[G.R. NO.
159708 : September 24, 2004] December 8, 2002 was a Sunday, the last day for filing
JAIME BELTRAN LUZ, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL
AMNESTY COMMISSION, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review of the Resolution1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74285
denying the second motion for extension to file Petition
for Review of petitioner Jaime Beltran Luz and its
resolution denying his motion for reconsideration of the
first motion.
It appears that on July 18, 1988, the petitioner was
charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866
(illegal possession of firearms) in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, docketed as Criminal Case No.
427.
On March 22, 2000, the petitioner filed an application
for amnesty with the Local Amnesty Board for Metro
Manila. In due course, the board denied the said
application. On August 26, 2002, the National Amnesty
Commission (NAC) issued a Resolution affirming that
of the Local Amnesty Board. The motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied by the NAC, per its
Resolution dated November 13, 2002, a copy of which
was received by the petitioner on November 22, 2002.
Under Rule III, Section 4 of NAC Administrative Order
No. 2, Series of 1999, the petitioner had until
December 7, 2002, a Saturday, within which to file a
Petition for Review of the said resolution with the Court
of Appeals. On December 9, 2002, the petitioner filed a
motion in the appellate court for an extension of fifteen
(15) days from December 9, 2002, or until December
24, 2002 within which to file his petition. The petitioner
alleged therein that he had just engaged the services
of counsel who needed additional time to study the
case and draft the petition. However, the petitioner
failed to file his Petition for Review .
December 24, 2002 was declared a national holiday;
December 25, 2002 was also a holiday. On December
26, 2002, the petitioner filed a second motion for
extension of fifteen (15) days from December 26, 2002
or until January 10, 2002, within which to file his
petition. The petitioner filed his Petition for Review with
the Court of Appeals on January 10, 2003.
On January 13, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution
granting the petitioner's first motion for a fifteen-day
extension counted from December 7, 2002 or until
December 22, 2002, within which to file said petition.
On February 20, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution
denying petitioner's second motion for having been
filed out of time. The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the February 20, 2003 Resolution
claiming that, since the last day to file his petition was
a Saturday, December 7, 2002, and the next day,
the petition was December 9, 2002. He reasoned that
since he filed his motion for extension of time to file his
Petition for Review on the said date, the said motion
was timely filed.
On August 19, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution
denying the petitioner's motion, relying on A.M. No.
00-2-14-SC issued on February 29, 2000, which
provides that any extension of time to file the required
pleading should be counted from the expiration of the
period regardless of the fact that the said due date is a
Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
The threshold issue posed is whether or not the
petitioner timely filed his second motion for extension
of time to file his Petition for Review .
The petitioner asserts that the resolutions of the Court
of Appeals are contrary to Rule 22, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court and the ruling of this Court in Labad v.
University of Southeastern Philippines,2 which was
promulgated after the Court issued A.M. No. 00-2-14-
SC. He avers that the rule in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC
should apply only where a motion for extension does
not specifically state the reckoning date of the
extension prayed for, such that the extension will be
reckoned from the last day of the period, even if it was
a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday. He contends
that even assuming that his second motion for
extension was filed out of time, the Court of Appeals
should have admitted his Petition for Review in the
interest of justice.
In its comment to the petition, the respondent avers
that the ruling of this Court in Labad v. University of
Southeastern Philippines, has not voided, overturned
nor vacated A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC; as such, the latter
should prevail. It asserts that the petitioner should not
have presumed that the CA would grant him an
extension until December 24, 2002 within which to file
his Petition for Review .
We agree with the appellate court that the petitioner's
motion for a second extension of time to file his
Petition for Review was filed out of time.
Section 1, Rule 22, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
Section 1. How to compute time. - In computing any
period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or
by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the
day of the act or event from which the designated
period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the
date of performance included. If the last day of the
period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court
sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.3
The Court clarified the provision when it issued A.M.
No. 00-2-14-SC, which reads:
Whereas, the aforecited provision applies in the matter
of filing of pleadings in courts when the due date falls
on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, in which case,
the filing of the said pleading on the next working day
is deemed on time;
Whereas, the question has been raised if the period is
extended ipso jure to the next working day
immediately following where the last day of the period
is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday so that when a
motion for extension of time is filed, the period of
extension is to be reckoned from the next working day
and not from the original expiration of the period;
NOW THEREFORE, the Court Resolves, for the guidance
of the Bench and the Bar, to declare that Section 1,
Rule 22 speaks only of "the last day of the period" so
that when a party seeks an extension and the same is
granted, the due date ceases to be the last day and
hence, the provision no longer applies. Any extension
of time to file the required pleading should therefore
be counted from the expiration of the period regardless
of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or
legal holiday.4
The extension granted by the Court of Appeals should
be tacked to the original period and commences
immediately after the expiration of such period. Under
the Resolution of this Court in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC,
the CA has no discretion to reckon the commencement
of the extension it granted from a date later than the
expiration of such period, regardless of the fact that
said due date is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday.
The Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for granting the
petitioner's first motion for extension of fifteen (15)
days within which to file his Petition for Review ,
reckoned from December 7, 2002, and not from
December 9, 2002 as prayed for by the petitioner. In
so doing, it merely applied, with fealty, Section 1, Rule
22 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, as
clarified by the Court via its Resolution in A.M. No. 00-
2-14-SC. Had the CA granted the petitioner's first
motion for extension and reckoned the fifteen-day
period from December 9, 2002, instead of from
December 7, 2002, the appellate court would have
acted with grave abuse of its discretion.
The petitioner cannot find refuge in Labad v. University
of Southeastern Philippines,5 which cited the ruling of
this Court (Second Division) in Moskowsky v. Court of
Appeals.6 When the petitioner in the said case filed his
petition with this Court, the Resolution of the Court in
A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC was not yet in existence.
On the other hand, the ruling of this Court (First
Division) in Capulong v. Workmen's Insurance Co.,
Inc.7 as cited in Moskowsky v. Court of Appeals8 is
anchored on the order of the RTC granting an
extension of time to the appellant without indicating
when it would commence.
In this case, the CA specifically stated that the first
extension it granted to the petitioner was reckoned
from December 7, 2002 and not from December 9,
2002 as prayed for by the petitioner. Moreover, as
stated by this Court in Labad v. University of
Southeastern Philippines,9 the underpinning
consideration in the Moskowsky case is the liberal
interpretation of the Rules of Court, as amended, to
attain substantial justice.
Prescinding from the foregoing considerations, we
agree with the petitioner's plea for a liberal
interpretation and application of A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC
in light of the peculiar factual mileu in this case. It
appears that the petitioner's counsel relied in good
faith on the ruling of this Court in Moskowsky.
Moreover, the petitioner filed his Petition for Review on
the same day, January 13, 2003, even before the CA
granted his first motion for extension of time to file his
Petition for Review . In fine, when the CA granted the
petitioner's first motion, the petitioner had already filed
his Petition for Review even as his second motion for
extension had yet to be resolved by the CA. As we
ruled in Labad v. University of Southeastern
Philippines:10
The underpinning consideration in Moskowsky, Vda. de
Capulong and in the case at bar, is the liberal
interpretation of the Rules to achieve substantial
justice. Petitioner would be outright denied her right to
appeal if the original period of December 26, 1998
would be the basis of the 15-day extension period.
While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural
right, nonetheless "it is an essential part of our judicial
system and courts should proceed with caution so as
not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but
rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition
of his cause, freed from the constraints of
technicalities.
The unfairness of the situation becomes even more
apparent when we consider the fact that petitioner
received notice that the extension was to be counted
from the original period and not from the date that she
had prayed for, a month after she had already filed her
petition. '11
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-49668 November 14, 1989
POLICARPIO, LUCIO, JULIAN, CATALINO, BONIFACIO,
CONRADA, DOMINGO, PAQUITA, AND LILIA, ALL
SURNAMED GALICIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. WENCESLAO M. POLO, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, CFI, Branch V, Samar (Calbayog City),
ZOSIMA PALAJOS, TITING LISTOJAS, ALFREDO
PALAJOS, MANUELITO ROSIALDA, respondents.
Mateo M. Leanda for petitioners.
Zosimo Santiago for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
summary judgment entered by the then Court of First Instance
of Samar, Br. V in Civil Case No. 758-CC entitled, "Policarpio,
Lucio, Julian, Catalino, Bonifacio, Conrada, Domingo, Paquita
and Lilia, all surnamed Galicia v. Zosima Palajos, Titing Listojas,
Alfredo Palajos and Manuelito Rosialda" and to order the trial
court to try the above-cited case on the merits.
The facts are undisputed.
On December 15, 1973. a complaint for forcible entry (Civil Case
No. 56) entitled "Amancio Palajos v. Policarpio, Perfecto,
Victorio Julian and Eduardo, all surnamed Galicia," was filed in
the Municipal Court of Almagro, Samar, alleging that Amancio
Palajos is the owner and in actual possession of a parcel of land
located at Bacjao, Almagro, Samar, more particularly described
as follows:
A parcel of land with an area of about 4-88-00
hectares, more or less, assessed at P 360.00
as per Tax Declaration No. 8547 in the name
of Juan Palajos, it is, however, 14.2860
hectares as per approved survey plan, the
boundaries of which are: N — Pedro Galicia
and the Poblacion of Barrio Bacjao; S —
Emilio Carpon, Magno Suico and Teresa
Subito; and W — Bernardo Ballarante and
Cenon S. Aguilar.
which he acquired by way of donation from his father, Juan
Palajos. It is further alleged that defendants (petitioners herein)
forcibly entered the northeastern portion of the said property
covering an area of about 1 1/2 hectares.
The trial of the case was set several times but was postponed at
the instance of defendants (petitioners herein). For the fifth time,
i.e., on July 19, 1974, neither the defendants nor counsel
appeared. Accordingly, the court granted a trial ex parte on
motion of plaintiffs counsel (Rollo, p. 24).
Subsequently, the municipal trial court rendered judgment
against defendants (petitioners herein), the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby renders
judgment ordering defendants Policarpio
Galicia, Perfecto Galicia, Victorio Galicia,
Julian Galicia and Eduarda Galicia to restore
to plaintiff Amancio Palajos the portion of land
described in par. 4 of the plaintiffs complaint
consisting of one and one-half hectares and
which is the northeastern portion of land
under Tax Dec. No. 8547 as described in
paragraph 2 thereof, ordering the defendants
to pay to plaintiff a monthly rental in the
amount of FIFTY PESOS (P 50.00) on the
premises in question for its use and
occupation from September, 1973, up to the
time when said premises is finally restored to
the plaintiff, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
On September 28, 1974, defendants filed a motion for
reconsideration and to grant a new trial but was denied in an
Order dated October 24, 1974 (Rollo, p. 28).
On November 12, 1974, defendants filed a notice of appeal but
the same was likewise denied by the trial court on the ground
that it was filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15)
days to perfect an appeal.
For failure of the defendants to pay the rentals adjudged in the
forcible entry case (CC No. 56), a writ of execution was issued
and after levy, the deputy sheriff of Calbayog City, on August 4,
1976, sold at public auction the real property owned by
petitioners' deceased father adjoining the land subject of the
forcible entry case more particularly described as follows:
A piece of real estate consisting of coconut
and cornland situated at Bo. Bacjao, Almagro,
Samar, Philippines, bounded on the NORTH,
by Isabelo Palajos; on the SOUTH, by Narciso
Pajalino; and on the WEST, by Seashore,
containing an area of 2-60-00 hectares, more
or less assessed at P180.00, under Tax
Declaration No. 12048, in the name of Pedro
Galicia (deceased); (Rollo, p. 30).
On October 10, 1977, or over 14 months after the execution
sale, petitioners filed a complaint for Ownership and Damages
against herein respondents in the then Court of First Instance of
Samar, 13th Judicial District, Br. V, docketed as Civil Case No.
758-CC, alleging that they are co-owners of a certain parcel of
agricultural land (subject of the auction sale) which they
inherited from their deceased father, Pedro Galicia, more
particularly described as follows:
A parcel of coconut and corn land located at
Bacjao, Almagro, Samar, Philippines, with an
area of 26,000 sq. m. and bounded on the
NORTH, by Isabelo Palajos; SOUTH, by
Narciso Pauline; EAST, by Benedicto Paulino
and WEST, by Seashore covered by Tax
Declaration No. 12048 in the name of Pedro
Galicia.
The complaint further alleged that pursuant to Civil Case No. 56
(forcible entry case), respondents were able to take possession
of the land in question as said case was heard ex-parte; and that
a decision was rendered in respondents' favor and said decision
was executed sometime in 1976 (Rollo, p. 36-37).
In their Answer, respondents (defendants below) countered that
they were able to take possession of the land described in the
complaint by virtue of the decision and later, execution of the
decision in the forcible entry case, which, by petitioners'
(plaintiffs below) averment in their complaint is an admission of
an existing judgment that would constitute res judicata; that they
are the lawful owners of the disputed land the same having been
subjected to levy and execution in 1975 thru a sale in favor of
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Juan Palajos.
The issues having been enjoined, the case was set for pre-trial
by respondent judge Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo. At the pre-trial,
counsel for private respondents moved for time within which to
file a motion for summary judgment which was granted by
respondent judge in his order dated June 28, 1978.
Defendants' (private respondents herein) motion for summary
judgment was filed on July 7, 1978 (Rollo, p. 43) alleging that no
genuine issue exists in the case at bar after the pre-trial was
conducted and admission of facts were had (Rollo, p. 44), while
plaintiffs (petitioners herein) filed their opposition to the motion
for summary judgment dated July 17, 1978 alleging among
others, that genuine issues exist (Rollo, pp. 45-47).
On August 11, 1978, the court a quo rendered the assailed
summary judgment dismissing petitioners' complaint (Rollo, p.
48-53), the pertinent portion of which reads:
As demonstrated by the parties, there is no
question that the land in dispute is that parcel
described in paragraph 3 of the complaint, a
portion of which was a subject in a forcible
entry case before the Municipal Trial Court of
Almagro Samar (Exhibit 1, 2 and 3) with the
defendants now as sucessors-in-interest of
the plaintiff, and most of the herein plaintiffs
as defendants.
The pleadings also show that upon the death
of the primitive owner, Pedro Galicia, the
plaintiffs as children and grandchildren
possessed and owned this land pro-indiviso,
until the possession of said portion was
transferred to the defendants when the
decision in that forcible entry case was
executed in 1976 (Exhibit 7) such being the
case, therefore, with respect to this portion of
the land in dispute, the possession is settled,
which would constitute as a bar to this action.
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the other portion of the land in
dispute, the plaintiffs admit that possession
was transferred to the defendant by virtue of
a sale executed by the sheriff; the one year
period having elapsed without exercising their
right of redemption, as a result a final deed of
sale was issued. The legality of the sale not
having been assailed by them, for all intents
and purposes, ownership on this land have
been vested on the defendants as heirs of
Juan Palajos.
WHEREFORE, premises above considered,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint, without
pronouncement as to cost."
A motion to re-open the case for trial on the merits was filed by
plaintiffs but was denied in an order dated November 27, 1978
(Rollo, p. 62). Hence, this instant petition.
Petitioners contend that the trial court erred when it decided Civil
Case No. 758-CC by summary judgment when there are several
genuine issues involved therein which require a trial of these
issues on the merits, such as:
(A) WAS THE EXECUTION SALE
CONDUCTED BY DEPUTY PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF EUFROCINO T. OLIFERNES OF
LOT NO. 1363 OF THE LATE PEDRO
GALICIA, PETITIONERS' FATHER, VALID
TO CONFER UPON THE DEFENDANTS IN
SAID CASE A JUST TITLE OVER SAID
REALTY?
(B) WERE THE UNDIVIDED SHARES AND
PARTICIPATIONS OF JULIAN GALICIA
AND CATALINO GALICIA WHO WERE TWO
OF THE LEGITIMATE CHILDREN OF
PEDRO GALICIA NOT IMPLEADED AS
PARTIES IN CIVIL CASE NO. 56 IN THE
MUNICIPAL COURT OF ALMAGRO OVER
LOT NO. 1363, AFFECTED BY THAT
EXECUTION SALE?
(C) WERE THE UNDIVIDED SHARES AND
PARTICIPATIONS OF EDUARDA GALICIA
AND PERFECTO GALICIA OVER LOT NO.
1363, BUT WHO WERE NOT IMPLEADED
AS PARTIES IN CIVIL CASE NO. 758-CC OF
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
SAMAR (CALBAYOG CITY) AFFECTED BY
THE DECISION OF THE LATTER COURT
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT? (Rollo, p. 10).
The crucial issue in this case is whether or not the trial court
erred when it decided Civil Case No. 758-CC by summary
judgment.
It is the contention of petitioners that the trial court erred in
deciding their complaint (CC No. 758-CC) by summary judgment
when there are several genuine issues involved therein which
require a full trial on the merits. Among other things, petitioners
contend that the execution sale conducted by the Deputy
Provincial Sheriff was null and void and would have merited a
trial on the merits. Moreover, it is further contended that as
between Civil Case No. 56 and Civil Case No. 758-CC, there
can be no res judicata, considering that there is no Identity of
parties, cause of action and subject matter between the two
actions.
After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds no cogent
reason to disturb the summary judgment rendered by
respondent judge.
The Rules of Court authorizes the rendition of summary
judgment if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file
together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount
of damages, there is no issue as to any material fact and that A review of the records of the case shows that petitioners failed
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law to directly assail and raise as issue, the validity of the
(Sec. 3, Rule 34). Conversely, summary judgment is not proper aforementioned auction sale in their complaint. It was only when
where the pleadings tender vital issues the resolution of which the respondent judge noted such omission in his decision
call for the presentation of evidence (Villanueva v. NAMARCO, dismissing Civil Case No. 758-CC dated August 11, 1978 (Rollo,
28 SCRA 729 [1969]; Guevarra, et al., v. CA, et al., 124 SCRA p. 48-53) that petitioners later filed a separate action for
297 [1983]). Annulment of Auction Sale and Damages on October 4, 1978
(Civil Case No. 837-CC; Rollo, p. 31-35). The validity of the
Summary judgment "is a device for weeding out sham claims or execution sale not having been raised and/or litigated in the
defenses at an early stage of the litigation, thereby avoiding the case subject of the present appeal, the Court, at this stage,
expense and loss of time involved in a trial. The very object is 'to cannot pass upon the same for the purpose of determining the
separate what is formal or pretended in denial or averment from propriety of the summary judgment. Objections to the execution
what is genuine and substantial, so that only the latter may sale cannot be considered in the Supreme Court inasmuch as it
subject a suitor to the burden of trial.' The test, therefore, of a was not raised in the lower court (Ramiro v. Grano 54 Phil. 744
motion for summary judgment is-whether the pleadings, [1930]; citing Tan Machan v. de la Trinidad, 3 Phil. 684 [1904]
affidavits, and exhibits in support of the motion are sufficient to and U.S. v. Inductive, 40 Phil. 84 [1919]).
overcome the opposing papers and to justify a finding as a
matter of law that there is no defense to the action or the claim WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
is clearly meritorious" (Estrada v. Hon. Consolacion, et al., 71 merit. Costs against petitioners.
SCRA 523 [1976]).
SO ORDERED.
In addition, summary judgment is one of the methods sanctioned
in the present Rules of Court for a prompt disposition of civil
actions wherein there exists no serious controversy. The
procedure may be availed of not only by claimants, but also by
defending parties who may be the object of unfounded claims.
A motion for summary judgment assumes that scrutinizing the
facts will disclose that the issues presented by the pleadings
need not be tried because they are so patently unsubstantial as
not to be genuine issues, or that there is no genuine issue as to
any material facts or where the facts appear undisputed and
certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and
affidavits (Singleton v. Philippine Trust Co., 99 Phil, 91 [1956],
cited in Bayang v. CA, 148 SCRA 91 [1987]).

Examining petitioners' complaint, the Court finds that the

disputed property is the same parcel of land, which adjoins
private respondents' lot which was the subject of the forcible
entry case and from which petitioners were ordered to vacate.
When petitioners (then defendants), failed to satisfy the rentals
adjudged in the forcible entry case, said adjoining parcel of land
was sold at public auction to Juan Palajos (respondents'
predecessor-in-interest) as the higher bidder in the execution
sale to satisfy the monetary judgment rendered therein. The
property so described in petitioners' complaint (Rollo, p. 36)
squarely fits what has been levied upon and sold at public
auction (Rollo, p. 30), the owners of which are now private
respondents upon the demise of their predecessor-in-interest.

There is thus no question that issue of ownership of the disputed

land subject of the present petition has long been foreclosed in
the forcible entry case which culminated in the public auction
sale of the parcel of land now sought to be recovered. Having
failed to redeem the property sold at the public auction sale
within the reglementary period of twelve (12) months (Sec. 30,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court), petitioners cannot now claim that
they still own said property. Petitioners' complaint for Ownership
and Damages is but a belated and disguised attempt to revive a
judgment debtors' right of redemption which has long expired.
There being no issue as to any material fact raised in the
pleadings, summary judgment may be rendered.

Neither can the issue of the validity of the execution sale help
petitioners' cause. Well-settled in this jurisdiction, is the rule that
issues not raised and/or ventilated in the lower court cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal (Rebodos v. WCC, 6 SCRA
717 [1962]; DBP v. CA, 116 SCRA 636 and a long line of cases).
G.R. No. L-34007 May 25, 1979
MARCELINO BELAMIDE, ALFREDO BELAMIDE (deceased
and herein substituted by his children Rodolfo, Reynaldo,
Lilian and Alfredo, Jr., all surnamed Belamide), JOSE
BELAMIDE, ANTONIO BELAMIDE, MARIA BELAMIDE,
LEONISA BELAMIDE and SALUD BELAMIDE, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and BIENVENIDO
MONTOYA, FRANCISCA MONTOYA and GREGORIO
MONTOYA, respondents.
Beltran Beltran & Beltran for petitioners.
Fortunato Jose for private respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court
of Appeals (4th Division) promulgated on June 9, 1971, affirming
the amended decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite
City the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby
adjudicates the parcel of land described in
Plan Psu-18949 situated in the poblacion of
Silang, Cavite, in favor of the applicants
(Marcelino Belamide, of legal age, Filipino,
married to Patrocinia de Castro, and resident
of Silang Cavite; Alfredo Belamide, of legal
age, Filipino, married to Anita Velez, and
resident of Silang, Cavite; Jose Belamide, of
legal age, Filipino, married to Elisea
Quiamzon and resident of Silang Cavite;
Antonio Belamide, of legal age, Filipino,
single, and resident of Silang, Cavite; Maria
Belamide, Filipino, of legal age, married to
Sofronio Bayla and resident of Silang, Cavite;
Leonisa Belamide, of legal age, married to
Fulgencio Reyes, and resident of Silang,
Cavite; and Salud Bede of legal age, Filipino,
married to Conrado Menchavez and resident
of Silang, Cavite) and the oppositors
(Bienvenido Montoya, Gregorio Montoya and
Francisco Montoya, Filipinos, of legal age,
married and residents of Silang, Cavite) in the
following proportions:
Three-fourths (3/4) undivided share belongs
to the applicants, and one-fourth (1/4)
undivided share belongs to the oppositors.
Once this decision becomes final, let the
corresponding decree of registration be
issued upon proof that the corresponding
estate and inheritance taxes have been paid,
or certificate of tax exemption has been
issued.
Petitioners herein were the applicants for the registration of the
parcel of land involved in this case The private respondents
were the oppositors allowed on Motion for a New Trial, to file an
opposition even after a decision has already been rendered by
then Judge Felix V. Makasiar, after hearing, following the
issuance of a general default order. (par. 1-3, Petition).
From the amended decision rendered after the new trial both
parties appealed to the Court of Appeals which found the
essential facts as narrated in the decision appealed thereto as
duly established by the evidence, and quoted the same
approvingly as follows:
The next question that presents itself is when
and by whom was the land in question
acquired. The oppositors allege that the
acquisition was made during the first marriage
of Vicente Montoya to Martin Montoya,
whereas the applicants maintain that such
land was acquired during the marriage
(second marriage) of Vicente Montoya to
Jose Velardo Both contentions are not
supported by any document. However, the
fact that Susana Velardo Belamide sold a
portion of the land in question (Exh. 6) to the
Municipality of Silang, Cavite (for widening of
the street) on May 1933 without the
intervention of, or opposition from, Hilarion
Montoya who died on December 2, 1955
(Exh. 3), coupled with the fact that Susana
Velardo Belamide has possession of the
property since the death of her mother
Vicenta Montoya) in 1931 after she sold the
same to the herein applicants on July 20,
1951 (Exh. B), convince the Court that said
property was acquired during the coverture of
Jose Velardo and Vicenta Montoya.
Consequently, upon the death of Jose
Velardo in 1888, the one-half (½) undivided
portion of the property passed by inheritance
to Susana Velardo Belamide and the other
one-half (½) undivided portion went to Vicenta
Montoya as her share of the conjugal estate.
Upon the death of the latter on February 28,
1931, her undivided one half (½) share of the
property should be divided equally between
Susana Velardo Belamide and Hilarion
Montoya, that is, each is entitled to one- fourth
(1/4) undivided share. Hence, Susana
Velardo Belamide's share is three-fourths
(3/4) while Hilarion Montoya's share passed
by inheritance to his children, the herein
oppositor. For this reason, the sale made by
Susana Velardo Belamide in favor of the
applicants (Exh. B) is null and void only with
respect to the one-fourth (1/4) undivided
portion of the property (the share of the herein
oppositors) who did not consent to the sale).
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the amended
decision of the Court of First Instance, this time rendered by
Hon. Jose P. Alejandro, and denied a Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the petitioners herein on June 29, 1971
(Annex E to Petition), as well as a Motion for a New Trial (Annex
F to Petition). The ground for the Motion for New Trial was that
Exhibit 8 of the oppositors (private respondents herein) which
was allegedly relied upon by both the Court of First Instance and
the Court of Appeals is a falsified document, As recited in the
petition, par. 12 thereof (p. 8, Reno the falsification consists of
the following:
 According to tie official records of the Civil
Registrar of Silang, Cavite, the name of the
father of Hilarion Montoya in the marriage
column is in blank. But according to Exhibit 8,
the name of the father of Hilarion Montoya
is Martin Montoya. Thus, whale the official
record of the civil registrar shows that
oppositors' father, Hilarion, had an unknown
father, thru falsification, Hilarion father
was made to appear in Exhibit 8 as Martin
Montoya. The latter false. ly became husband
of Vicente Montoya, thereby enabling private
respondents to inherit 1/4 of the land in
dispute from Vicente Montoya.
It is the denial of the Motion for New Trial by the Court of Appeals
which petitioners allege to be in grave abuse of discretion, and
their allegation that the Court of First Instance, as a land
registration court, has no jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs
of Vicente Montoya and partition the property by adjudicating 1/4
pro-indiviso to private respondents as children of Hilarion
Montoya, allegedly an unacknowledged natural child of Vicenta
Montoya, and that as a consequence, the Court of Appeals,
likewise, is without jurisdiction, or acted in grave abuse of
discretion, in affirming the decision of the lower court, that
petitioners came to this Court with the present petition.
1. There can be no grave abuse of discretion by the Court of
Appeals in denying petitioners' Motion for New Trial. The
document alleged to be falsified (Exh. 8) was presented in the
trial in the lower court. Petitioners should have attacked the
same as falsified with competent evidence, which could have
been presented, if they had exercised due diligence in obtaining
said evidence, which is Annex "A" 1 to the Motion for New Trial
(Annex F to Petition). 2 It is, therefore, not a newly discovered
evidence that could justify a new trial (Rule 37 [1-b], Rules of
Court).
The new evidence would neither change the result as found by
the decision. It might prove that Hilarion Montoya was registered
at birth without his father having been given, but from the
testimony of Marcelino Belamide, one of the applicants (now
petitioners), Vicente Montoya was married twice, although he
did not know the first husband. Likewise, in the opposition of
private respondents (pp. 30-31, Record on Appeal) 3 , it is there
alleged that the land originally belonged to the spouses Martin
Montoya and Vicente Montoya. This allegation was never
contradicted. The document sought to be presented by
petitioners, as stated in their Motion for New Trial in the Court of
Appeals, cannot effectively destroy this allegation, first, because
the marriage between Martin Montoya and Vicenta Montoya
could have taken place after the birth of Hilarion Montoya who
was thus legitimized, and second, Martin Montoya and Vicente
Montoya evidently lived together as husband and wife, and are,
therefore, presumed to have been legally married (Section 5,
par. [bb] Rule 131, Rules of Court). This Court held that a man
and a woman who are living under the same roof are presumed
to be legitimate spouses (Que Quay vs. Collector of Customs,
33 Phil. 128), and in the instant case, no less than one of the
herein petitioners, Marcelino Belamide, testified that Vicenta
Montoya married twice. The records suggest no other husband
by the first marriage than Martin Montoya, who then could have
been the father of Hilarion Montoya who, undisputedly, is the
son of Vicente Montoya.
With the law and the evidence showing with reasonable
sufficiency that Hilarion Montoya from whom private
respondents would derive hereditary rights over the land in
question, is the legitimate son of Vicenta Montoya, the
adjudication of said land by the lower court, as specified in its
decision, is in accordance with law.
2. The jurisdiction of the lower court as a land registration court
to adjudicate the land for purposes of registration cannot, as
petitioners try to do, be questioned. The applicants and
oppositors both claim rights to the land by virtue of their
relationship to the original owner, the late Vicente Montoya. The
Court is thus necessary impelled to determine the truth of their
alleged relationship, and on the basis thereof, to adjudicate the
land to them as the law has prescribed to be their successional
rights. The law does not require the heirs to go to the probate
court first before applying for the registration of the land, for a
declaration of heirship. This would be a very cumbersome
procedure, unnecessarily expensive and unreasonably
inconvenient, clearly averse to the rule against multiplicity of
suits.
Furthermore, petitioners Should not now be heard to complain
after they have themselves gone to the lower court to have their
title to the land registered in their names without having had a
previous declaration of their heirship by the probate court. In
filing their opposition to the application, private respondents
merely went to the same court invoking its jurisdiction in exactly
the same fashion as did the petitioners. In effect, there was
unanimity among the parties in consenting to, or acquiescing in,
the exercise of the jurisdiction of the land registration court, no
matter whether Same is a limited one. With this premise, and
with the full opportunity given both parties to air their sides with
the presentation of all evidence as they may desire in support
thereof, as fully as could be done in the ordinary court with
general jurisdiction, the decision of the lower court, sitting as a
land court, supported as it is with sufficient evidence, may no
longer be questioned on jurisdictional grounds. (See Martin
Aglipay vs. Hon. Isabelo delos Reyes, Jr., G. R. No. L-12776,
March 23, 1960; Franco vs. Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank,
L-17610, April 22, 1963, 7 SCRA 660; City of Tarlac vs. Tarlac
Development Corporation, L-24557, July 31, 1968, 24 SCRA
466; City of Manila vs. Manila Lodge No. 761, L-24469, July 31,
1968, 24 SCRA 466; City of Manila vs. Army and Navy Club of
Manila, L-24481, 24 SCRA 466; Demetrio Manalo vs. Hon.
Herminio C. Mariano, et. al., L-33850, January 22, 1976, 69
SCRA, 80).
For all the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby dismissed for
lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-3595 May 22, 1950
ANG LAM, petitioner,
vs.
POTENCIANO ROSILLOSA and VICENTE SANTIAGO,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, respondents.
Reyes and Matias for petitioner.
Manuel R. Trias for respondents.
OZAETA, J.:
This is petition for certiorari to annul an order of the respondent
judge, denying the petitioner's motion to set aside a judgment in
civil case No. 4820 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
Province, entitled "Potenciano Rosillosa vs. Maximo Alpay and
Eugenia "Peregrina," on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant Eugenia Peregrina, and to declare
said judgment null and void.
The herein respondent, Potenciano Rosillosa, was the owner of
a parcel of land, planted to coconuts, containing an area of
145,957 square meters, and located in the municipality of
Unisan, Province of Quezon, which parcel of land he had
acquired by homestead and for which he had obtained
homestead title No. 3201, patent No. 18102, issued January 30,
1932. On May 22, 1944, he sold said parcel of land to Maximo
Alpay for P10,000. In the month of July, 1944, Maximo Alpay in
turn sold said parcel of land to Eugenia Peregrina for the sum of
P25,000 and transfer certificate of title No. 19539 was duly
issued in her name on July 29, 1944.
On or about October 22, 1947, Potenciano Rosillosa instituted
said civil case No. 4820 in the Court of First Instance of Quezon
against Maximo Alpay and Eugenia Peregrina to redeem the
said property under the provisions of the Public Land Act. The
complaint was amended on October 21, 1948. In the meantime
the plaintiff asked for the dismissal of the case against the
defendant Maximo Alpay on the ground that the latter had
ceased to have any interest in the property sought to be
redeemed.
On December 4, 1948, upon petition of the plaintiff Potenciano
Rosillosa, who alleged that the defendant Eugenia Peregrina
could not found and served with summons at her known
address, the respondent judge ordered that said defendant be
served with summons by publication in The Manila Chronicle.
Thereafter said defendant, having failed to appear within the
period fixed in the summons, was declared in default; and the
court, after hearing the evidence for the plaintiff, rendered a
decision on April 2, 1949, ordering the defendant Eugenia
Peregrina to execute a deed of resale of the land in question in
favor of the plaintiff Potenciano Rosillosa upon payment to her
of the sum P50, which the court found as the equivalent in
Philippines currency of the original price of P10,000 in Japanese
military notes (which the original buyer Maximo Alpay had paid
to the said plaintiff) at the rate of P1, Philippine currency, for
every P200 of Japanese fiat money.
It turned out, however, that the defendant Eugenia Peregrina
had died in the City of Manila as early as April 1, 1945, that is to
say, several years before said civil case No. 4820 was
commenced. On September 22, 1949, the present petitioner
Ang Lam, who alleged under oath that on September 21, 1949,
he was appointed by the Court of first Instance of Manila
administrator of the estate of the deceased Eugenia Peregrina,
filed a petition in said civil case No. 4820, praying that the
judgment theretofore rendered therein be set aside on the
ground that the ground that the court had not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Eugenia
Peregrina. That petition was denied by the respondent judge on
the grounds (1) that plaintiff's action was by its nature one in
rem; (2) that the petitioner Ang Lam is the surviving husband of
the defendant Eugenia Peregrina and had the administration of
the land in litigation; and (3) that the decision of the court was
handed down on April 2, 1949, whereas the petition to set it
aside was presented only on September 26, 1949, that is to say,
after the lapse (sc.) of the periods mentioned in section 3 of Rule
38 of the Rules of Court.
We are of the opinion and so hold that the judgment in question
is null and void of jurisdiction over person of the defendant. At
the time the action was commenced said defendant had long
passed to another world. Hence the publication of the summons
against her was absolutely vain and no validity whatsoever.
The attempt of the respondent judge to hold the said summons
by publication binding upon the petitioner Ang Lam on the theory
that the action was one in rem and that said petitioner is the
surviving husband of the defendant and is the administrator of
the property in question, is, in our opinion, untenable. An action
to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is
not an action in rem or an action against the whole world, like a
land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an
action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard
or given an opportunity to be heard. (See Patriarca vs. Orate, 7
Phil., 390, 393-393.)
"Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former
are directed against specific and seek personal judgments, while
the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a
person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the
whole world." (1 C.J.S., 1148.)
An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action, but it is an
action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only
although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. An action for
resolution of a contract of sale of real property is an action in
personam (Sandejas vs. Robles, 46 Off, Gaz., [Supp. to No. 1],
2031). if, on the other hand, the object is to bar indifferently all
who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against
the right sought to be established, and if any one in the world
has a right to be heard on an allegation of facts which, if true,
shows an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem (Grey
Alba vs. Cruz, 17 Phil., 49, 62). For instance, an application in
rem, for the judgment which may be rendered therein is binding
upon the whole world (Reyes vs. Razon, 38 Phil., 480, 482). The
probate of a will is a proceeding in rem, because the order of
probate is effective against all persons wherever residing (In
re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156). (See Moran, Rules of Court,
2d Ed., Vol. 1, p. 9.)
With regard to the other reason adduced by the respondent
judge, that the petition to set aside the judgment was presented
after the lapse of the six months, period provided in Rule 38, we
think said rule is not applicable.2 That rule provides for relief from
a judgment, order or other proceeding taken against a party to
the case, who "by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, has been unjustly deprived of a hearing therein, or
has been prevented from taking an appeal." The petitioner
herein was not a party to the original case, and he did not seek
relief from the judgment upon any of the grounds mentioned in
section 1 of Rule 38, but sought the annulment of said judgment
for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who had
long been deceased before the action was commenced. A
judgment rendered by a court which had not acquired jurisdiction
either over the subject matter or over the person of the
defendant, is void. A void judgment may be assailed or
impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, by means of
a petition filed in the same case or by means of a separate
action, or by resisting such judgment in any action or proceeding
wherein it is invoked.

The order of the respondent judge of November 18, 1949, is set

aside and the decision rendered in civil case No. 4820 on April
2, 1949, is declared null and void, with costs against the
respondent Potenciano Rosillosa.