Economic Liberalization Reforms and Bureaucratic Politics in Developing Countries: Empirical

Insights from Privatization in the Nigeria’s Energy Sector

Abstract
This study investigates the phenomenon of bureaucratic politics as a factor that constrains liberalization
reforms in developing countries. The paper draws from literature on bureaucratic politics, administrative
reform and liberalization efforts in many developing countries. It historically examines the processes of
unbundling and privatizing Nigeria’s National Electric Power Authority and unbundling of Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) to provide more empirical grounds for the study. The study
finds that enormous interest racketeering has led to incessant changes of key managers of these
parastatals, delayed the timely privatization and unbundling of the two lucrative public parastatals, and
has continued to inhibit reforms in the two entities.

Key words: economic liberalization; bureaucratic politics, developing countries; Nigeria’s Energy sector;

Introduction
The phenomenon of government or bureaucratic politics as otherwise refereed to, has long been
acknowledged as a key relevant model for explaining reasons for government decisions and actions.
Building on the then popular model of explaining and predicating government actions – the Rational
Policy model, Allison (1969) tried to develop two other models, the Organizational Process Model
(Model II) and the Governmental or Bureaucratic Policy Model (Model III) as explanatory tools for
governmental behavior. Model (III) focuses on the internal politics of a government which explains
happenings in government neither “as choices nor as outputs” but instead “as outcomes of various
overlapping bargaining games among players arranged hierarchically in the national government”
(Allison (1969:690). Since then, this model has been employed by various scholars in the study of
government decision processes, especially in issues of foreign policy or national security (Rosati, 1981;
O’Leary, 1994; Halperin, Clapp and Kanter, 2006; Preston and ‘t Hart, 2010). It does appear however that
attention has not been paid much to how bureaucratic politics applies at the policy implementation stage.
Most scholars seem to have paid attention to the governmental and bureaucratic activities that surround
the policy formulation stage in which a major decision about a matter of concern is taken, neglecting
other aspects of policymaking such as implementation. More so, research intensiveness in this area is
largely on developed polities.
Policy process is a continuum of sequence of functional activities (Anderson, 1997). It consists of
various activities, which begin with the conception of a problem through identification of alternative
solutions and choice of an alternative, to implementation of the chosen alternative and evaluation. Van
Meter and Van Horn (1975) explain implementation as including both one time actions to transform
decisions into operational terms and continuing efforts to achieve the large and small changes mandated
by policy decisions. Egonmwan (2000) sees this stage as very critical in the policy process and
acknowledges that it can often turn out to be the grave yard of many policies especially in some
developing countries like Nigeria.
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 Policy studies especially as it relates to implementation, which to a large extent determines the failure
or success of public policies, continue to be very important for all countries. But the developing countries
seem to be worse for it. Despite the magnitude of policy failures in most of these countries, Brynard
(2005:11) observes that even the possibility that implementation research and practice in developing
countries may have something to learn from, contribute to, bear upon, or be relevant to implementation
research and practice is scarcely ever raised, let alone be debated.
This study seeks to fill this gap by outlining to investigate the relevance of the
government/bureaucratic politics model in explaining activities at the policy implementation stage in a
developing country environment. Bowornwathana and Poocharoen (2010) have given the insight that the
model can be used to explain aspects of administrative reform processes. Thus, this study investigates the
phenomenon of governmental or bureaucratic politics as a factor that constrains, delays, derails or totally
leads to failure of privatization and other aspects of economic liberalization reforms in developing
countries, with critical focus on Nigeria. The study objectives are clearly specified as follows:
i. Examining the nature of bureaucratic politics surrounding the implementation of economic
liberalization policy of privatization and unbundling of government parastatals in developing
countries;
ii. Investigating specifically how bureaucratic politics has influenced Nigeria’s economic
liberalization programme of privatizing and unbundling of two key government parastatals in the
Energy Sector since the introduction of SAP in 1986.
iii. Drawing lessons for policy implementation and administrative reform processes in developing
countries.
The study draws from literature on bureaucratic politics, administrative reform and liberalization
efforts in many developing countries. It critically examines the history of liberalization of the Nigeria’s
Energy sector – privatizing Nigeria’s National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) and unbundling of
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), applying documentary data to provide more empirical
grounds for the study.
The rest of the paper is organized in four sections. The first provides a theoretical perspective by
discussing bureaucratic politics and the nexus with policy implementation and reform. Section two
conceptualizes and examines economic liberalization policy of privatization and related programmes. The
next provides a brief history of the processes of privatizing and unbundling the two cases studies. Section
four undertakes analyses of issues of bureaucratic politics in the privatization and unbundling of the two
public sector entities. The final section concludes and draws some policy recommendations for policy and
reform processes.

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The Bureaucratic Politics Model, Administrative Reforms and Policy Implementation
Often very wonderful policies are introduced in developing countries, but the implementation
comes to naught, especially in Sub Saharan African. Usually, an acknowledged factor in policy delays,
derailing or failure is what is often referred to as lack of political will. This is when formulated policies
fail to achieve the set goals despite the utilization of resources meant for implementation. Another way of
conceptualizing this lack of political will is to understand the implementation constraints as nothing more
than the clash of self-centred interest of leaders and opposition against the policy from highly placed
officials, government agencies, and pressure groups that often constitute the substantial reason for reform
delays, discontinuance and failure.
The concept of bureaucratic politics is an age-long contention in public administration as to
whether career bureaucrats indulge in politics or are just mere apolitical executors of public policies.
However, this contention has taken on somewhat a central stage as a theory of policymaking in
government. As as a contending model for explaining governmental behavior, it was popularized by
Allison (1969) in an attempt to solve certain puzzles about the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 involving the
Soviet Union. Allison’s primary aim in formulating the model was to find an alternative explanatory
model to the classical rational policy model that proceeds from the conception of states as unitary and
purposive, which make consistent, value-maximizing choices within specified constraints. The model
which Allison in his piece daubed Model III was examined along two other models, the rational policy
model (Model I and the Organizational Process Model (Model II). Briefly summarized in Allison’s
rendition, the governmental or bureaucratic politics model asserts that
The leaders who sit on top of organizations are not a monolithic group. Rather, each is, in
his own right, a player in a central, competitive game. The name of the game is
bureaucratic politics: bargaining along regularized channels among players positioned
hierarchically within the government. Government behavior can thus be understood…not
as organizational outputs, but as outcomes of bargaining games. In contrast with Model I,
the bureaucratic politics model sees no unitary actor but rather many actors as players,
who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems as
well, in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various
conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals, making government decisions
not by rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics (Allison, 1969: 707).
Output as basic element of public policy refers to the tangible manifestation of policy implementation in
relation to set objectives, while outcomes also are results of policy implementation but comprises both
intended and unintended consequences. By understanding government behavior as outcomes and not as
outputs, Allison seems to have underscored the fact that exactness cannot be realized in policy
implementation against policy as formulated; and the variance from set goals is explained mainly as a
result of bureaucratic politics. In other words, “it is easier to evaluate policy output since the result is
measured in relation to set goals of the policy as formulated. But it is more difficult to measure policy
outcomes because the ramifications may be too wide to identify. Hence public policy may achieve all or

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some of the objectives but also causes other serious consequences that may not have been foreseen or
intended while designing the policy’ (Ikeanyibe, 2013:9).
Bureaucratic politics model therefore provides a leeway for policy failure and could also provide
answers to actions of government officials who engage themselves in evolving or adopting wonderful
policies with clear objectives but shy away from committed implementation or engage in execution of
programmes that are clearly counterproductive to the goals of their policies. In this instance,
implementation of policy reflects tendencies of officials who command power to influence
implementation in line with their undisclosed interest about the policy option.
Bureaucratic politics is not only understood in terms of the role of the bureaucratic officials that
control the implementing agencies of government. It can apply at the governmental level, which covers
the role of both political and high level bureaucratic/administrative officials. At least that is the idea
proposed by Allison (1969), Haperin, Clapp and Kanter (2006) and other prominent proponents. The
participants in the game include “political leaders at the top of this apparatus plus the men who occupy
positions on top of the critical organizations form the circle of central players. Ascendancy to this circle
assures some independent standing.” At this level, “each player has considerable discretion” (Allison,
1969:707). Like Allison, Halperin, Clapp and Kanter (2006) apply the bureaucratic politics model in the
study of foreign policy as it affects national security decisions in the United States. They more than
Allison tried to provide a detailed list of participants in the bureaucratic politics game in line with the
specific issue of their discourse. These scholars believe that in a presidential system like United States,
the president will almost always be the principal figure determining the general direction of actions; but
he does not act alone. “He is surrounded by a large number of participants with whom he consults, partly
at his pleasure and partly by obligation” (Halperin, Clapp and Kanter, 2006:16). Whom the president
consults depends on the issue at stake but the Cabinet officers and heads of relevant agencies will
necessarily be consulted from time to time because of their formal responsibilities and access to
information. There is their career subordinates with whom these in turn consult. Far and above the endless
list of possible political and career officials within the executive that could be involved in the decision
process, Halperin, Clapp and Kanter (2006:18) also recognise those they regard as “in-and-outers” who
come from careers outside the government for limited periods of government service. These may often
include
Lawyers, bankers, businessmen, or experts from universities or think tanks. Although not
formally members of the national security bureaucracy, individuals outside the executive branch
are frequently consulted by the president and have significant influence on decisionmaking. Some
senators and representatives are senior participants in the sense that they are routinely contacted
by the president for advice and support. They tend to be the chairperson or a high-ranking
member of a congressional committee with direct responsibility for national security affairs (for
example, the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Intelligence Committees),
and they have discretionary power over the federal budget.

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The legislature as an institution is not also ruled out. Halperin, Clapp and Kanter (2006:19) in this regard
submit that “Congress serves as an important forum for the discussion of national interests and the shared
images that define those interests.” Finally individuals and groups outside the government are not ruled
out. “Private Citizens who are close personal confidants of the president are included in this category.
Private interest groups”, for example “defense contractors affected by foreign policy decisions and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with foreign policy agendas, often seek influence; they may be
consulted by the president from time to time, and they are routinely involved through their contacts with
Congress” (Halperin, Clapp and Kanter, 2006:19).
In this broad view, it becomes difficult to exhaust the possible interests and participants that
could be involved in government decisions. Invariably, decisions end up being a bargaining, much more
like a political action than a formal problem-solving procedure in which decisions are disinterestedly
taken. Decisions become characterized by conflicting and competing interests and solutions.
From another angle, the bureaucratic politics model must be understood properly by also
considering Allison’s (1969) Model II or the Organisational Process Model. Groups and agencies may in
the course of participating in the policy process, seek to project the organizational interest rather than
those of individual members of the organization. This may be confusing a little since the bureaucratic
politics model itself assumes that what comes out as organisational interest is also reached through the
same process of bargaining. Kernaghan and Siegel (1999) have proposed a version of the bureaucratic
politics model characterized by intra-governmental as well as intergovernmental attributes. Concerning
this notion of the model, scholars show that bureaucratic agencies are involved in a constant competition
for various stakes and prizes, whose net effect is a policy process whereby struggles for organizational
survival, expansion and growth and imperialism are inevitable (Hartley nd., Halperin, Clapp and Kanter,
2006) ). The organizational interest in this sense is sustained through the organization or bureaucratic
culture and behaviour pattern (Hartley, nd). As posited by Drezner (2000: 734) in his modified ideational
approach, “the ability of bureaucracies to use organizational culture as a means of propagating ideas is
crucial to determining outcomes” and “ideas can be sustained through their institutionalization and the
organizational culture bred within the institution” (735). More importantly, “the existence of strong
organizational cultures can further impede the implementation of ideas” (736).
Thus, the organizational process model (Allison’s Model II) could become a tool for prosecuting
bureaucratic politics in relation to interagency matters. Drezner (2000) suggests that sufficient differences
in bureaucratic culture lead agencies to distrust the ability of other institutions to make any contribution to
foreign policy or any other policy issue. It also encourages existing bureaucracies to act like competitors,
providing alternative policy outputs as a way of limiting each other’s influence. Significant contribution
made by Drezner (2000) is that organizations could also use ideas to counteract entrenched organizational
culture or interest as a tool to bureaucratic politics. He classified bureaucracies into interest-based and

5
idea-based and remarks that interest-based bureaucracies push their ends through bargaining and the
accumulation of power while idea-based bureaucracies push theirs through the persuasion of other groups
to their principled beliefs, particularly if they communicate the psychic or material benefits of using their
ideas. A similar argument has unwittingly been promoted by Rhodes’ (1994) where he tries to show that
it is not politics but ideas that matter. He illustrates in his study of the U.S. Navy that Alfred Thayer
Mahan's ideas of naval warfare trumped the narrower parochial interests among the submariners, airmen,
and surface sailors in explaining weapons procurement (see p34). Thus, “ideas that resonate with broader
values or goals can spread across the larger organizational entity” (Drezner, 2000:737), and influence
eventual policy decision or reform.
Another important fact that needs to be underscored in relation to practical application of
bureaucratic politics in policy implementation is the fact that participants may shirk and/or sabotage
compromises they dislike (Drezner, 2000; Brehm and Gates 1997). This in effect implies that some
interests that are not favoured in the resultant policy that is the product of a bargain may continue to work
against the implementation, after all policy decision is not a one time off activity, but rather, a continuous
interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared towards achieving them (Pressman and
Wildavsky, 1973). Implementation of policies therefore becomes pivotal in achieving policy decisions.
Egonmwan (2000) describes this stage as grave yard of public policies since it is the stage where the
earlier preparation and designs, plans and compromises are “tested in the harsh light of reality and where
policy content and impact on people could be substantially altered or even negated by the political and
administrative process” (Egonmwan, 2000: 141).

Issues on Economic Liberalization Reforms: Developing Countries Perspective

The drive to improve public management through strands of liberalization socioeconomic and
public service reform programmes is common to most countries, developed and developing. The word
liberalism or liberalization as used in this study does not admit a simplified definition when its classical
and modern usages are reconsidered. Indeed liberalism seems to admit the seemingly contrary views of
both the ideological right and the left in the concern with the best way to guarantee individual freedom.
The conservative or ideological right as a liberal insists on the state keeping its activities within narrow
limits of maintaining law and order, while the radical liberals exemplified by John Stuart Mill and Green
concede relative intervention of the state in public affairs including the economy to ensure the realization
of the individual’s potential (see Sabine and Thomson, 1973).
However, the meaning attached to the concept of liberalism and its variants since the revolution
that started in the late 70s and usually qualified as neoliberalism fairly admits a consensus, (Williamson,
1991 has suggested the phrase Washington Consensus), hough not without enormous ramification in
diverse areas of public affairs viz, economic and financial, political, and socio-cultural. Harvey (2005)

6
considers the years 1978-80 as revolutionary turning-point for this new paradigm of liberalism. He
mentions three important events that illustrate this new trend: China’s Deng Xiaoping’s momentous steps
towards the liberalization of the communist-ruled economy of china that transformed the country from a
closed back water to an open centre of capitalist dynamism starting from 1978; (b) the reforms in the
United States Federal Reserve started in 1978 by Paul Volcker which drastically changed the US
monetary policy within a few months. This reform was taken up by the President Ronald Regan from
1980. He embarked on numerous reforms to roll back the state, revitalize the economy through a blend of
policies to curb labour power, deregulate industry, agriculture and resource extraction and to liberate the
powers of finance both internally and on the world stage; and (c), in the United Kingdom, Margaret
Thatcher, who was elected Prime Minister in May 1979 began a tortuous task of curbing trade union
power and other pursuing other reforms to end inflationary stagnation and to empower capital. Harvey
(2005:1) describes these as the epicentres from which “revolutionary impulses seemingly spread and
reverberated to remake the world around us in a totally different image.”
Liberalization reform therefore comprises of variants of this neoliberal paradigm which have
implications for political, administrative and economic policies and practices of countries. As Harvey
(2005:2-3) further posits,
There has everywhere been an empathic turn towards neoliberalism in political-economic
practices and thinking since 1970s. Deregulation, privatization and withdrawal of the state from
many areas of social provision has been all too common. Almost all states from those newly
minted after the collapse of Soviet Union to old-style social democracies and welfare states such
as New Zealand and Sweden, have embraced, sometimes voluntarily and in other instances in
response to coercive pressures, some of neoliberal theory and adjusted at least some policies and
practices accordingly.
The economic variant which is also termed economic neoliberalism has also far reaching ramifications
not just for the management of the economy but for far reaching political and administrative reforms that
included issues of democratization and good governance. Ciobotaru (2013) avers that economic neo-
liberalism can, indeed, be identified with a set of policies and elements. Some key among these policies
include: (a) policies that liberalize the economy (by eliminating price controls, deregulating capital
markets, lowering trade barriers); (b) policies that reduce the role of the state in economy (privatization of
state owned enterprises); and (c) policies that contribute to fiscal austerity and macroeconomic
stabilization (tight control of the money supply, elimination of budget deficits and curtailment of
government subsidies) (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2013).
Liberalization can therefore be understood as “the freeing up of restrictive conditions through the
introduction of laws and regulations aimed at bringing about a more competitive market structure”
(Oyejide and Bankole, 2001: 3). Liberalization reform package comprises of various aspects of the
paradigmatic neoliberal policy trend embodying socio-economic reforms of privatization, deregulation,
commercialization, contracting and outsourcing as well as administrative reforms of New Public
Management or other such strands that seek to reduce the role of the public bureaucracy in managing
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economic outfits and involvement in various areas of policy implementation and service delivery. In
essence, it is geared to empowering the private sector and restricting the economic involvement of
government bureaucracies. Other aspects such as the political and cultural liberalizations are not part of
this restrictive conceptualization. Indeed, liberalization in its various faces are also discussed as
globalization. But I chose to apply the meaning in the sense of economic liberalization. This aspect is also
a two-sided coin – the economic liberalization itself in form of free trade, deregulation,
commercialization or privatization of previously government-controlled entities, outsourcing of service
provisions to private organizations on one hand, and the consequential implication of the economic aspect
of the reform in repositioning the public bureaucracy for the new roles deserving of government in
economic affairs.
In developing countries, this two-pronged reform has dominated the policy stage since 1980s.
Van de Walle (1989:601) remarks that “just as the 1960s and 1970s were characterized by the rapid
expansion of the public sector in the developing world, the 1980s have seen widespread attempts by
policy makers to curtail the state’s economic role.” On the administrative front, Ali Farazmand (2002)
similarly posits that administrative reform has been a widespread challenge to almost all national and sub-
national governments around the globe. He observes that “unlike the reform movements of the earlier
decades of the twentieth century, which emphasized institution building, bureaucratization,
nationalization, and a wide variety of organizational and administrative capacity building for national and
economic development, the recent global phenomenon of administrative reform has been in the opposite
direction: reversing the traditional role of government, the state, and public administration institutions
into one that promotes a private, corporate-driven marketplace dominated by business elites” (Farazmand,
2002:ix).
The reform path in developing countries is either as a result of imitations of trends in more
advanced countries where such reforms started earlier in the 1970s, or, prescriptions by International
Financial Institutions on the heels of Structural Adjustment Programme under the excruciating socio-
economic down turn and unsustainable debt burden of the 1970s and 80s. The reform trend as observed
by Shamsul Haque (2010) “represents a more drastic transition in the developing world where the
postcolonial state-centric model of public management, known as ‘Development Administration’, came
under greater challenge posed by this newly emerging market-centered model.” Van de Walle (1989)
attests to the popularity of this reform by observing that over 80 developing countries are involved in
these efforts, including countries like China, Tanzania and Algeria, which have traditionally favoured a
prominent role for the state in the economy. Even Russia and other East and Central European transition
economies are not left out in the mainstream of the reform.
In the sub Saharan Africa, Structural Adjustment was introduced to virtually all the countries
through Fund-Bank prescriptions in the 1980s. Several of these countries sought help from these

8
institutions which required economic reforms as a precondition for financial help (Ayadi, Adegbite and
Ayadi 2008; Geo-Jaja and Mangum, 2001). The reforms introduced under SAP and continuing has also
been sustained to various degrees in different countries of the region till date. The reforms aim at
reducing economic distortions and financial imbalances under growing domestic and external pressures
by limiting the role of government in the economy, by promoting private sector operations, by eliminating
restrictions in the economy, and by ensuring market-determined prices (Skosireva and Holaday, 2010).
Scholars have variously examined the extent of success of aspects of the reforms, the concrete
impacts, and constraints to their implementation. To some, the reforms have distorted the countries’
development than advance it (Skosireva and Holaday, 2010; and Bourguignon, de Melo & Suwa, 1991;
Sahn, 1994; Walkins, 1995 Anyanwu, 1992). However adequate assessment of the success of SAP and
subsequent economic liberalization reforms cannot be properly done without evaluating whether the
reforms were effectively implemented as formulated, and if not the relative impact of various factors.
Ghosh (2005) provides a detailed analysis of the financial aspects of liberalization in developing
countries examining various issues that are of immediate policy significance such as the main elements of
the standard pattern of financial liberalization that has become widely prevalent, the theoretical arguments
for and against such measures, the political economy of such measures and their main economic and
social effects. The book edited by Gerald Roland documents the successes and failures of privatization
and some key aspects of liberalization reforms virtually in all the continents domiciled by economic
transition countries - Asia, East and Central Europe, Latin America and Africa. In his graphic statement in
the forward to this collection, Joseph Stiglitz (2008) reiterates the most fundamental issue about policy
adoption and adaptation; he underscores that
A new, more pragmatic consensus is developing—more consistent with economists’ normal two-
handed stance, “it depends.” Privatization has had some successes, but it has also been marked by
dramatic failures and disappointments. There are dramatic successes, and failures, in state
ownership. The questions being posed today are: When will privatization be successful? And how
can the privatization process be managed to maximize the likelihood of success?
Privatization is only an aspect of the economic liberalization policy as has been made clear, but rather
holds a central place since it is the likely programme in the menu that can successfully transfer
management of economic entities from the public sector to the private sector. Other aspects like
deregulation, commercialization and the like will most likely retain control of such entities in the purview
of public officials. But just like privatization, these are all policy and economic issues that cannot work as
a magic wand. Environmental conditions or what Stiglitz describes as the two-handed stance (it depends)
constitutes a necessary condition. To provide satisfactory answers to these questions about success as
Stiglitz (2008) prodded, invariably demands knowledge of facts about these necessary conditions, that is,
why liberalization reforms are failing.
The literature on privatization in particular and liberalization in general is rich offering varied
reasons driving or constraining the processes; so also is the literature on general administrative reforms in
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the same front. Farazmand (2002:x) posits that “many countries, notably the Latin American and some
Asian nations, are realizing the fallacies of the pure marketplace ideology and the private sector
efficiency model in public administration…. The central issues of equity, fairness, and market failure are
resurfacing as government after government realizes that the lives of the majority, the ordinary citizens,
cannot be ignored in favor of the few, the powerful particularistic interest group elites.” Invariably,
multifarious issues impinge on the process of liberalization, constraining and delaying the process or
leading outright to total failure of policies initiated.
The factor of politics has been hinted by a number of studies (Packenham, 1994;Bhaskar and
Khan, 1995; Fewsmith, 2007; Gupta, 2008; Bowornwathana and Poocharoen, 2010), Packenham posits
that political explanations are more sustainable than economic, cultural, or sociological explanations in
explaining the issue of why the pace of change toward economic liberalization has been more rapid so far
in some Latin American countries and not in others. But the political variables he finds to be relevant as
explanatory factors include the partisan relationship of the elected president to the historical legacy of
statism; the nature of the party system; presidential leadership; and the degree of consensus within civil
and political society on the economic situation and policies and political arrangements to deal with it.
Bhaskar and Khan (1995) in their study of privatization in Bangladesh show that in the privatization of
Jute mills, politics was used in determining which mills to privatize or not. Those privatized were not
chosen on the basis of financial performance, or any other endogenous consideration but rather on who
were the previous owners before nationalization. Thus, mills that were owned by West Pakistanis prior to
their nationalization were privatized. Jute mills that had been owned by Bangladeshi owners before they
were nationalized were restituted to their former owners. This provides the inkling that privatization has
been driven by government politics as it is treated as “exogenous to firm performance” (Gupta, 2008). In
Africa Skosireva and Holaday (2010) admit that there were anti-SAP lobby campaigns which centred on
negative distributional effects of these reform programmes.
Fewsmith’s (2007) piece is more relevant to the issue of bureaucratic or government politics. He
reveals that even though economic reforms have been successful in China, “yet at each and every step
along this path, reform has met with significant opposition – political, economic, and cultural. This
opposition has been based in part on interests that have been threatened by reform, but also in significant
part by the belief that marketization and globalization present real threats to the continued rule of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP).” It is then important to ask why the reform relatively succeeded in
China despite the opposition and politics. The conclusion the can only be that bureaucratic politics could
delay, derail or lead to failure of these reforms, it depends.

Background Information on Nigeria’s Energy Sector: Why Liberalization?

10
 Nigeria is usually considered a potentially economic great nation. This is not unconnected with
her natural and human resource endowments. As at the 2006 population census, the country has a total
population of 140 million people, which today is estimated at over 170 million. The country has also rich
endowments of various minerals ranging from oil and gas, precious metals, and stones to sundry
industrial minerals. Many of these natural resources are primary inputs for immense development of the
energy sector. For instance Iwayemi (2008:17) provides some insights by revealing that
Crude oil and natural gas reserves are currently estimated at 35 billion barrels and 185
trillion cubic feet, respectively. These fossil fuel reserves are more than adequate to fuel
much of Sub-Saharan Africa energy demand for several decades. Coal reserves are also
substantial at 2.75 billion metric tons. Also, a large amount of renewable energy
resources including hydroelectricity, solar, wind and biomass energy are present. Hydro
resources are estimated at 14,750 Megawatts. Solar radiation is estimated at 3.5-7.0
Kilowatt hour/m2 per day, wind energy 2.0-4.0 m/s, wind energy at 150,000 Terra Joule
per year and biomass at 144 million tons per year.
The term ‘energy sector’ has obvious fluidity in meaning and scope. Common usage covers the
following: use of fossil fuels including oil and gas, electricity power industry comprising generation and
distribution; nuclear power resources, use of coal and other natural renewable resources including
firewood for cooking and heating, solar, wind and hydro resources. The United Nations’ International
Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities Revision 4 (2008), avoids the use of the
word energy in its classification of productive activities. This is understandable because of the … it rather
classifies activities in electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning in section D which specifies that
This section includes the activity of providing electric power, natural gas, steam, hot
water and the like through a permanent infrastructure (network) of lines, mains and pipes.
The dimension of the network is not decisive; also included are the distribution of
electricity, gas, steam, hot water and the like in industrial parks or residential buildings.
This section therefore includes the operation of electric and gas utilities, which generate,
control and distribute electric power or gas. Also included is the provision of steam and
air-conditioning supply. (UN, 2008:165).
Extraction of oil and gas is classified by the UN (2008) under mining and quarrying activity. But because
of the importance of the oil and gas sector in providing inputs for the electricity sector and the strategic
position of Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation, NNPC in the management of the oil and gas, its
(NNPC’s) inclusion in the study is made necessary.
Oil was discovered in Nigeria at the beginning of the 20 th Century but extraction began in 1956.
Since the time of extraction, the economy of the country had gradually adjusted from agriculture to oil
dependence and oil has come to play the most central role in the economic and political life of the
country. The United States Energy Information Administration describes avers that “Nigeria is the largest
oil producer in Africa, holds the largest natural gas reserves on the continent, and was the world's fourth
leading exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in 2012. Hydrocarbons-Technology.com (2013) also
remark that over 80% of the world's proven oil reserves are concentrated in just 10 countries, and Nigeria
happens to be among these ten. Indeed, since the 1970s, contribution of oil export revenue has steadily

11
risen from 7.1 percent in 1961, 13.5 percent in 1965, 63.9 percent in 1970 and an all high index of 95
percent in 1979 (Edame, Effiong and Efefiom 2013), before the oil crisis of late seventies and early 80s
that set the pace for the Structural Adjustment Programme that was introduced in 1986. Liberalization
policy became more intensive with the return of the country to democratic rule in 1999. Even though
there is slight changes in the contribution of oil to Nigeria’s economy, the sector continues to account for
close to 90% of exports and roughly 75% of consolidated budgetary revenues (World Bank 2013).
The strategic importance of oil to Nigeria’s economy led to the establishment of the Nigerian
National Oil Corporation in 1971 to participate in exploration, production, refining, marketing,
transportation, distribution and regulation of the oil industry. The Corporation was latter merged in 1977
with the Ministry of Petroleum Reosurces to form the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, NNPC.
NNPC combined the commercial functions of the former NNOC with the regulatory functions
of the former Ministry of Petroleum Resources and was thereby vested with exclusive
responsibility for upstream and downstream development as well as regulating and
supervising the oil industry on behalf of the Nigerian government (Centre for Energy
Economics, nd).Thus the birth of the most powerful institution in Nigeria’s oil exploitation was born
and the institution has remained the driving force behind the country’s economy, providing fuel and
feedstock for the nation's industrial facilities and struggling to meet the energy needs of individual
customers and commercial enterprises. (see Pederson and Grant, 1988; FundingUniverse, nd:). Limited
space does not allow a detailed history of this Corporation. Suffice to say that the process of liberalization
and unbundling the enterprise started in 1988, when NNPC was commercialised decentralised into
strategic business units, covering the entire spectrum of oil industry operations: exploration and
production, gas development, refining, distribution, petrochemicals, engineering, and commercial
investments. Currently, the subsidiary companies include:
 Nigerian Petroleum Development Company (NPDC)
 The Nigerian Gas Company (NGC)
 The Products and Pipelines Marketing Company (PPMC)
 Integrated Data Services Limited (IDSL)
 National Engineering and Technical Company Limited (NETCO)
 Hydrocarbon Services Nigeria Limited (HYSON)
 Warri Refinery and Petrochemical Co. Limited (WRPC)
 Kaduna Refinery and Petrochemical Co. Limited (KRPC)
 Port Harcourt Refining Co. Limited (PHRC)
 NNPC Retail
 Duke Oil (NNPC, 2010)

12
It is also of interest to mention that NNPC is controlled and supervised by the Ministry of Petroleum
Resources (MPR), which has the mandate to initiate policies for the oil and gas sector and supervise the
implementation of approved policies.
The Ministry has a number of technical departments, agencies and parastatals under it leading to
enormous conflicts of interest in operational roles, including those of the Ministry itself. The Departments
and Agencies are as follows:
 The Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) - the technical department of the Ministry that
regulates and monitors activities of the oil and gas industry.
 The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) - a parastatal of the Ministry that
undertakes the commercial ventures in the petroleum industry on behalf of the Federal
Government.
 The Petroleum Training Institute (PTI) - a parastatal of the Ministry that undertakes human
capacity development for the Nigeria Petroleum industry.
 The Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF) - MPR's Parastatal which initiates and
coordinates programmes aimed at developing petroleum technology in Nigeria.
 The Petroleum Equalization Fund (PEF)- MPR's Parastatal that oversees petroleum bridging
activities.
 The Nigeria Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA)- the Agency of MPR that regulates and
monitors all activities involving development and use of nuclear tools and radioactive materials.
 The Petroleum Products Pricing and Regulatory Agency (PPRA) - an agency of Government
responsible for fixing the benchmark prices of petroleum products and regulating and monitoring
the transportation and distribution of petroleum products in Nigeria.
 The Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board- an Agency of the Ministry that
regulates and monitors the implementation of Nigerian Content in all activities of the Petroleum
industry (Federal Republic of Nigeria, nd).
Sustained reform has been on-going in Nigeria’s Petroleum sector but plans to further unbundle NNPC
into five smaller, compact, autonomous and profitable business units that can compete favourably with
existing National Oil Companies (NOCs) and International Oil Companies (OICs) was muted by the
Federal Government of Nigeria under President Umar Musa Yar’ Adua in 2007. This is as a result of
observed inefficiency in the sector as whole and NNPC in particular. The policy was to facilitate smooth
operation and provide a more profit oriented competitive environment in the oil and gas sector, NNPC
was unbundled on the 29th of August 2007 with five companies taking over its functions and those of its
parent Ministry as part of the reform in the Oil and gas sector (NPIC, nd:) Of course this is also in line
with the trend that government should hands off business enterprises. The unbundling programme is still

13
under implementation by the current Goodluck Jonathan’s government and remains the focus of this
study. The next section undertakes the analysis of this process.
Meanwhile, similar process of restructuring and privatizing government owned institution in the
electricity sector constitute the core of the liberalization reforms in the sector. Electricity generation
started in Nigeria in 1896 even before the formal administration of some sections of the country as a
British colony in 1900. The generation then was highly limited serving only the colony of Lagos and was
carried out through the installation of two generating sets. By then, other energy requirements such as
heating was achieved through the use of coal that was very much available. Gradually, other energy
sources, mainly the hydro-electric power were added, so with institutions to handle the operations and
management. In 1929, the first utility company, the Nigerian Electricity Supply Company, was
established and in 1951, through an Act of Parliament, the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria, ECN was
put in place. Also in 1962 the Nigerian Dams Authority was established to take care of the development
of Hydro power generation (Sambo, Garba, Zarma and Gaji, nd). Thus, the Nigerian Dams Authority was
was responsible for the development and management of Hydro Power stations. It thus electricity and
sold to ECN for distribution and sales at utility voltages. The two institutions were later merged in 1972
forming the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), to combine the key functions of generation,
transmission and supplies/distribution. NEPA is a parastatal under the Ministry of Mines, Power and Steel
Development.
Despite the early discovery and exploitation of crude oil, Nigerian electricity generation has basically
depended on hydro power leading to outages arising from fluctuations in water levels coupled with other
mal-administrative weaknesses. Citizens, companies and government itself have substantially relied on
self-provisioning through generators and plants. World Bank data for 2010 indicate that electrification rates for
Nigeria were 50% for the country as a whole (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013). . Over the years, NEPA,
the stated-owned monopoly has proved itself incapable of meeting Nigeria’s energy needs. Thus with the
intorduciton of SAP, the Technical Committee on Privatization earmarked NEPA among the 146 State
owned Companies to face various degrees of liberalization reforms (Gbenga et, 2014). Not much was
done however under the military until the return to democratic rule in 1999. The democratic government
immediately amended the decree no 25 of 1988 as the Public Enterprises (Privatization and
Commercialisation) Act 1999.
Privatization of Public Enterprises Act of 1999 which created the Bureau of Public Enterprises
empowered
Sustained reform efforts on the sector and more specifically on NEPA as a state owned enterprise
began with the return of the country to democracy in 1999. President Obasanjo began the process of
expanding the sector by initating policies to expand gas power plants for electricity generation. In 2001
the National Electric Power Policy was approved. The policy kicked off the power sector reform leading

14
to several other reforms over the last decade (KPMG, 2013). Obasanjo contemplated the unbundling of
NEPA and its privatization. The key reforms objectives during his tenure (1999-2007) include: To
 Promote competition to facilitate more rapid provision of service throughout the country;
 Create a new legal and regulatory environment for the sector that establishes a level playing field,
encourage private investment and expertise, and meet social goals;
 Unbundle the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA); and,
 Privatise the successors to NEPA and encourage them to undertake an ambitious investment
programme (Idris and Kura, 2013).
In the bid to prepare NEPA for privatization, it was unbundled into a number of units comprising
of three distinct areas or subsectors, namely, generation, transmission and distribution and
renamed the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN). Yet all these were still managed by
the government and there exists no significant difference between PHCN and its predecessor
NEPA.
Subsequent administrations to that of Obasanjo have given priority attention to the power
sector reforms. Yaradua coming on board in 2007 made power the first policy agenda in his
administration’s earmarked seven point agenda. Goodluck Jonathan who complete Yar’Adua’s
tenure as a result of ill health and eventual death and is into his first tenure also made power
central to his Transformation Agenda. Power was the first among the 8 key sectors where he
planned to build his administration’s so-called bankable infrastructure estimated to cost N7.5
trillion through Public Private Partnership. Other sectors are: Roads and Bridges, Railway
Projects, River Ports, Aviation, and Oil & Gas (Transformation Agenda, 2010). The figure below
presents the timeline layers in the implementation of Power sector reforms.

15
Fig 1: Timeline Layers of Implemented Policies in electricity Reforms

16
 2013
Fully privatised power
sector excluding the
Transmission Company of
Nigeria

2010-2012
Presidential Action Committee on Power (PACP)
and the Presidential Task Force on Power (PTFP)
instituted by the Jonathan administration
Roadmap for power Sector Reform released
Establishment of the Bulk Trader as credible off-
taker of power to guarantee liquidity in the market
Bureau of Public Enterprises management of the
Privatization Process

2008-2009
The introduction of the Multi-year Tariff Order for
the determination of electricity prices
Power Sector Reform Committee inaugurated to
identify urgent and workable solutions to the
nation’s power supply problems
Transitional board established to oversee PHCN
and the “unbundled” entities

2005-2006
Enactment of the Electric Power Sector Reform
(EPSR) Act 2005
Establishment of Regulator (NERC)
Formation of the Power Holding Company of
Nigeria (PHCN) to assume the assets, liabilities and
employees of NEPA
Unbundling of PHCN into autonomous companies: I
transmission company, 7 generation companies and
11 distribution companies
Implementation of 8 National Integrated Power
Projects (NIPP)
Establishment of the Market Operations Department
2000 -2005
of TCN to manage the whole electricity market
Power was a monopoly
Sector liberalization commenced
Adoption of National Electric
Power Policy

Source: Adapted from KPMG (2013:6)

As it is, the reform in the power sector seems to have been anchored somewhere, though
still very much on-going. KPMG (2013) avers that the Nigerian power sector privatisation is
17
reputed to be one of the boldest privatisation initiatives in the global power sector over the last
decade, and the Federal Government of Nigeria has been able to complete the privatisation
process. The veracity of this statement will be clearer with retrospect analysis of the policies and
their implementation, and the politics involved in this implementation.

The Politics of Unbundling Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and Privatizing
National Electric Power Authority (NEPA)
As already made clear, these are two most important public institutions in the Nigerian
energy sector that have attracted much of government attention since the Structural Adjustment
Programme started in 1986. Analyses of issues of bureaucratic politics relating to their
liberalization are taken under separate subheads in this section for obvious reasons: they are two
separate parastatals operating in different subsectors – electricity and oil and gas; they have
witnessed different policies though similar in terms of liberalization; they were managed by
different individuals over the time and witnessed varying policy-shaping and reshaping
participants over time. The disparate analysis of the two cases therefore provides room for
confirmatory evidence in the single country study. Our concern in this analysis is to show that
policies as originally designed were severally opposed, dropped, delayed or changed. The focus
of analyses in the two cases remains to show that the clash of self-centred interest of leaders and
opposition from various government agencies in the bid to implement policy of privatization and
unbundling in the two institutions constitute substantial reason for reform delays, discontinuance and
failure or inefficiency still very much apparent despite privatization. Hence, the leaders who sit on top of
organizations are not a monolithic group. Rather, each is, in his own right, is a player in a central,
competitive game. The name of the game is bureaucratic politics: bargaining along regularized channels
among players positioned hierarchically within the government (Allison, 1969).

The Politics of Unbundling NNPC

The Nigerian oil sub-sector is dominated by Multinational Oil companies. Hence whatever happens in the
sub-sector is not simply determined by Nigerian officially acknowledged policy makers alone.
Furthermore, while NNPC represents the interest of the Nigerian government in the business of, there are
also many other policy actors in the subsector, which include other government agencies for instance, the
controlling Ministry of Petroleum Resources, a complex web of government agencies, oil business
tycoons and other individuals and indeed the civil society at large often coordinated by labour unions.

18
 The first coordinated effort by government of Nigeria to embark on privatization and
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Commercialization (TCPC), established by the military government of General Ibrahim Babangida through Decree
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programmes: 45 were slated for partial privatization, 25 for partial commercialization, 66 to be fully
commercialized, and other 10 are to be fully commercialized (Gbenga, Mukaila, Micheal and Olayiwola, 2014). The
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and NEPA were among the companies earmarked for full
commercialization, implying that thenceforth, they would be expected to operate profitably on a commercial basis
and be able to raise funds from the capital income without government guarantees. It should be note here that NNPC
has hitherto operated. President Babangida had then remarked on Monday March 21, 1988 that “the
NNPC was going to be reorganised and put on a more solid footing to operate as a
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