STRICT LIABILITY

(The Rule In Rylands v.

Fletcher)
A. Development of the principle
• Strict liability=liability without fault
• Stated in the case of Rylands v Fletcher (1866);
where D, needing water storage, contracted
an independent contractor to construct a
reservoir on their land. Unknown to them
there were some disused mine shafts under
this land. Water burst into the shafts and
flooded P’s underground mines in adjacent
land.
• Qn: What was the connection with
independent contractor? Should the
defendants have been responsible for acts of
an independent contractor? Could P sue in
negligence?
• HELD: D was liable even though the
construction was the act of an independent
contractor
• Blackburn J stated what came to be known as
the Rule in Rylands v Fletcher that:
“We think that the true rule of law is, that the
person who for his own purposes brings on
his lands and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief, if it escapes,
must keep it at his peril, and if he does not
do so is prima facie answerable for all the
damage which is the natural consequence of
its escape.”
B. CONDITIONS OF APPLICATION

• 1. Accumulation on the defendant's land

• 2. A thing likely to do mischief if it escapes
• 3. Escape
• 4. Non-natural use of land
• 5. The damage must not be too remote (i.e.
must be foreseeable)
1. Accumulation
• D must bring the hazardous material on to his land
and keep it there. No liability if the thing is already
on the land or is there naturally; see Giles v
Walker (1890) 24 QBD 656 Seeds from some
thistles growing naturally on D’s land blew into P’s
land damaged his crops. Held: D not liable as he
had not brought the thistles onto his land;
Pontardawe RDC v Moore-Gwyn Some rocks from
the D’s land fell onto P’s land. D was not liable as
they had not brought the rocks onto the land to
accumulate them. The escape was also caused
by natural events with adverse weather conditions
causing an avalanche.
• Carstairs v Taylor (1871) LR 6 Exchequer 217 P
stored rice in the ground floor of a warehouse
leased from D. D used the upper floor for
storage of cotton. A rat gnawed through a
gutter box draining water from the roof of the
warehouse. Following this, a heavy rainfall
caused the roof to leak and damage P’s rice.
Held: D was not liable under RvF. He did not
accumulate the water onto his land. The heavy
rain and actions of the rat were an act of God.
2. Thing should be likely to “do mischief” if it
escapes
• Inherent danger of the thing is not significant;
it need only be able to cause damage if it
escapes beyond D’s land;
• see Attorney General v Corke where D allowed
people to gather on his land and reside there
in caravans. They went into adjoining
properties and interfered with the owners’
use. Held: D was liable on the basis of RvF
• Hale v Jennings Bros [1938] 1 All ER 579 where
D operated a chair-o-plane roundabout (a
swing ride) at a fairground. One of the chairs
broke loose and hit P.
• Held: the chair was a thing likely to cause
danger if it escaped notwithstanding it’s other
uses
Image of swing chair
3. Escape
• The thing must escape from D’s land into an
area beyond D’s control;
• see Read v J Lyons where P worked at D’s
factory manufacturing high explosives. She
was injured from an explosion inside the
factory. She relied on RvF on the ground that
D engaged in a dangerous business knowingly.
• HELD: RvF not applicable since there was no
escape from D’s premises over to a place
beyond D’s control
• Ponting v Noakes (1849) 2 QB 281; P’s horse
died after it had reached over D’s fence and ate
some leaves from a Yew tree (whose leaves are
toxic). D was not liable under RvF as the Yew
tree was entirely in the confines of D’s land
and there was no escape. Charles, J stated: "I
do not see that they can be made responsible
for the eating of these Yew leaves by an animal
which, in order to reach them, had come upon
his land. The hurt which the animal received
was due to his wrongful intrusion. He had no
right to be there and the owner therefore has
no right to complain."
4. non-natural use of land
• Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough
Council [2004] 2 AC 1 D (the Council) responsible for
the maintenance of the pipe work supplying water to a
block of flats. A leak developed which was undetected
for some time. The water collected at an embankment
which housed P’s high pressure gas supply. The water
caused the embankment to collapse and left the gas
supply exposed and unsupported. P took action to
avoid the potential danger then sought to recover the
cost of the remedial works on the basis of RvF. Held: D
was not liable. The council’s use of land was not a non-
natural use.
• See also Rickards v Lothian; where P ran a
business from the second floor of a building. D
owned the building and leased different parts
to other business tenants. An unknown person
had blocked all the sinks in the lavatory on the
fourth floor and turned on all the taps in order
to cause a flood. P’s stock was damaged and P
claimed from D on the basis of RvF.
• Held: D was not liable. The act which caused
the damage was a wrongful act by a third
party and there was no non-natural use of
land.
5. The damage must be foreseeable
• Liability is limited by the concept of remoteness of
damage; see Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties
Leather plc; D owned a leather tanning business.
Spillages of small quantities of solvents occurred
over a long period of time which seeped through
the floor of the building into the soil below
contaminating P’s borehole several miles away. As
a result the borehole could not be used to supply
water to local residents. The contamination was
not contemplated as it was believed that the
solvents being highly volatile would evaporate from
the floor. D was not liable as the harm was not
foreseeable
C. DEFENCES
• Act of a 3rd party-If the escape was caused by the
act of a stranger over which the defendant has
no control, D is not liable; see Rickards v Lothian;
Perry v Kendricks Transport [1956] WLR 85 D
kept an old coach that needed repair on their
land adjoining a piece of wasteland. P a boy of 10
approached two other boys on the wasteland
close to the coach. The boys lit a match and
threw it into the petrol tank of the coach causing
an explosion which left P with severe burns.
Held: D was not liable as the escape was caused
by the deliberate action of a third party.
• Act of God-Nichols v Marsland –D was not liable
when water which she had collected in pools
escaped and flooded P’s land as a result of a
violent storm that caused the pools to overflow;
see also Carstairs v Taylor above
• Statutory authority-a public body may be
exempted from liability by statute e.g. where its
role is to supply water, gas, electricity and such
similar services. However, the public body will
only have a defense if the statute imposes an
obligation on it to render those services rather
merely granting it permission to perform that
• Charing Cross Electric Supply Co v Hydraulic
Power Co [1914] 3 KB 772
• A water main burst causing damage to the
claimant’s property. P brought an action based
on RvF. D sought to rely on the defence of
statutory authority. However, whilst the
statute granted permission to the defendant
to keep the water main at high pressure there
was no obligation to do so. The defence
therefore failed.
• Smeaton v Ilford Corporation [1954] Ch 450:
where Sewerage from D’s sewer overflowed
into P’s land causing damage. Under s.31
Public Health Act 1936, D was obliged to
discharge their functions so as not to create a
nuisance. This amounted to an obligation or
duty rather than a mere permission and
therefore the defence of statutory authority
applied and the defendant was not liable
under RvF.
• Green v Chelsea Waterworks Co (1894) 70 LT
547 where a water main burst causing damage
to P’s land. Chelsea Waterworks Co were
under a statutory obligation to maintain high
pressure in the water main. This would mean
that any escape would inevitably cause
damage. They were not liable under RvF as
they had the defence of statutory authority.
Consent
• Where P agrees to the accumulation there’s no
liability. P may be held to have consented if he
benefits from the accumulation; see Peters v
Prince of Wales Theatre [1943] KB 73; P leased
a shop from D adjacent to a theatre owned by
D. P’s shop sustained flood damage when pipes
from the theatre’s sprinkler system burst due to
icy weather conditions. Held: D was not liable.
The sprinkler system was equally for the benefit
of P who was deemed to have consented to the
use of the sprinkler system since it had been
installed prior to him obtaining the lease.