been recognized or followed with
unanimity by the Indian High Courts.

In Dawan Singh v. Mahip Singh [1888] 10 All. 425, at 436 [of 10 All.] Mahmood, J., has laid down the
following propositions:
"(1) That whilst the English law of defamation recognizes no distinction between defamation as such and
personal insult in civil liability, the law of British India recognizes personal insult conveyed by abusive
language as actionable par se without proof of special or actual damage.

(2) That such abusive and insulting language, unless excused or protected by any other rule of law, is in
itself a substantive cause of action and a civil injury apart from defamation."

Decision: Held liable.

Ramjethmalani v. Subramaniyam Swamy

Facts: On 14.10.1995 when defendant submitted the "Written Concluding Argument " in Delhi HC in
which he said that " According to my information , Mr Jethmalani has been receiving money from the
LTTE being deposited in his son's account in CITIBANK in New York" as this statement was not for client
but for the counsel . For such an allegation a suit was filed by plaintiff, Mr. Jethmalani alleging that
defendant was guilty of vicious and gross libel for which the plaintiff claimed to entitled exemplary
damages.

Issues: The main argument argued by defendant is that his statement is not made with malice and it
come under the absolute privilege. plaintiff said that absolute privilege is not infinite and by citing case
1998 (1) All ER 625, Waple V. Surrey Country Council they proved that privilege is not available to
defendant as defendant statement is nowhere relevant or asked in the required query. Defendant
claimed that said statement is true but he failed to prove the same.

Principle: If statement is quite unconnected with and irrelevant to the main statement which is ex-
hypothesis privileged then it is more accurate to say that the privilege does not extend thereto than to
say that the result may be the same, and such statement is evidence of malice, so it is defamatory. Held
liable, 5 lacs compensation.

Parvathy v Mannar

Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India

Issues: The concurring petitions filed by leading political figures unanimously demanded decriminalizing
defamation on one hand and strengthening civil remedies and financial compensation for the loss of
individual reputation.

The two basic contentions of the seven issues raised in the writ petition filed by Subramanian Swamy
were: i. Declaring Section 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as unconstitutional. ii. Declaring
Section 199(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr PC) as unconstitutional. They contested the
constitutionality of the offense of criminal defamation, arguing that it inhibited their right to freedom of
expression.
Decision: The Supreme Court of India dismissed challenges to the constitutionality of the criminal
offense of defamation, holding that it was a reasonable restriction on the right to freedom of
expression. The Court found that there existed a constitutional duty to respect the dignity of others as
per art. 19(2)

https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/subramanian-swamy-v-union-india/

Innuendo

Morgan v Odhams Express [1971] 1 WLR 1239

Facts: The defendant was a journalist collecting material on a dog doping gang story, whereby he put a
key witness (who agreed to talk to him) under his surveillance while investigations were ongoing. The
witness left the defendant’s lodgings to spend a few days with the claimant with whom she was seen in
public. The witness was later taken back to the defendant’s lodgings until after some of the gang
members have been convicted. The defendant published his story, which included a photograph of the
witness with her name also indicated. A later article suggested that the witness was kidnapped by
members of the gang – the article did not mention the claimant by name or description.

Issues: The claimant brought an action for libel, arguing that by innuendo the article associated him with
the dog doping gang and thus the kidnapping. At trial, the judge put the case before the jury as words of
the article were capable of being understood as referring to the claimant. The jury found in favour of the
claimant. The defendants appealed. The Court of Appeal allowed their appeal. It held that any
reasonable man would have been prevented by the discrepancies in the story from thinking that the
article referred to the claimant. It also held that in order to become defamatory, the article should have
contained some clear indications that it referred to the claimant – which was not the case here. The
claimant appealed to the House of Lords.

Decision/Outcome: Held liable. The House of Lords held that one must first consider the nature of the
article and the class of readers likely to read it. Then, one might go on to determine the impression the
article would have had on the mind of the ordinary sensible reader, who read the article casually and
not in expectation of precision. The Court held that the article would be defamatory if it contained
defamatory imputations and pointed to the claimant as the person to be defamed. The Lords were of
the view that in the present case the article complied with these requirements and was thus
defamatory.

Tolley v. J.S Fry & Sons. Ltd.

Knowledge or intention to defame is not necessary.

Innocence is not a defence

Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspaper Ltd. [1929] 2 KB 331

Newspaper publishes photo of Mr.M and Ms.C together with a caption that they have announced their
engagement. This was false as they were already married to separate people. Wife of Mr.M, the pf,
brought action, and df’s were held liable as the caption meant she was not M’s lawful wife and was
living in immoral co-habitation with him.

Facts: The claimant was known as the lawfully wedded wife of a famous race-horse owner and former
General of the Mexican Army. The claimant and her husband lived separately but he often visited her at
her workplace. The defendant newspaper published a photograph of the claimant’s husband with a
woman labelled as Miss X, to whom – as alleged by the attached article – he was engaged.

Issues: The claimant argued that the publication caused damage to her in that it was intended to imply
that her husband was living with her immorally. The defendants denied any such intention and even the
possibility of their publication having such a meaning. The defendants refused to admit, even after
seeing evidence thereof, that the claimant was married to the subject of the publication. The trial judge
found that in the circumstances of this case, the publication could be seen as having a defamatory
meaning. He directed the jury that what mattered was the perception of the reasonably minded person
who knew the circumstances of the case. The jury found in favour of the claimant.

D.P Chowdhury v. Km Manjulata

Newspaper publishes that 17yr old girl ran away with a college boy(both belonging to distinguished
families).

Court finds that item was un-true and published negligently with utter irresponsibility. Df’s held liable.

Morrison v. Ritchie & Co.

Published in good faith that pf had twins, but she was married only 2 months ago.

Df’s held liable

E. Hulton & Co. v. Artemus Jones [1910] AC 20

Facts: Humorous article about some festival at Dieppe, was written by a correspondent of an English
newspaper reporting that at a large and well attended motor vehicle show in France there on the
terraces was‘Artemus Jones with a woman not his wife who must be you know – the other thing.”
Writer and owner unaware that an Artemus Jones exists in real, but is a barrister, not a church warden.

Decision: Defendant claimed it should not be held liable for libel because it used Defendant’s name as a
fictitious name and had never even heard of Plaintiff.

Court held that it reasonably referred to him only, and ‘A person charged with libel cannot defend
himself by showing that he intended not to defame, or that he intended not to defame the plaintiff, if in
fact he did both.” Lord Loreburn. The meaning intended by the publisher is irrelevant for the purpose of
construing the words, although it may be relevant to the question of damages. intention is no defence
‘however excellent it may be’. The defendant’s remedy ‘is to abstain from defamatory words.’ It is for
the jury to decide as a question of fact whether the article actually identified the plaintiff. The df’s were
held liable

Youssoup v. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Pictures Ltd.

The pf, a Russian princess, was falsely imputed by a cinematographic film that she had been raped or
seduced by the notorious monk Rasputin.

Df’s held liable.

Court held the photographic part as libel but regarded the speech as “synchronised with the
photographic reproduction and forms part of one complex common exhibition as an ancillary
circumstance, part of the surroundings explaining that which is to be seen.” Thus speech also considered
libel.

Alexander v North Eastern Railway Co [1865] 6 B & S 340

Facts: The plaintiff had been convicted of riding a train from Leeds without having purchased a valid
ticket. The penalty was a fine and a period of imprisonment of 2 weeks if he defaulted on the fine.
However, following the conviction, the defendant published a notice that the plaintiff was convicted and
issued a fine or three weeks imprisonment if in default.

Issues: The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had committed libel by describing the penalty issued to
him inaccurately. The defendants argued that the conviction was described with substantial and
sufficient accuracy and the words so far as they differed in their literal meaning from the words of the
conviction were not libellous.

Decision/Outcome: Truth as a defence: Judgment was given in favour of the defendants. The gist of the
libel was that the plaintiff was sentenced to pay a sum of money and, in default of payment, to be
imprisoned. Blackburn J noted that the substance of the libel was true but the question was whether
what was stated inaccurately was the gist of the libel. The difference between the conviction and the
statement of it published by the defendants did not make the latter in law libellous. The Court was not
prepared to say whether, as a matter of law, the notice published by the defendants was libellous or
that the inaccuracy regarding the term of imprisonment made a material difference. The question of the
effect on the public mind of the statement that the period of potential imprisonment was longer than
was actually issued was a question for the jury.

Huth v. Huth

If 3rd person wrongfully reads defamatory letter => no publication, and hence no defamation.

Theaker v. Richardson
If there is likelihood to be read by somebody else, like clerk/wife, there is publication

T.J. Ponnen v. M.C. Verghese

Husband writes defamatory things about father in law to his wife through a letter, wife shows it to her
father.

Held not defamatory as husband-wife in India considered to be single entity and hence no publication.

Radhey Shyam Tiwari v. Eknath

The def. published defamatory statement against plaintiff but could not prove that the facts published
by him were true and therefore, he was held liable.

McQuire v Western Morning news Co. ( Fair Comment Requirements)

Appreciation of existing facts and not invention of new facts.

Should be bonafide i.e. Without Malice

Comment must be in public interest.

Boxsius v. Golbert

An advocate under instructions of his client, dictated to his typist, a letter addressed to B, containing
defamatory statements about B. The letter was press copied by another clerk. B brought an action for
defamation against the advocate.

The Court observed that the privilege protecting a business communication made on a privileged
occasion covers, "all incidents of its transmission and treatment which are in accordance with the
reasonable and usual course of business."

The Court further added that the publication to his clerks by the solicitor was covered by qualified
privilege and, as such, Advocate was not held liable.

Nuisance

Crown River Cruises v. Kimbolton Fireworks

15-20 min o fireworks. Debris would fall on pf’s land and caused damage due to ensuing fire

held liable. => nuisance = continuing interference

Radhey Shyam v. Gur Prasad

Radhey restrained from setting up a mill as the noise from the machines would affect Gur Prasead’s
health and hamper his peaceful enjoyment of his land.

Court granted injunction to stop the mill, as it severely affected the physical comfort of Gur Prasad.

Robinson v. kilvert (Extra sensitive)

Extra sensitive paper was being damaged from heat from neighbours premisies. Pf’d claim failed as
ordinary paper would not have been damaged.

Mckinnon Industries v. Walker

Fumes from Df’s industry damaged delicate orchids. These fumes would have also damaged normal
flowers.

Hence, claim granted

Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v Emmett (Malice)

Christie v. Davey (Malice)

Plaintiff and defendant, both were neighbours. The plaintiff and their family were fond of music. They
used to sing and play various instruments. It disturbed the defendant. He started hammering the wall,
beating trays, shrieking and whistling.

The Court held the defendant liable as he was doing it intentionally and maliciously for the purpose of
annoying the plaintiff.

Public Nuisance

Solton v. De Held

De Held was a priest. The bell of church was rung day and night, disturbing everyone, pf was disturbed
the most as he was living right next to the church.

Court held that it was only public nuisance and granted injunction.

Dr. Ram Raj Singh v. Babu Lal

Injunction against brick grinding machine, which created noise and left red residue on clothes, and
caused pollution in the vicinity.

He also got special damages => both private and public nuisance.

Campbell v Paddington Corporation

The claimant owned a flat which overlooked a street. The defendants erected a grandstand on the
occasion of the funeral procession of Edward VII. The grandstand obstructed the view from the
claimant’s flat. She could not rent her flat out to spectators and recovered damages for loss of profits on
the grounds of public nuisance.

Sturges v. Bridgemen

Defendant was a confectioner and had a kitchen in the back of his house. The plaintiff did not feel any
noise and vibration from kitchen for over 20 years. After 20 years, plaintiff, who was a medical
practitioner shifted his consulting room in the back garden of his house. After this shifting, the plaintiff
felt the nuisance caused by kitchen's noise and vibration.

The plaintiff brought the suit and the Court granted injunction against the confectioner. Defendant's
claim of prescriptive right failed because the interference had not been actionable nuisance for the
preceding period of more than 20 years.

Also, nuisance in one place (Belgravia square) may not be nuisance in another place (Bermondsey )

Negligence

Butterfield v Forrester [Kings Bench, [1809]

The pl-injured-striking obstruction-roadway-The df-making repairs-house-pole across road. pl, left public
house-neared dark-riding horse violently -streets of Derby-struck pole-seriously injured-witness state pl
not riding violently-he would have observed pole-no evidence pl intoxicated at the time.

held liable : One person at fault will not dispense with the requirement that another person use ordinary
care for himself.

Davies vs Mann[152 Eng. Rep 588(1842)]

FACTS-

Pl tied donkeys feet,left side of road. Df coming in wagon at high speed,hit donkey and killed it.

HELD-

negligence of Pl, but Df could prevented accident using ordinary care.

Contributory Negligence
Rural Transport Service v. Bezlum Bibi (1980)

Bus overcrowded, people sat on the roof. The driver tried to overtake a cart ignoring passengers sitting
on roof. passenger hit by branch, received damage and died.

held both driver and conductor negligent-contributory negligence of passengers including the deceased,
who took risk of travelling.

Yoginder Paul Chowdhury v. Durgadas (1972) –

The Delhi High Court-pedestrian tries to cross road all of a sudden-hit by a moving vehicle- guilty of
contributory negligence.

Doctrine of alternative danger

Jones v. Boyce (1816) –

pl passenger of defendants coach. Coach driving negligently- pl jumped off bus-fearing accident-broke
leg

It was held that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover.

Shayam Sunder v. State of Rajasthan (1974)

truck caught fire-negligence of df. One occupants, Navneetlal, jumped out save himself from fire, struck
against stone lying by roadside and died. The defendants were held liable.

Rules For Determining Contributory Negligence

Absence of due care on his part about his safety.

Bhagwat Swarup v Himalaya Gas Co. (AIR 1985 HP 41)

Plt. Neg. must be the operative cause of accident.

Agya Kaur v PRTC [AIR (1980)]

Test of Prudent Man- Resonable care exercised by the plaintiff

Sushma Mitra v MPSRTC AIR 1974 SC

Doctrine of alternative danger- Plaintiff is permitted to take risk in dangerous situation created by
defendant.

Brandon v Osborne, Garret & Co. Ltd. 1924 1 KB

Presumptions that others are careful/ statutory negligence.

Plaintiff not guarding against the act of negligence of the defendant is not liable of Contributory
negligence -

11.Gee v Metropolitan Rly. Co. 1873 QB

12.UOI v Supriya Ghoash AIR 1973 Pat. 129

Contributory negligence of children- A child may not be able to appreciate and understand certain
damages like an adult -13.Yachuk v oliver Blias co. Ltd. (1949) A.C. 386

Doctrine of identification ( imputed Contributory negligence)- overruled. 14.Oliver v Birmingham &

Midland Omnibus Co. (1933) 1 KB 35

How far CN is defence?..

The Law reform (Contributary Negligence) Act, 1945-

Abolished TLO rule and said apportionment of damages will be according to the degree of their fault.15.
Lalman Badri Prasad v Union of India AIR 1954 VP 17 and

Butterfield and Davies cases- CN is a complete defence in common law that cause hard ship to plaintiff

16. P. R. Jhaveri Vs. K.K. Tak and Ors. 2002 (6) SCC 455.

It was a case of collusion in between a Car and a truck.

HELD- contributory negligence-act or omission on the claimant's part, contributed-damage caused- such
nature described as `negligence'.

Negligence means breach of a legal duty to care, but used in expression "contributory negligence", not
mean breach of duty. It means failure by a person to use reasonable care for the safety of either himself
or his property, so that he becomes blameworthy in part as an "author of his own wrong.

Nervous Shock

Courts first recognized that negligently caused psychiatric illness-give rise to claim for damages 17.
[Dilieu v White and Sons (1901) 2 KB 669

Why courts are reluctant to award damages for emotional disturbances

18. Victorian Railway Commissioners v. Coultas, (1888) 13 App Cas 222.

gate keeper invited pl and wife, driving buggy ,to enter gate, train approaching, narrow distance
between train and buggy, no collision, but lady fainted, suffered nervous shock resulting illness and
miscarriage.

The Privy Council held that "damage arising from mere sudden terror unaccompanied by any physical
injury but occasioning a nervous or mental shock cannot under such circumstances be considered a
consequence which in the ordinary course of things would flow from negligence of the gate-keeper".
And in this case it was held that the damage was too remote to be recovered since there was no actual
bodily impact.

19. Wilkinson v. Downton, 2 Q.B. 57 (1897)

Df (joke) told pl-her husband injured in accident-lying with broken bones- pillow need to carry him
home. pl shock to nervous system-week of suffering and incapacity. df held liable

Held- A party may seek recovery for outrageous conduct that causes physical harm or mental distress.

20. Dulieu v White [1901] 2 KB 669

Pf serving in public house as barmaid, van drawn by horses smashed into building . No physical injury to
pf but pleaded- due to nervous shock she become physical ill, miscarried, gave birth brain damaged
child.

HELD- liability in such cases arises where shock caused “reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to
oneself was caused by”.

illness caused by nervous shock -as much a physical injury as broken bone or torn flesh wound.

Burden Of Proof On Plaintiff

Need of close relationship with primary victim was overruled in 23.Chadwick v British transport
Corporation (1967) 1 WLR 912

22.Hambrook v Stokes Bross[1925] 1 KB 141

first case involving secondary victim.

df left lorry, top of street,engine running, started by itself, ran down incline,mother saw lorry moving in
direction of children, mother frightened for safety of children, bystander told child injured, she suffered
nervous shock resulted death.

Held liable even she not within area of physical injury.

23. BOURHILL v YOUNG [1943] AC 92HOUSE OF LORDS

motorcyclist killed-himself responsible- pregnant woman reached scene, saw blood, suffered shock,
premature labour, loss of baby

Held- insufficient proximity, she not present at time of accident, not liable, deceased no foreseeablity.

24.King v Phillips [1953] 1 QB

mother looking from window, taxi backing up sons tricycle , heard sons scream, injury slight, suffered
psychiatric injury result shock.

Held-no claim, watching from window rather than highway facts of Hambrook v Stokes “far removed
from the present” Weinfield: The case requires consideration

25. McLoughlin v O’Brian[1983] 1 AC 410

road accident of father,son,2daughters, pf(mother) home 2 mile from accident,2 hours later informed,
her son dying,taken to hospital where daughter died,she saw through window situation of rest of her
family, suffered psychiatric trauma.

Held- no claim, allowed damages not at or near scene of accident at or shortly after

26. Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police

Hillsborough disaster, Liverpool fans died in a massive crush. police negligently allowing too many
supporters to crowd in one part of the stadium friends and relatives saw their close ones die and
suffered from nervous shock
Held:

Plaintiffs were secondary victims.They shoud witness the event though their own “unaided ” senses

27. Page V Smith

Mr.Page was in an accident,suffered no injuries,however recurrence of myalgic encephalomyelitis

(Chronic fatigue syndrome) from which he had suffered for 20 years but was then in remission.The
defendant claim that the damage was Unforseeable.

Held:

It was held that Mr.Page was a direct victim of the accident,there is no issue of forseeablility,secondary
victims were spectators etc,the test of forseeability was to be applied to them,eggskull rule a defendant
must take their victim as they find them.

28. White v Chief Constable of thepolice officers who were present in the aftermath of the Hillsborough
disaster sued for post traumatic stress disorder. South Yorkshire Police

Primary victims:entitled to received compensation,even if NS was unforeseeable.

Secondary victims:compensation subject to control mechanism,

Close ties with main victim (which is presume in case of spouse, parent and child) and in other cases it is
to be proved.

Plaintiff must have been present at the accident or its immediate aftermath

Psychiatric injury received is direct perception of the accident or its immediate aftermath and not upon
hearing about it from someone else

29. Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta

Damages for mental agony in case of harassment of the plaintiff by public officers.

30. Gaziabad Development Authority v. Union of India

compensation for mental agony cannot be allowed in cases of breach of contract

31. Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjot Ahluwalia

Damages for mental agony were given parents when their child treatment suffered severe damage due
to negligence of the hospital staff and was left in a vegetative state. The child was separately allowed
damages for the injury suffered in the same case.

32. Ravneet Singh Bagga Vs. M/s KLM Royal Dutch Airline
verification of visa papers constitutes deficiency in service on part of airline - bonafide action taken by
staff of airline cannot be held to be deficiency in services

Halligua v. Mohan Sundaram

Shock which can be measured by direct consequences on bodily activity which can form the basis for an
action in damages

Haynes v Harwood

defendant pleaded novus actus interveniens or remoteness of consequences i.e. mischief of the child
was the proximate cause and negligence of defendant servant was remote cause . It was held that the
def. Is liable even though the mischief on the part of children was anticipated. Wrongful act shpuld be
the real cause (Causa Causan) and not causa sine qua non (An intervening cause of loss which, though
not direct, may nonetheless contribute to the loss) of damage.

Lampert v Eastern national omnibus co.

Mrs Lampert was in an accident lead to disfigurement of her face,he husband deserted her,she claimed
damages foir the loss of company of her husband.her estranged relations with her husband that led to
him deserting her.

Test of reasonable foresight was rejected and test of directness was considered to be more appropriate
by court of appeal in Re polemis and furness withy and Co. Ltd, 1921.

Smith v London &South Western Railway Co

The railway company allowed heap of trimmings of hedges and grass near a railway line. Spark from the
railway engine set fire to the material. Due to high wind the fire was carried to the plaintiff’s cottage,
(situated 200 yards away from the spot where the fire began), which was burnt.

Defendants were liable even though they could not have forseen the loss of the cottage,when
negligence is established the defendant is laible whether he could have forseen it or not.

Re Polemis And Furness Withy And Co. Ltd

Furness chartered the Polemis to carry a cargo of petrol and benzene in tins. Due to leakage in those tins
some of their contents collected in the hold of the ship. While discharging at Casablanca, a heavy plank
fell into the hold and caused an explosion, which eventually destroyed the ship. The falling of the plank
was due to Defendant’s negligence

To determine whether an act is negligent, one has to see the foreseeable damage, if there is none the
act is not negligent, but if it can cause damage,and the damage thus caused by the negligent act ,was
not the foreseen type of damage is immaterial.

Ovrseas Tankship U.K. Ltd. v Morts Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd.

The crew had carelessly allowed furnace oil to leak from their ship,the oil coated the water and the
shore,sparks from the welding of Morts dock welding torches set fire to the oil,causing damage to the
shipIn an action by Mort's Dock for damages for negligence it was found as a fact that the defendants
did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to know that the oil was capable of being
set alight when spread on water. The dock owners knew the oil was there, and continued to use welders

Test of directness was replaces by test of reasonable foresight,

Hughes v Lord advocate

a post office employee opened a manhole for the purpose of maintaining underground telephone
equipment covered it with a tent. It surrounded by parafin lamps but otherwise unguarded. A child of 8
years entered the tent and started playing with lamp. The lamp fell into the manhole and caused a
violent explosion resulting in the fall of boy also in man hole and severe injuries to him from burns.It was
foreseeable that a child would get burn by tampering with the lamp but the explosion could not be
foreseen.House of lords held that since the kind of damage was foreseeable although the extent was
not. def were held liable.

MODULE VI

Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932- negligent interference with an individual’s life, person and property-
imposed duty on manufacturer and any other person who is in a position to harm the interest of the
other in his activity

PASSING-OFF

Honda Motors Co. Ltd. v. Charanjit Singh & Others- Plaintiff trademark “HONDA” respect to automobiles
& power equipments-Def. mark HONDA pressure cookers-mark HONDA by the defendants not honest
adoption-cause confusion-plaintiff application allowed

Pizza Hut International v. Pizza Hut India Pvt. Ltd.- trading style of plaintiff international-plaintiff
repuration established in India long before started business- adoption of ‘Pizza Hut’ by def. an act of
passing

CYBER DEFAMTION

SMC Pneumatics v. Jogesh Kwatra-first cyber defamation-Delhi High Court-passed ex-parte and interim
injunction- restraining def. from sending derogatory mails-illegal activity

Malicious Prosecution
Bolandanda Premayya v. Ayaradara

Plaintiff was accused of committing theft. Called by police officer to police station. Police conducts
search at his house, finds out that no theft committed by him. He then files for damages against df for
malicious prosecution.

Courts rules that mere filing of complaint with police is no malicious prosecution. It starts only when
some judicial authority is set in motion as a result of the complaint.

Khagendra Nath v. Jacob Chandra

The Prosecution is not deemed to have commenced before a person is summoned to answer a
complaint.

There was mere lodging of ejahar alleging that the plaintiff wrongfully took away the bullock cart
belonging to the defendant and requested that something should be done. The plaintiff was neither
arrested nor prosecuted.

It was held that merely bringing the matter before the executive athourity did not amount to
prosecution and therefore the action for malicious prosecution could not be maintained

Mohammad Amin v. Jogendra Kumar Bannerjee

The defendant had filed a complaint before the magistrate charging the plaintiff with cheating. The
magistrate thereupon examined the complainant an oath and made an inquiry.

Notice of the inquiry had been issued to the plaintiff who attended it with his counsel and incurred costs
doing so. The magistrate finally dismissed the complaint. In these circumstances the Privy Council held
that there was a prosecution.

Gaya Prasad v Bhagat Singh

The privy council pointed out that the conduct of the complainant before and after the complaint has to
be seen to decide whether he was the real prosecutor or not.

If the complainant knowing that the charge is false tries to mislead the police by procuring false
evidence for the conviction of the accused, he would be considered to be the prosecutor.

Kamta Prasad v National Buildings Constructions Corp.Pvt Ltd.

The officer of the respondent corporation found certain articles missing while preparing inventory and
checking up with the stock register. The plaintiff was prosecuted under sec. 403 of the I.P.C. but was
given the benefit of doubt and hence acquitted. The plaintiff brought an action for malicious prosecution
Ram Lal v. Mahender Singh

The plaintiff and his father had been implicated in an offence of murder and they were acquitted by the
court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed suit for malicious prosecution. It was held that merely because the
plaintiffs came to be acquitted or discharged by the criminal court as the prosecution failed to prove the
case beyond doubt as is required in criminal law, it does not mean that such acquittal or discharge could
necessarily boomerang upon the defendant as a case for malicious prosecution.

The burden of proof squarely lied upon the plaintiffs to prove that the prosecution was malicious, mala
fide and done with an intention to harass and defame the plaintiffs. No such case was made out by the
plaintiffs, much less proved. Therefore, the plaintiffs were not entitled to claim any damages.

Girija Prasad v Uma Shankar Pathak

The pf was an advocate and also a Jan Sangh leader and had started an agitation on food scarcity and
one Jan Sangh worker had gone to a hunger strike.

Girija Singh a sub inspector was deputed to control the crowd that had collected there to support the
agitation. Then there were some bullet shots made from the revolver of the sub inspector. He stated
that while he was grappling with some person who was assaulting him the revolver got fired mistakingly.

On that date Girija Singh had lodged an FIR stating that he was assaulted by some person, his watch
snatched and also the pf Uma Shankar pathak was present there and was instigating the crowd against
him.

The case was investigated and the pf was arrested and released on bail on later. he was finally acquitted
after 6 months

The pf then sued 4 persons for malicious prosecution , the sub inspector Girija Prasad who lodged the
F.I.R. , the S.H.O. of that area who entertained the report and two other persons.

M.P. High court found that the report prepared by Girija Prasad was false and at that relevant time the
pf was not present there but was appearing infront of a civil judge.

Eventually Girija Prasad was held for malicious prosecution and others acquitted of the charge and not
held liable for malicious prosecution.

West Bengal State Electricity Board Vs. Dilip Kumar Ray

Respondent no.1 was an employee of the appellant No.1- Board and disciplinary proceeding was
initiated against him and a FIR was lodged against him and others for alleged misconduct and
commission of various offences. Initially, the respondent No.1 was placed under suspension for alleged
acts of misconduct while functioning as the Superintending Engineer, pending investigation, drawal and
disposal of the disciplinary proceedings against him. Since no charge sheet was issued within a period of
four months a writ petition was filed by the respondent No.1 for quashing departmental proceedings.
The writ petition was disposed of directing the Board to issue the charge sheet. Accordingly the charge
sheet was issued on 17.1.1986 containing 10 charges. Respondent No.1 submitted his reply to the said
charge sheet inter alia denying and disputing each and all of the charges levelled against him. He prayed
for permission to inspect certain documents and to take copies thereof.

Since the said prayer was not accepted, another writ petition was filed on 13.9.1986 before the High
Court

In the said writ petition order passed by the High Court was with to the effect that the enquiry should
continue upon proper inspection being granted to all documents for which inspection had been offered,
excepting three items.

It was further directed that the enquiry should commence after grant of proper opportunity to the
respondent no.1 in accordance with law.

Respondent No.1 continued to make grievance about denial of opportunity and on 10th September,
1986 purportedly written statement of defence in reply to the charge sheet was filed.

By order dated 12th December, 1986, the respondent no.1 was informed that his reply was found
unsatisfactorily and it was decided to hold an enquiry. Subsequently enquiry officer was appointed and a
presenting officer was also appointed.

However, the enquiry officer appointed originally was replaced because of respondent no.1's allegations
of bias.